Manuale di Storia dei Dogmi

A MANUAL OF THE HISTORY OF DOGMAS

INTRODUCTION

Dogma and the History of Dogmas

The word *dogma,* like many other religious and philosophical terms adopted from ancient usage, received a new meaning as employed by Christian writers. In the philosophical language of Greece it was commonly used to signify tenets or doctrines resting on a solid basis, whether of authority or reason, and as such claiming the assent of a prudent mind. In this sense Plutarch speaks of "the dogmas concerning the soul" [1] and Aristotle refers to the "unwritten dogmas of Plato." [2] Latin writers on philosophy attached a similar meaning to the term. Thus, for instance, Cicero says that the decrees of wisdom "are called *dogmata* by philosophers, and none of them can be set aside without making one guilty of a crime." [3]

This was, however, a derived meaning. Primarily the term denoted anything that seemed good or reasonable; hence an opinion, a resolution, a precept, or ordinance. In this sense it occurs several times in Holy Scripture, especially in the New Testament. Thus the edict of Cæsar Augustus, that the whole world should be enrolled, is called a *dogma;* [4] a body of such edicts is referred to as *dogmata;* [5] ordinances of the Mosaic Law are designated by the same term,[6] as are also the authoritative decisions of the Council of Jerusalem in reference to the observances enjoined by the Law of Christ.[7]

Early Christian writers use the term in both senses, and sometimes in one and the same connection. Ignatius of Antioch, for instance, speaks of the "*dogmata* of the Lord and

[1] Mor. 14, 3.
[2] Phys. Ausc. 4, 2.
[3] Acad. 2, 9.
[4] Luke, 2, 1.
[5] Acts, 16, 4.
[6] Ephes. 2, 15.
[7] Acts, 16, 4; 15, 20.

the Apostles," [8] understanding thereby their teaching and precepts. The Greek Apologists of the second century frequently refer to the "Christian *dogmata*" as a philosophy of life, regarding them as a guide both in respect of faith and moral conduct. Little by little, however, we find the term restricted to matters of faith as contrasted with precepts. Thus Cyril of Jerusalem, who wrote in the fourth century, says: "The way of godliness is composed of two things, pious doctrines (*dogmata*) and good actions." [9]

This latter has become the exclusive meaning of Christian dogma. Still, even as used at present, the term has both a wider and a stricter sense. In its wider sense it is applied to any doctrine which in the eyes of the Church is essential to the true interpretation of the faith. In its more restricted meaning it denotes a revealed truth which has in some way been defined by an infallible teaching authority, and as such is proposed to the acceptance of the faithful. It is only in this latter sense that the term is used in the History of Dogmas.

Hence Christian Dogma is obviously less inclusive than Christian Doctrine; for this latter comprises not only defined truths, but also such others as are ordinarily set forth in the instruction of the faithful with the simple approval of the *magisterium ecclesiasticum*. Obviously, too, Christian Dogma presupposes two things: the fact of revelation and the existence of an infallible teaching authority.

The History of Dogmas is a part of Ecclesiastical History, and as such it forms a record of the development of the Church's teaching, taking due account of the causes of that development, both internal and external, and presenting the final results of this critical inquiry in an orderly manner. It presupposes that revealed truths are objectively permanent and immutable, and also that their subjective apprehension and outward expression admits of progress. Hence whilst the meaning of doctrines once revealed never changes, these doctrines may nevertheless in course of time come to be understood more fully, be presented more clearly, and receive a cer-

[8] Ad. Magn. 13. [9] Cathech. 4, 2.

tain emphasis from their due coördination with other truths. In this sense every revealed truth is a living germ, the growth and unfolding of which is traced up and recorded in the History of Dogmas.

The determining cause of this growth is twofold. First, the God-given vitality of the Church, which assimilates ever more fully the contents of revealed truths as time passes on. Secondly, the rise of heresies, which calls for a clearer statement of the truths contained in the *depositum fidei.* Both contribute to the development of dogmas, but each in its own way.

How vast this development has been, and, by inference, will continue to be, one begins to realize only on comparing the definitions of later councils, as, for instance, that of Trent, with corresponding statements of the same revealed truths as contained in the Patristic writings of the first centuries of the Church. Equivalence of thought there may be, and identity of objective reality, of course, there is; but in all else the two seem worlds apart. These early Fathers believed all that we believe, for they had the complete *depositum fidei;* but much of what they believed was only implicitly contained in the faith as then explicitly taught by the Church. It required ages of thought and struggle before the mustard seed of the Gospel could grow into a fully developed tree, whose branches extend ever farther and farther over the vast region of revealed truth.

To trace up these various lines of thought, to follow in retrospect these mental struggles towards a fuller and clearer light, properly constitutes the object of the History of Dogmas. It implies, therefore, an unbiased and critical investigation of facts, an historical sifting of evidence, in reference to the development of those religious truths which the Church has authoritatively declared to have been revealed by God. It calls for an accurate and truthful determination of the " course followed by Christian thought in that evolution which thus brought it from the primitive elements of its doctrine to the development of its theology. What were the stages in that

progress? What impulses, what suspensions, what hesitations did it undergo? What circumstances threatened to bring about its deviation from that path, and, as a matter of fact, in certain parts of the Christian community, what deviations did occur? By what men and how was this progress accomplished, and what were the ruling ideas, the dominant principles, which determined its course? These questions the History of Dogmas must answer." [10]

From this it is sufficiently clear that the Sources of the History of Dogmas must include all the records of both the internal and external life of the Church — the works of the Fathers and of ecclesiastical writers, the writings of heretics, the various symbols of the faith, liturgical works and Christian art, constitutions, decrees, and decisions of Popes and Congregations, declarations and definitions of councils, both general and particular, and whatever else may bear witness to the gradual unfolding and final maturing of any given dogma, beginning with the first heart-throb of the Infant Church, after the Pentecostal showers had descended upon the Apostles, and leading up to that fullness of life which she may have attained at the moment when the history of dogmatic development is set down by the writer.

Strictly speaking, the records of revelation itself do not fall within the scope of the History of Dogmas, although a general outline of the revealed truths contained therein is almost indispensable for a full understanding of later developments. To prove that the contents of Holy Scripture are truly the word of God, and to show what progress there was in the manifestation of that word, are matters which the historian of dogmatic development must leave to writers who deal explicitly with the history of divine revelation. The most he can do is to group together the obvious teaching of the Sacred Writings, and then show how this original deposit entered into Christian consciousness in later ages. He simply accepts the seed and records its growth.

[10] Tixeront, Hist. Dogm. I, 2.

CHAPTER I

THE SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS CONDITION OF THE GENTILE WORLD AT THE TIME OF THE FIRST PREACHING OF THE GOSPEL[1]

As the reception and assimilation of truth, even in the supernatural order, is to some extent conditioned by the religious and moral disposition of the persons to whom it is proposed, it is first of all necessary to cast a glance at the state of the world in which Christianity made its appearance. What was the social condition of the various peoples to whom the Gospel was preached? What were their religious views, their moral tendencies, their philosophical interpretation of things? In one word, what was the nature of the soil in which the seed of revealed truth was first planted?

During the earlier centuries of the Christian era, the preaching of the Gospel was practically confined to the different countries that made up the Roman Empire. Territorially this was of vast extent, forming an immense ellipse, whose major axis extended from the north of England to the river Euphrates, whilst its minor axis reached from Lower Austria to the Sahara Desert. Its population was necessarily of an extremely heterogeneous character, comprising as it did a great variety of nations and tribes. Latins, Greeks, Egyptians, Syrians, Phœnicians, Jews, Celts, Teutons, and Iberians were

[1] On the contents of this chapter much valuable information may be found in Dr. Doellinger's work, "Jew and Gentile in the Courts of the Temple of Christ." The question of Ancient Religions is well treated in the series edited by Martindale, under the title, "Lectures on the History of Religions." Vols. I & II.

all brought together into one great commonwealth, of which Rome was the mistress. Although each conquered nation continued to dwell in its own definite territory, still there was considerable intermingling of races, especially by way of colonization and commerce. Thus Roman colonists established themselves among the Celts in Gaul and Britain, among the Iberians in Spain, among the Greeks in the Grecian Archipelago and in Asia Minor; whilst Jewish and Phœnician merchants settled down wherever there was hope of gain. Greek philosophers and rhetoricians, Oriental mystics, and charlatans from all over the Empire crowded the streets of Rome. It was a vast and varied throng to which the Gospel of Christ was about to be announced; numbering in all, it is estimated, over a hundred million human beings.

A — Social Conditions

Rome was intent not only upon extending the boundaries of the State, but also on building up an empire in which the various discordant elements should be reduced to some sort of homogeneity. Hence, so far as was consistent with the Romans' sense of superiority, an effort was made to break down national barriers and to cause the conquered peoples to regard themselves as integral parts of a great world-empire. For this purpose the most distant provinces were closely bound to the Capital City by means of excellent military roads, by an efficient postal service, and the publication of *Acta,* wherein were recounted the current social happenings, court proceedings, and literary news. To conciliate the provincials still further, national customs, religious worship and local administration of justice were usually not interfered with, although there was constantly a silent influence at work to make Roman views and Roman ways gain the ascendancy. The result of this was, not indeed national unity, but some sort of peaceful association, wherein conquerors and conquered admitted that they were made of the same clay.

Yet whilst there was thus brought about some kind of *rapprochement* between nation and nation, nothing of the sort was ever attempted between the free and the bond, between the rich

and the poor. In this respect Roman society was always divided against itself, and therein lay its weakness. Of the one hundred million inhabitants of the Empire at least a third were slaves. In some cities the proportion was even much higher. Rome itself at the time of Augustus counted over six hundred thousand in a population of a million and a half. Every wealthy citizen had his scores or hundreds or even thousands of slaves, employed partly in his city residence and partly on his rural estates. How miserable was the lot of these unfortunates, history tells only too plainly. In principle they were rated below beasts of burden, and in practice they frequently received worse treatment. They were the master's absolute property, mere chattels, which he might use or abuse as he pleased. They had no legal personality, and consequently could find no redress.

Very numerous, too, were the absolutely poor, who had no means of gaining a livelihood save only by begging or by accepting largesses bestowed either by the State or by private patrons. This latter abuse assumed in course of time frightful dimensions. Thus it is said of Augustus that he had to provide daily rations of corn and money for over two hundred thousand citizens, whilst thousands of stranded foreigners depended entirely on the crumbs that fell from the rich man's table. Charitable institutions there were none, nor was there charity. As Polybius puts it: "A Roman never gives any one anything ungrudgingly." The poor were commonly regarded as accursed of the gods. In Greece poverty was equally widespread, but there, owing to a democratic form of government, the poor forced the rich to maintain them at the public expense.

B — The State of Religion

At the beginning of the Christian era, the prevalent religion of the Empire was largely a sort of syncretism, resulting from a combination of the religious views and practices of the chief components of the population. Of these the ancient Roman, the Greek, Egyptian, and Syrian played the principal parts. The Celtic and German religious views remained almost en-

tirely confined to the peoples of these nationalities. Hence it is only of the former that anything need be said in this connection.

1°. *Roman Religious Views: Roman Gods: Roman Philosophy and its Influence on Religion.*— It has been said that the religion of Rome was based on only two ideas — the might of the gods who were friendly to the State and the power of religious ceremonies over the gods. Hence in practice religion did not consist in the exercise of virtue as enjoined by the gods, but in the faithful and exact performance of religious rites. The old Romans were indeed renowned for their *virtus,* but this term, including in its significance "self-mastery, an unbending firmness of will, with patience, and an iron tenacity of purpose in carrying through whatever was once acknowledged to be right," had primarily an ethical bearing; in the minds of the people it was to all intents and purposes unconnected with religion. It was the ceremonial rites that constituted religion properly so called. These rites consisted of sacrifice and divinations, which were performed by an hierarchical priesthood, with the Pontifex Maximus at its head. The priesthood was largely hereditary, and up to the fourth century before Christ open only to persons of patrician rank. In the beginning human sacrifices seem to have been offered, but within the strictly historical period there is evidence only of the sacrifice of animals and the produce of the earth.

As long as the Roman religion remained uninfluenced by the speculations of philosophy, and that was almost up to the foundation of the Empire, it was essentially polytheistic. Still, beyond even the mightiest gods there existed in the popular mind the *omnipotens fortuna* and the *ineluctabile fatum,* which may perhaps be taken as a faint echo of a primitive monotheistic belief. The principal indigenous gods were Janus and Jana, Saturn, Jupiter Optimus Maximus, Juno, Vesta, Mars, and Ops. These were general nature-powers, or mere abstractions of the human state, and, until Greek influence was brought to bear upon the popular view concerning them, they advanced to no real personality.

Although the ancient Romans were an intensely practical people, without myths and without a literature, yet even during the first five hundred years of the city's existence, gods and *genii* multiplied exceedingly, so that nearly every human occupation and every circumstance of life had some superior being as its guardian and protector. This was a logical outcome of the deification of nature. It is usually admitted, though some writers take a different view of the matter, that the gods were conceived to have an influence only on the physical and not on the moral life of their worshipers. Hence Cicero makes his Academician say: "Herein, indeed, are all agreed, that they have received external advantages — vineyards, corn-fields, olive-gardens, blessings on fruit of tree and field, and, in fine, all the comforts and conveniences of life — at the hands of the gods; but no one has ever acknowledged virtue as a gift of the deity and returned thanks for it as such." [2]

This relation of the gods to their worshipers was changed very much for the worse when, with the conquest of Greece and Oriental countries, the sensual Greek and the bestial Eastern rites found an entrance into Rome. Then the gods, instead of being merely unconnected with the practice of virtue among men, became examples of lustful indulgence and inciters of criminal deeds. There was no excess so foul but had its divine warrant in the conduct of some god, and in many instances religious worship itself was made to consist of the most shameful orgies. At first the Roman Senate struggled bravely against the abominations practiced in the Bacchanalia and other exotic rites, not shrinking even from executing thousands of participants; but Roman virtue, which had always been entirely human, was not proof against these sensual seductions, and the end was universal corruption. There still were, indeed, individual men and women who clung to their primitive views and longed for higher things; yet they formed but a dwindling minority. Rome was religiously and morally bankrupt.

It was under these conditions that Roman philosophy made

[2] Natura Deor. 3, 36.

its appearance. This, too, was an importation from Greece, and did not strike root until the last years of the Republic. Then a Stoic and an Epicurean school were founded, but neither of them did more than popularize Greek philosophical notions. Of the two, the Epicurean school of thought was at first in greatest favor; its sensual doctrines being widely spread by the poet Lucretius. He ridiculed the national gods, believed in nothing but material nature, and consequently denied the immortality of the soul, which had till then been unhesitatingly accepted by the people. The sum and substance of Epicurean teaching, at least in its later development, comes to this: Eat and drink and make merry, for to-morrow you die. Not precisely that these pleasures were recommended for their own sakes, but that through them might be attained the coveted state of interior tranquillity and satisfaction wherein the Epicureans placed man's greatest and only happiness.

The Stoic school, of which Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius were the best Roman representatives, spread at first more slowly, but in the end outlived Epicureanism. Essentially materialistic in its views, it was destructive of all true concepts of the deity and of the personal immortality of the soul; and in so far it had, like its earlier rival, a demoralizing influence on religion. But on the other hand, its ethics were singularly sane, approaching in outward expression very closely to the Christian code of moral conduct. The chief drawbacks of this ethical teaching were that it eliminated all notions of an overruling Providence, made everything depend on blind fate, and inevitably led to an intolerable self-sufficiency in the practice of virtue. As Seneca worded it, the truly virtuous man is the equal of, nay even superior to the deity; because the deity is virtuous of his very nature, whereas man can become so only through his personal endeavor.

Towards the close of the first century of the Christian era there sprang up by the side of Stoicism, and gradually absorbed it, a new school in which Platonic and Pythagorean doctrines were blended. It borrowed from Plato the idea of one supreme, infinitely perfect, and independent God, the

pre-existence of human souls, and the creation of the world from a primitive *hyle*; whilst from Pythagoras it adopted the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, which led to abstention from animal food and to certain ascetical practices. There was, moreover, in this new philosophy a marked tendency towards dualism, in as much as it more or less tacitly assumed the existence of an evil principle as the ultimate cause of the many evils that disfigure the world. A further though indirect development of this philosophical system resulted in the Neoplatonism of Porphyry and Plotinus, which combined Greek philosophic thought with Oriental mysticism.

2°. *Greek Religious Views: Greek Gods: Greek Philosophy and its Influence on Religion.*—Of the Greeks F. Cumont remarks: "There never was so cultured a people who had so childish a religion." In a certain sense, religion entered into every relation and manifestation of Greek social and private life, but, with the exception of some of their "mysteries," it was a mere dry formalism, a promiscuous collection of empty rites, devoid of all spiritual meaning for the people. There were sacrifices, ablutions, lustrations, divinations, adjurations, and prayers; yet whatever seriously religious suggestion might be contained therein, its effects upon the soul were inevitably counteracted by the trivially human conception of the gods. There was room for tragedy or comedy, as the occasion demanded; but real religious worship seemed strangely out of place.

The Greek gods, like those of the Romans, were personifications of nature-powers, but of a wholly anthropomorphitic character. Like men they are born, eat and drink, have their love affairs, reproduce their kind, and are themselves subject to fate. They have their quarrels, their intrigues; are swayed by hatred and envy, and stoop to all manner of human crimes. They are simply men and women of larger mould and fairer form, of stronger passions and endowed with immortality. This clothing of the gods in human garb was the work of poets. From Homer downwards, each wooer of the Muses wove around his country's gods a network of myths and fables that were partly the heirloom of preceding generations and

partly the offspring of his own poetic fancy. They created their gods to suit the requirements of their theme, put at their service troops of daimones, and ended up by conferring divine honors on the dead heroes of the past and the living despots of the present.

How detrimental an influence this view of the gods exercised upon morality need not be pointed out in detail. The Greeks had indeed a high sense of the beautiful, but, this notwithstanding, they were a most sensual people. Hence as they had in their gods a warrant for all that appealed to their sensuality, they never once thought of blushing for their carnal excesses. Phallus-worship, religious prostitution, paederastia, and *id genus omne,* were supposed to be acceptable to the gods. Especially towards the end of Greek independence, when Oriental influences were strongly felt, worship became orgiastic, and courtesans' statues were erected in several temples to represent Olympian goddesses. The rest may be imagined.

Unlike their later Roman conquerors, the Greeks were an intensely intellectual people, and from their very first appearance in history, literature, both light and serious, played an important part in the nation's life. In the matter of religion and worship, however, poetry and philosophy were in the main mutually antagonistic. Poetry created the gods, whilst philosophy annihilated them. Not that Greek philosophy was atheistic, but nearly all of its representatives threw discredit on the gods of mythology and reasoned to the existence of one supreme being which alone could lay claim to divinity. With the Ionian philosophers and the Stoics this supreme being was of a material nature — fire or ether; but Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle conceived it to be a spiritual substance, in one way or another the ultimate source of all those nature-powers which the common people worshiped as gods. Socrates spoke of this being as a Provident Ruler of the world, Plato regarded it as the Supreme Good, and Aristotle made of it the Prime Mover of the universe. Theirs was not exactly a Christian concept of God, but rather a preparation for it.

This attitude of the philosophers was not without its effect on the educated classes. They lost their respect for the na-

tional gods, without being able to rise to the height of a monotheistic creed. The result was largely religious skepticism and neglect of the traditional forms of worship. Thus the way was opened, not directly for Christianity, but for the mystic cults of the East, which tended to a vague syncretism in religion and to a terrible degradation in morals.

3°. *Oriental Religious Views: Oriental Gods: Oriental Mysticism in Western Lands.*—The Oriental mind is deeply religious, in so far at least as it acknowledges a far-reaching dependence on the divinity, has a keen realization of human sinfulness, evinces a strong bias towards the mystic and occult and shows a great readiness to sacrifice whatever is most dear to the gods and their clients. Hence in all the various forms of Oriental religions, there is an appeal, not to the senses only, as was the case in Rome and Greece, but to the heart as well, although that appeal not rarely led to the most shameful excesses.

Generally speaking, the chief gods of the East, including Egypt, were personifications of nature's productive powers. Baal of the Syro-Phoenicians, Bel of the Babylonians, Osiris of the Egyptians, represented the personified male principle of reproduction, to which corresponded respectively Astarte, Ishtar, and Isis, as the personified female principle. The worship of these gods and goddesses consisted primarily in sacrifices connected with the production of life. Sometimes little children were immolated, while on other occasions the sacrificial rite consisted in religious prostitution, emasculation, and even in bestiality. Secondarily, religious worship took the shape of mystic rites, in which magic played a principal part. In some countries, as Persia, the gods were concretized in the heavenly bodies, as the sun and the moon; in others, as Egypt, they assumed concrete form in certain animals, as the sacred bull and the he-goat. But everywhere they were titanic in their power over the human mind, and usually diabolical in their influence on human morals.[3]

[3] Of all pagan religions that of Persia was the purest and approached most closely to monotheism. Persia was also the home of Mithraism, which spread so widely through Western lands during the second and third centuries of our era. Cfr. Fr. Cumont, The Mysteries of Mithra; Lectures on the History of Religions, II, Mithra.

These mystic rites of the East, and partly also its sacrificial worship, swept over both Greece and Rome shortly before the establishment of the Empire. The result, as already indicated, was disastrous both to religion and to morals. Gods of the most diverse nationalities and characteristics were placed side by side in the same Pantheon, and those religious rites were in highest favor which made the strongest appeal to the beast in man. Augustus made a desperate effort to revive, at least for State purposes, the religious rites of ancient Rome, but he met with only partial success. The last attempt of paganism spent itself in placing the Emperor of Rome among the deities to be worshiped by every loyal subject of the Empire. Pan was dead indeed, and man usurped the place of the gods.

4°. *Final Results.*—From the interaction of these various causes, and of some others not mentioned here, there resulted a state of religious doubt, moral degradation, and spiritual helplessness, that was as universal as it was unique. Many even of the common people no longer believed in their ancient gods, or, still believing, only learned from them to follow freely the promptings of their corrupt nature. Yet through it all there was felt the craving for something stable and certain, for something that would fill the void of men's hearts during life and throw a gleam of light into the darkness beyond the tomb. Originally people had believed in a just retribution after death, but this belief was now shaken by the dogmatizing of materialistic philosophers. What, then, could life mean? And to what must it lead? Was there really one true God beyond the promiscuous Pantheon of their discredited deities, on whom nature depended for its existence and who governed all things according to His own wise ways? Was all the misery of the world perhaps but the result of men's misdeeds? Could all this be changed by a change of life? Whence might help be expected?

5°. *Supposed Dangers to the New Teaching.*—What were the obstacles and helps thus awaiting the advent and spread of Christianity is a matter that belongs to Church History. For the student of the History of Dogmas it is sufficient to

ascertain what there was in contemporary paganism that was likely to corrupt the message of Christ. This, according to Harnack, and perhaps the majority of non-Catholic modern writers on the subject, may be reduced to the following points.

1. The existence of a mighty empire, in which the whole governing power was concentrated in the hands of a single individual, yet exercised through a marvelously organized system of subordinate officials, was a powerful temptation to essay the establishment of a similar empire in spiritual matters, whether the ultimate realization of this lay in the plans of Christ or not.

2. The existence of a mediatorial priesthood, whose members alone claimed the right of immediate access to the deity, was an equally powerful temptation to interpose a similar priesthood between individual Christians and their God.

3. The fact that the Romans had a preëminently legal mind, and that the subjects of the Empire had gradually become accustomed to regard the law as supreme in all things, brought with it the danger that the Evangel of Christ would finally develop into a legal system, which would place upon the Saviour's followers a yoke as unbearable as the one under which the Jews had groaned in the days of old.

4. The wide-spread custom of apotheosis and hero-worship would naturally tend to introduce similar practices among the Christians in regard to the men and women who had deserved well of the faith. Hence the *Cultus Sanctorum,* which was unknown to the children of Israel.

5. The "mysteries" of the Greeks and the mystic rites of the Orient would point the way to the development of a sacramental system, in which mystery and magic would make their appeal to the minds and hearts of Christian worshipers.

6. The widely accepted view of the intrinsically evil nature of matter, especially among the Orientals, would open the way to encratism and a false asceticism.

7. The low tone of pagan morality, particularly in carnal matters, would either be admitted into Christian practice and thus frustrate the reforming efforts of the Saviour, or else lead to extreme views and attempts in the opposite direction.

8. Pagan polytheism, and the accepted belief that the gods appeared at times in human form, would exert a strong influence on the interpretation of Christ's oft-repeated statement that God was His Father.

9. Lastly, and this was the greatest danger of all, as the whole Empire was more or less under the influence of Greek culture and Greek thought, philosophic speculation would incontinently busy itself with Christ and His sayings, and then almost inevitably tend towards reducing His message of salvation to a body of doctrines that might easily admit a large admixture of human elements.[4]

That these so-called dangers, made so much of by Harnack and his school, are, as "dangers," purely imaginary, need hardly be pointed out. It is true, indeed, that all the points enumerated above — the existence of a mighty empire and of a mediatorial priesthood, the legal mind of the Romans and the acknowledged supremacy of the law, the custom of apotheosis and hero-worship, and so on even down to the prevailing influence of Greek culture and Greek thought — are so many historical facts; but that these facts "almost inevitably tended" to corrupt the message of Christ, or actually did corrupt it, can be asserted only by one who totally misunderstands both the message and the person of the Saviour. And it is precisely because of such a misunderstanding that these writers draw from the undoubted facts of history inferences which are wholly unwarranted. Hence what are merely concomitant facts are represented by them as principles of a corrupting influence on the message of Christ.

Thus Harnack and his followers assume that Jesus was purely human and that His sole message to the world was the realization of the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man. Hence, they infer, He did not contemplate the establishment of a world-wide Church, with a consecrated priesthood, an hierarchical government, sacramental means of grace, and full authority to bind and to loosen, to teach and to guide, assured of God's unfailing assistance even to the consummation of the world. Consequently if a Church did spring

[4] Cfr. Harnack, Dogmengeschichte, I, 146 sqq. 4th Germ. edit.

into being, her origin was purely human; and like all other purely human institutions, she necessarily borrowed the fundamental elements of her internal organization, and to some extent also the means of attaining her social aims, from the society in the midst of which she first saw the light of day and then gradually developed into perfect form. As a Christian Church she would, of course, make the message of Christ her message, but in proclaiming that message to the world she would infuse into it her own spirit and interpret it in accordance with her own views; and because of her origin, her spirit was but human and her views were fallible. Hence the danger; hence, too, the actual corruption of Christ's message to the world.

Granting the assumption, all this looks very plausible. If Christ had been only human, though the wisest and saintliest of men; and if the Church had been merely human in her origin, though born of an unselfish desire to save the world; things might well have worked out as here indicated, although the Church herself would long since have ceased to exist. But then the assumption is absolutely false, as will be shown in the following chapters; and upon a false assumption only an untenable theory can be built.

CHAPTER II

ISRAEL AND ITS RELATION TO CHRISTIANITY[1]

That the Jewish people, under the special guidance of Jahve, were in some way instrumental in preparing the world for the advent of the Saviour is admitted by all Christians. Not only was this chosen nation made the depository of a revelation that was to form an integral part of the *depositum fidei* of Christian times, but by its providential contact with the Gentile world it did much to dispose the minds of pagan peoples for the reception of the Saviour's message when the fullness of time had come. This latter preparation had its beginning as far back as the sixth century before Christ, when the Jews of Palestine passed under the domination of Persia, and later on under that of Greece and Rome. Until the Captivity they had been almost exclusively engaged in agriculture, and thus led an isolated existence; but in their subsequent long and intimate contact with enterprising strangers, they acquired a taste for trade, which soon caused them to spread far beyond the borders of their own small country. They gradually established themselves in the numerous commercial cities where Greek was spoken — in all the ports of Western Asia, along the coast of Africa, and even in Rome.

This led to the formation of two distinct groups of one and the same people: the Jews of Palestine, who continued to dwell in the land of their ancestors and were immediately connected with Jerusalem and the Temple; and the Jews of the Diaspora or the Dispersion, who fixed their homes permanently in Gentile lands. Although they remained ever closely

[1] Cfr. Doellinger, op. cit. II; * Schuerer, History of the Jewish People at the Time of Christ; * Drummond, Philo Judæus; Martindale, op. cit. III; Felten, Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte; Tixeront, H. D. I, 20–59.

united in national consciousness, in religious aspirations and mutual interest in each other's varying fortunes, nevertheless in course of time they developed traits and views that were in some respects quite dissimilar. Hence a few remarks on each of these two groups will be in place.

A — The Palestinian Jews: Their Messianic Hopes

The rule of the Persians, which extended from 537 to 330 B. C., was, all things considered, extremely mild, and placed no obstacles in the way of religious and national development. Some influence was indeed exerted on Jewish teaching, especially in the domains of angelology, demonology, and eschatology, but this was by way of quickening development rather than by the absorption and incorporation of foreign doctrines. Thus, although the scepter had in a manner passed from Judah, Jewish national and religious life remained practically intact.

Matters assumed quite a different aspect during the period of Greek domination. In 330 Alexander the Great did homage to the high priest Onias, conquered Persia and all the neighboring countries, and then subjected the Jews to Greek rule. Thenceforth a strong Hellenizing influence was brought to bear upon Jewish customs and manner of life. This reached its climax under Antiochus Epiphanes, who, in 170, attempted the extirpation of the Jewish religion and the conversion of the Temple at Jerusalem into a sanctuary of Jupiter Olympus. The attempt failed of its purpose, yet many there were who from that time on followed the ways of the Greeks.

Shortly after ensued the fierce struggle for liberty under the leadership of the Maccabees, the Asmonean high priests, which resulted in a quasi-independence that lasted for about a hundred years. After that time, in a fratricidal conflict between Aristobulus and Hyrcanus II, an appeal was made to Rome, whereupon Pompey marched with his legions into Palestine, took Jerusalem in 63, and established Roman supremacy throughout the land. Then, by favor of Rome, Herod the Idumean was made king. He oppressed the Jews for 37 years, rebuilt the Temple in a most magnificent style, made

and unmade high priests at will, murdered every one in whom he suspected the slightest opposition, tried all possible schemes to Hellenize the people, and left the country in a ruinous state to his sons. A few years later Rome appointed a procurator, who governed Palestine as a Roman province.

These various political disturbances, and more especially the accompanying religious oppressions, wrought a profound change in the life of the people. Early in the third century before Christ, when the Greeks endeavored to exercise a far-reaching influence on Judaism, three different parties were formed that remained in existence till the destruction of the nation. The first of these was that of the Pharisees, including all lovers of the Law, and therefore the bulk of the people. Prominent in this party were the scribes, who since the Captivity had become the authorized expounders of the Law. To it also belonged those priests who were not mere tools in the hands of the ruling power. Because of their great zeal for the Law, these Pharisees and scribes erected around it a "gader" or hedge, consisting of traditions and interpretations which in course of time were regarded as binding as the Law itself. It was chiefly these "traditions of men" that made the Law so burdensome, and later on caused the name of Pharisee to stand for a mere outward show of righteousness. Hence Christ's terrible denunciation of them as recorded in the Gospel. Sprung from a legitimate zeal for the Law, the party ended by betraying the Law to its own private interests.

The second party was that of the Sadducees, the reputed disciples of Sadok (291-260), who adopted the principles of the Hellenists. They repudiated the traditions of the Pharisees, disregarded the "gader," and appealed almost exclusively to the Thora, without, however, rejecting the other books of the Old Testament. In philosophy, although admitting the creation of the world in the accepted Jewish sense, they were followers of Epicurus, denying God's continuous operation in the universe, the immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the dead, and the existence of angels. Yet in spite of this, they took part in the services and sacrifices of the Temple,

practiced circumcision, observed the Sabbath, and wished to be considered as real Jews. In social life, however, they conducted themselves as Greeks.

The third party, numerically insignificant, was that of the Essenes, a body of ascetics, who based their asceticism partly on Judaism and partly on Greek philosophy. They clung tenaciously to the Mosaic Law, but at the same time admitted many non-Jewish elements in their religious practices and beliefs. In some respects there is a close resemblance between their mode of life and that of early Christian ascetics, but no genetic relation can be shown to exist.

There is no particular need of reviewing here the theological doctrines of the Palestinian Jews, as we find them practically all reproduced in the Gospels and in the preaching of the Apostles. Still a brief outline seems to be in place. The following points will be sufficient for our purpose.

1°. *God: The Blessed Trinity.*—Although the Jews, in spite of the prohibition of the law, came in frequent contact with idolaters and on divers occasions many individuals yielded to the fascination of foreign cults, nevertheless as a nation they were strict monotheists. From the first page of the Old Testament to the last, Elohim, or Jahve, is consistently represented as the one and only God. And the same teaching is also found in later apocryphal writings. Nor is He considered merely as a national deity, but as the one true God of all men and the whole world; although for providential reasons He made the children of Israel His own special people. The pagan gods are spoken of as Elilim (worthless), or as demons, who are no gods at all, but are foolishly worshiped as such by the wicked. Some day Jahve will bring back the Gentiles to His service. The existence of this one God is nowhere proved in the Sacred Writings; it is assumed as evident, and only "the fool saith in his heart there is no God."

God is a spirit, whom no man can see and live. He is being itself; without beginning and without end, unchangeable alike in perfection and counsel. He knows all things, and nothing is hidden from His eyes. He fills all things and all space with His presence, and of His wisdom, justice, and

mercy there is no end. All these attributes, however, are usually spoken of in a concrete way, to suit the understanding of a simple people. Anthropomorphisms and plural designations occur rather frequently; but the context, either proximate or remote, contains its own corrective.

The mystery of the Blessed Trinity is not explicitly taught in the Old Testament, but allusions to it are found in not a few texts. The expression in Genesis, "Let us make man to our image and likeness: . . . and God created man to his image: to the image of God he created him," may be said to be an implicit statement of the Trinitarian doctrine as understood in Christian times. The plurality of divine persons is rather clearly taught in the Book of Proverbs and Ecclesiasticus, where Wisdom is represented as a distinct hypostasis. But whether the Jews realized the full import of these texts is not so certain. The doctrine implied in these and similar passages becomes clear only when the Old Testament is read in the light shed upon it by the New. To this as to many other Christian doctrines contained in the Old Testament is applicable the saying of St. Augustine: "In Vetere Novum latet, et in Novo Vetus patet."

2°. *God's Relation to the World.*—By an act of His omnipotent will, Jahve drew all things out of nothingness; and He can again reduce them all to nothingness by withdrawing His sustaining power. He holds the world in the hollow of His hand. Yet He is a good and wise Providence, who loves His creatures and fills them all with blessings. "Good things and evil, life and death, poverty and riches, are from God." Creatures are an outward expression of His goodness, yet ultimately they must all serve to promote His glory; because He has made them for Himself, and His glory He will not give to another.

3°. *Angels and Men.*—Good and bad angels appear on the very first pages of the Bible; for Satan under the appearance of a serpent brought about man's fall, and after the fall Cherubims were appointed to guard the gates of paradise. These angels are everywhere represented as spirits, endowed with intellect and free will. More perfect than men, they are

nevertheless created beings, although their creation is nowhere recorded in explicit terms. Their fidelity to their Maker was subjected to a trial, and some of them proved unfaithful. These latter appear as workers of evil. The good angels are the messengers of God and the bearers of His commands to men. They protect both individuals and nations, whilst the evil spirits seek to encompass man's ruin. Only a few of either class are known by name; but of the good, at least, there are vast multitudes. For " thousands of thousands ministered to Him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him." It may be noted in passing, that there is no real resemblance between these angels, as represented in the Old Testament, and the genii and daimones of pagan mythology; though many critics hold that Persian angelology had some influence on the later development of Jewish belief in this matter.

After the angels, in the order of natural perfection, man appears as the noblest of God's creatures. He was made to the image and likeness of God. His body was formed of the slime of the earth, and his soul was " breathed into his face " by his Maker. He is, therefore, made up of two distinct elements; a material body and a spiritual soul. He is physically free to choose between good and evil; but he is morally bound to render faithful service to his Creator. In perfection he is a little less than the angels.

Between him and God exists not only the relation of servant and Master, but also of child and Father. This latter relation is not brought out very distinctly in the Pentateuch, but it appears quite prominently in the Psalms and the Prophetical Books. Man's elevation to the supernatural state is only implied in most of the texts that refer to his primitive condition, though there are a few that are usually interpreted as stating it explicitly. Originally he was destined for temporal and eternal happiness, but both were made dependent on his fidelity to God. He proved unfaithful and lost both. However, owing to the great mercy of God, his eternal happiness was again made possible. The first man's fall is the origin of all evil in the world.

Reinstated in God's friendship, in view of the merits of a future Redeemer, the making of his fortune is once more placed in man's own hands. A terrible conflict between his inclinations to good and evil is inevitable; but in this conflict God is on his side. In what precisely the divine assistance consists is not clearly stated; yet it is represented as enabling men both to know, to will, and to do what is right, and thus to become holy even as God is holy. As required of the chosen people, this holiness demands both legal and moral purity, so that in practice it is identical with the keeping of the ceremonial and the moral law. For the Gentiles, however, the moral law alone is of obligation.

Adam's fall and the subsequent sinfulness of all men stand out prominently in the various books of the Old Testament, and they give a distinct coloring to later apocryphal literature. Yet with all this, there is little said in either class of writings about the existence and transmission of original sin. In the canonical books several texts are pointed out by theologians, and also by some of the Fathers, as containing the doctrine; but others interpret these texts in a different sense. Perhaps the clearest reference to the inheritance of a moral stain from Adam is found in the fourth book of Esdras, where we read: "O tu, quid fecisti, Adam? Si enim tu peccasti, non est factus solius tuus casus, sed et noster qui ex te advenimus" (7,48).

Forgiveness could be obtained for all sins, however grievous and many, provided the sinner was truly repentant and confessed his sinfulness before God. But even in the case of true repentance, and consequent forgiveness of sin, temporal chastisement was not rarely inflicted by the justice of Jahve. Under certain conditions, moreover, sin-offerings were required, but they had no real sacramental efficacy. It was the conversion of the heart that counted — true sorrow for sins and a firm purpose of future amendment.

4°. *The Law of Worship Comprised Two Parts: Sacrifices and the Sanctification of the Sabbath.*—Sacrifices could be offered only by the priests, who by divine ordination were of

the family of Aaron. They were presided over by the high priest, whose succession to office was by heredity, and originally he could be removed only by death or on account of some great crime. In the preparation of the victims the priests were assisted by Levites. Menial offices connected with the sacrificial worship were performed by Temple slaves. After the Temple had been built, sacrifices could be offered only in Jerusalem. The beneficiaries of these sacrifices were, according to circumstances, both individuals and the whole nation. This sacrificial and ceremonial law, however, was intended to be only temporary; after the advent of the Messias it was to be replaced by a more spiritual worship.

The sanctification of the Sabbath consisted exclusively in rest from unnecessary work, although in later times it was customary to gather in the synagogues, where portions of the Thora, the Prophets, and other Holy Books were read aloud and explained. This custom seems to have originated with Esdras, after the Captivity. At the conclusion of the homily the people were dismissed by a blessing of the priest, the congregation answering, Amen. Here, as we shall see later, we have the type of Christian worship as gathered around the sacrifice of the New Law.

5°. *The Family Was by Divine Institution Monogamous, and Divorce a vinculo Was Originally Prohibited.*—However, owing to their "hardness of heart," the Jews later on obtained a dispensation in this matter, so that thereafter a man could lawfully have several wives simultaneously, and for anything "shameful" could dismiss one or all of them by giving a "*libellus repudii.*" The wife, on the other hand, had no right of divorce, although when duly dismissed she was allowed to marry again.

6°. *Eschatology.*—The Jewish doctrine concerning the final consummation of things does not appear very clearly defined. As a sanction of the moral law, the hereafter plays a rather subordinate part in both canonical and apocryphal writings. It is usually rewards and punishments during the present life that are held out as inducements to render God faithful serv-

ice; yet these rewards and punishments are not disconnected with, and exclusive of, a continued existence beyond the tomb. The following points will make this clear.

Death and judgment are consecutive, so that one follows immediately upon the other; for "it is easy before God in the day of death to reward every one according to his works." That this was also the popular belief is necessarily presupposed in Christ's parable of Dives and Lazarus. Besides the retribution immediately after death, there is to be a general judgment at the end of time, which will inaugurate each one's eternal condition. In Jewish apocryphal literature, however, this general judgment is usually brought into close connection with the Messias' reign on earth, either forming its beginning or its end. It shall be preceded by a resurrection of the dead, which Daniel and Joel represent as general, but which the Apocryphas limit to the Jews or just alone, who shall have a share in the Messianic reign.

What were the expected conditions of the great hereafter is somewhat obscurely expressed. Judging from what is said in the Book of Henoch and IV Esdras, Jewish belief was that there would be a temporal happiness or misery until the final sentence of the Great Judge. In the Psalms, on the other hand, the temporal abode of the dead is spoken of only in a general way, and pictured in rather dark colors. It is a still, gloomy spot, apparently in the bowels of the earth, where souls are indeed at rest from the troubles of the world above, but where they seem to lead a dull, inactive, and comfortless existence. Job's description of it strikes one as still more terrible. Of course, as we know from New Testament teaching that even the just could not enter heaven until the ascension of the Saviour, this gloomy view of the hereafter may be understood as bearing reference only to the delay of eternal beatitude.

At the last judgment, Daniel tells us, "some shall rise unto life everlasting, and others unto reproach, to see it always." And Job expects, after that dark intermediate condition, a happy eternity: for "I know that my Redeemer liveth; He will stand as the last one on the dust of my grave; my eyes

shall behold Him, and no stranger." The same is also the hope of the Psalmist. The wicked, on the other hand, shall be cast into Gehenna, where, according to Isaias, they shall dwell with devouring fire, with everlasting burnings. To purgatory there is no direct reference, save only in II Maccabees, where it is stated as the Jewish belief that it is a holy and a wholesome thought to pray for the dead, that they may be loosed from their sins.

After this general outline of Old Testament teaching, and of current Jewish beliefs as gathered from apocryphal writings, it seems much to our purpose to give a somewhat more detailed account of Israel's Messianic hope, since the realization of this forms the very central point of the Gospel message. The following paragraphs contain a fairly complete though brief statement.

Messianic prophecies are found scattered through the whole of the Old Testament, and find a clear echo in later apocryphal writings. Beginning with the rather obscure announcement of a future Saviour immediately after the fall,[2] these predictions become clearer and more definite as time passes on. The Messias is to be of the posterity of Abraham,[3] of the tribe of Judah,[4] of the family of David.[5] He shall be preceded by the angel of the Lord, and shall glorify the second Temple.[6] He shall be of virgin birth,[7] shall be born in Bethlehem of Juda,[8] sixty-nine weeks of years "from the going forth of the word, to build up Jerusalem again,"[9] after the scepter has passed from Judah.[10] He shall be Emanuel, God with us; His name shall be called Wonderful, God the Mighty, Counselor, Prince of Peace.[11] He shall grow up as a child of poverty in the land of Galilee,[12] shall be of a most lovable character, quiet and gentle, the friend of the poor and forsaken.[13] He shall cause the blind to see, the dumb to

[2] Gen. 3, 15.
[3] Ibid. 12, 1–3; 21, 15–18.
[4] Ibid. 49, 1–10.
[5] I Par. 17, 4, 10, 11; II Kings, 7, 13–16.
[6] Mal. 3, 1; Agg. 2, 7–11.
[7] Is. 7, 14.
[8] Mich. 5, 2.
[9] Dan. 9, 21–25.
[10] Gen. 49, 1–10.
[11] Is. 7, 14; 9, 6.
[12] Ibid. 9, 1, 2; 53, 2.
[13] Ibid. 42, 1–4.

speak and the lame to walk.[14] But in the end He shall be disowned by His own people, betrayed by His friend, subjected to untold sufferings, so that He is verily a worm and no man.[15] In the middle of the last week of years, He shall be slain, confirming the New Covenant. Then great tribulations shall ensue, the sacrifice of the Law shall fail, and a people with their leaders shall come to destroy the city and the sanctuary, and in the Temple there shall be the abomination of desolation, and the desolation shall continue even to the consummation and the end.[16] But His sepulcher shall be glorious.[17]

He shall be a prophet greater than Moses,[18] a priest forever according to the order of Melchisedech,[19] a king who shall sit on the throne of David and rule from sea to sea, and of His kingdom there shall be no end.[20] Yet this kingdom shall be of a spiritual order, to be established on Sion, the Holy Mount, whither the Gentiles shall flock from all parts of the world.[21] In it there shall be a new sacrifice, a clean oblation, which shall be offered everywhere, from the rising of the sun to the going down thereof, and Jahve's name shall be great among the Gentiles.[22] And because this priest-king shall lay down His life for sin, hence He shall see a long-lived seed, and the will of the Lord shall be prosperous in His hand.[23]

This is the prophetic view of the Messias, the inspired teaching of the Old Testament; but with this the popular view only partly coincided. The people were at all times firmly convinced that a Messias would come, yet the manner of His coming and the work He was to accomplish were variously colored by the needs and hopes of each particular epoch. The prophetic predictions were scattered over a vast period of time; in themselves they appeared but as so many *membra disjecta,* which, taken singly, impressed no well defined picture upon the popular mind. Hence it is not at all unintelligible that, in spite of the prophetic corrective, the long train

[14] Ibid. 42, 6, 7; 35, 5, 6.
[15] Ibid. 53, 2–9.
[16] Dan. 9, 26, 27.
[17] Is. 53, 9; Ps. 15, 10.
[18] Deut. 18, 15.
[19] Ps. 109, 4.
[20] Zach. 9, 9, 10.
[21] Ps. 2, 6–10.
[22] Mal. 1, 11.
[23] Is. 53, 10–12.

of national disasters should have suggested to the despairing Jews the hope of an all-conquering Messias, who, as an earthly king, would crush the enemies of the chosen people. He was to be David's son; the father had been the most powerful king of Israel's glorious past: could then the son be less? Was it not Jerusalem that was so clearly designated as the seat of His rule and the capital of His kingdom, where His throne was to be erected, and whither all the costly offerings of the Gentiles, their silver and their gold, were to flow together? Hard pressed by their conquerors, the Jews readily interpreted these prophetic promises in a purely material sense, and the natural result was that they looked forward to an earthly ruler, who would restore the golden age of the nation's past. Should He come in any other form or guise, they would not have Him.

However, it would be a mistake to think that the whole Jewish nation had abandoned the prophetic idea of a spiritual Messias. Many there still were, both among the lowly and the high, whose expectations found adequate expression in the "Nunc dimittis" of the holy old man Simeon, who was privileged to press the Child Jesus to his faithful heart on the occasion of the Saviour's presentation in the Temple. This appears not only from the Gospels, which record how the people were always ready to proclaim Jesus the long expected Messias, in spite of His humble and lowly appearance, but also from the apocryphal writings which originated in the century before Christ. In them the Messianic kingdom is called "the assembly of the just," which no one can enter except through penance.[24] The sovereign of this kingdom is holy and sinless, and no injustice shall be found in his realm.[25] Hence the constantly repeated prayer: "O God, purify Israel on the day of healing grace, when its Anointed of the Lord shall come," and when "a good generation shall live in the fear of God and in the works of justice." [26] Still this realization of the truth gradually disappeared from the

[24] Enoch, 38, 1.
[25] Ps. Sal. 17, 26, 41.
[26] Ibid. 18, 6. Cfr. L. Fonk, Parables of the Gospel, 59-63; Engl. Transl. by E. Leahy.

minds of those who directed the hopes of the chosen people, and hence when Jesus came unto His own, " His own received Him not."

B—The Jews of the Dispersion: Their Religious and Philosophical Views

The Jews of the Dispersion, also called Hellenistic Jews, remained in the main faithful to the religious teaching of the Old Testament, yet their close contact with Greek culture and thought led them in many instances to put new interpretations upon statements of the Bible which they had theretofore accepted in a literal sense. Many of them came gradually to believe that Moses and the Greek philosophers were on a large number of points in substantial agreement, their teaching differing chiefly in their respective viewpoints and in the terminology which they employed. To eliminate even this difference, and to arrive at a more perfect understanding, they had recourse to an allegorical method of interpretation, which on the one hand did away with the fabulous mythology of the Greeks, and on the other enriched the rather meager philosophy of the Jews. It was this allegorical method of interpretation that was later on rendered so famous by the Christian scholars of Alexandria.

Whilst treasuring the Sacred Books of their Palestinian home, these Hellenistic Jews gradually developed a religious literature of their own. The Greek translation of the LXX, the Book of Wisdom, the Second Book of Maccabees, and some deutero-canonical additions of other books, originated in their midst. So, too, did the apocryphal Third and Fourth Book of Maccabees, the Letter of the Pseudo-Aristeas, the Sibyline Oracles, and others. The fundamental doctrines of these various writings are generally identical with those contained in the Palestinian Old Testament, yet there are shades of differences that point to Greek influence. Anthropomorphisms are usually avoided when speaking of God, the personification of the Word is very marked, Messianic hopes are brought out but faintly, and much space is given to the consideration of man's condition after death.

The one who tried most persistently to bring Jewish and Greek thought into closer relation was Philo, at once a believer and a philosopher. Not that he ultimately succeeded in his purpose, or could have; but along certain lines his influence was felt for centuries, even in Christian circles. The principal Jewish doctrines on which he stamped his philosophic mark may thus be summarized.[27]

1°. *The nature of God.*—After the Platonic fashion, he looks upon God as wholly transcendent, of whom nothing definite can be affirmed; for any affirmation places a limit in the Godhead, and is of its very nature exclusive of other properties. He is simply WHO IS. Although He is eternal, immutable, free; yet He is without any quality or property whatever. He is so transcendent that He can have no direct contact with finite beings.

2°. Hence to explain the production of the world, Philo gathers together the teaching of Plato about pre-existing ideas, of the Stoics about the world-soul, of the Bible about the angels, and of Greek mythology about the demons, and out of these heterogeneous elements he constructs what may be called pre-existent dynamic ideas, which are the intermediaries of God's action upon the world, the Logoi through which He works. Whether or not these Logoi are really distinct from God, Philo does nowhere clearly state; yet, on the one hand, they must be distinct, for their purpose is to keep God from immediate contact with the world and to save Him from being the author of evil; but, on the other hand, they cannot be distinct from God, since it is through them that the finite is brought into contact and participation with the infinite. Hence logically, these dynamic ideas are self-contradictory.

And so, too, seems to be the concept of the Universal Logos, of which these dynamic ideas are partial or limited expressions. This Universal Logos is designated as God's image, God's shadow, God's first-born son, another or a second God.

[27] The following summary of Philo's teaching has in part been taken from Tixeront, H. D. I, 49–54; and from Drummond's Philo Judæus, cc. 4, 5, 6, vol. II. Cfr. Feder, Justins Lehre von Jesus Christus, 137–143; Felten, op. cit. I, 564, sqq. II, 19 sqq.

Yet in himself he is but the sum and substance or rather a combination of the various powers through which God acts upon the world, and therefore merely an intermediary between God and the created universe. Hence Philo says of him that he is neither unbegotten like God, nor begotten like us, but in "an intermediary way." What this "intermediary way" is, Philo does not know, or at least he does not attempt to explain it, and so the whole concept seems to evanesce because of its intrinsic repugnance.

In this connection it is well to note that Philo never hints at the identity of this Logos with the Messias. And furthermore, notwithstanding such designations as first-born son of God, another God, this Logos does not appear to have a real concrete personality, but to be simply a demiurgic and cosmic power, wholly alien from a God Revealer and Redeemer. Hence, if St. John borrowed his terminology from Philo, which is not at all certain, he surely did not go to him for the contents of his doctrine.

3°. *The Work of Creation.*—Although Philo bears witness to the traditional belief in a creation out of nothing, he himself seems to have followed Plato in assuming the existence of an eternal *hyle,* the source of all imperfection and evil, which God reduced to order by the agency of the dynamic forces indicated above, and then into portions of it He introduced a divine element as the source of physical and intellectual life, according to the nature of each being.

In the order of sequence Philo follows more or less strictly the Mosaic account of creation, speaking first of the angels, which in his treatment very closely resemble Plato's inferior gods. They are distributed in different spheres, one above the other. The highest are exclusively occupied with the service of God; others, nearer the earth, have united themselves to bodies and become the souls of men. Bad angels, or demons, he identifies with evil souls.

Man is made up of three elements: the intellect, "the soul of the soul," which comes from God; the inferior soul, which is propagated by generation; and the body. In this Philo teaches trichotomy, a doctrine that later on appeared some-

times in Christian writers. The human body, being made up of matter, is conceived as essentially evil. Its mere contact defiles the soul. Hence man is of his very nature inclined to moral iniquity, and of himself he is powerless against the promptings of his lower instincts. With this, however, the author nowhere connects the idea of original sin, as contracted in the fall of Adam.

Because man is thus inclined to evil, hence there is need of ascetical practices, that he may be enabled to lead a life of virtue and become acceptable to his Maker. Yet these ascetical practices alone do not suffice; there is also need of philosophy and science, in the sum total of which the perfection of virtue finally consists. There is a certain Stoic element in all this, yet without the Stoics' self-sufficiency and pride; for, in the last instance, it is the help of God that is man's strength. Thus assisted by God, and making proper use of contemplation, we may realize even here on earth a sort of intuitive vision of God's perfection, which is the final aim of all true philosophy.

That this teaching of Judaism, both in its purer form as found in the Palestinian group and in its somewhat modified contents as developed among the Jews of the Diaspora, would exert an influence on later Christian thought is quite obvious. "Salvation is from the Jews," said our Divine Saviour, and so likewise was the early preaching of the Gospel. The Apostles and first disciples of the Lord had been trained up in the doctrines of the Old Testament, and some of their immediate successors were deeply imbued with Hellenistic thought. Nor was there in this any great danger to the purity of the Gospel message. Outward expression of revealed doctrines might bear the impress of the preacher's early associations; forms of speech might be used that would be calculated to puzzle later generations; certain elements of the Saviour's teaching might be emphasized and others barely stated in a casual way: but all this did not necessarily imply that the Evangel of Christ would either be coerced into the narrow compass of the Mosaic Law, or flow out unhindered into the shoreless ocean of Greek speculation. The issue

would depend on the promised measure of divine assistance; for if the message was divine, its subsequent propagation and conservation must depend on a help that was equally divine. In this a merely human care and human wisdom would be insufficient. What did happen will appear in the sequel.

CHAPTER III

NEW TESTAMENT TEACHING ON THE FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS OF CHRISTIANITY

To the general outline of revealed truths contained in the Old Testament, as given in the preceding chapter, must now be added a summary statement of the Gospel message. The two together will enable us to form a proper appreciation of doctrinal development, as it is portrayed in the History of Dogmas. However, as this statement must necessarily be very brief, it appears advisable to confine our observations to such points of doctrine as are of greater fundamental importance, and for that reason recur constantly in the preaching of the Gospel. These are Christ's own teaching on the kingdom of heaven and on the life eternal, St. Paul's doctrine on the Church of Christ, and the doctrinal data on the mystery of the Blessed Trinity and on the person of the Saviour, both as found in the Gospels and in the Epistles of St. Paul. The reason for thus placing St. Paul's Epistles on a level with the Gospels, and treating them as an independent source of revealed truth, lies in the fact that he received his gospel not of man, but from the revelation of Jesus Christ.[1] The message which the Saviour announced personally, as recorded by the Evangelists, He also announced through Paul, whom He made "a vessel of election."

A—Christ's Teaching on the Kingdom of Heaven[2]

In one sense the doctrine of the kingdom of heaven runs through the whole New Testament, and is set forth as clearly and fully by St. John and St. Paul as by the first three Evan-

[1] G. I, 11, 12.
[2] Cfr. Yves de La Briere, in the Dictionnaire Apologetique, art. Eglise, I, 1221–1301.

gelists; yet in another sense it is found almost exclusively in the Synoptic Gospels. St. John and St. Paul use the term, but only incidentally; they throw the Saviour's teaching on the kingdom into another form, the one speaking of it as the life eternal and the other as the Church of Christ. The contents, as we shall see, are the same in each case; but the form differs. And it is this difference of form that makes it advisable to consider separately the three several aspects of one and the same doctrine. Hence in this first section we shall confine our remarks to the teaching of Jesus on the kingdom of Heaven as recorded by the Synoptists.

The doctrine of the kingdom may be said to be the fundamental idea that underlies the Synoptic Gospels. St. Mark and St. Luke usually speak of it as the kingdom of God, and St. Matthew as the kingdom of heaven. The two expressions are identical in sense, and properly signify the reign or domination of God, as appears from the Greek text. In its main outline and general concept, this doctrine of the kingdom presents an Old Testament idea, and coincides with the prophetic view of the Messianic reign.[3] Some modern critics take this kingdom, as portrayed in the Synoptic Gospels, to be exclusively eschatological in character, holding that Christ regarded its establishment as coincident with the end of time. However, the various texts bearing on the subject make it quite clear that the term is used in a threefold sense. In some passages the kingdom is obviously considered in its final consummation, as God's kingdom of the elect already in possession of their eternal reward, and in this sense it is purely eschatological. In other places it is referred to as present and established here on earth, either as including both the just and the unjust in a state of preparation, or as including only the just who here and now comply with all the conditions it imposes; evidently in neither of these two connections does it bear an eschatological import. It is as much a part of the actual present as is the field in which wheat and cockle are allowed to grow until the time of the harvest.[4] Hence the Baptist

[3] Cfr. L. Fonk, Parables of the Gospels, 53–63.

[4] Matt. 13, 24–30.

announced it as close at hand, and Jesus declared that it had appeared with His advent.[5]

The kingdom is first announced to the Jews, but it is intended for all.[6] Hence the Apostles must preach it to all nations, and before the consummation of the ages the glad tidings must spread over the whole world.[7] It shall grow as a mustard seed, and pervade the life of individuals and of society as a leaven, changing the whole mass. Yet, though all are called to this kingdom, admittance into it can be secured only on certain conditions. These may be summed up as faith in the divine message, penance for past misdeeds, attachment to the person of Christ, readiness to confess Him before men, an humble and docile heart, purity of morals, and helpfulness to the neighbor.[8]

The ruler of this kingdom is God; yet not the Father alone, but also the Son. The Father is the "householder who planted a vineyard, and made a hedge round about it, and dug a press, and built a tower, and let it out to husbandmen"; but the Son "is the heir," whom the faithless husbandmen killed, yet could not deprive of "his inheritance." He was sent by the Father, and He Himself sent others, giving the "kingdom to a nation yielding the fruits thereof."[9]

Under one aspect this kingdom is interior, the reign of justice in the hearts of men; but it also has a social side. Christ Himself calls it an *ecclesia,* a church, for which He is making preparation in the establishment of the Apostolic college. He will build it upon Peter, the Rock, who shall be its indestructible foundation. For this purpose He will give to Peter the keys of the kingdom, supreme power to bind and to loosen here on earth, in such wise that his actions shall be ratified in heaven.[10] As the head of the Church, Peter's faith shall never fail, and he shall confirm his brethren.[11] With him are associated the other Apostles, who shall also receive power to bind and to loosen;[12] they are all sent to

[5] Ibid. 3, 2; 12, 28.
[6] Ibid. 10, 5, 6.
[7] Ibid. 28, 19.
[8] Ibid. 11, 12; 5, 3–12.
[9] Ibid. 21, 33–45.
[10] Ibid. 16, 13–19.
[11] Luke, 22, 32.
[12] Matt. 18, 19.

baptize and to teach, and they must be listened to as Jesus Himself.[13]

Admission into this Church is by baptism in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.[14] This baptism, together with faith, is necessary for salvation.[15] Once admitted into the Church, the members thereof must partake of a Eucharistic meal, at which they eat the body and drink the blood of the Saviour. This rite is performed in obedience to Christ's explicit command, and commemorates the immolation of Himself for the sins of the world.[16]

In their intercourse with one another they must be mindful of the great law of charity, loving not only their brethren and friends, but also their enemies and persecutors, bearing injuries gladly for Christ's sake, forgiving offenses, and readily sacrificing their own interests for the good of their neighbor. They must keep their hearts pure and detached, and be perfect as also their Heavenly Father is perfect.[17] This is required of all, but if some wish to aim at higher things, let them sell all they have, give the price of their goods to the poor, leave father and mother, and follow the Master in voluntary poverty, chastity and obedience.[18]

Here on earth the kingdom of God, which is thus the Church of Christ, includes both good and bad, wheat and cockle; but the day of separation will come, and this will be twofold. An individual separation takes place immediately after death, when those who have followed Dives shall be buried with him in hell, whilst those others who have suffered patiently like Lazarus shall be at peace in Abraham's bosom.[19] Then there will be another separation at the end of time, a judgment of the whole world, when every one shall be rewarded or punished according to his deeds. This will be preceded by a general resurrection of the dead,[20] so that body and soul may share a common fate. The wicked shall go into everlasting fire, enkindled for the devil and his angels; and

[13] Luke, 10, 16.
[14] Matt. 28, 19.
[15] Mark, 16, 16.
[16] Ibid. 26, 26–29.
[17] Matt. 5, 19–48.
[18] Ibid. 19, 21.
[19] Luke, 16, 19–21.
[20] Ibid. 20, 37, 38; Matt. 5, 29.

the just shall possess forever the kingdom prepared for them from the foundation of the world.[21]

B—The Life Eternal

Corresponding to the kingdom of God as portrayed by the Synoptists, we find in St. John's account a presentation of life eternal. The proper object of the mission of Jesus is not to judge the world, but to save it; to give it eternal life. "Now this is eternal life; that they may know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent." [22] Hence Jesus is the light, "which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world.[23] He is to give His flesh for the life of His followers; He is the Good Shepherd who dies for His flock. All this is in accord with the command He has received from His Father. Yet no one takes His life away from Him, but He lays it down of His own free will; and as He has power to lay it down, so has He also power to take it up again.[24]

This eternal life is intended for all men, because "God so loved the world as to give his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him may not perish, but may have life everlasting." [25] But in regard to some this intention of God is not realized; for "men love darkness rather than the light," and so instead of allowing themselves to be "drawn by the Father," they follow their own will and trust in their own devices.[26] They refuse to comply with the conditions laid down for entrance into eternal life, the chief of which is attachment to Jesus.[27] They must belong to His sheepfold; they must be united to Him even as the branches are united to the vine.[28]

In its completeness this eternal life is twofold: it begins here on earth and reaches its final perfection in heaven. In so far as it has its inception on earth, it does not consist only in the perfection of individual souls, but it also implies a close union with the social organization of which Christ Him-

[21] Ibid. 25, 31–45.
[22] John, 17, 3.
[23] Ibid. 1, 9.
[24] Ibid. 10, 17, 18.
[25] Ibid. 3, 16.
[26] Ibid. 3, 19.
[27] Ibid. 15, 7–10.
[28] Ibid. 10, 14–17, 15, 5–8.

self lays the foundation during His three years of public teaching. He gathers around Him twelve Apostles, whom He endows with His own authority, and sends out into the world even as he was sent by the Father.[29] He sanctifies Himself for them, and prays that they, and all who believe through their word, may be one as He and the Father are one.[30] He promises them the Holy Spirit, the Paraclete, who will teach them all things and remain with them forever.[31]

Hence, although He, the Good Shepherd, must go to the Father, His sheepfold shall remain. For its preservation He makes one of His Apostles His own substitute, appointing him as chief shepherd in His own stead, with the power and the duty of feeding His lambs and His sheep.[32] His mission is to be continued by all the Apostles; they are all sent to preach and to teach, to forgive and to retain sins through the Holy Spirit who is given them; but to Peter alone is the care of the whole flock entrusted. Thus the sheepfold is identical with the Church which is built on Peter. St. John's thoughts are cast in a different mold; his terms and expressions are peculiarly his own; but the contents of his doctrine are the same as that of the Synoptists, because both represent the doctrine of Christ.

As no one "can enter into the kingdom of God, unless he be born again of water and the Holy Ghost," [33] entrance into the Church is evidently obtained through baptism; and once admitted into it, the members thereof must "eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood," or they shall not have life in them.[34] Furthermore, they must all believe in Jesus, hear the voice of the Shepherd and follow him, so that there may be but one fold and one shepherd. Under these conditions the Church is open to all, and any one may enter and remain in the fold; for besides the Jews, the Good Shepherd has other sheep; them also must He bring.[35]

On the other hand, those who will not comply with the

[29] Ibid. 20, 21.
[30] Ibid. 17, 4–25.
[31] Ibid. 16, 13–15.
[32] Ibid. 21, 15–17; 20, 21–23.
[33] Ibid. 3, 5.
[34] Ibid. 6, 54–64.
[35] Ibid. 10, 3–16.

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conditions here laid down, and whose works are evil, by that very fact judge themselves.[36] In this sense the judgment, which is to follow death, already begins in the present life, and determines each one's condition in the world to come. But this judgment will be followed by another one at the end of time, when all shall rise again and receive the recompense of their mortal deeds. For "the hour cometh, wherein all that are in their graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God; and they that have done good things, shall come forth unto the resurrection of life; but they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of the judgment."[37] This final retribution will be the full development of each one's condition here on earth: for the just the full possession of life in consequence of their union with Christ; for the wicked, death and God's wrath always standing against them.[38]

C—St. Paul's Doctrine on the Church of Christ

Christ's teaching on the kingdom of heaven and on the life eternal, as recorded by the Synoptists and St. John respectively, represents the Church as an institution still in the course of formation. It had its beginning indeed during the Saviour's life time, in as much as the foundation was then laid and the necessary powers were either promised or actually conferred; but it was to stand forth as a complete organization only after He had ascended to the Father. Then the Holy Ghost came down upon the Apostles, as had been promised by Jesus, and the Church entered upon her divine mission of saving the world. It is under this aspect that St. Paul speaks of the Church of Christ.

In many respects his presentation of the subject coincides closely with that of St. John, in as much as he emphasizes the intimate union that exists between the Church and her Founder. He speaks of her as the body of Christ, the spouse of the Saviour, made immaculate by His cleansing blood.[39] Jesus is her head, the center of her unity, the source of her

[36] Ibid. 3, 18; cfr. 12, 48.
[37] Ibid. 5, 28, 29.
[38] Ibid. 3, 36.
[39] Ephes. 5, 23–30.

organic life.[40] Then, too, the Spirit of Truth abides in her, and makes her the pillar and groundwork of truth.[41] In the "one Spirit were we all baptized into one body, whether Jews or Gentiles, whether bond or free; and in one Spirit we have all been made to drink."[42] Hence the Holy Spirit, together with Christ, is the source of life to the Church and the bond of union among the faithful.

The Church is an organized society, in which there are many ministries, but they all come from the same Spirit.[43] Men of approved virtue are constituted to govern each particular community of believers. Some of them are overseers or bishops, others presbyters, others deacons.[44] The bishops, either by themselves or together with the presbyters, must instruct the faithful, preach sound doctrine, and rebuke the gainsayers;[45] they must also ordain fit candidates for these sacred functions by the imposition of hands.[46]

Repeated mention is made of certain sacred rites, all more or less intimately connected with the social life of the Church. The first of these is baptism which symbolizes the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ, and effects a spiritual regeneration in the soul.[47] This is followed by the imposition of hands, whereby the Holy Spirit is imparted to the newly baptized.[48] Then there is the Eucharistic meal, which is the body and blood of Jesus, is commemorative of His death, and can be worthily received by those only who have proved themselves.[49] The breaking of the bread and the blessing of the chalice is also a sacrifice; for the Christians have an altar whereof those may not eat who serve idols.[50]

The ordination of bishops and presbyters constitutes a special religious rite, which consists in the imposition of hands by the presbyterium or by the Apostles, and imparts grace for the discharge of the various functions of the sacred ministry.[51]

[40] Ibid. 4, 15, 16.
[41] I Tim. 3, 15.
[42] I Cor. 12, 13.
[43] Ibid. 12, 5–30.
[44] Phil. 1, 1; Acts, 19, 6. In regard to St. Paul's teaching on the hierarchy, cfr. F. Prat. La Théologie de Saint Paul, I, 475–482; also Note Y, 488 sqq.
[45] Tit. 1, 9; I Tim. 5, 17.
[46] Tit. 1, 5; I Tim. 4, 13, 14.
[47] Rom. 6, 3–11; Ephes. 2, 5, 6.
[48] Acts, 19, 16.
[49] I Cor. 11, 20–34.
[50] Ibid. 10, 16–21.
[51] I Tim. 4, 14.

Christian marriage is represented as being of a sacred character. The union of husband and wife is a symbol of the union of Christ with His Church. In this sense it is a great sacrament.[52] Such a marriage cannot be dissolved except by death: this is the Lord's command.[53] Although matrimony is thus a holy state, yet perfect continence and virginity are preferable to it; and so is widowhood; but neither of them is obligatory.[54]

In their daily life and in their relation to one another, the members of the Church must walk as the children of light, giving thanks always for all things, and being subject to one another in the fear of Christ. Women must be subject to their husbands, as to the Lord; children must obey their parents in the Lord; servants must yield obedience to their masters from the heart; masters must treat their servants as children of the same Heavenly Father.[55]

The Church is the kingdom of God on earth, and this kingdom shall have its completion in the second coming of Christ. When that will be no one knows, but the time is short; we must use the world as if we used it not, for its figure passes away.[56] However, before the second advent of Christ, the man of sin, the son of perdition, shall appear, who will try to usurp the place of God.[57] Then, at the appointed time, the Lord shall come down from heaven, and at the voice of the Archangel and at the sound of the trumpet, Antichrist shall be exterminated, and the dead shall rise again, some in glory and others in corruption. Thereupon follows the judgment, which shall be presided over by Jesus Christ. Every one shall be judged according to his works.[58] The just shall inherit the kingdom of the Father, which will be at the same time an inheritance and a reward; whilst the wicked receive wrath and sorrow, death and destruction, as the just retribution of their iniquity.[59] They shall be assailed by the Lord

[52] Ephes. 5, 25–32.
[53] I Cor. 7, 10, 11.
[54] Ibid. 7, 7, 25–40.
[55] Ephes. 5, 18–21; 6, 24.
[56] I Cor. 7, 29–31.
[57] II Thes. 2, 3–12.
[58] I Thes. 4, 15; 1, 10; II Thes. 2, 8; Rom. 2, 5–16.
[59] Rom. 8, 17; 2, 5–9; 6, 21.

and His power with an avenging fire. Their torments, as well as the happiness of the just, shall be everlasting.[60]

D— The Blessed Trinity and the Person of Christ

In the Synoptic Gospels only one explicit reference to the Blessed Trinity is recorded as made by Christ, and this is contained in His commandment to baptize in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.[61] However, the divinity of the Son is taught in other texts, as will be shown below; and that of the Holy Ghost seems clearly implied in the passages where He is spoken of as being sinned against and as inspiring the disciples.[62] Hence, as the oneness of God is assumed all through the Gospels and even explicitly stated, the elements of the mystery are found in the Synoptists independently of the baptismal formula.

St. John, on the other hand, is quite clear on the point, although he does not formulate the doctrine in express terms. Christ is the only-begotten of the Father; the Father is the source of the Son's being and action, the Father and the Son know one another; they remain one in the other, to both the same honor is paid, and they are one.[63] In this there is at the same time distinction and identity: distinction of persons and identity of nature. The same position is assigned to the Holy Ghost. He proceeds from the Father and receives from the Son, and this because everything that is the Father's is the Son's also. Both send Him, yet He is not separated from them; for the Father and the Son accompany Him and dwell together with Him in the hearts of the faithful.[64] He is truly a divine person; for He is the Spirit of Truth, who instructs the Apostles, and takes Christ's place in their regard.[65]

St. Paul does not state the mystery of the Blessed Trinity in so many words, but he implies it with sufficient clearness. There is one God, the Father of all, and with Him associated in power and glory is His own Son, who is His image, being

[60] I Cor. 9, 25; Rom. 2, 7; 5, 21; II Thes. 1, 8, 9.
[61] Matt. 28, 19.
[62] Mark, 13, 11; Luke, 10, 10, 12.
[63] John, 5, 19, 26; 10, 15; 8, 29; 5, 23; 10, 30.
[64] Ibid. 15, 26, 14, 15; 16, 26; 14, 23.
[65] Ibid. 14, 16, 17; 15, 26.

in the form of God, and by whom all things are made.[66] With the Father and the Son is enumerated also the Holy Spirit, who dwells in our souls, and who prays in us. He knows the secrets of God, and is God. He is at the same time the Spirit of God and the Spirit of Christ; is sent by the Father and belongs to the Son.[67] Hence the Trinitarian formula: "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the charity of God, and the communion of the Holy Spirit be with you all.[68]

Regarding the person of Christ two points are of special importance in this connection: His Messiahship and His divinity. The Synoptists emphasize the first and imply the second; St. John emphasizes the second and clearly states the first; whilst St. Paul brings out both points, though more or less incidentally, representing Christ primarily as the world's Redeemer, who restored man to the high estate from which he had fallen through sin.

As recorded by the Synoptists, Christ presented Himself from the very opening of His public career as the Messias foretold by the Prophets; but at first He did so guardedly, forbidding all open proclamation of the fact.[69] Later on He freely accepted and also openly claimed the title, telling the disciples of the Baptist that in Him were fulfilled the predictions of the Prophets, as the signs and wonders which He wrought abundantly proved.[70] Then He pointed out to His Apostles that one of them would betray Him, that He should be delivered into the hands of the Gentiles, be put to death, but that on the third day He would rise again, as had been foretold in the Old Testament.[71] Thus whatever befalls Him, whatever He says and does, is in fulfilment of the Prophets. His mission is to save what has perished, to give His life as a ransom for many. His blood is the blood of the New Covenant, shed for many unto the remission of sins.[72]

[66] Rom. 8, 32; Col. 1, 15–17; Phil. 2, 6.
[67] I. Cor. 3, 16; 6, 19; Rom. 8, 11; 4, 6.
[68] II Cor. 13, 13.
[69] Luke, 4, 16–21; Mark, 11, 10.
[70] Matt. 11, 3–5.
[71] Mark, 8, 31.
[72] Luke, 24, 44–47; Matt. 26, 28.

As Christ thus claimed to be the Messias, so did He also claim to be the Son of God. It is true, in the Synoptic Gospels He is nowhere recorded as assuming the full title of His own initiative; but it is stated that He freely accepted it from others.[73] Twice, moreover, He styles Himself the Son, and He invariably calls God His Father.[74] That this title was, in the mind of Jesus, not merely Messianic, but implied over and above a divine filiation in the natural sense of the term, is indeed nowhere stated in so many words; but that this was really the case appears to a certainty from His manner of speaking and from the claims which He persistently advanced. A few examples will suffice to make clear the truth of this statement.

Thus almost at the beginning of His public career, in the Sermon on the Mount, He acts as an independent lawgiver, whose authority is equal to that of Jahve.[75] Later on He places Himself far above all Patriarchs and Prophets and holy men of old; they are merely Jahve's servants, whilst He is His Son and heir.[76] He claims a higher origin than that implied in His descent from David, a greater glory than that of the Temple.[77] He is Lord of the Sabbath, and He puts Himself in the very place of Jahve as the spouse of men's immortal souls.[78] He gives the keys of the kingdom of heaven to whom He pleases,[79] and points to Himself as the object of men's highest aspirations, in whom alone they can find rest for their souls.[80] He is the Absolute and Supreme Good, for whose sake men must sacrifice all that is nearest and dearest to them.[81] He is the Supreme Judge, who will pass sentence on all in accordance with what they have done or failed to do to Himself.[82] In speaking of God as His Father, He entirely separates Himself from His disciples and from the rest of mankind: He says, "My Father and your Father," but never, "Our Father." No one knows the Son except the Father,

[73] Matt. 16, 16, 17; Mark, 14, 61, 62.
[74] Matt. 11, 27; Mark, 13, 32.
[75] Matt. 5, 21–48.
[76] Ibid. 21, 33–39.
[77] Ibid. 12, 6.
[78] Ibid. 12, 8; Mark, 2, 18.
[79] Matt. 16, 19; 18, 18.
[80] Ibid. 11, 28, 29.
[81] Ibid. 10, 32–38.
[82] Ibid. 25, 31–46.

and no one knows the Father except the Son: their knowledge is one, and so is their nature.[83] All this, as seems quite obvious, admits of only one reasonable interpretation—that Christ claimed to be true God and wished to be accepted as such by men.

In the Gospel of St. John Christ's claim of the Messiahship appears throughout identified with His statement that He is the Son of God, sent into this world " that whosoever believeth in him may not perish, but have life everlasting." He is first and foremost a divine Messias, who was in the beginning with God as the eternal Word, but in time was made flesh and dwelt amongst us.[84] Before Abraham was HE IS; He was in glory with the Father before the world was made.[85] He comes from heaven and goes back to heaven; yet the Father is greater than He.[86] He is sent into the world, there to fulfill His mission; but also to speak, to act, and to judge in His own name.[87] His mission is that of the Good Shepherd, who lays down His life for His sheep.[88]

St. Paul, as already stated, represents Christ primarily as the promised Redeemer, who delivers the world from sin. Through Adam all have been constituted sinners, through Christ all are made just.[89] With Him comes the liberation from the Law; He is the promise that gladdened the hearts of the fathers. He is of our race and blood, true man, made of woman, of the fathers according to the flesh;[90] like us in all things, sin alone excepted, subject to our infirmities, and therefore capable of compassion in our regard.[91] Nor is He simply an individual man; He is the representative of our race in reference to the redemption. He is the second Adam, who is from heaven heavenly, whilst the first Adam was of the earth earthy; and through Him we all shall become heavenly.[92]

But further, this Christ is more than man: He existed before He appeared on earth, and took part in the creation of the

[83] Ibid. 11, 27; Luke, 10, 22.
[84] John, 1, 1, 14.
[85] Ibid. 8, 58; 17, 5.
[86] Ibid. 6, 63, 33, 51; 14, 28.
[87] Ibid. 8, 26; 10, 32, 37.
[88] Ibid. 10, 17, 18.
[89] Rom. 5, 12-21.
[90] Ibid. 5, 12–19.
[91] Hebr. 2, 17; 4, 15; 7, 26.
[92] I Cor. 15, 45–49.

world. He is the Son of God, God's own proper Son, the first-born, the heir of all things, superior to the angels, who must adore Him. He is the brightness of the Father's glory, the figure of His substance, without beginning and without end of days.[93] Before His coming He existed *in forma Dei,* so that He needed not jealously guard His equality with God, as if He had obtained it by robbery; it was His by nature, since He is over all things God blessed forever.[94]

As the representative of the human race, Christ is made sin for our sake that in Him we may become the justice of God.[95] He is the price of our ransom, the means of propitiation, in which we have a share since we are included in Him.[96] Yet this reconciliation is entirely gratuitous on the part of God, in as much as Jesus is a gratuitous gift to our race, and in Jesus God is reconciling the world to Himself.[97]

This work of restoration culminates in the death of Jesus: sin is crucified in Him, and therefore also in us who are included in Him. He is thus our true High Priest, who offers Himself as a victim for our redemption. His death is a most efficacious sacrifice, which needs to be offered but once.[98] It cleanses not from legal impurities only, as did the sacrifices of the Old Law, but from sin and guilt. It frees us from the dominion of Satan, gives us access to the throne of mercy, and bestows upon us the blessing of divine grace.[99] It is offered for all men, extends to all times, and is perpetuated in heaven, where Jesus intercedes for us.[100] In Christ and in His death, the Levitical priesthood and sacrifices have come to an end.

Further still, Christ not only died for us, but He also rose from the dead and with Him we arise to a new life. This new life has its inception in baptism; then it works through faith, which makes us sharers in His justice and merits.[101] Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence

[93] Rom. 8, 32; Col. 1, 15, 17; Hebr. 1, 1-12; 3, 6; 7, 3, 8, 16, 18.
[94] Phil. 2, 6-9; Rom. 9, 5.
[95] Rom. 3, 25; 6, 6; I Cor. 5, 19.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Rom. 5, 8; Ephes. 1, 3-6; II Cor. 5, 19.
[98] Rom. 3, 25; Hebr. 10, 7-10; 7, 27; 9, 12, 15.
[99] Ibid. 10, 9; 4, 6.
[100] Ibid. 2, 9; 9, 25, 26; 9, 11, 12.
[101] Rom. 6, 3-8; 3, 22-25.

of things that appear not. Without faith it is impossible to please God and be saved. Those who lose it have no further hope, as they have no further sacrifice of reconciliation.[102] This faith, however, is not merely speculative; it is eminently practical, a complete surrender of man to God. It is, therefore, not opposed to works in general, but only to those works from which faith is absent. "My just man liveth by faith." [103]

Finally, as the transgression of the first Adam implanted in our flesh the principle of sin, so the restoration wrought by the second Adam implants in our soul the principle of sanctification. This principle is the Spirit of God and of Christ.[104] He is the Spirit of grace and of charisms. By grace we are made intrinsically just before God.[105] Grace is also a principle of action, by which we overcome temptation, do God's work, and merit the crown of eternal justice.[106] Besides, this Spirit of God and of Christ, though dwelling and working chiefly in the soul, to which He renders the testimony of divine sonship, extends His influence also to the body; He consecrates it as His temple, and will one day raise it from the grave.[107]

As the reader may have noticed, on several points of doctrine St. Paul goes considerably beyond the explicit teaching of Jesus as recorded in the Gospels. This seems especially true in regard to the consequences of Adam's fall, the rise and power of concupiscence, the transmission of original sin, the nature of the atonement, the regeneration of human nature, the scope and operation of grace; although these points have barely been touched upon in the above summary of his teaching on redemption. It must be noted, however, that in all this there is nothing really new. What the Gospels imply, he frequently brings out with great clearness, as was required by the conditions and circumstances under which he wrote and

[102] Hebr. 11, 1, 6; 6, 4–8.
[103] Rom. 1, 5, 17; 6, 16, 17; G. 2, 16; 3, 11.
[104] Rom. 8, 4–12; I Cor. 2, 14, 15; G. 5, 16.
[105] Rom. 5, 16–21; Ephes. 3, 14, 21.
[106] Rom. 7, 23–25; I Cor. 15, 10; II Tim. 4, 7, 8.
[107] I Cor. 3, 16; 6, 19; Rom. 8, 11.

preached. His initial declaration that his preaching was "by the revelation of Christ," and that he had not received his message from men, was not meant as a justification of any departure in his doctrine from the Gospel message announced by the other Apostles. Hence his boldness in declaring anathema any one who should presume to preach a gospel different from his own. Hence, too, the readiness with which James and Cephas and John gave him the right hand of fellowship.[108]

[108] G. 1, 9.

CHAPTER IV

CHRISTIAN LIFE IN APOSTOLIC TIMES: THE FIRST APPEARANCE OF HERESIES

Faithful to their Master's command, the Apostles waited for " the power of the Holy Ghost " and then " were witnesses unto Jesus in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and Samaria, and even to the uttermost part of the earth." Assisted by the Holy Spirit, they taught whatever He had commanded them, and thus spread the glad tidings of salvation through the name of Jesus. Their earliest missionary preaching developed this thesis: Jesus is the promised Messias; in Him all the prophecies are fulfilled; He died for the salvation of sinners, was buried, rose again from the dead, ascended into heaven, and on the last day He shall come to judge all mankind. He is the Ruler and the Lord: Him all must accept, believe in, and worship. All must do penance, be baptized in the name of Jesus for the remission of sins, and then they shall receive the Holy Ghost.[1]

These glad tidings were first announced to the Jews, but by a special revelation Peter was reminded that they must also be preached to the Gentiles.[2] As head of the Church, he acted independently in the matter, but not without being severely criticised by certain narrow-minded converts from Judaism.[3] Later on it was especially St. Paul who devoted himself to the conversion of Gentile nations. Concerning the conditions on which converts from heathenism were to be admitted, there was at first a diversity of opinion, but a council of the Apostles and elders decided that the ordinances of the Mosaic Law need not be observed.[4] However, a Judaizing party caused

[1] Cfr. Acts, cc. 1–5.
[2] Ibid. c. 10.
[3] Ibid. 11, 1–3.
[4] Ibid. 15, 1–29.

considerable trouble, and it was largely due to the determination of St. Paul that the decisions given at Jerusalem were carried into effect.

The gradual formation of the Church and the development of the hierarchy proceeded in conformity with the fundamental ideas outlined in the preceding chapter. Admittance into the Church could be obtained only through baptism, and this presupposed faith and penance.[5] Baptism was followed by imposition of hands, whereby the Holy Ghost was communicated.[6] The faithful persevered in prayer and in the breaking of bread.[7] In Jerusalem they at first practiced community of goods, and in all places they were mindful of the poorer brethren. For the service of the poor seven deacons were chosen by the faithful, and then consecrated for their work by the Apostles.[8] Some of them also preached the Gospel and baptized converts; but they could not communicate the Holy Spirit by the imposition of hands. This was reserved to the Apostles.[9] If any of the faithful fell sick, the presbyters were called in, to pray over the sick man and to anoint him with oil in the name of Jesus, that he might obtain relief in his sickness and also the forgiveness of his sins.[10] For the continuance of the Apostolic work, men of approved virtue were constituted presbyters by the imposition of hands, and thereby the Holy Ghost made them guardians of the flock.[11]

As regards the instruction of converts before baptism, the Acts of the Apostles and the Letters of St. Paul make it sufficiently clear that this was in the beginning of a somewhat compendious and general character. Thus, when it is stated that after the first sermon of St. Peter "as many as received the word were baptized," and "there were added in that day about three thousand souls," [12] the inference is that faith in the most fundamental doctrines of the religion of Jesus and a ready will to observe His commandments were then and

[5] Ibid. 2, 38, 41; 8, 36–28.
[6] Ibid. 8, 17, 19; 19, 5, 6.
[7] Ibid. 2, 42, 46; 20, 11.
[8] Ibid. 6, 1–6.
[9] Ibid. 8, 14.
[10] Jas. 5, 14, 15.
[11] Acts, 20, 28.
[12] Acts, 1, 41.

there deemed sufficient for admission into the Church. Yet from this it does not follow that the first Christians had only a vague and imperfect idea of the contents of their faith. For it must be remembered that the whole Gospel was preached to them, and however limited their knowledge of Christian truths might be at the time of their baptism, it was certainly very much extended and perfected as soon as the opportunity for this was offered. In fact, it was precisely from the preaching of the Apostles that our present Gospels originated, and therefore their contents must have been known to the Christians of the Apostolic age. Faith and good will were in the earliest times undoubtedly considered sufficient for baptism, but baptism was only the beginning of Christian life.

Nor must it be forgotten that these first converts came from Judaism, and were already instructed in nearly all the essentials of the faith. Their acceptance of the Messias, as preached by the Apostles, made their faith Christian. No doubt, occasionally pagans also were received in the same way, but as a general rule their instruction previous to baptism was more thorough. St. Paul's practice of tarrying for a considerable time in each new church he founded, as well as his letters to the different Christian communities, bears ample witness to this. Along what lines these instructions proceeded, may, aside from the Letters themselves, be gathered from the Apostles' Creed, which we know to have been used at the beginning of the second century as a profession of faith before baptism. It is indeed not likely that this Creed was composed by the Apostles themselves, although there was an early tradition to that effect; nevertheless, as the most competent critics admit, it certainly grew out of an Apostolic practice. In its most ancient form it reads as follows:

"I believe in one God, the Father Almighty; and in Jesus Christ, His only Son, our Saviour, born of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary, crucified under Pontius Pilate, and buried, He rose again on the third day from the dead, ascended into heaven, sitteth at the right hand of the Father; from whence He shall come to judge the living and the dead; and

in the Holy Ghost, the Holy Church, the forgiveness of sins, and the resurrection of the body." [13]

As is quite obvious, this Creed is divided into three articles, which correspond to the three divine names in the baptismal formula. The first article contains a statement of the candidate's belief in one God, the author of all things; the second epitomizes the whole Gospel history; whilst the third, professing faith in the Holy Ghost, is completed by a brief mention of the Church, the forgiveness of sins through baptism, and the resurrection of the body. Used as a profession of faith in the baptismal rite, it served at the same time as a recapitulation of the catechetical instructions which had been given to the neophytes. Hence it gives us a fair insight into the general scope and contents of these instructions.

With this general outline of Apostolic teaching before us, and calling to mind what was said in the first and second chapters about the condition of the Jewish and Gentile world at the time of Christ, we can form some idea of what conversion to Christianity meant in those early days. For converts from paganism there was opened up an entirely new world. The gods and goddesses of their erstwhile Pantheon were forever dethroned, making way for the one true God, who was to be adored in spirit and in truth. There were to be no further incantations, divinations, and offerings of material victims in sacrifice; but in their stead succeeded hymns and canticles, and the one clean oblation once offered for the redemption of the world. The attainment of riches and the enjoyment of pleasures were no longer to constitute life's chief purpose; for the world and all its passing show were to be regarded as a place and condition of exile, whose one object must ever be to make preparation for the coming of the Lord. Truly a star had risen out of Jacob, whose radiance enlightened the dwellers in the shadows of the valley of death.

But even for converts from Judaism there was opened up a much wider horizon than they had ever dreamt of whilst still groaning under the yoke of the Law. They still retained

[13] Cfr. Bardenhewer, Altkirch. Lit. I, 68-76; Patrol. 17, 18; Tixeront, H. D. I, 142.

their ancient watchword, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God," but with this one God was associated in their new belief His only-begotten Son, who dwelt on the very pinnacle of divinity. There could be no thought in their mind that He was divine in a wider sense, as were the deified heroes of Greece and Rome; or that His generation from the Father was on a par with that of the old gods of Olympus whose genealogies were well known. Whether their instructions had been received from James or John or Peter, it mattered not: Jesus Christ was put before them as God's own Son, the eternal Word, true God, by whom all things were made. And then there was the Holy Ghost, the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, the Spirit of God and of Christ, in whose name, together with that of the Father and of the Son, they had received the remission of their sins in the sacred laver of regeneration. He, too, must be reverenced with equal honor. Yes, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God, but in that one God is the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, each of them identical with God and yet in some mysterious way each one distinct from the others. In this was presented to them a mystery of the inner life of the Godhead which perhaps even those among them who were most conversant with Jewish theology had barely so much as suspected.

And so were their minds raised to loftier heights in the worship which this Triune God claimed as acceptable to Him from His children on earth. The Temple worship with its multifarious sacrifices of sheep and goats and oxen, and its many sprinklings of blood, was set aside as superseded by the one great sacrifice of the New Covenant, wherein they were nourished with the body and blood of their God Redeemer. Only in the accidental accompaniment of prayers and hymns, of reading and exhortation, did they find themselves in an atmosphere they were familiar with from their recollection of the Synagogue. Even through this there breathed a different spirit, less narrow, less subservient to the letter of the sacred text, but the material part was practically the same. Their own holy Patriarchs were placed before them as examples of Christian virtue, their own beautiful Psalms were recited as

Christian prayers. This was a precious heirloom which preserved to them their glorious past, and, in the comments that followed, this past was dwelt upon in order to direct their hopes to a still more glorious future. Then, too, the monotony of their work-a-day life was as heretofore relieved by the Sabbath rest, although at an early date the following day, or Sunday, seems to have been devoted to divine service. In all this they had a decided advantage over their fellow converts from paganism, whose whole religious life had to be placed on a new basis.

A further widening of outlook was experienced by converts from Judaism in reference to their social relations. Hitherto, even if domiciled in Gentile lands, their social intercourse was practically limited to those of their own nation. They were the chosen people, and intimate contact with strangers begot in them a certain sense of defilement, even apart from the prescriptions and prohibitions of the Law. Hence wherever they finally settled down in their wanderings over the Empire, they forthwith formed a community within a community, governed by its own customs and largely also by its own laws. But now they were taught that in Christ Jesus there was neither Jew nor Gentile, neither bond nor free, and that even strangers must be loved and treated as children of the same Father in heaven. However, this did not cause so violent a wrench as might at first sight appear; for the idea of a chosen people was instinctively transferred from the Jewish nation to the followers of Christ, whom St. Peter had already designated as "a chosen generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people." Hence, although there was some opposition in the Palestinian community, there soon sprang up a new Israel, whose children, gathered from all parts of the Empire, were quickened by the same faith, sustained by the same hope, bound together by the same charity, and guided in their aspirations and practices by the universally acknowledged authority of those whom Christ had sent to announce the glad tidings of salvation. It was the Infant Church, which had made its advent in the silence of the night.

On the other hand, much greater difficulties were experi-

enced by converts from paganism in readjusting their social relations. For them to become Christians was, in this respect, a most momentous step. It practically meant entire separation from ordinary life. For pagan society was so permeated by superstition, immorality, and idolatrous practices, that neither theaters, nor public games, nor ordinary social functions could in conscience be frequented by one who professed to be a follower of Christ. These, in fact, constituted the works of Satan and his pomps, which every one was called upon to renounce on being received into the Church. In many instances this would mean disruption of life long friendships, breaking up of the home, and exclusion from the common civilities of life. In time, too, it would lead to difficulties with the State; for although the Jews, because of their acknowledged national privileges, were allowed to limit their religious practices to the worship of Jahve, such a favor was not granted to Christian converts from paganism. In the matter of worship pagan gods had always been extremely accommodating; and hence, whatever might be their name or position, their clients were called upon, at least occasionally, to take part in the various functions of the State religion. What this view of the matter, when practically enforced, meant to the Christians, later persecutions will amply show.

Such, then, was the life of those who received the word, and who tried in the simplicity of their hearts to become other Christs. But there were many others who heard the word but received it not; to whom the Saviour referred when He said: "The kingdom of heaven is likened to a man that sowed good seed in his field. But while men were asleep, his enemy came and over-sowed cockle among the wheat, and went his way. . And when the blade was sprung up, and had brought forth fruit, then appeared also the cockle." [14] How truly prophetic this parable of our Blessed Saviour must appear to one who studies the spread of the Gospel! The message contained therein was indeed good seed; it was sown diligently in the field of the world; it sprang up and brought forth excellent

[14] Matt. 13, 26.

fruit: but mixed up with it appeared from the very first much cockle—doctrines of men's making, false philosophical speculations, " fables and genealogies without end, which minister questions rather than the edification of God which is in faith." The saying of St. Paul, that heresies must needs be,[15] was fully verified during his own life time and that of the other Apostles. It is in these heretical vagaries that Hellenic speculations and Oriental mysticism have left their traces, rather than in the genesis of Christian thought and in the development of Christian doctrines. A brief summary of them, as they appeared in Apostolic times, will be helpful in clearing up the movements of orthodox thought.

These early aberrations seem to have sprung from two opposite tendencies; one of which was to perpetuate the observance of the Mosaic Law in the New Covenant, the other to force the Gospel contents into ready-made systems of philosophy, partly Greek and partly Oriental in character. The former tendency gave rise to Judaic-Christianity, the latter to Gnosticism. Of Judaic-Christianity, however, it is not necessary to treat in this connection, since, as an active force, it was short-lived and caused no real doctrinal disturbances. Its first advocates were substantially orthodox in faith, and when later on heretical elements found their way into its teaching, the party exercised only an insignificant local influence. Cerinthus indeed, who denied the divinity of Christ, and to refute whom St. John is said to have written his Gospel, drew after him a certain following, but his influence appears to have been transient. The last remnants of this heterodox Judaic-Christianity are found among the Ebionites and Nazarenes, who in the second and third centuries led an inactive existence in Syria and Palestine, and then disappeared from history.

Gnosticism, on the other hand, which appeared only in germ during Apostolic times, played subsequently a rather important part in doctrinal development. It seems to have first made its appearance under a Judaizing guise, and as such

[15] I Cor. 11, 19.

reference is made to it in St. Paul's Epistle to the Colossians, in the Pastoral Epistles, in the second Epistle of St. Peter and that of St. Jude, and also in the Epistles and Apocalypse of St. John. Somewhat later it is again referred to in the Letters of St. Ignatius and St. Polycarp.

In his Epistle to the Colossians, St. Paul first draws a magnificent portrait of Christ the Redeemer, the Son of God, "in whom we have redemption through his blood, the remission of sins: who is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature: for in him were all things created in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers: all things were created by him and in him: and he is before all, and by him all things consist." Then he adds: "Now this I say, that no man may deceive you by loftiness of words." What he understood by this "loftiness of words," he explains by his further warnings: "Beware lest any man cheat you by philosophy, and vain deceit; according to the tradition of men, according to the elements of the world, and not according to Christ." "Let no man therefore judge you in meat or drink, or in respect of festival days, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths, which are a shadow of the things to come, but the body is Christ's. Let no man seduce you, willing in humility, and religion of angels, walking in the things which he hath not seen, in vain puffed up by the sense of his flesh, and not holding the head, from which the whole body, by joints and bands being supplied with nourishment and compacted, groweth unto the increase of God. If then you be dead with Christ from the elements of this world; why do you yet decree as living in the world? Touch not, taste not, handle not: which all are unto destruction by the very use, according to the precepts and doctrines of men. Which things have indeed a show of wisdom in superstition and humility, and not sparing the body, not in any honor to the filling of the flesh."[16]

From this it appears that there were various tendencies at work to depreciate the person of Christ, to set aside the re-

[16] Cfr. Col. cc. 1, 2.

demption which He wrought, and to cause disunion in the Church. The angels seem to have been placed above Jesus; salvation was made dependent on various unseemly practices, in one way or another tending to an abuse of the body; and the purity of Christian worship was more or less destroyed by the observance of feasts, new moons, and sabbaths. No definite doctrinal system is indicated as the source of these heterodox practices, yet in the light of later developments one can readily detect in them the beginnings of the second-century Gnostic heresies.

In his Pastoral Letters the Apostle is even more severe in condemning these disturbers of the Christian communities. He points to Hymenæus, Philetus, and Alexander the coppersmith, as drawing after them men of "itching ears," and especially women, upsetting their minds with questions as silly as they are subtle, and disseminating Jewish fables. They inculcate abstinence from marriage and from certain kinds of food, and teach that there is no other resurrection than that from sin. Morally these men are utterly corrupt, seeking only for gain. "They profess that they know God, but in their hearts they deny Him, being abominable, and incredulous, and to every good work reprobate." [17]

Those referred to in the Epistles of St. Peter and St. Jude seem to have been of the same kind: for they "deny our only Master and Lord Jesus Christ," despise authority and reject the doctrine of the judgment and the Lord's coming. Their morals are infamous: they blaspheme what they do not understand, and are beastly in their conduct.[18]

St. John, when speaking of these or similar heretics, characterizes their doctrine as "the depth of Satan." They claim to be apostles and Jews, but they are of the synagogue of the devil. They teach chiefly unchastity, and the lawfulness of eating meats offered to idols.[19] In his First Epistle he says there are many antichrists, who have come from the ranks of Christians. They deny that Jesus is the Christ and the Son. They are liars: and by denying the Son, they have not the

[17] I Tim. 1, 20; 6, 5–10; II Tim. 2, 17, 18; 4, 6; Tit. 1, 11, 15, 16.

[18] Jude, 4, 8, 10; II Pet. 2, 3–14.

[19] Apoc. 2, 9, 14–25; 3, 9.

Father. "Every spirit which confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God: and every spirit that dissolveth Jesus, is not of God: and this is the Antichrist." [20]

In what sense precisely these false teachers denied that "Jesus is the Christ and the Son," and that "Jesus Christ is come in the flesh," is not clear; but the most probable inference is that they regarded Him as purely human, and thereby denied the doctrine of the Incarnation. How these first attempts of turning Christian thought into heterodox channels, and incidentally also of corrupting the purity of Christian morals, gradually developed into full-fledged Gnosticism, we shall have occasion to point out when studying the doctrinal development that was going on during the second century. Here are the germs.

[20] I John, 2, 18–23; 4, 2, 3, 15.

CHAPTER V

THE WRITINGS AND TEACHING OF THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS[1]

By Apostolic Fathers, in this connection, are understood the authors of certain early Christian writings, generally orthodox in tone and teaching but not inspired, which were produced in Apostolic or sub-Apostolic times, ranging, roughly speaking, from the last decade of the first to the middle of the second century. The writings in question are nine in number, but the authors of only five of them are known. These are: St. Clement of Rome, St. Ignatius of Antioch, St. Polycarp of Smyrna, St. Papias of Hierapolis in Phrygia, and Hermas the brother of Pope Pius I. For the sake of clearness it seems advisable to divide our review of these rather important documents into two sections. In the first we shall give some general information regarding each document, together with a brief analysis of its contents; and in the second we shall group the dogmatic teaching of the several authors under a number of conventional headings, corresponding more or less to the treatises usually studied in our modern schools of theology.

A—The Writings of the Apostolic Fathers

Geographically and chronologically the writings of the Apostolic Fathers may be arranged in the following order, although some authors prefer a different arrangement:

1°. *The Didache; or, the Doctrine of the Twelve Apostles.*—According to Bardenhewer, Funk, Zahn, Sabatier, and the majority of critics, this little treatise appeared in the last

[1] Cfr. Bardenhewer, Patrology, 19–43, English Translation by Thos. J. Shahan; Geschichte der Altkirchlichen Litteratur, I, 76–146; F. X. Funk, Patres Apostolici; Tixeront, History of Dogmas, I, 104. Batiffol, Primitive Catholicism; *Durell, The Historic Church, 11–128.

decade of the first century, most likely in Palestine or Syria. It is now usually regarded as authentic, with the exception of two verses (1, 3; 2,1), which, however, have no direct dogmatic value. It seems to have been intended as a catechetical instruction, the contents of which are gathered around three main points: Moral Conduct, Church Discipline, and Eschatology.

The part dealing with moral conduct (1-6) begins with the sentence: "There are two ways, the way of life and the way of death, but there is a great difference between the two." Then it is pointed out what must be done to remain in the way of life, which is practically a development of the general proposition announced in the second sentence: "This is the way of life: First, love God, who created thee; then, love thy neighbor as thyself: and whatever you do not wish that it should be done to you, neither do it to another." The exposition and practical application of this general law of Christian conduct takes up the first four chapters. In the following two, 5 and 6, the way of death is described. This is chiefly done by pointing out the various crimes against the Decalogue, and in particular those referred to by St. Paul in his Epistle to the Romans. The author ends with a warning against false teachers and the eating of meats that have been sacrificed to idols.

The second part, dealing with Church discipline, begins with directions in reference to the administration of baptism, for which the Trinitarian formula is prescribed. Ordinary Christian practices are touched upon in chapter 8, where the faithful are told to fast on Wednesdays and Fridays, and to recite the Lord's Prayer three times a day. Chapters 9 and 10 give the prayers to be said at the agape, during which, according to the more common interpretation, bread and wine were consecrated and distributed to the faithful. The same matter is again taken up in chapter 14, where it is enjoined to celebrate the divine mysteries on Sundays. In connection with this, the following chapter (15) contains directions for the appointment of bishops and deacons, whose office it is to offer the Christian sacrifice and to instruct the faithful. Apostles,

prophets, and teachers are also mentioned, and rules are given to distinguish the true from the false.

The third part, which takes up the last chapter, treats almost exclusively of eschatological topics. The faithful are exhorted to come frequently together, in order to take counsel concerning their spiritual welfare and protect themselves against false prophets, of whom there will appear many in the last days.

2°. *The Epistle of Barnabas; or, The Pseudo-Barnabas.*— The time of its composition is not certain. Bardenhewer, Funk, Hilgenfeld, Weiszaecker, Cunningham, Lightfoot, and many others, assign as its latest possible date the close of the first century, immediately after the reign of Nerva (96-98). Harnack is non-committal. The home of the author, according to the more common view, was Alexandria in Egypt. Some few scholars still defend this so-called Epistle as the work of Barnabas the Apostle, but their view seems to be untenable.

Aside from the introduction, the work is divided into two very unequal parts; the first comprising seventeen chapters and the second four. In the first part a decided antagonism is shown to the Old Testament, especially in its literal interpretation as understood by the Jews. So interpreted the author regards it as the work of the devil. Hence his purpose is to draw Christian believers away from it, and thus to perfect them in the true knowledge of the faith as derived from the more spiritual preaching of the Apostles. His own interpretation of the Old Testament is consistently allegorical, assigning throughout an exclusively spiritual meaning to the various ordinances and enactments of the Mosaic Law. The second part is little more than an adaptation of the Two Ways described in the Didache.

3°. *The Prima Clementis; or, The First Letter of Clement to the Corinthians.*— According to Eusebius (Hist. Eccl. 3, 15, 34), Clement was the third successor of St. Peter, and sat in the pontifical chair from 92 to 101. There is, however, a tradition according to which he followed St. Peter immediately. If this latter view be adopted, the date of the letter

falls somewhere between 67 and 80. In either case it must be regarded as a first century document.

Modern scholars are generally agreed that this letter is a model Pastoral, simple in style, cogent in argument, and full of fatherly solicitude for the welfare of the Church. It consists of an introduction, two main divisions, and a recapitulation. In the introduction the author first expresses his regret that the late persecution prevented him from writing sooner, and then depicts in an eloquent manner the former prosperous condition of the Corinthian church and its present miserable state (1-3). In the first part (4-36) he lays down general principles, gives instructions and admonitions, warns against envy and jealousy, and strongly recommends the practice of humility, obedience, and penance; all of which he enforces by examples taken from the Old Testament. Then, in the second part (37-61), he passes over to the troubles that are disturbing the church at Corinth. Here he treats of the hierarchy, its institution, mode of perpetuation, and authority over the faithful. He emphasizes the necessity of subjection on the part of the people, urges all to practice mutual charity, and calls upon the disturbers to do penance and to submit. In the recapitulation (62-65) he runs over the contents of the letter, recommends his messengers to the good will of the Corinthians, and ends with a beautiful liturgical prayer.

4°. *The Seven Letters of Ignatius of Antioch.*—Addressed respectively, Ad Ephesios, Ad Magnesios, Ad Trallianos, Ad Romanos, Ad Philadelphenses, Ad Smyrnaeos, Ad Polycarpum. St. Ignatius was the second successor of St. Peter in the see of Antioch in Syria. He was martyred in Rome during the reign of Trajan (98-117), but the exact year of his death is not known. He wrote the first four letters at Smyrna and the last three at Troas, whilst on his way to Rome, a captive for the faith.

These letters, whose authenticity is no longer called in question with any show of reason, are justly regarded as the most precious heirloom of Christian antiquity. They are original in thought, powerful in diction, glowing with charity, and crowded with doctrinal instruction. Regarding this last point

Cardinal Newman did not hesitate to say that "the whole system of Catholic doctrine may be discovered, at least in outline, not to say in parts filled up, in the course of these seven epistles." [2] And this is no exaggeration. The sovereignty and majesty of God, the Incarnation and redemption, the visibility, unity, and catholicity of the Church, the real presence of the Saviour in the Eucharist, the various means of sanctification in the Church of Christ, the virtues that must adorn the Christian life, and many other topics are dealt with in the author's own unique way. As Tixeront has well pointed out in his "History of Dogmas," the dogmatic teaching of Ignatius is chiefly gathered around three points: Christ, the Church, Christian Life.[3] Not that there is any attempt to present a carefully thought out theological system, but the needs of the various churches to which the author wrote called for suggestions along these lines.

5°. *The Fragments of the Writings of St. Papias.* — It is commonly held that Papias was in his youth a disciple of St. John the Evangelist. Later on he became bishop of Hierapolis in Phrygia. He seems to have died about the year 150, but at what particular date he composed the book of which these few fragments have been preserved is a matter of conjecture. What remains of his writings is of no special dogmatic value, except in so far as it gives us some information regarding the expected Millennium and the origin of the Gospels according to St. Mark and St. Matthew.

6°. *The Letter of St. Polycarp.*—Polycarp also was in his youth a disciple of St. John, and by him was made bishop of Smyrna in Asia Minor. He was martyred in his own episcopal city, February 23, 155, in the eighty-sixth year of his life. The year before his death he had paid a visit to Rome, in order to confer with Pope Anicetus about the time when Easter should be celebrated. They did not come to an understanding on this point, but preserved the harmony of faith and charity. During his stay in Rome, as St. Irenæus relates, he one day met the heretic Marcion, who asked him, do you

[2] Theology of the Seven Epistles of St. Ignatius, Historical Sketches.
[3] H. D. I, 122.

know me? "Surely, I know the first-born of Satan," was Polycarp's forceful reply, thereby indicating his abhorrence of all heresy and schism.

He wrote his letter at the request of the church of Philippi in Macedonia, the presbyters of which had sent him word about Ignatius and in turn begged him for a copy of the martyr's letters, together with a word of advice from himself. This request alone, he states, emboldened him to write to a church that had been founded by the great Apostle Paul, from whom also they had received an Epistle whilst he was laboring in distant parts. Then, after some general remarks, he admonishes and advises the different classes of the faithful; married women and widows, young men and women, deacons and priests. Next he refers to the sad fall of a certain Valens, a presbyter, whom avarice had led into evil ways, and he begs them that by prayer and charity they may endeavor to bring him back to the Church. In conclusion he promises to send the message of the Philippians about Ignatius to Antioch, says that he will forward to them copies of all the letters he has in his possession, and begs for further news about the martyr if perchance they should receive any. Hence the letter must have been written shortly after the martyrdom of Ignatius. Several passages show that the author was familiar with Clement's letter to the Corinthians.

7°. *The Martyrium Polycarpi,* an account of the martyrdom of the saintly bishop of Smyrna. Issued by the authorities of that church, it was intended for the different Christian communities in Asia Minor, where Polycarp was held in great veneration. It was written in 155 or 156. The inscription runs thus: "The Church of God which is sojourning at Smyrna to the Church of God that sojourns at Philomelium, and to all the communities of the Holy and Catholic Church in every place." It contains several points of considerable dogmatic value, which will be brought out in the second part of this chapter.

8°. *The Shepherd of Hermas.*—Hermas composed his work at Rome during the Pontificate of his brother, Pius I, who was Pope from 140 to 154. Early writers usually identified

him with Hermas, the disciple of St. Paul, but the Muratorian Fragment determines his date and identity as here given.

This treatise has been aptly called "a vast examination of conscience of the church of Rome," because in it the author lays bare with unsparing hand the many shortcomings, vacillations, and sins of the Roman Christians, both lay and cleric, and proposes the serious practice of penance as the only remedy that can cure these evils. Hence in concept and purpose it is a treatise on penance, although incidentally other matters are also touched upon and explained.

The work is apocalyptic in character, and derives its exhortatory force from the supposed divine inspiration of the author and the command he received from God to set forth the revelations vouchsafed him for the good of the Church. It consists of five Visiones, twelve Mandata, and ten Similitudines. In reference, however, to the contents, the treatise is divided into two parts. The first of these comprises the first four Visiones, in which the Church appears in the form of a matron, giving the author various instructions. The second part is made up of the fifth Visio, in which the Angel of Penance appears under the guise of a shepherd, and entrusts to him a number of mandata to be made known to the Church. It is from this last part that the whole work has received the name of "The Shepherd."

9°. *The Secunda Clementis; or, the Second Letter of Clement to the Corinthians.*— This document was by most ancient writers ascribed to Clement of Rome, but since the discovery of the entire text, or rather its publication in 1875, it has been shown to be a homily, which was produced at Corinth towards the middle of the second century. Who the author was is not known. Its contents are of a somewhat varied character, though the main purpose of the preacher seems to have been to exhort his hearers to the practice of penance.

Taken geographically, these nine documents represent almost the whole Church during the half century to which they belong. Their importance, therefore, in reference to the History of Dogmas is obvious. It must, however, be borne in mind that not one of these writers purposes to give a complete exposition

of Christian doctrine. They touch upon various doctrinal points in a merely casual way, being primarily intent upon exhorting their readers or hearers to the practice of virtue. Hence to infer from their writings that nothing was taught in those days except what they explicitly state, as is frequently done by modern critics, is as foolish as it is unfair.

B — Teaching of the Apostolic Fathers

From what sources the Apostolic Fathers drew the contents of their teaching is sufficiently evident from their own works. They appealed both to Scripture and tradition. Besides the various books of the Old Testament, of which they make frequent use, they also cite, though less frequently, nearly all the writings that are now contained in the New. In these sources they find the word of God, made known to men by the Spirit of Truth. This same Spirit also guides the Church in carrying on her divine mission of teaching all nations, so that her voice is none other than the voice of Christ. Indeed for practical purposes the teaching of the Church is supreme; for it is she who breathes the living spirit into the dead letter of the written word, and thus makes it available for Christ's flock entrusted to her shepherding.

This last thought is especially emphasized by St. Ignatius, whose efforts to ward off heresy and schism compelled him in a manner to set down his views on the matter in question. Thus writing to the church at Philadelphia, he says: "When I heard some of them saying: 'Unless I find it in the archives, that is, in the gospels, I do not believe it,' and I told them that it was so written, they answered: 'This is to be proved.' But to me Jesus Christ is the archive."[4] And again to the church of Ephesus: "Jesus Christ, our inseparable life, is the thought of the Father, as also the bishops, all the world over, are in agreement with the mind of Jesus Christ."[5] And to the church at Smyrna: "Where the bishop shall appear, there let the people also be; as where Jesus Christ is, there is the Catholic Church."[6] Thus presided over by the bishops,

[4] Philad. 8, 2.
[5] Eph. 3, 2.
[6] Smyrn. 8, 2.

the Church is an incorruptible teacher; for Christ has made her incorruptible.[7] Hence "He has set up through His resurrection, in all ages, a standard for the saints and for His followers, whether they be Jews or Gentiles, in the one body of His Church."[8]

In the following brief summary of the teaching of the Apostolic Fathers no attempt will be made to construct anything like a theological system, but it will be very helpful to gather their incidental statements and elucidations of doctrinal points under the same headings that form the main divisions of systematic theology as it is taught in our schools to-day. This will enable us to make some sort of comparison between what is held at present and what we here find to have been held in the distant past. The chief points to be considered are the following:

1°. *God and His Relation to the World.*— All these writers either expressly state or obviously imply that there is only one God, who transcends the world of finite beings, and has nothing in common with the false gods of pagan mythology. He is the creator of all things, the source of all blessings, the one object of all true worship. "First of all believe," says Hermas, "that there is one God, who created and consummated all that is, and out of nothing caused all things to be. He comprehends all, though He Himself is incomprehensible."[9] "Do we not have one God," asks Clement, "and one Christ, and one Spirit of grace poured out upon us, and one calling in Christ?"[10] "This is the way of life," explains the author of the Didache, "first, love God, who created thee."[11] "The Prophets, inspired by the grace of Christ," writes Ignatius, "suffered persecutions for the purpose of convincing the incredulous that there is one God, who manifested Himself through Jesus Christ His Son."[12] "This God," again argues Clement, "has established all things by the word of His majesty and by His word he can destroy them all."[13] Yet

[7] Eph. 17, 1.
[8] Smyrn. 1, 2.
[9] Mandat. 1, 1.
[10] I Clem. 46, 6.
[11] Didache 1, 2.
[12] Magn. 8, 2.
[13] I Clem. 27, 4.

He is not only a God of power, but also of merciful kindness, who is faithful to His promises and ever ready to receive back the erring.[14] It is a thoroughly Christian concept, based upon the teaching of Holy Scripture. So impressed is the author with the greatness and goodness of God, that ever and anon there flows spontaneously from his pen the doxology, "to whom be glory, world without end. Amen."

And what Clement, Hermas, Ignatius, and the author of the Didache thus express in so many words, all the others presuppose or imply as a belief that is held by every true follower of Christ. Hence when Polycarp was already bound to the stake, he ended his long prayer for friend and foe with the sublime words: "Wherefore I praise Thee in all things, I bless Thee, I glorify Thee through the eternal and heavenly high priest Jesus Christ, Thy beloved Son, through whom be glory to Thee together with Him and the Holy Spirit, now and through all future ages. Amen."

This firm and universal belief of these early Christians in the unity and transcendence of God, and in His loving solicitude for the creatures of His hands, is a point that deserves the most careful consideration in the History of Dogmas. Not only is it the foundation upon which Christianity was conceived to rest, but it also holds the key to the expressions used by these same writers in reference to the divinity of Christ and the Holy Spirit. Paganism confounded the deity with the world, and as a result it made gods of its own dead heroes; Christianity, on the other hand, separated God from the world, in the sense that it conceived God's being as standing absolutely by itself, and therefore as absolutely unapproachable by any other being, no matter with what extraordinary perfections it might be endowed. Between God and man these early Christians saw a chasm that nothing could bridge. Men might become godlike, but in no sense could they become gods. It is precisely in this that men like Harnack make a fundamental mistake. Because Christianity was propagated in a pagan world, therefore, they infer, its concept of God must have been more or less like that of paganism.[15] A mere glance

[14] Ibid. 19, 2, 3; 29, 1.
[15] Cfr. Harnack, Dogmengeschichte I, 203, foll.

at these early writers is quite sufficient to convince one of the contrary. They one and all echo the teaching of Holy Writ: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God!"

2°. *The Divinity of Christ.*—Although God was thus conceived as absolutely one, standing in His essence wholly apart from the world of finite beings, nevertheless the Apostolic Fathers had no hesitancy about admitting Christ also to be God. In regard to this point they do not all speak with the same clearness and precision, still, with the possible exception of Hermas, there is not one among them who gives expression to a different belief. The author of the Didache usually addresses God the Father "per Jesum puerum tuum," through Jesus thy servant, but as this is a liturgical formula, no argument can be drawn from it against his belief in the divinity of the Saviour.[16] Nor, on the other hand, is it a conclusive proof for his belief in the Saviour's divinity when he calls Jesus the "God of David."[17] But when he directs his readers to baptize "in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,"[18] the presumption is that he looked upon the Son and the Holy Spirit as associated with the Father in the same Godhead. For although this is a Scriptural formula, nevertheless we may well assume that these early Christians understood not less clearly than we do that a mere creature could not be associated with God in the solemn rite of Christian initiation.

Clement also, when using liturgical formulas, speaks of Christ as the servant of God,[19] but in other connections he calls Him God's Son.[20] Again, he associates Him and the Holy Spirit with the Father in the solemn formula of adjuration: "As God liveth, and the Lord Jesus Christ liveth, and the Holy Spirit, the faith and hope of the elect, so shall they who keep the commandments be in the number of those who are saved through Christ."[21] This formula, as Tixeront points out,[22] is equivalent to the Old Testament formula, "as

[16] Cfr. Didache 9, 2, 3.
[17] Ibid. 10, 6.
[18] Ibid. 7, 2.
[19] I Clem. 59, 2, 3, 4.
[20] Ibid. 36, 4.
[21] Ibid. 58, 2.
[22] H. D. I. 108.

the Lord liveth," so that for Clement "the Lord" is identical with "God, the Lord Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit." Moreover Clement applies to the Saviour the very explicit declaration of divinity contained in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews, thus incidentally making it quite clear in what sense he understands the term "Son of God." [23]

Polycarp speaks of Jesus Christ as "the Son of God, our eternal pontiff,[24] who came in the flesh"; [25] and hence the inference is that he regards Him as a divine being. This inference becomes quite certain when considered in the light of the doxology already cited in a preceding paragraph. For there he not only gives glory to God the Father through the Son, but accords the same glory to the Son and the Holy Spirit as to the Father,[26] which he certainly could not have done unless he considered all three to be truly God.

The "Martyrium Polycarpi" is more explicit. The Jews, it seems, had spread a rumor to the effect that the Smyrnian Christians would henceforth worship Polycarp instead of Jesus Christ. In answer to this the Christians protest that such a suggestion is absurd, because, whilst they love and venerate the martyrs as disciples and imitators of the Lord, they "adore Christ as the Son of God." [27] This shows how well these early Christians understood the nature of Christ's divine sonship. They conceived it as a sonship that entitled Him to divine honors, simply because as Son He necessarily possessed the same divine nature as the Father.

Pseudo-Barnabas puts the matter in an equally clear light. "Jesus," he says, "was not the son of man, but the Son of God, made manifest in the flesh. And because men would call Christ the son of David, hence David himself, fearing and understanding the error of the wicked, prophesied concerning Him: 'The Lord said to my Lord: Sit thou at my right hand, until I make thy enemies thy footstool.' . . . Behold how David calls Him his Lord, and not his son." [28] Moreover

[23] I Clem. 36, 2–4.
[24] Polyc. 2, 1; 6, 2.
[25] Ibid. 7, 1.
[26] Martyr. 12, 2.
[27] Ibid. 17, 3.
[28] Barn. 12, 10, 11.

it was necessary that on His coming into this world He should assume a body; for "if He had not come in the flesh, how would men have been able to look at Him, as they cannot even look steadily at the rays of the earthly sun, which at some time shall cease to be and is merely the work of His hands?" It was to the Son that the Father said at the beginning of the world: "Let us make man to our image and likeness." [29]

We find the same definite statements in the letters of Ignatius. Not only does he call Christ "my God," [30] "our God"; [31] but simply "God," and even "the God," (Τὸν Θεὸν) thus using the article, upon which modern critics place so much emphasis in this matter.[32] Again, he states that Jesus Christ is the Word of God,[33] who "before all ages was with the Father," [34] that His blood is the blood of God,[35] and that He raised Himself by His own power from the dead.[36] In fact, so definite is the author in his declaration of Christ's true divinity that it is hard to see how he might have expressed himself more forcibly. And yet modern Rationalists are not satisfied. They say that in other places Ignatius speaks of Jesus as the "Son of man and of God," as being "of God and of Mary," as "the Son of God according to the will and power of God,[37] as if he attributed the Godhead of Christ to His miraculous birth, thus taking the term, "Son of God," in an improper sense. They entirely overlook the fact that according to Ignatius Jesus is the "Son of God and of man" because He is God Incarnate.

The Secunda Clementis is hardly less clear and definite on this point. At the very beginning of his discourse, the preacher tells his audience: "Brethren, we ought so to think of Jesus Christ as of God, as the judge of the living and the dead." [38] Harnack regards this as undecisive, suggesting that the author called Christ God simply because of His position in the economy of salvation.[39] But how far this subtile dis-

[29] Ibid. 5, 10; 5, 5.
[30] Rom. 6, 3.
[31] Ibid. 3, 3; Ephes. 15, 3; Polyc. 8, 3.
[32] Smyrn. 1, 1.
[33] Magn. 8, 2.
[34] Ibid. 6, 1.
[35] Ephes. 1, 1.
[36] Smyrn. 2, 1.
[37] Ibid. 1, 1; Ephes. 20, 2.
[38] II Clem. 1, 1.
[39] Op. cit. 206, notes 3, 4.

tinction was from the author's mind appears with sufficient clearness from the fact that he introduces Christ's own words with the formula: "God said," [40] that he makes Jesus not only the Redeemer but also the Creator of the world,[41] that he refers to the Saviour as the object of our worship,[42] and repeatedly speaks of Him as if He were the only Lord and God in heaven and on earth;[43] all of which, strange to say, Harnack himself admits a few lines further on.

The only one of all these writers who is unsatisfactory in his statements concerning the divinity of Christ is Hermas. He holds, indeed, that the Son is truly God, but by the Son he appears to understand the Holy Spirit.[44] The divinity of Jesus he seems to admit only in so far as the Holy Ghost has taken up His abode in Him, and as, on account of His merits, this Jesus was subsequently adopted into the divine family circle.[45] Some have tried to read an orthodox meaning into all this, but the matter remains rather doubtful. Nor would this doctrinal confusion be inexplicable. For being a man of little education, as is commonly admitted, and relying largely on his own wisdom, as appears from several other places in his writings, it may be assumed that the author simply misinterpreted the text of St. Luke, which records the descent of the Holy Ghost upon Jesus at His baptism. Neither is it difficult to understand, how, in spite of this Adoptionist view, the work should have been so highly esteemed in the early Church; because, as the author is constantly dealing in visions and parables, his heterodoxy on this particular point might easily enough escape detection, at least so long as the later Adoptionist heresy had not yet aroused the suspicion of the faithful in this regard.

3°. *The Divinity of the Holy Ghost: The Blessed Trinity.* —On the divinity of the Holy Ghost Hermas is most explicit. Not only does he call Him the Son of God, the adviser of the Father, but also the Creator of all things,[46] who dwells in the

[40] II Clem. 13, 4.
[41] Ibid. 1, 4.
[42] Ibid. 2, 2, 3.
[43] Ibid. 5, 1, 2; 8, 2, 4.
[44] Simil. 5, 5; 9, 1, 1.
[45] Simil. 5, 6, 5, 6, 7; cfr. Funk, PP. Apost. ed. 2, p. 541.
[46] Simil. 5, 6.

faithful as the principle of sanctification.[47] According to Clement, He is the Spirit of God, the author of the Holy Scriptures, which therefore must be accepted as true.[48] He is the Spirit of grace poured out upon us all,[49] who is associated with the Father and the Son as a witness to the truth of God's promises.[50] Ignatius refers to Him incidentally as being instrumental in the sanctification of souls,[51] and as the Spirit who has come from God and knows the secrets of hearts.[52] Twice he mentions Him together with the Father and the Son as if belonging to the same order of being.[53] If we add to these texts the baptismal formula contained in the Didache and the doxology of Polycarp as recorded in the " Martyrium," we have practically all that bears either on the divinity of the Holy Ghost or on the mystery of the Blessed Trinity.

Modern critics usually point out that all this is so vague as to force upon us the conviction that these writers had no definite belief concerning the points in question. That is as much of an exaggeration as the assertion of some Catholic writers that the Apostolic Fathers were as conversant with the mystery of the Blessed Trinity as the great champions of orthodoxy during the fourth and fifth centuries. The truth seems to lie midway. We find here all the elements of the mystery — the unity of God, the divinity of the Son, and less clearly that of the Holy Ghost, together with the coexistence of three divine terms in one Godhead — or the substance of the doctrine *qua factum mysterii;* but to the combination of these elements, in so far as it involved any formal investigation or led to a theoretical exposition, it is not likely that much attention was given at the time. It must be remembered, however, that these matters are touched upon only in passing. Had the writers undertaken to give us a formal treatise on the points in question, the result would most likely bear quite a different aspect.

4°. *The Humanity of Christ and the Unity of Person in*

[47] Ibid.
[48] I Clem. 45, 2, 3.
[49] Ibid. 46, 6.
[50] Ibid. 58, 2.
[51] Eph. 9, 1, 2.
[52] Antioch. 7, 1.
[53] Eph. 9, 1; Magn. 13, 1.

the Saviour.—That Christ was true man is presupposed by all these writers as a matter of universal belief. He comes from Abraham "according to the flesh," [54] is the "Son of God made manifest in the flesh," [55] is "our God Jesus Christ borne in the womb by Mary, of the seed of David and of the Holy Ghost." [56] Furthermore, a few of them, like Ignatius and Polycarp, emphasize this point very strongly against the Docetæ, who maintained that Christ's humanity was only a semblance of human nature. "Jesus Christ," says Ignatius, "was truly a descendant of the race of David according to the flesh, truly born of a virgin, and truly baptized by John, that all justice might be fulfilled by Him; for us truly nailed to the cross in His flesh under Pontius Pilate and Herod the Tetrarch." [57] "He suffered truly, as He also raised Himself truly from the dead, and not, as some unbelievers pretend that He only seemed to suffer." [58] And in the resurrection He again took up His body: "For I know that even after the resurrection He was in the flesh, and I believe that He is so now." [59] Polycarp is not less outspoken. "For every one," he says, "who does not confess that Jesus Christ came in the flesh, is antichrist: and whoso does not confess the testimony of the Cross, is of the devil; and whoso wrests the sayings of the Lord to his own desires and says there is to be no resurrection and no judgment, he is the first-born of Satan." [60]

Christ, therefore, is true God and true man; is He then one person in two natures? This seems to be assumed throughout. Like the Evangelists and the Apostles before them, all these writers know only one Christ, who is at the same time the Son of God and the Redeemer of the world. "If the Lord," asks Pseudo-Barnabas, "bore sufferings for our soul's sake, seeing that He is the Lord of the world, to whom God said in the beginning, 'Let us make man to our image and likeness,' how then did He suffer at the hands of men?" And he answers, it was for this reason "that it behooved Him to

[54] Clem. 32, 2.
[55] Barn. 12, 10.
[56] Ignat. Eph. 8, 2.
[57] Smyrn. 1, 2; 2.
[58] Smyrn. 2.
[59] Smyrn. 3, 1.
[60] Polyc. 7, 1.

appear in the flesh, so as to destroy death and show forth the resurrection from the dead." [61] It was not a mere man who suffered and died, but "the Lord of the world," who had assumed a passible nature like our own. "The Lord Jesus Christ," says Clement, "according to the disposition of the divine will, gave His blood for us, His flesh for our flesh, His soul for our souls." [62]

And in this manner they all reason, without ever giving the slightest hint that they distinguished in Christ between the man and God. He is to them one individual, at the same time God and man. Hence, although they did not theorize on the point, the obvious inference is that they assumed such a union between the two elements in Christ as would make Him one person. This, moreover, appears almost to evidence from the letters of St. Ignatius, who treats the matter somewhat more in detail. "There is one physician," he says, "both corporal and spiritual, begotten and unbegotten, God existing in the flesh, true life in death, both of Mary and of God, first passible then impassible, Jesus Christ our Lord." [63] And again: "Expect Him who is above all time, the eternal, the invisible, for our sakes visible, the impalpable, the impassible, for our sakes passible, who has suffered in all manner of ways for our sakes." [64] What can this possibly imply except the unity of person and the distinction of natures in Christ? The author advances indeed no theory about the nature of the union, but he expresses himself in a manner that is justified only on the supposition that he considered it to be hypostatic. He knows only one Jesus Christ, who is at the same time God and man. A modern theologian could hardly place the matter in a clearer light.

5°. *The Redemption.*—The purpose of Christ's coming is regarded by nearly all of these writers as twofold: To bring us the knowledge of God and to deliver us from the death of sin. "This is the way, beloved, in which we find salvation," writes Clement, "Jesus Christ, the pontiff of our oblations, the advocate and helper of our infirmity. Through Him we

[61] Barn. 5, 5, 6.
[62] I Clem. 49, 6.
[63] Eph. 7, 2.
[64] Polyc. 8, 2.

behold the heights of the heavens; . . . through Him the Lord willed that we should taste immortal knowledge." [65] "Let us fix our eyes upon the blood of Christ, and know how precious it is in the sight of God His Father; it was shed for our salvation and brought the grace of repentance to the whole world." [66] "Jesus Christ," says Ignatius, "who is the thought of the Father, the truthful mouth by which the Father expresses Himself, has become for us the knowledge of God and our teacher." [67] "He bore all His sufferings for our sakes, that we might obtain salvation; and He truly suffered, as He also truly raised Himself from the dead." [68] Even Hermas, who, as we have seen, probably went astray on the divinity of Christ, bears witness to the prevalence of this view in regard to Christ's coming into this sinful world. "God," he says, "planted a vineyard, that is, He created a people, and gave it to His Son; and the Son placed angels over the people for their protection; and He Himself washed away their sins, laboring much and sustaining many trials; for no vineyard can be cultivated without labor and sorrows. He therefore having washed away the sins of the people, showed them the ways of life, giving them a law which He received from His Father." [69]

It is especially deserving of notice that these writers are perfectly familiar with the theory of vicarious satisfaction, which modern critics usually consider as a later development. When Clement states that "our Lord Jesus Christ, according to the disposition of the divine will, gave His blood for us, His flesh for our flesh, His soul for our souls," [70] he evidently goes on the supposition that Christ was put in our place, that "Him who knew no sin, for us God hath made sin, that we might be made the justice of God in Him," as St. Paul expressed it in his Second Epistle to the Corinthians. It is in the same sense that Ignatius tells the Christians of Smyrna: "But all things He has suffered for our sakes, that we might obtain salvation." [71]

[65] I Clem. 30, 1, 2.
[66] Ibid. 7, 4.
[67] Cfr. Eph. 3, 2; 17, 2; Rom. 8, 2.
[68] Smyrn. 2.
[69] Simil. 6, 2, 3.
[70] I Clem. 49, 6.
[71] Smyrn. 2.

This is brought out with greater emphasis by Pseudo-Barnabas in his reasoning against the Jews. He tells them that they have no cause to be scandalized at the sufferings and shameful death of the Saviour, since these are no sign of His weakness but rather a proof of the needs of our sinful nature. "If the Son of God, He who is the Lord and shall judge the living and the dead, suffered, it was because He wished to give us life by His stripes." "Be sure that the Son of God could not undergo sufferings save on our account; He gave His own body as a sacrifice for our sins." "The Lord willed to deliver His body that by the forgiveness of our sins we might be sanctified, which is effected by the aspersion of His blood; for it is written: He was wounded for our iniquities and bruised for our sins, by His bruises we are healed." "If He suffered, it was for our souls, . . . to destroy death and to bring about the resurrection of the dead, and to fulfill the promise made to our fathers that He would prepare unto Himself a new people."[72]

6°. *The Church of Christ.* — In one way or another, all these writers assume that the fruits of the redemption are laid up for the individual in the Church, which was founded by Christ and locally established by the Apostles and their disciples. The two who especially enlarge on this point are Clement and Ignatius, although the others also bring out the same idea.

Clement's teaching on the Church is based on the principle of unity through authority. The Gospel of Christ, he says, has been preached in the whole world, His elect are everywhere; they are His people, a holy portion reserved to Himself. They form His body, and the unity of that body they must ever preserve.[73] "Let us mark," he tells the Corinthians, "the soldiers that are enlisted under our rulers, how exactly, how readily, how submissively, they execute the orders given them. All are not eparchs, or rulers of thousands, or rulers of hundreds, or rulers of fifties, and so forth; but each

[72] Cfr. Barn. 5, 11, 12; 14, 6; 7, 2, 3; 5, 1, 2, 6, 7; 14, 4; 6, 11.

[73] I Clem. 5, 7; 49, 2, 3; 30, 3.

man in his own rank executeth the orders given by the king and his chief officers." [74]

For the building up of this body, Christ sent His Apostles, even as He was sent by the Father. "Christ, therefore, was sent by God, and the Apostles were sent by Christ: so both were sent orderly, according to the will of God." [75] Hence the community of the faithful, governed by proper authority, has Christ for its founder; and therefore those who foment schism set at naught the divine ordinances, they "tear asunder the members of Christ." [76]

The Apostles in their turn, after preaching the Gospel in country places and in cities, chose men of approved virtue and made them bishops and deacons, as had already been foreshadowed in the Old Testament, where it is said: I will confirm their bishops in justice and their deacons in faith.[77] And this they did of set purpose, for they well knew that after their death contention would arise over the episcopal dignity. Therefore they ordained that after their going hence other virtuous and holy men should receive their ministry. And these, thus lawfully constituted, cannot, so long as they faithfully discharge the duties of their office, be removed without grave fault.[78]

From this it appears that in the matter of Church government three points were quite clear to the author's mind: First, that there existed in the Church an authority which the faithful were bound in conscience to obey; secondly, that this authority was derived through the Apostles from Christ Himself; thirdly, that the Apostles themselves made provision for its perpetuation. All this he assumes as well known, and therefore he considers it sufficient to call attention to it in passing.

As regards the distribution of this authority, or the various grades of the hierarchy, the author's way of speaking is not clear. He usually designates those entrusted with ecclesiastical functions as presbyters, but in one place he dis-

[74] Ibid. 34, 7.
[75] Ibid. 42, 1, 2.
[76] Ibid. 4, 6, 7.
[77] Ibid. 42, 4; 40, 5.
[78] Ibid. 44, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6; 47, 6.

tinguishes them as bishops and deacons.[79] He also mentions a division into high priest, priests, and levites, each class having its own functions to perform.[80] It is true, this bears direct reference only to the Old Law, but it seems to suppose a similar division of ecclesiastical functionaries in the New Dispensation. He likewise states that at certain definite times oblations must be made and the sacred functions performed, and with this the bishops and deacons are entrusted.[81] It seems that he uses the term "presbyters" as including both bishops and priests, thus following the manner of speaking also found in St. Paul. At all events, these ecclesiastical superiors are the guides of our souls; they must be obeyed and honored.[82]

In this connection must also be mentioned the author's testimony to the Primacy of Rome in the matter of Church government. This is, indeed, only implied, but it is none the less forceful and clear. He puts himself obviously in the position of a judge, and as such holding the place of God. He is writing under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, and looks for obedience from those to whom he directs his exhortation.[83] He regrets that circumstances would not allow him to attend to this matter before, but now he will leave nothing undone to bring about peace; and if any there be who will not obey in those things which God commands through Him, they will be guilty of a grievous offense and run a great risk: still, whatever be the outcome of his intervention, he has done his duty and will be without sin before God.[84]

And thus, throughout the whole letter, he speaks as a superior to his subjects, though always in a fatherly way. There is no hesitancy, no weakness, no fear of unauthorized intrusion anywhere. Nor does it make any difference whether we suppose that he was appealed to by the church of Corinth or not; the very fact that he proceeds as one who has a right to command shows that he is conscious of his authority, and also that the Corinthians are supposed to recognize the legiti-

[79] Ibid. 42, 4.
[80] Ibid. 40, 5.
[81] Ibid. 40, 2; 44, 4.
[82] Ibid. 6, 3, 1; 1, 3.
[83] Ibid. 63, 2.
[84] Ibid. 1, 1; 59, 2.

macy of its exercise in adjusting their domestic difficulties. In this we can clearly discern the fundamental idea of the Primacy of Rome as understood at the present time.

According to Ignatius Christ is the "door of the Father, by which Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and all the Prophets, as well as the Apostles and the Church, did enter." Hence he says: "Christianity did not believe in Judaism, but Judaism believes in Christianity, in which are gathered together all those who believe in God." [85] Christ "has set up through His resurrection, in all ages, a standard for the saints and for His followers, whether they be Jews or Gentiles, in the one body of His Church." [86] "Jesus Christ, our inseparable life, is the thought of the Father, as also the bishops, all the world over, are in agreement with the mind of Jesus Christ." [87] Hence "where the bishop shall appear, there let the people also be; as where Jesus Christ is, there is the Catholic Church." [88]

The term "Catholic Church" appears here for the first time, although the doctrine contained in it is found in earlier writers as well. As here used it designates the Church of Christ in her universality, as spread over the whole world, "per tractus terrae," and including the various local communities as integral members. In this sense the epithet seems to have been in common use at the time, or at least a little later, as appears from the "Martyrium Polycarpi," where it occurs three times; but in its secondary meaning, denoting opposition to heretical sects, it was probably not used until the latter part of the second century. It may be noted that Ignatius, although occasionally referring to the "Catholic Church," is nevertheless almost exclusively occupied in his letters with the Church as established in particular communities. Whatever he says about Church government, the need of union among the faithful, or the particulars of divine worship, is primarily intended for local bodies of Christians. Under ordinary circumstances, and in the ordering of its daily life, each community is guided by its own ecclesiastical

[85] Philad. 9, 1; Magn. 10, 3.
[86] Smyrn. 1, 2.
[87] Eph. 3, 2.
[88] Smyrn. 8, 2.

superiors, "the bishop presiding in the place of God, the presbyters holding the place of the Apostolic college, and the deacons having entrusted to them the ministry of Jesus Christ." [89] As long as the faithful are subject to this divinely constituted authority, they do all things according to the mind of God.

The Church thus conceived, as universal in extension yet localized in particular communities, is the house of the Heavenly Father, His family.[90] Therein are stored up the graces of redemption, which are shared in by those who continue in communion with the bishop.[91] "For without the bishop it is not lawful to baptize, nor to celebrate the agape; but whatever he approves of, that is pleasing to God." [92] Owing, no doubt, partly to the heresies and schisms that were then threatening, and partly also to the bishop's position as the center of unity and source of orthodoxy to each particular community, St. Ignatius never tires of admonishing the faithful to be loyal in their adhesion to the bishop. It must, however, be noted that, in all this repeated insistence upon proper subjection, he nowhere says a word in defense of the institution of hierarchical powers and offices. That the hierarchy, in its various grades as he knows them, bishop, priests, and deacons, has a legitimate existence, and is therefore of Apostolic origin, he takes for granted as acknowledged by all, not only in Asia Minor, but "per tractus terrae," all the world over.[93] In this he but reproduces the teaching of St. Clement.

And like that writer, he also bears witness to the Primacy of Rome. This appears in his letter to the Romans. "I do not command," he tells them, "as did Peter and Paul." [94] "You have never envied any one, you have taught others. And I too wish those things to be firm which you teach and command." [95] "Be mindful in your prayers of the church of Syria, which has in my stead God for its pastor. Jesus Christ alone and your charity govern it now in place of its

[89] Magn. 6, 1.
[90] Eph. 6, 1.
[91] Smyrn. 8, 1.
[92] Smyrn. 8, 2.
[93] Eph. 3, 2.
[94] Rom. 4, 3.
[95] Ibid. 3, 1.

bishop." [96] Hence in the inscription of his letter, the author addresses the Church which is "in the place of the country of the Romans" as presiding over the brotherhood of charity, which brotherhood is made up of the faithful dispersed through the various local churches all over the world.[97] Non-Catholic scholars commonly take a different view of this matter, but, as Bardenhewer remarks, this want of agreement on their part is the outcome not of historical criticism as such, but of historical criticism perverted by religious bias. The fact that Ignatius admitted the Primacy of the Roman Church cannot well be doubted, but whether he held it to be of divine origin is not stated.

Hermas also dilates somewhat on the position of the Church in the divine economy of salvation, but owing to his allegorizing tendencies he is less satisfactory. He represents the faithful, stamped in baptism with the seal of spiritual regeneration, as incorporated in the Mystic Tower, which is a figure of the Church of Christ. The Church thus conceived is the new Israel, built upon the foundation of the Prophets and the Apostles, but of which the Son of God is Himself the cornerstone.[98] The Tower is still in building, and God Himself supervises the work. Only perfect stones are used, but in course of time many lose their original perfection. These are then removed from their position and handed over to the Angel of Penance, who cleanses and reshapes them, and thus makes them fit to be once more inserted into the walls of the Tower.[99]

All this is allegorical, but through the allegory one can get a glimpse of the reality that stood before the author's mind. The Tower in its completion and final perfection is, of course, a figure of the Church Triumphant in heaven, but so long as it is in building it also designates the Church Militant on earth. It is a Church in which penance is still of avail, and where the deformity of vice dwells side by side with the beauty of virtue. It is the same Church as that which the author

[96] Ibid. 9, 1.
[97] Cfr. Batiffol, Primitive Catholicism, 140–143; Bardenhewer, Altkirch. Lit. I, 123–124.
[98] Simil. 9, 5, 1, 2.
[99] Simil. 9, 6–7.

elsewhere depicts under the figure of a willow tree, some of whose branches have been cut off and are apparently lifeless; yet, when they are planted in the earth and well watered, they grow again.[100] In its most comprehensive sense, therefore, the Church includes all believers, whether they are still struggling here on earth or have already attained the eternal joys of heaven. Hence the author gives, in outline at least, also the fundamental elements of the Communion of Saints.

In one sense the Church dates from the beginning of the world, and the world was, in fact, created for the Church;[101] but in another sense she has her origin also in the redemption of mankind by the Son of God. "As many as hear His message, and believe, are called in His name. When they have received the baptismal seal, they are all of one heart and mind, having but one faith and one charity."[102] Hence, too, the Tower, which represents the Church, is built "upon the waters."[103] When Hermas asks the reason of this, he is told: "Because your life is saved and shall be saved by water." Without baptism no one can become a member of the Church. This is so true that "the Apostles and the teachers, who preached the name of the Son of God, after they had fallen asleep in the power and faith of the Son of God, preached also to those who had fallen asleep before them, and themselves gave unto them the seal of preaching. Therefore they went down with them into the water and came up again. But these went down alive and came up alive; whereas the others that had fallen asleep went down dead and came up alive."[104] Hence the author holds that all the just, who had died before the advent of Christianity, had to be baptized after their death.

Thus the Church is indeed a spiritual creation, embracing all times and comprising all the saints of God, yet in her concrete existence she is constituted in local and visible communities, into which the members are admitted by a sacra-

[100] Simil. 8, 2, 7.
[101] Vis. 2, 4, 1; 1, 1, 6.
[102] Simil. 9, 17, 4.
[103] Vis. 3, 2.
[104] Simil. 9, 16.

mental rite. In these communities are presiding officers and presbyters to whom the author is directed to read his book, and who sit down first in the assembly of the faithful.[105] Mention is also made of apostles, bishops, teachers, and deacons, some of whom are dead, whilst others are still living.[106] Then there is a certain Clement, who appears to be at the head of them all and to have authority over the whole Church. To him the author must give a copy of his book, that he may send it to other cities.[107] This obviously refers to Clement of Rome, the third successor of St. Peter, whose primatial position thus appears to have been accepted by the faithful as an undisputed fact.

The other writers belonging to this group speak of the Church only in passing. Thus the author of the Didache directs the faithful to pray that the Lord may be mindful of His Church, and gather her from the four winds into the kingdom He has prepared for her.[108] In connection with the Eucharist he speaks of bishops and deacons, whose office it is to celebrate the divine mysteries. "Constitute, therefore, for yourselves bishops and deacons, who are worthy of the Lord; men of gentle character and not greedy of money; men who speak the truth and are of approved virtue: for they also exercise in your behalf the ministry of the prophets and teachers." [109]

Besides bishops and deacons, the author mentions three other classes who exercise various functions of the ministry. They are: (a) Apostles, who are engaged in missionary work, going from community to community, or preaching the Gospel to the heathens. (b) Prophets, who teach and speak in the Spirit. As they are the recipients of special charisms, they hold the most honorable place among Christian ministers. Every sin can be forgiven, except that of speaking against a true prophet. (c) Teachers, who instruct the faithful, but do not speak in the Spirit. Their knowledge is acquired by study, and their lessons must be prepared. All

[105] Vis. 2, 4, 3; 3, 18.
[106] Vis. 4, 5, 1.
[107] Vis. 2, 4, 3.
[108] Didache 10, 5.
[109] Ibid. 15, 1.

three classes are subject to certain trials, and rules are given to distinguish the true from the false.[110]

Pseudo-Barnabas briefly notes that the Saviour gathered together a new nation, a holy people, the heir of those great promises which the Jews had falsely appropriated to themselves. This new nation is the Church of Christ, "the good land, the land of Jacob, the vessel of His Spirit," and as such the depository of spiritual gifts, the organ of the Spirit's manifestation to the world. The Church is holy, for it is the Church of saints; it is also one, so that all schism is to be condemned.[111] However, with regard to the constitution of the Church and ecclesiastical government, the author says nothing definite.

Polycarp implies that the hierarchy consists of three degrees, the bishop, priests, and deacons. He calls particular attention to the virtues required in deacons and priests, and warns them especially against avarice.[112] They have authority over the faithful, who must obey them as they would obey God Himself.[113] Priests, however, should be lenient in their treatment of delinquents, for we are all sinners before God.[114]

The "Martyrium Polycarpi" brings out very prominently that the Church is "Catholic." The term occurs three times in the body of the letter and once in the inscription. Dr. Funk contends that it is here used not merely in its primary sense, denoting universality, but also in its secondary meaning, as implying distinction from the conventicles of heretics. Others, however, do not accept this view, but maintain that in this latter sense the term is met with for the first time in the Muratorian fragment, which originated most likely towards the end of the second century.

The Secunda Clementis refers several times to "presbyters," whose duty it is to instruct the people, and disobedience to whom is sinful before God. "Let us not think to give heed and believe now only, while we are admonished by the pres-

[110] Ibid. 11, 1–12; 13, 2–7.
[111] Barn. 6; 7; 11; 19.
[112] Polyc. 6, 1; 5, 2.
[113] Ibid. 5, 3.
[114] Ibid. 6, 1.

byters; but likewise, when we have departed home, let us remember the commandments of the Lord." Unless we do this, we shall bewail it on the day of judgment, because "we obeyed not the presbyters, when they told us of our salvation."[115]

Besides these incidental references, the author gives the following rather puzzling description of the Church. He assumes that the Church is necessary for salvation, because she is the body of Christ. And she is the body of Christ, "because Scripture says, God made man male and female. The male is Christ, and the female is the Church. And the books of the Prophets and the Apostles plainly declare that the Church is not of to-day, but hath been from the beginning: for she was spiritual, as our Jesus also was spiritual, but she was manifested in these latter days that she might save us. Now the Church, which is spiritual, was manifested in the flesh of Christ, thereby showing us that, if any of us guard her in the flesh and defile her not, he shall receive her again in the Holy Spirit: for this flesh is the antitype of the spirit. No man, therefore, when he hath defiled the antitype, shall receive the reality. Listen then, brethren: Guard ye the flesh, that you may partake of the spirit. But if we say that our flesh is the Church and the spirit of Christ, then he that soiled the flesh hath soiled the Church, and such a one, therefore, shall not partake of the spirit, which is Christ." [116]

This is at best not very illuminating. That the Church is the body of Christ, of course in a mystical sense, is perfectly orthodox, and is evidently derived from the teaching of St. Paul; but the idea of her spiritual pre-existence, as here portrayed, seems altogether foreign to the Christian concept of the Church, although something like it appears also in Hermas. Batiffol suggests that it was derived from Jewish speculations about the heavenly Jerusalem." [117]

7°. *Baptism.*—Entrance into the Church is obtained through baptism, because the Church is "built upon the waters." On

[115] II Clem. 17.
[116] Ibid. 14, 1–5.
[117] O. c. 182, 183.

this all these writers are agreed, in as much as they assume every Christian to have received baptismal regeneration. Hence the author of the Didache says very positively: "Let no one eat or drink of your Eucharist, except he has been baptized in the name of the Lord; for it was in reference to this that the Lord said: 'Do not give holy things to dogs.'" [118] The external rite is thus described by the same author: "After you have said all these things (that is, after you have properly instructed the catechumens), baptize in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, in flowing water. But if you have no flowing water, baptize in any other water; if you cannot baptize in cold water, baptize in warm. But if you have neither (sufficient for immersion), pour water three times on the head in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost." [119] The minister and the candidate, and, if possible, some others also, ought to fast one or two days before baptism is conferred.[120]

The effects of baptism are thus neatly described by Pseudo-Barnabas: "We descend into the water full of sins and stains, and we come out of it bearing fruit, having in our hearts the fear, and in our minds the hope in Jesus." [121] Thus baptism is a true renovation and the beginning of a new life, in which the fruits of the redemption are applied to the individual soul. Hence he says in another place: "When, therefore, He renovated us through the remission of sins, He brought it about that we should have another form, to wit, a soul like that of children, seeing that He reformed us." [122] We become in a manner the living temple of God; for "having received the remission of sins, and filled with hope in the name of the Lord, we have become new men, again created in our entirety: for this reason God truly dwells in us, in our own dwelling. How? His word of faith, His calling, His promise, the wisdom of commands, the precepts of doctrine, He himself prophesying and dwelling in us, opening the door, to wit, the mouth, to us who are given up to death, all this

[118] Didache 9, 5.
[119] Ibid. 7, 1, 2, 3.
[120] Ibid. 7, 4.
[121] Barn. 11, 11.
[122] Ibid. 6, 11

inspires us with penance and introduces us into the incorruptible temple." [123]

Hermas speaks almost in the same terms: "Before man bore the name of son of God," he says, "he was dead; but when he received the seal, he put off mortality and resumed life. The water therefore is a seal; they descend into the water in the state of death and come up alive." [124] This new life is marked by union in faith and charity and by moral purity: "Having then received the seal, they had one mind, one faith, and one charity, and they bore within them the spirits of virgins together with the name." [125]

That baptism is a seal which marks the Christian as belonging in a special manner to God, and which carries with it the obligation of a holy life, is also brought out by the author of the Secunda Clementis, who exhorts the faithful to preserve immaculate the "sphragis" or seal, for this will entitle them to everlasting life, while its violation through sin leads to eternal loss.[126] "If we keep not our baptism pure and undefiled," he says in another place, "what confidence can we have of entering into the kingdom of God?" [127] Precisely what these writers understood by the "seal" is not clear, but in view of later developments it may be assumed that they referred to the sacramental character.

8°. *The Holy Eucharist.*—The author of the Didache speaks of the Eucharist in two different places. In chapters 9 and 10 he gives the prayers to be said before and after receiving, at least according to the more common interpretation of the passage. Here the consecrated elements are called "spiritual food and drink," which those only are allowed to receive who "have been baptized in the name of the Lord." In chapter 14 he says: "But on the Lord's Day coming together break bread and give thanks, after you have confessed your sins, so that your sacrifice may be pure. And let no one who has a controversy with his friend associate with you, until they have been reconciled, lest your sacrifice should be made unclean.

[123] Ibid. 16, 8, 9.
[124] Simil. 9, 16, 3, 4.
[125] Simil. 9, 17, 4.
[126] II Clem. 7, 6; 8, 6.
[127] Ibid. 6.

For this was said by the Lord: In every place and at all times let there be offered to me a clean sacrifice, because I am a great king, saith the Lord, and my name is wonderful among the Gentiles." Hence the author evidently regards the Eucharistic rite as the Christian sacrifice, but he makes no explicit mention of the Real Presence.

Clement also refers to the Eucharist as a sacrifice, when he tells the Corinthians that they must do all things which the Lord has enjoined to be performed at stated times. "For He commanded that oblations should be made and that the sacred functions should be performed, not carelessly and without due order, but at stated times and hours." [128] And then he instances how God had made similar regulations for the priests of the Old Law.[129]

All this, however, is more fully treated by Ignatius, who comes back to it again and again in his exhortations to union with the bishop. Thus, writing to the Ephesians on the necessity of perfect union, he reminds them that they "are breaking one and the same bread, which is the medicine of immortality, the antidote against death, and causes us to live forever in Christ Jesus." [130] He uses the term "Eucharist" not only to designate the ritual action, but also to signify the consecrated elements themselves. Speaking of the Docetæ, he says that "they abstain from the Eucharist and prayer, because they do not confess that the Eucharist is the flesh of the Saviour, which has suffered for our sins and which the Father has raised up from the dead in His kindness." [131] In this, as is quite evident, the Real Presence is not only assumed or implied, but explicitly stated. The same is true of several other texts, as, for instance, when he writes to the Romans: "I take no delight in the food of corruption, nor in the pleasures of this life: I desire the Bread of God which is the flesh of Jesus Christ, who is of the seed of David." [132] Hence when in other places he speaks of the Eucharist as a symbol and bond of union, he cannot possibly intend, as some modern

[128] I Clem. 40, 1.
[129] Ibid. 40, 5.
[130] Eph. 20, 2.
[131] Smyrn. 7, 1.
[132] Rom. 7, 3.

critics maintain, that the Saviour's presence in the consecrated elements is only symbolic. As Ignatius understands it, the body and blood of Jesus are really present, and because of their real presence the Eucharist is the symbol and bond of union. He also makes reference to the Christian sacrifice, when he writes that "there is but one flesh of our Lord Jesus Christ, and one chalice in the unity of his blood, one place of sacrifice, as also there is one bishop with the presbyterium and the deacons." [133]

9°. *Penance.* — Although these writers consider baptism as the beginning of a new life, which ought to be free from sin, nevertheless they all refer to penance as a matter of necessity for the ordinary Christian. They also give to this penance a kind of official character, which connects it in some way with the ministration of the Church. Thus the author of the Didache tells his readers in two different places that they must confess their sins in the Church,[134] and this direction is repeated by Pseudo-Barnabas.[135] When Clement exhorts the disturbers of the peace at Corinth to do penance, he bids them to submit themselves to the presbyters.[136] Ignatius tells the Christians at Philadelphia that "God remits the sins of all penitents, if they repent, acknowledging the unity of God and following the counsel of the bishop." [137] Polycarp admonishes the priests at Philippi to be lenient in their treatment of delinquents,[138] and the author of the Secunda Clementis exhorts his hearers to do penance for the sins which they have committed in the flesh, so that they may be saved by the Lord whilst they have time to repent. "For after we have departed this life, we can no longer confess and do penance." [139]

The matter is more fully treated by Hermas, who made it the burden of his entire book. He has heard it said by some that the only efficacious penance is the one connected with baptism, when a full remission of former sins is granted; and he has also heard it said by others that there is no need of

[133] Philad. 4.
[134] Didache 4, 14; 14, 1.
[135] Barn. 19, 12.
[136] I Clem. 57, 1.
[137] Philad. 8, 1.
[138] Polyc. 6, 1.
[139] II Clem. 8, 2, 3.

penance: but neither of these views is acceptable.[140] For penance is certainly necessary, and it is also efficacious after baptism.[141] However, efficacious penance is possible only for sins committed up to the time of his writing; those who avail themselves of it are assured of forgiveness, but if after that they sin again they run a great risk, they shall hardly be saved.[142] Hence for Christians there is only one penance, granted them by the merciful God who knows the weakness of human nature. This penance, however, is conceded to all; not even the wicked race of apostates, whose plight appears so desperate, is excluded from it: they, too, may thereby be restored to their former place.[143]

From this reasoning of the author some have concluded that the penance here mentioned was by way of a special concession, "a kind of jubilee," as Tixeront words it; but the text points the other way. When Hermas says to the Shepherd, "I have heard, sir, from certain teachers, that there is no other repentance than that which took place when we went down into the water and obtained remission of our former sins," the latter replies indeed, "Thou hast well heard, for so it is"; but he adds that this is to be the rule for the future, though it was not so in the past. "To those then that were called before these days the Lord hath appointed repentance, . . . but I say unto you, if after this great and holy calling any one, being tempted by the devil, shall commit sin, he hath only one repentance."[144]

Hence what is new in the author's teaching is not that sins are forgiven after baptism, but that in future there shall be no such forgiveness. The common belief therefore had been that post-baptismal sins might be blotted out by penance, and this Hermas feels constrained to admit; but he tries to make a compromise with the "certain teachers," obviously only a few, who hold that there is no other remission of sins except through baptism. For the past, he says, this was not so; but it is to be the law for the future. Hence the further

[140] Mandat. 4, 3, 1; Simil. 8, 6. 5.
[141] Vis. 3, 7, 2; 8, 6, 3, 11, 3.
[142] Mandat. 4, 3, 46.
[143] Simil. 8, 2, 8, 9; 9, 14.
[144] Mandat. 4, 3.

words of the Shepherd: "For the Master swore by His own glory, as concerning His elect; that if, now that this day a limit has been set, sin shall hereafter be committed, they shall not find salvation; for repentance for the righteous hath an end; the days of repentance are fulfilled for all the saints; whereas for the Gentiles there is repentance until the last day." [145] What the author dislikes so much in the Christians of his day, is their constant vacillation between sin and repentance; and to correct this, he cuts off for the future all hope of forgiveness.

Whether the forgiveness of post-baptismal sins depends in any way on the intervention of the Church, is not stated by the author in so many words; yet he seems to imply it all through his book. Thus the "Aged Matron" who gave him the little book on penance is none other, he is told, than the Church. It is she, therefore, to whom this matter of penance has been entrusted. Again, he brings penance into so close a connection with baptism, that its relative position in the Church may well be considered the same. Both are means of obtaining the forgiveness of sins; the one being intended for converts at the time of their admission into the fold of Christ, and the other for Christians after they have strayed from the fold. The former he knows to be applied by the Church, and the most reasonable inference is that he holds the same with regard to the latter.

This, furthermore, appears also to some extent from the manner in which he speaks about the various requisites for efficacious penance. Not only must one be truly sorry for past sins, and have a firm purpose of amendment, but there is also need of certain works of penance which must bear a more or less exact proportion to the number and gravity of the sins committed.[146] In this he seems to refer to some system of public penance that must have been regulated by the Church. For it is not likely that he would have excogitated all this himself, that is, without being guided by what was actually going on in the community of which he was a member.

What must especially be noted here, and the same is true

[145] Vis. 2, 2. [146] Simil. 7, 4; 6, 4.

in respect to all the other writers of this group, is that no sins whatever are excepted from the promise of forgiveness if all the necessary conditions are complied with. Heretics, apostates, adulterers, all can obtain the remission of their sins, provided they truly repent. Hence the general exhortation to penance: "As many as do penance from their hearts, and purify themselves of their iniquities, and do not add to their evil deeds, shall receive from God the forgiveness of their former sins, if so be that they do not entertain any doubts concerning these precepts and will live unto God. But those who add sin to sin, and walk in the evil ways of this world, will thereby condemn themselves to death." [147]

10°. *Matrimony.* — This is touched upon in passing by Ignatius and Hermas. The former says: "It is becoming that the bridegroom and bride contract marriage in conformity with the ruling of the bishop, so that their nuptials may be according to the Lord, and not as suggested by passion." [148] The latter points out the indissolubility of the marriage bond and the lawfulness of second marriages. If a man detects his wife in adultery, let him send her away; but he must not marry again during her lifetime: if he does, he himself becomes guilty of adultery.[149] If a marriage is broken up by death, the surviving party does not sin by contracting another marriage; still it is more meritorious to remain single.[150]

11°. *Eschatology.* — In one way or another all touch on this point, holding out the hope of eternal blessedness to those who lead good and virtuous lives, and the prospect of never-ending sufferings to such as live and die in sin.[151] In this they usually reproduce Scriptural data, without entering into details. The resurrection of the body, the judgment of the living and the dead, and the eternity of heaven and hell, these form the contents of their eschatological teaching. It may be noted, however, that the author of the Didache seems to limit the resurrection to the just only,[152] and that Pseudo-

[147] Simil. 8, 11, 3.
[148] Polyc. 5, 2.
[149] Mandat. 4, 1, 4-6.
[150] Mandat. 4, 4, 1, 2.
[151] Cfr. Hermas, Simil. 9, 18, 2; 8, 2; Ignatius, Eph. 16, 2; Polyc. 2, 3; 6, 2.
[152] Didache 16, 7.

Barnabas holds there will be a Millennium before the final consummation of things.[153]

Many other points of doctrinal value are brought out by these writers, which the want of space forbids us to consider in this connection. Thus, Hermas, for instance, has much to say about the angels as ministering spirits; the "Martyrium Polycarpi" points out most clearly the difference between divine worship and the veneration of martyrs, and all of them emphasize the necessity of faith and good works for the attainment of salvation. As already pointed out, these writings are almost entirely of a practical character, so that points of dogmatic import are usually brought in to drive home a lesson in right living; yet in spite of this, we find here an outline of Catholic teaching that is almost complete in its fundamental doctrines. There is room indeed for development, but there is no need of change in order to bring this incidental teaching of the sub-Apostolic past in connection with the fuller exposition of the actual present. This, however, will appear more clearly in the following chapters.

And here it must be noted how conservative these writers themselves are, how chary of innovation. They have received a message from their predecessors in the faith, and that message they are careful to hand down unaltered. "Do not deviate from the commandments of the Lord," says the author of the Didache, "but guard what thou hast received, neither adding thereto nor taking aught away from it." [154] "Those who foment schisms," writes Clement, "tear asunder the members of Christ." [155] "If any one speaks to you without Christ," says Ignatius, "close your ears, do not listen to him." [156] And again: "Do not be deceived, brethren; if any one follows him that causes a schism, he shall not obtain the inheritance of the heavenly kingdom." [157] "If any one wrests the sayings of the Lord to his own desires," adds Polycarp, "he is the first-born of Satan." [158] No matter how familiar these writers might be with Greek thought and Greek philosophy,

[153] Barn. 4, 13.
[154] Didache 4, 13.
[155] I Clem. 4, 6, 7.
[156] Trall. 9, 1.
[157] Philad. 3, 3.
[158] Polyc. 7, 1.

they experienced no temptation of thereby widening the deposit of faith entrusted to their keeping. Even of legitimate development there is hardly a trace in their writings, as a reference to the chapter on New Testament teaching will readily show. Their one and only care, the thought ever uppermost in their minds, was to guard and transmit the faith received from the Apostles. If any one dared touch that, and thus preach another gospel than the one which had been preached, he was forthwith put down as "the first-born of Satan," with whom Christians could hold no communion.

CHAPTER VI

HERETICAL TENDENCIES AND PAGAN OPPOSITION TO CHRISTIANITY DURING THE SECOND CENTURY[1]

It was towards the middle of the second century that doctrinal development began to manifest itself along the various lines of Christian thought. Up to that time, as was seen in the preceding chapter, little had been done by the teaching body of the Church besides stating the different revealed truths as they had been handed down by the Apostles. No philosophical inquiry had been made as regarded their full contents; nor had the concrete conditions of Christian life called for such inquiry. The large body of Christians, though not without its representative men, distinguished alike for literary attainments and social position, was on the whole made up of simple folk, who were well satisfied to know that Jesus Christ was the Son of God, that He had come to save a sinful world from death, that He wished His followers to cling together as a chosen nation, that He was still in their midst, governing them through His authoritative representatives and nourishing them with His flesh and blood, and held out to all the promise of eternal life, if they would but strive to follow in His footsteps. But how all this was to be explained, what was the ultimate rational setting of these revealed verities, and how these verities themselves might be put into exact theological concepts and set forth in apt definitions, had, with perhaps a few exceptions, not even begun to dawn upon the minds of the most progressive teachers. The fact of revelation was known, and the contents of the *deposi-*

[1] Cfr. Duchesne, The Early History of the Church, I, 112–143; Bardenhewer, Altkirch. Litt. I, 315–347; *Bethune-Baker, Op. cit. 76–93; Tixeront, H. D. I, 153–190; Hergenroether-Kirsch, Handbuch der allgemeinen Kirchengeschichte, 4th Ed. I, 144–183. This last named author gives a singularly clear and full exposition of Gnosticism.

tum fidei were readily accepted, but the rational side of these contents was still an unexplored world.

This could, however, not go on indefinitely. Little by little men trained in the various schools of Greek thought, who were eagerly in search of the true philosophy of life, came in contact with this new teaching, and, as a necessary consequence, subjected it to critical investigation along rational lines of inquiry. Some of them surrendered themselves to it with a whole-souled singleness of purpose; others accepted it with many reservations; whilst others, again, studied it only for the sake of holding up to ridicule its supposed inconsistencies. All three classes of inquirers, each in its own way, were instrumental in initiating and promoting doctrinal development. There were also, indeed, other contributory causes at work: such as popular calumny on the one hand, and the silent teaching of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of the faithful on the other; but they were, in this respect, more or less subsidiary to the first named, that is, to the efforts of intellectual inquirers into the truths of Christianity.

Of these three classes, thus interested in Christian teaching, the first was made up of orthodox writers, who are commonly called Apologists. The second consisted of men strongly marked by heterodox tendencies, and sometimes openly heretical in their views. The third embraced numerous contemporary pagan authors, and such purveyers of popular calumnies as provoked the Christian Apologists to an active defense of their faith. For clearness' sake and for a better understanding of the general drift of orthodox teaching as contained in the apologetical writings of the time, we shall begin our present inquiry with a brief exposition of the principal Gnostic systems of philosophical speculation along the lines of Christian thought. After this a word may be said about Millennarianism, which found favor both with heretics and some orthodox writers. And finally a summary account must be given of pagan opposition to the faith, as that also had a determining influence on the doctrinal exposition of the Apologists.

A — Gnosticism: Various Systems: Influence on Christian Thought

Gnosticism may be said to rest upon a triple foundation — Oriental mysticism, Greek philosophy, and the Gospel of Jesus. It is, indeed, not always possible to determine from which of these three sources any particular doctrine of the Gnostics is derived, or to affirm that there are no other elements contained in it, nevertheless it is here that we find the general basis on which the various systems are built up. Thus from the Orient comes the idea and conviction that matter is essentially evil, and that therefore the Father-God, the Supreme Good, cannot have created the world. Hence the invention of a demiurge, who is usually identified with the Creator-God of the Old Testament. Hence, too, the Docetic doctrine that the Redeemer, whose divinity is defended by the Gnostics, did not come in the flesh, but merely assumed the appearance of our humanity. Then from Greek philosophy were taken not only the dialectic weapons of defense and attack, but frequently also the intellectual moulds in which current Oriental ideas were cast; and perhaps too, at least in its general concept, the exaggerated view of the abstract nature of God. Finally, the Gospel of Jesus supplied the supernatural material upon which the other elements of Gnosticism were brought to bear, for the purpose of shaping it into a consistent philosophy of life.

In regard to this last point, however, it must be noted that the Gospel of Jesus, as understood and accepted by the Gnostics, is not identical with our canonical Gospels, although they too were made use of; but under this title were gathered certain special traditions, written or oral, which purported to contain secret conversations of the Saviour with some of His Apostles and of His first followers. In these conversations, which occurred after the resurrection, Jesus communicated to a chosen few the most profound mysteries of Gnosticism. Thus originated the gospels of Thomas, of Philip, of Judas, the Greater and Lesser Questions of Mary, and the Gospel of Perfection. It was on account of this claim to secret and

more perfect knowledge, or special gnosis, that the followers of these systems, and more particularly the intellectual aristocracy among them, were labelled Gnostics by those who refused to admit their pretensions.

The first beginnings of Gnosticism are usually traced back to Simon Magus, or Simon of Gitta in Samaria. According to St. Justin, who was a native of those parts, almost all Samaria honored Simon as a god, raised high above all other powers.[2] His doctrine, as summed up by St. Irenæus, was thoroughly Gnostic, but it is probable that some later developments found their way into this summary.[3]

From Samaria Simon's teaching passed to Antioch in Syria, where it was propagated by Menander and Saturninus about the time of Trajan. What particular views of their own they introduced cannot now be determined. Jesus, they held, had only an apparent body, and His mission was to defeat the God of the Jews. It was probably against them that Ignatius of Antioch defended the reality of Christ's human nature.

A little later, Gnosticism found its way into Egypt, where it reached a high degree of development through the labors of two Alexandrians, Basilides and Valentinus, the best representatives of Gnostic philosophy. Their efforts at proselytizing, however, do not appear to have met with any permanent success. The same was the experience of Carpocrates, a Platonic philosopher of Alexandria, who early in the second century founded a sect of his own.

It was about this time that Cerdon, a Syrian by birth, endeavored to make propaganda for Gnosticism in Rome. His efforts, as far as his own system was concerned, proved futile, but he seems to have prepared the way for Marcion, who made a sort of common sense synopsis of Gnostic teaching. This Marcion was the son of a bishop in Asia Minor, and he himself professed to be a follower of St. Paul. About 140 he came to Rome, and shortly after he began to spread his heterodox views. These were based not upon secret sources

[2] Cfr. I Apol. 26; 56; Dial. 120. [3] Adv. Haer. I, 29-31; cfr. Ibid. 23.

of revelation and higher gnosis, but rather upon anti-Jewish and dualistic tendencies. According to him, there was no agreement possible between the revelation of Jesus and the teaching of the Old Testament; nor between the God of creation and the God of redemption. But how the relation of these two orders of things to one another was to be explained, he did not stop to inquire. His was a practical rather than a speculative mind. Both Cerdon and Marcion were admitted to penance, but they did not persevere.[4]

Owing partly to the severity of its ethical code, and partly to the practical methods of its founder, Marcionism spread rapidly and made many converts. It had its martyrs, too, and resisted with uncommon energy the missionary efforts of Catholics as well as the violence of persecutors. Soon, however, it split up into many sects, headed by such men as Basiliscus, Hermogenes, and Apelles. Of these, Apelles became the most famous. He differed from Marcion chiefly in admitting only one First Principle, ascribing creation not to a second god but to an angel. Some of these sects remained in existence till the seventh century.

It would obviously be impossible, in a compendious work like the present, to trace up the divergent teaching of these different systems, but what was more or less common to them all may be placed under the following heads. With the exception of one or two points, this summary is given by the Abbè Duchesne in his "Early History of the Church."[5]

1°. Matter is essentially evil, hence God can have no connection with the world except through intermediaries emanating from Himself.

2°. The Creator and Lawgiver of the Old Testament is not the true God. He is infinitely below the Father-God, the Supreme First Cause of all being.

3°. Neither did He know the true God, nor did the world, until the appearance of Jesus Christ, who was sent as ambassador from the Father-God.

4°. Between the Supreme First Cause and creation is inter-

[4] Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. 3, 4; Tertull. De Praescrip. 30.

[5] Op. c. I, 127, 128.

posed a complicated series of beings, which somehow constitutes an ideal world. But at some point or other in this series there occurred a catastrophe, utterly destroying its harmony. It was from this primal disorder that the visible world, including its Creator, originated.

5°. In humanity there are some elements capable of redemption, having in one way or another come from the celestial world above the demiurge. Jesus Christ came to effect their deliverance.

6°. As matter is essentially evil, the Incarnation cannot imply a real union between the Saviour's divinity and human nature. Hence the Gospel story is explained by having recourse to a purely moral union, or more frequently by reducing Christ's human nature to a mere semblance of humanity.

7°. Neither the suffering and death, nor the resurrection of Christ, were real. Nor does the future of the predestined include the resurrection of the body. Matter is simply not capable of salvation.

8°. The divine element which has strayed into humanity, that is, the predestined soul, has no solidarity with the flesh. There is a necessary opposition between the two. Hence some teach that the flesh must be annihilated by asceticism, whilst others maintain that the soul cannot be held responsible for the weaknesses of the flesh, and therefore may allow full sway to the lower appetites.

Most writers on the subject are agreed that Gnosticism was for the time being a real danger to orthodox Christianity, especially as not a few of its defenders were men of singular ability; but they also point out that its actual influence was on the whole beneficial rather than injurious, although only in an indirect way. Once recognized as heretical, its leading tenets aroused strong opposition, and thus discredit was thrown on all leanings to dualism, on the negation of free will, and on the depreciation of Old Testament teaching. Then, too, by its constant appeal to Apostolic writings and traditions, it hastened the authoritative determination of the canon of Holy Scripture and ensured the safeguarding of such traditions as had really been handed down from Apos-

tolic times. Furthermore, it stimulated intellectual activity in orthodox circles, and forced Christian teachers to give an exposition of revealed truths which had till then usually been expressed in Scriptural language. Hence, although it was an evil tree, indirectly it brought forth good fruit.[6]

B — Millennarianism [7]

Taking the term in its general sense, Millennarianism stands for a variety of views adopted by some early Christians in respect of an era of peace and happiness, which they expected would be inaugurated by Christ sometime before the last judgment. They looked forward to the Saviour's second coming, when He would establish on earth a kingdom of perfect justice, over which He together with His saints would reign for a thousand years. Not all, indeed, assigned the exact time limit of a millennium to this period of earthly blessedness, but that duration seems to have been rather commonly accepted, and hence the general term by which these different views were designated.

Millennarianism is generally looked upon as a legacy from Judaism, although some writers on the subject trace it back to Parseeism, the religion of the ancient Persians. At any rate, certain obscure passages in both the Old and New Testament were usually appealed to as affording a Scriptural basis. Thus the great fertility of the earth during the Messianic reign as described by the prophet Joel,[8] the peace and glory of the children of God as pictured by Isaias,[9] the new life of those slain for a testimony to Jesus, and especially their rule with Him for a thousand years, as represented by St. John in the Apocalypse [10]— all these and similar predictions, interpreted in a literal sense, were held to contain God's own promise of a millennium of earthly happiness.

The different views, collectively designated as Millennari-

[6] Cfr. * Bethune-Baker, Op. cit. 91. 92.

[7] Atzberger, Geschichte der christlichen Eschatologie innerhalb der vornicaenischen Zeit; Funk, Patres Apostolici, 2, 276; Tixeront, H. D. I, 199 sqq.

[8] Joel, 3, 17–21.

[9] Is. 11, 6–17; 66, 18–23.

[10] Apoc. 20, 1–7; 21.

anism, may be divided into two classes. The first of these represents a gross and extreme form of Millennarian expectations, according to which the just, after their resurrection, were to live here on earth a life of coarse sensual pleasure, "without law and without shame." This view was, of course, plainly heretical, being in evident opposition to the teaching of Christ and the law of God. According to Eusebius,[11] it formed one of the tenets of the heresiarch Cerinthus. It seems to have also been advocated by the Ebionites, the Marcionites, and some Apollinarians. In the first half of the third century it was openly defended by Nepos, an Egyptian bishop; also by a certain Coracion, who is said to have drawn "whole dioceses over to his side."[12] This gross form of Millennarianism was strongly attacked by Caius, a Roman presbyter, who wrote during the latter part of the second century. Three quarters of a century later, it found a valiant opponent in Dionysius of Alexandria, whose efforts were so successful that he put an end to Millennarian teaching in the East.[13]

The second class of views is commonly designated as Moderate Millennarianism. This, again, is divided into two kinds. Some represented the happiness of the just, whilst reigning with Christ on earth, as largely made up of material enjoyment; although they carefully eliminated everything of an immoral nature. Of this form of teaching we have a sample in the writings of Papias, who during the early part of the second century was bishop of Hierapolis. In a fragment of his book, entitled "Explanatio Sermonum Domini," he says: "The day will come when vines shall spring up that have each ten thousand branches, and each branch ten thousand offshoots, and each offshoot ten thousand smaller offshoots, and each smaller offshoot shall bear ten thousand clusters, and each cluster ten thousand grapes, and each grape shall yield twenty-five measures of wine. And when one of the saints shall reach out his hand for a cluster, another cluster will cry out: 'I am the better one: take me, and through me

[11] Hist. Eccl. 3, 28.
[12] Ibid. 6, 35; 7, 24.
[13] Ibid. 3, 28, 1, 2; 8, 24, 25; 6, 35.

bless the Lord.' " [14] Lactantius, who wrote towards the end of the third century, points to a similar condition of things during the expected Millennium.

Other writers, however, took a more spiritual view of the thousand years of earthly happiness. Tertullian, when already a Montanist, described the Millennium as the heavenly Jerusalem that was to come down upon earth. Therein, he says, is prepared for the just an equivalent of spiritual joys and blessings for all they suffered and sacrificed in the cause of Christ.[15] St. Irenæus also emphasized this spiritual aspect. " The just," he writes, " shall reign upon earth, growing in perfection because of the vision of the Lord, and through Him they shall become accustomed to beholding the glory of the Father; they shall also hold converse and live in closest union with the holy angels." [16]

This form of Millennarianism is more or less clearly taught in the writings of Pseudo-Barnabas, Justin Martyr, Methodius of Olympus, Commodianus, Victorinus of Pettau, and Quintus Julius Hilarion. Augustine also seems to have favored it at first, but later in life he definitely rejected every form of Millennarian teaching.[17]

It must be noted that besides the above mentioned writers, none others are found in Patristic times of whom it can be affirmed with any degree of certainty that they lent their support to these fanciful speculations. Hence Millennarianism, even in its most moderate form, was in no proper sense of the term a part of Christian belief. Not only were its supporters few in number, but, with the exception of St. Justin, St. Irenæus, and St. Methodius, all of them were either men of mediocre ability or else infected with heresy.

C — Pagan Opposition

Soon after the middle of the first century, when Christianity began to make rapid progress and some of its doctrines became imperfectly known to the pagans, a storm of opposition was

[14] Funk, PP. Apost. II, 276 sqq.
[15] Adv. Marc. 3, 24.
[16] Adv. Haer. 5, 35, 1; 5, 32, 1.
[17] De Civit. Dei. 20, 7, 1; 6, 1, 2; 7, 2; 9, 1; Serm. 259, 2.

raised that made the position of the faithful extremely precarious. This opposition arose in the first instance from the populace, which charged the Christians with all manner of crimes — atheism, impiety, infanticide, cannibalism, and the like.[18] The Christians on their part, when the opportunity offered, answered these calumnies by emphatic denials and appeals to facts; but this availed little, since it was practically impossible to make the sublime nature of Christian worship intelligible to a people steeped in moral corruption.[19]

Then, in the early part of the second century, these popular outbursts began to be followed up by systematic attacks on the part of pagan philosophers, who saw their prestige interfered with by the efforts of Christian teachers. These men, for the most part untrained in the subtleties of reasoning and the graces of speech, were leading away the multitude; and their doctrine, though so repugnant to the merely human in man, made far more impression than the most learned disquisitions on the philosophy of the day. Hence the aggrieved parties were unsparing in their ridicule and contempt, sometimes engaging the Christian teachers in debate, as did the cynic Crescens, and at other times attacking them in writing, as was done by Fronto, Lucian, and Celsus. Of these writings, however, it is only "The True Discourse" of Celsus that has come down to us with any sort of completeness. A brief analysis of it will give us an idea of the lines of attack followed by these philosophers.

Celsus was an eclectic Platonist, and he published "The True Discourse," about 178, although in all likelihood he had employed his trenchant pen against the Christians long before that date. He seems to have been a highly cultured man of the world, who took a general interest in philosophy and attacked Christianity professedly because of its opposition to the State religion. He was, however, honest enough to study its doctrines before he attacked them. His work shows that he had read the Bible and many Christian books, that he knew the difference between the Gnostic sects and the main body

[18] Athenag. Supplic. 3.

[19] Justin, I, Apol. 13, 14; Tatian, Orat. 4.

of the Church, and that he understood to some extent the relation of Christianity to the Jewish religion. Thus prepared he began his task. But, strange to say, nobody seems to have taken much notice of his book until about fifty years later, when it fell into the hands of Origen, who thoroughly refuted it, and incidentally preserved its main contents for posterity. It has been reconstructed as follows:

After a general introduction, the author divides his subject into four parts. In the first part he tries to refute Christianity from the Jewish point of view. Here the principal figure is a Jew, who endeavors to show that the Messianic prophecies contained in the Old Testament have not been verified in Christ. In the second part he speaks in his own person, as a pagan philosopher, attacking the Messianic idea directly, thus rejecting both the Christian and the Jewish religion as based upon a false foundation. In the third part he singles out special doctrines and moral precepts, trying to prove that they have been borrowed from other religious systems. Hence, even if the teaching of Christianity is in part deserving of respect, this is no commendation of the Christian religion itself. In the fourth part he argues that in any case the State religion must be accepted, since it has come down from antiquity and is necessary for the well-being of the State.

There is a close resemblance between this argumentation of Celsus and that of modern Rationalists, and the refutation of it by Origen is as timely to-day as it was some seventeen hundred years ago. Many new adversaries of Christianity arise as time passes on, but in their stock of objections there is little that is really new.

CHAPTER VII

SECOND-CENTURY APOLOGISTS AND THEIR LITERARY ACTIVITIES[1]

From the very first preaching of the Gospel, and in every place where the message of Christ had been accepted, Christian communities took a decided stand against all teaching that came in conflict with the doctrine announced by the Apostles. The author of the Didache, Hermas, Ignatius, and Polycarp, were as definite in their denunciations of heretical pretensions as had been the Apostles themselves in similar circumstances. However, it was only when men who had been trained in philosophy, and whose lives were more or less devoted to literary labors, had entered the Church, that a formal defense of Christianity was taken up against its many and persistent adversaries. These men, because of the task they set themselves, were already in ancient times spoken of as Apologists.

The chief aim of these Apologists, as gathered from their own writings, was to clear Christians from the reproach of crimes attributed to them under the influence of prejudice, to obtain for them tolerance and a fair application of the State laws, and to show that the doctrines they professed rightly claimed the attention, respect, and even the assent of thoughtful minds. In addition to this, they also vigorously opposed all deformation of Christian truths by dreaming heretics, and they consequently had many an opportunity of expounding the contents of the faith in accordance with the teaching of the Church. A few of them, like Justin and Aristo, also

[1] Cfr. Tixeront, H. D. I, 123–139; Duchesne, The Early History of the Church, I, 148–156; Bardenhewer, Patrol. 44–70; Feder, Justins Lehre von Jesus Christus; Picard, L'Apologie d'Aristide; Batiffol, Primitive Catholicism, 192–197.

directed their efforts against the Jews, partly for polemical and partly for doctrinal reasons.

As may be inferred from references to their works in ancient writers, there was quite a large number of early Christian authors who devoted their literary ability to the defense of the faith, and who are therefore rightly numbered among the Apologists. In the present connection, however, only those can be taken notice of whose works, either whole or in part, are still extant. They are the following, arranged as far as possible in chronological order:

1°. Aristides of Athens, a philosopher, who between 156 and 161 sent an apology to the Emperor Antoninus Pius.

2°. St. Justin Martyr, a native of Palestine. After the manner of philosophers in those days, he wandered from place to place, seeking and dispensing wisdom, until, between 163 and 167, he died a martyr's death in Rome. He was the author of many works, but those still extant are only his *First Apology to Antoninus Pius* his *Second Apology,* which seems to be supplement to the preceding, and his *Dialogue with the Jew Trypho.* They were written about the middle of the second century, but the exact date of their composition is not known.

3°. Tatian the Assyrian, a philosopher, and disciple of St. Justin. Shortly after his conversion to the faith, about 165, he published an apology entitled *Oratio ad Græcos,* which is, in effect, a criticism of Hellenism. He also composed a so-called *diatesseron,* a *Gospel-harmony,* of which many fragments are still extant. Before his death he fell away from the faith and became a Gnostic.

4°. Melito, bishop of Sardis in Lydia, who died about 190. He was a most prolific writer, but of all his many works only a few fragments remain.

5°. Athenagoras, "the Christian Philosopher of Athens." He is the author of an apology presented to the Emperors Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus Commodus, under the title, *Supplicatio seu Legatio pro Christianis.* He also wrote a work on the resurrection of the dead. The apology was composed about 177; the date of the second work is not known.

6°. Theophilus, bishop of Antioch, the sixth successor of St. Peter. He wrote the three books *Ad Autolycum*, wherein he explains to his friend Autolycus, still a pagan, the nature of the Christian faith and of the invisible God, shows up the folly of pagan idolatry, and refutes the various charges brought against the Christians. The probable date of the work is about 170.

7°. The unknown author of the "Letter to Diognetus." The letter was probably written some time in the second century, but the exact date has not been ascertained. It is a reply to certain questions asked by a heathen much interested in Christianity. These questions deal chiefly with the Christian adoration of God, as distinguished from the pagan and Jewish worship, and with the remarkable change of life observed in converts to Christianity.

8°. Minucius Felix, a Roman jurist. He is the author of an apology entitled *Octavius*. It is in the form of a dialogue, the interlocutors being the Christian Octavius Januarius and the heathen Cæcilius Natalis. Cæcilius defends the religion of his fathers, whilst Octavius pleads the cause of Christianity. It ends up with the conversion of Cæcilius. The work was probably written in the last quarter of the second century.

9°. Tertullian, a priest of Carthage in Africa. Besides numerous other works, which will be considered in a subsequent chapter, he addressed a defense of Christianity to the governors of the Roman Empire, under the title *Apologeticum*. It was written in 197, and is a refutation of the various charges brought against the Christians.

Taking into account the many works that have been lost, although their authors are known, one cannot help realizing how very considerable was the literary activity displayed in these early ages of the faith. To a great extent, no doubt, this was owing to the difficult position in which Christians found themselves; but it also shows that they had in their midst an ample supply of men who were able to defend the faith, not only by laying down their lives, but equally as well by wielding a trenchant pen. If ever there had been a time

when none but "women and children and timid souls" followed the teaching of the Gospel, as some of the early adversaries of Christianity contended, that time was certainly past.

A — Defense of Christian Morals: Christianity and Philosophy

The teaching of the Apologists may be divided into three parts. They first of all refute the charges of immorality and atheism brought against the Christians by the excited populace and by scoffing philosophers. Then they point out the relation of Christianity to philosophy and to the various religions then in vogue. Lastly they expound Christian teaching by the aid of tradition and sound philosophical principles. Not that this order is always observed by the individual writers, but the three points here mentioned form the burden of nearly all the works now under consideration.

In answer to the charges brought against the Christians, they simply point to the facts of Christian life and faith, which any one of the accusers may investigate if so disposed. These facts show that Christians are neither atheists, nor enemies of the State, nor libertines. But the trouble is that they are condemned unheard, against the explicit provision of the law; and, worse still, the very crimes of which their accusers themselves are guilty are laid to their charge. They observe the law of Christ, and He bids them to worship God, to lead pure lives, to love their enemies, to be kind to the poor and forsaken, and to practice all manner of virtues.

A sample of this kind of defense may be taken from the apology of Aristides, which is illustrative of what is found in the other authors. "The Christians," he says, "derive their origin from Jesus Christ our Lord. He is believed to be the Son of the Most High God. . . . He appeared to men that He might draw them away from the error of polytheism. . . . These, then, are the men who, above all other nations, on earth, have found the truth. For they acknowledge God, together with His only-begotten Son and the Holy Spirit, as the author and fashioner of all things, and beside Him they worship no other god. They have the commandments of

Jesus Christ engraven on their hearts, and they keep them. They do not defile themselves with adultery and the crime of fornication, do not give false testimony, covet not what belongs to others; they honor father and mother, love the neighbor, render just judgment; what they do not wish that others should do them, neither will they do it to others; those by whom they are injured they forgive and try to make their friends; they do good to their enemies, are gentle and easy of access; from all unlawful intercourse and impurity they keep themselves free; they do not despise the widow, nor grieve the orphan, but gladly come to the help of the needy; they receive the stranger under their roof and rejoice in his coming as if he were a brother; for they call one another brother not by reason of the flesh but of the spirit; for the sake of Christ they are ready to lay down their lives, because they steadfastly observe His precepts, living holily and justly, as the Lord has commanded them." [2]

With regard to the relation of Christianity and pagan philosophy there are found among the Apologists different views, as was also the case with the later Fathers. Some of them, like Tatian and Tertullian, spoke as a rule in rather disparaging terms of the works of heathen philosophers; whilst the majority saw in the pre-Christian strivings after wisdom a providential preparation for the sublimer doctrines of revealed truth. They found many points of contact, and sometimes even of identity, between the teaching of Christianity and that of the best philosophers of the various schools. Of course, Christianity, receiving its truths from divine revelation and being supported by divine authority, presents them more clearly and establishes them more firmly; but in this it confirms rather than sets aside what the gropings of philosophy had brought to light in the days of old.

Of this coincidence and partial identity of certain truths, as taught respectively by the Christian religion and pagan philosophy, two explanations are offered. The one, already made use of by the Alexandrian Jews and adopted rather

[2] Aristid, 15.

widely in Christian circles, simply asserted that the pagan philosophers had somehow become acquainted with the contents of the Old Testament and had drawn therefrom the truths set forth in their own teaching.[3] In a few individual cases this might perhaps be so, but as a general rule it could not be sustained. Hence a second explanation was advanced, which found an especially staunch advocate in St. Justin. It is briefly as follows:

According to St. John, the Word is "the true light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world." Hence the Word of God, who is light and life, was in the world from the very beginning; not in visible form, not as a God-Man, but in His invisible communication with the souls of men. Among the Jews He spoke by the Prophets and inspired the sacred writers, whilst among the pagans He enlightened the minds of the philosophers and directed their teaching. It is true, the enlightenment and direction vouchsafed the philosophers was imperfect; it was not real inspiration, and hence they taught many errors; nevertheless, whatever truth is found in their works had its source in Him. Hence between Christian teaching and true philosophy, no matter to what period of time it belongs, there can be no real opposition; for both proceed from the Word, although each in a different way.[4]

This seems to be the meaning of the various passages found in the writings of St. Justin in reference to the matter in question. Here and there it may appear that he held real inspiration in the case of philosophers as well as in that of the sacred writers; but when all he says on the subject is taken into account, this cannot be held. For the enlightenment of which he speaks is, in varying degrees, vouchsafed to all men, and each one receives it according to his capacity, whilst in real inspiration the capacity of the recipient does not limit the divine action.[5]

B — Exposition of Christian Doctrine

In their exposition of Christian doctrine the Apologists do

[3] Justin, Apol. II, 44, 59; Theoph. Ad Autolycum, 2, 37, 36.

[4] Apol. I, 5; 46; II, 8; 10; 13.

[5] Apol. II, 8; 13.

not touch upon all truths taught by the Church at the time, but they are fairly comprehensive, and so their writings form a valuable source of information on matters appertaining to the History of Dogmas. Their arguments, besides such as philosophy supplied them with, are taken indiscriminately from the Old and the New Testament. Both are accepted by them as containing the word of God. It was the Holy Spirit who directed the sacred writers, and He vouches for the truth of their statements. "The Prophets," writes Athenagoras, "were transported out of themselves, and, impelled by the Holy Spirit, they spoke those things wherewith they were inspired, the Holy Ghost using them even as a flute player uses his flute." [6]

When writing against their pagan adversaries, they had frequent occasion for proving the existence of one supreme God, which they usually did by having recourse to the argument of causality, or to the teleological argument drawn from the marvelous order observed in the universe. "He alone is God," exclaims Theophilus, "who separates the light from the darkness, who established the depths of the abyss, and marked the bounds of the sea." [7]

They are quite commonly accused by their critics of overemphasizing God's transcendence and His incomprehensibility to the human mind, but this criticism does not appear altogether just. They were certainly very far removed from making of God a mere abstraction, as did some of the Greek philosophers before them; and also from placing Him in isolated grandeur beyond all contact with the world of His own creation, as did the Gnostics whose theories they rejected as absurd. They ascribe to Him in a preëminent degree the fullness of all physical and moral perfections; He is a God who loves all His creatures, who provides for them, and guides them in all their ways. "Him I call God," writes Aristides, "who created and preserves all things, who is without beginning, eternal, immortal, who stands in need of nothing, and is far above all perturbations and defects.[8] Or as Theophilus

[6] Supplic. 9.
[7] Ad Autolyc. 1, 6.
[8] Apol. 1.

words it: "God derives His name from the fact that He is the source of all stability in this changeable world, and the fountainhead of all action and life. He is without beginning, immutable, immortal; sustaining, ruling, and caring for all things. He is the creator and author of all beings, and His majesty is known and understood from the greatness of His works." [9]

Against both pagan philosophers and Gnostic sectaries they explicitly defend the creation of the world out of nothing, "jussu Dei," and very definitely reject the idea of an eternal *hyle* as postulated by Plato.[10] Nor is this Creator-God an inferior power, a demiurge, but the supreme God Himself, besides whom there is no other God.[11] Harnack, Tixeront, and many others who have written on this subject, point out that the Apologists shrink from bringing the all-perfect God into immediate contact with the finite and the changeable; and that therefore, like Plato and Philo, they postulate an intermediary, a minister, through whom He pronounces the creative fiat. The fact that they do postulate such an intermediary is certain, but whether they were guided in so doing by their exaggerated notion of an all-transcendent God, as these authors maintain, is not so clear. They had before them the teaching of St. John, that "in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God," and "all things were made by Him, and without Him was made nothing that was made." [12] This contains the fundamental elements of their doctrine on creation, and all they did was to evolve these elements along philosophical lines.

At the same time, however, it may be conceded, and is indeed highly probable, that in the concept of the Creator-Word they sought to combine the traditional teaching of the Church and the postulates of long established philosophical systems. Most of them, as already indicated, had received their early training in the philosophical schools of the day, and it was but natural that this training should influence them in their efforts to give a rational setting to the truths of faith. Within certain limits

[9] Ad Autolyc. i, 4.
[10] Ibid. 2, 4; Aristid. 1, 4.
[11] Ibid.
[12] John, 1, 1, 3.

this was, of course, quite legitimate, but in some respects they seem to have gone beyond these limits. For they introduced certain views, at least as far as the wording goes, which were later on found to be more or less out of harmony with the mind of the Church. We may instance the apparent subordination of the Word and the Holy Spirit to the Father, not only as regards their origin, but also in reference to the perfection of their being. Of this point, however, something more will be said in another paragraph.

First, then, they accepted from the traditional teaching of the Church the unity of God in the strictest sense of the term; and this God they held to be identical with the God of the Old Testament. Hence Justin could say with perfect truth to his friend Trypho: "Neither will there ever be, O Trypho, nor has there been from the beginning, another God besides Him who created and orderly disposed the universe. Nor do we hold that there is one God for us and another for you; but that very one we consider to be God, who led your fathers out of the land of Egypt. . . . Neither do we hope in any other, for there is no other, but in Him in whom you also hope, the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob." [13]

And yet, notwithstanding his emphatic statement that there is only one God, Justin does not hesitate to tell his friend that there is another one to whom this name applies. "I shall endeavor," he says, "to convince you, since indeed you understand the Scriptures, of what I say, namely, that there is and is said to be under the Creator of all things another God and Lord, who is also called Angel, because He announces to men whatever the Creator of all things wishes to make known to them." [14] True, there is only one God, but in this one God there is "another God and Lord."

Nor is there a contradiction in this; for the author says: "Referring to the Scriptures, I shall try to convince you, that this very one who is said to have appeared to Abraham and Jacob and Moses, and who is taught in the Scripture to be God, is another besides Him who created all things — another,

[13] Dial. 11. [14] Ibid. 56.

I say, numerically, not in sense," that is, in being.[15] So there are not really two Gods, but two divine terms, and they are one God.

How is this to be explained? The author tells us a little further on. "By another testimony from the Scriptures I shall also prove to you, my friends, that in the beginning, before all created things, God brought forth from His own self a certain rational power, which by the Holy Spirit is also called the glory of God, and again the Son, Wisdom, Angel, God, the Lord and Word."[16] God, therefore, has a Son, begotten of His own self, who for that reason is also God. He is indeed said to be "a certain rational power," "the glory of God," and "wisdom," but not in an impersonal sense; for He is distinct from the Creator, not in name only, but numerically. "Not as the light is in name only distinct from the sun, but numerically He is something else."[17] Hence those "who say that the Son is The Father, are convicted of error; because neither do they know the Father, nor are they aware that the Father of all things has a Son. And He, as He is the first-begotten Word of God, is also God."[18]

The Word, then, is begotten by the Father; brought forth by him as His Son. How is this to be understood? The author tries to illustrate it by two examples, which, whilst they are necessarily inadequate, still make clear his mind. The first is taken from human speech. Thought may be considered as a mental word, conceived by the mind, and when we utter it, we in a manner bring it forth. In this there is no severing of parts, nor are we by this utterance deprived of the mental word. In some such manner must we understand the divine generation of the Word of God. He remains in the Father and is one with the Father, and yet He is distinct.

The second example is taken from a fire at which another fire is lit. Although it communicates itself, yet it is not thereby diminished, but remains in the same state in which it was before. Similarly in the generation of the Word the

[15] Ibid. 56; Cfr. 58, 59.
[16] Ibid. 61.
[17] Ibid. 128.
[18] I Apol. 63.

Father indeed communicates His being to the Son, but He does so without change.[19]

When did this generation take place? St. Justin says, "in the beginning," "before all things created."[20] Does this mean eternity in the strict sense of the term? The author does not say so in so many words, but there can be no doubt that this is his meaning. For the source of the Word's divinity is precisely His generation by the Father,[21] so that His divine sonship is necessarily coextensive in duration with His divinity, and therefore obviously from all eternity. Whatever may be said in other texts about a sort of second generation in view of the creation of the world, it is sufficiently plain that in the author's mind this had no bearing upon the divine sonship of the Word. He was Word and Son and God before all ages, in every respect coeternal with the Father.

And what St. Justin thus sets forth with considerable attention to details, we find in substance also advanced by the other Apologists. Thus Athenagoras, although strongly emphasizing the absolute oneness of God,[22] points out to his pagan readers that this one God has a Son, the Word, through whom He created and disposed all things. And though distinct from the Father, because He is the Son, He is nevertheless one with the Father. The Son is in the Father, and the Father is in the Son, through the union and the power of the Spirit.[23]

Similarly Theophilus, who says that "the Word was always existing in the heart of God. Before anything was made, the Word was the counselor of the Creator."[24] "And this the Holy Scriptures teach us, and as many as were inspired by the Holy Spirit, among whom was John, saying: 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God,' thus teaching that in the beginning God alone was and in Him was the Word. Then he adds: 'And the Word was God, all things were made by Him, and without Him nothing was made.' The Word, therefore, as He is God and born of

[19] Dial. 61.
[20] Ibid. 48, 61, 62; cfr. II Apol. 6.
[21] I Apol. 63.
[22] Leg. pro Christ. 8.
[23] Ibid. 10.
[24] Ad Autolyc. 2, 22.

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God, the Father of all things sends into whatever place He wishes." [25]

The same views we find expressed in the Letter to Diognetus, the unknown author of which calls Christ the beloved, the proper, the only begotten Son of God; the holy and incomprehensible Logos, who is not an angel, but the creator and fashioner of the universe. The Father sent Him into the world both as God and as man, that He might call all men to salvation.[26] He is the proper Son of God, given for the redemption of us all; the holy, the incorruptible, the immortal.[27] He is the Word of God, who was from the beginning, the eternal, who is ever born again in the hearts of the saints.[28]

Again, Aristides tells his readers that Christians derive their name from our Lord Jesus Christ. "He is confessed to be the Son of the most high God, who in the Holy Spirit descended from heaven for the salvation of men. . . . They acknowledge the Creator and Fashioner of all things in His only-begotten Son and the Holy Spirit, and besides Him they venerate no other god." [29] Melito of Sardis says that the same Christ is both God and man, having two natures, the divine and the human; and although here on earth He hid His divinity under the lowliness of the flesh, He is nevertheless true and eternal God.[30] Even Tatian, who, as we shall see below, has some very strange expressions, states quite plainly: "God was in the beginning, and the beginning we understand to be the power of the Word. . . . By Him and by the Word, who was in Him, all things were sustained. . . . The Word was born by a communication, not by abscission. . . . Similarly as when from one torch many fires are lit. . . . Thus the Word, proceeding from the power of the Father, did not cause Him to be without the Word." [31]

Gathering all this together, it appears that regarding the matter in question three points were quite clear and fixed in the minds of the Apologists. 1°. That there is only one

[25] Ibid.
[26] Ad Diognet. 6, 11; 7.
[27] Ibid. 9, 2, 4.
[28] Ibid. 11, 3 sqq.
[29] Apol. 15.
[30] Fragm. 7.
[31] Adv. Graecos, 5.

true God, eternal and unchangeable. 2°. That the Word is in a proper sense the Son of God, distinct from the Father as Son, yet one with Him as God. 3°. That the generation of the Son, as the source of His true divinity, is eternal.

That all this is perfectly orthodox need not be pointed out. It was the faith of the Church at the time, as it had always been, and later on it formed the substance of the Nicene definition. It may be noted, too, that in the texts thus far cited we have chiefly statements of facts, no explanations being attempted by the authors, except that here and there they introduce a few examples by way of illustration. Thus far, then, they may be taken simply as witnesses of tradition, and as such they are safe guides. It is only when they venture to give their own views as Christian philosophers, that they begin to flounder; though even in this respect it may be said that things look worse than they really are.

The chief difficulties may be reduced to the following points. 1°. The Word, though God, is nevertheless "under the Creator of all things."[32] The Father is "ὁ θεός," the God, the Word is simply God.[33] 2°. The Word is in some way uttered or brought forth *ad extra* at the time and in view of the creation of the world. He is the Father's minister, through whom the Father acts upon the world of created beings.[34] 3°. In the Theophanies of the Old Testament it was always the Son who appeared.[35] The Father is "invisible and impassible, who can neither be understood nor be comprehended," who dwells in light inaccessible.[36]

From this it would seem that the Apologists somehow subordinated the Son to the Father, and that they ascribed to Him some sort of temporal generation. There are many authors, and some of them are Catholics, who hold this view. But all things considered, it appears perhaps more probable that the Apologists intended neither the one nor the other. The very fact that they derive the divinity of the Word from

[32] Justin, Dial. 56.
[33] Id. I Apol. 13.
[34] Id. II Apol. 6; Tatian, Adv. Graecos, 5; Theoph. Ad Autol. 2, 22.
[35] Justin, Dial. 127; Athenag. Leg. pro Christ. 10.
[36] Ibid.

His generation by the Father, justifies them in placing Him "sub Creatore universorum," not indeed in respect of the perfection of His being, but *ratione originis*. In this sense also, the Father is "ὁ θεός," the God, because unbegotten and underived Himself, He is the source and origin of the Son. Hence they have no hesitation in saying that the Father and the Son are one.[37] There is a difference between the two, but that does not touch the divine nature which is possessed by both.

Nor is there anything strange in the fact that they speak of the Word as the intermediary and organ of creation; for as Word He is the Father's "thought," the Father's "mind," the Father's "practical knowledge," through which the creative fiat goes forth. In itself this implies no essential subordination, and hence even Theophilus coördinates the Word and the Holy Spirit with the Father in the work of creation. Commenting on the words of Genesis, "Let us make man to our image and likeness," he says: "But these words He did not direct to any one else than to His Word and His Wisdom"; where Wisdom stands for the Holy Spirit.[38]

Apparently there is greater difficulty in giving an orthodox interpretation of what the Apologists, especially Tatian and Theophilus, say about the Word being brought forth *ad extra* at the time of creation. They distinguish between the Word as contained from all eternity in the bosom of the Father, the Λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, and the Word as being uttered in view of the creative work, the Λόγος προφορικος. Thus Theophilus says that the "Word was always existing in the heart of God. Because before anything was made, God used It as His counselor; for it is His mind and His judgment. But when God wished to create those things which He had determined upon, He brought forth this Word outwardly, the first-born of creatures; however not in such a way as to be deprived of the World, but bringing forth the Word He remained ever united to the same."[39] And Tatian states: "By the will of His (God's) simplicity the Word leaped forth;

[37] Athenag. Leg. pro Christ. 10.
[38] Theoph. Ad. Autolyc. 2, 18.
[39] Ibid. 2, 22.

but the Word, not going forth into emptiness, becomes the first-born of the Father."[40] And this he illustrates by the example of a torch from which other torches are lit, as already explained in a preceding paragraph.

The terms here used appear at first sight very strange; but as all things were created through the Word, is it not possible that these authors intended merely to indicate an outward manifestation of the Word, as it is de facto contained in the created world? This interpretation appears at least much more consistent with what they say about the divinity of the Son and the unchangeableness of God than any other that implies a change in the inner state of the Word. For it must be remembered that a change in the Word necessarily implies a change in the unchangeable God, since, as was pointed out above, in the Apologists' view the Father and the Son are one.

The further difficulty drawn from the Old Testament Theophanies, in which, according to the Apologists, it was always the Son who appeared, has in reality but little bearing on the matter in hand. For these appearances of God among men are very properly appropriated to the Son, both because of His procession from the Father and His position in the divine economy of salvation. Hence Theophilus says very much to the point: "The Word, therefore, since He is God and born of God, the Father sends, when He wishes, into a determined place, and when He has arrived there, He is heard and seen, being sent by the Father."[41] Hence the reason why the Son is sent by the Father is precisely because "He is God and born of God." The Father, being underived, cannot be sent. Justin uses almost the same terms, when he says that no one ever saw the Father, but they saw Him who, being God and the Son of God, carries out the will of the Father.[42]

To this interpretation it is commonly objected that the Apologists conceived the Father to be so transcendent as to be incapable of coming in direct contact with finite and contingent beings, and that for this reason they attributed these appearances to the Son. However there does not seem to be much

[40] Adv. Graecos, 5.
[41] Ad Autolyc. 2, 22.
[42] Dial. 127.

force in this objection. For, in the first place, the Apologists hold that the Son is of the same substance as the Father, being not made,[43] but begotten,[44] alone God's own proper Son,[45] Himself God,[46] and one with the Father;[47] hence, logically at least, the Father cannot be more transcendent than the Son. In the next place, touching the Apologists' view concerning the transcendence of the Father, there seems to be a good deal of exaggeration in the works of modern critics. For if Theophilus could write: "Not only is it proper to the most high and omnipotent and true God to be everywhere, but also to see all things and to hear all things, although He cannot be contained in any place," [48] it would seem that his idea about the transcendence of God was very much the same as that of modern theologians.

Hence, taking it all in all, these alleged aberrations of the second-century Apologists appear to have no very solid foundation in fact. The terms used are not rarely inaccurate, and the ideas expressed by them may at times be hazy, but the doctrines thus imperfectly set forth seem at least to admit of an orthodox interpretation. Dogmatically it matters little what was really in the minds of these writers, as their tentative explanations of abstruse theological problems were merely the personal views of men who tried to give a rational setting to the truths of faith. If they erred in this, their error cannot be laid at the doors of the Church. But as a matter of historical interest, it is well to hear also the other side.[49]

Whilst the Apologists thus enlarge upon the divinity of the Son, and His relation to the Father, they say comparatively little about the Holy Ghost, contenting themselves with occasional statements of what is contained in Scriptural data. The reason of this difference of treatment arises, no doubt, from the general scope of their works; although Harnack contends that in their system of theology there was no room for the

[43] Athenag. Leg. pro Christ. 10.
[44] Ibid.; Justin, Dial. 61; Tatian, 5, 7.
[45] Justin, I Apol. 23; II Apol. 6.
[46] Justin, I Apol. 63.
[47] Athenag. o. c. 10.
[48] Ad Autolyc. 2, 3.
[49] Cfr. D'Alès, La Théologie de Tertullien, who gives a succinct but clear exposition of the points in question, pp. 84–96.

Holy Spirit. The truth is, that in reference to the Holy Spirit there was no immediate call for philosophical and theological discussions, and hence they said little about Him. Yet incidentally they refer to Him as the Holy Spirit, the Prophetic Spirit, the image and similitude of God, who with the Father and the Son is the author of creation, who is derived from the Father and was associated with the Son in the work of redemption.[50] Here and there they use comparisons that would seem to indicate only a modal distinction, but in other places they name Him with the Father and the Son as a third divine term in the Godhead, as will appear from the following paragraph.

The mystery of the Blessed Trinity is not explicitly discussed by the Apologists, yet on occasion they express their views in a manner which shows that they were well acquainted with the substance of the doctrine as it was formulated at a later date. Thus Theophilus states that the three days which preceded the creation of the light were an image of the Trinity, of God, His Word, and His Wisdom; understanding by Wisdom the Holy Spirit.[51] The doctrine was still more clearly expressed by Athenagoras, in his Apology to the Emperors. After showing that the Christians are not atheists, because they believe in a spiritual and immutable God, and in the Son of God, who is the Word of the Father, and in the Holy Ghost, who emanates from God as a ray of light from the sun, he concludes with the very pertinent question: "Who then would not be astonished to hear these men called atheists who proclaim a God the Father, a Son who is God, and a Holy Spirit; who show their power in the unity and their distinction by the rank?"[52] And in another paragraph of the same Apology he states: "The Christians know a God and His Word, what is the union of the Son with the Father, what is the communication of the Father with the Son, what is the union and the distinction of those who are thus united, the Spirit, the Son, the Father."[53] Almost the same terms

[50] Justin, Apol. I, 6; 13; Athenag. 10; 12; 24; Tatian, 7; 12; 13.
[51] Ad Autolyc. 2, 15.
[52] Supplic. 10.
[53] Ibid.

are used by St. Justin.[54] From this somewhat elementary statement of the doctrine to its formal definition not quite two centuries later, the cry is not so very far.

Of the other doctrines found in the Apologists a brief summary will suffice, as, with a few exceptions, they are but a restatement of what is contained in the writings of the Apostolic Fathers. The following points may be noticed:

1°. Jesus Christ, says Melito of Sardis, though God eternal, is also man; a perfect man, with a body and a soul like ours. He has two natures, and yet He is only one person.[55] This unity of person and distinction of natures is also brought out by St. Justin, when he says that Jesus Christ consists of a body, the Logos, and a soul.[56]

2°. The God-Man is not only our Redeemer, but He is so by a vicarious substitution: for all men were under a curse because of their sins, and hence the Father required that His Christ, who was without sin, should take upon Himself the malediction of us all. We were accursed and He suffered for us. In reference to the redemption He was the representative of the human race; in Him all mankind was included.[57]

3°. The first creatures of God are the angels, who were called into being before man. They were created intelligent and free, and made to serve God. They are God's ministers for the government of the world. Several of them sinned. The good angels are venerated by the faithful, but are not adored as God. The devil was the author of Adam's fall.[58]

4°. Man is defined by St. Justin as a "rational being composed of a body and a soul."[59] With this definition the others agree, all of them being dichotomists. They emphasize man's freedom of action, and point out that he was created to observe the law of justice and to fit himself for the blessedness of heaven. "God created men and angels free beings," writes Justin, "and according to His good pleasure deter-

[54] Apol. I, 13.
[55] Fragm. 6, 7, 8, 14, 15, 16.
[56] Apol. II, 10.
[57] Justin, Apol. I, 63; Dial. 41, 95, 115; Melito, fragm. 13.
[58] Justin, Dial. 88; Tatian, 7; Athenag. 10; Justin, Apol. II, 2, 5.
[59] De Resurrect. fragm. 24; Athenag. 10.

mined the time during which they should use their free will in observing the law of justice."[60] And again: "That every one shall be punished or rewarded according to his merits, we have been taught by the Prophets; and this we can show to be true. . . ." "For he (the just) would not be worthy of reward if he did not of himself choose what is good, but were predetermined thereto by nature; nor would the wicked be deserving of punishment, if they were not evil of their own free will."[61] Athenagoras calls attention to the ultimate end which God had in view in the creation of man. He did not create human beings for the advantage of other creatures, nor for His own advantage, but on account of Himself, "propter se," so that He might show forth His wisdom and goodness. Secondarily, however, man was created for his own happiness, that he might live forever.[62]

The natural immortality of man's soul is clearly taught by the unknown author of the Letter to Diognetus, who states that "the immortal soul dwells in a mortal body";[63] but it appears that this truth was denied, or at least called in question by some of the other Apologists. Thus Tatian and Theophilus point out that immortality is a reward granted to the just and a punishment inflicted on the wicked.[64] Justin apparently takes the same view, for he writes: "God alone, because unproduced, is not subject to corruption, and therefore He is God; but all other beings are produced and consequently under the law of corruption, and this is the reason why souls die and are punished."[65] And a little further on: "As man does not always exist, and the union between soul and body is not perpetual, but when the time comes that this harmony should be destroyed, the soul leaves the body and man ceases to be; so in like manner, when it behooves the soul no longer to exist, the vital spirit leaves it, and the soul ceases to be, and returns to the source whence it was drawn forth."[66] Some interpret this as simply a denial of essential immortality,

[60] Dial. 102.
[61] I Apol. 43.
[62] De Resurrect. Mort. 12.
[63] Ad Diognet. 7, 8.
[64] Tatian, 13; Theophil. 2, 19, 27.
[65] Dial. 5.
[66] Ibid. 6.

which can be predicated only of God; but that does not seem to be the author's meaning.

In connection with man's origin, the Apologists make several statements which may well be taken to imply their belief in original sin; although most modern critics are rather sceptical on this point. Thus St. Justin, without making any distinction between adults and children, states that baptism is a regeneration that frees the recipient from sin; also that the Son of God became man and was crucified for the human race, which had by Adam's fall come under the power of death and the deceits of the devil.[67] Tatian says that we are born to die, but we die through our own fault because we were sold through sin.[68] Theophilus teaches that all the labors and sorrows and afflictions of human life, and finally death, flow from Adam's sin as from a fountain of evil.[69] It is true, these and similar statements may, absolutely speaking, refer merely to the transmission of physical evils; but it is at least very probable that they also bear reference to the inheritance of moral guilt.

5°. Of the Church very little is said by the Apologists, as the scope of their work did not call for remarks on this subject; nevertheless St. Justin gives us an outline which it will be helpful to set down in this place. The Church, he says, has her origin in Christ, whose name she bears. She "has sprung from His name and partakes of His name."[70] Between Christ and His Church exists the most intimate relationship, much resembling that which results between man and woman when they are united in wedlock. "The marriages of Jacob were types of that which Christ was about to accomplish. For it was not lawful for Jacob to marry two sisters at once. And he served Laban for his daughters; and being deceived over the younger, he again served seven years. Now Leah," Justin tells Trypho, "is your people and synagogue; but Rachel is our Church."[71]

Hence the Church has taken the place of the synagogue, and

[67] I Apol. 61.
[68] Ad Græcos 11; cfr. 7.
[69] Ad Autolyc. 2, 25.
[70] Dial. 63.
[71] Ibid. 134.

the Christians are now the people of God, "a holy people."[72] For this reason no one is ever admitted into the Church unless he has accepted the Christian faith and is regenerated in the waters of baptism. "As many as are persuaded and believe that what we teach is true and are of a mind to live accordingly, are instructed to pray and to entreat God, with fasting, for the remission of their sins that are past, we praying and fasting with them."[73] Then "they are brought by us to a place where there is water and are regenerated in the same manner in which we were regenerated. For, in the name of God, the Father and the Lord of the universe, and of our Saviour Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Spirit, they then receive the washing with water." And this is necessary; "for Christ also said, 'Except ye be born again, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.'"[74]

Hence baptism is a new birth, the beginning of a new life in the society of those whom God has chosen as His people. As members of this society the faithful must first of all be mindful of unity, since they constitute but one body. "Such a thing also you may witness in the body: although the members are numerated as many, all are called one and constitute a body. For, indeed, a people and a church, though consisting of many individuals in number, form a single entity and are spoken of and addressed by a single title."[75] Heresy, therefore, and schism are directly opposed to the fundamental idea of the Church, and those who are guilty of the one or the other are cut off from the fellowship of the faithful. There are many of this kind, as Christ Himself foretold that there would be. "Some are called Marcians, and some Valentinians, and some Basilidians, and some Saturnillians, and others by other names." "But with these we have nothing in common, since we know them to be atheists, impious, unrighteous and sinful, and confessors of Jesus only in name instead of being worshipers of Him."[76]

This unity of the Church is preserved by authorized teachers,

[72] Ibid. 119.
[73] I. Apol., 61
[74] Ibid.
[75] Dial. 42.
[76] Ibid. 35.

whose doctrine is in accordance with the Apostolic tradition. The Church teaches authoritatively as a mother teaches her children.[77] There is one who presides over the assembled faithful in each community, performs the liturgical services, instructs and exhorts the people, and has charge of the alms for the sick and the poor.[78] This, of course, is the bishop, although Justin does not call him by that name. Then there are also deacons, who distribute the consecrated elements to the faithful.

A further aid to the preservation of unity is the common worship in which the newly baptized immediately take part, and at which they must thereafter be present at stated times. "After we have thus washed him who has been convinced and has assented to our teaching, we bring him to the place where those who are called brethren are assembled, in order that we may offer hearty prayers in common, both for ourselves and for the baptized person and for all others in every place."[79] Then, "on the day called Sunday, all who live in the cities or in the country gather together in one place, and the memoirs of the Apostles or the writings of the Prophets are read as long as time permits; and when the reader has ceased, the president verbally instructs and exhorts to the imitation of these good things."[80]

"Next there is brought to the president of the brethren bread and a cup of wine mixed with water; and he, taking them, gives praise and glory to the Father of all, through the name of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, and offers thanks at considerable length for our being counted worthy to receive these things at His hands. When he has concluded the prayers and thanksgivings, all the people present express their assent by saying Amen. Then those among us who are called deacons take the bread and the wine mixed with water, over which the prayer of thanksgiving has been said, and distribute them to each one of those who are present, and also carry them to such as are absent."[81]

[77] De Resurrect. 5; Dial. 82.
[78] Apol. I, 65, 67.
[79] Ibid. 65.
[80] Ibid. 67.
[81] Ibid. 65.

"Now this food is called by us the Eucharist, of which no one is allowed to partake, except he has been baptized, believes what we teach, and observes the commandments of Christ. For not as common bread and common drink do we receive it; but in like manner as Jesus Christ our Saviour, having been made flesh by the word of God, hath taken both flesh and blood for our salvation, so likewise have we been taught that the food, which is blessed by the prayer of His word, and from which our flesh and blood by conversion are nourished, is the flesh and blood of that Jesus who was made flesh. For the Apostles, in their commentaries which are called Gospels, have handed it down that Jesus had so commanded." [82]

Then follow the words of the institution, together with a brief reference to the cult of Mithra, in which, according to the author, the sacred mysteries are imitated through the instigation of the devil. In his Dialogue with Trypho, Justin points out that the prophecy of Malachy is verified in the Christian Eucharistic rite. The prophet, he says, "speaks of those Gentiles, namely us, who in every place offer sacrifice to God, that is the bread of the Eucharist and also the cup of the Eucharist." [83] And this is indeed a true sacrifice; for "we are the true high-priestly race of God, even as God Himself bears witness, saying that in every place among the Gentiles sacrifices are presented to Him, well-pleasing and pure. Now God receives sacrifices from no one except through His priests." [84]

Thus, then, the author gives us a fairly complete outline of the Church as a divine institution, of the baptismal rite, and of the Eucharistic worship. In regard to the latter he presents the doctrine of the Church with singular completeness, including the elements of the consecration, the change of these elements into the body and blood of Christ, the words by which the change is effected, the sacrificial character of the liturgical action, and, at least in a general way, the order of divine service on Sunday. Truly a precious heirloom of the distant past!

[82] Ibid. 66.
[83] Dial. 41.
[84] Ibid. 116.

6°. The same author gives also a beautiful summary of the Church's traditional teaching on Mary's position in reference to the redemption. "The First-Born of the Father before all creatures," he says, "became a man through the Virgin, that by what way the disobedience arising from the serpent had its beginning, by that way also it might have its undoing. For Eve, being a virgin and undefiled, conceiving the word that was from the serpent, brought forth disobedience and death; but the Virgin Mary, taking faith and joy, when the angel told her the glad tidings (of the Incarnation), answered: 'Let it be done unto me according to thy word.'"[85] Mary is pure and undefiled, as Eve was in the state of innocence, and by her obedience restored what had been ruined by the disobedience of Eve. This not only implies Mary's close association with the Redeemer in the work of our salvation, but also contains in its fundamental elements the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. The same comparison we shall find often repeated in subsequent writers.

7°. In their eschatological views the Apologists follow the traditional teaching of the Church, calling attention to the two advents of Christ, the one in the lowliness of the Incarnation, the other in glory at the end of time.[86] Justin, however, holds that there will be a Millennium, when the just shall reign with Christ for a thousand years.[87] Until the end of that time the beatific vision will be deferred, and hence after death even the souls of the just may in some way fall under the power of the demons, although not to their destruction. Still he admits that the hope of the Millennium is not shared by all.[88] In fact, the more common opinion is that there will be a general resurrection followed by the judgment, and then either heaven or hell according to each one's deserts. The material universe, which was created out of nothing, shall then perish in a general conflagration.[89]

These, then, are the principal points that strike one in study-

[85] Dial. 100.
[86] Justin, Apol. I, 52; Dial. 49; Tatian, 13; Theoph. 2, 14, 15.
[87] Dial. 80, 81.
[88] Ibid. 105.
[89] Justin, Dial. 45, 120; Apol. I, 8, 28; Tatian, 5; Ad Diognet. 10, 7.

ing the teaching of the Apologists. Do they bear the impress of secularizing Greek thought? Traces of a gradual secularization of the message of Christ? Indications of faith passing into doctrine, of evangelical freedom yielding to the restrictions of law? The answer to these questions may, of course, be made to depend on one's presuppositions. If one supposes that Christ taught no doctrines and enacted no laws, but gave to the world as His message solely the perfect life He led; then, yes, not only the Apologists, but every Christian teacher, from St. Peter and St. Paul onward, labored persistently at the Hellenization of the message of Christ. For they all used the principles of reason, mostly dressed in Hellenic garb, to preach Christ and to explain His sayings to the Gentile world. But who, with the Gospel records before him, would dare to make a supposition so startling? When Christ said: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven"; "unless you eat the flesh of the Son of man and drink His blood, you shall not have life in you"; and so in a score of other instances, did He set forth no doctrines which His followers were called upon to believe? Why, then, did He say: "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved: but he that believeth not, shall be condemned?"

Again, when He said: "He that heareth you, heareth me; he that despiseth you, despiseth me: whatsoever you shall bind upon earth, shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth, shall be loosed also in heaven; as the Father hath sent me, I also send you," did He establish no law or give no power to make laws according to the future needs of the Church? And if He did — if He did teach definite doctrines and did enact particular laws, either Himself or through others, why should not His followers apply the principles of sound philosophy, even though it was of Hellenic birth, to set forth more clearly the meaning of these doctrines and determine more exactly the force of these laws? To deny them this right, to bind them down to a parrotlike repetition of the Saviour's sayings, would be to stultify the Son of God

and bring to naught the work which His Father had given Him to do.

In this connection mention ought also to be made of a fragment from the writings of Hegesippus, the *Inscription of Abercius,* and the *Muratorian Canon.* They belong to the latter half of the second century and have considerable doctrinal value.

1°. Hegesippus, as Eusebius mentions in his Ecclesiastical History, was the author of a work in five books, which contained the true traditions of the Apostolic preaching. Apparently a native of Palestine, he traveled from church to church, in order, as he tells us, to ascertain the faith taught in each. The fragment in question contains his findings in the churches of Corinth and Rome. It reads thus: "And the church of the Corinthians remained in the true word until Primus was bishop of Corinth (that is, till the time of the author's visit). I made their acquaintance in my journey to Rome, and remained with the Corinthians many days, in which we were refreshed with the true word. And when I was in Rome, I drew up a list of succession as far as Anicetus, whose deacon was Eleutherius. And Soter succeeds Anicetus, after whom Eleutherius. And in each succession and in each city all is according to the ordinances of the law and the Prophets and the Lord." What a precious testimony to the unity of faith in those early days this is! And also to the mode of government in each church, and to the early Papal succession, as handed down by one who knew the condition of things from his own personal observation.

2°. Abercius was bishop of Hieropolis in Phrygia. About the middle of the second century he visited Rome, and on his return he composed an epitaph. Translated freely, it reads: "The citizen of a chosen city, this monument I made whilst still living, that there I might have in time a resting-place for my body; I being by name Abercius, the disciple of a holy shepherd, who feeds his flocks of sheep on mountains and plains, and who has great eyes that see everywhere. For this shepherd taught me that the Book of Life is worthy of

belief. And to Rome he sent me to contemplate majesty, and to see a queen golden-robed and golden-sandalled; there also I saw a people having a shining mark. And I saw the land of Syria and all its cities. Nisibis I saw, when I passed over the Euphrates. But everywhere I had brethren. I had Paul. . . . (the last part of the sentence is missing). Faith everywhere led me forward, and everywhere provided as my food a fish of exceeding great size and perfect, which a holy virgin drew with her hands from a fountain — and this faith ever gives to its friends to eat; having also wine of great virtue, and giving it mingled with bread. These things I, Abercius, having been witness of them, ordered to be written here. Verily I was passing through my seventy-second year. He that discerneth these things, a fellow-believer, let him pray for Abercius. And no one shall place another grave over my grave; but if he do, he shall pay to the treasury of the Romans two thousand pieces of gold and to my good native city of Hieropolis one thousand pieces of gold."

This is only an inscription on the tomb of a second century Christian bishop, yet its few lines are crowded with information on matters of doctrine and religious practice. Baptism marks the Christian with a shining seal, the Church is spread everywhere, and everywhere its members are brethren. Rome is the place where "majesty" dwells; obviously a reference to the preëminence of that Church. Christians are the flock of Christ the Holy Shepherd, who bears witness that the contents of the Holy Books are true. Faith provides spiritual food, a large and perfect fish, the symbol of Christ, who is the Son of a Holy Virgin. Not all understand the meaning of this, but fellow-believers do; and for them it is meet to pray for the dead.

3°. The Muratorian Canon, so named from its discoverer, L. A. Muratori, contains the oldest known list of books making up the New Testament. The beginning is missing, and the first line of the preserved text refers to the second Gospel. Then are mentioned the third and fourth Gospels, of Luke and John respectively, the Acts of the Apostles, the First Epistle of St. John, thirteen Letters of St. Paul — two of which, one

to the Laodiceans and one to the Alexandrians, are rejected as spurious — the Epistle of Jude, two other Epistles of St. John, his Apocalypse, and the Apocalypse of St. Peter. All these, with the two exceptions indicated above, are acknowledged as canonical; whilst the Shepherd of Hermas and a number of Gnostic and Montanistic writings are rejected. The Shepherd, however, may be read, but not publicly in the church. Likewise the Apocalypse of St. Peter is not universally received. Of our canonical New Testament books the two Epistles of St. Peter, the Epistle of St. James, and the Letter to the Hebrews, are not mentioned; yet the value of the document consists not so much in the completeness of the list of books it contains, but rather in the statement that the books there enumerated are received as genuine in the " Catholic Church." Practically, therefore, some fifty years after the death of St. John, the canon of New Testament writings was fixed.

CHAPTER VIII

THE TEACHING OF ST. IRENÆUS AND ST. HIPPOLYTUS[1]

St. Irenæus is usually associated with a group of writers called Antignostics. This title is applied to them because of their strenuous opposition to the Gnostic heresy, which they regarded as a special menace to the Church. There was quite a large number of them, mostly Asiatics, but the works of nearly all have perished. Irenæus was a prolific writer, as is seen from the frequent references to his literary activity by ancient authors. He was, moreover, a man whose opinion was highly valued by his contemporaries and by those who came after him; but, as happened in the case of so many other great men in those early times, most of his literary productions have fallen a prey to the calamities of subsequent ages. Aside from a few fragments, only two of his works have come down to us. One is a small treatise preserved in an Armenian translation, only recently discovered, under the title, *Demonstration of Apostolic Preaching.* The other is his great work in five books, entitled, *Against Heresies.* The heresies in question refer chiefly to the different Gnostic systems, of which he appears to have had intimate and first-hand knowledge.

However, the scope of this great work is not limited to mere polemics. "Whilst refuting the Gnostic error, it expounds the theory of the Church and of her doctrinal functions with such fullness and firmness that the third book is a veritable treatise on the Church, and the oldest in existence." As a faithful follower of the Good Shepherd, to whom every

[1] Cfr. Dufourcq, Saint Irénée; Doellinger, Hippolytus and Callistus; Batiffol, Primitive Catholicism, 164–245; * Durell, The Historic Church, 202–253; Tixeront, H. D. I, 229–240; D'Alès, Théologie de Saint Hippolyte.

stray sheep is dear, Irenæus did not aim at discomfiting adversaries of the faith by holding up their false teaching to ridicule, but rather endeavored to open for them the way to the truth, by presenting a clear exposition of the traditional teaching of the Church. This is one of the reasons why it seems preferable, in our present inquiries, to study his teaching primarily in itself and only incidentally in its relation to Gnosticism. The other reason is that St. Irenæus stands at the parting of the ways. After his time, Eastern and Western theological thought tended in two divergent directions. Not that already at this early date the two great churches began to drift apart, owing to Eastern schismatic tendencies, for of that the first signs appeared only some two hundred years later; but circumstances of place and peculiarities of national character brought it about that East and West were thenceforth absorbed in trying to find solutions of widely different problems. The one speculative and the other practical, they went each their own way; although these ways, for all their divergence, were closely linked by the bonds of one and the same faith.

Irenæus was born in Asia Minor, sometime between 130 and 142, most likely at or near Smyrna. During his boyhood he often listened to St. Polycarp, for whom he professed great veneration in after years. When arrived at man's estate, he traveled westward, tarrying some time in Rome and finally taking up his permanent residence at Lyons in Gaul. In 177, during the persecution of Marcus Aurelius, he was already a priest and was made the bearer of a letter from the church of Lyons to the Pope, concerning matters connected with the Montanist heresy. Shortly after his return he was made bishop, succeeding Ponthinus, who had been martyred for the faith.

It was some years after his elevation to the episcopal see of Lyons that he took a leading part in the paschal controversy. Pope Victor I (189-198), according to a statement of Eusebius, threatened to excommunicate certain Asiatic bishops, who in spite of his admonition persisted in celebrating Easter on the " fourteenth day of the passover according to the Gos-

pel," instead of accommodating themselves to the Roman custom. Irenæus, "in the name of those brethren in Gaul over whom he presided, wrote an epistle, in which he maintains the duty of celebrating the mystery of the resurrection of our Lord only on the day of the Lord. He becomingly also admonishes Victor not to cut off whole churches of God, who observed the tradition of an ancient custom." "And this same Irenæus, as one whose character answered well to his name, being in this way a peacemaker, exhorted and negotiated such matters as these for the peace of the churches." [2]

From other sources also it appears that Irenæus was a holy man and a most zealous pastor. He converted a large number of the Gallic Celts to Christianity, and brought the church of Lyons to a very prosperous condition. It is commonly believed that he died a martyr's death.

In non-Catholic circles it is usually put down as an historic fact, that Irenæus of Lyons was largely responsible for the evolution of the early Church, conceived as a communion of brotherly love, into authoritative Catholicism as it finds its perfect expression in the Church of Rome to-day. He it was, they say, who put an end to the Gnostic and Montanist crisis, and must be considered as "the author of the theory of such victorious principles as the authority of the rule of faith, the authority of episcopal succession, the authority of the confederation of bishops." How very unhistorical this statement is, and how absolutely without any foundation in fact, has recently been exhaustively shown by Mgr. Batiffol, in his excellent work on Primitive Catholicism. Furthermore, a mere glance at the preceding chapters cannot fail to convince the reader that authoritative Catholicism is as old as Christianity itself. The author of the Didache, Clement of Rome, Ignatius of Antioch, did not less firmly insist upon submission of the faithful to their ecclesiastical rulers than does the bishop of Lyons. The only difference is, that circumstances forced Irenæus to bring out more clearly, than had been the case with his predecessors, the universal extent of this author-

[2] Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. 5, 24.

ity. But even in this he does not follow his own private notions; his constant appeal is to the traditions handed down since the time of the Apostles, and the facts of history bear out his appeal.

In making this appeal, Irenæus does not, in the first instance, have recourse to written tradition as contained in Holy Scripture; and he gives the reason. The Gnostics, when confronted with the written word, either claim, though foolishly, that they have a more perfect gospel of their own, or else they say that Catholics are too simple to understand the Gospel which they possess.[3] With such men one cannot argue, except by bringing before them the witness of the living Church. Incidentally, however, Irenæus bears witness to the reverence with which the Sacred Writings, of both the Old and the New Testament, were regarded by himself and his fellow-believers. They were dictated, he says, by the Word of God and His Spirit; and the four Gospels especially determine the faith and are the norm of truth.[4] His writings also show that the New Testament canon was already fixed in his day.

As, then, the heretics cannot be convinced by an appeal to Holy Scripture, because they either misinterpret it or oppose to it their own apocryphal gospels, he quotes against them the Rule of Faith, which every Christian receives at baptism, and which cannot be changed, although it can be more or less perfectly understood and explained.[5] "The Church," he says, "is indeed scattered over the whole world, extending even to the ends of the earth; but she has received from the Apostles and their disciples one and the same faith, to wit: In one God the Father Almighty, who made heaven and earth and the sea, and all that is contained therein; and in one Christ Jesus, the Son of God, who for our salvation became flesh; and in the Holy Ghost, who through the Prophets made known God's economy of salvation; and in the advent of the beloved Christ Jesus our Lord, His birth of the Virgin, His sufferings and resurrection, and His return from heaven in the glory of the Father, to restore all things and to raise all

[3] Adv. Hæres. 3, 1; 1, 20, 1; 3, 11, 7; 2, 10, 2, 3.

[4] Ibid. 2, 28, 2; 3, 1, 1; 3, 11, 8.

[5] Ibid. 1, 9, 4; 10, 3.

flesh from the grave, so that before Christ Jesus our Lord and God and Saviour and King, according to the good will of the invisible Father, every knee shall bend, of those in heaven and on earth and under the earth, and every tongue shall confess Him; (He shall come) to pass judgment upon all, condemning the spirits of wickedness, the disobedient and rebellious angels, as also the ungodly and unjust and evil-doers and blasphemers among men, to everlasting fire, and rewarding the just and godly, who have observed His commandments, whether from the beginning or since their conversion, with life and immortality and eternal glory." [6]

This is the faith into which the children of the Catholic Church are baptized, to this her converts must subscribe. In substance it is identical with the contents of the Apostolic Creed, although here and there the lines are somewhat extended. And who is at the back of this faith? Who preserves it and vouches for its truth? This the author tells us in the following paragraph. It is the living Church, whose very unity shows her to be the work of God.

"These glad tidings," he continues, "the Church has received, and this faith she preserves with great care, so that, although scattered all over the earth, her children seem to dwell in one and the same house: this all believe with such accord that one would think they had but one heart and one soul, and this she preaches and teaches and hands down in such oneness of doctrine as if she had but one mouth. For although there are many and diverse languages in the world, nevertheless the substance of tradition is everywhere the same. The churches in Germany do not teach a different doctrine from those in Spain or those among the Celts; nor is there any difference of teaching in the churches of the Orient, in Egypt and Lybia, and in those that were founded in the center of the world: but rather as the sun, which is the work of God, is one and the same in all parts of the universe, so likewise is the preaching of the truth, enlightening all men who are predestined to come to a knowledge thereof. And neither will he, among ecclesiastical superiors,

[6] Ibid. I, 10, 1.

who is powerful in speech say aught else . . . nor will he who is less gifted in preaching take aught away from tradition." [7]

Whilst the living Church is thus the guardian of truth, those upon whom in the Church this duty of watching over the purity of faith chiefly falls, and from whom, in consequence, the truth may be fully ascertained, are the bishops whose succession is legitimately derived from the Apostles. "All who have eyes to see," he declares, "can recognize this tradition in any one of the churches, and we can point out the succession of bishops from the Apostles to our own day." [8] This uninterrupted succession of bishops in the churches founded by the Apostles warrants the truth of their teaching; for "together with the episcopal succession they also received the unfailing charism of truth." [9] "However, as it would be too long to enumerate the episcopal lists of all the churches, there is one, very great, and most ancient and known to all, the church founded and established at Rome by two most glorious Apostles, Peter and Paul, whose tradition which it hath from the Apostles, and whose faith proclaimed unto men by a succession of bishops coming down even unto us, we point to, thereby confounding all those who in any way form undue assemblies, on account of either self-pleasing ways, or of vain glory, or of blindness and wrong opinion. For with this church, because of her higher authority, it is necessary that every church, that is, the faithful all the world over, should agree." [10]

Here, then, is the ultimate and all-sufficient criterion of orthodox teaching — agreement with the church of Rome. Apostolic succession is indeed under ordinary circumstances a sufficient warrant that the truth is taught in any given church; but instead of laboriously inquiring in each instance whether such succession can be established, it suffices to ascertain whether that particular church is in communion with Rome. That mere fact decides the question of orthodoxy. Does this mean, therefore, that the text sets forth the Primacy of

[7] Ibid. 1, 10, 2.
[8] Ibid. 3, 3, 1.
[9] Ibid. 4, 26, 2, 4, 5.
[10] Ibid. 3, 3, 2.

Rome in matters of faith? Such is the contention of Catholic scholars; and although Protestants usually attempt another interpretation, the obvious meaning of the text is that Rome holds a preëminence to which all Christianity must bow. Hence the strong expression: "Ad hanc Ecclesiam necesse est omnem convenire ecclesiam"— it is a matter of necessity, of obligation, that every church resort to Rome in order to find the truth. Hence, too, the historical fact, that men interested in the true faith, as Polycarp, Justin, Tatian, Rhodon, Abercius, Irenæus, Hegesippus, Tertullian, Origen, and numerous others, wended their way Rome-wards; not to speak of heretics who also tried to win Rome over to their side, in order to impress the world with the truth of their doctrines. Even Harnack, speaking of Polycarp's visit to Anicetus, says very significantly: "It was not Anicetus who came to Polycarp, but Polycarp to Anicetus." [11]

After thus pointing out the authoritative position of the church of Rome, Irenæus gives the succession of bishops, from "the Blessed Apostles, who founded and builded the church," to Linus, Anencletus, Clement, Evaristus, Alexander, Sixtus, Telesphorus, Hyginus, Pius, Soter, and Eleutherius, then occupying the see. Under the guidance of these bishops, "the Tradition which is of the Apostles hath ever been preserved." The safeguarding of the truth in the Church is, furthermore, assured for all times; because the Church is assisted in her teaching by the Spirit of God. It is He who renews her preaching, even as an exquisite deposit preserved in a goodly vessel, which keeps the vessel itself from becoming old. "He is the gift conferred by God on His Church, just as God imparted to Adam, His creature, the breath of life, in order that it might vivify his members." Whoso, then, does not hasten to the Church, cannot possess the Spirit of God. "For where the Church is, there also is the Spirit of God; and where the Spirit of God is, there is the Church and all grace: but the Spirit is truth." [12]

[11] Dogmengeschichte, I, 488.

[12] Adv. Hæres. 3, 2, 1, 2.

Over against this unity of faith in the Church, and its unfailing transmission by a divinely constituted authority and the guiding influence of the Holy Spirit, Irenæus places the endless variations and contradictions of the Gnostics. Among them there is no standard of truth, and every one makes his own doctrine for himself; they resemble the pagan schools of philosophy. They are sophists forever doomed to variations of every sort, tossed about by the waves of their errors, having no rock whereon to rest their edifice: nothing but moving sand. Thus truth can no longer be recognized. For if to-day we must look for it in the system of Cerinthus, tomorrow in that of Valentinian, then in that of Basilides, or Marcion, all of which contradict one another, how shall we know the truth? Can any one imagine a truth that varies? [13]

Besides this rather full and explicit teaching on the Church and the Rule of Faith, which, however, has been cited only in part, St. Irenæus touches on nearly all points of doctrine taught by the Church. Yet for brevity's sake most of this may be omitted; for as he is very conservative, he rarely goes beyond his predecessors in the development of any particular doctrine. Still the following points ought to be noted:

1°. Arguing against the Gnostics, who ascribed the creation of the world to a demiurge, he insists that there is only one God, and that this God is Himself the creator. He is the God of both the Old and the New Testament, the only God, holy, just, and merciful.[14]

2°. In answer to the Gnostics' contention that the supreme God, who is all-good, cannot be the author of evil, he points to the fact that whatever evil there is in the world has its origin in the abuse of man's freedom, whence also resulted the original fall. Of his very nature man is limited in perfection, and he must perfect himself by obedience.[15] Instead of doing this, Adam disobeyed, and in him the whole race was guilty of disobedience.[16] Here we have a rather clear statement of the doctrine of original sin, we too being "debtors to Him whose commandment also we transgressed

[13] Ibid. 3, 2, 1, 2.
[14] Ibid. 3, 24, 1; 2, 1, 1, 2.
[15] Ibid. 4, 37, 1–3.
[16] Ibid. 5, 16, 3.

originally." In this connection the author draws a rigorous parallel between Adam and Christ; through the one we fell and through the other we were raised to a new life. Elsewhere he draws a similar parallel between Eve and Mary, referring to the former as the cause of our death and to the latter as the source of salvation and our advocate.[17]

3°. Although there is only one God, the Father of all, still the Son is also true God, "God in a definite and absolute sense of the word." [18] "By the Son, therefore, who is in the Father, and hath in Him the Father, He WHO IS, is declared to be God; the Father bearing witness to the Son, and the Son announcing the Father." [19] Besides the Father and the Son there is also the Holy Ghost, who is eternal, the Wisdom of God, and His Image. He and the Son took part in the creation of man, and He dwells in our body as in His temple.[20]

4°. In his Christology and soteriology, both of which are rather fully developed, the author brings out clearly the union of the human and the divine in Christ. Precisely how this union is to be explained he does not know; but of the fact that there is a most intimate union he is certain. It was the Word of God, the Only-Begotten of the Father, our Lord Jesus Christ, who saved us: the Incarnate Word was suspended on the cross.[21] His very office of Redeemer required that He should be both God and man; so that He might mediate between heaven and earth, and conquer the devil justly.[22] He was man to be tempted, Word to be glorified.[23]

5°. Our spiritual regeneration is effected through baptism; therein we are born again and receive the Holy Ghost.[24] Baptism is also administered to little children.[25] Christians must share in the fruits of the redemption through faith in Jesus Christ. This faith, however, is not merely an assent of the mind, but also a fulfillment of the Lord's precepts.[26]

6°. The Holy Eucharist he clearly teaches to be the body

[17] Ibid. 3, 22, 4; 5, 19, 1.
[18] Ibid. 3, 6, 1, 2.
[19] Ibid. 3, 6, 2.
[20] Ibid. 5, 12, 2; 4, 7, 4; 4, 20, 1.
[21] Ibid. 3, 16, 9; 5, 18, 1.
[22] Ibid. 3, 18, 7; 5, 1, 1.
[23] Ibid. 3, 19, 2, 3.
[24] Ibid. 1, 21, 1; 3, 17, 2, 3.
[25] Ibid. 2, 22, 4.
[26] Ibid. 4, 2, 7; 4, 6, 5.

and blood of the Saviour, into which the bread and wine are changed by the invocation of God. Having established this, he draws from it an argument against the Gnostics, refuting their contentions that material creatures are evil, that God cannot have made them, and that the body shall not rise again. This argument presupposes that the Gnostics also admitted the Real Presence. "How," asks Irenæus, "can they be certain that the bread over which the Eucharistic words have been spoken is the Lord's body, and the chalice is His blood, if they confess not that He is the Son of the Creator, His Word, through whom the trees bear their fruit, the fountains gush forth, and the earth produces first the blade, then the ear, and then the full-grown wheat in the ear? How again do they say that our bodies shall be dissolved in corruption and not receive life, since they are nourished with the body and blood of the Lord? Therefore let them either change their mind or abstain from making the aforesaid oblation." [27] Catholics, on the other hand, are perfectly consistent, believing as they do in the Real Presence and in the resurrection of the body. "For even as the bread, which is of the earth, is no longer common bread after receiving the invocation of God, but the Eucharist, consisting of two elements, the one earthly and the other heavenly; so in a similar manner our bodies receiving the Eucharist are no longer corruptible, but have the hope of a future resurrection." [28]

Hence not only Catholics, but Gnostics as well, firmly believed in the Real Presence, although these latter distorted the doctrine to suit their own peculiar tenets. The same must be said about the Eucharist as a true sacrifice, since from this aspect, also accepted by the Gnostics, Irenæus proves to them that matter cannot be evil, because bread and wine, the elements of consecration, are material creatures.[29] In connection with this he reminds them that the Eucharist is the clean oblation spoken of by the Prophet Malachy, and that the Apostles, following the Master's direction, caused it to be offered throughout the world.[30]

[27] Ibid. 4, 18, 4; cfr. 5, 2, 2.
[28] Ibid. 4, 18, 5.
[29] Ibid. 4, 18, 5.
[30] Ibid. 4, 17, 5.

7°. Penance restores the truly repentant to peace, to the friendship of God, and to communion. Incidentally the author also refers to public penance and to confession, but he gives no particulars. The heretic Cerdon, he says in one place, did public penance before the Church during the pontificate of Hyginus;[31] and in another place he relates how at Lyons in Gaul certain women, who had been seduced by the Gnostics, despaired of salvation, because they were ashamed to confess their sins, whilst others who had committed the same sin did penance and were restored to communion.[32]

8°. The author's eschatological views are somewhat peculiar. He holds that the soul of Christ had to remain in limbo until the third day when He rose from the dead, and so must also the souls of the just remain in an invisible place until they shall be reunited to their bodies.[33] There will be first a resurrection of the just alone, who are to reign with Jesus Christ during a thousand years and enjoy all the blessings of the Millennium.[34] He admits indeed that others do not believe in this doctrine, but with them he has little patience. Then, after the thousand years have come to an end, the general resurrection and the judgment will take place.[35] The punishment of the wicked, as well as the reward of the just, shall be everlasting.[36]

Thus with the exception of a few minor points, concerning which he gives his own personal views, the author's exposition of Catholic doctrine is most satisfactory. His claim that he is guided by the tradition of the Apostles is borne out by almost every statement contained in his great work. And his witness to this tradition is all the more important as he knew from his own personal experience what was the teaching of the different churches on the points in question. Educated in Asia Minor, visiting Rome on several occasions, the chief pastor of Christianity in Gaul, he came during his life in contact with representative Christians from all over the world, and among them not a few whose memories, like his own, reached

[31] Ibid. 3, 4, 3.
[32] Ibid. 1, 6, 3; 1, 13, 7.
[33] Ibid. 5, 31, 2.
[34] Ibid. 5, 32–35.
[35] Ibid. 2, 33, 5; 5, 32, 1.
[36] Ibid. 4, 28, 2; 5, 36, 2.

back to the time of the Apostolic Fathers. A better witness to Apostolic tradition could hardly be found.

By way of supplement to the teaching of St. Irenæus, a few remarks may here be made about the doctrinal views of Hippolytus of Rome, who, according to Photius (Bibl. cod. 121), was a disciple of the bishop of Lyons towards the end of the second century. He was an exegete rather than a theologian, still his occasional observations on dogmatic points are of considerable value, especially as they record the views then entertained in the capital city of Christendom. He was a voluminous writer, but most of his works have perished. Of the eighteen books mentioned by St. Jerome, only two are complete, the treatise *Contra Noetum* and the *Philosophumena.* This latter, which is a refutation of various heresies, was for a long time ascribed to some unknown author of the third century, but it is now commonly admitted to be the work of Hippolytus. The teaching of this disciple of Irenæus, as gathered from the above-mentioned two works and from fragments of his other books, may be briefly summarized as follows:

1°. "God is one, first and alone, the Creator and Lord of all things, without anything coeval with Himself." [37] "There was nothing besides Himself; He was alone, and yet He was manifold. For He was not without His Word, without wisdom, without power, without counsel. All these were in Him: He Himself was all. When He willed, and as He willed, He manifested the Word at a time determined by Himself: through the Word He made all things." [38] "Of all beings the Word alone was generated by Him." [39] "His Word is from Himself; therefore also God, since He is the substance of God." [40]

"And thus there was present with Him another one. But when I say another, I do not say two gods; but the Word proceeded from Him as light from light, as water from a fountain, as a ray from the sun. For there is one power which proceeds from the whole; but the whole is the Father

[37] Philosoph. 10, 32.
[38] Cont. Noet. 10.
[39] Philosoph. 10, 33.
[40] Ibid.

and the power proceeding from the whole is the Word." [41] "Christ is God over all things." [42]

All this is rather archaic, as far as the expressions go, but the doctrine is perfectly clear and orthodox. The author has no doubt whatever about the oneness of God, the true divinity of the Word, and the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father. However, he is less satisfactory when he comes to speak of the Word's divine sonship, as a few citations will show.

2°. "What manner of Son did God send into the world through the Incarnation, except His Word, whom He called Son in view of His future birth? And when He is called Son, it is because of His love towards men. For the Word, apart from the flesh and in Himself, was not truly Son, although He was truly the only-begotten Word." [43] Hence the divine sonship of the Word seems to depend, at least for its perfection, on the Incarnation. However, in this there appears to be a question of the name rather than of the underlying reality; for the Word was born of the Father before the creation of the world, and was even then His Son.

3°. The Word Incarnate is both perfect God and perfect man. The union between the human and the divine is so intimate that without the Word the human nature could not exist. "Neither could the flesh exist by itself and without the Word; for it has its subsistence in the Word." [44] On the other hand, the human nature was not merged into the divinity; for "we must believe that God the Word descended from heaven into the holy Virgin Mary, so that He might become Incarnate in her, taking a rational soul and being made in all things like unto us, sin alone excepted." [45] Even as man He "is one Son of God," yet at the same time both God and man. Hence the unity of person and the distinction of the two natures in Christ is clearly maintained by the author.

4°. The personal distinction of the Holy Ghost is hardly touched upon by Hippolytus; but this is easily explained, as

[41] Cont. Noet. 11.
[42] Philosoph. 10, 34.
[43] Cont. Noet. 15.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid. 17.

the works that have come down to us are almost entirely controversial, and the controversy was not about the Holy Ghost but about the Son. Incidentally, however, the Holy Spirit is represented as one of the Trinity, being associated with the Father and the Son in the same Godhead.[46]

5°. "God the Word became man that He might save him who had fallen, and bestow immortality upon all those who would believe in His name."[47] The Incarnate Word is the new man, in whom the old Adam is restored to newness of life.[48] By His sufferings and death He paid our ransom and merited for us a title to incorruptibility and glory.[49]

6°. Of the Church the author speaks only in passing, but he bears witness to the fact that she was then called Catholic in opposition to heretical sects. She is the gathering of the saints, the assemblage of the faithful who live in justice. To be a true member thereof one must have practical faith, which shows itself in the observance of God's commandments.[50]

7°. Entrance into the Church is through baptism, which effects the forgiveness of sins and a spiritual regeneration.[51] The newly baptized are confirmed, and thus receive the Holy Spirit.[52] The faithful are nourished with the flesh and blood of the Saviour, which is offered in every place and among all nations as the great sacrifice of the New Law.[53] To the Church has been entrusted the power of forgiving sins committed after baptism, but there are some grievous offenses which she should not pardon.[54] It was on account of this rigorism that the author was so bitterly opposed to Pope Callistus, on which point something will be said in another chapter. Holy orders are also referred to, and the observance of celibacy on the part of the clergy is strongly insisted on.

8°. God created the world out of nothing, and all that He made was good. Man was created immortal, but after the primal transgression, and because of it, death and corruption are the common lot of all.[55] However, there will be a resur-

[46] Ibid. 8, 14; 8. 12.
[47] Ibid. 17.
[48] De Christo et Antichristo, 26.
[49] Cont. Noet. 17, 18.
[50] In Dan. 1, 17, 5–14.
[51] Ibid. 1, 16, 2, 2.
[52] Ibid. 1, 16, 3.
[53] In Gen. 49, 20; 38, 19.
[54] Philosoph. 9, 12.
[55] Ibid. 10, 33; In Gen. 38, 19.

rection of the dead, when each soul shall be reunited to her own body. The bodies of the just shall be changed so as to be a source of happiness to the soul, whereas those of the wicked shall ever remain subject to all the infirmities of this life. After the resurrection comes the judgment, over which the Incarnate Word of God will preside. All the world, angels, men, and demons, will acclaim the judgment to be just. Then every one shall receive the reward of his deeds. Those who have led good lives shall be recompensed with eternal happiness, whilst evil-doers shall be condemned to everlasting punishment. This punishment of the wicked consists in tortures of both soul and body. The end of the world is near at hand.[56]

Gathering up what has been said in three of the foregoing chapters — that on the Apostolic Fathers, on the Apologists, and on St. Irenæus and St. Hippolytus — we have a fairly complete view of Christian teaching during the second century. Nearly every point of doctrine is touched upon, and some of the more fundamental articles of our holy faith are stated with great clearness. Of doctrinal development, however, there occur as yet only a few noticeable traces. They are mostly found in matters connected with ecclesiology, the relation of the Word to the Father, the unity of person and duality of nature in the God-Man, the real presence of Christ's body and blood in the Blessed Sacrament, and the sacrificial character of the Eucharistic rite. As a general rule no theories are advanced, but the facts of faith are definitely stated. It is these facts that form the foundation of latter theories, which in their turn lead to a fuller exposition of the very same facts, and thereby advance the development of dogmas.

[56] Adv. Graecos, 2; 3; Philosoph. 10, 9, 34; 10, 34; In Proverb. 11, 30.

CHAPTER IX

MONARCHIAN ABERRATIONS AND MONTANISTIC EXCESSES[1]

Gnostic speculations not only stimulated literary activity among orthodox Christians in defense of the faith, but they made so profound and disturbing an impression on certain anxious souls that a reaction set in which led to opposite extremes. The fundamental doctrine of Gnosticism logically implied a division of the Godhead, defending as it did a *pleroma* of divine beings, all indeed subordinated to the Father-God, yet directly or indirectly emanating from him by some sort of generation, and therefore of necessity sharing his nature, although not by way of identity. It was these inferior divinities that were, according to Gnostic speculations, concerned with the visible world, whilst the supreme God stood aloof in majestic isolation. All this was so foreign to Christian consciousness, and appeared so radically opposed to the faith handed down by the Apostles, that many thought it necessary to place exclusive emphasis on the "sole and independent and absolute existence and being and rule of God." This concept of one God and one divine economy, in contradistinction to the Gnostic *pleroma* and its fatuous relation to the visible world, formed the root idea of a movement of thought usually designated as Monarchianism. The following is a brief outline of its genesis and teaching, to which may be added a few words about the rise and excesses of Montanism.

A — Adoptianism and Modalism

In its original intent and purpose, therefore, Monarchianism was neither more nor less than an orthodox reaction against

[1] Cfr. Tixeront, H. D. I, 287–298; Schwane, H. D. I, 148–161; *Bethune-Baker, Op. cit. 96–113; Duchesne, The Early History of the Church, I, 212–237; Bardenhewer, Altkirch. Litt. II, 496–555.

the unbridled license of Gnostic speculations. But before long it took a different turn and advanced views that were plainly out of harmony with the traditional teaching of the Church. Orthodox Christianity insisted indeed upon the unity of God and upon a strictly divine government of the world, but it insisted also upon the true divinity of the Son and upon His share in the " rule of God." These two beliefs must be reconciled, yet so as not to alter the traditions that had come down from the Apostolic past. This Monarchianism failed to do, and hence its final defection from the faith.

Thus it was the true divinity of the Son that proved a stumbling-block to the defenders of the Monarchy, although not in the same way to all. At an early date two parties were formed, each one offering its own solution of the problem. The one reduced the divinity of Christ to a mere power bestowed on Him by God, by the right use of which He acquired divinity in a relative and moral sense; whilst the other, maintaining that Jesus was truly God, merged His divinity so completely into that of the Father as to deny that the Son was a distinct person. The chief representatives of the former class were Theodotus, Artemon, and Paul of Samosata; of the latter, Praxeas, Noetus, and Sabellius. The former are also known to history as Adoptionists and Dynamic Monarchians, whilst the latter are called Modalists, Patripassianists, and Sabellians.

1°. Dynamic Monarchianism is usually traced back to Theodotus, a currier of Byzantium, who, during the last decade of the second century, came to Rome and was excommunicated by Pope Victor. He seems, however, to have been impelled by the desire to save his own reputation rather than by zeal for the unity of God. Accused of having denied Christ during the late persecution, he admitted the fact but pleaded as an excuse that thereby he had not denied God, since Christ was only man. When he was called to account for this statement, he persisted in his assertion that Jesus was merely human, an ordinary man born of a virgin, to whom the power of God was communicated in a singular manner. This led to his excommunication, and thereupon he founded a sect of

his own. His immediate followers, however, seem to have taken little interest in religious discussions. They were for the most part literary men, who preferred to busy themselves with the study of ancient authors and the grammatical exegesis of Holy Scripture. The best known of them is another Theodotus, called the banker, who placed Melchisedech above Jesus and thus gave rise to the sect of Melchisedechians.

Somewhat later a certain Artemon or Artemas, a Syrian by birth, tried to prove these new views by an appeal to Scripture and tradition, but his arguments were thoroughly refuted by the unknown author of the *Little Labyrinth,* who had no difficulty in showing that Christ had from the very first been regarded and worshiped as true God. After this the sect began to dwindle away, although remnants of it were still found at the time of St. Augustine. In Syria, however, it experienced a brief revival shortly after the middle of the third century, through the efforts of Paul of Samosata, bishop of Antioch and chancellor of Queen Zenobia. He contended that the Logos was indeed *homoousios* or consubstantial with the Father but only modally distinct, and that He dwelt in Jesus not essentially or personally, but merely as an attribute or quality. Hence in Paul's view the unity of God implies oneness of person as well as of nature; the Word and the Holy Spirit being simply impersonal attributes of the Godhead. He was condemned by three successive provincial synods and finally deposed through the intervention of the Emperor Aurelian, who, though a pagan, decided that the episcopal dignity and jurisdiction ought to be given to a person in communion with the Bishop of Rome.

2°. Modalistic Monarchianism started out with a fairer promise of success. For not only did it uphold the unity of God, but also the true divinity of Christ. It did this indeed by removing the real distinction between the persons of the Father and the Son, but this heterodox proceeding was not so apparent to the unsuspecting faithful. In reference to the divine persons the doctrine was identical with that of Paul of Samosata, but as its defenders insisted that Christ was truly divine, its heretical element was not easily recognized.

Hence for some time this new heresy escaped even the vigilance of Pope Zephyrinus; but under his successor, Callistus, its true nature was discovered, and its abettors were promptly excommunicated.

Tertullian connects the origin of this sect with a certain Praxeas, of whom nothing further is known than that he lodged a complaint against the Montanists at Rome, and then passed over into Africa, where he propagated his Modalistic views. He was convicted of heresy by Tertullian and made to sign a retractation. Hippolytus, on the other hand, states that Modalism was first taught by Noetus of Smyrna in Asia Minor, who was excommunicated by the presbyterium of that city. At all events, both were active in spreading the same error, Praxeas in Africa and Noetus in Asia Minor.

A somewhat modified form of Modalism was brought to Rome by Epigonus, early in the third century. There it found an ardent propagandist in the person of Cleomenes, and a little later in that of Sabellius. From this latter the heresy received the name of Sabellianism, by which it was known in the East; whilst in the West it was commonly called Patripassianism, in allusion to the fundamental doctrine advanced by these Modalists. According to them it was the Father Himself, under the name of Son, who became incarnate in Jesus and suffered for the salvation of the world. As strict Monarchists they admitted a trinity of manifestations, but not a trinity of persons. Father, Son and Holy Spirit, they said, are simply designations of three different phases under which the one divine essence reveals itself; three distinct names of one identical nature and person. Sabellius indeed, when occasion required, would speak of three divine persons, but only in the original sense of the word, signifying a rôle of acting or mode of manifestation. Patripassianism survived till the fifth century, and played a considerable part in the theological discussions that followed the Council of Nicæa.

B — Montanistic Excesses

Montanism was in no sense an Antignostic reaction, but it appears preferable to call attention to it in this place on account

of the baleful influence it exerted over Tertullian, of whom we must speak in the next chapter. In its beginnings the Montanistic movement did little more than overemphasize the influence which was traditionally attributed to the Holy Spirit, in reference to the special illumination of certain chosen individuals among the faithful. The gift of prophecy played a rather prominent part in the early Church, and authentic instances of this gift reached well up into the second century. Hence when Montanus, a Phrygian convert, began to attract attention by ecstasies and transports in which he uttered strange sayings, it was not at all surprising that he should pass for a prophet. And when two women, Prisca and Maximilla, developed the same symptoms, they were readily accepted as prophetesses. And so the movement was started, probably about 170.

In their first message from the Paraclete they announced that the Saviour would speedily return, and that the " Vision of the Heavenly Jerusalem " would soon appear on earth, at a spot which they indicated. The result, of course, was immediate and wide-spread social disorder. Earthly interests were entirely set aside, and people devoted themselves exclusively to the practice of asceticism, so as to be prepared for the expected advent of the great day. Thus started, the movement spread rapidly and sowed discord on all sides. At first the authorities of the Church adopted a waiting policy, hoping that the excitement would gradually spend itself; but when matters were going from bad to worse, a number of synods were held in Asia Minor, and finally the followers of the new prophet were excommunicated. At the same time several eminent writers, among them Apollinaris of Hierapolis and Serapion of Antioch, refuted the claims of these pretenders. But neither ecclesiastical censures nor polemical attacks had any appreciable effect towards checking the movement.

From Asia the followers of the prophet carried his message into Gaul, Italy, and Africa. In this latter country their most distinguished convert was Tertullian, a priest of Carthage, who since his conversion to Christianity, some fifteen years before, had done yeoman's service in the cause of faith.

His acceptance of the Montanists' pretensions meant a break with the Church, but his passionate nature did not shrink from so momentous a step. To his mind the movement did not endanger the faith, but rather confirm it; and so he threw all other considerations to the winds. Its asceticism especially had great attraction for him, and so had also certain rigoristic views regarding marriage and other points of doctrine. The Montanists of Africa chose him as their head, and even called themselves Tertullianists in his honor. However, in the West the movement did not prove very successful, whilst in the East it continued to make considerable stir till the fifth century. After that time it gradually disappeared.

As a doctrinal movement Montanism amounted to very little. Its Millennarian views were, in substance, shared by some orthodox Christians, among them men of eminence, like St. Justin and St. Irenæus. In asceticism it went somewhat to extremes, but its worst features resulted from doctrinal rigorism, especially touching remarriage and the forgiveness of certain sins. To these must be added its decided opposition to Church authority. It was principally these points that proved the undoing of Tertullian.

By way of reaction against Montanism another sect sprang up in the latter part of the second century, whose members are known as the Alogi. They rejected the Gospel and Apocalypse of St. John, presumably because in them the doctrine of the Holy Ghost holds a prominent place. In consequence they also rejected the Logos doctrine, and on account of this their adversaries, by a play on words, called them Alogi, that is, men without reason. It is usually held that they were the forerunners of Monarchianism, but little is known of their history.

CHAPTER X

SOME WESTERN THEOLOGIANS AND THE BEGINNINGS OF LATIN THEOLOGY[1]

St. Irenæus, though belonging to the East by birth and training, may nevertheless be said to have laid the foundation of Western theology. Conservative and practical, tenaciously clinging to the traditions of the past and yet solicitously attentive to the needs of the present, he exerted in far-away Gaul an influence that was felt in all Western lands, and impressed upon Latin theological thought and tendencies a sane conservatism which formed its most striking characteristic for many centuries. And yet in the initial efforts of building on this solid foundation, two men were chiefly concerned who both fell away from the Church; but it must be noted that their aberrations were to a great extent the outcome of their personal predispositions. These two men were Tertullian and Novatian. Both of them were gifted with more than ordinary intellectual powers, but unfortunately neither had that self-control, disinterestedness, and well balanced judgment, which are the first requisites in solving practical theological problems. Hence at the critical moment, when they should have set their personal views entirely aside, they were found wanting.

With these two may be associated a third writer of the same period, although he was more distinguished for his pastoral zeal than for his theological ability. This is Cyprian, the saintly bishop of Carthage. He professed to be a disciple of Tertullian, and in many instances he did little more than give

[1] Cfr. D'Alès, La Théologie de Tertullien; Leclercq, L'Afrique Chrétienne, I; Bardenhewer, Altkirch. Lit. II, 332–394; 394–464; Batiffol, Primitive Catholicism, 264–281; 332–402; Tixeront, H. D. I, 298–366.

to his master's speculations a practical turn. The works of these men represent in some way the beginning of Latin theology, differing from previous productions along theological lines both in language and in thought. Only a brief outline can here be given, but it will be sufficient for our purpose.

A — Tertullian: His Trinitarian and Christological Teaching

Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus was the son of a Roman centurion, resident at Carthage in Africa. In his early years he received a thorough training in Latin and Greek literature. Later on he took up the practice of law, and in a short time became a distinguished man. However, like the majority of educated pagans, he was steeped in worldliness and appears to have led a rather licentious life. Struck by the constancy with which Christians endured torture and death for their faith, he began to inquire into the claims of Christianity, and about 196 was received into the Church. A few years later he was admitted to the presbyterium at Carthage, where he gained universal respect as a fervent priest. His greatest failings were his violent temper and a decided leaning towards excessive rigorism. It was on account of this latter disposition that after some years he felt himself growing out of harmony with the Catholic spirit. Hence when in 207 the Montanists became very active at Carthage, he began to look for a realization of his ascetic ideals in their ranks. Still it was not until 213 that he definitely broke with the Church and became a full-fledged Montanist. He lived to a decrepit old age, but, as far as is known, he never renounced his error.

During more than twenty years, from 197 to 220, Tertullian was constantly writing against all manner of adversaries, and most of his works have come down to us, though not always in well preserved form. They are of very unequal value, and even the best of them must be read with discrimination. The chief reason is that they are nearly all polemical, and in the heat of combat Tertullian thought more of crushing his adversary than of setting forth the exact truth.

According to Harnack, Tertullian was the founder of

Western Christianity in its present form and the father of orthodox Trinitarian and Christological belief; an assertion, remarks Bardenhewer, that goes far beyond the worst exaggeration of which Tertullian himself, even in his wildest moods, was ever found guilty.[2] The fact is that Tertullian did little more than clear up hazy concepts and forge a new theological language. He did not add to the contents of Christian teaching as it existed before his time, nor did he divert theological thought from its accustomed trend; but he gathered up many a vague idea thus far imperfectly conceived, pointed out with legal accuracy its true significance, and coined the precise term that would best convey its meaning to others. He did not create a new theology, but a new theological language. Till his time the only theological language of the West as well as the East was Greek. Even Hippolytus, though a Roman, employed the Greek language exclusively in the composition of his many works. It may indeed be said that Tertullian's theology differed also in thought from that of his predecessors, but this difference is in the form only, not in the contents. Thus he was truly a pioneer, the founder of Western theology; but not in the sense claimed by Harnack. He created the outward form of theology as distinct from Christian doctrine, and provided the proper terms for the exact expression of theological thought, but the spirit that gave it life flowed from the fountain of Apostolic preaching.

And this he himself insisted on from the moment he took up his pen in defense of the faith until it fell from his palsied hand after his defection from the Church. In one sense it may be said that it was precisely his theological conservatism that finally led him astray. His was too rigid a character to bend to the exigencies of the times, even where it could be done without sacrifice of principle or truth. In all his writings he appeals to the traditions of the past. "No one," he says in the *De Præscriptione,* "knows the Father except the Son, and he to whom the Son has revealed Him; and to no others did the Son reveal Him except to the Apostles whom He sent out to preach what He had revealed. Now what

[2] Altkirch. Litt. II, 340.

they preached, that is, what Christ revealed to them, ought to be ascertained from the churches which they founded." [3] From the teaching of the mother-churches there is no appeal, even to the Scriptures; for the Scriptures belong not to heretics, but to the Church: she is their guardian and interpreter. This is the law of prescription which closes all further appeal.

For practical purposes the teaching of the Church is summed up in the Symbol, the *Lex Fidei,* as the author calls it in his legal phraseology. This Symbol, unlike matters that are merely of discipline and custom, cannot be touched; a view evidently borrowed from Irenæus. Even as a Montanist he clung to this principle. Only what lies outside the Symbol and at the same time is not clearly contained in the teaching of the Church, may be made a matter of investigation.[4] The Symbol of the African Church has been received from the mother-church at Rome; the latter, therefore, is the fountain of truth.[5] In all this there is evidently no attempt to strike out into new directions; the author closely follows the lines traced out by Irenæus, Justin, and the Fathers of the sub-Apostolic age.

With this ascertained, we may now examine a few points of doctrine, in which we shall indeed find new modes of presentation, but nothing new by way of contents.

1°. God is strictly one, yet in such wise that in the one God there are three divine persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, who are distinct in their personality but identical in substance.[6] This oneness of the Godhead admits of a certain *oikonomia,* a distribution of the unity into the Trinity, which does not destroy but organize the Monarchy.[7] The result of this distribution of the unity of the Godhead is the trinity of persons, through a communication of the same nature, the same substance, and the same power to each. "The Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, each of the three is God." [8] Though one, they are three; they are not "unus"

[3] Op. cit. 21; cfr. 19.
[4] De Praescript. 13; 14; De Virgin. Veland. 1.
[5] De Praescript. 21.
[6] Adv. Prax. 2; 4; 8.
[7] Ibid. 2.
[8] Ibid. 13.

but "unum," not one person but one nature; "tres personæ, una substantia," three persons, one substance; "trinitas unius divinitatis, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus," a trinity of one divinity, the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost.[9]

These expressions, "one substance, one state, three persons, a trinity of one divinity," are new theological terms; they are coined by one who has apparently a clear concept of what he believes and a thorough grasp on the genius of the language he uses; but there is absolutely nothing new in the ideas which they convey. The first three, it is sometimes contended, were borrowed from the legal language of the day and made to fit floating concepts of the faith; but if so, they acquired in this transference from one sphere of thought to another a new significance. They did not determine the author's thought, but the author's thought determined their meaning in the new usage which he thus inaugurated. And in this new usage he enshrined the faith as preached by the Apostles. For, after all his dexterous efforts to set forth in apt definition the teaching of the Church on the Trinity, after all the various turns of speech he employs to mark plurality of persons and identity of substance or nature, he falls back for the doctrine itself upon the words of the Saviour recorded in St. John, "Ego et Pater unum sumus." This contains the sum and substance, the very essence of his teaching. "Non unus sed unum," not identity of person but identity of nature. The new theological terminology which he thus originated became a precious heirloom for subsequent ages, but only in so far as it enshrined the more precious heritage of Apostolic preaching.

It must, however, be observed that whilst the author's terminology is almost Nicene in its exactness, and whilst in his mere statement of the Trinitarian doctrine he rivals the great Fathers of the fourth century, he is far from being satisfactory when he enters upon detailed explanations of his views. Even if Harnack's inference that Tertullian was in reality a Tritheist[10] goes somewhat beyond the premises, nevertheless there is found in his writings a large number of texts

[9] Ibid. 22; De Pudic. 21. [10] Dogmengeschichte, I, 575 sqq.

that seem to point in this direction. Thus when he states that the three divine persons do not differ in nature, in substance, in power, he adds that they do differ "gradu, forma, specie," and although the exact meaning of these terms is not quite clear, not a few writers are inclined to see in them more than a merely personal distinction.[11] Again, speaking of the Father and the Son, he says: "The Father is the whole substance, but the Son is a derivation of the whole and a portion, as He Himself acknowledges when he states, 'The Father is greater than I.'"[12] Hence the Father is invisible "pro plenitudine majestatis," whilst the Son is visible "pro modulo derivationis," and "pro temperatura portionis."[13] Similarly the Holy Spirit, who comes from the Father through the Son, "a Patre per Filium," is, as the "vicaria vis" of the Son, in a like subordinate position to the Father, although He is the same God with the Father and the Son.[14]

To some extent, no doubt, these and similar Subordinationist expressions may be accounted for by the author's anxiety to refute at all costs the views of Praxeas, who rejected the traditional teaching concerning the personal distinctions in the Godhead. Hence this distinction is very much emphasized, and then to preserve in spite of it the oneness of God, the Son and the Holy Spirit are conceived as in some way subordinate to the Father. There is obviously a flaw in this reasoning, at least as it is proposed by the author; but not to the extent, as Harnack maintains, that the unity of the divine substance is conceived as merely specific or generic. In the author's mind it is numerical and absolute; for he emphasizes again and again that the distinction of persons arises from a distribution of the unity, not from a separation and division;[15]

[11] The whole passage is as follows: "Sic quoque unus sit omnia dum ex uno omnia, per substantiæ scilicet unitatem; et nihilominus custodiatur oeconomiæ sacramentum, quae unitatem in trinitatem disponit, tres dirigens, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum. Tres autem non statu sed gradu, nec substantia sed forma, nec potestate sed specie; unius autem substantiæ et unius status et unius potestatis, quia unus Deus, ex quo et gradus isti et formæ et species in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti deputantur." Adv. Prax. 2.

[12] Ibid. 9.

[13] Ibid. 14.

[14] Ibid. 4, 8; 2; De Praescript. 13.

[15] Adv. Prax. 2, 3, 8.

also that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are "a trinity of one divinity," that "the Son and the Spirit are of the substance of the Father," and that the Son is God only in so far as He is "ex unitate Patris." [16] The truth seems to be that Tertullian, in common with other writers of this period, Irenæus, Hippolytus, Novation, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen, made use of explanations and expressions savoring of Subordinationism simply to defend the distinction of the divine persons against Modalism, but in his usual passionate way he allowed himself to be carried somewhat beyond the limits of strictly orthodox teaching.

2°. The author's way of speaking is also unsatisfactory in reference to the generation of the Son. He admits indeed the eternal existence of the Word, even as a distinct hypostasis,[17] and also that the Word thus existing from all eternity is properly called Son,[18] but this notwithstanding he contends that there was a time when the Son was not,[19] and that the Word was uttered by the Father in view and at the time of creation, by which utterance His generation became perfect.[20] Hence besides the eternal generation of the Son in the bosom of the Father, which seems to be put more or less on a par with conception, the author admits a kind of temporal generation in which the Word is brought forth as perfect Son. In this matter he likely enough formed his views on the writings of the Apologists, who had used similar terms.[21]

3°. In reference to the God-Man it is specially deserving of notice that the author strikes the exact terms in bringing out the unity of person and the duality of natures, thus neatly formulating the doctrine which the Council of Chalcedon defined in almost identical words two centuries later. Commenting on the opening verse of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, where it is said that Christ is the seed of David according to the flesh and declared God according to the Spirit, he writes: "He therefore is God, the Word and Son of

[16] De Pudic. 21; Adv. Prax. 2; 19.
[17] Ibid. 5.
[18] Ibid. 7.
[19] Adv. Hermog. 3.
[20] Adv. Prax. 7.
[21] Cfr. D'Alès, La Théologie de Tertullien, 81–102.

God. We see a twofold state, not confused, but united in one person, God and the man Jesus." [22] And not only, he says in another place, are there two distinct natures in one and the same Christ, but also two modes of action; for the properties of the two natures remain truly distinct.[23] This might very well serve as a definition against the seventh-century Monothelites. For the rest his Christology is practically the same as that of Irenæus, only that he holds the singular view of Christ's Blessed Mother having lost her virginity in His birth.[24] To this assertion, however, he was most likely driven by his anxiety to defend the reality of Christ's human nature against the Docetæ and Valentinians.

4°. In his soteriology he brings out the vicarious character of Christ's redemptive work, although his views are rather undeveloped as regards details. The Son of God became incarnate that He might expiate our sins, and thus the innocent Christ was substituted for us sinners; without this our ruin could not have been repaired.[25] Jesus was the new Adam in whom the souls of us all were contained.[26] It was for our redemption that the Word took our body and our soul *ex Maria,* and subjected Himself to all our weaknesses and infirmities, sin alone excepted.[27] Thus the Incarnation is the world's only hope.

5°. After the redemption is thus accomplished, our salvation is in our own hands. It was through an abuse of free will that sin and all its terrible consequences entered the world,[28] and now that sin has been blotted out by the blood of the Saviour, it is by a good use of our free will that we must attain salvation. To this we are strictly obliged, because we are the debtors of God; our eternal happiness must come to us as a reward of our merits.[29] This view of satisfaction and personal merit reveals Tertullian's legal bent of mind, yet, if rightly understood, it expresses the objective truth with great

[22] Adv. Prax. 27.
[23] De Carne Christi, 5.
[24] Ibid. 23.
[25] De Bapt. 11.
[26] De Resurr. Carn. 53.
[27] De Carne Christi, 16, 14; 10, 14; 5–9.
[28] Adv. Marcion. II, 5, 6, 7; I, 22.
[29] De Poenit. 2; 6; De Orat. 3, 4; De Exhort. Cast. 2.

exactness, and hence it survives in our modern text-books of Dogmatic Theology. It is, however, only a new formulation of a doctrine as old as Christianity.

6°. On the Church the author offers nothing new, although, even after he had become a Montanist, he bore witness to the fact, sarcastically it is true, that the mother-churches, of which he had made so much in his earlier days, were regarded as in some way depending on the jurisdiction of Rome. His sarcastic use of the terms Pontifex Maximus, Episcopus episcoporum, must have rested upon a more solid foundation than the mere pretension of Callistus to the powers indicated by these titles.

7°. In his teaching on the sacraments there are some points that deserve special notice. Baptism, in which the recipient is reborn in water as the divine *ichtus,* is ordinarily necessary for salvation, but it may be replaced by martyrdom.[30] It can be conferred only once, and if administered by heretics it is invalid.[31] Children are baptized according to the custom of the Church, but it were better to wait until they can be instructed.[32] The bishop is the ordinary minister, but with his consent priests and deacons can also baptize; and so can lay persons, provided they are not women.[33] Baptism is solemnly administered at Easter and Pentecost, still it is valid if conferred at other times.[34]

Confirmation is administered immediately after baptism. The laying on of hands is preceded by an unction, but it is not altogether clear whether this is regarded as an essential part of the sacramental rite.[35]

The Eucharist is the body and blood of the Lord, wherewith the flesh is nourished that the soul may fatten on its God. It is the banquet prepared for the returning prodigal, the food which Christ Himself places before us.[36] Those who receive it are very careful that nothing of the consecrated bread and wine fall to the ground.[37] It is distributed by those

[30] De Bapt. 1; 12, 13; 16.
[31] Ibid. 15.
[32] Ibid. 15; 18.
[33] Ibid. 17.
[34] Ibid. 19.
[35] Cfr. O'Dwyer, Confirmation, 22, 54 sqq.
[36] De Resurr. Carn. 8; De Pudic. 9.
[37] De Corona, 3.

who preside over the assembled faithful; it is also preserved to be taken on fast days.[38] Finally it is offered as a sacrifice, both for the souls departed and on the anniversary of martyrs.[39] All this obviously implies belief in the Real Presence, and hence in another place the author goes so far as to say that those who touch the Eucharist with hands that have made idols torture the Lord's body.[40]

On the question of penance Tertullian was not always consistent, yet he never denied that the power of the keys had been given to the Church. Even after he had become a Montanist, he only tried to limit its application, and that merely as a matter of prudence and expediency. Of this, however, more will be said in another chapter.

Holy orders the author speaks of in passing. The hierarchy is made up of bishops, priests, and deacons, who perform liturgical functions and instruct the faithful.[41] In several places he seems to hold that the distinction between the clergy and laity is simply the result of ecclesiastical legislation.[42]

Marriages must be contracted before the Church; entered upon in any other way, they are considered as adulterous unions.[43] After his defection from the faith, the author became quite rabid on the subject of marriage, demanding that all second marriages be absolutely forbidden.[44]

The only sacrament not mentioned in the writings of Tertullian is that of extreme unction, although it is possible that he refers even to this when he speaks of the *donum curationum*, the gift of healing. Of course, he had no formal sacramental theory, still there is found in his writings a symbolism that may be said to contain the elements from which such a theory was later on developed. It is the visible sign through which the invisible grace of God is communicated. Thus "the flesh is washed, that the soul may be cleansed; the flesh is anointed,

[38] De Orat. 19.
[39] Ibid.; De Corona, 3.
[40] De Idol. 7.
[41] De Bapt. 17; De Monog. 11.
[42] De Exhort. Cast. 7; De Pudic. 21.
[43] Ibid. 4.
[44] Ad Uxor. 1, 1; De Monog. 1, 2, 14.

that the soul may be consecrated; the flesh is signed, that the soul may be fortified; the flesh is overshadowed by the imposition of hands, that the soul may be illumined; the flesh feeds on the body and blood of Christ, that the soul may grow fat on its God."[45]

8°. The author's teaching on eschatological subjects is quite archaic and need not be specially noticed here. A word, however, must be said on his views in reference to the fall of man and its consequences. Adam's fall, he says, brought upon all mankind not only death, but sin and punishment as well. There is a solidarity in this transgression, and it introduced into every soul a stain, an original blemish, a bent to evil.[46] This seems to contain, in its elements at least, the doctrine of original sin.

B — Novatian: His Treatise on the Trinity

Novatian was a disciple and imitator of Tertullian. He was also the first Roman writer who composed his works in the Latin tongue. Up to the middle of the third century he was a priest of good standing, besides being generally esteemed as an eminent rhetorician and philosopher. After the death of Pope Fabian, which occurred January 20, 250, he wrote, in the name of the Roman clergy, several letters to Cyprian of Carthage, dealing with the reconciliation of the *lapsi*. The doctrine contained in them is in perfect harmony with the traditional teaching of the Church. But shortly after this, he became an extreme rigorist and started a schism in opposition to Pope Cornelius. His views were adopted by many others, and at the time of the Council of Nicæa the sect was still in existence. He seems to have been a prolific writer, but of his many works only four have come down to us. These are entitled, *De Cibis Judaicis, De Spectaculis, De Bono Pudicitiæ, De Trinitate*. Only the last one is of real doctrinal value. The following is a brief summary of its contents:

In close adherence to the order followed by Tertullian and

[45] De Resurrect. Carn. 8.

[46] De Anima, 40, 41; De Testim. Animae, 3.

St. Irenæus, the author treats first of the omnipotent Father, who so far transcends the world of finite things that He is beyond all thought; then he dwells at greater length on the nature of the Son, His real or personal distinction from the Father, His true divinity, and the reality of His human nature; finally he devotes one chapter to the doctrine of the Holy Ghost. In purpose and execution the whole is an orderly exposition of the Rule of Faith.

In his teaching on the Father he offers nothing special; but when speaking of the Son he emphasizes the fact that the Word is eternal not merely as Word, but also as Son. His generation is strictly from all eternity, and therefore also His divine sonship; and this necessarily so, for else the Father would not be Father.[47] However, even with this as a sufficient reason for the divine sonship, there is a sort of second generation when the Word was uttered by the Father in view of the creative work.[48] And thus the author seems to fall back into the course of reasoning initiated by the Apologists.

Between the Father and the Son there is a *communio substantiæ,* a common possession of the same substance, so that the Son is *substantia divina,* truly divine.[49] The Father is indeed anterior to the Son, but only in as much as He is Father; and so the Son is posterior to the Father, but only in as much as He is Son. In substance and being they are coeternal.[50] The Son is, however, a second person, and as such distinct from the Father. Nay, He is not only distinct, but in some way inferior; for He is neither invisible nor incomprehensible as is the Father.[51] Here we have the logical inconsistency again that occurs in nearly all these writers. Its probable explanation was given above.

The Holy Ghost is never called God by the author; yet He is represented as one of the Trinity, possessed of the attributes of the Godhead. He is the illuminator of things divine, a heavenly power, existing from all eternity, and still in

[47] De Trin. 31.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid. 11–24; 31.
[50] De Trin. 24.
[51] Ibid. 31, 27, 61.

some way inferior to the Son.[52] It is from the Son that He receives what He gives to creatures.[53]

In his Christology the author strongly emphasizes the unity of person in the Saviour, but without sacrificing the distinction of the two natures. Christ is at the same time true God and true man, born of a virgin, and having a nature like ours.[54] Even as man Jesus is the Son of God, not in virtue of a divine generation, or naturally, but in consequence of the personal union of His human nature with the Word. The author treats as heretics all those who deny either the reality of Christ's humanity or the truth of His divinity.[55]

Many other points of doctrine are touched upon, such as the creation of the world, man's likeness to God, his freedom, the immortality of his soul, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the Church and in the hearts of the faithful, but as all this is referred to only in passing it need not detain us here.

C — St. Cyprian: His Teaching on the Church

Cyprian was born in Africa, about the year 200, of wealthy pagan parents. Early in life he embraced the career of a rhetorician and won great renown in the schools of Carthage. When about forty-six years old, he was converted to Christianity and shortly after was elevated to the priesthood. Towards the end of the year 248, or early in 249, he was made bishop of Carthage and metropolitan of Proconsular Africa. He was not an eminent theologian but a model bishop, having a practical rather than a speculative mind. During the terrible persecution of Decius (250-251), he concealed himself in order not to deprive his flock of their pastor; but seven years later, when the persecution of Valerius broke out, he remained at his post in spite of all entreaties. In a short while he was arrested and after a brief trial, the Acts of which are still extant, he was beheaded for the faith, September 1, 258.

In theology St. Cyprian was a close follower of Tertullian, whom he was fond of calling his master; but he had none of

[52] Ibid. 16, 29.
[53] Ibid. 16.
[54] Ibid. 24, 13; 21, 23.
[55] Ibid. 11.

his master's impetuosity and passionate violence. Of him St. Jerome writes: "It would be superfluous to raise a monument to his genius, as his works are more brilliant than the sun." Soon after his death, Cyprian's writings were collected by Pontius, his deacon and intimate friend. They comprise sermons, pamphlets, tractates, and letters. In these he touches upon almost every point of doctrine and moral practice, but as far as the History of Dogmas is concerned, only his views on Church government and his contribution to Sacramental Theology are of real importance.

The Church, as conceived by St. Cyprian, is constituted after the fashion of a municipal commonwealth, having its *plebs,* made up of the ordinary faithful, and its *ordo* or *clerus,* consisting of those who are entrusted with governmental powers.[56] The constitution of the *ordo* is hierarchial. At the head, in each particular community, stands the bishop, who holds the "sacerdotii sublime fastigium." His authority descends in ever diminishing degrees to priests, deacons, and subdeacons. There are also other persons entrusted with various ecclesiastical functions, as acolytes, exorcists, and lectors.[57] Of ostiarii or porters, who at that time held a clerical rank in the church of Rome, no mention is made.

Thus the Church is a closely knit and sharply defined unit, of which the clergy and the laity are the constituent parts.[58] The chief bond of union in this collective body is the governing authority derived from Christ. When the consecrating prelates lay their hands on the head of the new bishop, to "confer upon him the episcopate," he is made to share in the Saviour's own authority over the faithful entrusted to his care. In virtue of this consecration he can claim as applied to himself the words spoken to the Apostles: "He that heareth you, heareth me." [59] The Apostles were the bishops of old, and the present bishops are the Apostles of to-day.

However, the bishops must not use their power tyrannically; they must feed their flock on the heavenly nourishment laid up in the Church. For the Church is the spouse of Christ,

[56] Ep. 51, 1; 59, 19.
[57] Ep. 29; 24, 4; 68; 69.
[58] Ep. 58, 4.
[59] Ep. 66, 4, 8; 3, 3.

to whom she must bring forth spiritual children.[60] Thus there is also provided an internal bond of union, faith and charity, which is made strong by the external bond of authority.

Hence the most fundamental note of the Church is unity: internal unity through practical faith and active charity, and external unity of due subjection to lawful pastors. And this unity was intended by Christ Himself. It is typified by His seamless robe, and called to the minds of all by the Eucharistic bread and wine, which, though derived from many grains of wheat and many grapes, are nevertheless but one heavenly nourishment.[61] To this unity the growth of the Church and her consequent dispersion through many lands offers no obstacle. For from one sun dart forth many rays, from one spring flow many rivulets, from one tree spread out many branches; yet in each instance unity is preserved by the oneness of the source.[62] So, as there is one God, one founder of the Church, and one source of authority, the Church ever remains one in spite of her diffusion throughout the world.

The proximate reason why this universal Church is firmly fixed in its unity is the solidarity of the episcopate.[63] Just as the Apostles formed only one Apostolic college, and only one Apostolic power was shared by all *in solidum,* so all the bishops together form only one episcopate, each one sharing in the powers given to it as a body.[64] Hence if an individual bishop is neglectful of his duty, the others must come to the rescue of his flock.[65] And to emphasize this corporate union and unity, Christ built His Church on one alone, on Peter; for although after the resurrection He gave equal powers to all His Apostles . . . nevertheless, in order to make manifest the unity, He so disposed matters by His own authority that the origin of this same unity should flow from one.[66] Heresies and schisms may and do arise, but they do not affect the unity of the Church. The well-disposed do not separate them-

[60] De Unit. 4-6; Ep. 33, 1.
[61] De Unit. 7; Ep. 63, 13; 59, 5.
[62] De Unit. 5.
[63] Ibid. 4.
[64] Ibid. 3.
[65] Ep. 68, 3.
[66] De Unit. 4.

selves from her communion. The wind does not blow away the wheat, nor does it tear up the tree that has its roots struck deep in the ground; it is the chaff that is blown about by every passing breeze, and trees without roots that are thrown down by the storm.[67]

And as there is thus unity in the Church of Christ, so is that Church also one. To her is applicable the Lord's saying, "He that is not with me is against me, and he that gathereth not with me scattereth abroad." Without the Church there is no salvation.[68] He cannot have God as his Father, who does not have the Church as his mother.[69] The Holy Ghost, the Sanctifier, was given to the Church and in her alone are treasured up the means of salvation. Outside the Church there is no baptism, no priesthood, no altar. She is the Ark outside of which there is no safety from the flood, the sealed spring from which outsiders cannot draw.[70]

For the better government of the Church, and to meet special difficulties that may arise, it is expedient that councils be held from time to time, which bishops from the same region attend and at which they act as one body. The decrees passed in these councils have a binding force and must be observed even by the bishops.[71] In the matter of convening provincial synods periodically, St. Cyprian simply enforced a well established custom of the African Church, which dated at least from the beginning of the third century. Over these synods he himself presided, and although according to his theory all bishops shared one divinely constituted authority *in solidium*, nevertheless in practice he seems to have claimed a real primacy over the whole of Proconsular Africa.

What, then, about the Primacy over the whole Church? Not only is unity the fundamental note of each individual church, or of a collection of churches belonging to the same region, but of the universal Church, the Church Catholic, as well. That Church had never yet gathered in council, and although there was kept up a constant correspondence between

[67] De Unit. 9; cfr. 3; 5; 6.
[68] Ep. 73, 21.
[69] Ep. 74, 7; De Unit. 6.
[70] Cfr. De Unit. 10; 11; 12; 13.
[71] Ep. 64, 1.

the particular churches of her communion, yet the episcopate as a whole had no opportunity to act as one body. Was there a head somewhere? Some one bishop endowed with authority to speak for all and to make his decision binding upon their consciences? Did Cyprian admit such a primacy?

Certain it is that Cyprian regarded the constitution of the universal Church as monarchical. The Church Catholic was to his mind not merely a gathering of coördinated local churches. He taught quite clearly that Christ built His Church on Peter; that Peter was at once her foundation and head. And Peter, he admitted, continued to live in the Bishop of Rome; hence in so far at least he acknowledged the Bishop of Rome as the Head of the Church. The "cathedra Petri" was to him the fountain and source of all ecclesiastical life: "Ecclesiæ Catholicæ matrix et radix."[72] Hence, whilst speaking of the schism of Felicissimus, he told his own flock: "God is one and Christ is one, and there is one Church and one *cathedra* founded by the voice of the Lord upon Peter."[73] And writing to a bishop who showed himself inclined to follow the anti-Pope Novatian, he argued: "Cornelius was made bishop by the judgment of God and of Christ . . . when the place of Fabian, that is, the place of Peter, and the dignity of the sacerdotal *cathedra* was vacant." Again, of those schismatics who sought protection in Rome, he wrote: "They dare even set sail for the *cathedra* of Peter and the *ecclesia principalis,* whence sacerdotal unity took its rise, carrying with them letters from schismatics and impious persons, oblivious of the fact that the Romans are they whose faith was praised by the Apostle, and to whom perfidy cannot have access."[74]

The Roman Primacy is brought out still more clearly in Cyprian's treatise *De Catholicæ Ecclesiæ Unitate.* In chapter 4 occurs the passage: "The Lord saith to Peter: 'I say to thee, thou art Peter, and upon this Rock will I build my Church!' (To the same He saith after His resurrection: 'Feed my sheep!' Upon him He builds His Church, and to

[72] Ep. 48, 3.
[73] Ep. 43, 5.
[74] Ep. 55, 8; 59, 14.

him He commends the feeding of His sheep), and although after His resurrection He confers a similar power upon all the Apostles and says: 'As the Father hath sent me, I also send you. Receive the Holy Spirit: if you forgive any one's sins, they shall be forgiven him; if you retain any one's sins, they shall be retained,' nevertheless in order to show forth the unity (He established one *cathedra*), and by His own authority He disposed matters in such a way, that the beginning (and reason) of unity should proceed from one. That indeed were all the Apostles what Peter was, associated with him in a similar honor and power, but the inception of both proceeds from the unity (and the Primacy is given to Peter), in order to point out that the Church of Christ is one (and that the *cathedra* is one). (All indeed are pastors, but the flock is shown to be one, and this must be fed by the Apostles in perfect agreement of mind. Whoso does not hold this unity, does he believe he has faith? Whoso deserts the *cathedra* of Peter, upon whom the Church is founded, does he trust that he is in the Church?)" [75]

If this text be taken as it stands, including the passages enclosed in parentheses, it undoubtedly asserts the Primacy, both as given to Peter and as continuing in his successors. But until a few years ago, the text was quite commonly regarded as interpolated; and most non-Catholic critics maintain this even now. The reason advanced for asserting that the text was tampered with by a later hand, is the fact that there are three series of manuscripts, in each one of which the text has a different reading. One contains the reading cited above; another leaves out the passages enclosed in parentheses; whilst the third is a combination of the other two. As there appeared no compelling reason why the second series of manuscripts should omit passages contained in the first, it was quite generally assumed outside of Catholic circles that the first had been interpolated by some one who was desirous of making St. Cyprian defend the Primacy of Rome.

Thus the matter stood until a few years ago, when Dom

[75] De Unit. 4.

Chapman undertook to trace up the history of the different manuscripts. The results of his long and detailed studies have been given to the learned world as follows: Both the first and the second series are undoubtedly genuine. They are faithful copies of the work of St. Cyprian. The difference of the reading is accounted for in this way. The first series is derived from a copy which Cyprian sent to Rome during the Novatian schism. In order to strike at the root of the schism, he inserted the passages referring to the Primacy of Peter and to the consequent authoritative position of the Roman Bishop. The second series originated from a copy directed against Felicissimus, who was then disturbing the peace of the church at Carthage. In this, as is obvious, there would be no need of appealing to Peter's Primacy nor to the authority of Rome.[76]

Batiffol, Harnack, and many other scholars admit Dom Chapman's contention that the text of the manuscript in question is undoubtedly authentic, although they do not subscribe to all his arguments leading up to this conclusion. The charge of interpolation, they say, must forever be abandoned. In whatever way the difference of reading in the two series of manuscripts may finally be explained, certain it is that both hand down the genuine doctrine of St. Cyprian.[77] As this is the only point of real importance, the long continued controversy may be considered to have been set at rest. In consequence, the Anglican contention, that Cyprian's views on the constitution of the Church support the Episcopalian position, becomes doubly untenable. If in the heat of conflict, during the baptismal controversy, Cyprian apparently failed to see the full bearing of his previous teaching on Church government, that only shows how short-sighted and inconsistent human reason may become when obscured by passion. It does not mean a repudiation of his teaching as proposed in times of peace.

In reference to the connection between the Church and the sacraments, St. Cyprian adopted the view of Tertullian, hold-

[76] Revue Benedictine, V, 19 (1902), V, 20 (1903).

[77] Cfr. Batiffol, Primitive Catholicism, 366–373.

ing that these visible means of sanctification are of no avail outside her communion. Hence heretics cannot confer the sacraments validly. This view was emphatically rejected by Rome, with the result that a rather animated controversy was carried on between Cyprian and Pope Stephen, of which a short account will be given below. Of Cyprian's teaching on the sacraments the following points may be noted:

1°. Baptism, which is a second and spiritual birth, not only may but must be administered to children. There is no need of deferring it till the eighth day after birth, as is contended by some because of the law governing circumcision among the Jews. Whenever conferred, baptism produces grace in the souls of children as well as in those of adults; and this all the more readily because these little ones have no personal sins, but only the "borrowed" sin of Adam.[78] Baptism of water may be replaced by martyrdom, which is a baptism of blood; this confers even a greater grace and exerts a higher power.[79]

2°. Confirmation is administered by the laying on of hands, anointing the forehead with chrism, and the recital of a prayer. Through this rite the Holy Ghost is given to the newly baptized.[80]

3°. The Holy Eucharist is also received immediately after baptism, and thenceforth more or less frequently according to the devotion of the faithful.[81] Its worthy reception presupposes freedom from grievous sins; for it is the "holy body of the Lord." Those who venture to approach the sacred table without having done proper penance for their sins, profane the Saviour's body and blood.[82] This teaching evidently implies belief in the Real Presence. Furthermore, the Eucharist is a true sacrifice, which was first offered by Christ, and now by priests in His stead.[83] It is identical with the sacrifice of the cross, and through it the Redeemer's sufferings are pre-

[78] Ad Donat. 4; Ep. 64, 2, 5.
[79] Ep. 73, 22; Ad Fortunat. Praef. 4.
[80] Ep. 73, 9; 70, 2.
[81] Ep. 70, 2.
[82] Ep. 15, 1; 63, 4; De Laps. 25.
[83] Ep. 63, 4, 14.

sented to God. It is efficacious for the living and the dead, and is also offered up for penitent sinners.[84]

4°. Penance blots out sins committed after baptism. For minor faults private penance, such as alms-giving, is sufficient; but if grievous sins have been committed, especially sins of adultery, apostasy, and homicide, recourse must be had to the bishop.[85] He takes cognizance of these sins, imposes a proportionate penance, and when that has been duly performed reconciles the penitent to the Church.[86] Even secret sins, such as sins of thought, when they are of a grievous nature, must be confessed; but no sins are so grave that they cannot be forgiven by the Church. In some cases, however, reconciliation is deferred till the hour of death.[87]

5°. Holy orders are conferred by the bishop assisted by the presbyterium.[88] When a new bishop is to be consecrated, all the neighboring bishops of the same province come together and take part in the ceremony.[89] Simple priests offer up the Holy Sacrifice where the bishop does not celebrate; they may also be delegated to reconcile penitents. It is the office of deacons to assist in the sacred liturgy, and to supervise the distribution of alms among the poor.[90]

6°. On matrimony the author has nothing special, except that he insists strongly on the indissolubility of Christian marriage and forbids all matrimonial alliances of the faithful with pagans.[91]

With these three authors as its first representatives, Latin theology made a fair start. Tertullian and Novatian contributed very extensively to the clearing up of orthodox Trinitarian and Christological teaching, whilst Cyprian's writings on the Church will ever be a source of valuable information. It was not until a century later that the work thus begun received any noticeable development, but the lines of that development are already clearly traced in the works of these three writers.

[84] Ep. 63, 17; 1, 2; 16, 2; 17, 2.
[85] De Opere et Eleem. 11; 14; De Bono Patient. 14; De Laps. 16.
[86] De Laps. 16.
[87] Ibid. 28; 29.
[88] Ep. 38, 2.
[89] Ep. 67, 5.
[90] Ep. 3, 3; 56, 3; 18, 1; 57, 6.
[91] Testim. 3, 62, 90; De Laps. 6.

CHAPTER XI

THE BAPTISMAL CONTROVERSY: PENANCE IN THE EARLY CHURCH

In the preceding chapter we have confined our remarks to the doctrinal statements of the writers whose works called for a brief review, thus leaving aside all discussion of the various controversies that were going on during the first half of the third century. This was done for clearness' sake, so as to keep the common teaching unobscured by the divergency of private views. However, a few words must be said about two points that caused considerable stir in Catholic circles, the one giving rise to the baptismal controversy and the other to the question of penance.

A — The Baptismal Controversy [1]

Although the reception of converts into the Church was always considered to belong officially to the bishop, since he was placed by the Holy Ghost as shepherd over the flock of Christ, still, under given conditions, priests and deacons and even lay persons might receive them by duly administering the sacrament of baptism. In all these cases, however, the ordinary supposition was that persons thus conferring the sacrament were in communion with the Church. But what if they belonged to an heretical sect? Would the sacrament in that case be valid? Or would it be necessary to treat these converts as if they had not been baptized at all? The same, of course, would also apply to confirmation administered by an heretical bishop.

Till the middle of the second century there was no occasion for inquiring into this matter, as there were practically no

[1] Cfr. Tixeront, H. D. I, 366–376; Duchesne, The Early History of the Church, I, 303–312.

heretical sects which had organized communities of their own; but a little later, when Marcion and the followers of Montanus established separate churches, the question became very practical. At first the course of action adopted does not appear to have been uniform; some bishops baptizing these converts and others simply imposing their hands by way of reconciliation. It was during Cyprian's time that the matter came up for general discussion, and the result was the baptismal controversy.

Taking it as an incontestable principle that the Church alone is commissioned to forgive sins and to impart the Holy Ghost, and overlooking entirely the distinction between a valid and a fruitful reception of the sacraments, Cyprian taught unhesitatingly that baptism administered by heretics was invalid. In this he was, moreover, supported by the authority of Tertullian and a well established custom of rebaptizing converts from heresy, not only in Africa, but also at Antioch, Cæsarea, and other places. He had against him the custom followed at Rome, Alexandria, Cæsarea in Palestine, and most places of Western Europe; but above all the weighty authority of Pope Stephen.

When he explained his position to the Pope, in order to solicit his approval, the latter not only refused to sanction the African custom, but sent a peremptory order to discontinue it in future. "Si qui ergo a quacumque heresi venient ad vos, nihil innovetur nisi quod traditum est, ut manus illis imponatur in poenitentiam." [2] "If therefore any come to you, no matter from what heretical sect, let nothing be renewed except what has been established by tradition (here at Rome), (namely) that hands be imposed on them by way of penance." Firmilian of Cæsarea, corresponding with Cyprian on this matter, states that "Stephen and those who are of the same mind with him contend that in the baptism of heretics sins are forgiven; because it matters little who confers baptism, since grace is obtained through the invocation of the Blessed Trinity, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Nay, as the

[2] Ep. 74, ad Firmilianum; cfr. Ep. 75, ad Cyprianum.

successor of Peter, upon whom the foundations of the Church have been laid, he says even that through the sacrament of baptism thus conferred all the stains of the old man are washed away, deadly sins are forgiven, the right of divine sonship is acquired, and a fit preparation is made for life eternal." [3] Surely the "successor of Peter" had a very thorough understanding of the efficacy of baptism.

If in the matter of Papal authority Cyprian's practice had corresponded with his theory, as explained in the preceding chapter, this decision of the Pope should have ended the discussion. But in the heat of the combat he seems to have forgotten completely what he had so strongly and clearly set forth in times of peace. And so the discussion waxed furious as time passed on. Backed up by the councils over which he presided at Carthage, and also by the letters he received from Firmilian of Cæsarea in Cappadocia, Cyprian became abusive in his correspondence with the Pope. But all to no purpose. Stephen stood firm; nor did Cyprian think of yielding. Finally matters were brought to a settlement by the death of the contestants; both laid down their life for the faith. However, even before Cyprian was called to martyrdom, peace was established between him and the successor of Stephen, Xystus II, and shortly after this the Roman custom prevailed in Africa. A conciliar decision was given at Arles in 314.

Whether Cyprian's insubordination, precisely as viewed by himself, touched merely a matter of discipline, or had at least an indirect bearing on faith, it is not so easy to decide. Many Catholics take the former view, exculpating the bishop of Carthage altogether, on the plea that in matters of discipline well established local customs have the force of law, with which it would be imprudent for the Church to interfere. However, this explanation does not seem to be in harmony with the facts of the case. Failing to distinguish between the validity and the efficacy of the sacraments, Cyprian necessarily inferred the invalidity of heretical baptism from his view on the position of the Church in the economy of salvation. Hence

[3] Ep. 75, Firmiliani ad Cyprianum.

the Roman practice, though he was willing to tolerate it for the sake of peace, appeared to him as treason to the Church. When he wrote: "Pro honore Ecclesiæ atque unitate pugnamus," [4] we battle for the honor of the Church and for unity, he was hardly thinking of discipline alone. However, with all its regrettable features, the controversy contributed not a little towards clearing up an important point of doctrine, namely, that the validity of the sacraments does not depend on the faith and virtue of the minister. It was this that later on stood St. Augustine in good stead in his contention with the Donatists.

B — Penance in the Early Church [5]

Baptism was from the very first regarded as a spiritual regeneration, a rebirth to newness of life, presupposing a complete break with the sinful past and imposing the solemn obligation of reaching forward to future holiness. Hence in the ideal Christian life there was no room for sin; and if not for sin, then neither for penance. This all true followers of Christ clearly realized, but they realized not less clearly that the ideal was difficult of attainment; that somehow sin usually had a part in the best of them, and therefore penance must be included in the economy of salvation through Christ. The fact is, this consciousness of post-baptismal sins and of the constant need of penance was so vivid that it gave a distinct coloring to the religious literature of the early Church. From the Shepherd of Hermas to the Penitential Canons of Peter of Alexandria, there is among the various documents which have come down to us hardly one that does not in some way refer to the necessity of penance. Hence it is not the fact of penance that is open for discussion, but its nature and form. What manner of penance was it? Had it in the beginning an exclusively private character, or did it fall under the jurisdiction of the Church? And if the Church was concerned in

[4] Ep. 73, 11.

[5] Cfr. O'Donnell, Penance in the Early Church; Rauschen, Eucharist and Penance, Part II; D'Alès, L'Édit de Calliste; Tixeront, H. D. I, 346–354; Funk, Kirchengeschichtliche Abhandlungen, I. 155–181.

it, did she reconcile the penitent to God by remitting his sins, or only to herself by declaring that he had sufficiently repaired his transgression of her social code? Lastly, if the Church reconciled the penitent to God, did she extend her power in this respect to all repentant sinners or were certain classes excluded from its scope?

That penance for post-baptismal sins, when they were of a serious nature, was never of an exclusively private character is now granted by all scholars; and the evidence leading to this conclusion, even as found in the earliest documents, is decisive. Thus Clement of Rome enjoins the Corinthians to "submit themselves to their priests and be instructed unto penance"; the Didache and the Pseudo-Barnabas direct their Christian readers to "confess their sins in the Church"; St. Ignatius of Antioch tells the Philadelphians that "God remits the sins of all penitents if they repent unto the unity of God and the council of the bishop"; Hermas places penance as practiced by Christians on a parallel with baptism, which was in the hands of the Church; Dionysius of Corinth asks the churches of Pontus to "receive kindly all who have been converted from any falling away, whether crime or heretical depravity"; whilst the author of the Secunda Clementis tells his hearers to "confess their sins while there is still time for repentance." All these documents were issued before 170, and yet every one of them connects penance for post-baptismal sins in some way with the intervention of the Church. After this time the evidence is so overwhelming that it need not even be cited. A mere glance at the preceding chapters will be sufficient to convince any fair-minded reader.

Nor is there much difficulty in showing that this intervention on the part of the Church had for its object the reconciliation of the penitent not only with herself, but also with God; although non-Catholic scholars are generally loath to grant this. First of all it is historically certain, and this even Protestants hardly venture to call any longer in question, that at the beginning of the third century the Church peacefully exercised the power of forgiving sins. Not even Tertullian, or Novatian, or Hippolytus, in his wildest diatribes against the

leniency of the Popes, ever dreamt of denying that the Church had power to forgive sins. They exempted certain sins from the range of this power, at least for disciplinary purposes; but the power itself they admitted, forced thereto by the *consensus* of the churches. Where, then, in the next place, is the starting point of this *consensus?* If in the beginning the Church reconciled penitents only to herself, when did she first presume to reconcile them also to God?

That history does not record a change of views and practice in this matter is freely granted, in so far as positive evidence comes in question. But more. When schism and heresy bring the reconciliation of penitents into the foreground of discussion, the whole Christian world understands it to imply the forgiveness of sins effected through the ministry of the Church; and not even the hoariest among the official custodians of tradition, though taught by men whose youth dated back to the dawn of the second century, have apparently the slightest recollection that in olden times this matter was regarded in a different light. When Irenæus, who had been a disciple of Polycarp, who in his turn had been a disciple of John the Apostle and Evangelist, relates incidentally that certain women perished miserably through despair, because they were ashamed to confess their sins, does he even hint that they might have confessed their sins to God alone and thus have obtained forgiveness without recourse to the power of the Church? The inference plainly is that he conceived the intervention of the Church to have for its object the forgiveness of sins as well as the restoration to her communion. But at all events, neither he nor any of those taught by him, nor any others by whom the traditions of early Christianity were transmitted to the third century bishops, ever raised the slightest protest against the supposed innovation of forgiving sins. Under the circumstances this is more than an *argumentum ex silentio.* It shows that these men were as conversant with the words of the Saviour recorded by St. John as was Origen when he wrote: "He on whom Jesus has breathed, as He did on His Apostles . . . remits what God remits and retains sins that are incurable. . . . This is

seen from what is said in the Gospel of St. John concerning the power of remission granted to the Apostles: 'Whose sins you shall forgive they are forgiven, and whose sins you shall retain they are retained.'" [6]

When, therefore, we read in the documents belonging to the sub-Apostolic age that Christian penitents must have recourse to the ministry of the Church, although the expressions used in themselves tell us nothing about the nature of this ministry, yet in the light that is thrown upon them by the subsequent attitude and practice of men who were perfectly familiar with the views entertained in these early times, they bear positive testimony to the fact that the intervention of the Church in the reconciliation of penitents was regarded then, as it was regarded later on, to extend itself even to the forgiveness of sins. A little historic sense would seem to make this conclusion unavoidable.

The third question still remains: To what extent did the Church make use of this power of forgiving sins? Did she extend it to all penitents, or were certain classes excluded from its benefits? That the power was not limited in itself, or by the terms of its concession by Christ, is sufficiently obvious, as its purpose was to make salvation possible for those who truly repented of their sins; and this is clearly acknowledged by Tertullian in his schismatic ravings against Callistus. Arguing against the remission of the sin of adultery, which the Pope had granted on the plea that the Church has the power to forgive sins, he cries out: "The Church, you say, has the power to forgive sins. This I acknowledge the more and adjudge proper, who have the Paraclete Himself in the persons of the new prophets, saying: 'The Church has the power to forgive sins, but I will not do it, lest they commit others again.' . . . Let Penance win pardon from the bishop for lighter sins, for the greater and irremissible from God alone." [7]

Hence the question narrows itself down to this: Did the

[6] De Orat. 28; cfr. In Luc. Hom. 17.

[7] De Pudic. 21, 7.

Church, though conscious of having the power to forgive all sins, at any period restrict the use of this power so as to exclude the *crimina mortalia*, usually classed as adultery, homicide, and apostasy? Thus limited the question is purely disciplinary, and as such does not strictly belong to the History of Dogmas. However, a few general remarks on this topic will be in place.

Hippolytus, whilst in open schism against Pope Callistus, accuses him of being the first to concede reconciliation to adulterers and fornicators and criminals of all sorts. "That deceiver," he says, "was the first who made an attempt to give free indulgence to the depraved lusts of mankind, when he asserted that all men's sins were remitted by himself." [8] As far as we know, Callistus only issued a decree, and a peremptory one, says Tertullian, that adulterers and fornicators should be admitted to communion after they had duly repented and performed the penance enjoined; though it is quite possible that the decree was intended to be universal in its extension. But however that may be, he acted in perfect harmony with the traditions of the past. A few pertinent instances will show this with sufficient clearness.

Thus when Hermas draws a parallel between the second penance and baptism, he evidently excludes from the efficacy of the former no sin whatever, although he limits its availability to a certain period of time. Hence we may rightly infer that in his day nothing was known of the irremissibility of certain sins. In fact, he explicitly states: "As many as do penance from their hearts, and purify themselves of their iniquities, and do not add to their evil deeds, shall receive from God the forgiveness of their former sins." [9] The only irremissible sin he knows of is that of persons who are so hardened as to refuse to repent. Yet, as was pointed out above, according to him forgiveness was to be obtained through the Church.

Neither Clement of Rome, nor the author of the Didache, nor Ignatius of Antioch, nor the Secunda Clementis, know

[8] Philosoph. 9, 12. [9] Simil. 8, 11, 3.

of any restrictions; whilst Dionysius of Corinth explicitly directs the churches of Pontus to "receive back kindly all who have been converted from any falling away, whether crime or heretical depravity." [10] Irenæus certainly did not exclude fornicators from pardon, as is sufficiently evident from what he says about the women who had been seduced by a certain Marcus, and to whom reference was made above. The church of Rome knew nothing about the exclusion of converted heretics, as appears from the same author's remark about Cerdon, and also from Tertullian's statement about Marcion." [11] Clement of Alexandria, citing the reconciliation of the robber chief by St. John, evidently saw no reason why homicides should not be reconciled, although he was a priest of good standing and a learned man, and therefore must have known what was and what was not in harmony with the custom of the Church.[12] And lastly, even Tertullian, whilst still a Catholic, made the second penance quite as extensive in its efficacy as that of baptism, calling it a second plank of salvation for all those who unfortunately had fallen into grievous sin after their baptismal regeneration.[13] And this he himself acknowledged after he had become a Montanist, saying that he did not blush for his change of views.[14] Surely this excludes anything like an appeal to tradition for the supposed restriction placed upon the use of her power by the Church.

Taking all this into account, it would seem to be historically certain that the Church Catholic never barred the way to reconciliation even to those who were guilty of the greater sins. She placed her conditions of readmission, imposed a severe and usually protracted penance, but when all this had been complied with, she was glad to receive the lost sheep back into her fold. In particular or local churches more rigoristic views prevailed at different times, but that is too intricate a question to be dealt with here. As far as the ques-

[10] Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. 4, 23.
[11] Adv. Haeres. 3, 4, 3; De Praescript. 30.
[12] Quis Dives, 42.
[13] De Poenit. 7, 10, cfr. 4, 1; 7, 3.
[14] De Pudio. 1, 11.

tion of penance in the early Church is of interest to the History of Dogmas, quite enough has been said in the preceding paragraphs.

CHAPTER XII

FIRST ATTEMPTS AT SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY IN THE EAST[1]

Until the latter part of the second century no attempt seems to have been made to establish Christian schools, in which the traditional teaching of the Church might be more or less scientifically investigated and explained. The first institution of this kind, so far as the records go, was the catechetical school at Alexandria. Precisely when this school was started is a matter of conjecture, but about 180 it began to attract considerable attention. It was then under the able direction of Pantænus, a converted Stoic philosopher. One of his most distinguished disciples was Clement, who some years later became his successor in the direction of the school. Clement in his turn was succeeded by his own disciple Origen, under whose guidance the school of Alexandria reached its highest fame. Pantænus does not appear to have written any books, but his two immediate successors exerted great literary activity, and their works now call for a brief review.

A — Clement of Alexandria

Titus Flavius Clemens, as his name indicates, was probably descended from a freedman of the Christian consul of that name. After his conversion he studied under several masters, apparently without much satisfaction to himself, until he met Pantænus in Egypt, and with him he found rest for his soul. He was entrusted with the direction of the school in 190, and continued in office until the persecution of Septimus Severus, 202 or 203, forced him to withdraw. He was a man of wide

[1] Cfr. Tixeront, H. D. I, 243–284; Duchesne, The Early History of the Church, I, 247–260; Batiffol, Primitive Catholicism, 146–163; 294–331; Bardenhewer, Altkirch. Lit. II, 15–159.

reading, in profane as well as in sacred literature, but his learning appears to have been extensive rather than profound. A saintly priest, and ever devoted to the interests of the faith, he nevertheless always cherished an ardent love for the philosophy of the past. He not only employed its methods in his exposition of Christian doctrine, but frequently also made use of its contents.

It was by means of philosophy that Clement thought he could devise a system of theological teaching which should indeed have faith for its solid and irremovable foundation, but in the building up of its superstructure should draw freely from the sources of natural knowledge. With this end in view he labored for many years at his great work, *Introduction to Christianity,* which consists of three parts called respectively *Protrepticus, Paedagogus* and *Stromata.* The names are taken from the method supposedly followed by the Logos, who first admonishes, then trains, and lastly instructs. The three divisions, however, hang very loosely together, and so too does the reasoning in each part. The work is an attempt at systematizing, but withal a rather poor one.

The leading thought that runs through the three divisions, and that gives some sort of unity to the whole, is the harmony that must necessarily exist between faith and knowledge. Both have their source in the same God, and although revelation and faith must ever hold the first and highest place in the Church of Christ, still philosophy and knowledge should not be excluded from her sacred precincts. There is a middle way between the rationalism of the Pseudo-Gnostics and the extreme supernaturalism of many narrow-minded Catholics. There is a true *gnosis* as well as a false one; a *gnosis* that is indeed not necessary for salvation, but that leads believing Christians to a higher perfection.

With this thought in his mind, Clement begins the *Protrepticus* with an earnest invitation to the pagan world, urging the worshipers of false gods to turn away from the foolish songs of mythology and listen to the new canticle of the Logos, who came forth from Sion to teach the world true wisdom. Pagan gods and mysteries and their sacrificial worship are

but idle vagaries, ugly excrescences of human reason gone astray; and although some philosophers and poets have in many things proclaimed the truth, yet their conception of it was but shadowy and imperfect. The full truth is found only in the Prophets, who were taught by the Holy Spirit. Their teaching is now completed by the Logos, who appeared on earth to cure the world of its moral diseases and make known to men the blessings of God.

Once brought under the influence of the Logos, men must go through a course of training in Christian virtue. This is the object and scope of the *Paedagogus*. The trainer is the Logos Himself, who through the teaching of faith shows His followers how to regulate their daily lives, in relation to God, the neighbor, and themselves. It is not fear that makes His training efficacious, but love and kindness. It is true, the Logos carries a rod, yet this is a symbol of grace rather than of punishment.

In connection with this, the author points out the importance of faith and its sufficiency for all practical purposes of life. Faith, he says, is the perfection of knowledge. Holy Scripture says, whoso believeth in the Son hath life everlasting: what then is there beyond that should be wanting to faith? Nothing: faith is perfect in itself and all-sufficient. However, the perfection of faith is only relative; it is a means of preparing us for what is greater. Beyond the perfection of faith here on earth, looms large the perfection of possession in heaven wherein are fulfilled the words of the Saviour: "Be it done unto thee as thou hast believed."

Faith, then, as shown forth in the practice of virtue is sufficient; but faith may be perfected by knowledge, by the true *gnosis,* which not only accepts the teaching of the Logos and puts it into practice, but aims at an intimate understanding of the things of God. As in one sense faith is the perfection of knowledge, so in another sense is knowledge the perfection of faith. Beginning with faith and ever growing in grace, one must advance along the path of knowledge to a fuller realization of divine things. And so it is only the Gnostic who is a perfect Christian; not the Pseudo-Gnostic of the

sects, but the true Gnostic whose life is in accord with the higher knowledge of the faith. Such a one is indifferent to all adversity, is indefatigable in the practice of charity, and labors incessantly to promote the interests of God. Hence there are two kinds of Christians: the simple folk who are satisfied with believing, and the more intelligent who aim at *gnosis*. They are both dear to the Lord, but those who have *gnosis* are more perfect and therefore entitled to a higher degree of glory in heaven.

In connection with this general summary of the contents of Clement's chief work, the following points, taken in substance from Moehler's History of the Church, are deserving of special attention. They bring out with great clearness the Alexandrian doctor's position in regard to faith.

As the Son of God has become truly man, divine teaching has become human and human teaching has become divine.[2] Faith is based on the authority of the Son of God. Who would be so rash as to demand proofs of God as he would of man?[3] The authority of Christ is represented by the Catholic Church, so that her teaching and her authority are the same as His.[4] Hence faith is the eternal foundation of all religious knowledge; it must guide us in all our studies of divine things.[5] Religious knowledge is acquired by meditating on the truths of faith; faith, therefore, is the criterion of knowledge.[6] True *gnosis,* or *gnosis* according to the mind of the Church, is nothing else than a thorough understanding of the faith, taking due account of the grounds upon which it rests and the relation that exists between the various truths which form its contents.[7] Religious knowledge and faith are of the same nature, and faith itself beckons us to the acquisition of knowledge.[8] Subjective faith is a clinging to the invisible, a union of the soul with the object of faith.[9] As man is free, his faith is essentially an act of obedience to God. Hence no demonstra-

[2] Paedag. 1, 2, 3, 1.
[3] Strom. 6, 1.
[4] Ibid. 2, 11–12; 7, 15–18.
[5] Ibid. 2, 4, 11; 7, 10, 16.
[6] Ibid. 2, 2–4.
[7] Ibid. 7, 10.
[8] Ibid. 6, 2; cfr. 7, 10, 57, 3.
[9] Ibid. 2, 2–4; 5, 1; cfr. Paedag. 2, 2, 8, 4–6.

tion can ever be the cause of faith; it can do no more than make the truth acceptable. Faith depends on the will subject to the all-wise and all-truthful God. And because faith thus necessarily implies submission of the will, hence it belongs to man's moral life and must find issue in works. Faith without works is dead.[10]

Besides the *Introduction to Christianity,* another little treatise has come down to us under the title, *Quis Dives Salvetur, What Rich Man May Be Saved?* In it the author gives a very sane and Christian exposition of the nature and use of property. Admitting the rights of private ownership, he points to the fact that the actual possessors of wealth are nevertheless only stewards of the Lord. They may not waste their possessions in extravagant living, but whatever they do not need for their own reasonable use they must employ in assisting the needy. Thus used, wealth becomes a means of salvation.

Many points of doctrine are casually explained in these two works, especially in the first; but only a few of them can here be mentioned. Something may also be gathered from the numerous fragments of his commentaries of Holy Scripture, which are usually cited under the title of *Adumbrationes.* The main points of interest in reference to the History of Dogmas are the following:

1°. Speaking of the Logos, Clement insists strongly on His eternal generation: as the Father was always Father, so the Logos was always Son; and although He came forward at the moment of creation, yet thereby His state was not changed.[11] In this the view of the Apologists, as interpreted by many modern critics, is evidently corrected.

2°. The Logos is "evidentissime verus Deus"; He is equal to the Lord of the universe, because He is His Son.[12] He is one with the Father,[13] the Father is in the Son and the Son is in the Father: to both prayers are offered up by the faithful.[14]

[10] Strom. 6, 13; 7, 5; 6, 14, 108, 4.
[11] Ibid. 7, 2; 5, 1; Adumbrat. in Joann. 1, 1; Paedag. 1, 8, 62, 3.
[12] Protrept. 10, 110, 1.
[13] Paedag. 1, 8.
[14] Paedag. 1, 8, 62, 3; 1, 7; Strom. 5, 14; 3, 13; 5, 26; In Joan. 1, 1; Paedag. 3, 12, 100, 2.

3°. Of the Holy Ghost the author says nothing very special, yet he represents Him in passing as a divine person and inspirer of Holy Scripture. "There is indeed one Father of all, and also one Word of all, and one Holy Spirit, and He is everywhere." "Not one point of Holy Scripture shall pass away without its fulfillment: for the mouth of the Lord, the Holy Spirit, has spoken whatever is contained therein." [15]

Thus he conceives the Godhead as a Trias, or Trinity, and commenting on a text in the Timæus of Plato, he says, "I understand this to refer to the Holy Trinity: the third is the Holy Spirit, the second is the Son through whom all was made according to the will of the Father." [16] The three must be adored as one God.[17] The Father is incomprehensible and ineffable being; the Son is wisdom, knowledge, truth, and all related thereto; the Holy Spirit is the light of truth, light without darkness, the Spirit of the Lord, who communicates Himself without division to all.[18]

4°. The world was created out of nothing: neither matter nor spirit is eternal, nor did souls exist before they were united to their bodies.[19] Adam and Eve were created in infancy, and their sin consisted in having carnal relations before the time appointed by God. That sin was the source of all evil in the world, and since then no one is without sin, save only the Incarnate Logos. Still to each one only his own sins are imputed.[20] The author speaks occasionally as if there were two souls in man, the one carnal and the other spiritual; however, he defines man as "composed of a rational and irrational part, of soul and body." [21]

5°. In Christ, the Incarnate Logos, there are two natures and only one person. He is one Logos, both God and man; He is God-Man.[22] The author seems to understand quite well the *communicatio idiomatum,* and even holds that the union of the human and the divine elements in Christ was not dis-

[15] Protrept. 1, 6, 42, 1; 9, 82, 1.
[16] Strom. 5, 14.
[17] Paedag. 3, 2.
[18] Strom. 6, 16.
[19] Strom. 5, 14; 3, 13; 5, 26.
[20] Protrept. 11, 111, 1; Strom. 5, 14; 3, 13; 5, 26.
[21] Ibid. 6, 6, 16; 4, 3.
[22] Ibid. 5, 3; 5, 14; Paedag. 1, 6; 3, 1.

solved in death: "The Word living and buried with the Christ is exalted in heaven." [23] Christ's human nature, though real like ours, was not affected by hunger or thirst or other corporal wants, nor was He Himself moved by passions of any kind. He came among us to be our redemption, our ransom, a propitiation for our sins, an immolated victim; He wishes to save all, but each one's salvation will depend on the use he makes of the redemption thus wrought.[24]

6°. Those who wish to be saved must belong to the Church; for she is the city of the Logos, the temple built by God.[25] There is only one Church, the one that has come down to us from olden days, and which heretics try their utmost to split up into many.[26] In this Church there are bishops, priests, and deacons, in imitation, the author thinks, of the angelic hierarchy.[27] Among the Apostles, Peter held the first place, the Primacy over all the rest; for Peter alone together with Himself the Saviour paid the tribute.[28]

7°. Admission into the Church is by baptism. "Being baptized, we are enlightened; being enlightened, we are adopted as sons; being adopted, we are perfected; being perfected, we are made immortal: 'I,' saith He, 'have said, you are gods and sons of the Most High.' Baptism is designated in many ways, a grace, an illumination, perfection, and a bath. A bath, because in it we wash away our sins. A grace, because by it are remitted the punishments due to sins. An illumination, because in it we behold that holy and salutary light by which we see God. Perfection, because that we call perfect to which nothing is wanting. For what can be wanting to him who knows God?" [29]

8°. The Eucharist is repeatedly referred to, but the author's way of speaking of it is not very satisfactory. Although he clearly enough admits the Real Presence, he usually enlarges upon the symbolic aspect of the mystery. "The mixture of

[23] Protrept. 11; Paedag. 1, 5; 1, 6.
[24] Strom. 6, 9, 71, 2; 2, 6; Paedag. 3, 12; 1, 6; Quis Div. 37.
[25] Strom. 4, 20; Paedag. 1, 6.
[26] Strom. 7, 17, 107, 3.
[27] Ibid. 6, 13, 107, 2.
[28] Quis Dives, 21, 3.
[29] Paedag. 1, 6, 26, 1–3.

the two, that is, of the drink and the Word, is called the Eucharist; that is to say, a praiseworthy and remarkable grace, by which those who partake of it are sanctified in body and soul." Still, "this it is to drink the blood of Jesus, namely, to become a partaker of the incorruption of the Lord." [30]

9°. Of penance he says that theoretically Christians should not stand in need of it, since in baptism they have arisen to a new life; but practically they do, as experience only too plainly shows. Some sins are so grievous that they demand a public satisfaction and reconciliation, but this should not be granted more than once. For this ruling the author appeals to Hermas, whom he quotes on the subject.[31] Even the sin of murder may thus be forgiven.[32] For less grievous sins forgiveness may always be obtained, provided the sinner submits to the chastising hand of God.[33]

10°. Marriage among Christians he holds to be indissoluble, even in the case of adultery. This he proves from our Lord's words as recorded by St. Matthew.[34]

11°. In his eschatological teaching the author prepared the way for Origen, in as much as he seems to hold that after the last judgment even the wicked shall finally be led to repentance and thus be reconciled to God.[35]

Thus it may be said that there is much wheat and some chaff in the teaching of Clement. His love of ancient philosophy carried him at times undoubtedly too far, as, for instance, in the excessive moral value he attached to *gnosis*; yet perhaps his worst fault lies in his allegorical interpretation of Holy Scripture. It is true, he explicitly teaches that the Sacred Writings, of both the Old and New Testament, are divinely inspired; but in his exegesis he frequently adopts the principles of Philo, and hence it not rarely happens that in his interpretation sober facts fade away into mere symbols.

B — Origen: Alexandria and Cæsarea

Notwithstanding his vast learning, Clement of Alexandria

[30] Ibid. 2, 2, 19, 4; 20, 1.
[31] Strom. 2, 13.
[32] Quis Dives, 42.
[33] Strom. 4, 24.
[34] Ibid. 2, 23, 145, 3; 146, 2, 3.
[35] Ibid. 7, 2; 6, 14.

did not achieve more than local fame. This is perhaps largely accounted for by the greater brilliancy of Origen, his pupil and immediate successor in the direction of the school. Both men undertook practically the same task, in as much as their common aim was to place the traditional teaching of the Church on a scientific basis; but whilst Clement ended by philosophizing Christianity, Origen succeeded in synthesizing theology. He wrote the first Summa Theologica.

Origen was born of Christian parents, probably at Alexandria. Whilst still a mere child, he was carefully instructed by his father, the martyr Leonidas, and thereafter at an early age he entered the school of Clement. When about seventeen years old, he lost his father, who was martyred for the faith, and thereby the duty of providing for a large and impoverished family devolved upon him. Yet so distinguished was he for learning and holiness that Demetrius, bishop of Alexandria, came shortly after this to his assistance by making him director of the catechetical school. For a number of years he discharged his duty with great success, although some of his views were not acceptable to his ecclesiastical superior. Whilst passing through Cæsarea on his journey to Athens, whither he had been called to confer with certain heretics, he was ordained priest without the sanction of his bishop. This was made the pretext for severing his connection with the school. After several vain attempts on his part to bring about a reconciliation, first with Demetrius and then with his successor Heraclas, Origen permanently established himself at Cæsarea, whither most of his pupils followed him. He died in 254, after having borne imprisonment and torture for the faith.

During all these years, first at Alexandria and then at Cæsarea, Origen was indefatigably active as a writer. Epiphanius estimates his literary productions at six thousand volumes. Of course, by volumes he understands rolls, *volumina,* or *tomoi,* several of which would be required to make a fair sized volume as we take the term. To facilitate this enormous output, a rich and devoted friend, Ambrose by name, placed at his disposal a numerous staff of stenographers and copyists, who took down his lectures and then copied them

for distribution. Most of these writings, including the celebrated *Hexapla* or six-column Bible, have perished. Of those that have come down to us his two treatises, *Against Celsus* and *On First Principles* or *Peri Archon,* are the most famous. It is this latter that contains his system of theology. A brief summary of it may be given as follows; we must bear in mind, however, that by "First Principles" the author understands fundamental doctrines and leading articles of the faith.

By way of preface the author states that the source and fountain of all truth is none other than the teaching of Christ and the Apostles. This lives on in the Church, and therefore her preaching is the criterion and norm of truth. However, as the Apostles gave a clear exposition of those truths only which they deemed necessary for all, whilst such others as are not so necessary they simply stated without explaining them, there is room for further study and investigation on the part of those who are capable of deriving fruit from such labors. And this same plan the Church also follows, teaching that certain doctrines must be accepted, whilst others are still open for discussion.

Then follows a brief summary of the truths that are of faith, namely: The existence of God, creator of all things, who, though incomprehensible in the perfection of His being, may yet in some way be known from the works of His hands. The divinity of the Son, His incarnation, virginal birth, His death for our redemption, His resurrection and ascension into heaven. The existence of the Holy Ghost, associated with the Father and the Son, who is the inspirer of the Old and New Testament, and the sanctifier of souls. The immortality of the soul, man's free will, future reward and punishment according to each one's deeds. The existence of good and bad angels, the former assisting man in the work of salvation and the latter tempting him to evil. The creation of the world, its beginning in time, and its future ruin. The inspiration of Scripture, and its having both a literal and a spiritual meaning.

Questions still open for discussion are the following: Is

the Holy Ghost begotten (originated? created?) or not? Is He also the Son of God? Does the soul come *ex traduce seminis?* Are the demons fallen angels? What was there before the world was created? And what shall there be after it has ceased to exist? When were the angels created? Are God and spirits without a body? And in what sense? Have stars souls or not?

According to his plan of work, then, it is the authorized teaching of the Church on which his theological synthesis is to rest. If, in obedience to the precept, "Enlighten yourself with the lamp of knowledge," a doctrinal compendium is to be drawn up, rationally designed as an organic whole, here are the elements which must be knit together as a solid foundation. Make use of clear and indisputable inference; draw from Holy Scripture whatever can be found there or deduced from it; consult the certain teaching of the living Church; and then from all these various sources form one single body of doctrine.

This is truly an excellent plan, none more serviceable could well be devised; but in the hands of Origen, owing largely to his allegorical interpretation of Scripture, it yielded at times rather unsatisfactory results. In passing it may be noted, that this doctrinal compendium was not intended for simple believers, but for scholars who were familiar with the speculations of the Gnostics and non-Christian philosophers. It was meant to be an antidote against the various errors of the day, which threatened to lead astray some of the more studious among the flock of Christ.

The body of the work is divided into four books. In the first book the author treats of God, His oneness and spirituality, of the Logos and the Holy Spirit, and of the angels. In the second he takes up the study of the world, of mankind, of redemption through Christ, of the end of creation and the last things. In the third he investigates the freedom of man's will, the struggle between good and evil, the beginning of the world in time and its final consummation. In the fourth he explains his views on inspiration and exegesis. In most instances particular articles of the faith are first briefly stated,

then philosophically examined, and finally proved by arguments drawn chiefly from Holy Scripture.

The development may be sketched in a few lines. God is essentially one, unchangeable, and good. Because of His goodness, He must reveal and communicate Himself; because of His unchangeableness, He must reveal and communicate Himself from all eternity; because of His essential oneness, He can directly do neither the one nor the other: therefore He needs a minister of creation and revelation. This minister is the Word, begotten of the substance of the Father, coeternal and consubstantial with Him. Being consubstantial with the Father, the Word is true God; but being also capable of coming into direct contact with the relative and the manifold, He is in some way inferior to the Father. He is true God, but not *the* God.

The Holy Ghost is thus obviously outside the scope of the author's reasoning, but forced by Holy Scripture and the teaching of the Church he brings Him into the exposition of his system, associating Him with the Father and the Son in one trinity of divine persons. Apparently, however, this Trinity corresponds but imperfectly with the true Christian concept of the mystery. All three persons are indeed said to be truly divine, but at the same time they are represented as if they were unequal in perfection, and are certainly conceived to be dissimilar in their sphere of action. "God the Father, holding all things together, reaches to each of the things that are, imparting being to each from His own; for He is absolutely. Compared with the Father the Son is less, reaching to rational things only, for He is second to the Father. And the Holy Ghost again is inferior, extending His operation to the saints only. So that in this respect the power of the Father is greater, in comparison with the Son and the Holy Spirit; and the power of the Son more, in comparison with the Holy Spirit; and again the power of the Holy Spirit more exceeding, in comparison with all other holy beings." [36]

Again, because God is essentially good and at the same time

[36] De Princ. 1, 3, 5.

essentially unchangeable, and omnipotent from all eternity, hence eternal creation must be admitted. But as matter cannot be eternal, it follows that spiritual beings were created first. They were endowed with freedom of choice, but abused it almost immediately and fell into sin. Then the material world was created, in order to subject the fallen spirits to a purifying discipline. They were then imprisoned in bodies, more or less gross in proportion to the gravity of their sin. Thus the bodies of angels are ethereal, those of men simply material, whilst the bodies of demons are "grotesque and horrible."

To assist men in their temptations and struggles, to which this purifying discipline gives rise, the Word sent them Prophets in the days of old, and finally Himself assumed human nature, perfect in body and pure in soul, and through His sufferings and death wrought the redemption of all. This redemption, however, although it is truly a payment of our debt and an emancipation from the power of Satan, does not primarily effect an elevation of our nature to a divine sphere; it removes obstacles, strengthens by example, and enlightens by the infusion of a higher knowledge.

The end of all things implies a universal restoration, an *apokatastasis,* when all reasonable beings, having repented of their faults under the chastising hand of God, shall be reconciled to their Maker. Yet as they still remain free, it is possible that they may fall again, and thus be forced to begin once more the cycle of purification.

Finally, Holy Scripture, whence our knowledge of revealed truths is chiefly drawn, has a triple sense: somatic, psychic, and pneumatic. The first of these is the literal and historical meaning of the text, intended for the simple. The second is spiritual, and is meant for those who have already somewhat advanced in the appreciation and understanding of divine truths. The third is mystic, and is for the perfect. There are many passages in the Old Testament, and also some in the New, that have no literal meaning; they must be interpreted in a spiritual sense. Hence the allegorical interpretation of Scripture is not only justified, but becomes a matter

of necessity. In fact, Holy Scripture, like all visible creation, is but symbol of the invisible things of God. It is only the spiritually enlightened who can interpret it aright.

From this brief outline of the treatise it is sufficiently clear that the author's intention of building upon the solid foundation of Holy Scripture and approved tradition was not altogether realized. In fact, on several points he went decidedly astray; and one is not surprised that his bishop on account of doctrines here set forth, as is probable, should have removed him from his post of head-master in the catechetical school of Alexandria. But in passing judgment on him, two things must be borne in mind. The first is, as already stated above, that he intended his treatise as a counterpoise to the teaching of the Gnostics, trying to show by philosophical argumentation the unreasonableness of Dualism, Emanationism, and Docetism; and in this he succeeded admirably. The second is that he sincerely endeavored to safeguard the traditional teaching of the Church, and as a consequence wherever he simply states doctrines to be admitted by all, he is usually quite orthodox. Only where he explains points which to his way of looking at them had not yet been determined by any authorized teaching, whether of Scripture or tradition, does he allow himself to be carried to extremes. Hence whilst he is an unsafe teacher, he is still a reliable witness.

Furthermore, as judged by what he says in his other extant works, his commentaries on Holy Scripture, his treatise *Contra Celsum,* and his tractate *On Prayer,* he appears in a somewhat different light. Thus, commenting on Romans, 9, 5, where the Apostle says that Christ "is over all things, God blessed forever," he speaks of the Trinity in a perfectly orthodox sense. "Both (the Father and the Son) are one God, because the Son has no other source of divinity than the Father; but, as Wisdom says, the Son is a most pure emanation of the one paternal fountain. Therefore Christ is over all things God. But He who is over all things, has no one over Himself. For He is not below the Father, but of the Father. And this very same has the Wisdom of God given us to understand of the Holy Spirit, when it says: 'The Spirit of the Lord hath

filled the whole world, and that which containeth all things hath knowledge of the voice.' If, therefore, the Son is called God over all, and the Holy Spirit is said to contain all, and the Father is He of whom all have their being, it is shown to evidence that the nature of the Trinity and the substance is one, and this is over all." [37]

Again, in a fragment of his commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews he says that the Son is begotten of the substance of the Father, that He is *homoousios* with the Father, that there was never an instant when He was not the Son.[38] In all this the author clearly anticipates the definition of Nicæa.

In Christ he clearly distinguishes between the two natures, the divine and the human. "In the first place it behooves us to know, that in Christ the nature of His divinity, by reason of which He is the only-begotten Son of the Father, is one thing, and another is His human nature, which He assumed in these latter times according to the divine dispensation." [39] Yet, though the two natures are distinct, they are not separate, but are so intimately conjoined in the unity of person, that the properties of the one can in the concrete be predicated of the other. Hence it is that the human nature, as united to the divinity, "is justly called the Son and the Power of God, Christ and the Wisdom of God; and again the Son of God, through whom all things were created, is styled Jesus Christ and the Son of man. For the Son of God also is said to have died, in that nature, of course, which was capable of being affected by death; and He is called the Son of man, who, according to the teaching of faith, shall come with the holy angels in the glory of the Father. And for this reason, throughout the whole Scripture, the divine nature is designated by terms applicable to human beings, and the human nature is honored with divine appellations." [40] Thus the author gives a perfectly correct application of the *communicatio idiomatum,* which is based upon the hypostatic union.

The object of Christ's coming into the world was the redemption of mankind. "For the people did this man die,

[37] In Rom. 7, 13.
[38] P. G. 14, 1308, 1307.
[39] De Princ. 1, 2, 1.
[40] Ibid. 1, 2, 10.

who was purer than all living beings; He bore our sins and infirmities, as He was able to pay for and to destroy and to blot out all the sins of the whole world taken upon Himself, because He had done no inquity, nor was deceit found in His mouth, nor did He know sin."[41] Hence Christ's satisfaction was vicarious. It was also a propitiatory sacrifice, the Saviour of the world offering Himself as a victim of propitiation to His Father.[42] Then, along with this perfectly orthodox view, the author develops the idea of a ransom being paid to the evil one, so that we might be justly freed from the slavery of Satan.[43] The redemption is universal in the widest sense of the term, extending not only to the whole human race, but likewise to all other reasonable beings.[44]

Freed from sin by the redemption thus wrought, men must work out their salvation by making a good use of their free will and the graces bestowed upon them by God. In this they are assisted by the Church of Christ. The author's ecclesiology appears to be quite orthodox. The Church, he says, is one all over the world, and no person is a true Christian unless he belongs to the Church which takes its name from Christ.[45] Out of the Church there is no salvation, and if any one separates himself from her communion, he is guilty of his own destruction.[46] Christ built His Church upon Peter, who is its solid foundation.[47] The faithful are under the jurisdiction of the bishop, who is assisted by priests and deacons.[48]

Of baptism he says that it washes away all sins, and as little children are also sinners, the Church, following Apostolic tradition, teaches that they should be baptized.[49] The baptism of water may, however, be supplied by martyrdom, which is the baptism of blood.[50]

The author touches the question of penance in several different places, but his position is not altogether clear. In his treatise *Contra Celsum,* he indicates the general rule followed

[41] In Joan. 28, 18 (160).
[42] In Rom. 3, 8.
[43] In Matt. 16, 18.
[44] In Joan. 1, 40.
[45] Contr. Celsum, 8, 16.
[46] In Jesu Nave, Hom. 3, 5.
[47] In Exod. 5, 4.
[48] De Orat. 28, 4; cfr. Contr. Cels. 3, 51.
[49] In Rom. 5, 9; In Joan. 6, 17.
[50] Exhort. ad Mart. 30, 34, 50.

by the Christians in regard to those who sin grievously. "Those," he says, "who fall into sin, and especially such as give themselves up to licentiousness, the Christians separate from their communion. . . . They mourn as lost and dead to God those who have fallen through lust or who have committed any other crime; and they regard them as having been raised from the dead, when they have so changed their ways that they deserve readmission. However, they are admitted less readily than those who are received for the first time; and because they have fallen after pledging their fidelity to the principles of our religion, they are forbidden to hold any place of honor and superiority in the said Church of God." [51]

In another place he enumerates several kinds of penance; one of which, he says, is more laborious than the rest, because it includes the confession of sins that have been committed.[52] And this confession is to be made to the priests of the Church, who, in imitation of their Master, impart to the people the forgiveness of their sins.[53] To the priests it also belongs to determine whether public penance should be performed for the sins confessed to them.[54] However, although the ministry of forgiveness belongs to all the priests, it does so more particularly to the bishop.[55] Sins that must be confessed are divided into mortal faults and mortal crimes. For the former one can always obtain pardon; as regards the latter, the author is apparently not consistent in his views. In one place he expresses his astonishment that priests should presume to pardon any of them, that is, apostasy, homicide, and adultery.[56] In another he states that deliberate and full apostasy is unpardonable.[57] In a third he holds that pardon may be granted once.[58] And finally in a fourth place he implies that they may be pardoned repeatedly.[59]

Anent this apparent contradiction, Tixeront gives it as his opinion that "Origen, as well as Tertullian, regarded the

[51] Cont. Cels. 3, 51.
[52] In Levit. Hom. 2, 4.
[53] In Levit. 5, 3; cfr. Ibid. 3, 4.
[54] In Num. Hom. 10, 1.
[55] In Levit. 15, 2; cfr. De Orat. 28.
[56] Ibid. 28.
[57] In Matt. 114.
[58] In Levit. 15, 2.
[59] Ibid. 11, 2.

crimina mortalia as beyond forgiveness: but he has been corrected in this point, as in many others." [60] Practically the same view is taken by Rauschen,[61] and many other modern critics. D'Alès, on the other hand, and perhaps the majority of dogmatic theologians contend that the contradiction is only apparent, and that, "when Origen speaks of unpardonable sins in his *De Oratione,* he does not imply that they are unpardonable *in se,* but unpardonable on account of the malice of unrepentant sinners or the laxity of priests who fail to dispose them to penance." [62] All things considered, this appears to be the more probable view.

Origen's teaching on the Eucharist is in the main quite satisfactory. He speaks of the consecrated elements as containing the real body and blood of Christ, which, he says, the faithful receive with the greatest care and reverence, lest some particles should fall to the ground; and if this were to happen through their own fault, he adds, they would be guilty indeed. They do not take so much care in preserving the word of God.[63] In another place he states that besides this common understanding of the Eucharist, one may also take a spiritual view of it, according to which the consecrated elements are symbols of the teaching of Christ.[64] He also holds that the Eucharist is a true sacrifice. The Christian altar, he says, is not flowing with the blood of animals, but is consecrated by the precious blood of Jesus Christ.[65] The material elements are consecrated by the "prolatum verbum," and it is from this that the sanctifying power of the Eucharist is derived.[66]

In his references to matrimony, the author stands for the indissolubility of the marriage bond, proving his view from the teaching of Holy Scripture.[67] He remarks, however, that some "Ecclesiæ rectores" have occasionally allowed persons to act contrary to this teaching; but, he adds, they did so most likely in order to avoid a greater evil.[68] It is God who unites

[60] O. c. 278.
[61] Eucharist and Penance, 180 sq.
[62] L'Édit de Calliste; La Théologie de S. Hippolyte, 44 sq.
[63] In Exod. Hom. 13, 3.
[64] Ibid. 13, 3, 5.
[65] In Num. Hom. 24, 1; In Jesu Nave, 2, 1; 8, 6.
[66] In Matt. 11, 14.
[67] Ibid. 14, 23.
[68] Ibid.

husband and wife, so that they are no longer two but one; and because it is God who unites them, therefore the union is to them a source of grace.[69]

As a reason for the baptism of little children, as was said above, the author adduces the fact that they too are sinners. This would seem to imply his belief in the existence of original sin. The same inference may be drawn from several other statements. Thus he holds that the soul on its union with the body contracts a moral stain, because it is united to a body of sin.[70] And in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans he argues that as Adam begot his first child only after he had committed sin, he necessarily transmitted a sin-stained body; and as all men were contained in Adam whilst dwelling in paradise, so were they all with him and in him expelled therefrom, all being subject to the consequences of that first sin.[71]

Many other points of orthodox teaching might be gathered from the author's writings, but these are sufficient for our purpose. It is indeed easy enough to draw up from his various works, especially from his *De Principiis,* a long list of propositions that deserve the severest censure, as was actually done some three hundred years after his death; but it is not less easy to make him a staunch defender of orthodox Christianity as it existed in his day. He unhesitatingly accepted the teaching of the Church, whether it was drawn from oral tradition or from the written word, but beyond its obvious and literal meaning, which he had no intention of setting aside, he sought for a higher spiritual sense, which would give him a deeper insight into the mysteries of God. In this his allegorizing tendency carried him at times too far; still it must not be forgotten that the conclusions thus arrived at were not meant to supplant the Church's ordinary teaching as it was explained to the simple. Thus when he says that the Holy Eucharist is the real body and blood of the Saviour, he understands and accepts the proposition in its literal sense; but the

[69] Ibid. 14, 16.
[70] In Levit. 8, 3; In Luc. Hom. 14.
[71] In Rom. 5, 9; 1, 1; cfr. Contr. Cels. 3, 62, 66.

reality of the Saviour's presence is to him at the same time a symbol of God's loving and merciful revelation to men, and so he does not hesitate to speak of the Eucharist as the word of God. If this be borne in mind, most of Origen's alleged aberrations, at least in matters which were then clearly taught by the Church, will disappear.

CHAPTER XIII

FROM THE DEATH OF ORIGEN TO THE COUNCIL OF NICÆA

Between the close of Origen's troubled and brilliant career and the opening of the Council of Nicæa, nearly three-quarters of a century later, no theologian of particular eminence appeared of whom we have any record. This is especially true of the West. Cyprian died in 258, and his immediate successors have left us nothing that is worthy of note. There were indeed a few writers, like Arnobius, Commodian, Lactantius, and Victorinus of Pettau, who employed their literary talents in defense of the faith or in the exposition of Christian doctrine, but they added nothing to what had already been accomplished by those who went before them. Arnobius was a recent convert and apparently but poorly instructed in the faith which he tried to defend; Commodian, probably a Jewish proselyte before his conversion to Christianity, was a poet, who appealed to his readers' imagination rather than to their reason; Lactantius, the Christian Cicero, was more skilful in discomfiting his pagan adversaries than in enlightening his fellow-believers; whilst Victorinus of Pettau confined himself almost exclusively to Scriptural exegesis, and of his many works only his commentary on the Apocalypse has come down to us. Hence about them nothing need be said in the History of Dogmas.

The East indeed produced some men of note, but even the best of them can hardly be compared with the writers of the first half of the third century. Some of these men, as Heraclas, Dionysius, Theognastus, Pierius, and Peter of Alexandria, succeeded Origen in the direction of the Alexandrian school, and likely enough they were quite competent as teachers; but with one or two exceptions, the few fragments of their works that are still extant give no indication of par-

ticular ability. Others, like Gregory Thaumaturgus, Methodius of Olympus, and Hieracas of Leontopolis, were constantly engaged in the discharge of their pastoral duties and had but little opportunity of accomplishing anything noteworthy along the lines of literary pursuits. Still in what remains of the works of these various writers, there are some points worth gathering; especially in the matter of Trinitarian and Christological teaching.

We may begin with Dionysius, who from the head-mastership of the catechetical school was raised to the episcopal see of Alexandria. He is best known to us from his correspondence with his namesake, the Bishop of Rome. In a letter written to refute the error of Sabellius, he used expressions which seemed to deny the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father. On account of this he was denounced to the Pope, and by him was called upon to clear himself of the charge of heterodox teaching. The Pope's letter itself contains a point worth noticing. After condemning those who identify the person of the Son with that of the Father, as Sabellius did, and those others who would make the Son a creature, as was afterwards done by Arius, he sets forth the teaching of the Church in the following terms: "We must neither divide the wonderful and divine Monad into three divinities, nor destroy the dignity and exceeding greatness of the Lord by considering Him a creature: but we must have faith in God the Father Almighty, and in Christ Jesus His Son, and in the Holy Ghost, and in the union of the Word with the God of the universe, 'for the Father and I,' He says, 'are but one, and I am in the Father and the Father is in me.' Thus both the Trinity and the holy preaching of the Monarchy will be safeguarded."[1] This is truly a precious relic of third-century theology, representing as it does the faith of the West in the Trinity and the divine sonship, and being at the same time a precise statement of the faith by the Head of the Church.

The answer of the bishop of Alexandria is also quite satis-

[1] Athanasius, De Decret. Nic. Syn. 15, 23.

factory. After calling attention to the fact that examples and comparisons may be strained beyond the limits of truth, and thus be made to imply what was never intended by the author, he says: "There never was a time when God was not Father. . . . And as the Son is the Splendor of Eternal Light, so He Himself also is strictly eternal. As the word in the mind is distinct from the mind, and yet one with it, the one being in the other; so too the Father and the Son, although distinct, are one." [2] And to the charge that he had not used the term *homoousios,* consubstantial, when speaking of the Son, he replies, that the omission resulted not from his denying the applicability of the term to the Son, but simply from his not having found it in Holy Scripture.[3] Then the other charge, that he makes the three hypostases or persons so many portions of the Godhead, he answers by saying: "Three there are though they (the adversaries) like it not, or they must utterly destroy the Divine Trinity. We extend the Monad indivisibly into the Triad, and conversely gather together the Triad without diminution into the Monad." [4] This perfectly satisfied the Pope, because it was thoroughly orthodox.

The same doctrine is found in the few fragments of the work of Theognastus, preserved by St. Athanasius. Although there are some traces of Subordinationism, yet when speaking of the generation of the Son, the author says that the Son is born of the substance of the Father, an expression that found its way into the Nicene Creed. He also insists strongly on the Son's full and perfect likeness in essence to the Father.[5]

St. Gregory Thaumaturgus is even more explicit. In his *Exposition of the Faith* he has expressions like the following: "One God, Father of the Living Word . . . perfect progenitor of a perfect offspring, Father of the only-begotten Son. One Lord, God of God, figure and image of the Godhead, the Word, creator of all things; true Son of true God. And one Holy Spirit, who has His substance from God, and who through the son appeared to men; the perfect

[2] Id. De Sent. Dionys. 15, 23.
[3] Ibid. 18.
[4] Ibid. 17.
[5] Id. De Decret. Nic. Syn. 25.

image of the Son, the life and cause of all life. A perfect trinity, not divided nor separated in glory and eternity and rule. Nor is there anything created or in servitude in the Trinity; nor anything superinduced, as if first not there and then added thereto. And thus neither was the Son ever wanting to the Father, nor the Spirit to the Son; but without variation and without change, the same Trinity ever abideth." [6] Bearing in mind that Gregory was a disciple and ardent admirer of Origen, the latter's teaching on the Trinity may perhaps appear in a somewhat new light; for it is hardly conceivable that the devoted disciple should be so correct, if the master had gone altogether astray.

St. Peter of Alexandria is noted chiefly for his opposition to Origen. He severely censures the latter's teaching on the preëxistence of souls, and on their union with a body in consequence of sin. He also finds fault with Origen's doctrine on the resurrection, as not sufficiently safeguarding the identity of the risen body with that which each one had during life. These strictures are just enough if no allowance be made for Origen's philosophical speculations, as was pointed out in the preceding chapter. Christ, according to Peter's teaching, was God by nature, and became man by nature. In the Incarnation the Word became true man, but He did not lay aside His divinity.[7]

St. Methodius of Olympus finds the same fault with Origen. Man was eternally with God, he says, as a possible being; as something that might be called into existence, but he was wholly created in time.[8] Man is a sort of microcosm, summing up the whole world in himself.[9] He was endowed by His Creator with freedom and immortality, and made to the likeness of God.[10] Adam fell, and as a consequence we are all inclined to sin. "When man was deceived by the devil, he violated the commandment of God, and thenceforth sin, propagated by this contumacy, took up its abode in him. . . . For deprived of the divine gifts and utterly pros-

[6] P. G. 10, 983–988.
[7] Fragm. P. G. 18, 512, 521, 509.
[8] De Lib. Arbitr. 22, 9–11.
[9] De Res. 2, 10, 2.
[10] Ibid. 1, 38, 3; 35, 2.

trated, we have become a prey to concupiscence, which the cunning serpent and shrewd deceiver excited in us."[11] To remedy the evil thus introduced into the world, the Word of God became incarnate, being at the same time true God and true man.[12] He was the second Adam, the representative of the human race, who laid down his life for the sins of the world.[13] The fruit of His redemption is treasured up in the Church, His spouse and the mother of His children.[14] These children are born to Him in baptism, which makes the recipients so many other Christs.[15]

Besides these fragments, there is an anonymous treatise belonging to this period, entitled, *On the Right Faith,* which was formerly ascribed to Origen. It was directed against the Marcian and Valentinian heresies, but incidentally gives also an exposition of Catholic doctrines. The author, who calls himself Adamantius, professes his faith in the eternal and consubstantial Word, and in the Holy Spirit, who is also eternal.[16] The Word, he says, is Son of God by nature, whilst men are children of God only by adoption.[17] He remained truly God in the Incarnation, but also truly assumed flesh from the Virgin Mary.[18] The Catholic Church, he states in another place, is the sole depository of truth, and those who leave her communion necessarily fall into error. True Christians are called Catholics because they are spread all over the world.[19] There is also a reference to the Holy Eucharist, which the author calls the communion of the body and blood of Christ.[20] Like St. Irenæus before him, he adduces the Real Presence as an argument against the Valentinians, who held that matter was essentially evil.

A few other points of interest might be gathered from the scattered fragments belonging to this period, but these will suffice for our purpose. They are only few in number, but

[11] Epiphan. Adv. Haeres. 64, 60; cfr. De Lib. Arb. 17, 4, 5.
[12] Banquet, 1, 5; 8, 7; 3, 5.
[13] Ibid. 3, 3, 4, 5, 8; De Res. 3, 23, 11.
[14] Banquet, 3, 8.
[15] Ibid. 8, 6, 8; 8, 9, 8.
[16] De Recta Fide, 1, 2.
[17] Ibid. 3, 9.
[18] Ibid. 5, 39; 4, 15; 5, 7.
[19] Ibid. 5, 28; 1, 8.
[20] Ibid. 2, 20.

of inestimable value. They present to us in the clearest possible light the faith of both East and West on two points of doctrine which a quarter of a century later were to stir the Christian world to its very depths. Their preservation appears truly providential.

As the present chapter concludes our review of Antenicene theology, it seems in place here to say a word about doctrinal development as referred to this particular period of time. Was there any real progress in the Church's teaching since the days of the Apostolic Fathers? Was there anything like development in her theology? Or did she simply hand down from generation to generation what she had received from the Apostles and their immediate successors in the days of old?

Both of these questions may be answered in the affirmative, but each under a different aspect. The Church simply handed down what she had received in so far as the contents of her doctrines came in question: the deposit of faith remained ever the same. Nothing is found in the orthodox writers of the third century that was not in some way implied or referred to by the men who wrote at the beginning of the second. Under this aspect there was no development. But the matter looks quite different when the explicit presentation and precise exposition of particular doctrines are considered. Then there is noticeable a progress and development that becomes ever more striking as time passes on. This is especially true in reference to the Blessed Trinity, the true Godhead of the Son, the unity of person and duality of natures in Christ, the constitution of the Church and her importance in the economy of salvation, the real presence of Christ's body and blood in the Eucharist, the sacrificial character of the Eucharistic rite, and the nature of the Church's intervention in the remission of post-baptismal sins.

To realize this, one need but compare the somewhat vague association of the Son and the Holy Ghost with the Father, as found in sub-Apostolic writers, with the precise Trinitarian formula worked out by Tertullian and freely used by Dionysius of Rome and his namesake of Alexandria. Or the indefinite expression Son of God, as implying the divinity of Christ,

with the explicit declaration of the Son's consubstantiality made by these same authors. Or, again, the simple statement of earlier writers that the Word became man with the definite teaching of third-century authors that the Word Incarnate is one person subsisting in two natures. And so all along the various lines of theological thought as indicated above. Nothing was added, nothing was taken away, but what was ever present gradually crystallized into clearer concepts and expanded into fuller statements. There was indeed no change, but there was growth.

And the same is more or less true of other points of doctrine. The veneration of martyrs, sacrifice and prayers for the dead, the Divine Motherhood of the Virgin, all at first referred to in a somewhat casual way, were by the end of the third century universally accepted as evidently contained in the authorized teaching of the Church. By that time also the New Testament canon was practically fixed, and the inspiration of Holy Scripture was placed beyond dispute.

There appears a similar progress in the manifest recognition of the Primacy of Rome. Merely implied in the Prima Clementis, and more or less incidentally referred to in the letter of Ignatius to the Romans, the fact of the Primacy is definitely stated by Irenæus and Cyprian, and the rights involved therein are unhesitatingly exercised by successive Popes. The position taken by Victor in the paschal dispute, by Callistus in the matter of penance, by Stephen in the baptismal controversy, and by Dionysius in reference to his namesake of Alexandria, shows how thoroughly these Pontiffs were convinced that as successors of St. Peter they had at once the right and the duty to feed the whole flock of Christ. And although at times, in the heat of controversy, the Pope's authority was apparently disregarded by individuals, nevertheless the Christian world as a whole was always ready to acknowledge the universal jurisdiction of the incumbent of the Roman see. For that see was to them the see of Peter, and the Pope was admitted to be Peter's successor. Hence the well attested historical fact, that not only orthodox bishops and teachers, but heresiarchs as well, ever sought to strengthen

their position by endeavoring to obtain the support of Rome. They well knew that communion with Rome was universally regarded as communion with the Church of Christ. There was as yet little or no theorizing about the Pope's Primacy, but as a mere fact that Primacy was well understood and readily admitted.

And thus without the intervention of general councils, without any formal definition of the faith issued by the Head of the Church, the ordinary *magisterium*, guided by the Spirit of truth and watched over by the Vicar of Christ, not only warded off all dangers from the preaching of God's word, but also directed orthodox teaching with a firm hand along the ever lengthening lines of legitimate doctrinal development. In the following periods we shall see this development proceed more rapidly, owing to the rise of wide-spread heresies and the consequent decisive action of general councils; but the final outcome will ever be the same.

CHAPTER XIV

RISE OF THE ARIAN HERESY AND THE COUNCIL OF NICÆA[1]

During a period of more than forty years, from 260, when the Valerian persecution ended, to 302, when that of Diocletian began, the Church enjoyed not only peace but practically full liberty to preach the Gospel throughout the vast extent of the Roman Empire. As a result the number of Christians increased rapidly, and the development of Church organization went on apace. Harnack estimates that at the beginning of the fourth century there were about four million believers, who were presided over by something like fifteen hundred bishops. This, of course, is only an estimate, and the actual number of Christians was probably much larger. Asia Minor, Armenia, Syria, Palestine, Northern Egypt, Proconsular Africa and Numidia, Central and Lower Italy, Southern Gaul and some parts of Spain, were almost entirely Christian. Believers in the Gospel message were much more numerous in cities than in the country districts, and many of them belonged to the highest classes of society.

This freedom of religious practice and worship led naturally to a more perfect organization of Church government. From the earliest times local churches had been governed by a hierarchy which consisted of three orders, bishops, priests, and deacons, to which towards the middle of the third century subdeacons and clerics in the four minor orders were added. This arrangement remained unchanged, but these local churches were gradually drawn more closely together as free

[1] Cfr. Newman, The Arians of the Fourth Century; Rogala, Die Anfaenge des Arianishen Streites; Tixeront, H. D. II, 29–36; Schwane, H. D. I, 207–219, II, 134–232; Hefele, History of the Councils, I, 231–449, Engl. Trans. 2nd Edit.; Hergenroether, Kirchengeschichte, I, 348–384; Marion, Histoire de l'Eglise, I, 395–424.

communication became established. Up to the fourth century they were usually grouped around their respective mother-churches, from which they had received the faith; but later on, first in the East and then also in the West, there was a division into provinces, each being subject to a metropolitan, who exercised a certain amount of directive authority over his suffragan bishops. In the East he usually had his residence in the capital city of the corresponding political division, whilst in the West this was rarely the case. Finally, all these churches looked to Rome as the center of unity, and in matters of extraordinary difficulty, which could not be settled by the authority of provincial councils, the Apostolic See was commonly considered as the court of last appeal.

Whilst the Church was thus peacefully carrying on her mission, there burst upon her the last and in some respect the most violent persecution. With occasional lulls and intermissions, the storm raged for nine long years; and when finally peace was restored, the Church's fairest provinces lay in ruin. Not only had thousands of Christians been slaughtered, but many also had proved untrue to their faith, having either offered sacrifices to the idols or bought written testimonials stating that they had done so. These were called respectively *sacrificati* and *libellatici,* whilst others who had surrendered the Sacred Writings were termed *traditores.* It was the work of reconciling these unfaithful children, grown careless during long years of peace, that awaited the Church when she finally emerged from the storm and was permanently liberated from pagan domination by the joint action of Licinius and Constantine. She undertook it as she had undertaken similar work many a time before, with loving patience and merciful kindness; but before she had healed the wounds struck by the terrible persecution, another storm burst upon her that was to prove almost more dangerous than the fury of pagan tyrants. This was the Arian heresy.

A — Rise of the Arian Heresy

Arius seems to have been of Libyan origin, and was born shortly after the middle of the third century. He received

his early training at Antioch, where he frequented the school of Lucian. This latter was a somewhat erratic genius, and on account of his heterodox Christological views he incurred the censures of the Church, but he was later on restored to her communion and died a martyr's death. After the completion of his studies, Arius was received among the Alexandrian clergy. Though for some time excommunicated on account of the part he took in the Meletian schism, he was eventually ordained priest by bishop Achillas, whose successor, Alexander, placed him in charge of Baucalis, one of the several parish churches of the city. Here he soon gained a considerable following, both by reason of his ascetic life, his dignified bearing, and his keen logic. It was whilst in charge of this church that he first broached his heretical views, but authors do not agree in relating the particular circumstances that caused him to take this step. When called to account by his bishop, he refused to retract or correct his heterodox statements, being assured of the support of his many followers. And so the troubles began which were to disturb the Eastern Church for nearly a hundred years.

At the root and center of the conflict was the old Christological problem with the solution of which the minds of learned men had been occupied for many years past. If there be but one true God, how can Jesus Christ be truly divine? In what precise sense, therefore, is Jesus the Son of God? Or as believing Christians would prefer to put it: As Jesus Christ is true God, and as the Father is true God, and as there is only one true God, what precise relation does Jesus Christ bear to the Father? Christian antiquity had always answered in rather general terms: Jesus Christ is the only Son of God, begotten from all eternity by the Father, and therefore true God; but how this can be reconciled with the absolute oneness of the Godhead, is a mystery that must be accepted on the authority of God's word. "Whoso wish to explain it are out of their minds." From the standpoint of faith this answer was quite satisfactory, but it did not satisfy those whose philosophical bent led them to look for the ultimate reasons of things. Hence many explanations were attempted, some more

or less orthodox, others obviously heretical. Here are a few of them, a brief statement of which will at the same time serve to point out the intellectual genesis of Arianism.

The second century Apologists admitted the eternal generation of the Word and staunchly defended both His personal distinction from the Father and His true divinity; but by way of explanation they postulated, at least as far as the wording goes, a certain subordination of the Word to the Father and a temporal "bringing forth" in view of the creative work. The Adoptionists (190) and Paul of Samosata (268) cut the Gordian knot by considering the Word to be impersonal, a merely outward aspect of the one God in His relation to the external world. Jesus, therefore, as they regarded Him, was purely human, a holy man, in whom dwelt permanently the impersonal Word of God. On account of His great merit He was adopted by the Father as His only Son, and as such He became entitled to special veneration. Hence for them there was no further Christological problem to be solved. The better to refute these heretics, some Catholic writers, among them those of the Alexandrian school, took over the Subordinationist expressions of the earlier Apologists and gave them a certain vogue, especially in the East. As a result, not a few Eastern bishops, whilst professing the true divinity of the Son, maintained at the same time that He was to be regarded as inferior to the Father. The Church meanwhile contented herself with defending the oneness of God against the pagans and the personal distinction of Father and Son against the Modalists, without as yet taking official cognizance of the Subordinationist tendencies that were at work.

When the ground had thus been slowly prepared for the seeds of heresy, Arianism took its rise. Its author chose an intermediate stand between the Adoptionists and the second-century Apologists. Against the former he defended the existence of a personal Word, and against the latter he denied the Word's true divinity and also His eternal generation. His teaching on the subject, as gathered from the few fragments of his works that still remain, may be reduced to the following points:

1°. God is absolutely transcendent and cannot communicate His essence; therefore He cannot have a Son in the strict sense of the term.

2°. As a necessary consequence, the Word is a creature, though altogether unique in perfection and position. There was a time when He was not, and He was made out of nothing, truly created.

3°. Yet because of His surpassing excellence and perfection, He was endowed with creative power and in time created the world, acting as the Father's instrument.

4°. He acted also as the agent of redemption, and for that purpose became incarnate in Jesus.

5°. Being a creature, He is subject to the Father, knows the Father only imperfectly, and during the time of His probation was, absolutely speaking, liable to fall into sin. Yet He served God faithfully in all things and thereby merited to be adopted as God's Son, in consequence of which adoption He is entitled to the veneration of men.[2]

In 320 Arius was cited before a synod of Egyptian and Libyan bishops, about a hundred in number. He appeared but refused to retract; whereupon he was excommunicated and after some time was expelled from the city. This, however, made him only the more zealous to spread his views. By letters to bishops and by tracts and songs written for the common people, he made propaganda for his cause in many parts of Palestine, Syria, and Asia Minor. To counteract these proselytizing efforts of Arius, and at the same time to justify his own action and that of his fellow-bishops, Alexander sent a circular letter to the various churches of the East, in which, after briefly summarizing the condemned errors, he set forth what he considered to be the traditional teaching of the Church concerning the matter in dispute. The following points may be noted:

1°. The Son is not created *ex nihilo,* but begotten by the Father from His own substance. He was begotten not in time, but from all eternity.

[2] Fragm. ex Thalia; fragm. ex Ep. ad Alex. P. G. 26, 21; 26, 705, 708.

2°. He is, therefore, not an adopted Son of the Father, but His Son by nature.

3°. The Father and the Son are inseparable in being, though distinct as persons. The Son is immutable, immortal, impeccable.

4°. The Father created the world through the Son, yet the Son is of the same substance as the Father.

5°. In all this there is a mystery, which we accept by faith, though we cannot fathom it by reason.[3]

Thus the traditional teaching of the Church and the obvious rejection of it by Arius were placed in a clear light; but the latter's influence with not a few bishops, who were more or less inclined to Subordinationism, made the quiet suppression of his teaching impossible. Hence another remedy was tried, hitherto unheard of, the intervention of a general council.

B — The Council of Nicæa

Whilst ecclesiastical and religious unity was thus seriously endangered, Constantine, by his victory over Licinius in 323, became sole ruler of the Empire. Heartily tired of wars and strifes, his first efforts on visiting his newly acquired Eastern dominions were directed towards bringing about an understanding between the contending parties. He was as yet only a catechumen, and in fact remained such until shortly before his death, still he considered himself as duly constituted "Episcopus in externis," and therefore entitled to exert his imperial power in trying to bring this annoying conflict to a close. With this object in view, he sent a letter to Alexander and Arius, bidding them to adjust their differences. As bearer of this imperial mandate, he selected Hosius, bishop of Cordova in Spain, whom he had for some years past employed as his ecclesiastical adviser. Hosius, however, soon found that this was not a matter that could be settled out of hand by the authority of the Emperor; and when he informed his master of this on his return, the latter determined that a general council should be summoned without delay.

[3] Socrates, Hist. Eccl. I, 6; Theodoret, Hist. Eccl. I, 3. P. G. 18, 548 sq.

As neither the contending parties nor the Pope made any objection, an invitation was sent to such bishops of the Empire as could be reached, and means of transportation were provided by the State. About 300 answered the summons, although tradition gives the total number as 318. These were mostly from Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt. From the West strictly so called only a few attended, but they seem to have been men of ability and of some importance. Pope Sylvester sent as his representatives the Roman presbyters Vitus and Vincent, Spain was represented by Hosius of Cordova, Gaul by Nicasius of Dijon, Calabria by the Metropolitan Mark, Pannonia by Domnus of Stridon, and Africa by Cæcilius of Carthage. Among those present were also several bishops who had suffered for the faith and still bore upon their persons the marks of conflict. There was Paul of Neocæsarea with his burnt hands, Amphion of Epiphania, one of whose eyes had been plucked out, the venerable Paphnutius also blind in one eye and lame from his long sufferings in the metal mines, and his companion Potamon who had endured the same tortures.

It was towards the middle of June, 325, that the bishops assembled in the great hall of the imperial palace at Nicæa in Bithynia. On the whole it was a venerable assembly, although not all the bishops gathered there were distinguished either for learning or for sanctity; nor were all of them entirely orthodox in their doctrinal views. In fact, Theonas of Marmarica and Secundus of Ptolmais, as the event showed, were in full accord with Arius, whilst Eusebius of Nicomedia, Theogonis of Nicæa, and Maris of Chalcedon, at least supported him in his opposition to Alexander. The Emperor himself was present in state, but he did not take part in the transactions of the Council, in so far as they touched matters of faith; nor did he interfere with freedom of discussion on either side. As the Acts have not been preserved, the mode of procedure cannot be established with any degree of certainty; nor is it certain who acted as president, although it is rather commonly assumed that this honor was conferred on

Hosius, who is also supposed to have been deputed by the Pope as his legate.

In order to understand at all the events that followed the dissolution of the Council, it is necessary here to call attention to the work which the assembled bishops were, in the first instance, expected to accomplish. They had not been summoned from distant parts of the Empire to decide whether Christ was true God. Nor even, assuming His true divinity, to define in what precisely His relation to the Father consisted. This latter point might, and in fact did come before the Council by way of supplement to its principal work; but it was not the main point at issue. The Council was summoned to decide the quarrel between Arius and Alexander; that is, to determine whether Arius had been justly condemned and deposed by his own bishop in view of his doctrinal position. This, as is obvious, necessitated an examination of the teaching of Arius by the assembled bishops, and this examination led to animated discussion; but at no stage of the deliberation was the true Godhead of Christ considered open for debate. Hence as soon as Arius openly avowed his views before the council, all further discussion was at an end. With the exception of his followers already mentioned, the bishops would not listen to such blasphemous utterances as that the Word was not truly Son of God, that He was not true God, that there had been a time when He did not exist; and hence the sentence passed upon Arius by his own bishop was not only sustained but explicitly confirmed. If this fact, so obvious from the fragmentary records we have of what took place, be overlooked, the Arian controversy can lead to only one conclusion, namely, that before the Council of Nicæa the true divinity of the Son and His eternal generation from the substance of the Father were not fundamental doctrines of the faith. And this conclusion is absolutely false, as appears quite clearly from what has been said on these points in the preceding chapters.

It was only when this main work, the condemnation of Arius as judged by his own teaching, was accomplished, and

the supplementary task of defining the orthodox faith in precise terms was undertaken, that a real difference of views manifested itself. As already mentioned, some of the assembled bishops were by no means learned men; others, although sufficiently versed in matters of faith, preferred to leave well enough alone; others again, whilst admitting the true divinity of the Son, were inclined to hold that He must be in some way subordinated to the Father, so as to save the absolute oneness of God and at the same time to avoid all appearance of Sabellianism. Hence when it was proposed to draw up a Creed which would make all subterfuge on the part of Arius and his followers impossible, there was considerable disagreement about the terms to be adopted. However, when Eusebius of Nicomedia submitted a symbol of faith that favored the views of Arius, it was promptly rejected. Another one substituted by Eusebius of Cæsarea was pronounced too vague in its phraseology to serve as a test of orthodoxy, although it seems that this was finally adopted, after such clauses had been inserted as would place the true divinity of the Son and His eternal generation in the clearest possible light. It reads as follows:

"We believe in one God the Father all-sovereign, maker of all things both visible and invisible. And in one Lord Jesus Christ the Son of God, the Only-Begotten of the Father, that is, of the essence of the Father, God of God, Light of Light, Very God of Very God; begotten and not made, consubstantial with the Father, by whom all was made, both the things that are in heaven and the things that are on earth: who for us men and for our salvation came down and was incarnate, became man, suffered, and rose again on the third day, ascended into heaven, and will come to judge the living and the dead. And in the Holy Ghost."

Then follow the anathemas, which not only sever Arius and his followers from the Christian communion, but also serve to elucidate the foregoing Creed. "And those that say there was a time when He was not, and before He was begotten He was not, and that He was made out of nothing, or assert that the Son of God is of another substance or essence, or

created, or capable of change or alteration, the Catholic Church anathematizes."

Those who objected to the wording of the Creed, found most fault with the term *homoousios,* consubstantial. This, however, was not so much on account of its meaning, because the phrases, "begotten of the essence of the Father," "Very God of Very God," are substantially synonymous with it; but there were extrinsic reasons against its insertion into the Creed that had considerable weight with many of the Eastern bishops. To begin with, it was not a Scriptural term, although the reality for which it stood was clearly enough contained in the Sacred Writings. Worse still, it had been the watchword of the Sabellians, who denied the personal distinction between the Father and the Son, and for that reason the term had been set aside by the Synod of Antioch some sixty years before. However, when it was pointed out that there was no need of defining the faith in Scriptural terms, that the synod of Antioch had found no fault with the term itself but only with the heterodox sense attached to it by Paul of Samosata, and that it provided a test of orthodoxy which admitted of no subterfuge on the part of Arian heretics, the majority yielded and consented to its insertion in the Creed. Thereupon the bishops, with the exception of Theonas and Secundus, subscribed their names. It is probable, however, that Eusebius of Nicomedia and other friends of Arius would not have done so had it not been for the determined attitude assumed by Constantine, who let it be clearly understood that the decision of the majority should be accepted. Arius, Theonas and Secundus were then banished to Illyricum.

Two other disputes were settled by the Council. Meletius of Lycopolis, a rigorist in the matter of penance, had caused a schism at Antioch and greatly disturbed the peace of the Church; for this he was deposed but was allowed to retain the name and title of bishop. Then the paschal dispute, dating from the end of the second century, was amicably adjusted, the bishop of Antioch and his Eastern colleagues consenting to conform to the custom prevailing at Alexandria and in the West.

Finally a number of disciplinary canons, twenty in all, were drawn up of which the following may be mentioned here as throwing some light on the trend of ecclesiastical legislation: (4) Bishops in each province are to be installed by all their colleagues; the installation must be confirmed by the metropolitan. (16) No bishop is allowed to receive or promote clerics who have deserted their own church. (5) The bishops of each province are urged to assemble twice a year in council, for the purpose of delivering judgment in cases of appeal. (15, 16) Bishops and priests are forbidden to transfer themselves from one church to another. (17) The clergy are forbidden to practice usury. (3) They must not keep under their roof any woman who may give cause for suspicion. (8) Novations shall be admitted to communion on their simple promise to accept Catholic dogmas and to hold communion with persons twice married and with apostates who have repented. (6, 7) The traditional rights and prerogatives of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem are confirmed, the position of the Bishop of Rome as Patriarch in the West being instanced as an example in this matter.

The Council was occupied with these various matters during a period of about two months and a half, and then the bishops returned to their several sees. Arianism had been officially condemned, but as subsequent events showed, peace had not been restored to the Church.

C — Some Fourth Century Theologians

As doctrinal development in Patristic times proceeded most rapidly during the century which intervened between the Council of Nicæa (325) and that of Ephesus (431), it seems in place here to give a short biographical notice of the theologians who chiefly contributed thereto, and whose names recur again and again in the following chapters. It will enable the reader to follow the trend of events more intelligently.

1°. *Eusebius of Cæsarea in Palestine (256-340).*—He was a friend and disciple of Pamphilus, head of the catechetical school at Cæsarea. In many respects the most learned man of his age, he was nevertheless but a shallow theologian.

Moreover his orthodoxy was justly suspected, as he supported Arius, fraternized with the Eusebians, rejected the *homoousios,* and was opposed to Athanasius. Principal works: *Chronicle, Ecclesiastical History, Praeparatio Evangelica, Demonstratio Evangelica, Contra Marcellum, Ecclesiastica Theologia.*

2. *St. Athanasius of Alexandria (295-373).*— Chief opponent of Arianism and "Standard Bearer of Orthodoxy." Of his early life nothing is known. He was ordained deacon in 319, accompanied his bishop, Alexander, to Nicæa in 325, and was consecrated Patriarch of Alexandria in 328. He was a man of considerable learning, of great holiness of life, and a powerful adversary of the Arians. The latter succeeded in having him banished five times, but he lived to see the decline of their faction.— Principal works: *Oratio de Incarnatione Verbi, De Decretis Nicænis, De Synodis, Epistolae IV a Serapionem, Vita Venerabilis Patris Nostri Antonii, Festal Letters, Contra Arianos.*

3°. *St. Cyril of Jerusalem (315–386).*— Ordained priest in 345, he became bishop of Jerusalem about 350. He was a staunch opponent of Arianism, but, most likely for prudential reasons, he never used the term *homoousios.* The Arians caused him to be exiled three times, once for eleven years; but he was reinstated in time to take part in the Council of Constantinople in 381.— Principal works: *Catecheses,* twenty-four in number, which contain an almost complete body of Christian doctrine.

4°. *St. Basil of Cæsarea in Cappadocia (331–379).*— First a monk, then a priest (346), and lastly metropolitan of Cæsarea (370). Distinguished as an exponent of orthodox teaching, famous as a prelate, and a man of deeds rather than of words, he was even during his life-time styled the Great. He bore a principal part in the work of pacification during the latter years of the Arian struggle.— Principal works: Five books *Contra Eunomium, De Spiritu Sancto,* about twenty-five *Homilies on the Hexaemeron and Psalms,* three *Canonical Letters, Rules for Ascetics, Liturgy.*

5°. *St. Gregory of Nazianzus, "the Theologian" (330–*

390).— He was an intimate friend of Basil, together with whom he received his literary education at Athens. Ordained priest by his own father (361), and consecrated bishop of Sasima by Basil (371), he was transferred to Constantinople in 379. Two years later, whilst the Second General Council was in session there, he resigned that see, and thereafter governed the Church of Nazianzus till his death in 390. Of a somewhat irresolute disposition, he was anything but practical. He is commonly regarded as one of the greatest orators of Christian antiquity.— Principal works: Forty-five *Orationes,* most of which bear upon the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity.

6°. *St. Gregory of Nyssa, brother of St. Basil (334–394).* — In 371, he was, much against his inclinations, consecrated bishop of Nyssa, "an insignificant town under the jurisdiction of Basil." Soon after deposed by the Eusebians, he led a wandering life till 379, when he was reinstated. He was one of the principal theologians at the Council of Constantinople in 381, and is regarded as the most diligent and versatile writer of his time. Though an able theologian, he was much more eminent as a philosopher. He cherished great admiration for Origen, and to some extent followed his teaching.— Principal works: *Catechesis, Twelve Books against Eunomius, Two Books against Apollinaris.* The first named work is an argumentative defense of the principal Christian doctrines, against Pagans, Jews, and Heretics.

7°. *Didymus the Blind (310–395).*— He had lost his sight when four years old, but by prayer, meditation, and close attention to the lectures given in the schools, he acquired extensive and accurate knowledge. For more than half a century he was director of the catechetical school at Alexandria. He was strongly influenced by the teaching of Origen, and fell into some of his errors. In the Fifth General Council (553), he was condemned together with Origen.— Principal works: *De Trinitate, De Spiritu Sancto.* The latter is considered to be the best treatise on the subject in Christian antiquity.

8°. *St. Epiphanius of Salamis (315–403).*— A Palestinian by birth, and for thirty years superior of a monastery at Eleutheropolis in Judæa, he was in 367 made bishop of

Salamis (Constantia) in Cyprus. His chief ambition seems to have been to be orthodox in the strictest sense of the term, and a great part of his life was spent in hunting up and refuting heretics.— Principal works: *Ancoratus* "the firmly anchored man," an exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity, and particularly of the Holy Ghost; *Panarion* or *Adversus Hæreses,* a catalogue and exposition of eighty heretical systems.

9°. *Diodorus of Tarsus in Cilicia (?–390).*— Belonging to one of the noblest families of Antioch, and singularly talented, he received a finished education in every branch of secular and sacred sciences. At first an ascetic and a friend of St. Basil, he was made bishop of Tarsus in 378. From 357 to 373, he was the chief supporter of orthodoxy at Antioch; but over-emphasizing certain tendencies of the Antiochene school, he sowed the seeds of Nestorianism.— Principal works: *Commentaries on Sacred Scripture.* Only a few fragments of his writings are extant.

10°. *St. John Chrysostom (344–407).*— He was born at Antioch of a wealthy family, and received his literary education from the famous rhetorician Libanius. Later on he studied the sacred sciences under Meletius, Patriarch of Antioch, and Diodorus of Tarsus. For some years he led an ascetical life, but was made priest in 386. After preaching for ten years with great success at Antioch, he was in 397 consecrated Patriarch of Constantinople. Twice banished from his see, he died in exile at Comana in Pontus. Though the first of orators, he holds but a secondary rank as a theologian.— Principal works: Most of his writings are Scriptural expositions in the form of homilies; 76 on Genesis, 60 on the Psalms, 90 on Matthew, 80 on John, and over 100 on the Epistles of St. Paul. To these must be added his beautiful treatise on the Priesthood, *De Sacerdotio* in six books; and a number of *Catecheses.*

11°. *St. Amphilochius of Iconium in Lycaonia (340–?).*— He was a cousin of Gregory of Nazianzus. He received a highly finished education under the direction of Libanius, and thereafter practiced law for some years at Constantinople.

In 374 he was consecrated bishop of Iconium and became metropolitan of Lycaonia. He was highly esteemed by St. Basil, with whom he effectively coöperated in defending the faith against the Arians. He wrote quite voluminously, but from the sixth century until a few years ago his writings attracted little attention.— Principal works: Of his many literary productions only eight *Orationes,* a letter *Ad Seleucum,* and some fragments remain.

12°. *Theodore of Mopsuestia in Cilicia (350–428).*— Born in affluence at Antioch, he enjoyed the advantages of a liberal education under Libanius, being a fellow student of John Chrysostom. He studied theology under Diodorus of Tarsus, was ordained priest in 383, and then threw himself heart and soul into the defense of orthodoxy against the Arians, Macedonians, and Apollinarians. In 392 he was consecrated bishop of Mopsuestia, and for more than a third of a century displayed great zeal and energy in the discharge of his pastoral duties. Unfortunately, in his Christological teaching he still further developed the erroneous views of Diodorus, and thus prepared the way for the Nestorian heresy. He was condemned in the Fifth General Council (553).— Principal works: *Commentaries on Sacred Scripture, Contra Eunomium,* a book on the *Mysteries, De Assumente et Assumpto.*

13°. *Aphraates, "the Persian Sage."*— Neither the date of his birth nor of his death are known, but he wrote between 336 and 356. He was first a monk, and then bishop of Mar Mathæus, a Persian monastery East of Mosul. His Christology is rather undeveloped, but quite orthodox. He frequently touches on the sacrament of penance and the Blessed Eucharist.— Twenty-three *Demonstrationes,* or homilies, are the most important of his works that have come down to us.

14°. *St. Ephraem Syrus (306-376).*— He was born at Nisibis, and as a young man led the life of a hermit. He was highly esteemed by Bishop Jacob of his native city, whom he is said to have accompanied to the Council of Nicæa. By him he was also made head-master of the school of Nisibis, but when in 363 the city fell into the hands of the Persians, he took up his abode at Edessa. In 370 he traveled to Cap-

padocia, in order to make the acquaintance of Basil the Great. The latter ordained him deacon. His own countrymen call him the "Eloquent Mouth," "Prophet of the Syrians," "Doctor of the World," "Pillar of the Church," "Lyre of the Holy Ghost."— Principal works: *Commentaries on Holy Scripture, Homilies, Sacred Hymns or Chants.*

The following is a list of the principal Western theologians during the same period of doctrinal development:

1°. *Hosius of Cordova in Spain (256–357).*— He was ecclesiastical adviser of Constantine, presided at the Synod of Sardica and probably also at the Council of Nicæa, and has been called the "Father of Councils." It seems to have primarily been owing to his exertions that the term *homoousios* was introduced into the Nicene Creed. What Athanasius was to the East that Hosius was to the West, and he has ever been honored as the foremost Western champion of the Catholic faith against Arianism. In his extreme old age he was prevailed upon to sign an Arian symbol of faith, but on his deathbed he declared that he had done so against his will. He labored for the faith almost exclusively by word and deeds; his writings comprise only a few letters.

2°. *St. Hilary of Poitiers (310–366).*— He is commonly called the "Athanasius of the West." In the prime of life, he, together with his wife and daughter, embraced the Catholic faith, and shortly after (355) he was consecrated bishop of Poitiers. Banished through the machinations of the Arian bishop Saturninus of Arles (355), he spent four years in Asia Minor, where he became familiar with the Greek language and Eastern theology. After his return to his diocese, he succeeded in stamping out Arianism in Gaul. He may be considered as the first really great theologian of the Latin Church.— Principal works: *De Trinitate, De Synodis, Commentaries.*

3°. *St. Ambrose of Milan (340–397).*— Whilst still a catechumen, he was by acclamation chosen bishop of Milan, to succeed the Arian Auxentius (374). He was a man of great practical ability, a staunch defender of ecclesiastical traditions, an eloquent preacher, and an able writer, though not a pro-

found theologian. In his many literary productions is noticeable the influence of Eastern writers, whose works he seems to have carefully studied.— Principal works: Besides his many exegetical writings, his *De Fide, De Spiritu Sancto, De Mysteriis, De Poenitentia,* and *De Virginibus,* deserve special mention.

4°. *St. Jerome (331 or 340–420).*— He was born of Catholic parents at Stridon in Dalmatia, but at the age of twenty he went to Rome, where he was shortly after his arrival baptized by Pope Liberius. Somewhat later he journeyed to Treves, to Aquileia, and then to the East, always in search of knowledge. Finally he became a monk, first at Chalcis and then at Bethlehem, where he was ordained priest. He was perhaps the most erudite man of his time: well versed in Latin and Greek classics, thoroughly familiar with the Hebrew language, a renowned exegete, and an able writer. As a theologian, however, he does not rank very high.— Principal works: Translation and recension of Holy Scripture, Commentaries, translations of many Greek theological works, *De Viris Illustribus, Adversus Jovinianum, Contra Vigilantium, Letters and Homilies.*

5°. *St. Augustine of Hippo in Numidia (354–430).*— Among the many great men of the fourth and fifth centuries he was *facile princeps,* and a grateful posterity has honored him with the title "Doctor Gratiæ." As a young man, and whilst still a catechumen, he fell into the heresy of the Manichæans, in which he remained for nine years. Whilst sojourning in Italy, he was converted by the prayers of his pious mother and received baptism from St. Ambrose (387). After his return to Africa he led for three years a monastic life on his little estate near Tagasta. Then, whilst on a visit to Hippo, he was ordained priest, and three years later (394) was consecrated bishop of the same city. During more than forty years he labored unceasingly to promote the interests of the faith, healing the Donatist schism, vigorously opposing the Pelagian, Semi-Pelagian, and Manichæan heresies, instructing the faithful, and training up a body of model priests. So many of his numerous writings are of paramount im-

portance that it is impossible to mention them in this place. Regarding the number of his works, he himself tells us, that, leaving aside his letters and discourses, they are "nonaginta tria in libris ducentis triginta duobus," ninety-three in two hundred and thirty-two books.

6°. Besides these great Western writers, there belong to the same period of a number of minor lights who may be mentioned in passing. Phœbadius of Agen in Aquitaine, who died after 392. He is the reputed author of a treatise *De Fide Orthodoxa contra Arianos,* and also of a *Profession of Faith.*— St. Pacian of Barcelona in Spain. Sometime between 360 and 390 he wrote three letters to the Novatian Sympronianus. The first two treat of the Catholic Church, and the third is devoted to the Catholic teaching on Penance.— Marius Victorinus, a famous rhetorician of Rome during the reign of Constantius. In his old age he was converted to Christianity, and wrote three works against the Arians, *Adversus Arium, De Generatione Divini Verbi,* and *De Homoousio Recipiendo.* From a theological point of view they are of little importance.— Optatus of Mileve in Africa. Between 370 and 385 he wrote a large work in seven books *Contra Parmenianum Donatistam.*— Nicetas of Remesiana in Dacia. He lived towards the end of the fourth century, and wrote a work for the instruction of candidates for Baptism: *Competentibus ad Baptismum Instructionis Libellos Sex.*

CHAPTER XV

THE REACTION AFTER NICÆA: ITS CAUSES: AN OUTLINE OF THE ARIAN CONTROVERSY[1]

"The victory over Arianism achieved at the Council," says Bethune-Baker, "was really a victory snatched by the superior energy and decision of a small minority with the aid of half-hearted allies."[2] This statement is a half-truth, and like most half-truths leads to inferences that are entirely devoid of truth. The condemnation of Arianism, as was shown in the preceding chapter, was practically unanimous and spontaneous. There was no half-heartedness about it on the part of the Council. But the positive formulation of the orthodox faith, conceived in the precise terms that were finally chosen, was in a measure "a victory snatched by the superior energy and decision of a small minority with the aid of half-hearted allies." And this was likely enough to cause some sort of reaction after these "half-hearted allies" found themselves free from the influence of stronger minds and the restraint of imperial authority. How very real this likelihood was, subsequent events soon showed.

A — The Reaction after Nicæa

Hardly had the Council been dissolved when the trouble began. In Egypt the Arians and Meletians caused such a disturbance that a provincial synod had to be summoned; but it led to no results. In Asia Minor Eusebius of Nicomedia and Theogonis of Nicæa openly favored Arianism. They were both sent into banishment, but the ominous mutterings of the

[1] Cfr. Hefele, History of the Councils, II, 1–86, Eng. Transl. 1st Edit. Tixeront, H. D. II, 37–48; * Bethune-Baker, An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine, 171–195; Hergenroether, op. cit. I, 356–384.

storm continued. Some time later they were recalled, through the influence of Constantia sister of Constantine. Then Arius himself, after making a profession of faith that was conceived in the vaguest terms, was allowed to return. Preparations were even made for his readmission into the Church, but his sudden death frustrated the Emperor's designs.

Meanwhile the crafty Eusebius of Nicomedia had wormed himself into the favor of Constantine and was thereby enabled to strengthen his party in its opposition to the Council. He soon had a large following, known to history as the Eusebians. They were all men whose doctrinal views were undefined and whose training had for the most part been along Subordinationist lines. Still afraid to attack the Council openly, he and his party first endeavored to undo the principal champions of orthodoxy. In 330 they succeeded in deposing Eustathius, Patriarch of Antioch, on the charge of Sabellianism. Somewhat later they attacked Marcellus of Ancyra, who had written a book *De Subjectione Domini,* in which Eusebius of Cæsarea claimed to find a defense of Adoptionism. At a synod held in Constantinople they brought about his deposition. The person, however, whom they most desired to ruin was Athanasius, who, on the death of Alexander in 328, had been elected Patriarch of Alexandria. He had been present at the Council as deacon of Alexander, and had greatly distinguished himself in showing up the sophistries of Arius. For this he had incurred the undying hatred of the Eusebians. As they could find nothing else against him, they trumped up a political charge and thereby succeeded in having him banished to Treves. Then Constantine died, being baptized on his deathbed by the principal author of all this mischief, Eusebius of Nicomedia. He was succeeded in the East by his son Constantius, a man of no fixed principles, under whom the Eusebians had a free hand.

B — Nature and Causes of the Arian Controversy

In order to understand the religious confusion that ensued shortly after the death of Constantine, as well as to form

a correct judgment of its bearing on orthodox faith, it is very necessary to keep the following facts clearly in mind.

1°. The disturbance did not affect the whole Church, but was practically confined to Christian communities within the boundaries of the Eastern Empire. In the West only a few localities were affected by the dissension, and most of these but for a short time.

2°. The conflict was not between the Church and Arianism in the strict sense of the term. Real Arians, that is, persons who denied the true divinity of Christ, constituted only a small minority and were violently attacked by all other parties.

3°. The point at issue was the Nicene definition of the Son's relation to the Father as expressed by the term *homoousios*. Hence in the minds of the parties opposed to the Council it was not the true divinity of Christ that was on trial. Excepting the small Arian contingent, that was in principle accepted and defended by all.

4°. In fact, however, the controversy was not a *lis de verbis*, a mere quibbling about words; because the terms substituted for *homoousios*, such as *homoiousios*, and *homoios*, were intended to express a certain subordination and inferiority of the Son to the Father, which must logically and objectively lead to a denial of His divinity, whatever was the view and intention of those by whom they were used. For if the Son is not equal to the Father in His Godhead, He is simply not God; although He be said to be of a like substance, or simply like the Father. God's substance or essence is absolutely simple and indivisible, and as such admits of no multiplication in individuals of the same species.

5°. At the same time, it must not be overlooked that this leaning towards Subordinationism, on the part of the adversaries of the Council, was very much accentuated owing to an imperfect and undeveloped terminology. The terms signifying substance, essence, person, were used indiscriminately now in the one sense and then in the other. Hence when the *homoousians* said that the Son was of the same *ousia* as the Father, meaning thereby that He was of the same essence or substance, the *homoiousians* or *homoians* would in many

instances take this to signify that He was the same person as the Father. For the Arianizing or Eusebian party could never boast of many trained theologians; it consisted mainly of men whose ideas were vague and whose talk was proportionately loud. What they dreaded most was the bugbear of Sabellianism, which had deprived the Word of His distinct personality: this must be beaten down at all costs.

6°. The dissension was mostly in the ranks of bishops and priests; it affected the laity very little. The dissenting clerics had, of course, a certain following among the common people, but that was owing to personal rather than to doctrinal reasons. Still it is not true, as seems to have been the personal view of Cardinal Newman,[2] that the episcopate went astray whilst the laity remained faithful. That view is altogether inaccurate. The episcopate did not go astray, although many bishops did. It must be remembered that very many of the Arianizing bishops had been raised to the episcopate for the purpose of strengthening the party. They were not bishops who seceded from the Catholic Church. Her bishops, as a body, ever remained faithful to her traditional teaching and to the Nicene Creed.

7°. The bishops and priests of the Arianizing party were, as a whole, an heterogeneous collection; gathered together in haste to meet the demands of the moment. Really learned men among them were few, and few also were the men distinguished for their Christian virtue. They were mostly court-prelates, who sought their own interests rather than that of the faith. There were, of course, exceptions, but exceptions can only confirm the rule. Eusebius of Cæsarea in Palestine was a man of wide reading, even of vast erudition, but every student of history knows that he was but a shallow theologian and forever courting the favor of the Emperor. Meletius of Lycopolis, and afterwards of Antioch, was a holy man, but although he caused endless trouble during this controversy, he was at heart always a staunch Catholic.

8°. Much of the bitterness of the controversy was owing

[2] Cfr. The Arians of the Fourth Century, c. 5, s. 1. Further discussion in Appendix, note 5.

to the personal element injected into it by the enemies of Athanasius. The friends of Arius could never forgive him the part he had played at Nicæa. Plots and counterplots were devised to disgrace him with the Emperor, and the Eusebians succeeded in having him banished five times before the controversy was ended.

9°. The temporary success of the Arianizing party was almost entirely due to the favor they enjoyed at court. Backed up by Constantius and Valens they swept everything before them; left to themselves by Julian the Apostate and Jovian the Catholic they sank into insignificance. Their strength was wholly adventitious and in no sense inherent in their cause.

10°. Lastly, therefore, the whole trouble may be laid at the door of Erastianism, although Thomas Erastus was still hidden in the womb of the future. Had the Emperors, Constantine included, confined their attention to the civil interests of the State, future history would have had little to tell about the Arian controversy. A certain reaction there would have been after the Council of Nicæa, supposing that the Council had been summoned at all, but a few years of patient endeavor on the part of the Church would have won back the dissenting party to the unity of the faith. This she effected in the case of Montanism, Novatianism, and other Isms, before Arianism ever saw the light of day.

C — An Outline of the Arian Controversy

With the foregoing facts clearly fixed in mind, it may be possible to form a more or less intelligent view of the confusion and strife that filled the years intervening between the death of Constantine, in 337, and the convening of the second General Council at Constantinople, in 381. Only the merest outline can here be given, and even this must be limited to matters that have in some way a bearing on dogma. For a full account some reliable Church History must be consulted.

The most striking feature of the controversy was the seemingly insatiable desire manifested by the Arianizing party for new symbols of faith. Of these at least a dozen different

forms were drawn up and proposed for universal acceptance, nearly all of them being devised for the twofold purpose of safeguarding the divinity of Christ and of eliminating the obnoxious terms *homoousios* and of the essence of the Father. Excepting the "Blasphemy of Sirmium," so called because in it Christ is denied to be true God, none of them was openly heretical so far as positive doctrine came in question; but they were all so vague in concept and terminology that they admitted of almost any interpretation a person might feel inclined to put upon them, and for this very reason they were under the circumstances unacceptable to all parties.

During the first few years of the conflict Rome adopted a waiting policy, persuaded that a hasty intervention would be likely to intensify the dissension. But in October, 341, Pope Julius called a council at Rome, hoping to bring about an understanding between the dissenting parties. It was a comparative failure from the very beginning. Most of the Eastern bishops pleaded that under the circumstances they could not come, and of the Western only some fifty attended. However the meeting proceeded to investigate the case of Athanasius and Marcellus, both of whom had been deposed by Eastern synods. They were found to be innocent of the charges preferred against them, and their claims to be reinstated in their respective sees were recognized. Then the Pope sent a severe reprimand to the Eusebians for having dared to depose the Patriarch of Alexandria without first notifying Rome, "as had been the custom."

The Eastern bishops received this rebuke in silence, but they gave no evidence that they were influenced by it in their actions. It was about this time that the Dedication Council was held at Antioch, where some ninety bishops had gathered for the purpose of dedicating the great basilica, called the Golden Church, begun by Constantine and completed by Constantius. These bishops were nearly all orthodox, and they issued twenty-five disciplinary canons, which were afterwards received by the Church. The first of these emphasizes the necessity of observing the decree of "the holy and great Council of Nicæa." Three symbols of the faith were also presented, all

of which set aside the *homoousios* and condemned Arianism strictly so called. It was on this occasion that the watchwords of Semi-Arianism, *homoiousios* and *homoios,* were officially introduced.

The following year another attempt was made by the Pope to settle the dispute, and this time the dissenters agreed to appear at a council where all parties should be represented. This initial success was largely owing to Constans, the Catholic Emperor of the West, who prevailed on his brother Constantius to facilitate the convening of the Council. Hence in the autumn of 342 or 343, about eighty bishops, headed by Hosius of Cordova and the two Roman priests Archidamus and Philoxenus, gathered at Sardica, the present Sofia. About half of them came from Greek and Latin Illyricum, whilst the others were from different parts of the West properly so called. Nearly an equal number came from the East, led by the Eusebians Basil of Ancyra, Acacius of Cæsarea, and Maris of Chalcedon. But when they saw that Athanasius, Marcellus, and Asclepas, all deposed by Eastern synods, were treated by the Western party as lawful incumbents of the sees from which they had been driven by violence, they refused to take part in the deliberation of the Council. Their protests, however, were not heeded by the Western bishops, and so they withdrew to Philopopolis in Thrace, where they held a council of their own. They drew up a new symbol, in which they condemned the Sabellians and all those who taught that the Father did not beget the Son by His will. This condemnation was aimed at Marcellus of Ancyra and Photinus of Sirmium, who were accused by the Eusebians of denying the personal distinction of the Son from the Father. Photinus was afterwards deposed by the Catholic party, as he was evidently heterodox in his views.

Meanwhile the Council of Sardica held its session. It restored Athanasius and Marcellus to their sees, deposed the leaders of the Eusebians, and drew up twenty canons. A new symbol seems also to have been composed, but it was never promulgated. The most important of the canons are those relating to the condemnation and deposition of bishops. Such

measures, it is enacted, cannot be taken except by the assembled bishops of the province to which the accused person belongs. Then, if he is not satisfied with the decision thus given, his judges must send the case to the Pope, who shall decide whether there is need of revision. Finally, if the Pope decides there is such need, he himself shall appoint the judges of appeal. This legislation was evidently intended to prevent the recurrence of what had happened in the case of Athanasius and Marcellus. Later on the canons in question were sometimes quoted as Nicene, either through mistake, or more probably because the Council of Sardica came soon to be looked upon as an appendix of Nicæa.

After the Council of Sardica was dissolved, the controversy went on as before. Bishops met in synod, abused their opponents, drew up new symbols to win them over to their side, and then continued the controversy. In 345 the Eusebians held a synod at Antioch and drew up the symbol known as the Macrostich, because of its interminable prolixity. In it they declared the Son to be of the hypostasis, or substance, of the Father; perfect and true God by nature, united to the Father without an interval of separation, and possessing with Him only one dignity; yet also subordinate to the Father, being begotten by Him spontaneously and voluntarily.

Matters grew considerably worse when, on the death of Constans in 350, the Arianizing Constantius became sole Emperor. Then the Antinicæans made a supreme effort to bring all the world to their way of thinking. Synods were held successively at Sirmium, Arles, Milan, Beziers, Rimini, and Seleucia, at all of which their party triumphed, though by physical coercion of the opposing bishops rather than by force of argument. At the two last named synods, that of Rimini and Seleucia, nearly all Catholic and moderate Semi-Arian bishops present were induced by fraud and force to sign a noncommittal symbol, and this was flaunted in the eyes of the world as an Arian victory. It was in reference to this that St. Jerome wrote the words so often misapplied and misinterpreted by later historians: "Ingemuit totus orbis et se esse Arianum miratus est." The world had indeed reason

to marvel, for it was no more Arian than it had ever been, all forced signatures of bishops to the contrary notwithstanding.

Whilst the Arianizing party was thus apparently making rapid progress, it at the same time began to disintegrate. About two years before the synods of Rimini and Seleucia, in 357, during a visit of Constantius to Sirmium, Ursacius of Singidunum, Valens of Mursa, Germinicius of Sirmium, and Potamius of Lisbon, drew up a symbol, or rather a theological document, which became known as the "Blasphemy." Both *homoousios* and *homoiousios* were rejected; the Son was declared inferior to the Father in honor, dignity, and majesty, and also subject to Him; thus making Him in fact a creature. This occasioned a threefold division in the party, thereby creating an extreme left, an extreme right, and a center, as distinguished from one another by their theological views.

The extreme left was under the leadership of Aetius of Antioch, Eunomius of Cizicus, and Eudoxius of Constantinople. God, they said, is essentially simple and one; unbegotten and not produced. Hence any being begotten or produced cannot be God; can be neither *homoousios,* nor *homoiousios,* nor *homoios,* but is necessarily *anomoios.* The Son, therefore, since He is produced, is physically *anomoios* or unlike the Father, although He is morally *homoios* or like Him. The Holy Ghost, like all other created beings, is a creature of the Son. The followers of this party are known in history as the Anomœans, or New Arians, who revived the Arianism of earlier days which had fallen into general disrepute.

The extreme right was led by Basil of Ancyra, who had been intruded into the see of Marcellus. It was made up of Semi-Arians and a certain number of orthodox bishops who somehow distrusted Athanasius and his formulas. Their watchword was *homoiousios,* as they held the Son to be like the Father in substance. Some of the party denied the divinity of the Holy Ghost, whilst others were more or less noncommittal on that point. Strictly speaking it was this denial of the Godhead of the Holy Spirit that earned for them the name of Semi-Arians; for they all admitted the true divinity of

the Son, although they were opposed to the definition of Nicæa.

The center, with leanings to both extremes, was captained by Acacius of Cæsarea in Palestine, who had succeeded the erudite Eusebius. It was largely an heterogeneous collection of makeshift bishops, who were actuated in their contention as much by political as by theological motives. Their motto was *homoios*. The Son, they maintained, was simply like the Father, according to Scripture, without any reference to substance or essence. In history they go under the name of Homœans or Acacians.

It was about this time, 357 or 358, that the reputed falls of Hosius of Cordova and Pope Liberius occurred. Hosius, who was then almost a hundred years old, was after protracted ill treatment and torture prevailed upon to sign the "Blasphemy of Sirium," although he could not be induced to turn against Athanasius. On his deathbed he protested that he signed against his will, and he died in full communion with the Church.

Liberius became Pope in 352. He was a very saintly man, and bore persecution with unflinching courage. Since 355 he had been living in exile at Beræa, and had been supplanted at Rome by the anti-Pope Feliz II. Wearied almost to death by the unceasing argumentations of his keeper, Bishop Demophilus, he was brought to Sirmium, where he is said to have signed a document which stated that he severed all connection with Athanasius, and to have accepted a formula of faith which omitted the *homoousios*. The formula was not heretical but vague. The historian Sozomen states that Liberius at the time openly declared that he considered as strangers to the Church all those who denied that "the Son is like the Father in substance — nay, in everything." Whatever be the truth about his supposed weakness, the fact remains that on his return to Rome he was never reproached with it, though the Romans stood solidly for the faith of Nicæa, and after his death he was universally venerated as a saint.

Finally the real cause of all this trouble, the dogmatizing Emperor Constantius, was called to his account on November

3, 361. With his death the Antinicene agitation lost its force. It had been thrust upon the world by a comparatively small number of court-prelates, whose persistent efforts were made effective by the militant support of their imperial patron. Under Julian the Apostate (361-363) and his Catholic successor Jovian (363-364), a reaction towards orthodoxy set in, which, though somewhat checked during the reign of the Arian Valens (364-367), finally triumphed under Theodosius, through whose efforts the Second General Council was convened at Constantinople in 381. The pacification had, however, already been going on with excellent results for several years past.

CHAPTER XVI

THE MACEDONIAN AND APOLLINARIAN HERESIES: THE SECOND GENERAL COUNCIL[1]

Theodosius was baptized soon after his accession to the throne, in 379, and immediately set about the work of procuring religious unity in his dominions. The pacification of the contending parties had been proceeding satisfactorily for some years past, owing largely to the prudent moderation of the Catholic bishops who exerted themselves everywhere to lead the dissenters back to the fold. Pope Damasus, Hilary of Poitiers, Eusebius of Vercelli, Athanasius of Alexandria, Basil of Cæsarea in Cappadocia, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, and Amphilochius of Iconium, were all staunch defenders of the Nicene Creed, but at the same time they had the good sense to make the conditions of reconciliation as easy as was consistent with orthodox belief. Those who were willing to accept the Symbol of Nicæa, condemn Arianism, and acknowledge the divinity of the Holy Ghost, were admitted to communion if otherwise well disposed. A series of synods, held in different countries, gave permanent and universal effect to the work of these individual bishops. As a result, the disaffected communities in Gaul and Italy, practically the whole of Asia Minor, Egypt, and Syria, were gradually won over to the orthodox faith. Only Constantinople and some of the neighboring provinces still clung to their heretical tenets.

Excellent though these results were, they did not quite satisfy Theodosius. The work, he thought, proceeded too slowly. Like most fervent neophytes, he had more zeal than discretion; and hence on February 27, 380, he issued an edict that

[1] Cfr. Hefele, History of the Councils, II, 340–374, Eng. Transl. 1st Edit. Tixeront, H. D. II, 59–66; Ibid. 94–111; Voisin, L'Apollinarisme; *Bethune-Baker, An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine, 239–254; Hergenroether, op. cit. I, 384–391.

all must profess the religion which "the Apostle Peter taught the Romans in the days of old, and which is now followed by Pope Damasus, and also by Peter of Alexandria, a man of Apostolic sanctity." However, he soon found that his peremptory edict counted for little with those who were not already disposed to return to the unity of faith. Moreover his reference to Pope Damasus and Peter of Alexandria was a decided *faux pas,* as neither of them was liked by the Orientals. His next step, therefore, was to gather together in a great council the episcopate of the Eastern Empire, prudently refraining from inviting the bishops of the West.

The way for holding the Council at Constantinople had been prepared by Gregory of Nazianzus, nominally bishop of Sasima, who had for some time past been preaching his famous sermons on the Trinity in the chapel of the Anastasis. Whether or not all the Eastern bishops received an invitation is a matter of conjecture, but only 186 appeared at the Council. Meletius of Antioch was appointed president, but he died before the work had well begun. He was succeeded by Gregory of Nazianzus, who had meanwhile been chosen bishop of Constantinople. Gregory, however, always of a vacillating disposition, soon resigned both the presidency of the Council and his episcopal see, and was in his turn succeeded by Nectarius, an imperial official and still a catechumen, who was in quick succession baptized, ordained priest, and consecrated bishop for the vacant see. Under his presidency, which however seems to have been merely an honorary one, the Council concluded its work.

This work was primarily concerned with the suppression of Arianism, but not exclusively so; for whilst the Arian controversy was going on two other heresies sprang up, one of which denied the divinity of the Holy Ghost and the other asserted that Christ as man had only a sensitive soul. During the confusion of the preceding years these vagaries had been more or less overlooked, although Athanasius and others had written against them, but now they called for an authoritative condemnation on the part of the council.

The first of these heresies was necessarily included in strict

Arianism, but shortly after the middle of the fourth century it began to be broached by the Semi-Arians as well. Athanasius refuted it thoroughly in three letters addressed to Serapion, bishop of Thmuis, in whose diocese it was then making considerable stir. About the same time it was propagated in Asia Minor by Marathonius of Nicomedia, and thence found its way to Constantinople and the neighboring provinces. Historically this heresy is commonly called Macedonianism, after Macedonius, who was then bishop of Constantinople, although he does not seem to have had any connection with it. Its defenders were termed Pneumatomachoi, because they were fighting against the Holy Spirit.

Gregory of Nazianzus, in one of his sermons preached about 380, refers to it as follows: "Some have held the Holy Spirit to be an energy, others a creature, others God. Others again have not decided which of these He is, out of reverence, as they say, for the Scriptures, because they lay down nothing precise upon the point. On this account they neither concede to Him divine veneration, nor do they refuse Him honor; thus keeping in their disposition concerning Him to some sort of middle way, which, however, is in effect a very wretched way. Of those, on the other hand, who have held Him to be God, some keep this as a pious opinion to themselves, whilst others have the courage to express their belief openly. Others I have heard in some kind of way mete out the deity, being more wise in so far as they conceive and acknowledge the three as we do, but at the same time maintain a great distinction between them, to the effect that the one is infinite both in respect of being and of power, the second in respect of power but not of being, the third circumscribed in both of these relations." [2] After this exposition of the various views concerning the Holy Spirit, he proceeds to prove His true divinity as professed by Catholics, drawing his arguments chiefly from Holy Scripture.

The second heresy, referred to above, was started about 360 by Apollinaris the Younger, bishop of Laodicea, a man

[2] Orat. 31, 5.

of high culture and undoubted theological learning. The difficulty that presented itself to him was the unity of person in Christ. If Christ has two perfect natures, the one human and the other divine, as Catholics profess to believe, how is He only one person? A union that is so perfect as to result in unity of person necessarily presupposes that at least one of the component parts is in itself capable of being physically perfected by its union with the other. Now Christ was truly God Incarnate, truly a divine person become man; for else He could not have wrought our redemption, since only a God could save the fallen race. Nor did His divine person admit of being perfected, as God is absolutely perfect and unchangeable; hence His human nature must have been lacking some perfection which was supplied by the Word. What was this perfection?

Following the teaching of Plato, Apollinaris tried to solve the problem by assuming three constitutive elements in man: the body, the soul, and the spirit. The body, of course, is the purely material element; the soul is the principle of life and sensation; the spirit is the rational part of man, the controlling and determining principle of his being. Now Christ's humanity evidently comprised the first two elements, the body and the soul; but the third, the spirit or the rational soul, might, he thought, well be supplied by the Word. And this seemed all the more necessary as otherwise the God-Man would have possessed a finite principle of intellectual and moral action, which, it appeared to him, could not be admitted without impiety; because this finite principle, this spirit or rational soul, would be a source of conflict and a predisposition to sin. Hence whilst Christ was perfect God, He was perfect man only in so far as He had a human body and a sensitive soul.[3] As God He was indeed consubstantial with the Father, but as man He was not consubstantial with us — He lacked the very element that makes man a man, the rational soul.

This is the sum and substance of the teaching of Apollinaris, as gathered from the fragments of his works and from the

[3] Cfr. Greg. Naz. Epp. 101, 102; Athan. Adv. Apoll.; Epiphan. Adv. Haer. 77. Greg. Nys. Antirrhet, adv. Apoll.;

writings of his adversaries. It was obviously destructive of the true humanity of Christ, and as soon as it became known it was vigorously attacked and unhesitatingly condemned by individual bishops and by synods. At first, indeed, many refused to believe that Apollinaris really held these erroneous views, because he was a staunch defender of the Nicene Creed and in every way an excellent man; but when Vitalis, one of his disciples, came to Rome, in 375, to clear himself of the charge of heresy, and then refused to acknowledge that the Son of God assumed in the Incarnation a complete human nature, "corpus, animam, sensum, id est, integrum Adam, et, ut expressius dicam, totum veterem nostrum sine peccato hominem," as Pope Damasus worded it, a definite condemnation was pronounced, and when informed of this Apollinaris broke with the Church.

These three heresies, therefore, Arianism in its various forms, Macedonianism, and Apollinarianism, although all of them had already been condemned, came before the Council that was gathered at Constantinople. Most of the discussions, however, seem to have been occupied with Macedonianism, which was strongly defended by some sixty bishops infected with the heresy. No agreement was reached, and so the council finally proceeded to pronounce condemnation.

All we have left of the work of this Council is gathered up in four canons. The first of these proclaims once more the faith of Nicæa and anathematizes all heresy, mentioning by name the Eunomians, the Arians or Eudoxians, the Semi-Arians or Pneumatomachoi, the Sabellians, Marcellians, Photinians, and Apollinarians. The second forbids prelates to meddle with the affairs of other civil "dioceses" than their own. The third gives to the Bishop of Constantinople the preëminence of honor after the Bishop of Rome, "because Constantinople is a New Rome." The fourth decided the case of Maximus the Cynic, who had been unlawfully consecrated bishop of Constantinople; all his ordinations were declared null and void.[4]

[4] Mansi, 3, 557.

The Council did not draw up a new symbol of the faith. It seems, however, that the assembled bishops adopted, with a few modifications, the baptismal creed of the church of Jerusalem, which Epiphanius had published some years before in his *Ancoratus*. It begins with the Symbol of Nicæa, to the third article of which, "And in the Holy Ghost," are added the following words: "Lord and Giver of life; who proceeds from the Father, is adored and glorified with the Father and the Son, who spoke through the prophets." Thus it served as a definition against the Pneumatomachoi, who denied the divinity of the Holy Spirit. This Creed was recited at the Council of Chalcedon, 451, and a little later was received into the liturgy. It is known as the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed.[5]

As Theodosius vigorously enforced the decisions of the Council, the various forms of heresy practically disappeared from the territory subject to his rule. But meanwhile Arianism had begun to infect the numerous Teuton tribes that were hovering about the Northern boundaries of the Empire, preparing to overrun the whole civilized West. It was not until two and three centuries later that they were won over to orthodox Christianity. However, among them it assumed from the first a political rather than a doctrinal aspect. The Macedonians disappeared with the Arians, but the followers of Apollinaris maintained scattered communities in the Empire till the fifth century, when some of them were won back to the faith whilst the rest joined the Eutychian or Monophysite sects.

Thus from 325 to 381, three dogmas of the faith were thoroughly discussed, solemnly defined, and universally accepted by those who claimed communion with the Church — the true divinity of the Son, the true divinity of the Holy Ghost, and the perfect humanity of Christ. In these dogmas others are implicitly contained and at least indirectly defined, as the oneness of God, the personal distinction of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and the doctrine of one person

[5] Ibid. 3, 565; cfr. Funk, Manual of Church History, I. 143.

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and two natures in the God-Man. As was pointed out in the preceding chapters, all these truths were taught by the Church long before the first General Council was convened at Nicæa; hence nothing new was added to the faith, but the same old faith was thus presented in a fuller and clearer light.

In regard to this last point St. Athanasius makes a very pertinent remark, when writing about the Council of Nicæa. "When the Fathers came to the paschal question," he states, "they said, 'It is decreed'; but when they declared the faith, they did not say, 'It is decreed'; they said, 'Thus believeth the Catholic Church,' and immediately they confessed what they believed, thus indicating that they did not set forth a new doctrine, but that which had been received from the Apostles." [6]

[6] Epist. De Syn. 5.

CHAPTER XVII

THE ESSENCE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD: THE BLESSED TRINITY

From the middle of the fourth century on, theological literature becomes so voluminous that it is impossible to attempt anything like an analysis of the works of the different authors, as was done in the chapters dealing with Antenicene theology. Hence it seems advisable to take up the various points of doctrine as they are usually treated in modern theological text-books, indicating briefly what was held concerning them in successive centuries until their full development was reached. It will not, however, be possible to observe always the same order of sequence, since development of doctrine depends to a considerable extent on the rise of heresies. Still as far as convenient this general plan will be followed, as it appears best adapted to bring out the connection between the different points that come up for consideration.

A — The Essence and Attributes of God

The Trinitarian discussions of the fourth century necessarily involved many concepts that called for definite doctrinal statements concerning the essence and attributes of the divinity. In fact, it was his false concept of God's essence that led Arius into his Trinitarian errors. He conceived the eternal, simple, immutable God as essentially unbegotten, so that all communication of God's substance by way of generation must imply a contradiction in terms. Thus the very essence of God demands that all His productive actions be *ad extra,* terminating in beings whose essence is only analogous to His own. He can create, but not generate. Towards the end of the Arian controversy this erroneous view was so much accentuated that Catholic writers found it neces-

sary to compose formal treatises by way of refutation. It is chiefly in these that the Catholic doctrine on the subject in question is fully explained.

The Arian leader against whom these treatises were principally directed was Eunomius of Cyzicus in Mysia, more famed for his sophistical dialectics than for his knowledge of theology. He looked upon Christ as a pure creature, who, so far from being identical with God, as Catholics held, or like God, as the Semi-Arians taught, must be considered as altogether unlike God, or *anomoios*. Hence his followers were usually called Anomœans. To this conclusion he reasoned from the fundamental proposition that God is absolutely simple. For even Catholics admitted the simplicity of God, and moreover held that the Father at least was unbegotten. Hence *agennesia,* or being unbegotten, must in some way be a divine attribute. Now in a God who is absolutely simple there can be no distinction between attributes and essence, and therefore *agennesia,* is the very essence of God. Consequently, since the Word is said to be begotten, that can only mean by way of creation: and therefore He is a pure creature.

From this same fundamental proposition of God's absolute simplicity he reasoned to other astounding conclusions. Thus a God who is absolutely simple cannot be a God of mystery; hence there is nothing in God that is not perfectly known and comprehended by the human intellect. "God," he was fond of saying, "knows no more about His own substance than we do; nor is this more known to Him or less to us: but whatever we know about the divine substance, that precisely is known to God. On the other hand, whatever He knows, the same also you will find without any difference in us."[1] Thus God is practically reduced to a mere abstraction, whose inmost nature lies unshrouded before the casual glance of the human mind. Not only shall we see God face to face in the world to come, but we do so already in this world.

Against these and similar vagaries Basil the Great and

[1] Socrates, Hist. Eccle. 47.

Gregory of Nyssa wrote their treatises entitled *Contra Eunomium,* in course of which they also explain somewhat in detail the traditional teaching of the Church on the essence and attributes of God. Their fundamental position is that God's essence is being itself — not being in the abstract, but in its very fullness; nor being in the passive sense, but as the source and fountainhead of all activity. "One sign of true divinity," writes Gregory, "is shown us by the word of Holy Scripture, which Moses learned by revelation when he heard the heavenly voice saying: 'I am who am.' That, therefore, alone, we think, ought to be considered truly divine, whose existence is known to be eternal and infinite; and whatever is perceived in this being is always the same, without increment and without diminution." [2] This idea was more fully developed by Gregory of Nazianzus, in a sermon which he delivered a few years later.

"God," he says, "always was, and is, and will be; or rather He always is. For *was* and *will be* are but portions of our passing time and changing nature; but He always *is,* and by this name He called Himself when He spoke to Moses on the mountain. He comprises in Himself all being, which has neither beginning nor end, and in essence is like a vast and boundless ocean, surpassing all thought of time and nature. The mind alone can in some very slight and very obscure way know Him, not directly from the attributes of His being, but from the things that are outside Him, just as from an image one can derive some little knowledge of the original — a knowledge which escapes one before it is firmly grasped. . . . God therefore is immense, and difficult to contemplate; the fact of His immensity alone is clearly perceived." [3]

Basil puts the matter in practically the same light. "The operations of God are various and many, but His essence is simple." However, "when we say that God's essence is simple, that does not prevent us from ascribing to Him many different attributes, as creative power, goodness, justice, providence, fore-knowledge, all so many qualities which deter-

[2] Cont. Eunom. 8. [3] Orat. 43, 3.

mine in some way the one essence of God."[4] Hence, although we cannot comprehend God's essence in itself, just because it is simple and at the same time the very fullness of being, we know His attributes sufficiently well to render Him reasonable service. For "His majesty is known to us, and His power, and His wisdom, and His goodness, and His providence by which He has care of us, and the justice of His judgments; but not His very essence."[5]

In direct answer to Eunomius, Gregory of Nyssa points out that although the Godhead as such is simple and unbegotten, from this it does not follow that the two properties are altogether identical. Simplicity is one thing and not being begotten is another. The Son is also simple, without parts, without quantity, without composition; yet He is begotten, the Only-Begotten of the Father. He is an individual, a person, who possesses the Godhead, although derived from another. Of course, if one arbitrarily assumes that the essence of God, as a divine person, consists in the fact of not being begotten, it is self-evident that the Son cannot be God; but this is begging the question. Not begotten and begotten, as affirmed of the Father and the Son respectively, are personal distinctions in the Godhead; they do not indicate any difference of essence in the persons of whom they are affirmed.[6]

As regards the relation of the attributes to one another and to the divine essence, these writers hold that some distinction must be admitted between them; yet this distinction is not altogether objective and real: it is founded upon the limitations of the human intellect and the infinite perfection of God. It is *κατ' ἐπίνοιαν*, a mental distinction, to which there is something corresponding in the object, but not in the same way as it is conceived by the mind.[7] The mind reasons from effect to causes; it infers from God's operations in the visible world that He is all-powerful, wise, beneficent, and just; and these attributes are really in God, but not as forming distinct realities, although they appear so to the contemplating mind.

[4] Ep. 234, 1; 235.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Cont. Eunom. 12.
[7] Greg. Nys. Cont. Eunom. 12; Basil, Cont. Eunom. 7.

The same position as regards God's essence had already been taken by Athanasius before the controversy on this particular point reached an acute stage. Thus he writes in connection with the decision of the Nicene Council: "When we hear the expressions, 'I am who am' and 'In the beginning God made heaven and earth,' and 'Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one Lord,' and 'Thus saith the Lord,' we understand nothing else than the simple, blessed, incomprehensible substance of Him who is; for although we cannot comprehend what precisely He is, nevertheless when we hear the words, Father, God, Omnipotent, we conceive that the reality thus indicated is the substance of Him who is." [8]

Western writers, not directly connected with this controversy, took practically the same view. Thus Hilary of Poitiers, commenting on the words of Exodus, "I am who am," writes: "I am struck with admiration when I consider the absolute significance of these words in reference to God. They bring out the incomprehensibility of the divine nature, and yet in a way adapted to human understanding. Nothing is more proper to God than being itself, which has neither beginning nor end, but is possessed in permanent enjoyment of incorruptible beatitude." [9]

Similarly St. Ambrose: "God, knowing what was in the mind of Moses when he asked, 'What is Thy name?' did not mention His name in replying to the question, but indicated that for which the name stands, 'I am who am': for nothing is more proper to God than always to be." [10] The same was evidently taught in far away Edessa, for Ephrem writes: "God manifested His name to Moses when He said, 'I am,' because this name signifies His essence." [11]

This matter is treated much more thoroughly by St. Augustine, who, as was his wont in regard to questions that had at any time come up for discussion, considered it in all its different aspects. Here, however, we can do no more than simply indicate his line of thought. Deeply conscious that reason must precede faith, he in various places brings out

[8] Ep. De Syn. 35.
[9] De Trin. 1, 5.
[10] Enar. in 12 Ps. Dav. 43, 19.
[11] Serm. Adv. Haeres. 53.

the different arguments that may be used to prove the existence of a personal God, who demands our worship here on earth and promises us eternal blessedness in heaven. The wonderful order of the world points to a wise Providence that directs every being to its appointed end;[12] the varied activities of existing and ever changing natures demand an eternal source of energy which can be none other than God Himself;[13] the ascending scale of finite perfections necessarily implies the existence of an infinitely perfect God who is the source and crown of them all;[14] the eternal ideas and principles which illumine the human mind are in some way a reflection of God's unchangeable truth.[15] To the intelligence this God is the highest truth, to the heart He is the supreme good. Without Him the intellect can have no certain knowledge, without Him the heart can find no lasting rest.[16]

He, too, looks upon being itself as the essence of God. "Putting aside," he says, "every other denomination by which He might be designated, God answered Moses that He was being itself, so that in comparison with Him other beings are as if they were not. Not compared to Him they are indeed, for they are from Him; but in comparison with Him they are not, because He alone is the one true and unchangeable being." [17]

This essence, however, has its definite attributes; for God is all-powerful, all-wise, immense, eternal, and perfect in every way. But all these attributes, in so far as they are realities, are identical with His essence. Hence he writes: "Whatever is mentioned as being in God, is God Himself. For power is not one thing in God and prudence another; nor fortitude, nor justice, nor chastity. Whichever of these attributes you predicate of God, they are neither understood nor rightly said to be really distinct; for this distinction is a matter of the mind illumined by the light which these qualities shed upon it." [18]

[12] Serm. 141, 2.
[13] Confess. 10, 8–10.
[14] De Trin. 8, 5, 4.
[15] Ibid. 8, 5; De Lib. Arbitr. 7–14.
[16] De Civ. Dei, 8, 10, 2.
[17] Enar. in Ps. 134, 4.
[18] De Trin. 6, 4, 6; 6, 7, 8.

Besides the testimony of Holy Scripture, the created world itself proclaims these attributes of God. For by His eternal and unchangeable will He called all beings into existence; they are all the outpouring of His goodness; they were all made according to a preconceived plan, and He preserves them all.[19]

In this condition the Church's teaching on God and His attributes practically remained until the end of the Patristic age, except that the Pseudo-Areapagite towards the middle of the fifth century added some further details. Besides other works, he wrote a treatise on the *Divine Names,* in which He shows that no name taken from creatures can befittingly be applied to God. The attributes of goodness, mercy, power, wisdom, or any other that we perceive in the world around us, are not formally found in the Divinity. God is above all names and all attributes as we understand them. In this sense He is ανώνυμος, without a name.[20] Yet as He is the author of all that is positive and good in nature, He must in a certain sense contain all the perfections of His creatures; they are but the multiplied expressions of His absolute unity, and in so far He is also πολυώνυμος, designated by many names.[21]

Analyzing our knowledge of God, he distinguishes three acts as concurring in its genesis. First we affirm of God all perfections of which He is the origin. Next we perceive that He is above and beyond them all, and thereby we deny Him these same perfections. Yet this denial does not destroy our first affirmation; for it simply comes to this that we recognize God to be above all perfections as they are in creatures, and thereby we conclude that He possesses them all in a more eminent degree. This is true knowledge of God, or true theology.[22]

B — The Blessed Trinity

The teaching of the Church on the Blessed Trinity received

[19] De Gen. ad Lit. 4, 26; 4, 22; Confess. 13, 2–5.
[20] De Div. Nom. I, 1, 5, 6; De Myst. Theol. 5.
[21] De Div. Nom. I, 6; II, 3, 11.
[22] De Myst. Theol. I, 2.

its first real development in the East, for it was chiefly there that the Arian heresy called for a clear exposition of the doctrine. The men principally concerned in it were Anthanasius of Alexandria, Basil the Great, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, Didymus the Blind, and Amphilochius of Iconium. They not only defended the divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit, but made also some attempt to explain the relation that exists between the three divine persons, and thus brought the mystery itself into the foreground of theological discussion. The West, though represented at the time by a number of eminent men, contributed little to the elucidation of the mystery. Hilary of Poitiers, Phoebadius of Agen, Ambrose of Milan, Zeno of Verona, Nicetas of Remesiana in Dacia, and the learned Jerome, were all staunch defenders of the Trinity, but they rarely stopped to theorize or to offer much by way of explanation. Excepting Marius Victorinus, whose Neoplatonic philosophy makes him a very unsafe guide in matters theological, the theoretical side of the question was not touched in the West until Augustine undertook to perfect what had been so well begun by the fourth-century writers of the East. He brought Trinitarian teaching to a point where it remained till the end of the Patristic age.

The first of the Eastern theologians to write copiously on this subject was St. Athanasius, the "Standard Bearer of Orthodoxy." He, however, confined himself mostly to traditional lines of exposition and defense. His fundamental proposition in reference to the true divinity of the Son comes to this: According to Holy Scripture Christ deifies us; therefore He must be God of His very essence. For were He God by participation only, He could not unite us to the Divinity, He could not redeem us; because He Himself would then need to be united to the Godhead. Therefore Christ is true God.[23]

Now God is certainly a unity, He is one; but in this unity, in this one God, there in a trinity.[24] For first of all, the very

[23] De Syn. 5; cfr. Cont. Arian. 1, 16, 39.

[24] Ibid. 1, 18.

name Father supposes the existence of a Son.[25] But as God is without parts, He is necessarily Father of the Son without partition or passion.[26] Hence the generation of the Son does not mean the act of being made, but signifies participation in the entire substance of the Father.[27] The Son is coeternal with the Father, and shares the undivided plenitude of the divinity.[28] They are two, the Father and the Son, but their nature is one, and this oneness is indivisible and inseparable.[29] The Father wills and loves the Son just as necessarily as He wills and loves Himself, and therefore He begets the Son both necessarily and voluntarily.[30] The Father begot the Son by His will, but by His necessary will.

Then there is the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of God, who shares the same divinity and the same power.[31] He sanctifies and deifies us through His indwelling in our hearts, makes us partakers of the divine nature; therefore He, too, must be God by His very essence.[32] The Holy Spirit is inseparable from the substance of the Father and the Son;[33] hence there is but one divinity, one God in three divine persons. "Thus there is a holy and perfect Trinity, which is acknowledged in the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost; . . . having the same and undivided nature, one energy and one operation. For the Father effects everything through the Word in the Holy Spirit, and in this manner the unity of the Holy Trinity is preserved."[34]

As regards the relation of the three divine persons to one another, this is to be held: "The same relation which we know to exist between the Son and the Father, we also find to exist between the Holy Spirit and the Son. For as the Son says: 'Whatsoever the Father has is mine also,' so do we perceive all this to be in the Spirit through the Son. . . . Hence if the Son, on account of His relation to the Father and because He is the proper offspring of the Father's sub-

[25] De Decret. Nic. 30.
[26] Ibid. 11.
[27] Cont. Arian. 1, 16.
[28] Ibid. 1, 14.
[29] Cont. Arian. 4, 1.
[30] Ibid. 1, 16; 62, 66.
[31] De Incarn. 9; Tom. ad Antioch 5.
[32] Ad Serap. 1, 24.
[33] Tom. ad Antioch. 5.
[34] Ad Serap. 1, 28.

stance, is not a creature but consubstantial with the Father, so neither is the Holy Spirit a creature; to say that He is would indeed be impious, because of His relation to the Son, who imparts Him to all, and whatever He has is the Son's own." [35]

St. Basil, besides emphasizing the traditional teaching of the Church, contributed much towards the clarification of ideas and the development of a fixed terminology. Against the Arians he maintained the unity of God, and against the Sabellians the trinity of persons in the Godhead. He condensed His teaching into the short expression: "*Μία οὐσία, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις*," one essence, three persons. "In God," he says, "there is at once a certain ineffable and incomprehensible community and distinction: the distinction of persons does not exclude the unity of nature, nor does the unity of nature destroy the proper and characteristic marks of distinction." [36]

He tried to define still further the term *ὑπόστασις*, which since 362 had gradually come to be distinguished from *οὐσία*, to signify person in opposition to nature. In this, however, he was not wholly successful, if judged by modern standards of theological precision. "*Οὐσία*," he says, "has the same relation to *ὑπόστασις* as the common has to the particular. Every one of us shares in existence by the common term *οὐσία*, and by his own properties he is such and such a one. In the same manner, in the matter in question, the term *οὐσία* is common, . . . while the *ὑπόστασις* is contemplated in the special property of fatherhood, sonship, or the power to sanctify." [37] "*Οὐσία* in God is the intimate nature or being, in opposition to His attributes (*φύσις*), and His personal modes (*ὑποστάσεις*)." [38] As it stands, this explanation would imply a specific rather than numerical identity of nature in the three divine persons; but this, as is evident from his insistence on the oneness and absolute unity of God, was not intended by the author.

The Holy Ghost, although the third in the order of enumeration, has the same essence as the Father and the Son: He

[35] Ibid. 3, 1.
[36] Ep. 38, 4.
[37] Ep. 236, 6.
[38] Cont. Eunon. 1, 10.

must be conceived with them, and not below them; He must be honored with them, and not as inferior to them; He is *homoousios* with the Father and the Son.[39] He is "from the Father through the Only-Begotten,"[40] and "the Son bears the same relation to the Father as the Holy Ghost bears to the Son."[41] "Yet he comes from God not by generation as the Son, but as the Spirit of His mouth. He is also called the Spirit of Christ, as being in respect of nature made His own."[42]

Gregory of Nazianzus devoted long years to the defense and exposition of orthodox Trinitarian teaching, which he sums up as follows: "I give thee this profession of faith as a lifelong guide and protector: One sole divinity and one power, which exists in three together and includes in itself the three distinct, not differing in substance or nature, neither increased by addition nor lessened by subtraction, in every way equal, absolutely one, even as the single and undivided beauty and grandeur of the firmament, an infinite unity of three infinite persons, each being God as considered apart, God the Father and God the Son and God the Holy Ghost, each being distinct by His personal properties; all three together being God: that on account of identity of nature, this on account of one sovereignty."[43]

The same view is taken by Gregory of Nyssa, except that he calls particular attention to the term "Godhead," which, he says, is significant of operation rather than of nature. In connection with this, he develops some remarkably clear ideas on the activity and immanent relations of the three divine persons. "Every activity," he says, "that proceeds from God in reference to creatures, and is designated according to their various kinds, takes its origin from the Father, proceeds through the Son, and is perfected in the Holy Spirit. Hence we cannot speak of several activities, although we predicate plurality of the persons. The activity of each is not divided or separate; but whatsoever is done, be it in the matter

[39] Cont. Eunom. 5; cfr. 1–3.
[40] De Spir. Sanct. 47.
[41] Ibid. 43.
[42] Ibid. 46.
[43] Orat. 40, 41.

of God's providential love for us or His government and direction of the world, is done by the three, nor are the things done threefold." [44] This might have been written by St. Thomas.

Then in reference to the immanent relation of the three divine persons: "Should anyone object against our teaching that by the denial of any difference in nature we confuse and commingle the *hypostases* we reply that, while firmly adhering to the identity of nature, we do not deny the distinction between the principle and what proceeds from it. We find this distinction between them: We believe that one is the principle and that the other is from the principle, and in what is from the principle we find another distinction. For one is from the first immediately, the other only mediately and through that which is immediately from the first, so that the characteristic note of Only-Begotten belongs undoubtedly to the Son. On the other hand it is certain that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, for while the intermediate position of the Son entitles Him to the distinction of Only-Begotten, His natural relation to the Father does not exclude the Holy Spirit." [45]

The divinity of the Holy Ghost he defended specially against the Macedonians. In the course of his argumentation he says: "We confess that the Holy Spirit is coördinate with the Father and the Son, in the sense that between them there is absolutely no difference as regards all things that can be thought and said in a Godfearing way concerning the divine nature, except that the Holy Spirit is a distinct *hypostasis,* because He is from God and of Christ, in such wise that he does not share with the Father in the property of not proceeding, nor with the Son in the property of being the Only-Begotten." [46]

Didymus the Blind treated this matter at length in his three books *De Trinitate,* and in a separate work, *De Spiritu Sancto.* He gives a clear and solid exposition of orthodox teaching on the points in question. Like St. Basil, he sums

[44] Quod non sunt tres Dii, 4, 125.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Adv. Maced. 2.

up his Trinitarian views in the proposition, "*Μία οὐσία, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις,*" one essence, three persons. The Son is *homoousios* with the Father and the Holy Ghost is *homoousios* with the Father and the Son; distinct from one another as persons, they are identical in the essence of the Godhead. "As it is impossible that the Father should not be truly Father from all eternity, so it is impossible that the Son and the Holy Spirit should not be from all eternity and by nature from His very essence; for as soon as the Father was, if one may so speak, immediately the one was born and the other proceeded." [47] Hence anything like a temporal generation or procession is necessarily excluded.

Again: "The Son is said to receive from the Father, whereby He Himself subsists. For neither is the Son aught else but what is given Him by the Father, nor the Holy Ghost but what is given Him by the Son. These things (de meo accipit, etc.) are said in order that we may believe that the nature of the Holy Spirit is the same as that of the Father and the Son." [48] The Holy Ghost, therefore, proceeds immediately from the Son, but ultimately also from the Father.

Amphilochius of Iconium was intimately associated with the three great Cappadocians in the work of pacification, and wrote an excellent Synodal Letter on the *True Divinity of the Holy Spirit.* In the fragment of it that has been preserved he gives a somewhat detailed exposition of the *modus essendi* as proper to each of the three divine persons. "Father, Son, and Holy Ghost," he states, "signify personal relations, and not the nature of the Godhead. The name God designates the *to esse* of the three, whereas the names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, signify the *to esse tale* of each." [49] In this he somewhat perfected the teaching of Basil and Gregory of Nyssa, who had used the same expression in reference to the Son and the Holy Spirit, but without applying it to the Father.

The same subject was also touched upon by Epiphanius of Salamis in his *Panarium Adversus Haereses,* although he does little more than state the traditional teaching of the Church.

[47] De Spir. Sanct. 1, 15.
[48] Ibid. 3, 12; 6, 37.
[49] Ad Seleuc. fragm. P. G. 39, 112.

"They (the Antiochians)," he says, "confess that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are consubstantial, three persons, one nature, one Godhead: and this, indeed, is the true faith, delivered to us by our forefathers — the Apostolic faith, announced by the Prophets and the Evangelists, which those fathers and bishops also professed who were gathered together in the Council of Nicæa, held under the great and most blessed Emperor Constantine." [50]

However he adds also something of his own. Replying to the contention of some Arians that in the Catholic view the Holy Spirit must be considered as the brother of the Son or the nephew of the Father, he says: "The Spirit was always with the Father and the Son; not the brother of the Father, not born of Him, not created, not the brother of the Son, nor the nephew of the Father, but proceeding from the Father and receiving from the Son; not foreign to the Father and the Son, but of the same substance and of the same divinity; from the Father and the Son, with the Father and the Son, subsisting always as the Holy Spirit, the Divine Spirit, the Spirit of glory, the Spirit of Christ, the Spirit of the Father. For it is the Spirit of the Father that 'speaketh in you and my Spirit is in the midst of you.' The third in the order of enumeration, He is equal to the others in divinity; not of a different nature from the Father and the Son, but the bond of the Trinity, the seal of confession." [51]

From the foregoing citations it appears quite evident that all these writers hold the absolute and numerical identity of the divine nature as possessed by the three divine persons; and hence Harnack's contention that the Cappadocians were *homoiousians* rather than *homoousians* is without foundation in fact. They all agreed with the teaching of St. Basil, who stated his views on this point very clearly when he wrote: "In accordance with the true doctrine, we speak of the Son as neither like nor unlike the Father; for each of these terms is equally repugnant. Like and unlike are predicated of beings in reference to their accidental determinations, and from

[50] Adv. Haer. 73, 34. [51] Ibid. 62, 4.

such God is free. We, on the contrary, confessing the identity of the nature, accept the *homoousios* and avoid adding to the Father, who is God in substance, the Son, who is also God in substance; for this is what is meant by the *homoousios*." [52]

Hence when they sometimes, by way of illustration, say that God is one as man or mankind is one, notwithstanding the distinction that exists between individuals, it must be borne in mind that in this connection they take man or mankind in the abstract, and not as existing in the concrete order of things. And in the abstract, as a mere concept, mankind is not only specifically but numerically one. Thus the illustration is philosophically faulty, based as it is upon a confusion of the abstract and the concrete, but the theological doctrine which it is intended to illustrate is perfectly orthodox.

With the Trinitarian teaching of these Eastern theologians, as outlined in the preceding paragraphs, their contemporaries of the West were in perfect accord. It must be noted, however, that they look at the matter from a different view-point. Whilst the Eastern writers usually reason from the distinction of persons in the Godhead to the unity of the divine nature, those of the West almost invariably fix their attention primarily upon the unity of the divine nature and then proceed to establish the distinction of persons. The doctrine in each case is the same, but the method of procedure is different. Harnack indeed contends that the Western theologians, and especially Augustine, differed also in doctrine from their Eastern contemporaries,[53] but as already pointed out above, he simply misinterprets the Trinitarian teaching of the East. The groundlessness of his contention will, moreover, appear with sufficient clearness from the following summary of Western theological thought, as gathered from the works of the principal writers belonging to the period now under consideration.

Hilary of Poitiers, commenting on the baptismal formula, writes: "He commanded to baptize in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, that is, in the

[52] Ep. 8, 3.

[53] Dogmengeschichte, II, 304 sqq.

confession of the Author and of the Only-Begotten and of the Gift. There is one Author of all things. For one is God the Father, from whom are all things; one is the Only-Begotten, our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things; and one is the Holy Spirit, the Gift in all things." [54] What kind of unity he has in mind when he says that God is one, he sets forth more clearly in another place: "God is one, not in person but in nature." "Not one subsisting, but one substance without differentiation." [55] "God the Father and God the Son are absolutely one, not by a union of person, but by the unity of substance." [56] Nor is the Son in any way inferior to the Father: "The plenitude of the divinity is perfect in both. For the Son is not a diminution of the Father, nor is the Son less perfect than the Father." [57] And what is said of the Son in this respect, must also be said of the Holy Spirit; for the "names, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, refer to one and the same nature." [58]

Ambrose of Milan speaks in the same strain: "There is," he says, "a certain indistinct substance of the distinct, incomprehensible, and ineffable Trinity. For we have been taught that there is a distinction between the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, not a confusion of the same; a distinction, not a separation; a distinction, not a plurality." [59] Both the distinction and the unity have their reason in the origin of the second and third persons. "For the Father is not the same as the Son, but between the Father and the Son is the distinction that arises from the generation, so that the Son is God of God." "The plenitude of the divinity is in the Father, and the plenitude of the divinity is in the Son; not a different, but the same divinity." [60] The same is also true of the Holy Spirit; for "He received from the Son *per unitatem substantiæ,* even as the Son received from the Father." [61] And "who would dare to say that the Holy

[54] De Trinit, 2, 1.
[55] De Syn. 69, 64; De Trinit. I, 16.
[56] Ibid. 4, 42, 40.
[57] Ibid. 3, 23.
[58] Ibid. 2, 5.
[59] De Fide, 4, 8, 91.
[60] Ibid. 1, 2, 17.
[61] De Spirit, Sanct. 2, 118.

Spirit is different in nature from the Father and from Christ?" [62]

Phœbadius of Agen proposes the same doctrine in equally clear terms. After maintaining against the Arians that the Son is true God, he goes on to say: "If anyone is scandalized at this, let him understand that the Spirit is also God. As the Son is the second person in the Godhead, so is the Holy Spirit the third person. However all three are one God; the three are one. This we believe and this we hold, because this we have been taught by the Prophets, the Evangelists, and by the Apostles of old." [63]

Zeno of Verona, Nicetas of Remesiana, and Jerome adhered closely to the Trinitarian formula worked out by Tertullian: "Una substantia, tres personæ"; "tres personas unius substantiæ et unius divinitatis confitentes." [64] Adjectively this formula is expressed by *consubstantialis,* which has for its Greek equivalent the term *homoousios,* though the latter is more expressive of the identity of nature. The formula is a summary statement of Western theology in reference to the true divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit.

This traditional teaching we find reproduced in the works of Augustine, who in 387 had been converted and instructed in the faith by the conservative Ambrose of Milan. However as it appears in his writings, it is considerably developed, and set forth with much attention to details. Profiting by the labors of his predecessors and gifted with singular clearness of vision as well as depth of penetration, Augustine brought the Church's Trinitarian teaching to a point of perfection that precluded further development for centuries to come. Only a mere outline of his teaching can here be given, but it will be sufficient to show the fruitfulness of his labors.

In the first chapter of his book *De Trinitate,* he indicates the aim of his work as follows: "Wherefore, our Lord God helping, we will undertake to render, as far as we are able, that very account which they so importunately demand, namely, that the Trinity is the one and only true God, and also how

[62] Ibid. 1, 6, 80.
[63] Cont. Arian. 22.
[64] De Pudic. 21; Adv. Prax. 19.

the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are rightly said, believed, and understood, to be one and the same substance or essence." [65]

He will, however, attempt nothing novel; but only propose what has been the teaching of the Church at all times. For a little further on he states: "All those Catholic expounders of the divine Scriptures, both Old and New, who have written before me concerning the Trinity, and whom I have been able to read, have purposed to teach, according to the Scriptures, this doctrine, that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit intimate a divine unity of one and the same substance in an indivisible equality, and that therefore they are not three Gods, but one God: although the Father hath begotten the Son, and so He who is the Father is not the Son; and the Son is begotten by the Father, and so He who is the Son is not the Father; and the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son, but only the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, Himself also coequal with the Father and the Son, and pertaining to the unity of the Trinity. . . . The Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as they are indivisible, so they work indivisibly. This is also my faith, since it is the Catholic faith." [66]

As appears quite obvious from these introductory remarks, what stood primarily before the author's mind was the unity of the divine nature rather than the trinity of persons. "The Trinity is the one and only true God": one sole divine nature subsisting in three persons; whereas the Greek formula ran: "Three persons having one and the same divine nature." The two formulas propose the same doctrine, but that of Augustine brings out much more clearly the absolute equality of the persons. The subsisting nature is God, and that nature subsists in the Father and in the Son and in the Holy Ghost. Hence the three persons "intimate a divine unity of one and the same substance in an indivisible equality." And this equality is so absolute, that not only is the Father not greater than the Son, nor the Father and the Son greater than the

[65] Op. cit. I, 4. [66] Ibid.

Holy Spirit, but neither is any single one of the three less than the whole Trinity.[67] "All that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit together are, that also is the Father alone, or the Son alone, or the Holy Spirit alone."[68] The reason for this is the indivisible unity of the divine nature. Hence the author lays down the rule that all absolute perfections of the Godhead must be predicated in the singular: "Unus Deus, bonus, omnipotens ipsa Trinitas, et quidquid aliud non invicem relative, sed ad se singuli dicuntur; hoc enim secundum essentiam dicuntur."[69]

Yet this indivisible unity of the divine nature does not interfere with the distinction of persons. "For, indeed, since Father is not Son, and Son is not Father, and the Holy Spirit, who is also called the Gift of God, is neither the Father nor the Son, they are certainly three. And so it is said in the plural, 'I and the Father are one'; for He did not say, 'is one,' as the Sabellians say, but 'are one.' Yet if it be asked what the three are, human speech has not the terms to set forth the true answer. Still we say three 'persons,' not that we wish to say it, but that we may not be altogether silent."[70]

Here, then, is the mystery. We are certain of the fact that there is one divine essence, definite and individual, numerically identical in the three who possess it; moreover it does not form a fourth term added to the three persons,[71] but is objectively and really identical with them, being the very Godhead which is Father and Son and Holy Spirit: how this can be, the human mind is unable to fathom. And there is another mystery about the three in so far as they are persons. In what does their personality consist? All we can say is that they are *relationes subsistentes,* subsisting relations; not identical with the divine substance as such, nor objectively and really distinct from it, nor in any sense mere accidents, but essential to the nature of the Godhead. The Father is a person because of the relation He bears to the Son, the Son is a person because of His relation to the Father, and the Holy Spirit is a person

[67] Ibid. 8, procem.
[68] Ibid. 6, 9.
[69] Ibid. 8, procem.
[70] De Trinit. 5, 10.
[71] Ibid. 5, 9.

because of His relation to the Father and the Son. It is the relatio "ad invicem et ad alterutrum" that constitutes them persons.[72] Of course, as already stated, the term person, as applied to the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, is taken in an analogous sense. Its meaning is not the same as when applied to human beings. The three are called persons, and they are persons; but in it all there is a mystery that lies beyond the reach of human intelligence.[73]

That there can be only three persons in the Godhead, the author tries to make clear in various ways. Thus, for instance, by analyzing the concept of love. "Love is of some one that loves, and with love something is loved. So here are three things: he that loves, and that which is loved, and love. What else then is love but as it were a life that links together or seeks to link together some two things; namely, him that loves and that which is loved?"[74] In the Trinity, then, we have the Father loving the Son, the Son who is loved by the Father, and the Holy Spirit who is love. "One God, and this God Himself the Trinity."

The *relatio originis* is different in the different persons. "The Father alone is of no one else, and for that reason He is called unbegotten, not only in Scripture, but also by those who discuss this profound subject in so far as they are able. The Son is born of the Father; and the Holy Spirit is *principaliter* of the Father, and without the slightest interval of time, proceeds *communiter* from both the Father and the Son. He would indeed be called the son of the Father and the Son, if, what is altogether foreign to those of a sane mind, both had begotten Him. Not therefore begotten by both, but from both of them the Spirit proceeds."[75] Precisely how the procession of the Holy Spirit differs from the generation of the Son, is, the author thinks, a mystery that we shall fathom only in heaven.[76]

The Holy Spirit is said to proceed "principaliter" from the Father. This, however, must not be understood in the

[72] Ibid. 5, 6, 16, 17.
[73] Ibid. 7, 8, 9.
[74] Ibid. 8, 14.
[75] Ibid. 15, 26, 47.
[76] Ibid. 15, 45; cfr. 9, 17, 18.

sense that there are two active principles of procession. "I added *principaliter,* because the Holy Spirit is also found to proceed from the Son. But this also the Father gave Him, not as already existing and not having, but whatever He gave the Word, He gave by begetting Him. For in such wise did He beget Him, that from Him also the Common Gift should proceed and the Holy Spirit should be the Spirit of both." [77] Hence "we cannot say that the Holy Spirit does not also proceed from the Son; for it is not without reason that He is called the Spirit of the Father and of the Son": but "it must be confessed that the Father and the Son are *the principle* of the Holy Spirit, not *two principles.*" [78]

In their operations *ad extra* the three divine persons act as one principle. "When we say that the Father is the *principum creaturæ* and that the Son is the *principium creaturæ,* we do not say two principles; because the Father and the Son are relative to the creature but one principle; there is one Creator as there is one God." [79] "In respect of the creature, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one principle, as they are one Creator and one Lord." [80] Moreover, this operation *ad extra* causes no change in the Godhead; for the new denominations which thus arise in time are all based upon a change that is entirely in the creature. God is absolutely unchangeable.[81]

The Trinitarian teaching, thus formulated by these fourth century writers and considerably developed by Augustine, was neatly summarized in the *Symbolum Athanasianum,* which, according to modern research, most probably originated sometime in the fifth century. "Whoso wishes to be saved, it is before all things necessary that he hold the Catholic faith. . . . But the Catholic faith is this: That we venerate one God in the Trinity, and the Trinity in the unity; neither confounding the persons, nor separating the substance. For one is the person of the Father, another that of the Son, another that of the Holy Spirit: but of the Father, and of the Son,

[77] De Trinit. 15, 17, 29.
[78] Ibid. 4, 29; 5, 15.
[79] Ibid. 5, 13, 14.
[80] Ibid. 5, 14, 15.
[81] Ibid. 5, 16, 17.

and of the Holy Spirit, there is one divinity, equal glory, coeternal majesty. What the Father is, that is the Son, that the Holy Spirit. . . . Thus God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Spirit. And yet not three Gods, but one God. . . . The Father was made of none: not created, not begotten. The Son is of the Father alone: not made, not created, but begotten. The Holy Spirit is of the Father and of the Son: not made, not created, not begotten, but proceeding. . . . And in this Trinity there is nothing prior or posterior, nothing greater or less: but all three persons are coeternal and coequal. So that, as was already said above, both the unity in the Trinity and the Trinity in the unity must be venerated. Whoso therefore wishes to be saved, let him thus think of the Trinity." It may here be added, that the doctrine thus set forth is found expressed in almost the same terms in the *proœmium* to the eighth book of Augustine's *De Trinitate.*

CHAPTER XVIII

MANICHÆISM AND PRISCILLIANISM: THE PROBLEM OF EVIL: THE WORK OF CREATION

Some of the best efforts of the great theologians of the fourth century were spent in refuting the arguments of heretics, who attacked now one and then another of the fundamental doctrines of the Church. This was apparently a regretable necessity, as these efforts might have been spent to great advantage in a peaceful elucidation of the faith. However, as the champions of orthodoxy made the refutation of error, in nearly every instance, an occasion of setting forth the true doctrine, the work thus accomplished was largely of a very positive character, and so contributed at least indirectly to the same end. This is true not only in reference to the Trinitarian and Christological controversies, which involved the greater part of the Christian world, but also in respect of such as were less far-reaching in their influence and effects on the general body of the faithful. To this latter class belong the discussions occasioned by the heresies of Mani and Priscillian, of which the following is a brief account.

A — Manichæism and Priscillianism [1]

Originally Manichæism was not a Christian heresy, but in its westward course, during the fourth and fifth centuries, it adopted many Christian elements, and thereby became a danger to the faith. Its author, whose name is variously given as Mani, Manes, or Manichæus, was a third century Persian dreamer, who represented himself as a divine legate, sent into the world to bring about a religious and moral reformation;

[1] Cfr. Rochat, Essai sur Mani et sa Doctrine: *Bethuen-Baker, op. cit. 93–95; Tixeront, H. D. I, 404–412; Hergenroether, op. cit. I, 297–302; 417–422.

but, although successful in gathering about him many followers, he finally ended on the cross. The fundamental doctrine of his system is that of a dual principle of creation, the one good and the other evil. Between them is the opposition of light and darkness. Only what is good in the world can ultimately be traced to God, whereas what is evil must have its source in an antagonistic power. This power has its concrete existence in Satan and his bad angels, whose one object it is to destroy the work of God. Primitive man, in so far as the spiritual or light-element of his being comes in question, had his existence from the good principle, but in the struggle which ensued between good and evil he fell into the power of Satan. Hence man's life on earth is a perpetual warfare. God through His good angels draws him on to virtuous deeds, whilst Satan through his bad angels drags him into sin. Moreover man carries the elements of this struggle in his own composition. His spirit is of God and inclined to good, but his body is from Satan and essentially evil. Only in so far as the spirit emancipates itself from matter, and as far as possible avoids all contact with matter, does man triumph over the powers of darkness.

In the West the special home of Manichæism was Proconsular Africa, where it gained many followers among the educated classes. However, owing to the opposition of the government, it there developed into a sort of secret society, having its mysterious initiations, its grades, signs, passwords, and occult doctrines, whilst outwardly it assumed a Christian aspect. Its elect were styled bishops, its inferior officers bore the title of priests and deacons, and Christian phraseology was constantly employed to allay suspicion. The strength of its appeal lay chiefly in its apotheosis of human reason, claiming to have an answer to every question and offering to explain the deepest mysteries of the Christian religion. It was this that ensnared Augustine, whilst still an ambitious youth, and held him captive for nine long years. In his work *De Utilitate Credendi,* which was addressed to his friend Honoratus, he says: "Thou knowest, Honoratus, that for this reason alone did we fall into the hands of these men, namely,

that they professed to free us from all error, and bring us to God by pure reason alone, without that terrible principle of authority." [2]

How sadly disappointed he was in what he actually found, he tells us in his Confessions, where he thus pours out his regret and sorrow before God: "I fell, therefore, into the hands of men carnal and loquacious, and full of insane pride, with the snares of Satan on their lips, and a birdlime made up of the syllables of Thy name and that of our Lord Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Ghost, the Paraclete. These names were ever on their lips, but only on their lips; for their hearts were void of truth. And they incessantly repeated to me, truth, truth, but there was no truth in them. They taught what was false, not only about Thee, my God, who art the very Truth, but even about the elements of this world, Thy creatures." [3]

Thus disillusioned, he took up his pen against the sect, and thoroughly refuted the specious arguments constantly advanced by the leaders to deceive the unwary. In 394 he wrote a book against Adimantus, the first apostle of Manichæism in Africa, and another against *The Fundamental Epistle of Manichæus,* the founder of the sect. Then his old friend Faustus, who was looked up to by the Manichæans as their great champion, published a voluminous work against the Catholic Church and the Old Testament, which Augustine answered, paragraph by paragraph, in thirty-three books. In the course of this refutation he reveals the immoral doctrines and practices of the elect, which were not generally known to the rank and file of the sectaries.

Some years later, in 404, Augustine held a three days' public discussion with Felix, another Manichæan leader, who had come to Hippo for the purpose of re-establishing there a community of his sect. The Acts of this conference were afterwards published in two books, which are usually cited under the title, *Contra Felicem Manichæum.* This was followed by a book against Secundinus, who had urged Augustine to

[2] Util. Cred. I, 1.

[3] Confess., III, 6.

return to his former allegiance. His last work against the Manichæans was composed in 420, comprising two books, *Against the Adversaries of the Law and the Prophets.*

Through these patient labors of Augustine many individual heretics were converted to the faith, but the sect as such still continued to flourish, gradually spreading into Gaul and Spain and establishing a community even in Rome. Though subjected to fierce persecution by the Arian Vandals, who about this time invaded Africa, they tenaciously clung to their tenets, and during the sixth and seventh centuries they were still considered sufficiently dangerous to provoke attacks from leading Christian writers. In the Middle Ages Manichæism burst into new life through the efforts of the Cathari, of whom something will be said in the second part of this work.

Closely connected with Manichæism was another error, which, towards the end of the fourth century made its appearance in Spain. This is known to history as Priscillianism. According to the account of Sulpicius Severus,[4] who wrote during the first part of the fifth century, the orginator of this sect was a certain Marcus, from Memphis in Egypt, who towards 370 came to Spain and there gained over to his way of thinking a noble lady, Agape, and the rhetorician Elpidius. These, in their turn, made a disciple of Priscillian, "a man of noble birth, of great riches, bold, restless, eloquent, learned through much reading, and very ready at debate and discussion."[5] He became the leader of the sect, and in a short time gathered about him a large following, gaining over even a number of bishops.

This drew the attention of ecclesiastical superiors to the sect, and after a severe denunciation by Hyginus, bishop of Cordova, Priscillian and his followers were condemned by the Synod of Saragossa, in 380. Unfortunately the suppression of the heresy was entrusted to Ithacius, bishop of Ossanova, whose violence aroused fierce opposition and caused even a number of Catholics to espouse the cause of Priscillian. Among these latter was Hyginus, the first opponent of the

[4] Hist. Sacra, II, 46–51. [5] Ibid. 46.

sect. Priscillian himself was shortly after consecrated bishop of Avila. Then the Emperor Gratian was appealed to by the Catholic party, with the result that the Priscillianists were exiled. However they managed to have the sentence of exile revoked, and when Gratian was a little later assassinated, they resumed their proselytizing with renewed vigor.

Meanwhile they had also found followers in Italy and Aquitaine, and threatened to overrun the whole of Southern Europe. This led Ithacius to seek help from the usurper Maximus, who had established himself at Treves. By his direction a synod was convened at Bordeaux, but Priscillian tried to evade its sentence by appealing to Maximus himself. This, as the event proved, was an unfortunate move. Anxious to please the Catholic party, Maximus was bent on eradicating the heresy at all costs. Although Ithacius withdrew from the prosecution and Martin of Tours vigorously protested against the violent measures that were taken, Priscillian and several of his followers were executed on the charge of having practiced magic, whilst others were sent into exile. It was a disgraceful proceeding and severely condemned by the leading Catholic bishops. Nor did it have the desired effect of rooting out the heresy. The sect continued to flourish till after the Council of Braga, which was held in 563. From that time on it gradually disappeared.[6]

About the teaching of Priscillian there exists at present a considerable diversity of opinion, owing to the recent discovery of some of his writings, which seem to contradict the account given by Sulpicius Severus and other early authorities. As the matter is stilll undecided, it is advisable to give here simply the findings of the Council of Braga, which is in nearly every instance confirmed by writers who were practically contemporaneous with the first rise and spread of Priscillianism. These findings are embodied in seventeen propositions, fifteen of which are exclusively concerned with doctrinal matters. In substance they read as follows:[7]

[6] Cfr. Tixeront, H. D. II, 229-241. A somewhat different account is given by Fr. Lezins, in the Realencyklopaedie fuer Protestantische Theologie und Kirche, 16, 59-65.

[7] Cfr. Mansi, 9, 774 sqq.

1°. Like Sabellius, Priscillian does not admit three distinct persons in the Godhead, but holds that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one and the same.

2°. Like the Gnostics, he admits other unintelligible names in the Godhead, saying that the divinity itself is a trinity of the Trinity.

3°. Following Paul of Samosata and Photinus, he says that the Son of God, our Lord, did not exist before He was born of the Virgin.

4°. With Cerdo, Marcion, and Manichæus, he denies that Christ came in a true human nature, and therefore he fasts on the anniversary of Christ's birth and also on Sundays.

5°. With Manichæus he holds that human souls and angels are emanations of the divine substance.

6°. He also maintains that human souls at first dwelt in heaven and there fell into sin, and on account of this they were cast into the bodies of men upon earth.

7°. Adopting the teaching of Manichæus, he contends that the devil was not created by God as a good angel, but of himself came forth from darkness and is in his very being the principle and substance of evil.

8°. He says that some creatures are the work of the devil, who also causes thunder and lightning and storms and droughts.

9°. Like the pagans of old, he teaches that human souls are subject to fate.

10°. He also holds that the twelve signs of the zodiac correspond to the various parts of the human soul and body, and are connected with the names of the Patriarchs.

11°. Like Manichæus he condemns marriage and abhors the procreation of children.

12°. Again like Manichæus he maintains that the formation of the child's body in its mother's womb is the work of the demons, and for that reason he does not believe in the resurrection of the body.

13°. He contends that the body of man is not the work of God, but of the bad angels.

14°. With Manichæus he holds that flesh meat, which God

has given for the use of man, is unclean, and for that reason he abstains from it, and even from vegetables cooked with meat.

15°. He perverts the Scriptures and wrests their teaching to the support of his own errors.

In view of these propositions, which, as already stated, are supported by the testimony of the most ancient writers, Priscillianism may well be regarded as "a mixture of Gnosticism and Manichæism, a composite system in which there are elements of dualism, astrology, Pythagorism, Docetism, and immoderate Encratism — the whole combined with Sabellianism and some Origenistic tenets." [8]

B — The Problem of Evil

Manichæism, and to some extent Priscillianism also, may be regarded as another of the many Oriental attempts to solve the problem of evil in the world. The human mind shrinks from looking upon the good God as the cause of evil, and yet if evil is not caused by God, whence does it come? Its universal and unavoidable presence seems to postulate a universal and self-existing cause, and if this cannot be identified with God, there appears to be no escape from the inference that there is a second principle of creation, whose productive efforts necessarily tend to mar the work of the Creator-God. This idea seems to be at the root of Oriental dualism and most likely inspired the dreams of Mani.

It was largely in reference to this point that Catholic writers discussed the question of creation with the Manichæan sectaries. They emphasized the teaching of faith that God is the sole author of the world and the endless variety of beings it contains, that He created them by His all-powerful will, made them all the beneficiaries of His goodness, and never ceases from directing them wisely to their appointed end. "Believe," says Gregory of Nazianzus, "that the whole world, the visible as well as the invisible, was made by God out of nothing, that it is governed by the Creator's providence,

[8] Cfr. Tixeront, op. cit. 237.

and is destined for a more exalted end." [9] They readily admitted the prevalence of evil in the world, and also that its presence in a world created by the good God enshrouds the problem in a deep mystery; but they were agreed that its solution, in so far as it may be attempted by the human mind, must be sought in an abuse of man's free will, which destroyed his primitive happiness and made him the prey of temptation and sin, of sickness and death.

It was especially St. Augustin who defended this view against the Manichæans, and thus solved the problem of evil in so far as it admits of a human solution. Having himself been a follower of the sect for nine years, he fully understood their position, and also remembered the difficulties which he had encountered during those years of conflict. Hence the memorable words with which he opens his refutation of the Manichæan errors. "May the omnipotent God," he says, "the giver of all good gifts, enable me to refute your errors with a calm and peaceful mind, bent more on your conversion than your ruin. Let those be angry with you who know not what it costs to arrive at the truth. Let those be angry with you who were never held captive in the same errors. For my part, having been long held captive in them; having heard and studied and rashly believed them; having obstinately defended and zealously propagated them; having at last escaped from them only by the merciful intervention of the Sovereign Physician of my soul; never can I bring myself to be angry with you, but, on the contrary, I shall always feel obliged to extend to you that forbearance which my friends extended to me when I wandered blindly and madly in your errors." [10]

Again, in his Confessions he states: "Whence does evil come, I asked, and there was no solution." [11] It was only when he became familiar with the Catholic view that the solution suggested itself to his searching mind. In a few words it comes to this. It is an absurdity to say that evil is a positive being, in itself an existing reality. Evil is a defect, a negation of good. "It is nothing else than a cor-

[9] Orat. 40, 46.
[10] Cont. Ep. Fundam.
[11] Confess. 7, 11.

ruption either of the condition of beings, or of their nature, or of the natural order of things." [12] Hence there can be no evil by nature. "In itself all nature is good, and it is only through a diminution of what is good that it is affected by evil." [13]

This evil may be divided into three different kinds: Metaphysical, Physical, and Moral. The first is evil only in an improper sense of the term, being nothing more than merely natural limitations. Thus every created being is necessarily finite, and the very fact of its being finite denotes the absence of higher perfections than are due to its nature.[14] The second is real evil, but wholly confined to the natural order of things. It consists in the privation of a perfection which is in some way due to the nature of a given individual. Thus by nature man was intended to have the use of his bodily senses; if he is deprived of it, whether congenitally or in later life, he is afflicted by a physical evil.[15] This God in His wise providence sometimes permits, and sometimes positively inflicts as a punishment for sins. The third is an evil in the strictest sense of the term, and consists in the privation of a moral perfection that is due under given conditions. This results only from an abuse of free will by a reasonable creature. When man sins, for instance, he thereby loses God's grace, which is an evil beyond all calculation; but the evil is of his own making and was not intended by God, except as a consequence of sin.[16]

In this exposition, which he amplified on various occasions, St. Augustine clearly formulated the Catholic doctrine on the question of evil, and subsequent writers did little more than apply the principles which he had drawn with unerring logic from reason and faith.

C — The Work of Creation

There are few doctrines that were from the very first set forth more clearly and definitely than that of creation. Even

[12] De Nat. Boni, 4.
[13] Ibid. 17.
[14] De Nat. Boni, 8, 16, 23.
[15] Ibid. 10.
[16] De Duab. Anim. 14; 15.

the Apostolic Fathers, as we have seen, were quite explicit on that point. The Apologists, too, brought it out as occasion required; and so did Irenæus, Tertullian, Cyprian, and the Alexandrians, Clement and Origen. Among the orthodox there never was any dissension about the matter, but pagan philosophers and heretical innovators made it necessary that this fundamental doctrine should be placed in the clearest light. However it was mainly the fact of creation that was emphasized; merely theoretical aspects of the question were usually relegated to the background. All of these writers maintained that the world was created out of nothing, that it was called into existence by the Father, through the Son; and, as some added, in the Holy Spirit.

It was in this condition that the great theologians of the fourth century found the doctrine when they were called upon to defend it against heretics or explain it to the people. They developed it to some extent, but principally in reference to other points of doctrine which then formed the chief subjects of discussion. A few citations will suffice to bring out their views on the matter in question.

Emphasizing the fact that God created the world out of nothing, St. Athanasius writes: "Some, among whom is also enumerated the great Plato, assert that God made everything out of preëxisting matter; for, say they, God could not have made anything if matter had not already existed, similarly as the wood which the carpenter uses must first exist before he can make anything out of it.

"See, then what foolish babble they give out. But the divine teaching and the faith of Christ utterly rejects this nonsense as a detestable impiety. For it knows that things were not made fortuitously, because everything is governed by Providence, nor were things made of preëxisting matter, because God is not wanting in power; He made all things, in nowise as yet existing, out of nothing through the Word, and thus caused them to be, as He said through Moses: 'In the beginning God made heaven and earth.'" [17]

[17] De Incarn. 2.

With this view of creation the other writers are in full agreement. Hence St. Chrysostom states: "To say that the things which are were made out of preëxisting matter, and not to confess that the Maker of all things created them out of nothing, is a sign of extreme foolishness." [18]

God was always Creator, but the created universe began in time. From this universally admitted fact the Arians attempted to refute their Catholic opponents, who inferred from God's eternal Fatherhood that the Son existed from all eternity. This inference, the Arians contended, cannot be valid; for all admit that God was always Creator, and yet there was a time when the world did not exist: hence although He was always Father, it does not follow that He always had a Son. Athanasius replied to this argument by making a distinction between divine generation and the act of creation. "Creatures," he says, "were made out of nothing, they were not before they were made; how then could they eternally coexist with God, who always is? . . . But the Son necessarily always exists, because He is not the work of the Father but is proper to His very nature. For as God is always Father, that also must always be which is proper to His nature, which same is both His Word and His Wisdom." [19]

God created the world freely, but He generated the Son through a necessity of the divine nature. For the nonexistence of creatures does not detract from the perfection of their Maker, as He can produce them at any time according to His good pleasure; but if the Son were not always with the Father, the result would be a diminution of the divine perfection. Hence His created works God produced through the Son when it pleased Him; but His Son always is, because He is the proper offspring of His nature.[20]

This free creation of the world was the outcome of God's goodness, as is thus clearly expressed by St. Hilary. "God created man not because He had need of his services in any way, but because He is good. He called into existence a sharer in His own blessedness, and He endowed the *animal*

[18] In Gen. Hom. 2, 2.
[19] Adv. Arian. 1, 29.
[20] Ibid.

rationale with life and understanding for the purpose of bestowing upon him His own eternity." [21] Hence the ultimate end which God had in view in creating the world was His own glorification through man's eternal happiness, and also through the eternal happiness of the blessed angels." [22]

The creative act whereby the world was called into being must be attributed to the whole Trinity, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, as having but one will and one power. "The Father," says St. Ephrem, "is the Genitor, the Son is begotten in His bosom, and the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son. The Father is the Maker who made the world out of nothing, the Son is the Creator who together with the Father called the universe into being, the Holy Spirit is the Paraclete and the merciful Dispenser, by whom all that was and is and will be is perfected. The Father is the Mind, the Son is the Word, the Holy Spirit is the Voice — three names, but one will and one power." [23]

Moreover this creative act is such that it lies entirely beyond the power of any and every finite being. Hence the very fact that the Son is the creator of the world shows Him to be truly God. This is strongly brought out by Athanasius in his writings against the Arians. "For how is it possible," he asks, "that He should produce the things that are not, if He Himself, as you think, was made out of nothing? For if He, although Himself created, could produce a creature, then certainly the same must also be assumed in regard to other creatures, namely that they also have power to create. And if this is conceded by you, what need was there of the Word, since inferior beings could thus be produced by those of a higher order, or, to say the least, since each single being could in the beginning have heard from God: 'Be thou made,' or, 'Be ye made,' and thus they would have been produced. But this is neither written nor could in any way be. For none of those things that are made can be a creative cause; for all things were made through the Word, and this would certainly not be true if the Word also belonged to the category of cre-

[21] Tract. super. Ps. I, 2, 15.
[22] Greg. Naz. Orat. 38, 9.
[23] De Def. et Trin. 11, 12.

ated beings. And indeed not even the angels can create, seeing that they too have been created, although this is held by Valentinus, Marcion, and Basilides, whose rivals you are." [24]

These few citations are sufficient to indicate what were the general views entertained at the time in regard to the work of creation. The matter was somewhat more fully treated by Augustine, whose teaching on this point may be briefly summarized as follows:

In regard to the various points already touched upon in the preceding paragraphs, he is in full agreement with his contemporaries. "God," he says, "is most properly believed to have made all things out of nothing, for, although the things that were formed (in the second creation) were made of existing matter, nevertheless this matter itself was made absolutely out of nothing." [25] Hence the author distinguishes two moments of creation: the production of matter and spirits out of nothing, and the organization of the material universe. The first he finds recorded in verses one and two of Genesis, and the second in the subsequent verses of the first chapter.[26]

The creative act is common to the three Divine Persons in such a way that there is only one Creator, and it is of such a nature that the creature has nothing in common with the being of the Godhead. "That this Trinity, therefore, is called one God, and that He made and created all things that are, in as much as they are, Catholic teaching bids us to believe; so that all creatures, whether intellectual or corporal, or to put it briefly according to the words of Holy Scripture, whether invisible or visible, are not born of God, but are made by God out of nothing; and that there is nothing in them that is part of the Trinity, only that the Trinity produced them all. Wherefore it is not lawful either to say or to believe that creatures are consubstantial with God or coeternal." [27] And again: "In regard to creatures the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one principle, as also one Creator and one Lord.[28]

[24] Adv. Arian. 2, 21.
[25] De Gen. Cont. Manich. 1, 6, 10.
[26] Ibid. 1, 7, 11.
[27] De Gen. ad Lit. Imperf. I.
[28] De Trin. 5, 14, 15.

Creation, in the strict sense of the term, presupposes omnipotence in the Creator, so that it lies beyond the reach of any finite power. "To make a thing out of nothing, to cause that to be which in no wise exists, is not within the power of man. Whilst God, because He is omnipotent, begot His Son of Himself, and made the world out of nothing, and formed man from the slime of the earth, so that through this threefold power He made it manifest that His production reaches out to all things." [29] Again: "Angels cannot create any nature; for the only and one Creator of every nature, whether great or small, is God, that is, the Trinity itself, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit." [30]

Although the world was created in time, nevertheless God did not for that reason undergo any change; for "by one and the same eternal and immutable will He brought it about that the things which He made should first not be, so long as they were not, and afterwards should be, when they began to exist." [31]

God created the world in accordance with a definite plan, and the archetypes of beings to be created were from all eternity in His mind. For to say that anything outside of Himself served Him as a model would be a sacrilege. Hence these archetypes are eternal and unchangeable and true. It was to them that Plato referred when he taught the existence of an ideal world, and it is by participating in them that created beings are.[32]

This, however, did not interfere with His freedom in creating: He made all things, not because He was forced thereto, but because He so willed. The cause of all His works is His free will.[33] And the reason why His free will called creatures into being is His goodness. For the words, God saw that it was good, "make it sufficiently clear that God made the things which He did make, not through any necessity, nor because of any need He had of their usefulness, but solely on account of His goodness, *id est, quia bonum est.*" [34]

[29] Cont. Felic. 2, 18.
[30] De Civit. Dei, 12, 17, 2.
[31] De Trin. 9, 15, 26.
[32] De Div. Quaest, 46, 2.
[33] Enarrat, in Ps. 134, 10.
[34] De Civit. Dei, 11, 24.

The beings thus created by God depend constantly on His sustaining power for their continued existence. Hence when it is said in Holy Scripture that on the seventh day God rested from His work, that is to be understood in reference to creation of new species, and not in regard to the kinds of beings already called into existence; for if He were to withdraw His sustaining power from them, they would instantly fall back into nothingness.[35]

All these points, though brought out more fully by Augustine, were contained in the common teaching at the time. He added, however, some speculations of his own. In the first place, he contended that all things were created together in one instant of time, regarding the six days of Genesis merely as a convenient division adopted by the sacred writer for the purpose of reducing his narrative to a certain order. For "of the same Creator of whom Holy Scripture narrates that He consummated all his works in six days, it elsewhere not inconsistently states that He created all things together. Whence it appears that He made the six or seven days, or rather the one day six or seven times repeated, all at once, because He made all things together." [36]

However this must not be understood in the sense that all things then already obtained their actual and complete being. What God really did create in that first instant of time, in so far as this visible universe comes in question, was matter with all its potencies, predispositions, and tendencies to evolve under given conditions into those species and varieties of beings that were ultimately intended by the Creator. For "there are in corporeal things, embracing all the elements of the world, certain occult seminal causes (seminariæ rationes), by reason of which, when the opportunity offers itself in the lapse of time and the proper causes are at hand, they evolve into the species that are due to their mode of being and to the end intended. And hence the angels, who cause animals to be, are not called their creators, as also farmers are not called the creators of their crops, or of trees, or of whatever else the earth brings forth, although they know how to pro-

[35] De Gen. ad Lit. 4, 12, 22. [36] Ibid. 4, 33, 52.

vide certain visible opportunities and causes for the purpose of bringing these things into being. And what farmers do visibly, that the angels do invisibly; but God alone is the one Creator, who implanted in things the causes themselves and the seminal reasons." [37]

In this sense the human body also was created in that first instant of time, but not the soul. "Let it, therefore, be believed, if not against Scripture or reason, that man was so made on the sixth day, that the causal reason (ratio causalis) of the human body was created among the elements of the world; but the soul itself, created as the first day was created, was reserved among the works of God until it should be breathed in its own time into a body formed of slime." [38]

Augustine's doctrine on the points in question is condensed into this single passage: "In that first framing of the world the future man was made; the reason of the man that was to be created, not the man actually created. But these things take one form in the Word of God, where they are eternal, not made; another in the elements of the world, where all things to be are created together; another in the things which are created in their own time, not all together, but according to the causes created together." [39]

At first sight all this looks very much like the modern theory of evolution, in as much as unformed matter is said to have been endowed with the potency of evolving itself under given conditions into different species of beings. However upon closer examination it is found that this was not in the mind of Augustine. For although the *rationes seminales* were implanted in matter at the beginning of time, nevertheless the actual production of finally complete beings is according to him the work of God, and not of matter alone. Hence he writes: "The earth is then said to produce the herb and the tree causally — that is, it received the power to produce them. For in it were now made, as if in the roots of time, those things which were afterwards to be produced in the course of time. God afterwards planted paradise, and brought forth

[37] In Heptat. 2, 21.
[38] De Gen. ad Lit. 7, 24.
[39] Ibid. 6, 10.

of this earth all manner of trees fair to behold and pleasant to eat of; but we must not suppose that He added any new species (creatura) which He had not previously made, and which was needed to complete that perfection of which it is said that they were good. No, for all the species of plants and trees had been produced in the first creation (conditione), from which God rested, thenceforth moving and administering, as time went on, those same things which He had formed. Not only did He then plant paradise, but even now all things that are produced. For who else creates them now but He who worketh until now? For He creates them now from things that already exist; then, when they had no existence whatever, and when that day (the first) was made." [40]

What precisely Augustine understood by these *rationes* of things, in so far as they are precontained in corporeal elements, is not very clear. He sharply distinguishes two kinds: the *rationes causales* and the *rationes seminales*. Thus he would call the qualities of wood, which enable us to convert it into fire, its causal reasons, and the qualities of seeds, which make them develop into one kind of plant rather than into another, their seminal reasons.[41] Yet it is to be noticed, as modern critics point out, that whenever he uses the form *rationes seminales* in connection with matter as first created, he invariably modifies it by "quasi" or its equivalents.[42] Hence the other expressions, obviously used in the same sense: "modorum rationes," [43] "formabilitas," [44] "potentia." [45] The form most commonly employed in this connection is "rationes causales," to which correspond the adverbial expressions "causaliter" and "potentialiter." Hence that he ascribes some kind of casuality to these rationes is obvious; but of what kind it is he nowhere states.

[40] Ibid. 5, 4.
[41] Cfr. De Gen. ad Lit. 9, 17, 32.
[42] Cfr. Ibid. 4, 51; 6, 8, 11, 18; 9, 32.
[43] Ibid. 9, 32.
[44] Ibid. 5, 16.
[45] Ibid. 5, 44.

CHAPTER XIX

ANGELOLOGY: ANTHROPOLOGY

In the foregoing chapter a brief outline has been given of the doctrine on creation in general, which must now be supplemented by a short account of what was held in regard to God's noblest creatures, the angels and man. In this there is no need of inquiring into the mere fact of their having been created by God; for that was never made a matter of discussion among Catholic writers, nor is it a subject that admits of doctrinal development. It is rather their nature, their primitive condition, and their final destiny that comes up for investigation. No special treatises were written on these subjects in Patristic times; still in their sermons to the people, and especially in their homilies on passages of Holy Scripture, the various writers found occasion to set forth the common teaching, and incidentally also to develop their own ideas. As we shall see, concepts on several of these matters were still somewhat vague, so that there was considerable room for doctrinal development.

A — Angelology

Regarding the angels, which were from the very beginning of Christianity looked upon as the first creatures of God, early orthodox teaching was little more than a reproduction of Scriptural data. Nor did the fourth-century writers go much beyond this. They had no occasion to defend the Church's doctrine on this subject against adversaries, and so they expressed their views concerning it only in a casual way, and usually in connection with other matters. Still they touched on nearly every point of the doctrine, and incidentally also contributed something to its gradual development. Hence a few remarks on their teaching will be in place here, to which

may be added a summary statement of what was accomplished by subsequent writers.

A fair outline of the doctrine, as it was commonly understood during the fourth century, is thus given by Gregory of Nazianzus: "Angels are called spirits and fire: spirits because they are endowed with an intellectual nature; fire, because they take part in the purification of our souls. Sometimes also these names are primarily used to signify the angelic essence. In respect to us they are indeed incorporeal, or at least very nearly approaching thereto. You see, then, how hard we try to throw some light on this matter, and yet we are not able to proceed very far; or certainly we cannot go beyond the statement that some of them are Angels, others Archangels, others Thrones, Powers, Principalities, Dominations, Splendors, Sublimities, Intellectual Powers, or rather Minds, pure natures, in no wise adulterated, immovable in respect of evil, or certainly not easily moved thereto, forever gathered in jubilant ranks around the First Cause; . . . chanting the praises of the Divine Majesty, and unceasingly beholding that everlasting glory, not that thereby the glory of God receives an increase (for there is nothing that can be added to the glory of Him who possesses all and is the author of all honors that accrue to others), but rather that these natures, first after God, may not cease to be filled with blessings." [1]

As is sufficiently evident from this passage, the details of the doctrine were at the time not well determined. The author does not know whether the angels are pure spirits, although he is inclined to think that they are. St. Basil, on the other hand, seems quite certain that they are not; for he writes: "The substance of these heavenly powers is a breath of air, or an immaterial fire, according to what is written: 'He makes His angels spirits, and His ministers a flame of fire'; and therefore they are in circumscribed places, and become visible, appearing in their own bodies to those who are worthy." [2] Gregory of Nyssa states that "rational creatures

[1] Orat. 28, 31.

[2] De Spir. Sanct. 38.

are divided into incorporeal and corporeal nature. The angelic nature is incorporeal, our human nature is corporeal. The angelic nature, therefore, is intellectual, and free from a body that weighs it down (from a body, I say, that is rebellious and ever inclining earthward); destined for the higher regions, this nature dwells in lightsome and ethereal places." [3] He too, appears to have some doubt concerning their absolute spirituality, although he is usually cited as defending it without reserve.

The same uncertainty with regard to this point is found among the Latin writers of this period. Some of them, like Hilary and Ambrose, were inclined to believe that the angels fell through unchastity, sinning, that is, with the "daughters of men," and that consequently they had a body. Jerome rejects this interpretation of the text in Genesis altogether, but at the same time confesses that about the nature of the angelic substance nothing is known.[4] Augustine, though not pronouncing definitely on the merits of the case, for his own part prefers to believe that angels have some sort of body; this being more in accord with the texts of Scripture which speak about angels appearing to men.[5] This also helps us to explain how material fire can torture "the devil and his angels" in hell.[6]

It was not until the end of the fifth century that belief in the absolute spirituality of the angelic nature became general. This was primarily owing to the authority of the Pseudo-Areopagite. Although he was some unknown fifth century writer, apparently of Monophysite leanings, he purported to be the Dionysius of Athens mentioned by St. Luke in the Acts of the Apostles.[7] Hence as soon as his writings became known they obtained great vogue, although when cited for the first time at a synod, they were immediately rejected by the Catholic party as spurious. He represents the angels as having an altogether spiritual nature, a simple essence which somewhat resembles the simple essence of God. They are

[3] De Orat. Dom. 4.
[4] In Ezech. 27, 16.
[5] Ep. 95, 8; De Civ. Dei, 21, 10.
[6] Ibid. 21, 10, 1.
[7] Acts, 17, 34.

entirely intellectual beings, supramundane spirits, who have no body of any kind.[8] At the time when he wrote it was indeed already quite common to speak of the angels as ἀσώματοι, without a body; but this expression, as then used, was rather indefinite, frequently excluding only a gross body like ours. Hence little can be inferred from it in regard to the absolute spirituality of the angels. His writings, however, are quite clear and definite on the point: angels are pure spirits. Abbot Maximus incorporated this view in his *Scholia,* and from that time forward it became quite general.

To the same Eastern source must also be traced our present division of the angelic host into orders and choirs. Gregory of Nazianzus, as seen above, was still very indefinite on this point; and so were his contemporaries, usually employing the designations found in the Epistles of St. Paul. Dionysius, however, introduced a definite classification of the heavenly spirits, building up a celestial hierarchy of three orders and nine choirs, which in their appointed ranks and degrees act as intermediaries between God and man.[9] After him Gregory the Great adopted practically the same classification, founding it upon the teaching of Holy Scripture. "We know," he says, "on the authority of Scripture that there are nine choirs of angels, namely, Angels, Archangels, Virtues, Powers, Principalities, Dominations, Thrones, Cherubim, and Seraphim. That there are Angels and Archangels nearly every page of the Bible tells us, and the books of the Prophets speak of Cherubim and Seraphim. St. Paul, too, writing to the Ephesians, enumerates four orders when he says: 'Above all Principality, and Power, and Virtue, and Domination'; and again, writing to the Colossians he says: 'Whether Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities, or Powers.' If we now join these lists together, we have five choirs, and adding Angels and Archangels, Cherubim and Seraphim, we find nine choirs of angels."[10]

On some other points, however, the fourth-century writers are as definite as their successors in subsequent ages. They

[8] De Coel. Hierarch. 4, 1, 2; 15, 1.
[9] Ibid. 4, 3; 6, 2; 8, 2.
[10] In Evang. Hom. 2, 34, 7.

are all agreed that the angels were created by God for the same purpose as man, to render their Maker faithful service and to receive from Him the reward of eternal blessedness in heaven. All are agreed, too, that the angels were created before man, but there is no agreement as regards the particular time of their creation. Thus Ambrose holds that the creation of the angels preceded that of the visible world: "Although they at some time began to be, nevertheless they were already in existence when this world was made." [11] Epiphanius, on the other hand, is quite certain that the angels were created after "heaven and earth." "This," he writes, "the word of God evidently declares, that the angels were neither produced after the stars, nor before heaven and earth were constituted." [12] Augustine is undecided, holding however as most probable that their creation is recorded either in the first or the third verse of Genesis.[13]

There is among them a more perfect agreement in reference to the elevation and fall of the angels. Thus St. Basil writes: "For neither are the Powers of the heavens holy by their own nature; if they were, they would not differ from the Holy Spirit: but in proportion as they rise one above the other in perfection do they receive from the Spirit the proper measure of sanctification. . . . But sanctification, which is distinct from their substance, perfects them through the communication of the Spirit." [14] And again: "No sanctity is ever acquired except through the presence of the Holy Spirit. Therefore their angelic nature they have from the Creative Word, the Maker of all things; but their sanctity was imparted to them by the Holy Ghost. For the angels were not created as little children, perfecting themselves by personal endeavor and thus rendering themselves worthy to receive the Spirit; but they received their sanctity together with their substance at the moment of creation." [15] Augustine speaks in almost identical terms. Arguing that every good and meritorious action, even as proceeding from the free will of creatures, must

[11] Hexaem. 1, 5, 19.
[12] Adv. Haer. 65, 5.
[13] De Gen. ad Lit. 1, 7, 15.
[14] De Spir. Sanct. 16, 38.
[15] In Ps. Hom. 32, 4.

be traced back to the grace of God as its ultimate cause, he says: "And this good will (of the angels) who had given it, if not He who imparted it to them in their creation? That is, He gave them that chaste love through which they cling to Him, at one and the same time constituting their nature and bestowing His grace." [16]

As created by God, the angels were all good; but some fell away from their Maker and were turned into devils. The majority of these writers attribute the fall of the angels to pride. Thus Athanasius, whilst recommending the practice of humility, argues: "It was not on account of impurity, or adultery, or theft, that Satan was cast out of heaven; but it was his pride that hurled him thence into the lower abyss. For thus he spoke: 'I will ascend and place my throne over against that of God, I will be like unto the Most High!' And because of this boast was he cast out, and the eternal fire became his portion." [17] Similarly St. Augustine: "Some," he writes, "contend that Satan fell because he envied man on account of his having been made to the likeness of God. But however that be, it is certain that envy follows pride, and does not precede it; for envy is not the cause of pride, but pride is the cause of envy." [18]

By nature the angels were endowed with singular powers and knowledge, being the "splendores secundi," fit ministers of the Word; and these perfections they retained in their fall, yet they do not know the secrets of the human heart except by inference from external signs. "The devil," writes Jerome, "does not know what man thinks in his heart, unless he learns from some external motion in what object each one takes his delight, and then he makes diverse suggestions in accordance with what he observes." [19] And Cassian: "No one doubts that the impure spirits can know the nature of our thoughts, although only in so far as they gather this knowledge from external signs, that is, by observing our disposition, our words, and the tendencies of our desires. But for the rest,

[16] De Civ. Dei, 12, 9, 2.
[17] De Virgin. 5.
[18] De Gen. ad Lit. 11, 14, 18.
[19] In Ps. 16, 20.

those things which are entirely hidden in the soul they cannot touch." [20]

That the good angels were appointed by God to be our guardians, whilst the evil ones endeavor to encompass our destruction, is admitted by all. Gregory of Nyssa thus sets forth the common view: "There is a teaching, based upon the tradition of the Fathers, which holds that after our nature had fallen into sin, God did not leave our misery without protection, but that an angel, one of those incorporeal spirits, was appointed by Him to assist each one of us during life; and that, on the other hand, the corrupter of our nature plies his machinations through some wicked and malevolent demon for the purpose of destroying the life of man. Placed between these two spirits, each one of which draws him on to opposite ends, man has it in his power to decide which of them shall prevail. The good spirit suggests thoughts of virtue, which lead to a well founded hope; whilst the other one brings before him sordid delights, in which there is no hope of good, dragging him down to the desire of temporal things and to the sensual slavery of the foolish." [21]

These are the principal points touched upon by the fourth and fifth century writers in their teaching concerning the angels. They comprise practically all we know of the matter to-day. Excepting the practice of special devotions to the angels on the part of the faithful, which in some cases have been approved by the Church, there has been but little development along these lines of Christian thought.

B — Anthropology

Justin Martyr defined man as a reasonable being composed

[20] Coll. 7, 15.

[21] De Vita Moysis, P. G. 44, 337. It is interesting to notice that over a hundred years before the time of Gregory, Origen had set forth this doctrine in almost identical terms. "With every one of us," he says, "there are present two angels, the one an angel of justice, the other a spirit of iniquity. If good thoughts arise in our hearts, and justice begins to spring up in our souls, there can be no doubt but that the angel of the Lord is speaking. But if, on the contrary, evil reigns in our hearts, the angel of the devil is speaking to us. And as there are thus two angels with individual men, thus, I am of opinion, there are also two angels in the various

of soul and body.[22] This definition was in one way or another repeated by most subsequent writers. Even Clement of Alexandria, who is commonly accused of having held that man is made up of body, soul, and spirit, says quite definitely: "Man is composed of a rational and an irrational part, of soul and body."[23] With this view the fourth-century Fathers, excepting Didymus the Blind in the East and Victorinus Afer in the West, both of whom seem to have been trichotomists, were in perfect accord. They all held that the two constitutive elements in man are his spiritual soul and his material body, from the intimate union of which results the *animal rationale* called man.

Speaking of man's origin, they usually restate what is contained in Holy Scripture, accepting without demur that "the Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life." This last statement, however, was not accepted by all in the same sense. Didymus revived the view of Origen, that souls were created before their union with the body, and that consequently this breathing of the soul into man's face signifies simply a subsequent imprisonment of the soul, as a punishment for sins committed in a previous state of existence.[24] This same view was also entertained by Victorinus.[25] The other writers of this period, on the contrary, interpreted the same statement as a creative act of God; although Epiphanius, who held indeed that Adam's soul was created, seems to have been at a loss how to understand the text in question.[26]

Regarding the origin of the first man's soul, then, all were at one: it was created by God. But what of the souls of Adam's posterity? Are they also created? Or are they in some way derived from the children's parents in the act of generation, *ex traduce seminis*? Among Eastern writers Gregory of Nyssa seems to have been inclined to hold this

different countries, endeavoring to make them either good or bad" (In Luc. Hom. 12).

[22] De Resurr. 8.

[23] Strom. 4, 3.

[24] Enarr. in I Petri, 1, 1.

[25] In Epist. ad Ephes. 1, 4.

[26] Ancor. 55.

latter view,[27] whilst the others stood for the creation of individual souls. Of the West St. Jerome affirms that the greater number follow Tertullian and Apollinaris, asserting that "the same way as the body is born of the body, the soul is born of the soul, and subsists under the same conditions as brute animals."[28] This, however, is undoubtedly an exaggeration, especially in the wholly material sense in which Tertullian understood Traducianism. As St. Augustine rightly points out, such a derivation would make the soul corporeal, and this no well instructed Christian could admit.[29] At any rate, Jerome himself, Ambrose, Hilary, Zeno, Victorinus, and others who touched this question, agreed with their Eastern contemporaries in defending Creationism. Augustine indeed was undecided, but only for practical reasons, not seeing his way how to explain the transmission of original sin if individual souls are created by God. Hence whilst rejecting the gross Traducianism of Tertullian, he viewed the derivation of souls *ex traduce seminis* in a more spiritual sense, and retained it as a working hypothesis till the end of his life. In this he was followed by other Latin writers up to the Middle Ages.

With the exception of the followers of Tertullian, both Eastern and Western writers admitted the spirituality of the soul. They also defended the soul's natural immortality, which was not affected by Adam's fall into sin. This, together with his intellect and free will, constitutes man's natural likeness to God.

A somewhat more difficult question is that of man's primitive condition. Was Adam before his fall endowed only with natural perfections, or had he over and above received others that placed him in a preternatural state? And if the latter, were any of these gifts of a strictly supernatural order? In what precise light did the fourth and fifth-century writers view Adam's condition in paradise?

There is no particular difficulty about the first question, if the term preternatural be taken in a somewhat wider sense,

[27] De Hom. Opif. 29.
[28] Ep. 82.
[29] Ep. 190 (al. 157) ad Optat. 2, 14.

so as to signify simply a condition of existence which was lost through the sin of Adam. For all these writers are at one in holding that we are now living in a world wholly unlike that which came from the creative hand of God. Blindness of the intellect, perversion of the will, anguish of soul, pains of body, sickness and want, are the bitter fruit of our first parents' sin. There was nothing of all this in that garden of pleasure which God in His goodness had prepared for the progenitors of our race. They were made right, the material world ministered to their pleasure, and their lives were bright with the love and familiar intercourse of God. About this there is no dissentient voice.

Furthermore, they are also agreed that man was originally endowed with immortality of body, so that if he had not sinned, he would never have tasted death. And yet, on the other hand, they admit that death is natural to man, although in the present order it is the consequence of sin. Man is a compound being, made up of body and soul, whose union may be dissolved by a proportionate finite cause. Nay, his very organism requires that he gradually develop to his full strength, enjoy for a little while the perfection of his manhood, and then by degrees grow feeble with age, until at last his body returns to the dust. Hence, although these writers did not theorize much about the matter, they in effect regarded man's primitive immortality as a preternatural gift, as something not due to his nature. And in the same light also did they view his impassibility, and his immunity from concupiscence. In this, again, they are practically unanimous.

The real difficulty begins when the term preternatural is taken in a stricter sense, as synonymous with supernatural. Immortality of body, impassibility, immunity from concupiscence, although not due to human nature as such, are nevertheless entirely within the range of its unelevated capacities. Their bestowal does not necessarily imply an elevation of man to an essentially higher state. But it is otherwise with gifts that are *in se* or entitatively supernatural, as is that of sanctifying grace. Thereby man in his spiritual aspect is lifted to a divine plane of being, becoming a partaker of the divine

nature. And here the question is, whether the writers now under consideration held that such a gift had been bestowed upon our first parents. If so, then they must have considered man's primitive state to have been strictly supernatural.

Harnack, in his *History of Dogmas,* is at great pains to show that the Greeks made no room for the supernatural, whenever they were occupied with cosmological speculations. With them the supernatural, in this connection, he says, was the same as the spiritual. They had no notion of a gift that reached beyond the natural capacity of our first parents. He grants, however, that aside from such cosmological speculations they presented the matter in a different light. Thus they proved themselves perfectly capable of grasping and describing the specific significance of the grace brought us by Christ; and some of them, he admits, held that a similar grace had been bestowed upon the ancestors of our race.[30]

Although these statements contain some half-truths which necessarily lead to false inferences, nevertheless they also give us the key to the problem now under consideration. It is this. When the Fathers, and this is true of the Latins as well as of the Greeks, were directly engaged in discussing man's primitive condition, they as a general rule did not emphasize the strictly supernatural aspect of his state. But when they spoke of the grace of redemption, they almost invariably represented it as a restoration of man to the state from which Adam had fallen by sin. This difference of treatment resulted more or less from the very nature of things. For theological science was still too undeveloped to favor speculative discussion on the natural and supernatural; whereas the grace of redemption through Christ, and its being a restoration of man to his primitive condition, were truths which they found clearly stated in Holy Scripture. The grace of redemption, moreover, even as imparted to individual souls, they looked upon as a deification of human nature, as something really and strictly supernatural. And yet this same grace, they held, had also been conferred on our first parents before the fall; for the redemption was in a

[30] Dogmengeschichte, II, 146–156.

true sense a restoration. Hence whatever may have been the tenor of these writers' "cosmological speculations," they undoubtedly held that man was in the beginning raised to the supernatural state.

Nor is it altogether true that "the Greeks in their cosmological speculations made no room for the supernatural." For as early as the beginning of the third century, St. Irenæus clearly taught that man, whilst still in paradise, was through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit a supernatural image and likeness of God. That deprived of grace by sin, he retained indeed the natural image; but the supernatural likeness, which God had bestowed upon him and which he was to preserve by the good use of his free will, was lost and could be restored only through the grace of Christ.[31] And hence he represents Adam after the fall thus soliloquizing at seeing himself clad in the skins of beasts: "The stole of sanctity, which I had received from the Holy Spirit, I have lost through disobedience, and now I know that I deserve to be covered with this garment, which indeed gives me no delight, but bites and stings the body." [32]

This interpretation of Adam's "likeness" to God was adopted by most subsequent writers, although they usually make reference to it in connection with the grace of redemption. Thus Gregory of Nyssa: "Let us return to that divine grace in which God created man at the beginning, when He said: Let us make man to our image and likeness." [33] The same is implied by Gregory of Nazianzus, when he closes his oration on Adam's glorious condition in paradise, his fall, and redemption through the Incarnate Logos, with the statement: "The culmination of it all is this: my perfection and restoration, and my return to the first Adam." [34] Similarly Basil the Great: "Through the Holy Spirit is bestowed the reinstatement in paradise, the ascent into the kingdom of heaven, the return to the adoption of children." [35] And hence the general principle laid down by the same author, and ad-

[31] Adv. Haer. 5, 6; 2, 33, 4.
[32] Ibid. 3, 23, 5.
[33] De Opif. Hom. 30.
[34] Orat. 38, 16.
[35] De Spir. Sanct. 15.

hered to by all other writers when speaking of this matter: "The (new) dispensation of God and our Saviour in regard to man is a calling back from the fall, a return to God's friendship from the estrangement brought about by disobedience." [36]

Now the grace of Christ, whereby we are restored to our primitive condition, is regarded by all these writers as strictly supernatural; not only in reference to our sinful nature, but as referred to human nature in itself. It is a deification of the creature, the adoption of the servant as God's own child. "In this consists the goodness of God," says St. Athanasius, "that He deigns to be the Father of those of whom He is the Creator. And this comes to pass, when, as the Apostle says, men created by Him receive into their hearts the Spirit of His Son, who cries out, Abba, Father! Such are all those who received the Word, and from Him have power to become the children of God. Because as they are creatures by nature, they can become sons of God only by receiving into themselves the Spirit of the natural and true Son of God. And for this purpose the Word has become flesh, to fit men for the reception of divinity." [37]

Cyril of Jerusalem uses almost the same terms. "Although," he says, "it has been granted us to say, especially in our prayers, 'Our Father who art in heaven,' yet this is a favor that comes to us from the goodness of God. For not as though we were naturally born of the Father who is in heaven, do we call Him Father; but as translated by the grace of the Father from servitude to adoption, through the Son and the Holy Spirit, is it conceded to us by His ineffable bounty so to address Him." [38] His namesake of Alexandria is even more explicit, when he points out that this "deification is beyond the natural capacity of all created nature. This incomprehensible new creation can be attributed only to God, who permits the souls of the saints to share His own divinity through the Holy Spirit, through whom we become conformable to His natural Son." [39]

[36] Ibid. 15, 35.
[37] Contr. Arian. 2, 59.
[38] Catech. 7, 7.
[39] Contr. Eunom. 3, 7; cfr. Athan. Ad Serap.; Greg. Naz. Orat. 34.

How this deification of nature, this human participation of the divinity, is to be understood, appears from the exposition of John Damascene, who interpreted the writings of the earlier Fathers. "Man," he says, "is deified through grace, in as much as he shares in the divine enlightenment, and not because his being is changed into the nature of God."[40] Human nature remains human nature, but it is elevated to a divine plane; it is, so to speak, admitted into God's own family circle.

With this teaching of the Eastern Fathers, their Western contemporaries are in perfect accord. They all subscribed to the saying of Tertullian that we are gods, not by our own nature, but through God's grace. "Those," says Ambrose, "in whom God sees His Son, His own Image, He admits through the Son to the grace of sonship: so that as through the image we are to the image, so through the generation of the Son are we called to the grace of adoption."[41]

The whole matter is thus clearly explained by Augustine, of whose teaching on divine grace and the state of original justice something more will be said in another chapter. Speaking of the grace of the New Law, he says: "This birth (through grace) is spiritual, and therefore not of blood, not of the will of man, nor of the will of the flesh, but of God. And this birth is called adoption. For we were something before we became the sons of God, and we received grace that we might become what we were not; even as he who is adopted, before adoption was not yet the son of him by whom he is adopted, nevertheless he was already such a one as might be adopted. And from this generation through grace must that Son be set apart, who, when He was the Son of God, came to be made the Son of man and to bestow upon us, who were the sons of men, the grace to become the sons of God. He was indeed made what He was not, but nevertheless He was something else; and this very something was the Word of God, through which all things were made, and the true light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world, and God with God. We also through His grace were made what we were

[40] De Fide Orth. 2, 12. [41] De Fide, 5, 3.

not, that is, sons of God; but still we were something, and this same something much inferior, that is, sons of men. He therefore descended that we might ascend, and remaining in His own nature was made partaker of our nature, so that we, remaining in our nature, might be made partakers of His nature." [42]

With all this, however, it is very true that the Fathers did not enter into any speculative consideration of the nature of divine grace. They took a practical view of the matter, and built upon the data supplied by Holy Scripture. But, on the other hand, it is not less true that they had a very definite concept of the elevation of human nature through the grace of Christ, and they either explicitly affirmed or evidently implied a similar elevation when speaking of our first parents before the fall. Hence although there is truth in Tixeront's remark concerning the Greek Fathers, that " from all their affirmations (in reference to man's primitive condition) one can hardly draw a single precise and well connected theory," still it does not eliminate the further truth that in their view of the matter our first parents were elevated above their natural condition, and that along with this elevation, or in consequence of it, they were made the recipients of favors and gifts which were all lost through sin.

[42] Epist. 140 (al. 412); cfr. Retract. 2, 32.

CHAPTER XX

THE WORD INCARNATE: THE REDEMPTION OF THE WORLD

The fourth century Fathers, especially those of the East, set forth their views on the Word Incarnate chiefly in two different connections: First, whilst arguing against the Apollinarian heresy, according to which the humanity of Christ was imperfect, in the sense that the Word had taken the place of the rational soul; secondly, when speaking of the redemption of the world, from which they drew a special argument for the divinity of Christ. The tenets of Apollinaris have already been explained in a previous chapter, hence in this place we need do no more than briefly set down the teaching of orthodox writers on the person of the Saviour; and to this we may appropriately add their views on the work of redemption, as in their minds the two were intimately connected.

A — The Word Incarnate

Practically the same men who defended the Church's doctrine on the Trinity against the various forms of Arianism, also defended her teaching on the God-Man against Apollinarianism. Their line of argument may, for brevity's sake, be reduced to the following points.

1°. "He who before the ages existed as God the Word, became man at Nazareth. He was born of the Virgin Mary and the Holy Spirit, in Bethlehem of Juda, of the seed of David, of Abraham, and of Adam, as it is written; and He took from the Virgin whatever God in the beginning fashioned and contributed to the constitution of man, sin alone excepted."[1] This was effected not by a change of the divinity,

[1] Athan. Contr. Apoll. 2, 5.

but by a renovation of the humanity; "so that man might be truly God, and God might be truly man, and that He should be true man and true God." [2] The union between the human nature of Christ and the divinity of the Word had its beginning at the moment of conception in the Virgin's womb, so that in the union itself the human nature began to exist.[3]

2°. This human nature of the Saviour was in every sense consubstantial with ours: because otherwise "we who had died in Adam would not have been made alive in Christ; that which was broken would not have been restored; that which by the serpent's lie had been estranged would not have been reunited to God." [4] For "that alone is healed which has been assumed by the Word." [5] This lay in God's plan of redemption; and hence "Jesus did not give one thing for another, but a body for a body, a soul for a soul, and a complete being for a whole man." [6] This "whole man," therefore, was assumed by the Word, although the writers in question usually speak of the soul as the immediate bond of union.[7]

3°. As the Saviour's human nature is thus consubstantial with ours, it follows that as man He is subject to all our needs and weaknesses and infirmities, in so far as they naturally affect the body and the affective part of the soul. In this respect "He kept all the consequences of the Incarnation." [8] So far all these writers are agreed; but on the subject of Christ's mental perfections their agreement is not so complete. Athanasius and Nyssa admit a gradual increase of human knowledge in the Saviour, whilst Basil, Amphilochius, Didymus, Epiphanius, and Chrysostom hold that He was perfect in wisdom from the very beginning of His human life.[9] These latter explain the apparently contrary Scripture texts by postulating an economic ignorance and a progressive mani-

[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid. 1, 4.
[4] Basil, Epist. 266, 2.
[5] Greg. Naz. Epist. 101, P. G. 37, 181.
[6] Id. Contr. Apoll. 1, 17.
[7] Id. Epist. 101; Greg. Nyss. Antirrhet. 41.
[8] Didym. De Trin. 3, 21.
[9] Athan. Orat. 3 contra Arian. 54; cfr. ibid. 43, 45, 48; Nyssa, Antirrhet. 28; cfr. ibid. 24. Basil, Ep. 236, 1, 2; Amphil. Fragm. 6; Didym. De Trinit. 3, 22; Epiphan. Ancorat. 32, 38, 78; Chrysost. In Matt. Hom. 77, 1, 2.

festation of wisdom and knowledge. Gregory of Nazianzus also appears to admit that Christ as man was ignorant of some things; for arguing against the Arians, who attributed ignorance of the day of judgment to the Word Itself, he asks: "Is it not clear to all that He knew it as God, and did not know it as man?" [10] However, later writers, and among them John Damascene, interpret Gregory's words as referring to humanity as considered in itself, and not as it existed in Christ.[11]

4°. All are at one in maintaining the perfect holiness and absolute impeccability of Jesus. "He has been specially sanctified and anointed by the Holy Ghost. This sanctification the Saviour as God imparted to Himself as man: He imparted it to Himself that we too might be sanctified." [12] "He is called Christ because of the divinity; for this is the unction of the humanity, sanctifying it not by a mere passing operation, as is the case in others who are anointed, but in such wise that He who anoints (the Word) is called man, and that which is anointed (Christ as man) becomes God." [13] It was because of this substantial unction, consisting in the union of the human and the divine, that Christ was absolutely impeccable. "The incarnation of the Word, effected according to the nature of God, admitted in no sense whatever any of those things which even now cling to us from our ancient heritage, and for this reason are we taught to put off the old man and to put on the new. And in this there is a miracle, both that the Lord was made man and is without sin." [14] Hence Cyril of Alexandria, who wrote somewhat later, does not hesitate to say that "they are stupid and altogether demented who affirm that Christ could have sinned." [15]

5°. The union of the Godhead with the humanity is so intimate that the Saviour's human nature, in so far as it is united to the Godhead, is an object of adoration: "For if the flesh also is in itself a part of the created world, yet it has become

[10] Orat. 30, 15.
[11] De Fide Orthod. 3, 21.
[12] Athan. Ad Adelph. 4.
[13] Naz. Orat. 30, 21.
[14] Athan. Cont. Apollinar. 1, 17.
[15] Contra Antropomorph. 23.

God's body."[16] Still this intimate union does not change the two natures: "You must distinguish the natures, that of God and that of man: nor has Jesus advanced from the nature of man to that of God."[17] "He assumed the humanity in union with the divinity."[18] "Those words of the Saviour: I came down from heaven not to do my will, but the will of Him that sent me, must be understood in this sense, that Christ did not follow the prompting of His human will, but the will of the Godhead; for the (divine) will of the beloved Son was none other than that of God."[19] Hence there are in Christ two wills, the divine and the human, and thus both the Monophysites and the Monothelites are refuted beforehand.

7°. There is in Jesus only one person: He is at the same time both God and man. "It is to be held that Christ is perfect God and perfect man; not that the divine perfection was changed into the human, which it would be impious to say; nor that the two perfections remained separate the one from the other, which it would be equally impious to affirm; nor that the result was effected through an increase of power and an addition of justice, God forbid! But one and the same is both perfect God and perfect man."[20] On this all are agreed, and they are quite familiar with the *communicatio idiomatum,* predicating of the same Christ both human and divine attributes; but the particulars are more clearly set forth by Gregory of Nazianzus. Thus in order to prove that Mary is truly Theotokos, the Mother of God, he points to the fact that it was the Son of God who took flesh in her womb and was born of her, and then continues: "In one word, the Saviour is indeed made up of different elements, for the invisible and the visible are not the same, nor the eternal and the temporal; but for all this He is not other and other, not two persons, God forbid! For the two elements have become one in union, God taking to Himself human nature, and human nature being united to the divinity, or however one should express it. I say different elements, for in the Incarnation we

[16] Athan. Ad Adelph. 3.
[17] Amphiloch. fragm. 9.
[18] Epiphan. Ancor, 75.
[19] Amphiloch. De Trin. 3, 12.
[20] Athan. De Incarn. 1, 16.

have the reverse of what we find in the Trinity; because there we acknowledge another and another, so as not to confound the persons, but not different elements, since the three are one and the same Godhead." [21] This teaching refutes in advance the Nestorian heresy, which was to make its appearance half a century later.

8°. Hence, according to the common teaching of these theologians, the union between the human and the divine elements in Christ is in some way a personal union, since it results in oneness of person; but in what that personal union precisely consists, how it is still further to be explained, they do not undertake to say. Here and there we find general statements that seem to point the way to an ultimate explanation, as far as such an explanation is possible; but they hardly go to the root of the matter. Thus Athanasius says that "the Word has not changed the humanity, but has made the humanity and what belonged to it His own. The humanity was not the Word, but it was the humanity of the Word." [22] The same view is expressed by Gregory of Nyssa when he writes: "By reason of the natural contact and union the wounds and the honors are common to each element, the Lord receiving the stripes of the servant, and the servant being glorified by the honors of the Lord." [23] These and similar statements, which occur frequently in the works of all these writers, indicate with sufficient clearness that the union was regarded as being in the physical order. Of a merely moral union they knew nothing. No definite theory regarding the nature of this physical union was advanced, but the very fact that it was explained as resulting into unity of person without destroying the duality of natures shows that it was considered to be hypostatic.

This, then, represents the Christological teaching of the East, as determined more or less by the aberrations of Apollinaris and his followers; but with it the Christology of the West during the same period of time was in full accord, although in Western lands the heresy of Apollinaris was hardly known. In fact, Latin Christology had already been formu-

[21] Ep. 101.
[22] Ad Epictet. 6.
[23] Cont. Eunom. 5.

lated by Tertullian at the beginning of the third century, when he wrote the terse sentence: "Videmus duplicen statum, non confusum, sed conjunctum in una persona, Deum et hominem Jesum." "We see a twofold state, not confused, but conjoined in one person, God and the man Jesus." Those who came after him did little more than expand this epigrammatic statement as circumstances required. A few examples will make this clear.

Thus Hilary writes: "The change in outward appearance and the assumption of human nature did not destroy the divinity, because it is one and the same Christ who assumed human nature and who appears in mortal garb." [24] Similarly Phœbadius: "What the Virgin conceived that she brought forth, God and man united into one. Each of the two substances, the divine and the human, retained its own properties and its own operations." [25] "Christ is not divided," says St. Ambrose, "but He is one; that is, one in two natures, the divine and the human: for He is not one in so far as He is of the Father, and another one in so far as He is of the Virgin; but one and the same in one way of the Father and in another way of the Virgin." [26] Of the *communicatio idiomatum* Zeno of Verona gives this striking example: "Mary conceived the Creator of the world; she brought forth a child that was before all ages. God wails as an infant, and He who was to pay the debt of the whole world allows Himself to be wrapt in swaddling-clothes. He whose eternity is not susceptible of increase in duration, passes through all the successive stages of advancing age." [27]

These men are evidently thoroughly persuaded that there is a most intimate union between the human and the divine elements in Christ, but they evince no inclination to speculate about its precise nature. They know that there are two natures in the Saviour and only one person, and also that these two natures are so closely united as to form but one being, the God-Man Christ, although each nature, notwithstanding the union, retains its own properties and its own mode of

[24] De Trin. 9, 14.
[25] Cont. Arian. 19, 4.
[26] De Incarn. 35.
[27] Tract. 2, 8, 2; 7, 4.

action. "Utramque substantiam suam," says Phœbadius, "affectus proprietate distinxit." [28] "Suscepit ergo Christus voluntatem meam," St. Ambrose infers from Christ's prayer in the garden, "suscepit tristitiam meam. Mea est voluntas quam suam dixit." [29]

On Christ's absolute sinlessness all are agreed, but with regard to the natural consequences of the Incarnation there is some discrepancy among the Western writers, as there was also among those of the East. Thus St. Hilary is inclined to believe that Christ was normally not capable of suffering, both because of the intimate union of His human nature with the Word and by reason of His virginal birth; whilst the others commonly teach that Christ came in a passible nature, and was therefore in consequence of the Incarnation subject to all our natural weaknesses and infirmities, sin alone excepted.

There is also some difference of views in regard to Christ's mental perfections. Whilst Hilary holds that Christ was perfect in all human knowledge and incapable of real progress in virtue, Jerome is inclined to look upon the progress of Jesus in wisdom and grace, of which the Evangelist speaks, as objective and real. Ambrose is rather undecided, although he favors the view taken by Hilary. In general, however, the Latin writers of this period regard the human knowledge of the Saviour as perfect, although in view of His mission it was not always communicable to others. So was He also perfect in grace, and therefore the Scripture texts that seem to imply the contrary must be understood to refer simply to a progressive outward manifestation of what was in itself perfect from the beginning.

The Christological teaching of these Western writers is also found in the works of St. Augustine, but in many instances he added some further developments of his own. The Son of God, he says, assumed a real human body from a woman, so that both sexes might overcome Satan, and that woman, who had been the cause of death, might also be the cause of life.[30] The formation of Christ's human nature is

[28] Cont. Arian. 5, 18.
[29] De Fide, 2, 53.
[30] De Agon. Christi. 20, 24.

the work of the whole Trinity, although it is rightly appropriated to the Holy Spirit.[31] Christ's was a virginal birth: "Concipiens virgo, pariens virgo, virgo gravida, virgo feta, virgo perpetua."[32] As will be noticed, this is but a summary restatement of traditions that reach back to the earliest centuries. His own contributions to Christology refer more directly to the nature of the union.

Because of the incarnation of the Word, Christ is at one and the same time perfect God and perfect man. He is perfect God by reason of the person assuming, and perfect man by reason of the nature assumed; not that the one was in any way changed into the other, but because the union is so intimate that the two natures, though remaining distinct, are possessed by one person as His very own. "The same who is God is also man, and the same who is man is also God, not by a confusion of natures, but by the unity of person."[33] And this union took place at the moment of conception, so that He who was born of the Virgin was truly Son of God. "The man (in Christ) was never man in such a way that He was not also the only-begotten Son of God, on account of the only-begotten Word."[34] Hence, even as man, Christ cannot be called an adopted Son of God. And this inference the author states explicitly: "Read the Scriptures, nowhere will you find it said of Christ that He is God's adopted Son. There are not two sons of God, God and man, but one Son of God."[35]

Yet the humanity of Christ, which is thus incapable of divine adoption, is complete and perfect, consisting not only of a body, living and sensitive, but also of a rational soul. "For there was in Christ a human soul, a whole soul, not only the irrational part, but also the rational which is called mind."[36] Hence the logical inference is that the union was hypostatic, for this alone would make adoption impossible. And this seems to be the author's consistent view, in spite of his occasionally comparing the union with that which makes

[31] Enchir. 38–40.
[32] Serm. 186, 1.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Opus Imperf. 1, 138.
[35] Cont. Sec. 5.
[36] In Joan. tract. 23, 6.

soul and body one being. God Himself, he says, remains God, but man is united to God, and there results one person; not so that Christ be half God and half man, but perfect God and perfect man, possessing the two natures in the unity of person.[87] To this exposition the later Scholastics could add but little.

The Christological teaching of these centuries is summed up in the Athanasian Symbol as follows: "But for eternal salvation it is necessary that one also faithfully believe the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ. The right faith therefore is this, that we believe and confess that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God and Man. He is God begotten before the ages of the substance of the Father, and He is man born in time of the substance of His mother. Perfect God, perfect man: subsisting in a rational soul and human flesh. Equal to the Father according to the divinity: less than the Father according to the humanity. Who, although God and man, is nevertheless not two, but one Christ. One not by a conversion of the divinity into the flesh, but by an assumption of the humanity into God. Altogether one, not by a confusion of substance, but by the unity of person. For as the rational soul and the flesh is one man, so is God and man one Christ." Of course, this symbol did not then have the force of a definition of the faith, but as it was shortly after the fifth century quite generally accepted, in the East as well as in the West, it bears a most valuable testimony to the faith of those times.

B — The Redemption of the World

Nearly all the writers referred to in the preceding section drew their arguments for the divinity of Christ from the nature of His redemptive work. They looked upon it as more or less self-evident that if Christ was really the Redeemer of the world, who lifted up the fallen race and reunited it to God, then He Himself must be God. Sin had corrupted human nature in its inmost being, and this corruption could not be

[87] De Civit. Dei, 12, 2.

done away with, except the nature so corrupted be brought into physical contact with the Godhead. Not that this was absolutely necessary for the forgiveness of sin, but it was required for the full restoration of our fallen nature to its union with God. Hence these writers infer the necessity of the Incarnation from the redeeming will of the all-merciful Father. He wished to save sinful man, therefore His only-begotten Son must assume human nature and through it accomplish man's redemption. It is true, as they all admit, He could have saved the world in other ways, but none would have been as suitable and as effective in remedying the disastrous consequences of sin; therefore, presupposing the redeeming will of God and taking it in its fullest sense, as we are entitled to do from the teaching of Holy Scripture, the Incarnation was a matter of necessity. This seems to have been the common view of all these theologians, as will appear more clearly from a brief summary of their teaching on the subject of redemption.

In the Antenicene writers two aspects of the redemption are usually brought out very prominently. The first is that Christ was the representative of the fallen race, the second Adam, who in some way gathered up all mankind in Himself, so that in His death for sin all died with Him and were thereby restored to newness of life. This is much insisted on by St. Irenæus, who comes back to it in several places. Thus speaking of what the Incarnation of the Word really means, he says: "When He was incarnate and made man, He summed up in Himself the long roll of the human race, securing for us all a summary salvation, so that we should regain in Christ Jesus what we had lost in Adam, namely, the being in the image and likeness of God." [38] The other view represented Christ as the juridical substitute for the fallen race, who in the place of sinners made satisfaction to God for the offences committed against His sovereign majesty. This we find already considerably developed in the Letter to Diognetus. Referring to the Incarnation as "a grand and unspeakable thing," the author continues: "O the boundless

[38] Adv. Haer. 5, 21, 1.

love of God! He hated us not, nor did He cast us away, nor did He take revenge. On the contrary, He suffered us to be, and yet more, moved by mercy, He loaded Himself with our sins, and gave His own Son as a redemption for us, the Holy for the wicked, the Blameless for the guilty, the Righteous for the unrighteous, the Incorruptible for the corruptible, the Immortal for mortal men; for what else could have blotted out our sins save His righteousness? Who could have justified us impious sinners save only the Son of God?" [39] As is evident, both of these views are based upon the teaching of St. Paul.

At the beginning of the third century two other aspects of the redemption came into prominence. In the one, which is developed to some extent by Origen, there is question of a ransom being paid to Satan for the liberation of sinful man from his slavery. By the free exercise of his will, man had yielded to the inducements set before him by Satan, and thus sold himself into captivity. God could indeed have liberated him by force, but it was more in accord with His justice that He should do so by the payment of a ransom. This consisted in the death of Jesus, in as much as Satan instigated the Jews to crucify Him unjustly, and for that he was rightly deprived of his dominion over man. In the other view the sanctification of the human race through the Incarnation itself is emphasized. Origen speaks of it as follows: "Since the Incarnation the divine and the human nature began to be woven together, in order that the human nature might become divine through a communication with the more divine, not only in Jesus but also in all those who along with belief receive the life which Jesus taught." [40]

In the course of the fourth century these different views, which had till then been stated more or less casually, were gradually reduced to three separate theories concerning the redemption. The first is known as the Physical or Mystical Theory, according to which the Incarnation itself has in some way a redemptive value, in as much as sinful human nature

[39] Ad Diognet. 9. [40] Cont. Cels. 3, 28.

by its contact with the divinity, through the humanity of the God-Man, is cleansed and sanctified and raised to new life. This was much favored by St. Athanasius and St. Gregory of Nyssa. The former says: "Just as when a great king has entered some important city and takes up his dwelling in the houses thereof, such a city is certainly deemed worthy of honor, and no enemy or bandit any more attacks or overpowers it, but it is counted worthy of all respect because of the king who has taken up his dwelling in one of its houses; so it has happened in the case of the King of all. For since He came into our domain and took up His dwelling in a body like ours, attacks of enemies upon men have entirely ceased, and the corruption of death which of old prevailed against them has vanished away." [41]

The second, whilst not excluding the foregoing, lays special stress on the sufferings and death of the Saviour, as a satisfaction offered to the justice of God. Man by his sins contracted a debt with God which he was unable to pay; hence the sinless Christ substitutes Himself for sinful man, offering a condign and superabundant satisfaction to God's offended majesty. This is usually called the Realistic or Substitution Theory. It was strongly defended by Basil, Didymus, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Chrysostom, and was admitted by all the others. A few citations will be sufficient to show us the mind of these writers.

Thus Basil, drawing from the redemption an argument for the divinity of Christ, says: "Moses did not deliver his people from sin, he was unable even to offer an expiation to God for himself when he was in sin. Hence it is not from a man that we must expect this expiation, but from one who surpasses our nature, from Jesus Christ the God-Man, who alone can offer God a sufficient expiation for us all." [42] Similarly Gregory of Nazianzus: "He delivers us from the power of sin by giving Himself in our stead as a ransom which cleanses the world." [43] And again: "Just as He became a curse and sin for my salvation, He made Himself into a

[41] De Incarn. 9.
[42] In Ps. 48, 3-4.
[43] Orat. 30, 20.

second Adam instead of the old; He took unto Himself and made His own our rebellion, as the head of the whole body. On the cross it was not He who was forsaken; He occupied our own position; it was ourselves who were abandoned and despised; He saved us by His sufferings, for He made our sins His own." [44] With this Gregory of Nyssa connects Christ's priesthood: "With His own blood He presented the priestly expiation for sin. He sacrificed His own body for the sins of the world. He humbled Himself in the form of a servant and offered Himself in sacrifice for us." [45]

The third theory that began to be rather common during the fourth century is styled the Satan's Rights Theory, to which reference was made in a preceding paragraph. It was strongly emphasized by Gregory of Nyssa, and frequently made use of by most of the others in their sermons to the people. Gregory of Nazianzus, however, rejects it absolutely. "Was the ransom paid to the evil one?" he asks indignantly; "it is a monstrous thought. If to the evil one, what an outrage? Then the robber receives a ransom, not only from God, but one which consists of God Himself, and for his usurpation he gets so illustrious a payment — a payment for which it would have been right to have left us alone altogether." [46] No doubt, if put in this way, the thought is "monstrous," but most of these writers used it for oratorical purposes, emphasizing the teaching of the Apostle that he who sins becomes the servant of sin; and in this sense, barring a few oratorical exaggerations, there was nothing "monstrous" about either the thought or its popular presentation.

The fruit of the redemption is placed by all in man's restitution to the place whence he had fallen by sin. It gives back to him what he had lost, frees him from sin and death, restores immortality, and deifies him. "Jesus, who was God's own Son, became son of man in order to make the sons of men children of God." [47]

With this teaching the Western writers are in perfect agree-

[44] Ibid. 5.
[45] Cont. Eunom. 6.
[46] Orat. 45, 22.
[47] Chrysost. In Joan. Hom. 2, 1; cfr. Athan. Ad Adeph. 4.

ment; however, they usually emphasize the Realistic or Substitution Theory of redemption. "As all men," says Ambrose, "were held in an hereditary bondage, it was necessary that Jesus should take up our cause, should be substituted for us, and that, assuming the debt of us all and becoming our security, He should suffer, atone, and pay in the name and stead of us all." [48] But this substitution was entirely voluntary on the part of Christ. "He offered Himself to the death of the accursed," writes Hilary, "so that He might remove the curse of the law, presenting Himself voluntarily as a victim to God the Father." [49] The satisfaction which He thus rendered was a superabundant atonement and redemption for all the sins of the world.[50] It was a true sacrifice of propitiation: "For according to the Apostle He is our peace-offering, in whose blood we have been reconciled to God." [51]

To this teaching St. Augustine added little by way of further development. His leading thesis is: "If man had not perished, the Son of man would not have come." [52] Hence, the redemption of mankind from sin forms the primary motive of the Incarnation. Christ came indeed also to manifest God's wisdom, and to give us an example of right living, but all this is secondary.[53] In our utter misery, resulting from sin, God wished to give us hope, and he had no more effective means of doing this than to show us what a price He was willing to pay for our redemption. Hence, the Son, whom He had begotten from His own substance, entered into fellowship with our nature, bore our sins, endured all our ills, and opened up for us again the way to eternal life.[54] Hence, the Incarnation, in all its aims and purposes, is a work of love. And this love of God does not merely result from the Incarnation, but preceded it as a motive cause. "For it was not from the time that we were reconciled to Him by the blood of His Son that He began to love us; but He loved us from the foundation of the World. . . . We were reconciled

[48] In Ps. 118; De Incarn. 60.
[49] In Ps. 53, 13.
[50] Ambrose, In Ps. 48, 13–15.
[51] Id. In Ps. 54, 4.
[52] Serm. 174, 2.
[53] In Joan. tract. 98, 3.
[54] De Trin. 13, 13.

unto Him who already loved us, but with whom we were at enmity because of our sins." [55]

In his further development of the subject, St. Augustine considers the redemption under many different aspects. Christ is our substitute, He paid our ransom, He gave satisfaction for our sins, He offered for us a propitiatory sacrifice.[56] In principle the redemption is universal, but in fact those only profit by it who are willing to do so.[57]

In this condition the doctrine of the atonement remained during the rest of the Patristic age, except that the Substitution Theory of redemption was gradually gaining ground. The one point that was ever retained, and which had been emphasized from the very beginning of Christianity, was the fact of the redemption itself. Christ truly redeemed us from sin, and through Him were we reconciled to the Father.

[55] Tract. In Joan 90, 6.
[56] Cfr. Cont. Faust. 14, 6, 7; De Trin. 13, 21; 4, 17.
[57] Serm. 244, 5.

CHAPTER XXI

THE DONATIST HERESY: ECCLESIOLOGY[1]

From the very beginning of Christianity it was a cardinal point of orthodox teaching that the fruits of the redemption were laid up in the Church of Christ, that salvation was made dependent on her ministrations, and that therefore Christian life must necessarily bear a social aspect. This idea, which is indeed fundamental in Christ's message to the world, was in course of time more and more emphasized in proportion as heresies and schisms threatened to rend asunder the unity of the Church. On such occasions it became necessary for the defenders of orthodoxy and Church unity to place the social aspect of Christianity in the foreground, and to clear up ideas on ecclesiastical government and sacerdotal powers. During the fourth century this work devolved largely on the theologians of the West, as it was chiefly there that the Donatist schism brought the question to an issue. Besides, during this period, as was indicated in the preceding chapters, the East was kept busy with its Trinitarian and Christological controversies, and so the discussion of ecclesiological problems was in large measure left to Western theologians.

The Donatist schism, which affected chiefly the Church in Africa, dated from the beginning of the fourth century, and was indirectly a result of Diocletian's persecution. In 311 the archdeacon Cæcilian was elected successor to Mensurius, the late bishop of Carthage. He was consecrated by Felix of Aptonga, whom many regarded as a *traditor,* because he was reported to have given up the Holy Books during the persecution. Professedly on this account a strong party was formed

[1] Cfr. Leclercq, L'Afrique Chretienne, I; *Bethune-Baker, An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine, 357–375; Tixeront, H. D. II, 220–229.

against Cæcilian, though the opposition to him seems to have been instigated by a certain Lucilla, a rich lady, whom he had somehow offended. In the following year about seventy bishops gathered at Carthage, and although not a few of them were themselves *traditores,* they deposed Cæcilian and in his stead consecrated Majorinus, who was of the household of Lucilla. Two years later Majorinus was succeeded by Donatus, from whom the party took its name. On account of his strict asceticism and singular executive ability, he is known to history as Donatus the Great. He thoroughly organized the party and wrote voluminously in its defense. Soon the whole of Proconsular Africa and Numidia were involved in the strife. Pope and Emperor tried repeatedly to settle the dispute, but it dragged its weary length through the whole of the fourth century. In spite of the condemnation passed upon the schismatics, first by a commission of bishops at Rome, in 313, and then by the Council of Arles, in 314, the party increased so rapidly that by the middle of the century it counted over 300 bishops. It was only through the patient efforts of St. Augustine, in the first quarter of the fifth century, that peace was finally restored.

Although it is rather difficult to absolve the Donatists from the reproach of heresy, still Augustine always treated them merely as schismatics. The doctrinal points involved in the dispute bore chiefly upon the Church and the administration of the sacraments. Public and notorious sinners, it was contended, do not belong to the Church; and outside the true Church, by which of course the Donatist sect was understood, no sacraments can be administered validly. The first of these contentions the sectaries tried to defend by adducing the statement of St. Paul, that Christ disposed unto Himself a holy Church, not having spot or wrinkle. This should logically have led them to exclude all secret sinners as well, but for reasons of their own they maintained that it applied to public and notorious sinners only. Their second contention they based upon the principle that no one can give what he himself does not possess. The sacraments, they said, belong to the Church, and therefore they can be validly administered only

by a member of her communion. In this, moreover, they appealed to the authority of St. Cyprian, who some sixty years before had taken a similar stand.

It was chiefly in connection with these contentions of the Donatists that the Western theologians found occasion to set forth their ideas on the Church of Christ, and to explain somewhat in detail points of doctrine which had till then been referred to only in a general way. However before examining into this, it may be well to give a brief outline of what was taught on this subject by contemporary writers in the East, whose views were not influenced by the Donatist controversy. This will make it more easy to detect the particular developments of doctrine that resulted from the discussion. The following points will suffice for the purpose:

1°. Although the Eastern writers of this period did not treat the matter professedly, still their casual references to it show with sufficient clearness that they adhered closely to the traditional view, already somewhat developed during the second and third centuries. According to this, the Church is the spouse of Christ, the mother of His children, the depository of the spiritual treasures which were purchased by the redemption. Thence is inferred the unity of the Church, and the obligation incumbent upon all to belong to her communion. This union is destroyed not only by heretics who alter her doctrines, but also by schismatics who refuse to acknowledge her authority. For the Church is infallible in her teaching, she is the pillar and groundwork of the truth, and was destined by Christ to spread over all the world and to embrace all mankind.[2]

2°. The Church is Catholic not only in her universality, but also in opposition to the sects. "When you are traveling to other cities," St. Cyril of Jerusalem tells his hearers, "do not ask simply where is the *Dominicum*, the House of the Lord; for the impious and heretical sects also designate their dens by this name; nor ask simply where is the Church, but where is the Catholic Church: because this is the proper name

[2] Cfr. Chrysost. In Ep. ad Ephes. Hom. 11, 5; In Matt. Hom. 54, 2; Greg. Naz. Orat. 18, 6; Cyril, Catech. 18, 23.

of this holy mother, the mother of us all." [3] St. Epiphanius brings out this same point. "We never heard," he says, "of Petrines, or Paulines, or Bartholomæans, or Thadæans, but from the first there was one preaching of all the Apostles, not preaching themselves, but Christ Jesus the Lord. Wherefore also all gave one name to the Church, not their own, but that of their Lord Jesus Christ, since they began to be called Christians first at Antioch; which is the sole Catholic Church, having naught else but what is Christ's, being a church of Christians; not of Christs, but of Christians; He being one, they are from that one called Christians. Besides this church and her preachers, there are none others of such a character, as is shown by their own epithets, Manichæans, and Simonians, and Valentinians, and Ebionites." [4]

It is to this Church that the name "One Holy Catholic" belongs. To this all bear witness. Besides, the four notes of the Church, which are defended as essential in Catholic theology to-day, are thus given in the symbol ascribed to the Council of Constantinople, held in 381: "We confess One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church." This symbol, which most likely had its origin in the church of Jerusalem, was approved by the council just mentioned, and implicitly also by that of Chalcedon in 451, shortly after which it was received into the liturgy. Its teaching, therefore, embodies the common view of Eastern theologians during these centuries.

3°. The government of the Church is hierarchial, and the distinction between the higher orders is not merely a matter of ecclesiastical legislation. It involves a difference of powers which were conceded by God. Thus Epiphanius writes: "To say that priests and bishops are equal is the height of stupidity, as is plain to any prudent man. For how could this be? The order of the episcopacy has for its object to beget fathers, for it brings forth fathers to the Church; but the presbyterate, as it cannot beget fathers, brings forth children to the Church through the laver of regeneration; not, however, fathers and teachers. And how is it possible that he should

[3] Ibid. 26. [4] Panar. 42.

appoint any one as priest, who has not the power to make him such by the imposition of hands?" [5]

4°. The Church was founded on Peter, who established his episcopal see at Rome, and died there after having governed the faithful since his arrival in the imperial city during twenty-five years. This view is recorded by Eusebius and seems to have been universally accepted.[6] The Primacy of Peter is frequently alluded to by fourth century writers in the East, and some of them grow quite enthusiastic when they refer to his prerogatives as prince of the Apostles. They all agree with St. Ephrem, who impersonating Christ thus addresses Simon Peter: "Simon, my disciple, I have placed thee as the foundation of my Holy Church. Before I called thee Rock, because thou shalt bear up the whole building. Thou art the overseer of those who shall build up for me the Church upon the earth. If they are minded to build badly, do thou as the foundation restrain them. Thou art the head of that fountain from which my doctrine is drawn, thou art the head of my disciples; through thee will I give drink to all the nations. Thine is that vivifying sweetness which I bestow. Thee have I chosen to be the first-born in my dispensation, the heir of my treasures; to thee have I given the keys of my kingdom. Behold, I have placed thee as the chief stewart over all my treasures." [7]

5°. From this double fact, that Peter had established his see at Rome and that he had received charge over the whole Church, the inference was as obvious as it was inevitable that the Bishop of Rome held the Primacy over all the churches that claimed communion with the Church of Christ. And this inference was clearly drawn by the bishops of the East, although they gave expression to it by their acts rather than in words. Thus when Dionysius of Alexandria was suspected of heresy, his own church reported him to the Bishop of Rome, who unhesitatingly called him to account, and Dionysius rendered his account without a thought of ques-

[5] Ibid. 75, 4.
[6] Hist. Eccl. 2, 14; 15.
[7] Serm. in Hebd. Sanct. 4, 1; cfr. Didym. De Trin. 1, 27, 30; Epiph. Anchor. 9, 34; Id. De Iudic. 7.

tioning the Pope's authority in the matter. When Athanasius was persecuted by the Eusebians, "he sought refuge in Rome as in a most safe harbor of his communion." And when Pope Julius a little later reprimanded the Eusebians for their unjust deposition of Athanasius, and asked them as one having authority, "do you not know that this is the custom, that you should first write to us, and that what is right should be settled here?"—this, as is stated by the Greek historians Sozomon and Socrates, who make mention of it, caused no surprise to any one."[8] It was precisely what all the world somehow took for granted as the proper course to be taken by the incumbent of Blessed Peter's see. And thus scores of other instances might be cited, all of which show that Rome's preëminence was generally acknowledged in Eastern countries, although in the heat of the conflict it was often set aside by the discontented parties.

6°. The unwarranted interference of dogmatizing emperors with the affairs of the Church gave the defenders of her rights many an opportunity of proclaiming her independence of the State in matters appertaining to her own sphere. Nor did they fail to speak out their minds boldly, when the occasion for so doing presented itself. "The domain of royalty is one thing," exclaims Chrysostom, "and the power of the priesthood is another; it excels the power of kings."[9] This, indeed, was not the language of court-bishops, but it expressed the views of all those who were faithful to their duty as shepherds of Christ's flock.

These fundamental doctrines on the nature of the Church as a social body, the importance of her position in the economy of salvation, her *de jure* independence of State interference, and the preëminence of the Bishop of Rome as a logical consequence of his acknowledged succession to Peter, were also held by contemporary Western writers, even when they set forth their views without reference to the Donatist schism. And the reason is that all of this is nothing more than a casual statement of what was found to be contained in the earliest

[8] Sozom. Hist. Eccl. 3, 8, 10; Socrat. 2, 8, 15, 17.

[9] In illud "Vidi Dominum," Hom. 4, 4, 5.

teaching of Christianity. Clement of Rome, Ignatius of Antioch, Irenæus of Lyons, and Cyprian of Carthage, had advanced the same doctrines in a manner equally as clear and emphatic. It is true, they made no direct reference to the Church's independence of State interference; but the reason of the omission is evident. The State was then pagan, and although it ventured to kill Christian believers, it did at least not presume to define Christian faith.

As the Donatist schism was practically confined to Africa, not all the Western theologians took part in the discussion. The brunt of the battle was borne by two African bishops, Opatus of Mileve and Augustine of Hippo. The former carried on the discussion chiefly with Parmenian, the successor of Donatus in the see of Carthage, and the latter with Petilian, Donatist bishop of Cirta. Besides these, however, they also met other adversaries.

It was about 370 that Opatus wrote his great work, entitled, *Contra Parmenianum Donatistam.* It comprises seven books, of which the second deals with the doctrinal aspect of the question. Its fundamental thesis is: "There is only one Church of Christ, and this is the one that is in communion with the Chair of Peter." Around this all his other expositions and arguments are ranged.[10] In order to understand and follow his argumentation, it must be borne in mind that the Donatists placed the holiness of the Church in the sanctity of her individual members, and that they made this the distinguishing mark of the true Church. Furthermore, as they recognized no holiness except in persons of their own persuasion, they claimed, logically enough, that they alone constituted the true Church of Christ. It is to this pretension that Optatus replies in the second book of his work, and then develops his views somewhat further in the seventh.

Starting from the general concepts, then current both in the West and in the East, that the Church is "the house of God where His children dwell," "Christ's mystical body of which the faithful are members," "the same to-day and yes-

[10] Cont. Parmen. II, 28.

terday, and till the end of time," He points out that she is recognized chiefly by two marks — Catholicity and Unity. "Therefore the Church is one, whose holiness is gathered from her sacraments, and not measured by the pride of persons. This one Church cannot be identified with every one of the different heretical sects, nor with the schismatical bodies; she must then be that of the one or the other of these many communities. You, brother Parmenian, say that yours is the one Church of Christ. Therefore she is in this small country alone? And not with us? Not in Spain, in Gaul, in Italy, where you are not? Nor in all the other provinces and islands where you are not now, nor ever will be? Where, then, is the propriety in calling her Catholic, since she is termed Catholic precisely because she is consistent and spread all over the world? This was promised her in the Saviour to whom it was said: To thee will I give the Gentiles for an inheritance, and the ends of the earth for a possession." [11] Hence, the author concludes, any merely national church, such as at best the Donatist sect is, is by that very fact shown not to be the Church of Christ.

The first mark of the Church, therefore, is that of Catholicity; the second is Unity. Parmian, forced by the exigencies of the controversy, had named six other marks besides that of holiness; five of these Optatus admits, but he fixes on Unity as the most essential. The Church must be one, excluding both heresy and schism. It was to secure this that Christ made Peter the foundation of His Church. "We must inquire, therefore, where Peter established his *cathedra*. Now you cannot deny that you are perfectly aware of the fact that Peter established his episcopal chair in the city of Rome, where he sat as the head of all the Apostles. That thus unity might be observed by them all, and not each one stand up for his own, thereby becoming a schismatic and a sinner. In this one chair, therefore, which holds the first place in the Saviour's dowry to His Church, first Peter sat, who was succeeded by Linus, and Linus was succeeded by Clement . . . and Damasus

[11] Ibid. II, 28, 29.

was succeeded by Siricius, with whom to-day we are in communion, and with whom all the world through epistolary communication is associated in the unity of faith. Do you, who wish to claim the Holy Church for yourselves, now then show the origin of your *cathedra.*" [12]

This is not only the mark of Unity, but of Apostolicity as well; for it is a unity that is based on the Primacy of the Bishop of Rome, in virtue of his succession to the place and the prerogatives of Peter, as all the world acknowledges. Hence whatever church is not in communion with Rome, is by that very fact proved to be not the Church of Christ. And of this the Donatists themselves are aware, for they have tried to establish a bishop at Rome; but this is a vain endeavor, as he does not have the *cathedra* whereon Peter sat. He is a son without a father, a disciple without a master.[13]

Then taking up the question of holiness, the author admits that the Church of Christ must indeed be holy; but this holiness does not exclude sinners from her fold. She is the field mentioned in the Gospel, wherein wheat and cockle grew together until the time of the harvest. Her holiness consists first and foremost in her sacraments, by which she sanctifies her children and receives back the erring. On the day of judgment, indeed, there shall be a separation of the good and the bad, but until then we must suffer them to grow up together. For it is unlawful that we bishops should do what the Apostles did not do, who gave no permission either to separate the seed or to tear up the cockle from among the wheat. The Blessed Peter fell by denying his Master, but he did penance and thereby merited to be, for the sake of unity, the sole recipient of the keys, the use of which he was also to communicate to others. If you, Donatists, will follow his example and be truly converted from your erring ways, why should the Catholic Church refuse to receive you back into her communion? [14]

This same line of thought was also followed by St. Augustine, who for many years, in letters and sermons and controversial treatises, labored strenuously and prudently to heal

[12] Ibid. II, 31, 32.
[13] Ibid. II, 32, 33.
[14] Ibid. VII, 2, 3, 19.

the terrible schism, until during the three days conference held at Carthage, in 411, he defended the Catholic cause with such learning and charity that he carried all before him. From that time forward the schism gradually declined, although it did not entirely disappear until about a century later.

Although Parmenian had been thoroughly refuted by Optatus, still the Donatists boasted that he had never been fully answered, and indeed could not be answered. Augustine wrote three books against him in 401, and about the same time he composed seven books on baptism, in which he shows that the Donatists' appeal to Cyprian in support of their schism is extremely foolish, as the saintly bishop of Carthage never dreamed of separating himself from the universal Church. Next he wrote three books against Petilian, another Donatist champion, and utterly demolished his arguments. And when Petilian's defense was taken up by Cresconius, Augustine answered him in four books. To these controversial works, he added a treatise on the Unity of the Church, addressed to Catholics, for the purpose of enabling them to answer the quibblings of their Donatist friends. Besides this, he also treated the points at issue in several letters to private individuals, of which those to Honoratus, Generosus, and Glorius Felix may be instanced.

His main contention in all these writings is that there can be no reason sufficiently grave to justify a local community in separating itself from the universal Church, and if this were nevertheless done, that separation alone would prove to evidence that such a community had broken with the Church of Christ. "What can be clearer," he asks, "than the promises of God uttered thousands of years ago, and accomplished before our own eyes, namely, that in the seed of Abraham, which is Christ, all nations should be blessed? And what more obscure than the presumption of those men who assert that Christianity has perished in the whole world, Africa alone excepted? And this presumption of theirs they call light!" [15] "The question between us is, where is the Church? Christ

[15] Ad Parmen. 2, 1.

says in all nations. And you, who are not in communion with all nations, how can you be His sheep? Where the Church is, there is His fold. Whoever, therefore, draw away men from this fold are but ravening wolves that slay the sheep, by separating them from the life of unity." [16] "Therefore, whoever draws away any one from the universal Church to any sect, is a murderer and a child of Satan." [17]

These promises contained in Holy Writ, that the Church of Christ should be universal, embracing all mankind, he insists upon again and again. And with this he connects the idea that the Church must be Apostolic. Thus writing to Generosus, he says: "Holding, therefore, by these promises, should an angel from heaven ask you to quit the Christianity of the whole world and pass over to the Donatists, let him be anathema. For if it is a question of episcopal succession, the surest way is to count from Peter himself, to whom, as representing the whole Church, the Lord said: 'On this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against her.'" To Peter succeeded Linus, to Linus Clement . . . to Siricius, Anastasius, who now occupies the same see. In this succession no Donatist occurs; but they have sent one from Africa, who governing a few Africans keeps up there the mountaineers." [18]

Thus the universal Church traces back her origin through the Apostles to Christ Himself, and she shall endure till the end of time. She is truly Apostolic and indefectible. Commenting on verse 17 of Psalm 44, "Instead of thy fathers, sons are born to thee," he says: "Nothing is more evident. Only fix your eyes on the temple of the King, because thus He speaks in respect of unity diffused over all the earth. . . . Instead of thy fathers, sons are born to thee. The Apostles brought thee forth: they were sent, they preached, they are the fathers. But could they remain always with us bodily? . . . Even to the present time? Even till the remote future? Was then the Church left deserted by their going hence? By no means. . . . Instead of thy fathers, sons are born to thee. What does this mean? The Apostles were sent as fathers,

[16] Ad Petil. 2, 78.
[17] Ibid. 2, 13.
[18] Epist. 53.

in place of the Apostles sons are born to thee, bishops are constituted. For the bishops of to-day, who are dispersed all through the world, whence were they born? The Church herself calls them fathers, she brought them forth, and she placed them in the chairs of the fathers. Do not therefore consider yourself deserted, because you see not Peter, because you see not Paul, because you see not those of whom you were born: of your own children has grown up for you a Paternity. . . . See the temple of the King, how widely extended it is! . . . This is the Catholic Church: her sons are constituted princes over all the earth; her sons have been put in the place of the fathers. Let those who are separated from her acknowledge this, let them return to the unity, let them be brought into the temple of the King. This temple is built everywhere, placed firmly on the foundation of the Prophets and the Apostles." [19]

This wide diffusion of the Church, of course, implies unity; without that she would not be Catholic. The sects may also be widely diffused, if one takes them altogether, but this does not make them Catholic; because they are not united into one body, each one differing from the other and flourishing in its own little place.[20] The Church is the spouse of Christ, and as such she is one. All her children are united by the bond of faith, and if any one teaches unsound doctrines, he is a heretic and must be avoided as an enemy.[21] They are all linked together by a mutual charity, avoiding schism. It is a unity prefigured by the Saviour's seamless coat.[22] And finally they are all in communion with the *cathedra* of Peter.[23]

And this Church is Holy, but with a holiness that does not exclude sinners. She is a "corpus permixtum," as Christ Himself pointed out in His parables of the wheat and tares and the draw-net with its good fish and bad. Her sanctity, therefore, does not primarily consist in the holiness of her individual members, but rather in her power and mission to sanctify all by teaching the truth and communicating God's

[19] Enar. in Ps. 44, 32.
[20] Serm. 46, 18.
[21] De Civit. Dei, 18, 51, 1.
[22] Serm. 265, 7.
[23] Serm. 259, 2, 2.

grace through the administration of her sacraments.[24] Yet there is in the Church a certain select body, holy souls, the "invisibilis caritatis compago," spiritually as distinct from her sinful members as Catholics are from heretics; but they do not form a church by themselves, as the Donatists affirm. The two classes constitute one Church of Christ, "propter temporalem commixtionem et communionem sacramentorum." [25]

In matters of faith, this "One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church" is an infallible guide. "She is the predestined pillar and groundwork of truth." [26] She stands like a solid rampart against all errors; heresies may indeed originate in the ranks of her children, but the gates of hell shall never prevail against her.[27] Such is the weight of her authority that whoso attacks her shall be dashed to pieces.[28] The source of this infallibility is the permanent assistance of Jesus Christ, who governs her through the Holy Spirit.[29] No heresy can drag her away from the path of truth; because Christ, her Head in heaven, guides and directs her as His own body.[30] If it were not for this indwelling and guidance of the Lord, she too, like the sects, would lapse into error.[31] But now she is the supreme authority in matters of faith, and also the legitimate and unerring interpreter of Holy Scripture and tradition.[32] Refusal to acknowledge her as such is either the height of impiety or stupid arrogance.[33]

The Primacy over the universal Church is held by the Bishop of Rome. That this was really Augustine's view cannot be doubted, although Protestants are usually at great pains to controvert the fact. "Peter," he says, "received the Primacy over the other disciples"; [34] "to him the Lord, after His resurrection, confided the feeding of His flock"; [35] and it is the Roman Church "in which the Primacy of the Apostolic

[24] De Utilitate Credendi, 35.
[25] De Doctr. Christ. 3, 45.
[26] In Ps. 103, 17.
[27] De Symb. ad Catech. Serm. 1, 14.
[28] Serm. 294, 18.
[29] Enar. in Ps. 56, 1.
[30] De Nupt. et Concup. 1, 20, 22.
[31] Enar. in Ps. 9, 12.
[32] De Doctr. Christ. 3, 27, 38.
[33] De Until. Cred. 17, 35.
[34] Enar. in Ps. 108, 1.
[35] Contr. Epist. Fund. 6.

cathedra has ever maintained its vigor." [36] It was because of his firm belief in the Primacy of Rome that Augustine so readily allowed appeals from his own judgment to that of the Pope,[37] and that he was so careful to have the decisions of African synods approved by Papal rescripts.

Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he also took the next step, and ascribed to the Pope the prerogative of infallibility in matters appertaining to faith and morals. That the universal Church, as gathered in an ecumenical council, "plenario totius orbis concilio," is divinely preserved from teaching error, he states in so many words.[38] He also states that particular synods, whether merely provincial or national, as "plenarium totius Africæ concilium," can justly claim the right to close all further discussion; [39] not, however, by any inherent authority of their own, but in so far as their decisions are accepted and confirmed by the Pope.[40] That this statement implies belief in Papal infallibility is obvious. For it is the Pope's confirmation that makes the decisions of these particular synods irreformable. Hence in his discussion with Julius of Eclanum, Augustine reproaches him severely with not having listened to Pope Innocent, whose decisions could not corrupt the ancient doctrine of the Church.[41] Furthermore, in matters of faith, he says, it is the duty of all to have recourse to the Apostolic See and its pastoral ministry; for God specially directs the Pope in giving his decisions.[42] It is true, the oft quoted phrase: "Roma locuta est, causa finita est," is not found verbally in any writings of Augustine; but its equivalents occur again and again. And this is all that can be required to make him a staunch supporter of Papal infallibility.

In connection with this it may be of interest to note the reasons which St. Augustine assigned for his remaining in the universal or Catholic Church. Writing against the Funda-

[36] Ep. 43, 7.
[37] Ep. 209.
[38] Serm. 294, 21, 20; De Bapt. 1, 7, 9.
[39] Serm. 131, 10.
[40] Ibid.; Cont. Duas Ep. Pel. 3, 3, 5.
[41] Cont. Jul. 1, 4, 13.
[42] Ep. 176, 2.

mental Epistle of Mani, he says: "You ask, what retains me in the Catholic Church? Without pretending to that profound wisdom and knowledge which falls to the lot of a few, and whose existence in the Catholic Church you deny, I say with the simple faithful, that many other things retain me: the consent of peoples and nations; authority founded in miracles, nourished by hope, perfected by charity, confirmed by antiquity; the succession of bishops from the Apostle Peter to him who now occupies his see; in fine the very name Catholic, which the Church has always retained, so that if in any country you ask for the Catholic Church, not even one of the sectaries will point to his conventicle. These bonds suffice to retain me in the Catholic Church, even though my dulness of understanding or imperfect life should deprive me of deeper knowledge." [43]

These expositions of Augustine and Optatus brought the traditional teaching on the Church and her powers to a point where it practically remained during the Patristic age. Later Popes continue to urge, as their predecessors did before them, that in matters of faith and universal discipline the final decision rests with them; bishops and particular councils as a general rule admit the validity of this claim, and so likewise do several general councils; individual theologians here and there emphasize one point or another in reference to the constitution of the Church, her divine mission to teach and save all men, and her title to the obedience of high and low in all matters appertaining to the life of faith: but in all this no appreciable advance is made over what was firmly established and clearly understood by the end of the Donatist controversy. Only after the birth of Scholasticism was the work of development along these lines taken up again, to be finally completed in the definitions of the Vatican Council.

[43] C. 4, n. 5.

CHAPTER XXII

SACRAMENTAL THEOLOGY[1]

The second contention of the Donatists, as indicated above, touched the validity of the sacraments when conferred outside their own sect. Not only did they rebaptize those who came to them from any other communion, but they laid it down as a fundamental principle that no one could administer any sacrament validly, or offer the Holy Sacrifice, except he were a member of the true Church of Christ, which, of course, they identified with their own. In some respects this was a logical deduction from the position taken by St. Cyprian and his friends in the time of Pope Stephen. For they, too, made the sacraments and the Holy Spirit so exclusively the possession of the Church that outside her communion neither the one nor the other could be validly conferred in the present economy of salvation. They were, however, charitable enough, though somewhat inconsistently, as to admit that those who differed from them in this particular view might still belong to the Church of Christ. The Donatists had more logic, but less charity.

It was whilst attacking this assumption of the Donatists that Optatus and Augustine found occasion to develop somewhat the traditional teaching of the Church on the nature of the sacraments and the conditions that were regarded as essential for their valid administration. In this, again, the way had been prepared for them by their predecessors during the previous centuries, and to some extent also by their contemporaries independently of the controversy. Whilst it is true that no formal theory had as yet been worked out which would enable them to construct an essential definition applicable to

[1] Cfr. Pourrat, Theology of the Sacraments; Tixeront, H. D. II, 160–191; 305–424.

all the sacraments, nevertheless the fundamental elements of such a theory were well known, and more or less successfully applied to the three sacraments of Christian initiation, baptism, confirmation, and the Holy Eucharist. These elements are found in sacramental symbolism, which dates back to the days of St. Paul. When he compared baptism to Christ's burial and resurrection, and matrimony to the union of Christ with His Church, he laid down principles which were in course of time gradually extended to similar religious rites. In its material sense baptism is a cleansing of the body, but this material cleansing of the body symbolizes the spiritual cleansing of the soul; it represents and in some way effects the recipient's dying to sin and his rising to a new life, the life of grace. From this symbolism to the theory of efficacious signs of grace there is only one step, and this step being taken, the first part of sacramental theology is complete. Augustine took this step, and thereby completed the work of those who had gone before him.

The better to appreciate the great work thus accomplished by the bishop of Hippo, it will be helpful to review briefly what had already been done in the same field of theological inquiry both in the East and the West. A mere outline will be sufficient for our purpose.

In the East sacramental symbolism received its first scientific development through the labors of the Alexandrians, especially Clement and Origen. Baptism is to them a burial and resurrection with Christ, as St. Paul had expressed it, and as such it is a sign or symbol of what takes place in the soul. The neophyte on being submerged in the baptismal water dies to sin, and emerging thence rises to the life of grace. This is not effected by the water as such, nor by any magic charm, but by the power of the Holy Trinity under whose invocation baptism is conferred. What God could do by a mere act of His will, that He effects through the external rite. This symbolism falls in with Origen's definition of a "sign," which is "a visible something that suggests the idea of another invisible thing." [2]

[2] In Ep. ad Rom. 4, 2; cfr. In Joan. 6, 17.

The Holy Eucharist, too, whilst really containing the body and blood of the Saviour, is a symbol of the spiritual effects which it produces in the soul. In this respect it may be compared to the teaching of Christ, which "nourishes our souls and gladdens our hearts." Bread and wine are bodily nourishment, but when they have been sanctified by the prayer of consecration they become spiritual food for those who partake thereof in the spirit of faith.[3] "This is the suitable food which the Lord gives us, and henceforth nothing is wanting for His children's growth."[4]

For a while the application of this symbolism to the Eucharist met with considerable opposition, owing to the ambiguity to which it gave rise in reference to the Real Presence. Ignatius of Antioch had already spoken of the Eucharist as the symbol of charity and of union in faith, but Origen's allegorizing tendencies caused not a little suspicion in regard to this matter. Hence Theodore of Mopsuestia thought himself called upon to enter a vigorous protest. "Christ," he writes, "did not say, 'This is a symbol of my body, and this is a symbol of my blood,' but He did say, 'This is my body and this is my blood.' He teaches us to draw away our minds from the nature of the offering, and to consider only that these gifts are transformed into His flesh and blood by the Eucharistic prayer."[5] Others were more or less of the same mind, until the doctrine of transubstantiation became more clearly understood. Then all ambiguity ceased and Origen's exposition was readily adopted. Thereafter the appearance of bread and the appearance of wine, as St. Cyril of Jerusalem expressed it, were commonly regarded as figures of the body and blood of Christ, as symbols containing the divine reality which is given us as the spiritual nourishment of our souls.[6]

The same symbolism was also extended by these writers to confirmation, which was then conferred immediately after baptism, forming a part of the same ceremony. Christ in His baptism was anointed with the Holy Spirit, and the newly

[3] Orig. In Ep. ad Rom. 4, 2; In Matt. 9, 14; 11, 4.
[4] Clem. Paed. 1, 6, 42, 3.
[5] In Matt. 26, 26.
[6] Mystag. 4, 3, 9.

baptized Christian is anointed with chrism in order that he may share in the same divine gift. Of itself the chrism has indeed no power to effect this, but its efficacy is derived from the Holy Spirit Himself who is invoked by the bishop. As the oil flows visibly over the body, the soul is invisibly sanctified by the life-giving Spirit of God.[7]

All this, it is pointed out, is conformable to man's nature: for being made up of a material body and a spiritual soul, he apprehends and understands the spiritual action of God in the interior of his soul more readily when it is represented to his bodily senses in a material form. "If thou hadst been incorporeal," writes St. Chrysostom, "Christ would have given thee purely incorporeal gifts, but because the soul is united to a body, He delivered to thee what is intelligible to the mind in things that are perceptible to the senses."[8]

Along with this almost perfectly developed sacramental symbolism, which St. Augustine defined more accurately in his controversy with the Donatists, these Eastern writers also brought out a number of other points that were destined to receive a clearer exposition in the same controversy. One of them is the impression of a special mark or character on the soul, as an effect of haptism, confirmation, and orders. Even the writers of the sub-Apostolic age spoke quite generally of baptism as a sphragis or seal, which the Christian must ever keep inviolate. They, however, did not enter into any particulars, so that it is not clear what precisely they understood by this term. But as used by the fourth-century theologians the meaning of the term is no longer doubtful. Thus Chrysostom says that the Jews of old, like a flock of sheep, were marked with circumcision, whereas Christians are stamped with the Spirit, as it behooves the children of God.[9] Whilst baptism is being administered, the Holy Ghost marks the souls with His own seal.[10] This seal is spiritual in its nature, it is beneficial to the recipient, it is indestructible. It marks the soul as God's own property, and protects it against the attacks of the demons. It is the distinctive mark of the Christian,

[7] Ibid. 3, 1, 2, 3.
[8] In Matt. Hom. 82, 2, 4.
[9] In Ephes. Hom. 2, 2.
[10] Cyril, Catech. 4, 16.

whereby he is known as belonging to the family of Christ, and entitled to the protection of God's angels.[11]

A similar mark is produced by confirmation. "Whilst the chrism flows on the forehead of the neophyte," says St. Cyril, "the seal of the communication of the Holy Spirit is produced in him." [12] Hence in the formula then used for the blessing of the chrism, the bishop prayed that all those who were about to receive the unction might become partakers of the Holy Ghost, and, confirmed by His seal, might remain immovable and strong in the faith.[13] Hence, too, the sacramental formula of confirmation in use among the Greeks, which dates back to the fourth century, consists of the words: The seal of the gift of the Holy Spirit.[14]

When speaking about the character impressed by the sacrament of orders, these authors are not quite so clear. Yet the newly ordained are referred to as separated from the rest of the faithful, deputed in a special manner to do the work of Christ. They receive a permanent consecration, somewhat resembling that of altars on which the divine mysteries are celebrated. This is especially brought out by Gregory of Nyssa, who points to the fact that through the power of God an invisble transformation takes place in those who are ordained, whereby they are enabled to do what lay beyond the power of Moses and the Prophets to effect.[15] There is a certain vagueness about all this, but the fundamental idea of the sacramental character is undoubtedly there.

Another point is that the efficacy of the sacraments is independent of the moral disposition of the minister. The sacraments belong to Christ, and the minister cannot frustrate their effects, unless indeed he corrupts the sacramental rite itself. This latter, according to Athansius, was done by the Arians and some other heretics who denied the Trinity, and therefore, it was assumed, they could not rightly perform the religious rite of which the invocation of the Blessed Trinity formed an essential part. The same view is taken by Basil and Cyril

[11] Id. Protocatech. 17; Catech. 1, 3.
[12] Catech. Mystag. 4, 7.
[13] Euchol. Serap. 25, 2.
[14] Cyril, Catech. 18, 33.
[15] In Bapt. Christi, P. G. 46, 581.

of Jerusalem, and hence they rebaptized converts that came to them from these sects, although they never called in question the validity of sacraments conferred by schismatics. The one who expressed himself most clearly on this matter was St. Chrysostom, who directed attention to the fact that in the administration of the sacraments priests and bishops are merely the instruments of the Saviour. "The gifts which God bestows," he says, "are not such as to be the effects of the virtue of the priest; all is the work of grace. His part is but to open his mouth, while God works all: the priest effects only the symbolical sign." [16] "When the priest baptizes, it is really not he who confers baptism, but it is God whose invisible power bestows the grace of regeneration." [17]

Similar views concerning these various points prevailed in the West before the matter was brought to an issue in the Donatist controversy. Sacramental symbolism was already adverted to by Tertullian, although his extremely realistic views did on the whole not favor the development of the theory. Baptismal immersion is a bodily act, but it benefits the soul in a spiritual way; and the anointing with oil is a bodily act, but it spiritually benefits the soul. Cyprian uses almost the same language in regard to baptism, but is more explicit when he comes to speak of the Holy Eucharist. The many grains of wheat which form but one bread, and the mixture of wine and water blessed in one chalice, typify the union which is effected by the Eucharist between Christ and His people. The Saviour's body and blood are really present, and their reception in holy communion fosters the life of faith and charity of which the Eucharist is the symbol.[18]

These ideas were set forth in much greater detail by St. Ambrose. He distinguishes clearly between the external rite that falls under the perception of the senses and the interior effects that can be known by faith alone. Yet even these invisible effects are in a manner made tangible by the external rite. The immersion of the neophyte in the baptismal font typifies his death to sin; the unction of the newly baptized with

[16] Ep. II ad Tim. Hom. 2, 4.
[17] In Matt. 50, 3.
[18] Ep. 63, 17.

oil symbolizes the unction of his soul with the Holy Spirit; the appearances of bread and wine in the Holy Eucharist contain and signify the body and blood of the Saviour, which the faithful receive as the nourishment of their souls.[19]

As regards the sacramental character the Latin writers of this period are, as a general rule, not quite as explicit as their Eastern contemporaries. Tertullian had already represented baptism as a covenant between God and the Christian, which he conceived to be confirmed by a seal. If the Christian proves unfaithful to this covenant, the seal still remains.[20] This idea was taken up by subsequent writers, and gradually also extended to confirmation and orders. After baptism, says St. Cyprian, neophytes receive the Holy Ghost by the imposition of the bishop's hands, that thus their initiation may be perfected by the *signaculum* of the Lord.[21] This is somewhat further developed by St. Ambrose, who says that our souls are marked by the Holy Spirit with a spiritual sign, so that we may preserve undimmed the brightness of His image and the grace which He has bestowed. "And this indeed is a spiritual seal."[22] In its fundamental concepts this teaching is obviously identical with that of the Eastern writers, but it is less developed as regards details.

About the other point above referred to, the independence of sacramental efficacy in respect to the moral disposition of the minister, there was in the beginning of this period some disagreement, as is evident from the baptismal controversy. When Cyprian asserted that no one not in communion with the Church could administer the sacraments validly, he supposed not only that the sacraments belonged exclusively to the Church, but also that the bestowal of the Holy Spirit through the sacramental rite was dependent on the sanctity of the minister. "But who," he asks, "can give what he himself does not have, or how can any one who has lost the Holy Spirit perform these spiritual rites?"[23] Hence in his view, and

[19] De Spir. Sanct. 1, 83, 77; 1, 76; De Myst. 50, 52, 54.
[20] De Spect. 24.
[21] Ep. 73, 9.
[22] De Spir. Sanct. 1, 6.
[23] Ep. 70.

that of his followers as well, the efficacy of the sacraments depends at least partly on the disposition of the minister.

Pope Stephen at the time took the opposite view, which, he contended, was handed down by the Apostles. "Whoever has been baptized in the name of Christ receives forthwith the grace of Christ." Although this is a rather sweeping statement, yet, presupposing the proper disposition of the recipient, it is perfectly true, and, at all events, it firmly established the principle that the efficacy of the sacraments is independent of the minister's faith and sanctity. This was still further developed by the unknown author of the treatise entitled *De Rebaptismate,* who wrote about the same time. He clearly distinguishes between the validity of the sacramental rite and its spiritual fruitfulness. The former may be had without the latter, and therefore when heretical and unworthy ministers confer the sacraments, the sacramental rite is valid, but the spiritual effects are not produced in the recipient until he is reconciled to the Church.[24] This latter distinction was more or less lost sight of by subsequent writers until the time of St. Augustine, but in some way all assumed that the minister's unworthiness did not interfere with the effects of the sacraments, if nothing else intervened to invalidate the sacramental rite.

These, then, were the general views entertained at the time when the Donatist controversy brought the subject of sacramental efficacy into the foreground of theological discussion. Obviously the ground was well prepared, and in many instances Augustine needed do no more than explain in detail what his predecessors had already accepted as the common teaching. This, however, did not prevent him from clarifying certain obscure concepts and emphasizing a number of points that had been more or less overlooked before the controversy was started. It was chiefly in this that his labors were so fruitful.

In this connection but little need be said of the work of Optatus. He indeed valiantly defended the Catholic position against the Donatists, but in doing so he rarely went beyond

[24] De Rebapt. 2, 3, 4, 6, 11, 15; cfr. Conc. Arelat. 314.

what was clearly contained in the common teaching at the time. When the Donatists brought forward their chief difficulty, "Qui non habet quod det, quomodo dat?" if a person do not have what he may give, how does he give? he explained that in baptism, about which the difficulty chiefly turned, three things are to be considered: First, the Trinitarian formula; secondly, the recipient of the sacrament; thirdly, the minister. The invocation of the Trinity is absolutely necessary: the faith of the person who receives the sacrament is also necessary; but the proper disposition of the minister is necessary only in a secondary way. The first two enter in some manner into the sacrament itself, and are therefore unchangeable; the third is extrinsic to the sacrament, and in consequence is not absolutely necessary.[25] And the ultimate reason is this, that the minister is merely an instrument of Christ, who Himself is the chief minister of baptism. It is God who cleanses through the sacrament, and not man. It is He who gives, and it is His that is given. The recipient, indeed, must have faith; for it is because of this faith that God bestows His gifts: but the minister's faith does not determine the action of God. Let therefore the Donatists allow God to do His own work. For it is not man who bestows things divine. It has been promised to our times that Christ Himself would give what is given to-day. He indeed baptized, but by the hands of His Apostles, to whom He had given the law of baptism. In this matter we are all His disciples, so that we act in such wise that he Himself gives what He promised He would give.[26]

These points were sufficient to refute the main contention of the Donatists, and with this Optatus was satisfied. Hence it was left to Augustine, who took up the work begun by Optatus, to develop the Church's traditional teaching on the sacraments as the ever changing phases of the controversy required. This he did on many different occasions, now explaining and emphasizing one point of Catholic teaching now another, but for clearness' sake his scattered remarks may be reduced to a connected system of doctrine, of which the following is a brief outline:

[25] Cont. Parmen. VII, 4.

[26] Ibid. V, 4; V, 6, 7.

By way of general definition he states that sacraments are external signs of a sacred reality: "When signs appertain to things divine, they are called sacraments."[27] This, of course, is a very wide definition, and is readily applied to all sacred rites. Of this the author is perfectly aware and he frequently applies the term to the various ceremonies accompanying baptism and to other religious observances.[28] But a sign may either simply indicate a spiritual reality, or it may also concur in its production; when this latter is the case we have a sacrament in the strict sense of the word. In this restricted sense the term is applied by the author especially to baptism, confirmation, and the Holy Eucharist; and incidentally also to holy orders.[29] Matrimony he likewise calls a sacrament, but whether in precisely the same sense is not so clear.[30]

In every sacrament there are two elements to be considered: one that is sensible and signifies, the other that is spiritual and is signified. "They are called sacraments for this reason, that one thing is seen in them and another is understood."[31] The sensible element is itself made up of different parts, usually the *elementum* and the *verbum*. Thus in baptism the water is the *elementum*, the consecratory prayer and the invocation of the Trinity is the *verbum*. The two together make up the sacrament as distinguished from the effects which it produces. "Accedit verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum, etiam ipsum tamquam visible verbum."[32] But "the sacrament is one thing and the power (or the effect) of the sacrament is another";[33] the two are quite distinct. Hence by the sacrament the author understands the whole external rite, and by the power of the sacrament the effects produced in the soul.

The bond between the sacrament and its effects is in some way indicated by the nature of the sacramental sign, so that, although Christ has assigned a spiritual meaning to these external rites, they are also of their very nature adapted to con-

[27] Ep. 138, 7.
[28] De Catech. Rud. 50.
[29] De Bapt. 5, 28; Cont. Faust. 19, 19; De Bono Conj. 32.
[30] Ibid. 32.
[31] In Joan. Tract. 80, 3; 26, 11.
[32] In Joan. Tract. 2, 4.
[33] Ibid. 26, 11.

vey this meaning. "For if the sacraments did not have some likeness to the things of which they are sacraments, they would not be sacraments at all." [34] Hence they are at the same time both natural and conventional signs. Of course, their power to produce the spiritual effect in the soul is not owing to the material element in itself; that comes from the consecratory prayer and from the sacramental form. "Whence does the water have such power that it should touch the body and cleanse the heart, if not because of the word?" [35] It is the power of Christ Himself acting through the consecrated water.

Hence the sacraments have Christ for their author, since the efficacy of the external rite is derived from Him. Augustine asserts this explicitly only of baptism and the Holy Eucharist, but his concept of sacramental efficacy makes it evident that he means to extend it to all true sacraments. And this he also indicates with sufficient clearness; for when he says of baptism and the Holy Eucharist that they flowed from the side of Christ, he immediately adds, "et si quid aliud in Scripturis canonicis commendatur." [36] Their power to sanctify is derived from the merits of Christ, and these merits He applies to His followers according to His own wise disposition.

The Old Law also had its sacraments, among which circumcision held the same relative place as baptism does in the New Law; but their chief purpose was to announce the future coming of Christ, whereas the sacraments of the New Law bestow upon the recipient the fruits of the redemption and bind the followers of the Saviour closely together in a religious community. Hence they are "virtute majora, utilitate meliora, actu faciliora, numero pauciora." [37]

In the administration of the sacraments the author clearly distinguishes the validity of the sacramental rite from its fruitful reception. When a person is baptized in heresy he receives the sacrament validly, but on account of a supposed want of proper disposition he is not thereby sanctified. "For it is

[34] Serm. 98, 9.
[35] In Joan. tract. 80, 3.
[36] Ep. 54, 1.
[37] Cont. Faust. 19, 13.

one thing to have the sacrament, and another to have it usefully," that is, to receive its proper effects.[38] It was for want of this distinction, he says, that Cyprian fell into error concerning rebaptism: "Non distinguebatur sacramentum ab effectu vel usu sacramenti." [39]

If the sacraments are conferred in the Catholic Church, although by an unworthy minister, they are not only valid, but also produce their intended effect. And the reason is that man's action in this matter is purely ministerial: "Non eorum meritis a quibus ministratur, nec eorum quibus ministratur, baptismus constat, sed propria sanctitate atque veritate propter eum a quo institutus est, bene utentibus ad salutem." [40] It is their own sanctity and truth, derived from the Saviour who instituted them, that makes the sacraments a source of salvation to those who receive them worthily. Hence they produce their effect *ex opere operato;* for although, according to the author, it is Christ who sanctifies the recipient, nevertheless He does so through the sacramental rite. "Propria sanctitate atque veritate propter eum a quo institutus est (baptismus), bene untentibus ad salutem."

And as the sacraments do not depend for their salutary effects on the moral disposition of the minister, so neither do they depend on the merits of the recipient; but in this latter they presuppose certain dispositions as a *conditio sine qua non* of their fruitful reception. What these necessary dispositions are the author does not state in detail, but in adults they certainly include faith. For when pointing out that baptism is productive of grace in children as well as in adults, he reasons that in their case the absence of actual faith is no obstacle to the infusion of grace; hence the necessary inference is that in adults the want of faith would be an obstacle.[41] And what is true of baptism in this respect is also true of other sacraments. Then there is need of some kind of intention on the part of recipients who have arrived at the age of reason; but on this point the author is rather liberal in his views, declining

[38] De Bapt. 7, 102.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Cont. Cresc. 4, 19.
[41] Ep. 98, 10.

even to hold as certainly invalid a baptism that is received "totus ludicre et mimice et joculariter."[42] In cases of emergency the intention of the subject may be presumed; for "multo satius est nolenti dare quam volenti negare."[43]

Three sacraments, namely, baptism, confirmation, and holy orders, imprint a character on the soul. This character is compared by the author to the image on imperial coins, to the *nota militaris* of soldiers, and to the brand wherewith sheep are marked. He conceives it to consist in a permanent consecration which cannot be lost, and therefore these sacraments cannot be repeated. Speaking of baptism and orders, he says: "Utrumque enim sacramentum est, et quadam consecratione homini datum; illud cum baptizatur, istud cum ordinatur; ideoque in Catholica Ecclesia utrumque non licet iterari."[44] And in another place he affirms the same of confirmation.[45] The soldier of Christ may become a deserter, but the badge of his enrollment always remains.

This brief outline of St. Augustine's teaching on the sacraments in general will be sufficient to indicate how much he contributed to the development of sacramental theology. He brought it to a point of perfection where it remained till the beginning of the thirteenth century. It was only then that his definition was perfected, and the causality of the sacraments more accurately determined. It is true, Augustine did not give expression to any definite view in regard to the exact number of sacraments, but neither was there any particular reason for investigating the subject carefully in his time. He mentions all the religious rites which we now regard as sacraments in the strict sense of the term, and also shows that he was acquainted with their salutary effects. Beyond this he had no occasion to go, as the controversy which called forth his exposition did not touch all the sacraments in particular. In our times, indeed, much emphasis is placed upon the fact that the sacraments are neither more nor less than seven; but that is owing to the denial of this truth by heretics. In Augus-

[42] De Bapt. 7, 102.
[43] De Conjug. Adult. 1, 33.
[44] Cont. Ep. Parmen. 2, 28.
[45] Cont. Litt. Petil. 2, 239; Serm. ad Pleb. Cæsar. 2.

tine's time the truth regarding this point was not called in question. Though sacramental terminology was still rather indefinite, nevertheless the seven religious rites which we now defend as true sacraments, were even then looked upon as in a class all by themselves; so much so that even those heretical sects which in the fifth century separated from the Church kept them all as belonging essentially to the religion of Christ.

By way of completing the foregoing summary, a few remarks must be made with regard to some of the sacraments in particular, as in reference to them there occur in the writings of the fourth-century Fathers several points that are of considerable importance. In this matter, however, no distinction need be made between Eastern and Western writers, nor between Augustine and his predecessors, as the points in question are treated by all of them in practically the same way.

1°. Baptism of water, although ordinarily necessary for salvation, may be supplied by martyrdom, and under certain conditions also by the baptism of desire. The former was universally admitted, but the latter was apparently denied by Chrysostom and Cyril of Jerusalem.[46] Baptism must be conferred in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; however, Basil and Ambrose seem to have held that baptism in the name of Jesus alone would be sufficient.[47] Grace is bestowed on little children as well as on adults.[48]

2°. Forgiveness can be obtained for all sins committed after baptism, but if they are grievous they must be confessed. Public penance, enjoined for the "crimina graviora," appears to have been conceded only once in a life-time.[49] Occasionally reconciliation was deferred till the hour of death. In some places the practice had crept in of denying final reconciliation to those who had put off doing penance, a practice that was severely condemned by Celestine I.[50] Ambrose, Pacian, Augustine, and Gregory of Nyssa made some attempt at classifying sins according to their gravity and in reference to the

[46] Chrysost. In Ep. ad Philipp. Hom. 3, 4; Cyril, Catech, 3, 4.
[47] Basil, De Spirit. Sancto, 28; Ambrose, De Spirit. Sancto, 1, 3, 42.
[48] August. Ep. 166, 7, 21.
[49] Ambrose, De Poenit. 2, 10, 95.
[50] Ep. 4; P. L. 50, 431.

necessity of confessing them, but they are not very clear on the point. The power of the keys was admitted by all, though hardly any of them go into particulars with regard to its use.[51]

3°. The real presence of Christ's body and blood in the Holy Eucharist is universally taught, and on occasions strongly emphasized. Some difficulty has been raised with regard to St. Augustine's view on this point, but his belief in the Real Presence cannot justly be called in question. He insists indeed strongly on the spiritual aspect of the Holy Eucharist, but he does so without rejecting the Church's traditional teaching on the Real Presence. Hence there are found in his works two series of texts, the one setting forth the common teaching that the Eucharist contains the real body and blood of the Saviour,[52] that the Eucharistic Lord must be adored before being received by the faithful,[53] and that the Real Presence is effected by the conversion of the bread and the wine into

[51] That the Church has the power to forgive sins, is thus neatly shown by Ambrose. Arguing against the Novatians, who excluded certain sins from the exercise of this power, he says: "Why do you baptize, if it be not lawful to obtain forgiveness through the ministry of man? In baptism assuredly forgiveness is obtained for all sins; but what is the difference whether priests exercise this power, which they claim was given them, through penance or through baptism? It is the same mystery in both" (De Poenit. 1, 8, 36). Again: "It is most evident that the Lord enjoined to extend the grace of this heavenly sacrament also to those who are guilty of the most heinous crimes, if they do penance for them from their whole heart and manifest them in confession" (Ibid. 2, 3, 19).

Augustine speaks in almost the same terms. Thus in one of his sermons he says: "If, then, after baptism anyone find himself entangled in his old sins, let him not be so far his own enemy as to hesitate to change his life, and, while he has yet time, to have recourse to the keys of the Church, by which he shall be loosed on earth that he may be loosed in heaven. Let him come to the prelates by whom the keys are administered in the Church, and receive from the ministers of the sacraments the due measure of satisfaction. And if his sin was not only an injury to himself but also a scandal to others, and such that the bishop should think it useful to the Church that he should do penance, not only before many, but even before all the people, let him not refuse nor add to his mortal wound the tumor of pride. . . . The keys of the Church are surer than the hearts of princes: for by these keys, whatever is loosed on earth shall be loosed in heaven" (Serm. 351).

[52] Serm. 1, 10.

[53] Enar. in Ps. 98, 9.

the body and blood of Christ;[54] whilst the other series, presupposing all this, points out that the eating of Christ's body and the drinking of His blood consist in sharing the Saviour's passion,[55] in being united with Him through faith,[56] and in becoming more intimately incorporated into His mystical body the Church, of which He is the Head.[57] Obviously, if we had only this latter series of texts we should look upon Augustine as teaching Eucharistic symbolism pure and simple; but if these same texts be read in the light thrown upon them by the former series, they are found to emphasize one aspect of the Eucharist without in any way denying the other. And hence it was that Augustine's disciples and admirers in the fifth and sixth centuries not only taught the Real Presence, but they did so without being in the least influenced by his supposed purely symbolistic conceptions. It was only during the early part of the Middle Ages, and again in the sixteenth century, that Augustine's authority was invoked by the opponents of the doctrine of the Real Presence.

The same authors who thus one and all teach the real presence of Christ's body and blood in the Holy Eucharist, also bring out with great distinctness the doctrine of Transubstantiation. It is true, the term itself is of later origin, but its significance is clearly contained in the works of these writers. Almost every possible expression is used by them to emphasize the change wrought by the Eucharistic prayer. The bread and wine are said to be *transformed, changed, converted,* so that the bread is no longer bread but the body of Christ, and the wine is no longer wine but the blood of the Saviour. "Once in Cana of Galilee," writes Cyril of Jerusalem, "Jesus changed water into wine, which is akin to blood; and we would not believe Him when He changes wine into blood?"[58] "Rightly do we believe," argues Gregory of Nyssa, "that the bread which is sanctified by the word of God is converted into the body of God the Word."[59] St. Ambrose, answering an objection brought forward against the Eucharistic change,

[54] De Trinit. 3, 4, 5.
[55] De Doctr. Christ. 3, 16.
[56] In Joan. 27, 5.
[57] Ibid. 15.
[58] Catech. 4, 1.
[59] Orat. Catech. 37.

points to the omnipotence of God as its all-sufficient cause. In the creation of the world and the beings contained therein, he says, " He spoke and they were made, He commanded and they were created: if then the word of Christ could make out of nothing the things that were not, how should it not be able to change the things that are into what they were not " before the same word was spoken? [60] And even Augustine calls attention to the fact that the conversion of the bread and wine, which is daily wrought on our altars, is a far greater miracle than any of those recorded in the Bible.[61] These authors do indeed not theorize about the intimate nature of the Eucharistic change, but they are quite certain of the fact.

Furthermore, they are all agreed that this change is wrought in virtue of the Eucharistic prayer; but on the further question, to what particular words of that prayer the change must be attributed, their agreement is apparently not so complete. Whilst the Western writers usually regard the words of institution as effecting the change, their Eastern contemporaries, with the exception of John Chrysostom, seem to look upon the *epiclesis,* or subsequent invocation of the Holy Spirit, as more or less essential. This is strongly brought out by Cyril of Jerusalem, when he writes: " After we have sanctified ourselves, we beseech the good God to send His Holy Spirit upon the elements that are offered, that He may make of the bread the body of Christ, and of the wine His blood; for whatever the Holy Spirit touches is thoroughly blessed and transformed." [62] In course of time, especially through the influence of John Damascene, the Eastern Church officially adopted this view; whereas the West always maintained the more common traditional teaching, and finally all discussion concerning the point at issue was closed by an authoritative declaration that the words of institution alone are essential.

All these writers also strongly emphasize the sacrificial character of the Holy Eucharist. In it is offered to God a living, spotless, unbloody, and perfect sacrifice, which is a commemoration and in some manner a continuation of the great sacrifice

[60] De Myst. 8; 9.
[61] De Trinit. 3, 4, 5.
[62] Catech. 4, 1.

of the Cross. It is offered both for the living and the dead.[63]

4°. Extreme unction is referred to in the *Euchologium of Serapion,* where a prayer is given for the consecration of the "oleum aegrotorum"; and Innocent I speaks of it as a "genus sacramenti," that is in common use among the faithful.[64] Similarly Augustine, who, in the *Speculum,* which he wrote to place before the faithful their ordinary duties, exhorts his people in the words of St. James, that "if anyone is sick among them they ought to bring in the priests of the Church, to pray over the sick, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord, etc."[65] In reference to this exhortation, his biographer, Posidius, tells us that "if Augustine happened to be called to the sick, for the purpose of praying to the Lord for them and imposing hands on them, he went without delay."[66]

5°. Holy orders were then as now divided into major and minor; that is, in so far as a sharp distinction was made between the higher and lower degrees of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. How the minor orders were conferred is nowhere stated in the writings of the fourth-century Fathers, but bishops, priests, and deacons were ordained by imposition of hands and an appropriate prayer. The superiority of bishops over priests and of priests over deacons was commonly admitted to be *de jure divino,* although Jerome states in one place that bishops are superior to ordinary priests "magis consuetudine quam dispositionis dominicae veritate."[67] But in this view he had no followers.

6°. Marriage was by all looked upon as a sacred rite: the nuptial blessing was given to the bride, except in the case of a widow. Several diriment impediments were recognized.[68] With the exception of Ambrosiaster, the Latin writers regard the marriage bond as indissoluble, even in the case of adultery;[69] but several of the Greeks, among them Gregory of

[63] Didym. De Trinit. 2, 7; Chrysost. In Ep. ad Hebr. 17, 3; Ambrose, In Ps. 38, 25; Jerome, Ep. 94, 2.

[64] Ep. ad Decent. 11.

[65] Op. cit. 27.

[66] C. 27.

[67] Ep. 146; In Ep. ad Tit. 2, 15.

[68] Basil, Ep. 199, 23, 42; 217, 78.

[69] Ambrose, In Luc. 8, 5, 2; Jerome, Ep. 55, 3; August. De Adult. Conj. 1, 9.

Nazianzus, Chrysostom, and Basil, make statements from which the contrary doctrine has been inferred.[70] However, as these authors in other places stand up strongly for the indissolubility of the marriage bond, it is more probable that in the statements referred to they simply bear witness to a custom introduced by the civil law.[71]

[70] Naz. Orat. 37, 8; Chrysost. In Ep. I ad Cor. Hom. 19, 3; Basil, Ep. 199, 9; 299, 21.

[71] Naz. Orat. 37, 6; Chrysost. De Libel. Repud. 1, 2; Basil, Reg. 73, 2.

CHAPTER XXIII

PELAGIANISM AND THE QUESTION OF ORIGINAL SIN[1]

Pelagius was a British monk, whom Augustine calls a "bonum et praedicandum virum," but whose renown was destined to be changed into notoriety. His first great mistake was that he insisted too much upon the invincible power of the human free will to resist evil. This led him by degrees into various errors concerning man's primitive condition, his present state, and the part which divine grace plays in the economy of salvation.

Sometime during the first years of the fifth century he came to Rome, and there he met a certain Rufinus, a Syrian priest, from whom he learned to deny original sin. One of his earliest disciples was Celestius, a young and ardent monk, who knew not the value of discretion in stating his own convictions. This brought them both into trouble. After a short stay in Rome, they went to Sicily, then to Africa, and thence Pelagius alone traveled to Palestine. When left to himself, Celestius began to preach his false doctrine openly, with the result that he was summoned before a council, and as he refused to recant he was excommunicated. After this, Augustine sent his friend Orosius into Palestine to look after Pelagius. This resulted into a summoning of the latter before a local synod, but as he was favored by Bishop John of Jerusalem he escaped condemnation. Again brought before a synod at Diospolis, he somewhat modified his statements concerning the point at issue and a second time escaped without censure.

A little later Pelagius gained a most distinguished disciple in Julian, bishop of Eclanum in Apulia. He was a skilled

[1] Cfr. Tixeront, H. D. II, 432–505; *Bethune-Baker, An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine; Toner, Dissertatio Historico-Theologica de Lapsu et Peccato Originali.

logician and voluminous writer, and, according to Augustine, became the "architect" of the whole Pelagian system. However the Catholic party was not idle. In 416 two synods were held, one at Carthage and the other at Mileve, at both of which the innovators were condemned. This condemnation was ratified by Innocent I in 417. Another condemnation was passed upon them by two subsequent synods held at Carthage, each of which was attended by more than two hundred bishops. After some misunderstanding on the part of Innocent's successor, Pope Zozimus, this condemnation was also ratified in the *Epistola Tractoria,* which all the bishops of Italy and Africa were required to subscribe. Eighteen of them refused, and they were deposed from their sees. Some twelve years later Julian tried to effect his reinstatement at the Council of Ephesus, but his condemnation by the Pope was confirmed.

The various errors of the Pelagian system may be reduced to the following points, which, however, did not follow one another chronologically in the same order.

1°. Adam was created mortal and subject to all the present miseries of life; this state was not the result of sin, but the primitive condition of nature.

2°. When Adam sinned he did harm to himself alone, and not to his posterity, except in so far as he gave them a bad example.

3°. Hence men are born now in the same condition in which Adam was created, nor do they in their birth contract any sin.

4°. Therefore children do not stand in need of baptism in order to be cleansed from any original stain, but only that they may enter into the kingdom of heaven, which is distinct from life eternal.

5°. Man's natural powers and his free will are sufficient to overcome all temptations, to avoid all sins, to observe all the commandments of God, and to gain eternal blessedness.

6°. God's graces are merely external helps, or if any of them are interior graces, they are nothing more than illuminations which are vouchsafed to make the practice of virtue easier.

7°. All these graces are bestowed by God not gratuitously, but according to man's natural merits.

Against these errors Augustine, at the request of Bishop Aurelius, first delivered a series of sermons on the existence of original sin and the necessity of divine grace. His next effort was to protect the many friends who consulted him. To Marcellinus he wrote a book *On the Demerit and Remission of Sins,* and the *Baptism of Infants;* and another, *On the Spirit and the Letter,* in which he develops the difficult doctrine of grace and free will. In answer to a book written by Pelagius, he composed a treatise, *On Nature and Grace,* and against a work of Celestius he wrote a short tractate, *On the Perfection of Righteousness.* Then, at the request of Pope Boniface, he undertook the refutation of two documents circulated by Julian of Eclanum, in a work entitled, *Four Books to Boniface.* Against the same Julian he wrote two other books, *Contra Julianum,* and *Contra Julianum Opus Imperfectum.*

The main points discussed in these several works are, of course, original sin and the necessity of divine grace; but many other questions, in one way or another connected with them, come also up for consideration. Attention will be called to them in this and the following chapter. First, then, we shall consider the subject of original sin.

When Celestius, in 411, was urged by the synod of Carthage to retract his erroneous views, he refused to do so on the plea that the question of original sin was still a matter of speculation, that it was not a dogma of the faith, and that consequently he could not be charged with heresy. Even priests, he said, are not unanimous on the point. On the other hand, Augustine, a few years later, concluded a sermon preached at Carthage with these words: "Let them calumniate us if they please; but let them not calumniate Holy Church, that labors daily for the remission of original sin in infants. This is a fundamental doctrine. Should anyone err in something not yet defined by the Church, it may be tolerated; but he must not try to shake the foundation of the Church itself." [2] He also

[2] Serm. 294.

maintained that the Church's representative teachers were in full agreement on this matter. Hence a brief summary of the prevailing views on original sin, previous to the Pelagian discussion, is not only advisable but necessary. The following outline will be sufficient for our purpose.

Origen, as was pointed out in a previous chapter, most probably held the doctrine of original sin; but his peculiar view on the preëxistence of souls and their falling into sin before their union with the body leaves some room for doubt. After him Methodius of Olympus teaches the doctrine rather clearly. "When man," he says, "was deceived by the devil, he violated the commandment of God, and thenceforth sin, propagated by this contumacy, took up its abode in him. . . . For deprived of the divine gifts and utterly prostrated, we have become a prey to concupiscence, which the cunning serpent and shrewd prevaricator excited in us." Then citing Romans 7, 18, he continues: "By these words the Apostle designates the sin which had been brought upon us by the violation of the divine commandment through concupiscence; from this sin there arise in us sprouts and branches and voluptuous thoughts."[3] Didymus the Blind is also very clear. Speaking of the virginal conception of Christ, he says by way of explanation: "If the Saviour had assumed a body procreated by man, He would of course have been stained by the sin which all of Adam's descendants contract in their birth from him; for in that case He would have been subject to the same law as we are."[4] Athanasius explains that as we all die in Adam, so are we raised to new life in Christ. And this death in Adam does not refer solely to the death of the body, but to that of the soul as well. For "when Adam sinned," not only the effects of sin, but "sin itself was transmitted to us."[5] Basil calls attention to original sin when speaking about the necessity of fasting. He admonishes his hearers to fast and give the food thus saved to the needy, that thereby they may "pay for the primitive sin; for just as Adam, by eating unlawfully, trans-

[3] Epiphan. Adv. Haer. 64, 60.
[4] Adv. Manich. 8.
[5] De Incarn. 3, 4; Cont. Arian. 3, 33; 1, 51.

mitted the sin, so we do away with the effects of that perfidious food by relieving the hunger of the neighbor." [6]

On the other hand, Gregory of Nazianzus, although maintaining in one place that Adam's sin is ours also, teaches nevertheless that unbaptized children are without sin.[7] The same position is apparently taken by Chrysostom, though Augustine interprets him differently, and even quotes from his writings a text, now lost, in which he speaks of a "paternal bond written by Adam, the beginning of a debt which we have increased by our subsequent sins." [8] Gregory of Nyssa also, whilst speaking very clearly of Adam's fall, makes no mention whatever of the sin having been transmitted to us. It has been suggested that the apparent opposition of these writers to the more common teaching may be explained by assuming that they admitted indeed the transmission of a moral stain, but did not look upon it as a sin in the strict sense of the term; because they considered that sin, properly so called, must originate in a person's own free will. This assumption, which is far from being improbable, would solve the whole difficulty.

The teaching of the Latin writers of this period is much more satisfactory. They follow the fundamental views traditional in the West. Thus St. Cyprian, arguing that baptism should not be withheld from children, says that "they have not sinned except in so far as they contracted the stain of death by reason of their descent from Adam according to the flesh; and for this they can obtain pardon more easily, as it is not a sin which they themselves committed, but which they received from another." [9] Hilary states that "in the error of one Adam all mankind went astray." [10] "Before we are born," Ambrose affirms, "we are defiled by an hereditary stain." And again: "In Adam I fell, in Adam I was ejected from paradise, in Adam I died; how can the Saviour restore me to my former condition, unless He find me in Adam?" [11] Jerome speaks in a similar strain: "No one is without sin,

[6] Hom. De Auct. Mali, 7.
[7] Orat. 40, 23.
[8] Cont. Jul. 1, 21, 23, 26.
[9] Ep. 64.
[10] In Ps. 118, 3, 3.
[11] Apol. Dav. 1, 56; In Luc. 7, 234.

not even a child of one day. . . . For if the stars of heaven are not pure in the sight of God, how much less is a worm and rottenness, and those who are held fast in the bonds of sin committed by Adam." [12] Pacian of Barcelona declares that the "sin of Adam has justly passed over to his descendants, because they have been begotten of him." [13] Finally a contemporary writer, usually referred to as Ambrosiaster, not only anticipates Augustine's doctrine, but uses almost the same terms. Commenting on Romans 5, 12, he writes: "It is manifest, then, that in Adam all sinned *quasi in massa;* for as he himself was corrupted by sin, those of whom he became the ancestor were all born under sin. Because of him, therefore, we are all sinners, because from him we are all descended." [14]

Hence the plea of Celestius before the synod at Carthage, that there was no agreement on the question of original sin, had really no foundation in fact. With the possible exceptions mentioned above, the writers of that and the preceding century were fairly well agreed on two points: the existence of original sin and its connection with the fall of Adam. Its nature, the ultimate reason of its propagation, how it could in any sense be called voluntary so as to be a real sin, they did not investigate. This devolved to a great extent upon Augustine in course of the controversy that ensued, although even he did not clear up these points completely. As it would be too lengthy to follow him through the various phases of the discussion, it seems advisable to reduce his teaching to a connected system, which may be done without altering in any way his own exposition of the doctrine as contained in his writings.

In order to prove the existence of original sin, Augustine drew arguments from many different sources. The following are the most important:

1°. From Holy Scripture: (a) Ps. vi, 6. "What does David mean by saying that he was conceived in iniquity, if not that iniquity is contracted from Adam?" (b) Job xiv, 4. "It is because of the original stain that he says, not even an

[12] In Joan. 3, 5.
[13] De Bapt. P. L. 13, 1092.
[14] In Ep. ad Rom. 5, 12.

infant of one day is free from sin." (c) Thes. ii, 3. "We were all the children of wrath," because of original sin. (d) Rom. v, 12. "In whom all have sinned," that is, in Adam, therefore all are born in sin. (e) John iii, 5. "Unless anyone be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven"; hence everyone has contracted a sin that bars the way.

2°. From the teaching of the Fathers: Cyprian, Hilary, Ambrose, Ambrosiaster, Irenæus, Reticius of Autun, Olympius of Spain, Gregory of Nazianzus, Basil, Chrysostom, the fourteen bishops of the synod of Diospolis; these are cited as witnesses to the teaching of the Church. With them on his side, he tells Julian: "You are convicted of error from all the world over; the testimony of these holy men is brighter than the sun." [15]

3°. From Infant Baptism: "That baptism is an ablution, a cleansing; those who receive it are redeemed from the slavery of Satan, and share in the redemption of Jesus Christ, as is proved by the exorcisms and by the renunciation of Satan required of the sponsors in the name of these children"; therefore they were born in sin. "You say that because of the sins of another these little ones ought not to have perished. They are the sins of another, but the sins of their father: and for this reason, by the law of descent and propagation, they are also ours." [16]

4°. From the sufferings of little children: "They extend even to attacks from the demons. How can one account for them, except by reason of original sin? They are not chastisements for personal sins, nor are they intended to try the virtue of these little ones." [17]

5°. From the profound and universal misery of mankind in its present condition: disease, pain, poverty, vice, labor, accidents, misfortunes of all sorts, which are the permanent condition of our race. Would the good God have placed all mankind in such a wretched state, were it not on account of some primitive fault in which all have a share? [18]

[15] Cont. Jul. 1, 30.
[16] Ibid. 7, 11; Opus Imperf. I, 48.
[17] Cont. Jul. 6, 67.
[18] Opus Imperf. 1, 50, 54.

As to the nature of original sin not much can be said except that it is involved in great obscurity. "Nothing is better known than its existence, nothing is more difficult to understand than its nature." [19] However, it must in some way consist in concupiscence; primarily in the craving for bodily pleasures, and secondarily in a general tendency away from good: "since every one is turned away from what is divine and of permanent value to what is changeable and of uncertain issue." [20] "This concupiscence (especially sexual passion) is an evil with which every man is born"; therefore it must in some manner be connected with the primitive fault.[21]

However original sin does not consist in concupiscence as such, but rather in its guilt. It is because of Adam's sins that concupiscence is found in all his descendants, hence its presence under these conditions is imputed to them as a fault. When persons are baptized, and thereby freed from original sin, concupiscence indeed remains, but its guilt is taken away. Baptism removes the shaft, yet the wound remains.[22]

This guilt of concupiscence is in each individual a real sin, because it is in a certain sense a voluntary guilt. Not that it was caused by the personal will of those who are infected with it, but by reason of Adam's position in respect to his descendants. "That which in little children is called original sin, in spite of the fact that they are unable to use their free will, is not without reason termed voluntary, because, contracted by the sinful will of the first man, it has become in a manner hereditary." [23] It is our own sin through our descent from Adam. Though the sin of another, it is nevertheless by the law of descent and propagation also our own.

The fact of transmission is certain, but the manner is involved in great obscurity. However it seems plain that the instrumental cause of transmission is concupiscence: not actual, but habitual. It is on account of this habitual concupiscence that even of the holy and lawful wedlock of God's own children are born children of this world and not children of God.

[19] De Morib. Eccl. Cath. 1, 40.
[20] De Lib. Arbit. 1, 34.
[21] De Pec. Mer. et Rem. 1, 57.
[22] De Nupt. et Concup. 1, 28, 29; De Trin. 14, 23.
[23] Retract. 1, 13, 5.

Parents do not beget children by reason of their divine sonship, but by reason of the concupiscence that is in them.[24] Hence it was that Christ, in whom original sin had no part, chose to be born of a virgin. "For although Mary's own body had been conceived under the influence of concupiscence, nevertheless as she did not conceive her Son's body in the same way, she did not transmit concupiscence to Him." [25]

The fact, therefore, that concupiscence is the instrumental cause of the transmission of original sin must be admitted; but precisely how the transmission is thus effected, is more or less a matter of conjecture. There are two hypotheses that seem admissible, yet neither of them is without its difficulties. Either both body and soul are generated by the father in a vitiated condition, or the body alone is thus generated by him. In the former supposition everything is clear, except the generation of the soul. If this is repugnant, then the soul, created by God pure and innocent, is vitiated or stained in its union with the body, according to God's hidden justice.[26] Theoretically Augustine favored the view which held the creation of individual souls by God, but as that seemed to make the transmission of original sin unintelligible, he in practice preferred to say that they are derived "ex traduce seminis." The existence of original sin, he argued, is a matter of faith, the creation of individual souls is not; therefore I cling to the former, and, if need be, sacrifice the latter.[27]

The consequences of original sin are many and grievous. Besides the physical evils already mentioned, the author emphasizes especially the following:

1°. The loss of freedom in respect of moral good. Adam, before the fall, had the power of avoiding evil and of doing good; by the assistance of God's grace, the *auxilium sine quo non,* he could perform actions that were meritorious of a supernatural reward. This freedom and power, which the author calls *libertas,* was lost to Adam's descendants through

[24] De Nupt. et Concup. 1, 20, 21, 27.
[25] Serm. 151, 5; cfr. De Nupt. et Concup. 1, 27.
[26] Contr. Jul. 5, 7.
[27] Ibid. 5, 17.

original sin. Not that free will itself, or the *liberum arbitrium*, was lost: no, free will did not perish in the fall, but freedom did — that freedom which Adam had in paradise, and which enabled him to fulfill all justice.[28]

2°. Eternal damnation of unbaptized children who die before they come to the use of reason. Since, aside from purgatory, there is no intermediate place between heaven and hell, and since these children, owing to original sin of which they were not cleansed before death, cannot enter heaven, their portion must be with the damned in everlasting fire.[29] However, the positive pain which they there suffer is "omnium mitissima," the slightest of all pains found in that place of horrors.[30]

3°. Universal damnation, from which there is no redemption except through the gratuitously bestowed grace of God. "Things, therefore, were in this condition: all mankind, as one mass of damnation, lay prostrate in evil and groveled therein, rushing from evil to evil, and, sharing the fate of the angels who had sinned, bore the just punishment of its impious desertion." [31] Hence were it not for the free grace of God, adults as well as children would all be condemned to the eternal pains of hell. With this is connected Augustine's theory of predestination and reprobation, of which something will be said in the following chapter.

This is, in brief outline, St. Augustine's teaching on original sin. It takes account of many points never touched by his predecessors, yet it also involves some of them in almost impenetrable obscurity. His partial identification of original sin with concupiscence was destined to retard the further development of this doctrine for many centuries. Not a few dogmatic theologians have tried to interpret it as being in full accord with present day teaching, but there is little in the works of St. Augustine that suggests such an interpretation. At all events, it was never so interpreted until the time of St. Thomas, and then only to a limited extent. Yet all

[28] Contr. Duas Epist. Pelag. 1, 5.

[29] Opus Imperf. Contr. Jul. 3, 199.

[30] De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. 1, 21.

[31] Enchir. 27.

these imperfections and obscurities should not detract from the consideration due to Augustine's work. With the exception of St. Anselm, no one improved on his teaching until the middle of the thirteenth century. And even then progress was slow, because of the difficulty of the subject. He well said: "Nihil ad praedicandum notius, nihil ad intelligendum secretius."

CHAPTER XXIV

THE QUESTION OF GRACE: SEMI-PELAGIANISM

As already stated in the preceding chapter, Pelagianism grew out of the undue emphasis which its author placed upon the power of man's free will. Since the human will is free, he contended, man can do good or evil just as he chooses: hence if he is not perfect, as his Father in heaven also is perfect, the fault lies entirely with his free will. He failed to reach perfection, because he failed to will it.

It was to maintain this fundamental proposition that Pelagius and his followers denied the existence of original sin, and swept aside all supernatural gifts and graces as in any way necessary for the practice of perfect virtue. God suited man's strength to the burden He imposed; hence for the carrying of this burden man's nature suffices. What Adam received in the beginning from the hand of his Creator, that he later on transmitted to his descendants: neither more nor less, and therefore Adam was created in the same state in which human nature has ever been since his day. He was neither immortal nor endowed with any other prerogative surpassing the exigencies of his nature. By the right use of his free will he could merit his eternal salvation, and also such extra divine helps as would make the practice of virtue more easy. And precisely the same obtains in our case. We receive no graces that are such in the strict sense of the term — entirely gratuitous gifts which lie beyond the reach of natural merit. Furthermore, with the possible exception of interior illuminations, whatever so-called graces we do receive consist in purely external helps, such as instruction, example, encouragement.

This is really the essence of Pelagianism, which, together with the denial of original sin, was finally condemned by the

Council of Carthage, held in 418, and approved by Pope Zozimus in the same year. In a considerably modified form Pelagianism appeared a few years later in Southern Gaul, where men of undoubted learning and holiness considered Augustine's teaching on grace and predestination to restrict unduly the freedom of man's will. Their system of teaching is known as Semi-Pelagianism, which will be considered in the second part of this chapter.

A — The Question of Grace

In this matter there are evidently two points that call for separate consideration: First, man's primitive condition in respect of gratuitous gifts and graces; secondly, man's condition since the fall in reference to the same or similar gifts and graces. Both points had frequently been touched upon by Eastern and Western writers previous to the controversy, but they were very much clarified by the efforts of Augustine to defend the traditional teaching of the Church. It will be helpful if we first summarize the general views that were then prevalent, and thereafter briefly outline Augustine's system of thought in this matter. However, as the common teaching on man's primitive condition has already been reviewed in a previous chapter, under the heading, "Anthropology," that part may be omitted here; except that a short account of Augustine's own views on the subject is properly inserted in this place to round out his system.

As was pointed out in the chapter referred to in the preceding paragraph, all the writers of this period looked upon the grace of Christ as effecting in us a certain deification which makes us partakers of the divine nature, not indeed substantially, but through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and a close moral union with the Godhead. This grace is first communicated to us in baptism. Of the effects produced by baptism, St. Chrysostom gives the following vivid description whilst speaking of the neophytes: "They are not only free but holy, not only holy but just, not only just but sons, not only sons but heirs, not only heirs but brothers of Christ, not only brothers of Christ but coheirs, not only coheirs but mem-

bers, not only members but temples, not only temples but also organs of the Spirit. See how many are the blessings bestowed in baptism, and yet some fancy that the heavenly grace consists only in the remission of sins; but we have enumerated ten glorious gifts. And for this reason we also baptize the little ones, although they are not stained by (personal?) sin, so that they may receive sanctity, justice, divine adoption, a title to inheritance, the brotherhood of Christ, and being accounted His members." [1]

Baptism, then, makes us fit for heaven; it bestows the grace of divine adoption and makes us coheirs of Christ. But the title to heaven, thus gratuitously bestowed, must be preserved; it must be made good by a life of practical faith and divine charity. For this we need the help of God; it is a work that lies beyond the reach of our own natural strength. It is true, free will remained after the fall, because it is an essential endowment of our nature; but unaided free will can do no more than enable us to perform naturally good works; it cannot reach up into the supernatural order.

This was fully recognized by the writers now under consideration. Salvation, says St. Basil, does not come from the power of man, but from the knowledge and grace of God.[2] Or as Gregory of Nazianzus words it: "Our salvation must come both from ourselves and from God." [3] Commenting on the words of St. Paul, "non est volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis Dei," he says: "Since there are some who pride themselves on the good they have done, ascribing all to themselves, nor referring anything to their Creator and the wisdom of their Maker from whom all has been received, Paul teaches that even for the desiring of what is good we stand in need of divine assistance; nay even the choosing of what is right is something divine and a gift that comes to us from God's goodness. For our salvation must come both from ourselves and from God. . . . Thus because to will is also from God, hence he very justly ascribes the whole to God. However much you may run, however much you may strive,

[1] Apud August. Contr. Jul. 1, 6, 21.

[2] De Spir. Sanct. 18, 55.

[3] Orat. 37, 13.

you have need of Him who is disposed to crown your efforts." [4]

Practically the same view is taken by Chrysostom, although he is frequently adduced as a strong advocate of the power of man's free will. "God," he says, "looks for occasions from us to show forth His great liberality. Therefore, lest through laziness we should deprive ourselves of His gifts, let us hasten and press forward to lay hold of the beginning and the way that leads to virtue, so that helped by assistance from on high we may also be able to reach the end. For it is indeed not possible for us to do any good as we ought, unless we be helped by divine grace." [5] It is true, this looks as if he placed the beginning of good works in our own hands, but it must be borne in mind that he was pleading for personal efforts, and thus naturally emphasized his hearers' own part in the work of their salvation. The same may be said of another statement, which, as it stands, has a decidedly Semi-Pelagian coloring. Placing before his hearers the example of Abraham, in order to urge them on to strenuous efforts in the practice of virtue, he says: "But perhaps some will say that he received abundant grace from God, and the God of all manifested in his regard a singular providence. This is so, and I confess it. But if he had not first done what in him lay, he would not have received what came to him from the Lord. Consider, therefore, not this alone, but, having due regard to each particular, learn how in all things he first gave proof of his own virtue, and thus merited the divine help." [6] Similar views are brought out again and again in the writings of Chrysostom, but with all this he unhesitatingly ascribes the chief part in our good works to the grace of God.[7]

Contemporary Latin writers speak in very much the same straint. They, too, are, without exception, very clear on the elevation of human nature through the grace of Christ,

[4] Ibid.
[5] In Gen. Hom. 25, 7.
[6] Ibid. 42, 1.
[7] Thus in Homily 69, on Matthew, n. 2: "We are called not because of merit, but by grace." Also in Homily 4, on the Epistle to the Ephesians, n. 2: "Not even the gift of faith is ours, but God's; it is not bestowed because of our works."

and also on the constant need there is of divine help to make salvation possible. "You see, then," writes Ambrose, "that the power of the Lord everywhere sustains human endeavor; so much so that without the Lord no one can build, without the Lord no one can guard, without the Lord no one can even begin anything." [8] "We must be assisted and directed by God's grace," affirms Hilary, "that we may keep His precepts and work out our salvation." [9] With this Jerome is in full agreement when he says: "It is for God to call us, and for us to believe." [10] Victorinus is even more explicit. Commenting on the words of the Apostle, "work out your salvation," he says: "But again, lest anyone should be remiss in giving thanks to God, on seeing that he himself works out his salvation, it is added: 'For it is God who worketh in you according to your good will, both to will and to accomplish.' Therefore work out your salvation," he says; "but this work itself is from God. For God worketh in you, and He brings it about that you may thus will. . . . Thus who worketh not as assisted by God, in the first place does not have the will to work; and furthermore, even if he had the will, he is not able to accomplish anything, because he has no good will." [11]

But here again, in nearly all these writers expressions are occasionally met with that have a Semi-Pelagian ring to them. Man must will, must desire, must reach out to the good work, then God in His goodness will bestow His grace. These men spoke at times unguardedly, because the danger of Pelagianism was not yet apparent.

In this condition, then, did Augustine find the doctrine on grace when he was called upon to refute the errors of Pelagius and his followers. He did not altogether revolutionize it, nor in any way change it; yet whilst keeping all that was then commonly accepted, he developed it to such an extent, that a grateful posterity has honored him with the title, *Doctor Gratiae.* The following outline of his teaching on the subject is all that can here be attempted.

As already stated above, a short account of his views on

[8] In Luc. 2, 84.
[9] In Ps. 118, 1, 12.
[10] In Is. 49, 4.
[11] In Epist. ad Philipp. 2, 12, 13.

man's primitive condition is properly given in this place, although the common teaching on that phase of the subject has been reviewed in a previous chapter. It will give some completeness to his system. Leaving aside some doubtful expressions in his earlier writings, his final view comes to this. Before their fall, Adam and Eve were dowered with many preternatural and supernatural gifts, which perfected them in soul and body, and made their existence in paradise one of supreme happiness. Their bodies, though mortal by nature, had been gifted with immortality by the generosity of their Creator. They were at one and the same time mortal and immortal: mortal in the sense that their natural constitution admitted of death; immortal in so far as owing to God's special providence death had no power over them — they were in a condition not to die.[12] This immortality implied immunity from suffering, disease, old age: theirs was a perpetual youth, a life free from all misery, which, after a definite duration here on earth, was to be perfected by the greater blessings of life eternal.[13] Their minds were endowed with a high degree of infused knowledge and wisdom, which fitted them for their exalted position of ancestors and instructors of the human race.[14] Furthermore, they were free from all concupiscence, so that the sensitive part of their nature was in perfect subjection to reason, and their reason was subject to God.[15] They were indeed free, and capable of choosing either good or evil; but theirs was a freedom with a decided inclination to good. They could sin and they did sin, yet before sin was committed they were free from all interior inclination to sin.[16]

The foundation of these gifts was the "gratia justitiae," or, as we now call it, sanctifying grace. Adam was "vestitus gratia," clothed with grace. It was the same grace in which we are renewed through the redemption of Christ. We receive "per gratiam justitiae" that divine likeness to God

[12] De Gen. ad Lit. 6, 25, 36.
[13] De Civit. Dei, 14, 26; De Gen. ad Lit. 8, 11.
[14] Opus Imperf. 5, 1.
[15] De Gen. ad Lit. 11, 1, 3.
[16] De Correpț. et Grat. 11, 29; Opus Imperf. 5, 61.

which Adam forfeited by his disobedience, and through Jesus we enter again into the possession of the "justia fidei," the justice of faith, of which we were deprived in Adam. This "gratia" made Adam a spiritual man in his inmost being.[17] This was Adam's natural state; not natural in the sense that it was due to his nature, but in so far as God constituted him therein as his actual and permanent condition. Hence the contention of some that Augustine considered the primitive condition of our first parents as the natural state of man, in which God must create him, is really without foundation. The most that can be said is that Augustine did not professedly consider the possibility of the state of pure nature, but simply looked at the matter historically as he found it delineated in Holy Scripture.

Besides these supernatural gifts with which our first parents were dowered as they came from the creative hand of God, they received also a special divine help without which they could not have worked out their salvation. This was an "auxilium sine quo non," or an actual grace necessary for the performance of good works and for final perseverance in God's friendship.[18] They had, in virtue of their elevation to the supernatural state, the intrinsic powers or faculties to perform salutary actions; yet these powers must be assisted in exerting their activity by the help of God, so that their intrinsic capability might be actuated and find issue in salutary acts. This help was different from the grace which we receive since the fall; for as through Adam's sin we were deprived of the very power to act meritoriously, in our case grace is not only a help without which we do not perform good works, but without which we cannot: it must supply the very power or faculty itself. Hence the author calls it an "auxilium quo," a help which gives the power to act supernaturally and also assists that power in its action. Strictly speaking, this "auxilium quo" includes both sanctifying and actual grace; but Augustine, in his controversy with the Pelagians, considers it chiefly under this latter aspect. His teaching on the subject may be reduced to the following points:

[17] De Gen. ad Lit. 6, 37, 38, 39. [18] De Grat. et Lib. Arbit. 33.

1°. In the matter of actual grace we must distinguish between exterior and interior graces. Exterior graces are of many different kinds, comprising instruction, exhortation, example, pious reading, or any occurrence that may lead us to thoughts of a better life. Interior graces are of two kinds: illuminations of the mind that teach us what to do, and motions of the will that lead us to act. "Let them read and understand," the author says in reference to the Pelagians, "let them behold and confess that not by the law alone and by teaching coming from without does God work in the hearts of men by His marvelous and ineffable power, but also in an interior and invisible manner; and this not only by revealing Himself to the mind, but likewise by properly disposing the will." [19]

2°. Interior graces are further divided into prevenient and concomitant, or preventing and assisting grace. The former precedes the good action and leads up to it; it comes to us from God without our own doing: the latter accompanies the good action, and with this we must coöperate. "That we may will, God gives to us without any action on our part; but when we will, and will in such wise as to do, He assists us: nevertheless without Him, either bringing it about that we will, or helping us when we will, we can do nothing in the way of (supernaturally) good works." [20]

3°. Interior graces that precede the good actions may be either merely sufficient or they may also be efficacious. In the former case the divine help enables us to act, yet the act does not follow. In itself the grace was a sufficient help, but we failed to correspond. "It is the grace of God that helps the wills of men; and when they are not helped by it, the reason is in themselves and not in God." [21] In this sense we too have an "auxilium sine quo non," which we may abuse as Adam did in paradise. We have the power to act, given us by the grace that is presented; we have also the necessary assistance to make this power effective: but we fail to do our part. Hence the grace is not efficacious; it is merely sufficient.

In his explanation of efficacious grace the author is some-

[19] De Grat. Christi et Pecc. Orig. 1, 25, 8, 9.

[20] De Grat. et Lib. Arbit. 33.

[21] De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. 2, 17.

times very obscure. He understands by it, of course, a grace that not only enables us to act, but under the influence of which we do act. In itself it is a "delectatio," a drawing on to perform the good work in question. This is sufficiently clear; but what is the influence of this "delectatio" upon the will? He speaks of it at times as if it were irresistible; and this is the sense in which Jansenists and many Protestants interpret his teaching on efficacious grace. From expressions like this: "Quod enim amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est," [22] they infer that in Augustine's view efficacious grace is a divine help which takes away man's freedom of action, in the sense that its impulse is irresistible. The will may indeed coöperate with such a grace, it need not be merely passive; but it has no power to refuse its coöperation. In this sense men are not induced to act, but driven thereto.

This is, however, a false inference. For although Augustine strongly emphasized the power of divine grace, he ever did so without denying the freedom of the human will. A large number of texts might be adduced in support of this point. Thus he says: "Men are induced to act, and not driven in such a way that they themselves do not act at all." [23] "To assent to God's calling or to dissent from it, as I have said, is the part of our own will." [24] He treats this matter very thoroughly in his *De Diversis Quaestionibus, Ad Simplicianum;* and although that treatise was one of his first works, he refers to it again and again in his later years, as a book in which, "quantum Deus adjuvit, acriter disputavi contra inimicos gratiae Dei." [25] It contains, therefore, his consistent teaching on the nature of efficacious grace; and that teaching, as there set forth, places the efficacy of grace precisely in this, that the divine call is of such a nature as to move man's will to act freely.[26] Hence dogmatic theologians, after carefully examining all that has been written on the subject, unhesitatingly appeal to St. Augustine as an authority for the freedom of the human will under the action of divine grace. The

[22] Expos. Ep. ad Gal. 49.
[23] Serm. 156, 11, 11.
[24] De Spir. et Lit. 34, 60.
[25] Retract. 2, 37.
[26] Op. cit. 1, 2, 13.

"necessity," therefore, of which Augustine speaks as induced by the greater "delectatio," in so far as it affects the will, is simply a strong inclination to follow the appeal of divine grace; it is in no sense irresistible.

4°. Grace is absolutely necessary, not only for the perfecting of good works, but for their beginning as well; and also for the beginning of faith. "We cannot even will unless we be called: and when after being called we do will, our own will and endeavor are not sufficient to lead us whither we are called, unless God supplies the strength for the finishing of our course." [27] "Our sufficiency by which we begin to believe is from God." [28] Grace is, moreover, purely a gift of God's mercy. "For it will not be the grace of God in any way, unless it has been gratuitous in every way. Grace does not find the merits in existence, but causes them. For if grace be by merit, thou hast bought, not received gratis." [29] However, actions performed under the influence of grace are meritorious, both in respect of additional graces and eternal glory.[30] But final perseverance can be obtained only by prayer.[31]

Closely connected with this subject of grace, and in one sense forming a part of it, is the question of predestination. Did God by an act of His sovereign will decree from all eternity that certain definite persons should infallibly be saved, whatever may be said of the rest of mankind? And if so, was He directed in forming this decree by the foreknowledge of their fidelity to grace, or did He decree their salvation independently of this foreknowledge? In either case, predestination to glory necessarily implies predestination to efficacious graces, as without them salvation is never actually attained. On the other hand, predestination to grace does not necessarily imply predestination to glory, since grace may be sufficient without being efficacious.

Augustine's teaching on this subject is not as clear as might be desired; and according to many critics, he was not always

[27] Ibid. 2.
[28] De Praedest. SS. 8, 16.
[29] Serm. 169, 2; cfr. Retract. 1, 22.
[30] Ep. 194, 9; De Perfect. Justit. Hom. 17.
[31] Cont. Duas Epist. Pelag. 3, 23.

consistent in explaining his views. Up to 412, when he began his discussion with the Pelagians, he held that even after the fall God sincerely willed all men to be saved, although He foreknew that some, through failure of corresponding with His grace, would not actually attain salvation. Hence God did indeed predestinate some to glory, but only *post praevisa merita;* guided, therefore, by His foreknowledge of their fidelity to grace. On this point most critics are agreed. But it is contended that Augustine later on changed his mind, owing to the position taken by the Pelagians, who denied predestination altogether and held that salvation depended solely on man's free will. On the other hand, not a few of the more recent critics hold that Augustine was consistent throughout, and that he taught predestination *post praevisa merita* up to the end of his life.[32] A general outline of his thoughts on the subject may be given as follows:

1°. From all eternity God chose His elect and predestinated them to heaven: "And how could He choose those who as yet were not, except by predestinating them? Therefore predestinating He chose them." [33] This predestination on the part of God is always effective: "Of them no one perishes, because all are chosen. If any of them were to perish, God would be deceived; but no one of them perishes, because God is not deceived." [34]

2°. Predestination implies the following gifts and graces: First, a call to faith that is efficacious, or that actually leads to the embracing of the faith; secondly, justification by means of efficacious graces, so that persons thus predestinated may be "holy and immaculate in the sight of God"; thirdly, final perseverance, at least in the sense that moral faults are repaired at the hour of death; fourthly, actual bestowal of the crown of life.[35]

3°. To the predestination of the elect corresponds the reprobation of those who are lost; with this difference, however,

[32] Cfr. E. Portalié, Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, 2398–2407; Tixeront, H. D. II, 491 sqq.

[33] De Praedest. SS. 35.

[34] De Correpт. et Grat. 14, 23, 24.

[35] De Praedest. SS. 37, 36; De Corrept. et Grat. 16, 21, 22.

that God does not induce the reprobate to commit sin as He leads the elect to practice virtue. God decrees eternal damnation as a just punishment of their sins, but does not decree the sins of which eternal damnation is a just punishment. It has been said that in Augustine's view reprobation is a preterition or omission in the decree of predestination, a sort of negative reprobation.[36] But this interpretation of the Holy Doctor's teaching cannot be sustained. It is true enough that because of original sin he regards all mankind as a "massa damnata," "massa peccati," "massa perditionis," from which God needed not have separated any one; but he also tells his readers, "you have received the power to stand at the right hand of God; that is, to be made the sons of God;" [37] "it is *now* in your power to choose which of the two (elect or reprobate) you wish to be; choose whilst there is time." [38] Hence he necessarily supposes that God gives to everyone sufficient grace to avoid reprobation. If, therefore, some do become reprobate, is not simply because God passed them by, but because they failed to correspond with the graces which the merciful God placed at their disposal.

B — Semi-Pelagianism

Augustine's teaching on the necessity of interior grace for the performance of salutary actions was adopted by the synod of Carthage and approved by the Pope. Also many of his particular views on grace, though passed over by the synod, were accepted by his contemporaries; but others were called in question and even severely criticised. Four years before his death, the reading of his 194th letter caused such a commotion in the monastery of Adrumetum in Byzacene, that he found it necessary to explain his position on the question of grace and free will. Thus originated the two treatises, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* and *De Correptione et Gratia,* which were sent to the monks and seem to have restored peace to the community.

Much more serious trouble, however, was started a little

[36] Cfr. Tixeront, H. D. II, 500 sqq.

[37] In Ps. 120, 11.

[38] In Ps. 36, Serm. 1, 1.

later in Southern Gaul, where John Cassian, abbot of Saint Victor at Marseilles, stood out strongly for the rights and power of free will under the action of grace. A disciple of Chrysostom and deeply imbued with the theology of the East, he looked with suspicion at the absolute dominance of grace as apparently taught by Augustine. He, like other Eastern theologians, maintained indeed the necessity of grace; but at the same time strongly emphasized the freedom of the will. "If God does everything," he was fond of saying, "where is our merit? And if we can do nothing without grace, what becomes of our liberty?" He was a strong and outspoken opponent of Pelagianism, and vigorously defended the necessity of grace for all salutary actions; but whilst defending grace, he did not wish to see man's free will sacrificed, and that, he thought, had been done by the bishop of Hippo. His own views he brought out in his thirteenth conference, entitled, *De Protectione Dei,* which appeared sometime before 426, The following are his main contentions:

1°. A liberty that does not allow man to will and to do good "ex semetipso," by his own natural power, is not liberty in the true sense. As a fact, however, God in dispensing His graces sometimes demands and waits for our own efforts, and therefore the free will contributes something of its own.[39]

2°. God calls men in various and different ways; but of whatever kind God's calling may be, man can of himself resist or follow it; the beginning of faith is thus placed in his own power. Hence grace is an *auxilium sine quo non volumus,* and not an *auxilium quo volumus* as Augustine conceived it. Grace calls, solicits, inclines the will to act, but it does not give the very power to will and to begin the good work. We can of ourselves think of and desire the good; we can of ourselves follow the divine call, although without grace we cannot realize the good we conceive or perfect the salutary work we begin.[40]

3°. On the other hand, however, the grace of God is entirely gratuitous; the Pelagians are altogether in the wrong when they teach that men can of themselves merit grace; nay,

[39] De Protect. Dei. 12, 13. [40] Ibid. 14, 12, 13.

even between the good actions performed under the influence of grace and the final reward there is no strict proportion; the gratuitous mercy of God has its part in all.[41]

4°. As regards salvation, presupposing of course the help of God's grace, that depends finally on our own will. God intends the salvation of all men, and it is a horrible blasphemy to maintain the contrary. There is no such a thing as *predestinatio ante praevisa merita;* for grace is given indifferently to all and it is only the use or abuse of grace that is finally responsible for man's eternal salvation or damnation. In this sense, therefore, salvation depends on our own efforts. We can always correspond with the grace of God, which is given us, gratuitously indeed, but also infallibly. Even final perseverance is in our hands, since God's part in it is assured by the bestowal of the first grace.[42]

5°. If it be objected that grace is not given indifferently to all, because to some the Gospel is never preached, and others, as is the case with many infants, die before they have an opportunity of receiving baptism, the answer is that God was fully prepared to give them grace, but foreseeing the evil use these persons would make of it, He withheld it on account of their own demerits. Hence there is nothing arbitrary in the actions of God — there is no predestination and no reprobation except in consequence of men's own free actions.[43]

Owing to Cassian's high reputation for asceticism and learning, and by reason of his influential position as abbot of a large monastery, his teaching soon spread far and wide through Southern Gaul. However, Augustine was not without friends and defenders in that same region. Prosper of Aquitaine, a highly educated layman, informed him of what was going on. He replied in two treatises, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* and *De Dono Perseverantiæ;* but as they did not have the desired effect, Prosper himself took up his pen in defense of his beloved master. However in his various writings on the subject he did little more than restate and enforce Augustine's teaching. A few of the points he advances may here be presented.

[41] Ibid. 13, 16.
[42] Ibid. 13, 7, 17, 18; 17, 25; Prosp. Ep. 226, 4.
[43] Ibid. 2, 5, 3.

The contention of the Calumniatores, as he calls Cassian and his followers, that man's nature and free will have not been entirely vitiated by sin, that he is of himself still able to desire what is supernaturally good, and that he can pray for and begin the work of salvation, all this is simply untrue and can only be met with a blunt denial. Man is of himself absolutely incapable of beginning the work of salvation; his free will, unless extricated by grace, lies helpless in an abyss of evil and is under the power of the devil. He cannot go to God except by the help of God, nor can he have the beginning of faith except through the Holy Spirit.[44]

Their further contention that grace is sometimes given in view of a man's good disposition is simply a restatement of the Pelagian error; their claim that God calls men indiscriminately goes against the well known fact that many never hear the message of salvation; whilst their teaching that grace is only an *auxilium sine quo non* is utterly false, since it must give us the very power to do good.[45]

Then what the Calumniatores say about predestination cannot be admitted, because God does not predestine men to glory in consideration of their merits, but altogether gratuitously and independently of their good works: "Ut et qui salvantur ideo salvi sint quia illos voluit Deus salvos fieri."[46] In this as in most other points the author simply follows Augustine's view, but with regard to reprobation he is more explicit in stating its true nature. For the reprobate, he says, are predestined to damnation in consequence of God's foreknowledge of their sins.[47] They are not simply passed by in the decree of predestination, but they are excluded from it because God foresaw that they would not be faithful to grace.

This defense of Augustine's teaching had very little effect. Cassian disdained to answer, whilst Vincent of Lerins, in his *Commonitorium,* continued to attack Augustine with virulence, though without mentioning his name. Then Prosper appealed to Pope Xystus III, but obtained no satisfaction; and thus mat-

[44] Resp. ad Cap. Gall. 6.
[45] De Ingratis, 5, 287; Resp. ad Cap. Gall. 4, 5.
[46] Sent. super Cap. Gall. 9.
[47] Resp. ad Cap. Gall. 3, 12.

ters remained for years. Meanwhile, however, the views of the Roman Church had been clearly expressed in a letter of Pope Celestine to the bishops of Southern Gaul, in 431, to which was attached a number of doctrinal canons issued by former Popes, probably by Innocent and Zozimus. These condemn the chief proposition advanced by the Semi-Pelagians, that man of himself can desire, will, and begin a salutary work. Reference is also made to other points of the controversy, but they are put summarily aside as matters about which it does not behoove us to make inquiries.[48]

About the same time an unknown author published a work under the title *De Vocatione Gentium,* which threw considerable light on the matter under discussion. Its main purpose was to reconcile the fact of reprobation with the salvific will of God. To this end the author postulates a twofold call: the one general, which is extended to all men and implies ordinary graces, and the other special, providing for graces that are foreseen to be efficacious. In this way God sincerely wills the salvation of all, and if in spite of this some are lost, the reason is to be sought outside of God. In this way, too, there is a real predestination of the elect, in as much as God by a special decree gives to certain persons graces which He foreknows to be efficacious. But the further question, why these special graces are given to some and not to others, we must leave for solution to the all-wise and all-powerful God.

This rather clear exposition of one point of the controversy, together with the position taken by Rome in regard to the other, should have ended the discussion; but apparently neither the one nor the other did much towards setting men's minds at rest. After the death of Augustine (430) and of Cassian (435), there was a lull of about fifty years, until a book written by Faustus of Riez in Languedoc, *De Gratia Libri Duo,* caused the dispute to break out anew. Faustus was a learned and holy man, who before his elevation to the episcopate had been abbot of Lerins, for some time past a stronghold of Semi-Pelagianism. He first distinguished himself by

[48] P. L. 50, 530.

his determined stand against Predestinarianism, which was advocated by Lucidus, one of his priests. The error of Lucidus, that God predestined some men to eternal punishment, in the sense that He did not give them sufficient grace to work out their salvation, was condemned by the Synods of Arles and Lyons in 472 and 474. It was at the instance of these Synods that Faustus composed his two books on grace.

Concerning the doctrine contained in this work, critics are not agreed. Some regard the author as strongly infected with Semi-Pelagian views, whereas others consider his "Semi-Pelagian formulas as mere verbal exaggerations against Predestinarianism." Whilst resolutely rejecting the errors of Pelagius, he at the same time anathematizes any one who says that Christ did not die for all men, or does not will the salvation of all men, or that those who perish never had the opportunity of being saved. Let men put their free will to good use and God's grace will not be wanting, nor will they be excluded from the number of the elect by reason of predestination. The assumption that God gives special graces to some and denies them to others, in the sense that He wills the former to be saved and passes by the latter, is altogether untenable.

The views of Faustus seem to have been generally accepted by the theologians of Southern France, and in the early part of the sixth century were reproduced in the works of Gennadius of Marseilles. On the other hand, they aroused strong opposition among the Scythian monks at Constantinople. In 519 the monks applied to an African bishop, then tarrying as an exile in the imperial city, for information concerning the standing of Faustus. The bishop laid the matter before Pope Hormisdas, who replied in somewhat vague terms that Faustus was not regarded as an authority of special weight, and that the authentic teaching of the Church on the question of grace might be ascertained from the works of Augustine.

This reply of the Pope did not satisfy the monks, and thereupon they consulted the African bishops who had shortly before been exiled to Sardinia. The latter entered a vigorous protest against the teaching of Faustus. Their answer to the monks was written by Fulgentius, bishop of Ruspe. In this

letter, and in three other works which he wrote before his return to Africa in 523, he strongly defended the teaching of St. Augustine. He took up the matter again in a subsequent work, *De Veritate Prædestinationis et Gratia Dei,* and also in a letter written in the name of a synod of twelve bishops, whom the Scythian monks had again consulted. In these two productions also, he adheres closely to Augustine's views, and regards the teaching of Faustus, especially on predestination, as untenable.

The efforts of Fulgentius produced no more effect than those of Prosper had done almost a century before. Finally, however, the controversy was brought to a close by the intervention of Cæsarius of Arles. He first had the matter considered by a synod held at Valence, probably in 527, and then sent nineteen *Capitula Sancti Augustini* to Rome for approval. Felix IV, who was then Pope, sent back the document in a modified form, having struck out eleven of the *capitula* and added sixteen new ones, all taken from the *Sententiæ Augustini* collected by Prosper. To this list Cæsarius added one proposition, slightly changed some of the others, and then presented the whole, together with a profession of faith, to a synod gathered at Orange, in July 529.

When the bishops, fourteen in number, had subscribed the document, Cæsarius sent it once more to Rome, in order to obtain the confirmation of the Holy See. Pope Felix having meanwhile died, his successor, Boniface II, gave his approval in a letter to the bishop of Arles. He confirmed the decrees of the synod and declared the profession of faith to be "consentanea Catholicis Patrum regulis." He also expressed the hope that the zeal and learning of Cæsarius would soon succeed in bringing back those who had strayed from the right path. This hope was fully realized; for in a short time all the Gallic bishops signified their adhesion to the decisions of the synod, and Semi-Pelamianism practically disappeared from the land.

Thus Augustinianism triumphed, though not all of its views were either approved or accepted. That by Adam's sin human nature was changed for the worse both in body and in soul, that this sin is truly transmitted to Adam's descendants, that the

beginning of faith and of good works is not in the power of man's unaided free will, that grace is necessary for all salutary actions, that merely naturally good works cannot merit grace, that final perseverance must be obtained by prayer — all this is decided and approved; but the question of predestination and reprobation is passed by in silence, except in so far as anathema is pronounced against those who affirm that God predestines some men to sin. It is, however, explicitly declared that baptized persons can and must unite their efforts to divine grace in working out their salvation, and that in this sense their salvation is in their own hands.[49]

[49] Mansi. 8, 712 sqq.

CHAPTER XXV

THE NESTORIAN HERESY: THE COUNCIL OF EPHESUS[1]

Whilst the West was thus engaged in solving such practical questions as the Constitution and Authority of the Church, the Nature of the Sacraments, the Transmission of Original Sin, and the Necessity of Grace, the East continued its speculations on certain Christological problems, which had been only partially solved during the fourth-century controversies. This soon led to new discussions. Hardly had the great champions of orthodoxy, Athanasius, the two Gregorys, Basil, and Chrysostom, been called to their reward, when serious difficulties arose in reference to the union between the human and divine elements in Christ, and also about Mary's title of Theotokos as implied in her Divine Motherhood. The Council of Nicæa had defined Christ's true divinity, and that of Constantinople had declared His perfect manhood; but neither of them had given a direct decision as to what manner of union must be admitted between His humanity and His Godhead, or in what precise relation the Virgin stood to the Son of God. On the other hand, however, the Church's mind on both points had always been sufficiently clear to guide theologians of unswerving loyalty in their teaching; and hence the fourth-century Fathers had incidentally discussed them with all the assurance that is born of faith. Still for such as were less well disposed there was a possible occasion of going astray, and so new errors arose that called for further decisions on the part of the Church.

A — THE NESTORIAN HERESY

The Christological error usually designated as the Nes-

[1] Cfr. Hefele, History of the Councils, III, 4–115; Tixeront, H. D. III, 19–57; * Bethune-Baker, op. cit. 255–279; Hergenroether, Kirchengeschichte, I, 504–518; Marion, Histoire de l'Eglise, I, 451–469; Schwane, H. D. II, 480–534.

torian Heresy, because it was first openly defended by Nestorious, Patriarch of Constantinople, reaches well back into the fourth century. Cyril of Alexandria, the chief opponent of Nestorius, traced it to Diodorus of Tarsus, who died about 390. Diodorus handed it on to his disciple, Theodore of Mopsuestia. This latter was a staunch opponent of Apollinarianism, and in his zeal to uphold Christ's perfect humanity he broached views that were inconsistent with the Saviour's unity of person. The tendency to divide Christ was more or less common to theologians trained in the Antiochene school, which had always emphasized the distinction between Christ's humanity and His Godhead rather than their union. It was in this school that both Theodore and Nestorius were trained.

Theodore's teaching on the subject comes practically to this: The union of the Word with Christ's human nature consists in an indwelling, not of God's being, nor of His power, but of His εὐδοκιά, complacency, good pleasure, or approval. God's being is everywhere, and so is His energizing power; hence neither of them can be said to dwell more especially in one created being than in another; but His complacency or His approval may terminate differently in different persons. This divine indwelling may therefore be more or less perfect, according to God's free determination; hence whilst it is in some measure found in every just man, in Christ it is so perfect that it widely separates Him in this respect from all mankind. Through it He shares in all the honors and in the worship properly due to God alone.

The union thus effected between the human and the divine elements in Christ, although it is of an intimate nature, must not be conceived as a commingling or composition, but rather as a conjunction of the two terms. This conjunction began, in accordance with the divine foreknowledge of the Saviour's disposition, with the first formation of the humanity in the Virgin's womb, and in after life manifested itself in a ready practice of virtue and a determined avoidance of sin. Yet it was only a conjunction of distinct elements, not a union in the strict sense of the term.

Christian tradition always taught the oneness of person in

Christ, and this Theodore also admits, but he explains it by saying: "The two terms united make only one person as man and wife are one flesh. If we consider the natures in their distinction, we must define the nature and the person of the Logos as perfect and complete, and also the nature and the person of the man; but if we have regard to the union, we must say that there is only one person." Hence whilst in his belief he holds fast to the oneness of person in Christ, in his explanation he destroys it altogether.

Consistency required him to do away with the *communicatio idiomatum,* as that is founded on the hypostatic union in the strict sense of the term; yet he retained it in so far as he admitted a participation of the humanity in divine honors and worship. In other respects he simply set it aside. It was not the Son of God, the Logos Incarnate, who suffered and died and rose from the dead; it was only His temple, the humanity, in which He dwelt.

For the same reason he rejected the term Theotokos as applied to the Blessed Virgin. "Mary," he says, "is properly Christotokos, not Theotokos. It is madness to say that God is born of a woman: not God, but the temple in which God dwells, is born of Mary." When reproached that thus he admitted two sons of God in Christ, he expressly repudiated the inference, stating that through the indwelling of the Logos the human nature shares in the same divine sonship.[2]

All this is pure Nestorianism, but as Theodore was primarily intent upon a faithful discharge of his pastoral duties, his Christological speculations attracted little attention except in his own immediate surroundings, and so he escaped condemnation and died in communion with the Church. Matters took, however, a different turn with his pupil Nestorius, who ventured to preach from the housetops what his master had spoken more or less in secret.

Nestorius was at first a monk and then a priest at Antioch, where he soon became favorably known as an ascetic and a

[2] Cfr. fragments of his work De Incarnatione, quoted by Leontius in his treatise Contra Nestorium et Eutychen, P. G. 86, 1267–1396; also P. G. 66.

preacher. Owing to the reputation thus gained, he was in 428 consecrated Patriarch of Constantinople, and on assuming his new charge evinced great zeal for the purity of the faith, thus addressing the Emperor: "Give me, O Emperor, the earth cleansed from heretics, and I will help thee in the wars against the Persians." But before long he himself was condemned as a heretic.

The trouble seems to have started when his chaplain, Anastasius, who had accompanied him from Antioch, began to preach against the use of the term Theotokos. The title had been in common use for a long time, and is found in the writings of Origen, Alexander of Alexandria, Athanasius, Eusebius, and many others; but Anastasius would not allow it. "Let no man," he said, "call Mary Theotokos; for Mary was but a woman, and it is impossible that God should be born of a woman." [3] As this caused great excitement among the people, Nestorius tried to defend his chaplain. In a sermon preached on the subject, he says: "They ask whether Mary may be called Theotokos. But has God then a mother? In that case we must excuse heathenism, which spoke of mothers of the gods; but Paul is not a liar when he says of the Godhead of Christ, that it is without father, without mother, without genealogy. Mary did not bear God; the creature did not bear the Creator, but the man who is the instrument of the Godhead. . . . This garment of which He makes use I honor for the sake of Him who is hidden within it, and is inseparable from it. I separate the natures and unite the reverence. Consider what this means. He who was formed in the womb of Mary was not God Himself, but God assumed him, and because of Him who assumes, he who is assumed is also called God." [4] Hence Mary may be called Theodochos, or Christotokos, but not properly Theotokos.

As regards the union of the divine and the human elements in Christ, he holds that it must be understood as a conjunction of the complete and perfect natures; an indwelling of the Godhead in the humanity, resulting in a moral and sympathetic

[3] Socrates, Hist. Eccl. 7, 32.

[4] Adv. Dei Genitricem Mariam; cfr. Hefele, op. cit. p. 12.

union of the two. "One thing is the Logos who dwells in the temple formed by the Holy Ghost, and another is the temple itself, differing from the God who dwells within it." Yet this moral and sympathetic union suffices to make the two natures, when considered precisely as united, one person. "He who is born of woman is not pure God and not mere man: for the manhood which is born is united with the Godhead." From this it is quite clear that Nestorius, like Theodorus before him, tried to preserve the oneness of person in Christ, but his explanation of the union between the two natures made all his efforts in this direction futile.

In a short while these heterodox views began to spread, and caused not a little apprehension in those who were concerned about the purity of the faith. The first one of real consequence to raise his voice in defense of the traditional teaching of the Church was Cyril of Alexandria, who addressed two strong letters to Nestorius, pointing out the true doctrine and asking him to correct his statements. Although at first evasive in his replies, Nestorius finally cut the correspondence short by practically telling Cyril that he would do much better if he were to attend to his own affairs. Meanwhile, however, he had endeavored to gain the monks of Egypt over to his view. As they were under the jurisdiction of Cyril, the latter thereupon addressed a letter to them, setting forth the true doctrine on the points in question. A few extracts will be sufficient to show us the drift of his teaching.

Reminding them that the great Athanasius, for whom they all entertained the profoundest reverence, had used the title Theotokos quite freely, and that Holy Scripture and the Council of Nicæa clearly teach that the union between the two natures in Christ is most intimate, he exclaims: "Thus then I marvel that there should be any who in the least doubt whether the Holy Virgin ought to be called Mother of God. For if our Lord Jesus Christ is God, how is the Holy Virgin, who brought Him forth, not the Mother of God? . . . But perhaps you will say this: Is then the Virgin, tell me, the mother of the divinity? To this we reply that the living and subsisting Word was truly, without controversy, begotten of the

very essence of God and the Father, and had His being without beginning in time, always coexisting with the Father, in Him and with Him abiding and conceived; but that in these latter times, when He was made flesh, that is, when He was united to a body informed by a rational soul, He was also according to the flesh born of a woman." [5]

The union of the divine and the human in Christ, and the birth of God's own Son of a human mother, he illustrates by an analogy drawn from the birth of human beings in general. What is born of the mother is neither the body nor the soul of the child, taken separately, but the two together as united in oneness of nature and person. Moreover the soul in itself is incapable of being born; it is only its union with the body, derived from the parents, that enables it to be born along with the body. Similarly the Logos, because of its union with human nature, is born along with human nature; and this Logos Incarnate is thus both the Son of God and the Son of the Virgin.[6]

As this letter soon found its way to Constantinople, a new correspondence ensued between the two patriarchs, which was carried on with considerable bitterness on the part of Nestorius. The latter also wrote to Pope Celestine, asking for information concerning certain Pelagian bishops, and stating that a new heresy had sprung up in the East, which seemed to be a mixture of Apollinarianism and Arianism.[7] By this, of course, he meant the teaching of Cyril. He likewise induced certain Alexandrians, who had been punished by Cyril for their moral excesses, to lodge a complaint against their patriarch with the Emperor. In a letter of remonstrance written on this account, Cyril again took occasion to explain his teaching concerning the points under dispute. "The Word," he said, "did not become flesh in such a manner that God's nature had been changed or transformed into a body or soul: on the contrary, the Logos had hypostatically united with Himself the body animated by a rational soul, and thus had, in an inexplicable manner, become man. . . . The two distinct natures had been

[5] Epist. ad Monachos Aegypti, 1, 1, P. G. 77, 13, 21.

[6] Ibid. cc. 18, 19.

[7] Mansi, 4, 1021, 1023.

united into a true unity, and from both one Christ and one Son had come, not as though the difference of the natures had been done away by the union, but, on the contrary, that they constituted the one Lord Jesus Christ and Son by the unutterable union of the Godhead and the manhood." [8]

About the same time Cyril addressed also a letter to the Emperor, Theodosius II, another to his sister Pulcheria, who held the rank of Augusta, and a third to the Empress Eudocia, in each of which he gave a full exposition of the doctrine as taught by the Church. Then, as nothing further could be accomplished, he forwarded his correspondence with Nestorius to the Pope, entreating him to settle the dispute.

Thus fully informed concerning the troubles that disturbed the Eastern Church, Celestine gathered some forty bishops in council, and after a careful examination of the several letters submitted to him, he condemned Nestorius as a heretic, threatening him with deposition unless he retracted his errors within ten days from the time he received the Papal sentence. At the same time he also sent a letter to the church of Constantinople, to John of Antioch, and to Cyril of Alexandria, setting forth the reasons for the condemnation. Furthermore, he appointed Cyril as his representative, with strict orders to execute the sentence in case Nestorius refused to retract.[9] John of Antioch, who had been a fellow student of Nestorius and was his intimate friend, tried to induce him to make the required retractation, urging that the term Theotokos was in perfect accord with Holy Scripture and tradition; but Nestorius, relying on the support of the Emperor, answered in evasive terms and then appealed to a general council.[10]

Meanwhile Cyril called a synod of his suffragans at Alexandria, to draw up a formula of belief which Nestorius was to subscribe if he decided to submit to the judgment of the Pope. The formula begins with the Nicene Creed, then clearly explains the orthodox doctrine of the hypostatic union, and closes with twelve anathematisms, which sum up the contents of the document and anathematize any one who presumes to

[8] Cfr. Hefele, op. cit. p. 21.
[9] Mansi, 4, 550, 1017–1047.
[10] Ibid. 4, 1061; 4, 752.

hold contrary views.[11] A committee, consisting of two Egyptian bishops and two of the Alexandrian clergy, was then sent to Constantinople, with full authority to adjust matters in accordance with the decision of the Pope. The synodal letter, together with the documents from Rome were publicly delivered to Nestorius, but he refused to give an answer. Instead he tried to gain the Emperor over to his side, and when he was fairly sure of being safe on that point, he replied to the anathematisms of Cyril and the Alexandrian synod by issuing twelve counter-propositions, which either rejected the doctrine of Cyril or evaded the issue.[12] The most important of the two sets of propositions are the following:

1°. Cyril: If any one does not confess that Emmanuel is true God, and that therefore the Holy Virgin is Theotokos, since she bore, after the flesh, the Incarnate Son of God; let him be anathema.

Nestorius: If any one says that Emmanuel is true God, and not rather God with us . . . ; and if any one calls Mary the mother of the Logos, and not rather the mother of Him who is Emmanuel . . . ; let him be anathema.

3°. Cyril: If any one separates the hypostases (natures) as to their unity in Christ, connecting them only by a conjunction in dignity, power and appearance, and not rather by conjunction in physical union; let him be anathema.

Nestorius: If any one says that Christ, who is also Emmanuel, is one not (merely) in consequence of the conjunction, but (also) in nature, and does not acknowledge the conjunction of the two natures, that of the Logos and that of the assumed manhood, as still continuing without mingling; let him be anathema.

12°. Cyril: If any one does not confess that the Word of God suffered in the flesh, was crucified in the flesh, and tasted death in the flesh, and became the first-born from the dead, since He as God is life and the life-giver; let him be anathema.

Nestorius: If any one, in confessing the sufferings of the flesh, ascribes them also to the Logos of God, as to the flesh in

[11] Ibid. 4, 1081 sqq.

[12] Ibid. 4, 1099 sqq.

which He appeared, and thus does not distinguish the dignity of the natures; let him be anathema.

One glance at these propositions suffices to show the fundamental difference between the teaching of Cyril and that of Nestorius. Whilst Cyril affirms the Divine Motherhood of Mary, the intrinsic union of the two natures in Christ, and the *communicatio idiomatum,* Nestorius flatly denies all of them, and thereby necessarily rends the one Christ in two. It is not merely a casual difference of view-points, but an essential difference of doctrine. Cyril represents the traditional teaching of the Church, although he expresses it at times somewhat obscurely; Nestorius advances the extreme speculations of a particular school, and in doing so often confuses the issue so as not to oppose openly the current of accepted tradition. He may have been a good man and perhaps even sincere in his contentions, but in that case he was a singularly incompetent theologian.

Harnack in his History of Dogmas tries to show that the Christology of Nestorius was identical with that of the Western Church, and that Pope Celestine through political motives denied his own belief in order to endorse the views of Cyril. To substantiate this assertion he cites from the second letter of Nestorius to the Pope the following passage: "Utraque natura quae per conjunctionem summam et inconfusam in una persona unigeniti adoratur." [13] "This," he states, "was essentially the Occidental formula; Celestine himself knew of nothing else." [14] True, "this was essentially the Occidental formula," as far as appearances go; but in objective significance, as understood by Nestorius, it had nothing in common with Occidental teaching. If the reader will turn back to the chapter on Christology, "The Word Incarnate," he will find ample proof that the Latins understood the union of the two natures in the same sense as Cyril did, and that they had no hesitation whatever about calling Mary the Mother of God. And what these fourth-century writers held, that was also held by Celestine. He did not deny his belief "through politi-

[13] Epist. 2, ad Coelest. Mansi, 4, 1024.

[14] Op. cit. II, 356 sqq. Fourth Germ. Ed.

cal motives," but was intent upon safeguarding the faith that had been delivered to him.

On the other hand, in his opposition to Cyril, Nestorius did not stand alone; he was supported by the Antiochene school in general, and more particularly by John of Antioch, Andrew of Samosata, and the famous Theodoret of Cyrus, all of whom thought they detected in Cyril's writings, and especially in the third and twelfth anathematisms, a restatement of Apollinarian errors. They interpreted the physical union of the two natures affirmed Cyril, and his ascription of the Saviour's sufferings and death to the Incarnate Word, as a denial of the distinction of the united natures in Christ. Cyril answered them by pointing out, what should have been sufficiently evident from his previous letters on the subject, that by the physical union he merely understood a true union as opposed to the mechanical conjunction held by Nestorius, and that the sufferings and death of the Incarnate Word physically affected only His human nature, but by reason of the hypostatic union were rightly ascribed to His divine person. This explanation failed to satisfy his opponents, but the reason of this failure was personal rather than doctrinal.

B — The Council of Ephesus

In order to put an end to these contentions, the Emperors Theodosius II and Valentinian III, acting with the consent of the Pope, made preparation to summon a general council, which should meet at Ephesus. The summons was issued in November, 430, and the date for the first meeting was set for Pentecost, 431. About a month before the council was to meet, the Pope informed the Emperors that he could not appear in person, but would send his legates. He appointed the two bishops Arcadius and Projectus, together with the priest Philip, directing them to support Cyril, but at the same time to safeguard the dignity of the Apostolic See. In a letter which the legates presented to the council, he says: "The legates are to be present at the transactions of the synod, and will give effect to that which the Pope has long ago decided with regard to Nestorius; for he has no doubt that the assem-

bled bishops will agree with this." A special letter had been sent by the Emperors to Augustine of Hippo, but he had died some months before. Candidian and Irenæus, two imperial counts, were commissioned to preserve order.

Nearly 200 bishops, mostly from the East, were present on the appointed day, June 7, 431; but John of Antioch with his forty suffragans was still loitering on the way. When after five days of waiting he failed to appear, although he was in the neighborhood, the bishops concluded that he did not wish to be present at the condemnation of his friend, and so they opened the synod without him. Nestorius was summoned three times to present himself before the council and answer the charge of heresy, but protected by Candidian he refused to come. His case, therefore, had to be adjusted in his absence.

During the first session the second letter of Cyril to Nestorius was read, together with the latter's answer, whereupon the whole assembly cried out: "We all anathematize the impious Nestorius." Then, to submit the doctrinal points at issue to a thorough examination, a number of passages from the writings of the Fathers were presented, which were found to be in perfect agreement with the doctrine as explained by Cyril in his letter to Nestorius. These passages were taken from Peter of Alexandria (+ 311), Athanasius (+ 373), Basil (+ 379), Gregory of Nazianzus (+ 390), Gregory of Nyssa (+ 394), Theophilus of Alexandria (+ 412), Atticus of Constantinople (+ 426), Cyprian of Carthage (258), Pope Felix I (+ 274), Pope Julius I (+ 352), and Ambrose of Milan (+ 397). This was the first time that the argument from the Fathers was introduced into the discussions of a general council, although in local synods and controversies it had often been invoked before.

In opposition to these passages there were next read some twenty extracts from the writings of Nestorius, in which His heterodox views were clearly expressed. Further discussion seemed superfluous, especially as the Pope had directed the council simply to execute the sentence already pronounced by himself. Hence a decree of deposition was drawn up, which

concluded with the words: "Urged by the canons, and in accordance with the letter of our most Holy Father Celestine, the Roman Bishop, we have come, with many tears, to this sorrowful sentence against him, namely, that our Lord Jesus Christ, whom he has blasphemed, decrees by the holy Synod that Nestorius be excluded from the episcopal dignity, and from all priestly communion." The sentence was then subscribed by all the bishops present.

This first session of the Council lasted from early in the morning till late at night, yet the whole day long enormous crowds of the faithful were waiting at the doors of "Holy Mary," the church in which the session was held, to learn the decision of the bishops on a matter which they had so much at heart. When at last the doors were opened and the result of the deliberation was announced, the people shouted for joy, praised the holy Synod, and, gathering in procession, escorted the bishops with torches and censers to their dwellings. The whole city was illuminated, and there was joy in every house, because Holy Mary was in truth Theotokos, the Mother of God. A similar demonstration took place somewhat later at Constantinople. These popular outbursts show perhaps better than anything else how definite a shape the doctrine under discussion had assumed in the belief of the faithful. At the same time they afford an instance of the infallibility of the *sensus fidelium.*

A few days later John of Antioch arrived, accompanied by his forty suffragans. When he learned what had been done, he showed himself greatly displeased and immediately called a meeting of his own bishops, which declared the first session of the Council irregular and void, and then excommunicated Cyril and his adherents. All attempts on the part of the council to come to an understanding proved fruitless, as John was supported by the Emperor's representatives, who had been instructed to sustain Nestorius.

Meanwhile, however, the Council continued its work. It finished in the seventh session, when, besides issuing six canons in reference to recalcitrant prelates and priests, it also drew up a circular letter, which was to be sent to all the churches. In

this letter the bishops set forth that the Synod had pronounced excommunication against John of Antioch and the bishops who had taken his part. This ended the Council, but not the dispute.

As the Emperor, through misunderstanding rather than through ill will, supported Nestorius and his friends against the decision that had been given by the assembled bishops, a deadlock ensued which lasted till the end of August. Both parties sent appeals to the court, but the members of the council could obtain no hearing. Their opponents so far prevailed on the Emperor that he ordered Cyril of Alexandria and Memnon of Ephesus to be deposed from their sees and cast into prison. Finally, however, through the intervention of the monks at Constantinople and the influence of Pulcheria, the Emperor's eyes were opened to the true state of things. Then the deposition of Nestorius was ratified, and Maximian, a priest of Constantinople, was consecrated in his stead. After this the council was officially dissolved, Cyril and Memnon were reinstated, and the bishops received permission to return to their sees.

Whilst the disputes just referred to were going on, John and his followers drew up a formula of belief, which some time later became the means of reuniting the two parties; hence it is called the Union Creed. From it one can readily see that the dissension arose from personal animosity rather than from a real difference in faith. The part referring to the points then under discussion reads as follows: "We acknowledge that our Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, is true God and true man, consisting (as man) of a rational soul and a body; that He was born before all time of the Father as to His Godhead, and was in the end of days, for us and for our salvation, born of the Virgin as to His manhood, of one substance with the Father in respect to His Godhead, and of one substance with us in respect to His manhood. For the two natures are united together, and therefore we acknowledge one Christ, one Lord, and one Son. On account of this union, which is however far from being a mingling, we also confess that the Holy Virgin is Theotokos,

because God the Word was made flesh, and by the incarnation, from the time of His conception, has united the manhood which He assumed of her with Himself." This ended the dispute between Catholics, but as a separate sect Nestorianism has survived to the present day.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE MONOPHYSITE HERESY: THE COUNCIL OF CHALCEDON[1]

Although there are in Christ two distinct natures, the divine and the human, yet they are not separated: by reason of the hypostatic union they form one being, one person, one Christ, one Son of God Incarnate. This was the teaching of Cyril in opposition to that of Nestorius, and this teaching was dogmatically defined by Pope Celestine and the Council of Ephesus. But even before the death of Cyril, which occurred in 444, some of his followers emphasized the union to such an extent that the human element in Christ seemed more or less absorbed by the divine. This view found its fullest expression in the heresy of Eutyches, which is known to history as Monophysitism or Monophysism, because it defends the oneness of nature in Christ.

A — The Monophysite Heresy

Eutyches was an enthusiastic follower of Cyril, and as archimandrite or abbot of an important monastery near Constantinople he had contributed not a little to the final overthrow of Nestorius. In 448, when he had been a monk for more than threescore years, he was accused by Eusebius of Dorylæum, his former friend, of Apollinarian tendencies. A Synod of some thirty bishops, just then gathered at Constantinople by the Patriarch Flavian, summoned him to clear himself of the charge. At first he refused to come, but finally he was prevailed upon to answer the summons.

His doctrinal statements before the Synod were too vague and guarded to be satisfactory, and when the question was

[1] Cfr. Hefele, History of the Councils, III, 285–449; Tixeront, H. D. III, 76–94; *Bethune-Baker, o. c. 281–300.

put to him: "Do you confess the existence of two natures even after the incarnation, and that Christ is consubstantial with us?" he tried to evade the issue. This, however, did not satisfy his questioners, and as they pressed him for a clear statement of his belief, he replied: "I confess that before the union (of the Godhead and manhood) Christ was of two natures, but after the union I confess only one nature."[2] Urged to conform to the orthodox teaching, which held that the two natures, though hypostatically united, remained nevertheless distinct after the union, he protested that for peace sake he was willing to do so, but as he could not find this teaching either in Holy Scripture or in the writings of the Fathers, he could not pronounce anathema upon the opposite doctrine. When all further urging proved useless, the patriarch in the name of the Synod pronounced sentence of deposition and excommunication.

Supported by the Emperor, Eutyches now set to work to gain the people of Constantinople over to his side. He put up placards all over the city, setting forth the justice of his cause. Then, to secure ecclesiastical support, he sent letters to Alexandria, Jerusalem, Thessalonica, and Ravenna, appealing at the same time to Pope Leo for an authoritative decision and for protection. Dioscorus of Alexandria and Juvenal of Jerusalem promised their support, while Peter Chrysologus, bishop of Ravenna, replied that he could do nothing in the matter without the consent of the Pope. Leo, however, refused to intervene until he had heard from the other side.

Meanwhile Flavian had dispatched a letter to Rome, fully explaining the situation. This enabled Leo to take the matter in hand, and he did so without delay. He notified Flavian that judgment would be given, and sometime later he sent his famous *Epistola Dogmatica ad Flavianum,* in which the orthodox doctrine was clearly set forth and the condemnation of Eutyches sustained. In the introduction he points out that "the very Creed itself refutes him (Eutyches): and old as he is, he does not comprehend what every catechumen in the

[2] Mansi, 6, 744.

world confesses; for to declare belief in God the Father all-ruling, and in Jesus Christ our Lord, who was born of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary, is really to overthrow the devices of almost all heretics." Then he makes the following four points:

1°. Christ is only one person: the Word and Christ are not two, but one individual being. One and the same person is truly the Son of God and truly the Son of man.

2°. In that one person are two natures, the divine and the human, without confusion, without mingling, so that each nature retains undiminished what is proper to itself.

3°. Each one of the two natures has its own proper activity, which, however, is not independent of the other, nor outside the union which is permanent; but nevertheless it is an activity of which the nature in question is the immediate principle.

4°. From the unity of person necessarily follows the *communicatio idiomatum,* so that what is proper to one nature may in the concrete be predicated of the other. Hence also we confess in the Symbol that the only-begotten Son of God was crucified and buried.

Neither Leo nor Flavian desired to submit the matter to a council, but, without consulting them, Theodosius summoned the bishops of the Empire to meet at Ephesus. Informed of this, the Pope, in order to show his good will, gave his consent, and chose as his legates Bishop Julius of Puteoli, a priest by the name of Renatus, and the deacon Hilarius. On their departure from Rome he entrusted to them a letter which was to be read at the opening of the Council. In this he strongly reminded the assembled bishops of the authority of the Apostolic See in matters of faith.

The Council met in August, 449, with Dioscorus of Alexandria as president. He was attended by a strong body of Egyptian bishops and monks, all opposed to Flavian and Eusebius of Dorylaeum. They behaved in a manner much more becoming a frenzied mob than a deliberative assembly of churchmen. Eusebius, who had first called attention to the error of Eutyches, was accused of dividing Christ. "Bury him alive," they shouted; "as he has divided Christ, so let

him be divided himself." Flavian was mobbed by the monks who accompanied Barsumas of Nisibis; Dioscorus refused to have the letter of Leo read, and the statements of Eutyches were received with applause. The Egyptians asserted boldly that after the union the distinction of the two natures no longer existed, and the outcome of it all was that Eutyches was declared orthodox and restored to his ecclesiastical dignity, while all his opponents were deposed.

Flavian and the Roman legates protested against these proceedings but they had to flee for their lives. After they had departed, a blank paper was handed around which all the bishops present, 135 in number, were forced to sign. When this had been done, the decisions of the Council were recorded over their signatures. When Leo was informed of these proceedings, he severely denounced the action of Dioscorus and designated the council as a *Latrocinium,* a Robber Synod, by which name it has ever since been known in history.

The Emperor, however, not only approved the work of the Council, but put its decisions into immediate execution. He denounced all opposing bishops as Nestorians and sent them into exile. Flavian died shortly afterwards and was succeeded by Anatolius. The result of these stringent measures was general confusion and universal dissatisfaction. Egypt, Thrace, and Palestine held with Dioscorus and the Emperor; whilst Syria, Pontus, and Asia protested loudly against the treatment of Flavian and the acquittal of Eutyches. These latter were supported by Rome, and Leo, excommunicated by Dioscorus, excommunicated him in turn and demanded a new council. However as long as Theodosius lived nothing could be done. But he died in the following year, and then the way was opened for a settlement.

B — The Council of Chalcedon

Theodosius was succeeded by his sister Pulcheria, who had been associated with him in the rule of the Empire as Augusta ever since 415. On her accession to the throne she bestowed her hand on Marcian, a very able and universally beloved general of the army. Both were devout adherents of the orthodox

party, and they took immediate steps to settle the dispute by convoking a council. In this they forestalled Leo who had meanwhile changed his mind, but as the summons had already been sent out before he knew of it, he gave his consent. Ephesus was the place chosen for the meeting; however this proved too inconvenient for the Emperor who wished to be present, and so Chalcedon was substituted. There, on October 8, 451, about 600 bishops, nearly all from the East, gathered for the first session. The Pope had sent as his legates the bishops Paschinus and Lucentius, and the priest Boniface. Paschinus was designated by Leo as president of the council, "vice mea Synodo convenit praesidere." [3]

Besides this, the Pope made it clearly understood that he did not want further discussion, but simply a declaration of the faith along the lines marked out in his letter to Flavian. "It is not lawful to defend," he wrote, "what it is not lawful to believe, and in our letter to Flavian, of blessed memory, it was most fully and clearly pointed out what is, according to the authority of the Gospel, the declaration of the Prophetic Spirit, and the teaching of the Apostles, the pious and sincere profession of faith concerning the mystery of the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ." [4] In accordance with this, therefore, the Council must formulate its decision; hence the Council could only define what had already been defined by the Pope.

After some rather violent scenes, occasioned by the exclusion of Dioscorus and his accomplices in the Robber Synod, the following five documents were read and universally approved: The Creed of Nicæa; the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, here for the first time ascribed to the Second General Council; the fourth letter of Cyril to Nestorius; Cyril's letter to John of Antioch, in anticipation of the reunion; and Leo's *Epistola Dogmatica.* This last was received with loud applause, the whole assembly crying out: "Peter hath spoken by the mouth of Leo."

The Council was decidedly in favor of not drawing up a new formula of faith, but the Emperor insisted that some Creed must be presented for subscription to all the bishops,

[3] Ep. 89; cfr. Ep. 103. [4] Ep. 90.

for the purpose of ascertaining their orthodoxy. Thereupon a lengthy discussion ensued, in course of which it became manifest that many Eastern bishops had either decidedly Monophysitic leanings, or at least preferred the terminology of Cyril to that of Leo. As, however, the legates insisted that Leo's definition must be embodied in the proposed formula, or they would take their departure and arrange for a council in the West, the following Creed was drawn up and subscribed by 335 bishops, many of the others being disqualified to vote on account of the part they had taken in the Robber Synod.

After stating that the bishops present accepted the Creed of Nicæa and of Constantinople, and also the letter of Cyril and the *Epistola Dogmatica* of Leo, the document proceeds: "Following, therefore, the holy Fathers, we all confess and teach, with one accord, one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, at once perfect in Godhead and perfect in manhood, truly God and truly man, having a rational soul and a body; of one essence with the Father as regards His Godhead, and at the same time of one essence with us as regards His manhood, on account of us and our salvation begotten in the last days of Mary the Virgin, Mother of God; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-Begotten, proclaimed in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation; the difference of the natures being in no way destroyed on account of the union, but rather the peculiar property of each nature being preserved and concurring in one person and one hypostasis — not as though parted or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son and only-begotten God the Word, Lord, Jesus Christ, even as the Prophets from of old and the Lord Jesus Christ taught us concerning Him, and the Creed of the Fathers has handed down to us." [5]

"In this definition the Church at length pronounced a final verdict on both extremes of Christological opinion, clearly repudiating Apollinarian, Nestorian, and Eutychian teaching, and stating positively in a few words the relation between the two natures in the one person: the relation which was more fully expressed in the statements of Cyril and Leo, to which,

[5] Mansi, 7, 116.

by recognition on this occasion, conciliar authority was given." [6] This is the Protestant view of the final outcome of these lengthy discussions, which is correct in every way, except in one important particular: it was not the Council that gave authority to the decision of Leo, as the author states, but it was Leo who gave authority to the decision of the Council, as is quite evident from what has been said in the preceding paragraphs. He simply dictated to the assembled bishops what decision they should reach.

Before the Council closed, twenty-seven canons were drawn up, all of which are disciplinary, and need therefore not be considered here. To these a twenty-eighth was added in the absence of the Papal legates, which gave the second rank in the universal Church to the Patriarch of Constantinople, besides placing the whole of Pontus, Proconsular Asia, and Thrace under his jurisdiction, and making it obligatory upon the metropolitans of these regions to ask consecration from him. When the legates learned what had been done, they protested vigorously, contending that this was contrary to the ruling of Nicæa and an encroachment on the rights of the Holy See. Leo, too, when asked to confirm the council, refused to ratify this canon. Apparently the Greeks yielded, and even omitted the canon from their collections, but in practice they clung to all the privileges it granted. It always remained a cause of trouble, until, on the establishment of the Latin Empire at Constantinople in 1215, the Fourth Lateran ratified it in its fifth canon.

In the Creed cited above, the faith of the Church was defined; and "writing, composing, or teaching any other creed" was forbidden under severe penalties; but the Eutychian error was by no means suppressed. Considerable bodies of Christians refused to accept the doctrine of two natures, at least in the terms used at Chalcedon, although they were quite ready to condemn the teaching of the extreme Monophysites, who held that the human nature of Christ was absorbed by the divine. Accordingly numerous secessions from the Church took place, the seceders asserting one incarnate nature, without

[6] *Bethune-Baker, o. c. 286.

however explaining how, precisely, the oneness of nature was effected in the God-Man. In Palestine and Egypt serious rioting and bloodshed followed. Large numbers of monks and lay people, led by such recalcitrant bishops as Timothy Ælurus (the Cat), Peter Mongus, and Peter the Fuller, rose in open rebellion against those who accepted the Council. Peace was at last restored, but only when wide regions had been lost to the Church.

It must be noted, however, that very many of those who left the Church, both bishops and people, were in reality schismatics rather than heretics. They contended, indeed, for one incarnate nature in Christ, but they admitted at the same time that this incarnate nature was made up of two distinct substances, the divine and the human, which remained somehow distinct even in the union. They professed to follow the teaching, not of Eutyches, but of Cyril of Alexandria, from whom they took the expression, "one incarnate nature." But while they thus professed the orthodox doctrine in antiquated terminology, they made the great mistake of not adopting the language of the Church, when the new heresy called for the substitution of clearer terms.[7] Thus it was their want of submission, not their want of faith, that cut them off from the Church. But from schism to heresy is but a short step, and in the course of years many of these orthodox opponents of the Council of Chalcedon joined the Eutychian party, and in consequence did away with all objective distinction between the two natures in Christ. Hence the Monophysites of to-day are not only schismatics, but heretics as well; and, like all heretics, split up into a vast variety of sects.

By way of supplement to the foregoing discussion, something must here be said about St. Cyril's relation to the Monophysites. Whilst he was universally regarded as the great champion of orthodoxy against Nestorius, he was at the same time claimed by many of the Monophysite leaders as an authority for their teaching; and this claim is considered as justified by a large number of modern Protestant writers. Hence it

[7] Cfr. Tixeront, o. c. 99–123.

is necessary to investigate briefly the reasons upon which this claim is based.[8]

The most obvious reason, no doubt, is the fact that the Monophysites formulated their doctrine in the very terms used by Cyril. Their watchword, "One incarnate nature of God the Word," was his watchword also; and the statement of Eutyches: "I confess that before the union Christ was of two natures, but after the union I confess only one nature," is likewise found in his writings:[9] but he used both expressions in a perfectly orthodox sense, which his followers seem to have overlooked. This oversight on their part was, no doubt, largely owing to Cyril's peculiar terminology. Thus φύσις and ὑπόστασις, which the Cappadocians had already distinguished as nature and person, were employed by him as identical in meaning, signifying a concrete, individual, and independently existing nature, or simply a person as distinguished from nature. He hardly ever designated the human nature of Christ by φύσις only, but usually added some qualification to show that the idea of personality was excluded. And hence when he says that after the incarnation Christ is μία φύσις, he does not mean that Christ has only one nature, but that He is only one person. And again, when he says that before the union there were δύο φύσεις, and after the union only μία φύσις, he refers not to natures but to persons; without, however, intending to imply that the human nature ever had a distinct personality of its own which was lost in the union.[10]

In this particular Cyril's terminology is peculiar, and altogether different from that employed in the Antiochene school at the time. The latter also identified φύσις and ὑπόστασις, but to signify nature, in opposition to πρόσωπον or person. Hence much of the opposition that Cyril experienced on the part of John of Antioch and Theodoret of Cyrus arose precisely from the different meaning they attached to the terms that were used. When Cyril spoke of μία φύσις, his adversaries understood him to mean one nature; and when they defended δύο φύσεις in Christ, Cyril inferred that they meant

[8] Ibid. 58–75.
[9] Epist. 40, ad Acac.
[10] Cfr. Bardenhewer, Patrol. 366.

two persons. It was only after much acrimonious contention and lengthy explanations that they came to understand each other's theological language; and that understanding once reached, they found that they agreed in doctrine. And as Cyril's terms were thus misunderstood by his Catholic adversaries, so were they also misunderstood by his Monophysite followers.

At the same time, however, it must not be forgotten that the Alexandrian and Antiochene schools approached the Christological problem from entirely different view-points. The latter always reasoned from the distinction of the natures in Christ to the unity of person, with the result that the distinction was very much emphasized; whilst the former started from the unity of person and derived thence the distinction of the two natures, with the contrary result that the unity received special emphasis. In the one case the two distinct natures are regarded as united, and therefore Christ is one person; in the other case the person is considered as having assumed a second nature, and therefore Christ has two natures. Hence the Antiochenes would say that Christ is one person because of the union, while the Alexandrians would prefer the expression that Christ is one person in spite of the union. It was exactly the same doctrine, as considered from one view-point or the other; but overemphasis in the one case led to Nestorianism, and overemphasis in the other ended in Monophysism. Yet whilst John and Theodoret are not considered as Nestorians, it would be unfair to look upon Cyril as a Monophysite.

Nor did he fail to repudiate all such imputations in the most emphatic language. When through a misunderstanding of his terms the confusion of the two natures in Christ was laid to his charge, he replied without hesitation: "He is mighty foolish who asserts any such confusion or mixture. Considering the manner in which the incarnation took place, we see that the two natures are united in an indissoluble union, without confusion and without transformation; for the flesh is flesh and not the divinity, although it is the flesh of God; and similarly the Word is God and not the flesh, although through

the incarnation the flesh has become God's very own." [11] In the same sense he explains the terms used by some older writers, who at times called the union κρᾶσις or mixture; they thereby, he says, only meant to indicate the intimate nature of the union.[12] The same also follows from his famous saying about the Divine Motherhood of Mary: "A perfect, sufficient, and irreproachable profession of faith is found in the assertion of the Divine Maternity of the Blessed Virgin"; because if Christ were not truly God after the union, her maternity would not be "divine"; if He were not at the same time also truly man, it would not be a "maternity" at all.[13]

Hence whilst it is perhaps true that Cyril unconsciously prepared the way for Monophysism, on account of his peculiar and obscure terminology, he cannot in justice be charged with leanings in that direction. Others who later on expressed their belief in almost the same terms, were indeed accounted Monophysites; but they wrote after the Council of Chalcedon had fixed orthodox terminology in this regard, whereas he wrote before that work had been accomplished, which makes all the difference in the world.

The same must be remarked about the later contention of some Monothelites, who invoked Cyril's authority for asserting only one will and one operation in Christ. He never treated the subject *ex professo,* and from his casual remarks on the subject one may perhaps infer either the one or the other view, according to one's own bias in the matter; but certain it is, that, whilst he admitted only one acting subject in Christ, or one subject of predication, he at the same time distinguished between divine and human actions in the Saviour. Aside from particular texts, this necessarily follows from his doctrine that both natures are complete and perfect after the union, since that inevitably implies two distinct principles of action, each endowed with its own natural activity.

[11] Epist. 45.
[12] Adv. Nest. 1, 3.
[13] Hom. 15 De Incarn. Verbi.

CHAPTER XXVII

SOME NEW DISSENSIONS: THE THREE CHAPTERS: THE FIFTH GENERAL COUNCIL[1]

When Zeno came to the throne in 474, the Monophysite trouble was at its height. His own preferences seem to have been for the heretics, but circumstances compelled him to be conciliatory to Catholics. Hence he conceived the idea of bringing together the different parties by more or less suppressing the particular points of doctrine that were at the root of the dissension. With this end in view, he issued the famous *Henoticon,* or Union Decree, which extolled the first three Councils, referred slurringly to that of Chalcedon, and carefully avoided all mention of nature and person in Christ. It aimed at conciliating all parties, but pleased none. Yet the Emperor insisted on its acceptance by all, and resolutely deposed Catholic and Monophysite bishops alike, if they refused to subscribe. The result was universal dissatisfaction.

A — Some New Dissensions

In this desperate state of things, the Eastern bishops appealed to Rome for protection against the unwarranted interference of the Emperor in ecclesiastical affairs. John Talaias, Catholic Patriarch of Alexandria, visited Rome in person to obtain help from the Pope. As a result, Felix III, in 483, sent legates to Constantinople, both to obtain a legal recognition of the Council of Chalcedon and to assert the rights of the deposed bishops. However the Emperor, by threats and bribery, gained the legates over to his side, and in consequence nothing was accomplished. When the Pope was informed of what

[1] Cfr. Hefele, History of the Councils, IV, 229–363; Tixeront, H. D. III, 124–144; Schwane, H. D. II, 567–574; Hergenroether, op. cit. I, 600–613.

had happened, he convened a synod at Rome, for the purpose of taking stringent measures against the disturbers of the peace. He excommunicated Acacius, Patriarch of Constantinople, who was regarded as the originator of the Emperor's foolish scheme, and who openly fraternized with the Monophysites. Acacius retaliated by striking the Pope's name from the diptychs, and, protected by the Emperor, continued to discharge his patriarchal functions in spite of the Papal excommunication.

Thus originated the first Greek schism, which lasted for thirty-five years, or from 484 to 519. It was only during the reign of the Catholic Emperor Justin I, that the Patriarch John, the fifth successor of Acacius, acceded to the demands of Rome. He subscribed the famous formula of Pope Hermisdas, in which the Council of Chalcedon and all the letters of Pope Leo on matters of faith are received without reserve. It concludes as follows:

"And thus I hope that I may deserve to be with thee in the one communion of faith preached by the Apostolic See, in which is found the entire and the truthful and the perfect firmness of the Christian religion: promising that for the future the names of those who are separated from the communion of the Catholic Church, that is, those not agreeing with the Apostolic See, are not to be recited in the Sacred Mysteries. But if in anything I should deviate from this my pledge, I confess to be by my own judgment an accomplice of those whom I have condemned. And this my pledge I have subscribed with my own hand, and directed to thee, Hormisdas, the holy and venerable Pope in the city of Rome." [2]

This formula was subscribed by nearly all the Eastern bishops, and thus the schism was healed; but the seeds of it remained, to spring up at a more opportune time. Yet it must not be overlooked how clear a testimony the subscription of this formula bears to the Primacy of Rome as acknowledged by the Eastern Church on that occasion.

During the time of the Acacian schism another dispute arose out of the expression, "Unus ex Trinitate crucifixus est," one

[2] P. L. 68, 460.

of the Trinity was crucified. It was Peter Fuller, the Monophysite Patriarch of Antioch, who introduced the phrase into the *Trisagion,* "Deus sanctus, Deus fortis, Deus immortalis," by adding to it, "qui crucifixus es pro nobis." Thereby he intended to imply that the divinity had in some way absorbed the human nature in Christ, and that consequently the sufferings of the cross had directly affected the divine nature. This was obviously heretical; yet in itself the expression admitted of a perfectly orthodox sense, in as much as the divine person could be said to have suffered in His human nature. Hence many Catholics felt no scruple in reciting the *Trisagion* in the amended form, whilst others regarded it as a profession of the Monophysite error, and so it became an apple of discord among Eastern Catholics.

The matter was brought to the notice of ecclesiastical authority by some Scythian monks at Constantinople, who were of opinion that the Council of Chalcedon had done scant justice to the teaching of Cyril in regard to the *communicatio idiomatum.* With this in mind, they demanded that the formula, "Unus ex Trinitate passus est," as they worded it, should be solemnly approved. But neither the Patriarch John nor the Papal legates would agree to this, although they did not reject the formula itself. Then appeal was made to Pope Hormisdas, but he also refused; because on account of the interpretation put upon it by the Monophysites it appeared dangerous to use the expression, and besides the Council of Chalcedon stood in no need of correction. Meanwhile the friends of John Maxentius, who was the leader of the monks, approached a number of theologians, among them Fulgentius of Ruspe, and Dionysius Exiguus, to obtain their opinion on the orthodoxy of the formula. As they received a favorable answer they became the more insistent, but all their efforts were unavailing; if they wished to use the expression they might do so, but the Pope had no mind to make its use obligatory.

Whilst this was going on, another party of monks, the Acemeti, or the Sleepless Ones, attacked the formula as heretical and fell back into Nestorianism. Thereupon the dogmatizing Emperor Justinian endeavored to obtain an of-

ficial approval of it from Rome, but John II, who was then Pope, and after him Agapetus I, did not fall in with his views. However Justinian was not the man to be disconcerted by the opposition of Popes, and so he presented his request to the Fifth General Council, in 553, and succeeded in having the formula approved. In all this there was obviously no difference of doctrine between Pope and Pope, or between Pope and Council, but only a question of expedience as suggested by the circumstances of the times.

It was also at the instance of Justinian that certain propositions taken from the works of Origen were condemned, almost three hundred years after the author's death. The Emperor's attention had been called to them, it seems, by the Roman deacon Pelagius, who a few years later became Pope, and also by some Palestinian monks. He forthwith composed a long document containing twenty extracts from the *Peri Archon,* which bore on the preëxistence of souls, the *apokatastasis,* etc. These he essayed to refute, and then ended up with ten anathemas against the Alexandrian doctor. At the same time he directed the Patriarch Mennas to call a synod and settle this matter ecclesiastically.

The synod met in 543, and after much discussion fifteen propositions were drawn up from the extracts submitted and condemned as contrary to the faith. These the Emperor sent around to the various churches, and it appears that Pope Vigilius, all the patriarchs, and most of the bishops subscribed the condemnation. For a long time the propositions in question were considered to have been drawn up and condemned by the Fifth General Council, but it is now satisfactorily established that they originated as here indicated, and that the Council included Origen only in a general condemnation of heretics.[3]

B — The Three Chapters

As early as 531, the Emperor had gathered a Synod of Orthodox and Monophysite bishops for the purpose of effect-

[3] Mansi, 9, 201, 533.

ing a union. At this Synod the writings of the Pseudo-Areopagite were cited, only to be immediately rejected as spurious. The Emperor's efforts towards bringing about a union came to nothing, but he kept the project in mind for future opportunities.

Hence when the Origenist bishop of Cæsarea, Theodore Askidas, in his anxiety to divert the Emperor's attention from Origen, suggested that the union with the Monophysites would be much facilitated if the writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret of Cyrus, and Ibas of Edessa were to be condemned, the imperial dogmatizer eagerly took up the suggestion. In 543 he published a letter on the matter, which ended up with a condemnation of Theodore, some of the writings of Theodoret, and the letter of Ibas to Maris. The writings of these three men thus condemned, together with the authors, are known in history as the Three Chapters. The matter had already been brought up at the Council of Chalcedon, but the assembled bishops abstained from issuing a formal condemnation, and even reinstated Theodoret and Ibas in their sees, after they had subscribed a formula of faith which anathematized Nestorius. For this reason the Emperor inserted in his condemnation of the Three Chapters the following clause: "If any one say that we took this course for the purpose of suppressing or setting aside the holy Fathers who were gathered in Council at Chalcedon, let him be anathema." Hence the decisions of the Council were to remain in force, nor was anything to be attempted contrary to the minds of those holy Fathers.

Thus safeguarded, the letter was sent around for subscription, and nearly all the Eastern bishops complied with the Emperor's wishes, though it may well be presumed that many did so against their better judgment. The Western bishops, however, and also Pope Vigilius, declared themselves against the condemnation. The Pope had been urged to take this stand by the deacon Ferrandus of Carthage, whose advice he had asked in the matter. To break down this opposition, Justinian had the Pope conveyed to Constantinople, where he at first treated him with all the consideration due to the Father

of Christendom. The Pope attributed this friendly attitude of the Emperor to a change of views in regard to the Three Chapters, and proceeded to excommunicate Mennas and the other bishops who had subscribed the condemnation. But little by little Justinian made him understand that the condemnation must remain in force, with the result that Vigilius was prevailed upon to issue his *Judicatum,* wherein he completely reversed his former judgment. In this document he condemns the person and writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia, the letter of Ibas and all those who approved it, and such writings of Theodoret as were against the true faith and the anathematisms of Cyril, "salva tamen Concilli Chalcedonensis auctoritate."[4] Thus the Emperor triumphed, but the West turned against the Pope, and the African Church even excommunicated him until he had done penance.

Apparently neither the Pope nor the Emperor had anticipated this strong opposition from the West; for on realizing it they quietly withdrew the *Judicatum* and came to an understanding that the whole matter should be settled in a general council. After a little while, however, Justinian changed his mind, and in 551 once more condemned the Three Chapters. When Vigilius heard of this he fled to Chalcedon, where he took sanctuary in the Church of Saint Euphemia. Thus safe from the Emperor, he published a sentence of deposition against Theodore Askidas, the Emperor's adviser, and a sentence of suspension against the Patriarch Mennas. The latter died shortly after this, and his successor Eutychius effected a reconciliation with the Pope, who had meanwhile returned to Constantinople. In this condition matters remained until the opening of the council.

C — The Fifth General Council

After publishing the *Professio Fidei,* in which he once again condemned the Three Chapters, the Emperor summoned the bishops to meet in council at Constantinople, as had been agreed upon between him and the Pope. In May, 553, about

[4] Mansi, 9, 181, 104; P. L. 69, 111.

160 bishops had arrived, who were nearly all from the East. When Vigilius was informed of this, he changed his mind about the council, being unwilling to submit his dispute with the Emperor to a gathering of almost exclusively Eastern bishops. He suggested Italy or Sicily as the proper place for the meeting, and stipulated an equal representation from the East and the West. This was precisely what Justinian tried to avoid, and so he would not listen to the suggestion. As both parties refused to yield, the Council opened without the Pope, Eutychius acting as president.[5]

Whilst the Council was thus holding its sessions without proper sanction, Vigilius wrote another document, called the *Constitutum,* in which he considerably modified his judgment on the Three Chapters as contained in his earlier *Judicatum.* After summing up what had been done thus far, and subjecting the points under discussion to a thorough examination, he condemned the writings of Theodore, but not his person, deeming it unbecoming to anathematize the dead; then, as the writings of Theodoret had not been condemned at Chalcedon, although they had been discussed there, he would not condemn them either; lastly, he took the same position with regard to the letter of Ibas, being satisfied with anathematizing in a general way all writings against the true faith, whoever might be the author. He concluded by prohibiting all clerics either to add to, or to take from, or to change in any way, the decisions of the Council of Chalcedon; also forbidding all persons, of whatever ecclesiastical degree or dignity, to write, publish, compose, or teach anything contrary to the present *Constitutum,* or to agitate anew, after this definition, the question of the Three Chapters.[6]

This determined stand taken by Vigilius greatly offended the Emperor, and he ordered the Council to break off communion with the Pope, contending that he had made himself a *particeps* in the heresy of Nestorius. The Council obeyed, but. at the Emperor's suggestion, explicitly professed to continue in communion with the Apostolic See: "Servemus itaque

[5] Mansi, 9.

[6] Mansi, 9, 61–106; P. L. 69, 114.

unitatem ad Apostolicam sacrosanctae Ecclesiae sedem antiquioris Romae." [7] This is the first instance of the notorious distinction " inter sedem et sedentem," which in later centuries was to play so important a part in the pretensions of the Gallican Church. By the step thus taken, however, the council from being merely insubordinate became *ipso facto* schismatical. It held only one more session, during which a document was composed that reviewed the whole question of the Three Chapters and launched fourteen anathemas already contained in the Emperor's *Professio Fidei.* It ended with a sentence of deposition against all bishops and clerics, and a sentence of excommunication against all monks and laics, who dared spread, teach, or write anything contrary to the dispositions thus made.

As soon as the Council had been dissolved, the Emperor took measures to secure the subscription of all the bishops who had failed to attend the meeting. He was quite successful in the East, but in the West he encountered a determined resistance, although he did not shrink from using violence in enforcing his will. Vigilius himself seems to have been banished for a while, but he ended by yielding to the Emperor's wishes. In a letter to Eutychius he condemned the Three Chapters in the sense of the Council, and annulled whatever he and others had done to uphold them.[8] He expressed himself similarly in a new *Constitutum,* probably addressed to the Latin bishops.[9] Then, after an absence of seven years, he was allowed to return to Rome, but he died before he reached his destination. His successor Pelagius, although at first opposed to the council, in his turn ended by accepting it.[10] This gave rise to numerous local schisms in the West. Many bishops in Illyria, Dalmatia, Istria, Venetia, Liguria, Tuscany, and North Africa, broke off communion with Pelagius. It was only under his successors, especially Gregory the Great and Sergius I, that these schisms were healed. Gaul and Spain also assumed a hostile attitude, but in these countries it never came to a formal schism.

[7] Mansi, 9, 367.
[8] Ibid. 9, 414 sqq.
[9] Ibid. 9, 457–488.
[10] Epist. Pelag. 3, 5, 9; P. L. 69.

Dogmatically these controversies are of interest only in so far as they have a bearing on the infallibility of General Councils and the Pope. And even in this respect they offer nothing that is of real importance. For it must be borne in mind that the writings of Theodore, Theodoret, and Ibas, or the so-called Three Chapters, might at the time of the controversy either be allowed to go uncensured or be condemned as heretical, without injury being done to the faith in either case. If due allowance was made for the time in which they originated, for the rather indefinite terminology which was then and there in vogue, and for the subjective good faith of the authors which was at least probable, there was no call for condemnation; and this was apparently the position taken by the Council of Chalcedon. But if, on the other hand, all these considerations were set aside, and the writings in question were judged exclusively on their own merit as they appeared in the light of a clearer and more definite terminology of later times, they could not well be passed by without severe censure; and this seems to have been the view taken of them by the Fifth General Council. Hence as far as these two Councils come in question, the matter of infallibility presents no difficulty; especially as Chalcedon did certainly not give a conciliar approval. And the same reasoning applies also to the action of Pelagius in accepting the condemnation of the Three Chapters by the Council of Constantinople.

The case of Vigilius offers greater difficulty. His *Judicatum* and his confirmation of the Council, on the one hand, and his *Constitutum,* on the other, seem certainly to give contradictory decisions, and yet they were meant to be binding on the whole Church. Of course, the case of Theodore may be eliminated, as his writings were consistently condemned all through and as the judgment regarding his person does not touch the faith. The difficulty, then, turns about the writings of Theodoret and Ibas. The *Judicatum* condemns them without discrimination, whilst the *Constitutum* cancels the sentence and anathematizes in a general way all writings against the true faith. But here it must not be overlooked that in his *Constitutum* Vigilius makes allowance for all the attenuating

circumstances enumerated above, taking the same position as the Council of Chalcedon, without passing any judgment on the objective merits or demerits of the writings in question. This alone would appear to remove all contradiction between the two documents in so far as they touch the question of Papal infallibility. And furthermore, it may reasonably be supposed that the *Constitutum* was not intended to give a definitive decision, but only to pass a disciplinary measure whereby respect for the Council of Chalcedon would be safeguarded. Thus whilst it is only too evident that Vigilius played an inglorious part throughout the whole proceeding, there is no evidence whatever that Papal infallibility was in any way compromised by his apparently contradictory decisions.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE MONOTHELITE CONTROVERSY: THE SIXTH GENERAL COUNCIL[1]

The Council of Chalcedon defined the duality of natures in Christ, and reaffirmed the unity of person, declaring that both natures, the human and the divine, are "united in the one person of the Logos, without confusion and without change, without severance and without separation." This, if rightly understood, necessarily implies one subject of predication and a twofold principle of action — one Christ to whom, by reason of the hypostatic union, both human and divine actions are attributed, and two natures from each of which its own proper activity proceeds without interference from the other. Yet this latter doctrine, regarding the two distinct operations, was not explicitly and directly defined, and so there were not wanting those among orthodox Christians who favored one theandric or divinely human activity in Christ. There was no direct question of the acting principles themselves, but of their activity as proceeding from them and posited in its term. Logically, indeed, this confusion of activities should have led to a like confusion of principles, and so the Monophysites generally understood it; but orthodox writers, who favored one activity or operation in Christ, do not appear to have drawn this inference. Others, however, clearly perceived the implication, and resolutely defended two distinct operations as they were bound to defend two distinct natures. The result was a protracted controversy, which on the one side led to the definition of two wills and two operations by the Sixth General Council, and on the other to the Monothelite heresy.

[1] Cfr. Hefele, History of the Councils, V, 137–206; Tixeront, H. D. III, 153–179.

A — The Monothelite Controversy

The immediate occasion of the controversy was furnished by the Emperor Heraclius, who was anxious to conciliate the Monophysites of Syria and Egypt in his war against the Persians and Arabians. To gain over these heretics, he advanced the theory of one will in Christ as explained above, which was obviously a concession to their belief in the one nature. He was encouraged in this by Sergius, Patriarch of Constantinople, who had been quietly advocating this view for some time past. The Emperor's first important convert was Cyrus of Phasis in Armenia, whom he transferred to the vacant patriarchate of Alexandria, with the understanding that he should gain over the Monophysites. The new patriarch was faithful to his commission and in a short time persuaded large bodies of the heretics to rejoin the Church. This reconciliation was effected on the basis of nine anathematisms, which emphasized that the union of the two natures in Christ was physical, that it resulted in one incarnate nature of the Logos, and that all those are anathema " who deny that there is one Christ and one Son, producing all His actions, divine and human, by one sole theandric operation, as is taught by St. Dionysius (the Pseudo-Areopagite), the elements of the union being so related that there is between them only a mental and not a real distinction." [2] All this is genuine Monophysism in phrase and expression, if not in thought and purpose.

The work of Cyrus was highly appreciated by the Emperor and the Patriarch of Constantinople, and by their assistance the reconciliation of heretics proceeded apace. But in 633, two Palestinian monks, Maximus and Sophronius, who were tarrying for a while in Alexandria, examined the Union Formula and immediately raised their voices in protest. This did not have much effect, but as Sophronius was the following year consecrated Patriarch of Jerusalem, his opposition became formidable. He wrote a long synodal letter, in which, after setting forth the orthodox Trinitarian and Christological doctrines as taught by the Church, he enlarges on the question

[2] Mansi, 2, 564–568.

of one will and operation in Christ. There is, he says, only one agent in the God-Man, one person, one subject of predication; but as there are two natures, and each nature preserves in the union its own perfections and properties, it follows necessarily that Christ has two wills, and where there are two wills there must be two operations ontologically distinct, although one nature does not act altogether independently of the other. Where there is only one operation, there can be only one nature; as it is from the distinction of operations that we infer, as philosophers have it, the distinction of natures.[3]

This protest made Sergius realize that his position would be untenable unless he could gain Rome over to his side. With this end in view, he sent a letter to Pope Honorius, giving an account of what was going on, and adding that since his conference with Sophronius he thought it better to observe a discreet silence on this matter, to which effect he had also written to Cyrus of Alexandria. It might easily happen, he thought, that people would be scandalized at the expression of one operation in Christ, although that was obviously the right doctrine, since two operations must lead to the assertion of two contrary wills, which would be against the teaching of the Fathers.

The suggestion of Sergius to observe a discreet silence was quite acceptable to Honorius, and he signified his acquiescence in two letters, one of which was written before he had received the synodal letter of Sophronius, and the other when he had examined that document. In the first letter the following points are deserving of notice, as they throw considerable light on the charges later on preferred against the author:

1°. One must avoid speaking about two operations in Christ; it is a mere question of words, which is apt to scandalize the simple. If we speak of two operations we are taken for Nestorians, if of one only we are believed to be Eutychians. Neither the Evangelists nor the Apostles nor the Councils say anything about one or two operations, but they tell us that there is one Jesus Christ who in His divinity and in His

[3] Mansi, 11, 461–509; P. G. 87; Hefele, o. c. 43 sqq.

humanity acted in a multitude of different ways. Hence to decide whether it is proper to speak of one or two operations is not our business; that belongs to grammarians and philosophers to determine. Let us, therefore, keep quiet about it; or if anyone wishes to occupy himself with the question, let him beware of making his opinion a dogma of the faith.

2°. We must hold to this: Jesus Christ being one person, in a unique sense, has performed at diverse times divine works and human works, with the concurrence of both natures: the same Jesus acted in His two natures divinely and humanly.

3°. As regards the unity of will, it is obvious that one ought to acknowledge it; for although the Word took our nature, yet He did not take our vitiated nature: He took our flesh without the law of the flesh, which fights against the law of the spirit. Hence there was not in Christ a will of different tendencies, nor contrary to the law of the spirit; and if He said, "I am not come to do my will, but the will of the Father who sent me," or again, "not as I will but as thou wilt, my Father," that does not indicate a different will (from that of the Father), but only the economy of human nature which was assumed. These words were spoken for our instruction, so that we may imitate the example of the Master, each one of us preferring to his own will the will of God.[4]

In the second letter, of which only two fragments remain, Honorius quotes the famous passage in the *Epistola Dogmatica* of Leo, which clearly defines the two natures and their respective operations, but he insists that all such discussions should be avoided. Instead of one operation, as some contend, let us confess one Christ who acts in both natures; and instead of two operations, as others will have it, let us acknowledge two natures indivisibly and without confusion united in the Only-Begotten of the Father.[5]

But although Sergius had suggested that all parties should observe a discreet silence, he had no intention of doing so himself. In order to counteract the effect produced by the synodal letter of Sophronius, he composed a document known

[4] P. L. 40, 470–474. [5] Ibid. 474, 475.

as the *Ecthesis,* or Profession of Faith, which the Emperor signed and then sent around for subscription. Concerning the question under discussion he says: "Following in all things, and in this more particularly, the teaching of the holy Fathers, we confess in our Lord Jesus Christ, who is true God and true man, one only will; for at no time did His human nature, separately and of its own initiative, and against the assent of the Divine Word, with which it was hypostatically united, exercise its natural activity, but only when, in what manner, and to what extent, the Divine Word willed."[6] As Sophronius had meanwhile died, it was an easy matter to induce the Eastern bishops to subscribe the *Ecthesis,* especially as two successive synods held at Constantinople, the one under Sergius in 638, and the other under his successor Pyrrhus in 639, approved its doctrine.

Thus the East readily yielded to the wishes of the Emperor, but the West offered strong opposition. Honorius died in 638, and his successor Severinus survived the election only a few months. He was succeeded by John IV, who summoned a council to meet at Rome, for the purpose of taking decisive steps against the false teaching that was spreading in the East. The assembled bishops condemned the doctrine of one will as heretical, and notice of this was immediately sent to Constantinople. But meanwhile Heraclius had also died, leaving the government in the hands of his two sons, Heraclius and Heracleon. As soon as this became known at Rome, the Pope sent a letter to the new rulers, explaining the true doctrine and demanding the immediate suppression of the *Ecthesis.* In the same letter he also shows that Honorius did not deny two wills or two operations in Christ, but only two contrary wills and tendencies, in as much as the Word did not assume the law of the flesh which is radicated in our vitiated nature.[7]

This might have brought the dispute to a close, but before any results of the Pope's determined action could be looked for, Heraclius was assassinated and a little later his brother was first mutilated and then sent into exile. By this over-

[6] Mansi, 10, 992, 979. [7] Mansi, 10, 682–686; P. L. 80, 602–607.

throw of the government Constans II secured the throne, and he resented all interference from the West. A few years later he issued a *Typus,* or Statement, which enjoined strict silence on all parties concerning the matter under discussion. Pyrrhus, who seems to have been implicated in the political upheaval just referred to, fled to Africa and was succeeded by Paul as Patriarch of Constantinople.

Matters had, however, gone too far to be adjusted without a final decision on the part of the Church. Hence synods were held in many different places, all condemning the teaching of Sergius as an heretical innovation. Practically the whole West followed the lead of the Pope, whilst in Africa a famous discussion took place between the fugitive Pyrrhus and Abbot Maximus, wherein the latter proved the existence of two operations in Christ so conclusively that Pyrrhus owned himself vanquished and professed the true doctrine. This conference was followed by several synods which secured Africa for the orthodox view. When John IV died, his successor Theodore pursued the same policy. Paul of Constantinople having applied to him for confirmation of his election to the Patriarchal see, he demanded of him a clear profession of the orthodox faith in reference to the two operations, and when Paul in his answer advanced the views contained in the *Ecthesis,* the Pope promptly deposed him.

It was in this condition of things that Martin I ascended the Papal throne in 649. He had been legate at Constantinople and was thoroughly familiar with the cunning ways of the Greeks. Encouraged by Abbot Maximus, he made it his first care to convoke a synod, for the purpose of discussing ways and means of putting an end to the scandal of a divided episcopacy. Some 150 bishops were present, and during a whole month they subjected Monothelism to a thorough investigation. The result was a very decided condemnation of the doctrine of one will and one operation in Christ. A conciliar document was drawn up which contains the profession of faith as formulated by the Council of Chalcedon, and twenty anathematisms setting forth the true doctrine concerning the controverted points. As Christ had two natures, so had He

also two natural wills, and two natural operations, the divine and the human, which are predicated of one and the same person. The so-called theandric operation of the God-Man is not one action, partly human and partly divine, but comprises two distinct actions, the one divine and the other human, each originated by its own principle and both together indicating the marvelous union that was effected between the two natures. Hence Theodore of Pharas, Cyrus of Alexandria, Sergius, Pyrrhus, and Paul of Constantinople, all of whom taught the contrary doctrine, are condemned as heretics, whilst the *Ecthesis* and the *Typus* are rejected as utterly opposed to the true faith.[8]

As soon as this bold action of Martin became known to the Emperor, he had him arrested and banished to Chersonesus, where after many sufferings for the sake of orthodoxy the holy Pontiff died on September 16, 655. Abbot Maximus and two of his disciples, both called Anastasius, were also arrested and subjected to most cruel tortures, and then sent into banishment.

For more than a year the Roman clergy refused to elect a new Pope, but when they saw that the Emperor was going to appoint a Monothelite to the see of Rome, they chose Eugenius, who on the death of Martin became legitimate Pope. He sent two legates to Constantinople to come to an understanding with the Emperor, but they were imposed upon by Greek cunning and accepted three wills in Christ, two natural wills and one hypostatic. On their return to Rome they were very badly received; however as Eugenius died about that time, his successors Vitalian, Adeodat, and Donus, allowed the matter to rest. It was the next Pope, Agatho, who brought the long protracted dispute to a close.

B — The Sixth General Council

The Emperor Constans II died in 668, and was succeeded by Constantine IV, who was well disposed towards the cause of orthodoxy. Soon after Agatho's accession to the Papal throne, an understanding was reached which made provision

[8] Cfr. Hefele, l. c.

for the final settlement of the dispute. The Pope ordered synods to be held all through the West, and he himself held one at Rome, to give the orthodox doctrine its definite and permanent form. Immediately after the synods he drew up two letters to the Emperor, one in his own name and one in the name of the bishops of his patriarchate, the contents of the two being essentially the same.

In these letters he sets forth the faith of the Western Church in the form of a symbol, and when he comes to the matter in dispute he says: "When we confess in one and the same Lord Jesus Christ two natures, and two natural wills, and two natural operations, we do not say that they are contrary or opposed the one to the other, . . . nor, on the other hand, do we say that they are separate in two persons or two substances, but we mean that the same Lord Jesus Christ, as He has two natures, so has He also two natural wills and two natural operations, the one divine and the other human." [9]

As soon as the legates, who had been asked for, arrived at Constantinople, the Emperor summoned the bishops of the Patriarchates of Constantinople and Alexandria for a conference; but as the Patriarchs of Antioch and Jerusalem also sent their representatives, the final outcome of it was a general council. It was attended by 164 bishops, and lasted from November 7, 680, to September 16, 681. The Emperor himself presided, but only for the sake of honor, the doctrinal discussions being under the direction of the Papal legates, who also subscribed their names to the Acts before all the other members of the council.

As everyone was perfectly free to state his own views on the matter in question, a rather lively discussion ensued between the two parties. The leaders of the Monothelites were Macarius of Antioch, his disciple Stephen who was a monk, Peter of Nicomedia, and Solomon of Claneus. The Patriarch of Constantinople played a waiting game. The discussion was largely occupied with the examination of Patristic testimony, in which the orthodox party had decidedly the advantage, especially when it was found that the opposition had

[9] Mansi, 11, 234–286; P. L. 87, 1161–1213.

interpolated certain manuscripts in order to prove their point. However Macarius and Stephen would yield to no evidence, and so they were excommunicated. The dogmatic letters of Sergius to Cyrus and Honorius, and also Honorius' first letter to Sergius, were condemned as absolutely in disaccord with Apostolic teaching, with the decisions of Councils, and the doctrine of the holy Fathers. Several other documents, notably the second letter of Honorius to Sergius, were likewise declared to be stained with the same impiety. Finally, Sergius, Cyrus, Pyrrhus, Peter of Nicomedia, Paul of Constantinople, and Theodore of Pharas were anathematized, together with Honorius, who "was found in his writings to Sergius to have followed the latter's opinion, and to have confirmed his impious doctrines." [10]

The profession of faith drawn up by the Council is practically an adaptation of Agatho's letter to the Emperor, which, when it was read, was acclaimed by the assembled bishops with the words: "Peter has spoken through Agatho." The Emperor sanctioned all that was done, and Leo II, who had meanwhile succeeded Agatho, confirmed the council. He also anathematized, together with the Monothelites, "Honorius, who neglected to sanctify this Apostolic Church with the teaching of Apostolic tradition, but by profane treachery allowed its purity to be polluted." [11]

Thus the true doctrine was defined, which, when put into our modern terminology, comes to this: "According to orthodox teaching, personality is not an active principle, but in its concrete existence forms the subject of predication. The active principle in any and every person is his nature with its inherent faculties. Hence if in consequence of an hypostatic union there are two natures in a person, there must be two principles of action, each one of which has its own proper operation, though both operations are rightly and necessarily predicated of one and the same person."

It was in respect to this that Sergius and his followers fell into a fundamental error. They looked upon personality as an

[10] Mansi, II, 553–556. [11] Ibid. 753.

active principle, which operates physically in the nature it possesses as its own. This once assumed, the logical inference was that the human nature of Christ never acted spontaneously, of its own initiative, but was simply used as a physical instrument of the divinity. Thorough-going Monophysites would, of course, push their views still further, practically regarding the human faculties of the Saviour as absorbed by the divine energy. Sergius seems to have stopped short of this extreme view, admitting as he did that the human faculties remained distinct after the union of the two natures, but he asserted that the human nature of Christ had no initiative of its own, and could therefore act only in so far as it was moved by the all-powerful will of the Godhead. Hence the Council defined not merely the existence of a human will in Christ, but also the spontaneity of its natural operations.

A word or two must here be said about Honorius, whose case has been made much of by the adversaries of Papal infallibility. From the foregoing account it seems clear that the Sixth General Council condemned him as a heretic, and that Leo II associated him with the Monothelites. On the other hand, John IV stated expressly that Honorius did not teach the doctrine of one will or of one operation in Christ, and the same was also maintained by Abbot Maximus, who took a personal part in the discussions then going on. Hence whatever view one may take of the case, it would seem that either the Council or the Pope, or perhaps both fell into a dogmatic error.

Quite a number of solutions have been attempted, but most of them fail to convince. Some have maintained that the Acts of the Council are Greek forgeries, and that therefore Honorius was never condemned as a heretic. Others hold the Acts to be genuine, but contend that Honorius was condemned merely for negligence, because he was silent at the wrong time. Others, again, admit the genuineness of the Acts and also concede that Honorius was condemned for heresy, but maintain that the Council erred in a dogmatic fact, condemning an innocent man. This solution is admissible, since the council was neither presided over by the Pope in person nor had the

legates received definite instructions to bring about the condemnation of Honorius; hence if an error was committed, it was under conditions that do not warrant infallibility of teaching as inherent in a general council.

However a more satisfactory solution is suggested by Hefele, who holds that Honorius did not teach heresy and that his condemnation by the Council was not a dogmatic error. The first he shows from Honorius' own words, which contain the true doctrine but formulate it in misleading terms; the second he explains by pointing out that the Council was concerned only with the doctrine as expressed by the author, and in this sense it could rightly be condemned. Hence the council did not condemn the teaching of Honorius, but his unlucky expressions which were taken advantage of by the Monophysites. This may very well be maintained, especially as the Pope in his confirmation of the Council viewed the error of Honorius in this light. For he associated him with the Monothelites only in this sense, that he had "neglected to sanctify this Apostolic Church with the teaching of Apostolic tradition, but by profane treachery allowed its purity to be polluted." These words contain a severe censure, but they do not charge the unfortunate Honorius with positive heretical teaching.[12] It may be added that if he did teach error, it was only as a private individual and not in his capacity of Chief Shepherd; for in neither of his two letters does he speak *ex cathedra*.

[12] Cfr. Hefele, o. c. V, 49 sqq.

CHAPTER XXIX

CONTEMPORARY CHRISTOLOGY: ORTHODOX MARIOLOGY

From the account given in the preceding chapters of the various controversies that agitated the Christian world during the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries, one is apt to carry away the impression that the Church's teaching on the points under discussion was vague and uncertain, at least so long as she was not called upon to give a final definition. Yet such an impression would be untrue to facts, although under the circumstances apparently well founded. Religious controversies are in the history of dogmas what wars are in the history of nations. If they are recorded at all, they at once seem to occupy the whole field of vision, causing one to forget that they are only abnormal incidents, unduly accentuating for a while the ambitious strivings of a few. They are manifestations of passion rather than of reason, or at best a manifestation of reason misguided in its quest after truth. Hence after recounting the story of the conflict, we must now briefly summarize the results achieved during times of peace; this alone can give us a correct view of the Church's position in reference to the points at issue.

A — Contemporary Christology

What the West thought of Christ during this period of conflict, what of the hypostatic union, and what of the consequences of that union, is sufficiently clear from the decisions concerning these matters given by Eastern councils. For these decisions were all dictated by the Popes, and the Popes on these occasions acted as spokesmen for the Western Church. The definition marked out for Ephesus by Celestine, for Chalcedon by Leo, for Constantinople by Agatho, embodied the

traditional teaching of the entire West on the points then under discussion. Always deeply conscious of its sacred heirloom received from the Apostolic past, the West struck a happy medium between the two extremes of Eastern theological speculations, represented respectively by the schools of Antioch and Alexandria. As a result, not only did the Western Church herself keep the faith intact, but with a strong hand also guided the East through all dangers of going astray, until a final decision was reached which made all further aberrations practically impossible.

But even before these authoritative decisions were given, individual theologians quite clearly presented the common teaching on the points in question. Thus John Cassian in his work entitled, *De Incarnatione Christi,* which was written at the request of the future Pope Leo I, anticipates all the definitions of Ephesus and Chalcedon. Mary is truly the Mother of God, in Christ there is only one person, that of the Word, but two distinct natures, the divine and the human, each one preserving in the union its own natural properties.[1] Fulgentius of Ruspe is equally clear, and emphasizes the fact that the union was established at the moment of conception, so that Mary is not the mother of the Godhead as such, nor of the humanity by itself, but of the Incarnate God.[2] The duality of natures in Christ brings with it the duality of wills and operations. This was pointed out by Leo in his letter to Flavian when the Monothelite controversy was still a matter of the future. The same was taught by other theologians of the time, as for instance by Maximus of Turin, who states quite definitely: "In one and the same Redeemer there are two distinct operations, of the divinity and of the humanity."[3] Whilst Agatho, in his letter which was accepted by the Sixth General Council, explains the doctrine in detail. In fact, all this was already fully understood by the Fathers of the fourth century, as has been pointed out in previous chapters.

During the time that the discussions with the East were going on, Boethius, though a philosopher rather than a theo-

[1] De Incarn. Christi, 2, 24; 5, 1; 6, 13, 22.
[2] Ep. 17, 7, 12.
[3] Serm. 117.

logian, endeavored to bring about a better understanding by a proper definition of terms. He gave the Latin equivalents of *οὐσία*, *ὑποστάσις*, and *πρόσωπον*, as nature, substance, and person.[4] His definitions of nature and person have become classical. According to him, nature is that which constitutes the specific difference of things: "Natura est unamquamque rem informans specifica differentia;"[5] whilst a person is the individually existing substance of rational nature: "Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia."[6] Cassiodorus, his contemporary, gives a somewhat similar definition, understanding by person a rational and individually existing substance, distinguished by its own properties from others of its kind: "Persona hominis est substantia rationalis, individua, suis proprietatibus a consubstantialibus caeteris segregata."[7]

Theological writers of the East, even whilst defending the same doctrines, showed less agreement in the manner of presenting and explaining their views. This, as has already been pointed out, was owing to the difference of viewpoints of the theological schools of Antioch and Alexandria. Both schools as such were perfectly orthodox, although in either the one or the other all the chief heretics of the time had received their training. The best representative of the Alexandrian school was Cyril, who championed the cause of orthodoxy against Nestorius. Although handicapped by an imperfect terminology, he almost rivaled Leo in depth of thought and precision of doctrine. His Christological views have been given in connection with the Council of Ephesus, and need not be repeated here. Of the Antiochene school we have a fair representative in Theodoret of Cyrus, the ablest opponent of Cyril in the Nestorian controversy. A few remarks on his Christological teaching will be in place.

He starts out with the assumption that before the union there was only one nature, the divine nature of the Word. The human nature of Christ never existed apart; it was in its very production united to the Godhead, and hence it never was a

[4] Cont. Eutych. et Nest. 3.
[5] Ibid. 1.
[6] Ibid. 3.
[7] In Ps. 7.

human person.[8] After the union there were in Christ two natures, the nature assumed and the nature assuming, of which, however, he frequently speaks as if they were two persons as well.[9] Bardenhewer and others maintain that in his earlier writings against Cyril, Theodoret defended the Nestorian thesis of a double hypostasis in Christ; but it would perhaps be truer to say that Theodoret did not interpret the Nestorian thesis as postulating a double hypostasis at all. If it is true, as is held by many, that he was the author of the Union Creed, this conclusion becomes unavoidable. For at the time he was still a friend of Nestorius, and yet the unity of person in Christ as well as the divine motherhood of Mary are quite clearly brought out in the Creed thus ascribed to him. And even if he was not its author, he certainly accepted it as his own profession of faith. It is true, his writings were later on condemned by the Fifth General Council; but that does not necessarily mean that he was heterodox in so far as his own subjective faith came in question. They were condemned only in their obvious sense, which, owing to the author's faulty way of expressing himself, was sufficiently at variance with orthodox teaching to call for condemnation, as will appear from the following paragraphs.

In the union, according to Theodoret, each nature preserves its own properties and natural mode of action; but there is between them a conjunction, an indwelling, and intimate union, which, indeed is a matter of complacency and grace, but it is not merely a moral union; it is physical in such wise that Christ is only one person and one incarnate Son of God.[10] This is, however, the weakest part of his teaching, and gave the greatest offense to his orthodox opponents. Whilst he rejects the purely sympathetic and mechanical union advocated by Nestorius, he seems ever afraid of making it too close. This is partly owing to the traditions of his school, and partly also to his dread of Apollinarianism, which he thought was lurking under the terms used by Cyril.

He admits the necessary consequences of such a union, the

[8] Eranist. 2.
[9] Ibid. De Incarn. Dom. 18.
[10] Eranist. 2.

communicatio idiomatum and the Divine Motherhood of the Virgin, though always with some reserve. Thus Mary is truly Theotokos, Mother of God, as she "is called by the masters of piety," yet he points out that by the same "masters of piety" she is also termed "Mother of man." [11] If she bore the Word of God incarnate in human nature, she likewise bore the man who had been assumed by the Word. Nor was Cyril justified in ascribing sufferings and death to the Word of God. It was not God who was crucified; but the man Jesus Christ, who was of the seed of David, the son of Abraham.[12] This apparent inconsistency, which admitted a real union and yet hesitated to recognize all its consequences, may perhaps partly be ascribed to a misunderstanding of Cyril's teaching. When Cyril attributed the death of the cross to the Incarnate Word of God, Theodoret seems to have understood this as referring to the divine nature in itself, which was at best a blundering misconception.

There are two other writers belonging to this period, though not so directly connected with either school, who deserve special mention. The first of these is Leontius of Byzantium, who wrote in the early part of the sixth century. Cardinal Mai, who first edited most of his works in the original Greek, declared him to be the foremost theologian of his epoch. He is the author of three books against the Nestorians and Eutychians, in the preface of which he says: "I shall demonstrate the thesis that the nature of the divinity of Christ and the nature of His humanity existed and continued to exist after the union: afterwards I shall treat of the mutual relations of these two natures and their modes of existence"; both of which, says Bardenhewer, he has done in an admirable manner.[13]

He begins with a definition of terms, in which he largely utilizes the Categories of Aristotle. As regards the suppositum or person, he follows the teaching of the Cappado-

[11] De Incarn. 35.
[12] Serm. fragm. P. G. 84, 62.
[13] The following summary of the Christology of Leontius and Maximus has in part been taken from the account given by Tixeront, H. D. III, 145–153, 180–185.

cians, indentifying it simply with the individual nature in so far as it exists apart, independently, and in consequnece being *sui juris.* Hence he writes: "Nature implies the idea of being simply, but hypostasis the further idea of being apart; the former indicates the species, the latter bears reference to the individual; the former connotes the universal, the latter separates the proper from the common. Hence the notion of hypostasis is realized only in beings that are identical in nature but numerically distinct, or in such as result from different natures that have an hypostasis in common." A person, therefore, is a complete nature existing independently, not united to a whole of which it is a constituent part in any sense.

After this definition of terms, he proceeds to consider the human nature of Christ. As every individual nature must in some way be completed by an hypostasis, Christ's human nature also demands this complement; yet it does not exist apart, independently; it has no hypostasis of its own, and as such it is not "ὑπόστατος": still it exists, and therefore it is not "ἀνυπόστατος," which would make it a mere abstraction; but it exists in the Word, it is completed by the hypostasis of the Word, and in consequence it is "ἐνυπόστατος."

But is such an inexistence possible? The author adduces several analogous examples, which in some way illustrate the mystery. Thus the specifying and individuating notes have a somewhat similar inexistence, as on the one hand they are not simple accidents, and on the other they are not parts of subsisting natures. Something similar, again, we see in the human compositum, where soul and body constitute a whole, yet retain their own nature. Of course, these are only examples, and must not be pushed too far in their application. They illustrate to some extent, but do not explain the mystery.

Now this view of the matter excludes both the Nestorian and the Eutychian heresy. For although the Word assumed a complete and perfect nature, yet that nature does not exist apart, is not *sui juris;* it is but a part of the whole, and therefore not a person: hence Christ is only one person, the person of the Word, having two natures. On the other hand, as the

followers of Eutyches admit that the specific characteristics of human nature are in Christ, they are forced to admit that human nature itself is also there, since the two are inseparable; and consequently they must confess that Christ has two natures, although He is only one person.

True, the union of soul and body, which had been used as an illustration, results in one nature; but this is owing to their innate relation to one another, whereby they constitute a species that admits of several individuals. The same result cannot have place in the union of human nature with the person of the Word. In this union both elements are complete, and so the result of the union cannot be a new nature — a nature divinely human, which would make Christ a species instead of an individual.

To the objection of Severus, one of the Monophysite leaders, that if two natures be admitted, two operations must also be admitted, and this in its turn must lead to the admission of two persons in Christ, he replies: "The distinction of the natures does indeed imply the distinction of operations, since operation is, after all, only nature in action; but this in no way interferes with the unity of person. It is not the distinction of the natures, whether in action or otherwise, but their separation that divides the person."

In all this the Byzantine philosophizing theologian is certainly orthodox, and if at times, in other connections, he seems to speak against the Council of Chalcedon, it is not because of the doctrine that was there proposed, but rather because of the terms in which that doctrine was defined. All in all, he did yeoman's service in the cause of orthodox Christology, and paved the way for many a subtile distinction of the Scholastic age.

The second theologian who deserves special mention in this connection is Abbot Maximus. He was to the seventh century what Leontius was to the sixth, but he approaches more closely to the Western concept of Christological teaching. This may be accounted for by his long stay in the West and his intimate association with John IV and Martin I in their struggles

against Monothelism. He was both a mystic and a dogmatic theologian, and his writings were much appreciated for many centuries after his death.

In his theological discussions he makes free use of the technique and definitions of Aristotle, and thus he may be accounted as one of the earliest Scholastics. "The God-Man is always the center of his dogmatic teachings. The Logos is for him the origin and end of all created beings. The history of the world develops along two great lines: the first is the Incarnation of God predestined from the beginning and accomplished historically in the fullness of time; the second is the deification of man that begins with the Incarnation of God and will be finally accomplished through the restoration of the divine image in man. As the beginning of the new life and the second Adam, Christ is necessarily true God and perfect man. The difference of the natures in Christ does not imply a division of personality, nor does the unity of the latter imply a commingling of the natures. On the contrary, given two whole and perfect natures, there must be also two wills and two natural activities or energies." [14] Hence whilst there is one person in Christ, there are two natures and two operations, the latter naturally resulting from the two distinct wills.

This leads him to speak of the nature of activity. Some sort of activity is essential to every existing being; a being without any sort of activity is simply a nonentity. Now this essential activity always corresponds to the nature of the being whose activity it is, and it is proximately by their activities that beings are distinguished from one another. Its principle or source is nature in the concrete, not personality as such, although personality imparts to it its moral value. Hence it will not do to say that Christ's human nature is so subordinated to the divine that it is a mere instrument which has no activity of its own. This would be to destroy His human nature as Apollinaris did. Nor will it do to call His human nature a merely extrinsic instrument, for that would be to divide His person as was done by Nestorius.

It is true, Cyril speaks of "one connatural energy," but this

[14] Cfr. Bardenhewer, Patrol. 578, 579.

expression he uses in reference to a particular case, as when Christ by His omnipotence worked a miracle with the concurrence of His human nature. His hands touched the sick person, and His omnipotent power restored him to health. It was morally one action, yet physically it was made up of two distinct activities. In a somewhat similar sense does the Areopagite say that because of the union of the two natures in Christ there results "a certain new theandric energy"; for by this he only points to the circuminsession of the two natures, which, although they have each their own proper activity, yet by reason of their intimate union and perfect harmony act as one.

However the presence of a twofold activity in Christ does not imply that the human nature is in its actions altogether independent of the divine. In itself the human will is vacillating and imperfect, because of the limitations of the human intellect which serves it as a guide. In order to make it firm in the pursuance of good, it must be illumined by a perfect knowledge, which comes to it through the union with the Word. Moreover, although the will in itself is essential to a perfect nature, its manner of acting is under the direction of the person; and in so far the human will of Christ was directed by His divine will. Hence Christ had indeed a free human will, but not one that was impaired by human defects. This is the only difference between His human will and ours. Whilst our will can always lapse into sin, His could not; it was a perfect will as demanded by the hypostatic union. For by reason of this every act of the human will in Christ is attributable to the person of the Word.

All this reasoning, which is purely and eminently Scholastic, the author supports by copious citations from Holy Scripture and the writings of the early Fathers. In this, too, he was a worthy forerunner of the Angel of the Schools.

B — Orthodox Mariology

Here seems to be the best place for gathering together the teaching of the Fathers concerning the Blessed Mother of God. In this as well as in their teaching on Christ, there is

noticeable a constant development, which received a new impulse from the definition of her Divine Motherhood by the Council of Ephesus. Whilst the bishops, gathered in that solemn assembly, voiced the faith of the past, they at the same time offered fresh incentive to the pious veneration of the future. Hence taking our stand at the Council, we may at once look backward and forward and so observe at a glance what development there was in Mariological teaching from Nicæa to the end of the Patristic age.

As was pointed out in the general summary of Antenicene theology, the Divine Motherhood of Mary and her close association with the Saviour in the work of redemption were universally accepted as a matter of orthodox belief during the first three centuries of the Christian era. Justin, Irenæus, and Tertullian spoke of her as the cause of our salvation and our advocate with God. To them she was the sinless Virgin, who by her obedience restored what had been ruined by the disobedience of Eve. There is little in the line of records from which it might be inferred that she was made the object of a special religious veneration by the faithful of those early times, but we know that her place in orthodox theology was already clearly defined.

The Fathers of the fourth century adopted the views of their predecessors, and developed them as occasion required. Those of the East defended her Divine Motherhood against the Arians, and her perpetual virginity against the Antidicomarianites. "The Word that was from all eternity born of the Father," says Athanasius, "the same was in time born of the Virgin, the Mother of God." [15] "If any one does not believe that Holy Mary is the Mother of God," writes Gregory of Nazianzus, "he is separated from the Divinity." [16] Epiphanius calls her "Virgo in partu et post partum," [17] and in another place he asks: "What man ever was there at any time, who presumed to mention the name of Holy Mary and did not immediately add, Virgin? . . . Thus the title of virgin was given to Holy Mary, nor shall it ever be changed; for this

[15] De Incarn. 8.
[16] Ep. 101.
[17] Adv. Haer. 88, 18.

holy one remained incorrupt." [18] Didymus speaks of her as "ever Virgin, always and in all things Virgin undefiled." [19] Similar terms were used by Amphilochius, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and others; whilst some among the faithful, who had more zeal than discretion, formed at this time a special sect, called the Collyridians, who went so far as to offer sacrifices to her as if she were a goddess. These, of course, were disowned by the Church.

Among the Eastern Fathers of this period it was especially St. Ephrem of Nisibis in Syria who sang her praises in most eloquent strains. "O Thou Virgin Lady," he addresses her, "Thou Immaculate Mother of God, my most glorious Mistress, most generously kind, Thou art higher than the heavens, much purer than the resplendent rays and brightness of the sun. . . . Thou art the fruitful rod of Aaron, Thou didst appear as the true Virgin, and the flower Thou bearest is truly Thy Son our Christ, my God and my Maker; Thou didst bring forth God the Word according to the flesh, keeping Thy virginity unstained before His birth, and after His birth Thou didst remain a virgin." [20] And in another place, addressing the Saviour, he says: "Indeed, Thou and Thy Mother are the only ones who are altogether beautiful; for in Thee, O Lord, there is no sin, and in Thy Mother there is no stain. But my children are in no wise like unto these two examples of perfect beauty." [21] This evidently implies the Immaculate Conception, although the author may not have had the idea clearly in his mind.

As regards her freedom from even the slightest personal faults, there seems to have been some difference of opinion among the fourth-century writers in the East. Whilst the majority extol her holiness without reference to anything reprehensible either in her character or conduct, Chrysostom thinks that she was moved by vanity when at the marriage feast in Cana she asked her Son to provide the necessary wine; [22] and that, when she wished to speak to Jesus whilst He was ad-

[18] Ibid. 78, 6.
[19] De Trin. 1, 27.
[20] Orat. ad Sanct. Dei Matrem.
[21] Carm. Nisib. 27, 8.
[22] In Joan. 21.

dressing the multitude, she was guilty of imperiousness.[23] Similarly Basil and Cyril of Alexandria, who interpret the prophecy of Simeon as implying that Mary was moved by a doubt in the divinity of Jesus whilst she was standing under the Cross.[24] But these are exceptions that do not effect the common view that Mary's holiness was in every way perfect.

The Western writers are equally definite when speaking of Mary's position in the economy of salvation, and of her unexampled holiness and prerogatives. "O wonderful mystery," exclaims Zeno, "Mary conceived as an undefiled virgin, as a virgin she brought forth her child, and a virgin she remained after His birth." [25] Her praises were especially celebrated by Ambrose, who pointed to her as the "Virginitatis Magistra." "Exalted therefore is Mary, who unfurled the banner of holy virginity, and raised the standard of undefiled integrity. . . . Non deficit Maria, non deficit virginitatis magistra." [26] In another place he seems to allude to her immaculate conception; for addressing Christ, he says: "Receive me in the flesh which has fallen in Adam. Receive me not from Sara, but from Mary; that she may be an undefiled virgin, but a virgin through grace, free from all stain of sin." [27]

Mary's prerogative of perpetual virginity was also staunchly defended by Jerome, who wrote against Helvidius and Jovinian. Both resuscitated the singular and forgotten opinion of Tertullian, that Mary had lost her virginity in the birth of Christ. Helvidius furthermore contended that she had become the mother of other children, to whom Holy Scripture refers as the brothers and sisters of Jesus. In refuting these heretics, Jerome rejected the authority of Tertullian as of one who did not belong to the Church, gave an orthodox interpretation of the pertinent Scripture texts, based upon the Jewish custom of applying the terms brother and sister to near relations, and then summed up the traditional teaching on the subject in the terse sentence: "That God was born of a virgin we believe, because this we read; that Mary ceased to be a virgin after

[23] In Matt. 44, 1.
[24] Ep. 259; In Joan. 19, 25.
[25] Tract. 2, 8, 2.
[26] De Instit. Virg. 35, 45.
[27] In Ps. 118, 22, 30.

the birth of her Son, we do not believe, because this we do not read." [28]

St. Augustine, too, always speaks of the Mother of God with the greatest reverence, and in one striking passage brings out her absolute sinlessness. "When there is question of sin," he writes, "I do not wish to have the Virgin Mary so much as mentioned, out of respect for the Lord." [29] Because the Son is without sin, therefore the Mother must also be without sin. This statement many theologians interpret as a declaration of Mary's immaculate conception; and although the text is directly concerned only with actual or personal sins, the interpretation may well stand. For in another place the author lays down the rule that no one can be free from personal sin unless he was preserved from the original stain.[30] It is true, in the same text he actually exempts only Christ from having incurred the sin of Adam; but it may well be that in this he pointed to Christ's inherent right to be so preserved. Christ had a right to be immune from original sin; Mary was immune from it through grace. That this distinction was in the author's mind, may be inferred from another text. For when Julian of Eclanum accused him of involving Mary herself in guilt by his theory of original sin, he replied: "We do not transfer Mary to the devil's book owing to the law of birth; but the reason we do not, is that this law is broken by the grace of being born again." [31] This reply has really no sense except on the supposition that Augustine meant to assert Mary's preservation from original sin.

It can indeed not be denied that there are other texts in Augustine's writings, which seem to imply that in his view Mary had incurred the common guilt. Thus in one place he sets up the general principle, that exemption from original sin presupposes a virginal birth in the person so exempted.[32] He also calls Mary's body simply a body of sin, whereas he speaks of the body of her Son as being in the likeness of a body of sin.[33] But in view of what was said in the preceding para-

[28] Advers. Helvid. 19.
[29] De Nat. et Grat. 42.
[30] Cont. Jul. 5, 15, 57.
[31] Opus Imperf. Cont. Jul. 4, 122.
[32] Cont. Jul. 5, 52.
[33] Cont. Jul. Opus Imperf. 4, 79; 6, 22.

graph, it is more than likely that in these and similar passages the author had in mind only the general law according to which original sin is transmitted; leaving aside for the moment all consideration of what might be effected by a special grace of God. Hence it would seem that Augustine may reasonably be appealed to as an authority for the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. And for the rest also he is very explicit in extolling Mary's sanctity.

However, whilst the Mother of God thus occupied a prominent place in the love and veneration of the faithful, there are no records of any feasts having been celebrated in her honor during the fourth century. Etheria or Silvia, in her *Peregrinatio,* makes indeed mention of the Presentation in the Temple, which was celebrated during her stay in Jerusalem in 360, but she does not associate it with the Blessed Virgin. As gathered from her narrative, it commemorated the presentation of the child Jesus forty days after His birth, and occurred on the 14th of February, Epiphany then still holding the place of Christmas. On the other hand, even at that early date many churches were dedicated to the Mother of God, as among others was the church at Ephesus, " Holy Mary," in which the Third General Council was held. Her images, too, were in use among the faithful, as we learn from recent discoveries in the catacombs; but whether religious veneration was paid to them is not so certain.

Such, then, was the place which the Virgin Mary held in the hearts of the faithful and in the teaching of the Church when the Council of Ephesus officially declared her to be truly the Mother of God. From that time forward devotion to her became even more intense and widespread. The splendid encomiums pronounced on her virtues and privileges by Cyril of Alexandria found an echo in all subsequent ages. Not only her perpetual virginity, but also her absolute sinlessness was universally accepted as necessarily implied in her dignity of Divine Motherhood. And this sinlessness, at least as interpreted in the East, was understood to imply also immunity from the original stain. It is true, this is nowhere stated in so many words, but the terms used by the writers subsequent

to the Council of Ephesus can hardly mean anything less. Hers, they say, is a holiness so complete that it admits of no stain, so great that it places her above the Apostles and the angels, so altogether singular that it makes her a worthy Mediatrix between heaven and earth. Whatever a purely human being can receive from the hand of God, that is found in Mary. This, however, was not so universally held by Western writers. They also extolled Mary's sanctity and reverenced her with loving devotion; but many of them seem to have stopped short of believing her immune from original sin. In fact, Fulgentius states openly that she was conceived in sin as the rest of mankind; and similar expressions are found in the writings of Ferrandus, Leo I, Gregory I, and Venerable Bede.[34] They were close followers of Augustine, and it seems that they interpreted him in this sense.

It is also after the Council of Ephesus that we first find records of feasts being celebrated in honor of the Mother of God. The second Trullan synod, or the Quinisext, held in 692, refers to the Annunciation as a well known festival of our Lady. The feast of the Visitation originated most likely in Jerusalem early in the sixth century; whilst our present feast of that name, celebrated on the second of July, dates from the bringing of the Virgin's veil to the Blachernæ monastery near Constantinople in 478. The Dormition of the Mother of God, or Mary's Assumption, which the Emperor Maurice had transferred from the 18th of January to the 15th of August, probably reaches back as far as the fifth century, since belief in Mary's bodily assumption into heaven was then spreading rapidly both in the East and the West.[35] Mary's Nativity also, commemorated

[34] Cfr. Tixeront, o. c. III, 409.

[35] That the traditional belief in Mary's bodily assumption into heaven reaches back to the earliest Christian centuries is very likely; but there is no direct historical evidence to prove it. St. John Damascene in his three homilies on the Dormitio represents this belief as an ancient heirloom, and he declares that his sole purpose in preaching on the Assumption of the Mother of God is to develop and establish what in a brief and almost too concise a manner the son has inherited from the father, according to the common saying (Hom. 2, 4.). Yet, on the other hand, St. Epiphanius, in the second half of the fourth century, seems to have been unaware of the existence of such a belief; for he declares that he does not know whether the Holy Virgin died at

on the 8th of September, was a well known festival in the seventh century. Finally the feast of Mary's Conception, which the Greeks celebrate on the 9th of December, was observed in some Eastern churches from the beginning of the seventh century onwards. All of these festivals had their origin in the East; but, with the exception of the last one, they were almost immediately adopted in the West, an evident sign that both Churches were at one in their reverence for the Mother of God.

And this brings the development of Mariology practically to a close. Many new feasts have since been introduced, and a variety of special devotions have been originated; but they have contributed little to the further development of Patristic teaching in this respect. Only the long continued discussion of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception during the Middle Ages, and its final definition by Pius IX in the last century, marked a forward step; although even this forward step had been well prepared for by the Fathers of old.

all, or was buried (De Haer. 78, 11). About a century later, the Pseudo-Areopagite gave currency to the legend that the Apostles opened the tomb of the Virgin some days after her burial, and instead of her body they found therein the most fragrant lilies (De Div. Nom. 3, 2). However as his writings were almost immediately rejected as apocryphal, they can have had little to do with the growing belief in Mary's Assumption.

The first undoubted testimony to the firmly established belief in the Assumption is a statement of Gregory of Tours, who died in 596. He writes: "The Lord commanded the holy body to be borne in a cloud to paradise, where, reunited to its soul, and exulting with the elect, it enjoys the never ending bliss of eternity" (Mirac. 1, 4; P. L. 71, 708). Of the same tenor is a prayer found in the Gregorian Sacramentary, which dates probably from the beginning of the seventh century. It runs thus: "Today's festival is venerable to us, O Lord, because on this day the Blessed Mother of God suffered temporal death, but it was not possible that she who gave birth to our Incarnate Lord, Thy Son, should be subjugated by death" (P. L. 88, 133). From this time on references to the fact of the Assumption and to the celebration of the feast become quite numerous.

The dogmatic reason underlying the belief in Mary's bodily Assumption into heaven is thus stated by St. Germanus of Constantinople, who died in 733: "Thou hast obtained the honorable title of Mother of God, . . . therefore it was becoming that thy body, which had received into itself the Life, should not be enshrouded in death by corruption (Orat. in Dormit. B. Mariae, 2; P. G. 98, 359). Another reason is, of course, contained in Mary's immaculate conception and perpetual virginity.

CHAPTER XXX

THE VENERATION OF THE SAINTS: THE DOCTRINE OF PURGATORY: ESCHATOLOGICAL VIEWS[1]

As is sufficiently evident from what has been said in the preceding chapters, the dissensions of heretics gave a strong impulse to the development of orthodox teaching in reference to points of doctrine which they called in question. However development took place also along other lines, independently of all controversy. The Holy Spirit is ever active in the Church of Christ, guiding her not only in her official decisions and formal definitions, but also in the faithful discharge of her ordinary duties, whether it be the preaching of God's word or the promoting of divine worship. In all this she clings to the traditions of the past, yet without overlooking the needs of the present. She ever preaches what the Apostles preached, and she ever worships what the Apostles worshiped; but in this preaching and worshiping she emphasizes now one point or feature and then another, as best suits the circumstances of time and place. Sometimes the initiative in this matter is taken by the head of the Church, but oftener by some individual bishop or priest, moved thereto not rarely by members of the flock; for the Spirit breatheth wheresoever He listeth. The result of this shows itself in the gradual fixation of the doctrines or features of worship thus emphasized, and so the work of development is promoted in God's own quiet way. To the doctrines thus gradually developed belong the three placed at the head of the present chapter.

A — The Veneration of the Saints

In one sense the practice of venerating the saints of God is

[1] Cfr. McGinnis, The Communion of Saints; Kirsch, The Doctrine of the Communion of Saints; Atzberger, Eschatologie; Duchesne, Christian Worship.

as old as the Church; for from the very beginning of Christianity religious reverence was shown to the martyrs of the faith, and prayers were offered to obtain their intercession with God. It was altogether distinct from divine worship as such, even as it is distinct from it now, both in object and purpose; but it was truly of a religious nature and found its proper place near the altar of sacrifice. "Christ," wrote the church of Smyrna, in the early part of the second century, "we adore as the Son of God, but the martyrs we rightly love as the disciples and imitators of the Lord." Their bones are reverently gathered up, "as being more precious than gems," and deposited "in a decent place, where the faithful may come together for the purpose of celebrating the anniversary of the martyr's death, both in memory of those who have triumphed in the conflict and that their successors may be ready and prepared to bear the same trials." [2]

This contains at once a record of the practice then in vogue, an explanation of the veneration paid to martyrs, a statement of the reasons upon which it is based, and a reference to the purpose it was meant to subserve. The martyrs, it is stated, are not worshiped as gods, but venerated as the dear friends of God; and this is right and just, because here on earth they were the disciples and imitators of the Lord; nor is this useless, for it contributes to their honor and helps others to follow their example.— Here we have a complete and exact exposition of the theological aspect of the veneration of Saints.

These same views were frequently touched upon by the writers of the fourth and fifth centuries. "Whoever honors God," says Epiphanius, "honors the saint; whoever despises the saint, despises the Lord of the saints." [3] "They have great power with God," Chrysostom tells his hearers, and Gregory of Nazianzus adds: "Much greater than when they were still on earth." [4] The Latin writers were entirely of the same mind; hence Jerome states: "We honor the relics of the martyrs that thereby we may adore Him whose martyrs they are. We honor the servants, so that their honor may

[2] Martyr. Polyc. 17.
[3] Adv. Haer. 18, 21.
[4] De S. Melitio, Orat. 18, 21.

redound to the honor of the Lord." [5] And to this there is no exception among orthodox theologians, either in the fourth or any subsequent century.

However in the beginning this veneration was almost exclusively paid to the martyrs of the faith. Moreover this *cultus* remained for a long time more or less local, each community honoring its own martyred heroes. Gradually, however, a commemoration was also made of all the holy martyrs in general, as appears from a homily of Maximus of Turin, which was written about the middle of the fifth century. But he still emphasizes the propriety of first and especially honoring the martyrs belonging to his own particular church; for he says: "As we must celebrate the general commemoration of all the holy martyrs, so, my brethren, ought we to celebrate with special devotion the feasts of those who shed their blood in our own locality. For while all the saints, wherever they may be, assist us all, yet those who suffered in our midst intercede for us in a special manner. And the reason is that the martyr suffers not for himself alone, but also for his fellow citizens. By his sufferings he obtains rest for himself and salvation for them." [6] It was only when the Teuton nations, who as yet had no martyrs of their own, were converted to the faith, that the restriction of festivals to local saints was gradually removed.

The earliest records of the public veneration of saints who were not martyrs, aside from the Blessed Virgin, date back to the beginning of the sixth century. About that time a church was dedicated in Rome to Pope Sylvester and Martin of Tours.[7] Thereafter the custom spread rapidly, and feasts were instituted of virgins and confessors as well as of martyrs. The principle involved is, of course, the same in both cases. Any one, whether a martyr or not, who is with God in heaven, is by that very fact deserving of veneration. But whether the Church will think it expedient to accord him public veneration is another matter. This rests with her. It is true, in olden times there was no formal process of canonization;

[5] Ep. 109, 1.
[6] Hom. 81, P. L. 57, 427.
[7] Cfr. Kellner, Heortology, 208.

the veneration of deceased holy persons usually grew up spontaneously among the faithful, and was then accepted by the bishop of the diocese or by a local synod: but this does not alter the case; the final decision always rests with the Church. However she never issued a prohibition which stood in the way of paying public veneration to those of her sainted children who were not martyrs; but she accommodated herself to the exigencies of the times. The memories of the terrible years of conflict still lingered in the minds of the faithful, and when in consequence they restricted their veneration to the martyred heroes of the faith, she did not interfere. But when with the lapse of time the proper moment arrived, she had no misgivings about according the honors of her altars to confessors and virgins as well as to the martyrs of old. She laid down only two conditions: that the sanctity of the person in question be beyond suspicion, and that the example of his or her life be an inspiration for good to the faithful.

B — The Doctrine of Purgatory

The Catholic doctrine of purgatory comprises two points: First, that there is a place of purgation, where the souls of the departed that are still stained by slight sins, or at least have not yet completely satisfied the justice of God, are subjected to some kind of purifying process until they are worthy to be admitted to the blessed vision of God; secondly, that while detained in this place they may be assisted by the suffrages of the faithful here on earth. Under both aspects the doctrine is met with in the writings of the earliest times. Thus Origen knows of a place in the lower regions where souls are purified by a baptism of fire;[8] and Tertullian states that the prison-house of which the Gospel speaks is a subterranean place in which souls are detained, and that the last farthing, which must be paid before deliverance is possible, stands for slight faults of which these souls must be cleansed before they are fit for the resurrection;[9] whilst Cyprian and others speak of the Holy Sacrifice being offered for the dead as a general custom.

[8] In Luc. Hom. 24.

[9] De Anima, 58.

However it was chiefly during the fourth and fifth centuries that this doctrine was fully developed. Thus St. Basil states quite clearly, that souls are judged immediately after death, "so that, if they are found to be still disfigured by the wounds of the conflict, or to have retained any stains or vestiges of sins, their reward may be delayed for a while; and, if on the other hand, they are found to be without wounds or stains, that they may, unconquered and free, rest with Christ." [10] Gregory of Nyssa uses almost the same terms, and then announces the general principle: "No one can see God unless the purgatorial fire has cleansed his soul from all stains." [11] This principle was admitted by all, and from it, in view of human weakness, they necessarily inferred the existence of purgatory, although they also deduced it from the teaching of Holy Scripture.

Belief in the efficacy of suffrages for the departed was equally firm and widespread. A commemoration of the dead was universally made during the Holy Sacrifice, as is thus stated by St. Cyril of Jerusalem: "Afterwards we make a commemoration also of those who have slept in the Lord: first of the Patriarchs, Prophets, Apostles, and martyrs, so that through their supplications and intercession God may receive our prayer; then for the deceased holy fathers and bishops, and for all in general who have departed this life, believing that this is of the greatest help for those souls for whom prayer is offered whilst the holy and tremendous Victim lies upon the altar." [12] And for this Ephrem, the Syrian, also pleads in his last will: "On the thirtieth day, my brethren, make a commemoration of me. For the dead are helped by the sacrifice which is offered by the living." [13] And a little further on: "If the men of Mathathias, who were entrusted with the offering of sacrifices, could expiate, as you have read, by their oblations the sins of the fallen soldiers, how much more are the priests of God's own Son able to expiate by their Holy Sacrifice and by the prayers of their lips the sins of the dead!" [14]

[10] In Ps. I, Hom. 4.
[11] Orat. De Mortuis.
[12] Catech. Mystag. 5, 9, 10.
[13] Testam. 72.
[14] Ibid. 78.

This doctrine the fourth century writers had sometimes to defend against the followers of Aërius, who formed an extreme section of the Arian party. These sectaries contended that suffrages for the dead were useless, and to pray for them or offer the Holy Sacrifice in their behalf was folly. In answer to them Epiphanius writes: "Even though it does not blot out all sins, the prayer made for the departed is profitable to them; for while we are in this world, it often happens that willingly or unwillingly we waver in choosing what is more perfect." [15] Chrysostom traces the custom of offering suffrages for the dead to the Apostles themselves. "It is not in vain," he writes, "that the Apostles established this law, that in the venerable and tremendous Mysteries a commemoration should be made of those who have departed this life. For they knew that thereby great gain and help would accrue to these souls. Because at that time, when the whole people and the sacerdotal assembly stand praying with arms extended, and the awe-inspiring Victim is present, how should we not placate God as we pray in their behalf?" [16]

The efficacy of suffrages for the dead is also taught by the Western writers of this period, who frequently refer to the custom of praying for the departed in the liturgical services. Besides private prayers and alms-giving, to which each one attends as devotion to his loved ones may prompt him, solemn rites are celebrated on the seventh and fortieth day after their demise. Apostles and martyrs are invoked in their behalf, and whatever is thus done for them washes away their sins and hastens their final happiness.[17] However these writers have but few references to purgatory as a special place of purification. This was possibly owing to their somewhat confused notions on eschatology, about which something will be said in the following section. It was Augustine who fully developed the doctrine of purgatory in the Western Church.

He touches both points: the existence of purgatory and the efficacy of our prayers for the departed. "Some," he writes, "suffer temporal punishment in this life only, others

[15] Adv. Haer. 75, 7.
[16] In Ep. ad Phil. 3, 4.
[17] Ambrose, Serm. 20, 22; De Excessu Frat. 1, 5, 29.

after death, and others both now and hereafter, but before that most severe and last judgment. But not all of those who bear temporal punishment after death are condemned to the everlasting pains which follow that judgment." [18] "He who does not till his field, and allows it to be overrun with thorns, receives in this life the curse of the earth in all his works, and hereafter he shall be condemned either to the fire of purgation or to eternal punishment." [19]

In answer to those who doubt whether there is fire in purgatory, he says: "It is not incredible that even after this life there should be something of the kind, but whether there really is remains a matter of dispute. And when one examines into the question, it may either be found to be so or continue to be doubtful, namely, whether some of the faithful departed are detained in a certain purgatorial fire, their salvation being thereby delayed in proportion as they have more or less loved the perishable things of this world." [20] Hence though the existence of purgatory admits of no doubt, the nature of the sufferings which souls must there endure is to some extent a matter of speculation.

On the second point, the efficacy of prayers for the dead, he is very definite. "For some of the departed," he says, "the prayers either of the Church herself or of the pious faithful are of avail; but for those only who have been regenerated in Christ, and whose life here on earth was neither so bad as to make them unworthy of His mercy, nor so good as to have no need of it." [21] And again: "Neither is it to be denied that the souls of the departed are relieved by the piety of their living relatives, when the Sacrifice of the Mediator is offered for them, or alms are given in the church." [22] These souls, he remarks in another place, are deserving of being helped after death, not because of any present merit, since they no longer can merit for themselves nor can others merit for them; but because they have so acted during life as to be worthy of mercy after death.[23]

[18] De Civ. Dei, 21, 13; cfr. Enar. in Ps. 37, 3.
[19] Cont. Manich. 2, 20, 30.
[20] Enchir. 69.
[21] De Civ. Dei, 21, 24, 2.
[22] Enchir. 110.
[23] Serm. 172, 2.

Beyond this, Catholic teaching on purgatory has hardly made any advance, even till the present day. It is true, we make much of the application of indulgences to the poor souls, but in their present form indulgences were unknown in the Patristic age. The principles underlying the doctrine were indeed understood and admitted by the Fathers, but the theory of indulgences was worked out later.

These views of Augustine soon spread and were adopted throughout the West. Some fifty years later Cæsarius of Arles speaks in terms that are fully as definite. Referring to the slighter sins, such as intemperance in eating and drinking, talking too much or too little, he says: "We do not believe that by these sins the soul is killed; but she is disfigured thereby as with so many ulcers and ugly scars, which make her unworthy to receive the embraces of her Heavenly Spouse." [24] And again: "But if we do not give thanks to God in our tribulations, nor redeem our sins by good works, we shall be detained in that purgatorial fire until the above mentioned slight sins have been consumed, as so much wood, or hay, or stubble." [25]

The same clear statements are found in the writings of Gregory I. "In the same condition as one leaves this world," he says, "one will also be found in the judgment. However it is a matter of belief that for the cleansing from light faults before the judgment there exists a purgatorial fire; for this follows from the words of the Eternal Truth, that he who uttereth a blasphemy against the Holy Spirit shall not be forgiven, either in this world or in the next." [26]

In the East, however, the doctrine of purgatory received little attention from the later writers. Even John Damascene, who summed up Greek theology, barely touches the subject. Moreover the opinion seems to have been fairly general among Eastern theologians of this period that by the purgatorial fire, of which some of the earlier Greek Fathers spoke, must be understood mental sufferings, such as remorse, shame, and sadness. This view was eventually adopted by the Greek Church.

[24] Serm. 104, 3.
[25] Ibid. 4.
[26] Dial. 4, 39.

C — Eschatological Views

Death, judgment, heaven, and hell, are the four topics usually included in the general term of eschatology. Of death nothing need be said here, as the doctrine that it is decreed for all once to die admits practically of no development.[26a] Judgment, as treated in this connection, includes both the judgment that is to follow immediately after death, and the one that is to take place at the end of time. Hence these four points, the particular judgment, the general judgment, heaven, and hell, form the subject matter of this section.

On the particular judgment both the Eastern and Western writers were fairly well agreed, at least in so far as they admitted a determination of each one's lot immediately after death. This was necessarily implied in their views on purgatory, as recorded in the preceding section. Sometimes, moreover, they stated this explicitly. Thus St. Chrysostom writes: "I think that the valiant athletes of God, who during life contended bravely with the invisible enemies, . . . shall at the end of their days be examined by the Prince of the ages." [27] He refers here only to the just because he is speaking of purgatory. St. Hilary is very explicit. If we have led a bad life, hell will be our portion. And this he proves from the parable of Dives and Lazarus. "Our witnesses," he says, "are Dives and Lazarus, of whom the Gospel speaks. One of them was carried by angels into the abode of the blessed, in Abraham's bosom; whilst the other was immediately dragged down into the place of punishment. And so immediately did the punishment follow, that it was inflicted while his brothers were still among the living. There was no interval of delay. For the day of judgment marks the beginning either of eternal blessedness or eternal pain." [28]

Nor was there any disagreement about the general judg-

[26a] It is indeed still a matter of dispute among theologians, whether those living immediately before the second advent of Christ shall actually die, or merely pass through tribulations in some measure equivalent to death; but the writings of the Fathers contain little that might be used in elucidation of this question.

[27] In Ep. ad Cor. Hom. 42, 3–7.

[28] Tract. super Ps. 2, 49.

ment, in so far as a second or last judgment comes in question. At the end of time Christ will come to judge the living and the dead. This is Scriptural data, and was from the very first professed by every believing Christian. But as to the further question of who shall be judged on the last day, all were apparently not of the same mind; although they should have been if they followed the Symbol and accepted the obvious meaning of the Sacred Writings. Thus Aphraates, the Syrian, states very plainly: "As the just, who have been perfected in good works, do not come to the judgment to be judged, so neither are the wicked, whose sins have been multiplied and the measure of whose iniquity is overflowing, compelled to come to the judgment; but as soon as they have risen from the dead, they return to hell." [29] The same opinion found also advocates in the West, as, for instance, Hilary and Zeno. According to them, neither the just nor infidels and profligates will have to undergo the judgment; but only those careless and lukewarm Christians who though believing did not live up to their faith.[30] However in regard to this peculiar view it must be borne in mind that the term judgment, at least as used in the West, may well refer to the passing of a sentence in a case that is not already evident, therefore implying a previous examination of the accused person. Hence even these authors would admit that in a wider sense of the term the last judgment will be general.

The resurrection of the dead, which is to precede the last judgment, is admitted by all; but this, again, only in so far as the mere fact of the resurrection is concerned. When there is question of the manner, or of what the resurrection really implies, opinions differ. It must, however, be noted that the vast majority take the term in its proper sense, namely, that each one shall arise in his own body which he had during life. "The resurrection," says Epiphanius, "is not affirmed of that which never fell, but of that which fell and rises again. . . . For not that which does not die, but that which dies is said to fall. It is the flesh that dies; the soul is immortal." [31]

[29] Demonstr. 22, 17.
[30] Hilary, In Ps. 1, 15–18; Zeno, Tract. 1, 21.
[31] Adv. Haer. 64, 35.

This is strongly defended by Cyril of Jerusalem and by Chrysostom. The former says: "This very body shall rise from the dead, not weak as it is now; yet this same body itself shall rise again. . . . Therefore this body itself shall rise, but it shall not remain as it is; yet it shall remain forever." [32] How this may come to pass is thus indicated by Gregory of Nyssa: "Just as the seed, which in the beginning is without form, is by the ineffable skill of God fashioned into a being of its own kind, and then grows up into bodily substances, so it is not at all unreasonable, but altogether in accord with the nature of matter, that the material part of man which is in the grave, and which formerly had a definite form, should be brought back to its erstwhile condition, and that thus man should again become dust, whence in the beginning he had his origin." [33]

The same view was taken by the majority of the Western writers. Thus Hilary, speaking of the transformation of our bodies in the resurrection, as indicated by St. Paul, says: "That which was broken God will repair; not by using any other matter, but the very same whence men had their origin, imparting to it a beauty that is in accord with His own good pleasure; so that the resurrection of our corruptible bodies in incorruption does not mean a destruction of their nature, but a change of their condition." [34] Ambrose is just as definite: "For this," he writes, "is the resurrection, as the word itself indicates, that the same which fell rises again; the same which died is brought to life." [35]

However along with this common teaching there was astir a tendency to revive the peculiar views of Origen, according to which the resurrection consists in the development of a reproductive germ, contained in each body and surviving the corruption of death. The result of this development will indeed be a real body, but it has nothing in common with that which each one had during life, except the reproductive germ. Epiphanius argued strongly against this view, which unsettled the faith of the simple; and two centuries later it was thought

[32] Catech. 17, 18, 19.
[33] Orat. 3.
[34] Tract. super Ps. 2, 41.
[35] De Exitu Frat. 2, 87.

necessary to issue a formal condemnation of Origen's teaching on this point.

After the resurrection and final judgment the just will enter with Christ into eternal life, and the wicked shall be cast into hell. On the first point there is practically no disagreement. It is true, Chrysostom and a few other theologians of the Antiochene school are sometimes adduced as denying the intuitive vision of God's essence;[36] but what they had in mind was most likely the comprehensive knowledge of God, as the texts in question seem to refer to Eunomius, who contended that God is as perfectly known by us as He is known by Himself. The common view on the object of Beatitude is thus expressed by Gregory of Nazianzus: "The bliss of heaven consists primarily in the vision of the Holy and Royal Triad, which illumines us with a great splendor and wholly communicates itself to the spirit."[37] The bodies of the blessed shall also be glorified, and shine with a great light.[38]

On the second point, the punishment of the wicked in hell, many different views appear to have been entertained during the latter part of the fourth century, both by theological writers and the common people. In the first place, Ambrosiaster among the Latins and Gregory of Nyssa among the Greeks apparently held that there would be a universal *apokatastasis,* a final restoration of all rational creatures to the friendship of God.[39] In regard to Gregory it is indeed frequently pointed out by dogmatic theologians that he has passages in which he explicitly defends the eternity of hell, but unfortunately he himself interprets that "eternity" as "long periods of time."[40]

In the next place, the view seems to have been rather common, at least in the West, that the punishment of hell would be everlasting only for the most wicked of sinners — for infidels, apostates, and the evil spirits. Even Jerome and Ambrose are said to have been inclined towards this view,[41]

[36] Cfr. Tixeront, H. D. II, 198, 199.
[37] Orat. 15.
[38] Cyr. Hier. Catech. 18, 18.
[39] In Ephes. 3, 10; Orat. Catech. 26, 35.
[40] Ibid. 26; De An. et Resurr.; P. G. 46, 72, 152, 157.
[41] Cfr. Tixeront. op. cit. 339–347.

although there are not wanting in their works passages from which one might well infer the contrary. St. Augustine, who had no patience with these lax opinions, has put on record the different views that were quite generally held at the beginning of the fifth century. Some, he says, maintain that all baptized persons will be saved; others that all those are sure of salvation who besides baptism have also received the Blessed Eucharist; others promise salvation to all Catholics without exception; others hold that there will be a universal restoration, so that in the end all will be admitted to the everlasting joys of heaven.[42]

None of these strange views, however, were based on tradition. In fact, up to the middle of the fourth century, the common teaching was rather inclined towards rigorism in the matter of salvation; and practically no one thought that out of hell there was any redemption. It was the translation of Origen's *De Principiis* by Rufinus that caused all this confusion in Latin countries. No doubt, the view was very acceptable to persons of lax moral principles, and so from the learned world it readily spread among the common people.

But even at this time the weight of authority was entirely on the side of tradition. In the East, men like Basil, Cyril of Jerusalem, Chrysostom, Didymus, and Epiphanius, were quite positive and outspoken about the eternity of hell. And the same is true of Hilary, Zeno, and Augustine in the West. Nor did they reserve the eternal punishment of hell for only "the most wicked of sinners"; they were fully convinced that it would overtake every one who did not depart this life in the friendship of God.

St. Augustine undertook the task of formally proving the eternity of hell, both from Holy Scripture and from the usage of the Church of not praying for the deliverance of the lost souls. Referring to Matthew, 25, 46, he asks: "What sense is there in thinking that the eternal punishment of hell means only a long period of time, and at the same time asserting that eternal life is without end? For in one and the same place,

[42] De Civ. Dei, 26, 17–22; Enchir. 67, 112; De Fide et Opere, 1, 22.

in one and the same sentence, taking the two together, Christ said: 'Thus these shall go into eternal punishment, but the just into life eternal.' If both are eternal, surely both must be understood to signify either a long duration of time which shall some day come to an end, or a duration without end. Both stand in the same relation: on the one hand eternal punishment, on the other life eternal. But to say in this one and the same sense: Eternal life will be without end, eternal punishment will have an end, is utterly absurd." [43]

The sufferings of the damned are of two kinds: the loss of God and positive pains. "It is an everlasting death," he argues, "when the soul can neither live, because she does not possess God; nor be without pain, because she cannot die. The first death drags the unwilling soul out of the body, the second death keeps the unwilling soul in the body." [44] These sufferings, however, will not be the same for all: "It must not be denied that even the torture of the eternal fire will be in proportion to the guilt of each, lighter for some and more severe for others; either because the intensity varies according to the punishment decreed for each one, or if the intensity remains the same, it does not inflict upon all the same pain." [45] As to the opinion of some, which was also held by Chrysostom, that the lost may at times experience a mitigation of their sufferings, he says that he neither approves nor rejects it.[46]

He also counteracted the view that all Christians, at least, can be practically certain of their final salvation, even if they lead bad lives. Neither baptism, nor the Eucharist, nor anything else will avail them aught, unless their lives be such as God demands of His faithful servants. For some time he seems to have been inclined to look for a Millennium before the end of the world, but in his later years he rejected Millennarianism altogether. He then interpreted the thousand years, spoken of by St. John in the Apocalypse, as the duration of the Church here on earth, although he was not without misgivings about the correctness of this interpretation. On the resurrection, the two judgments, and the joys of heaven, he

[43] De Civ. Dei, 21, 23.
[44] Ibid. 21, 3, 1.
[45] Ibid. 21, 16.
[46] Enchir. 112.

held practically the same as we do to-day. The identical body which was dissolved in death shall rise again; it shall be spiritualized, as is taught by St. Paul, but it will always remain a material body. The final judgment lasts only an instant, and thereafter eternal life or everlasting pain, according to each one's deserts.

These clear expositions stemmed the tide of Origenistic speculations in the West, and during the remainder of the Patristic age they were made the basis of sermons and ascetical instructions. Some details were still further developed, but on the whole eschatology remained where Augustine had left it. And as he left it, so do we find it to-day; except that some points have been defined which he defended simply as contained in tradition and Holy Scripture.

A word may here be added about the doctrine of the Communion of Saints. The term found its way into the Symbol only in later days, but the truth for which it stands was well understood and firmly believed in the earliest times. It is necessarily implied in the veneration of the blessed in heaven and the suffrages for the poor souls in purgatory. For it is only because the faithful, no matter where they are, constitute one body of which Christ is the head, that they can pray for and assist one another. This idea was frequently brought out by the writers of the early centuries. Thus Augustine says: "Neither are the souls of the faithful departed separated from the Church, which is even now the kingdom of Christ." [47] "You know and you acknowledge and you understand that our Head is Christ; we are the body of that Head. We alone? And not rather also those who have gone before us? All the just, even from the beginning of time, have Christ as their Head." [48]

[47] De Civ. Dei, 20, 9.

[48] Enar. in Ps. 36; Ser. 3, 4.

CHAPTER XXXI

SOME SUPPLEMENTARY REMARKS ON SUBJECTS DEALT WITH IN THE PRECEDING CHAPTERS[1]

It must have been noticed by the reader that, with the sole exception of Christology, the development of doctrine came practically to a standstill after the first quarter of the fifth century. This is only partly accounted for by the far-reaching results achieved by St. Augustine. He left many a point of doctrine still capable of further development, and under normal conditions his patient and successful labors should have acted as a powerful incentive in the case of his successors to work along similar lines. But unfortunately, during the three centuries that followed his death, conditions were not normal. The East was disrupted by protracted and violent disputes on account of the Nestorian, Eutychian, and Monothelite heresies, which made the quiet study of other doctrines almost impossible. The West, on the other hand, was during this same period of time constantly harassed by the devastating incursion of barbarian tribes from the North, so that it was even a matter of the greatest difficulty to preserve what had been accomplished by the great men of the past. The Church of Africa, which had figured so largely in the promotion of doctrinal development, was almost ruined by the fierce persecutions of the Arian Vandals, whilst that of Italy, Spain, and Gaul barely escaped a similar fate at the hands of the Ostrogoths, the Visigoths, and the Franks. Religion and learning found a comparatively safe retreat only within the walls of monasteries, which since the middle of the fourth century had begun to cover Southern Europe. It was a time when the sword supplanted the pen, and the Church had to begin anew her work of evangelizing the Gentiles. Under these conditions there

[1] Cfr. Tixeront, H. D. III, 185–265, 302–420.

was little opportunity of developing the Gospel message.

However these times were not altogether sterile. Men like Fulgentius, Ferrandus, Cassiodorus, Cæsarius, Ildephonsus, Isidore, and Venerable Bede, carefully preserved and even somewhat expanded the precious heirloom of the past in the Western Church; whilst in the East, Cyril, Theodoret, Maximus, Nilus, Isidore of Pelusium, and others, found time to set down their views on points of doctrine not directly connected with the Christological controversy. And fortunately, too, during these times of stress and strain the Church was blessed with a succession of great Popes, Celestine, Leo, Martin, Agatho, and Gregory, who wielded the scepter of their Apostolic authority with no uncertain hand, and at the same time were an inspiration to others in the common duty of defending and explaining the faith. Hence some supplementary remarks must here be made in reference to subjects that have been more carefully treated in connection with the work of the fourth century writers. This will give us a better perspective of the results achieved.

These remarks, however, must necessarily be very brief, and so there is no need of dividing the chapter into sections; still for clearness' sake we will set down a number of points, indicating under each what appears to be of greater importance.

1°. *Anthropology.*— On this subject there was already some difference of views among the fourth-century writers, as was indicated in a previous chapter. All were indeed agreed that man was created by God, and, excepting Didymus and Victorinus, also that there is only one soul in man; but on the further question, whether individual souls are produced by a creative act of God or come *ex traduce seminis,* opinions differed. Gregory of Nazianzus, Hilary, Ambrose, and Jerome, taught Creationism very definitely; whilst Didymus, Epiphanius, and Augustine, did not know what to think. During the following centuries Eastern writers generally held that each individual soul is created by God at the moment of its union with the body, but among the Latins there was considerable difference of opinion. Thus Cassiodorus, Genna-

dius, Cassian, and the Semi-Pelagians generally, were Creationists; while Fulgentius, Gregory, Ildephonsus, declared the soul's origin to be unknown, but favored Traducianism. Cassiodorus thus defines the soul: "Anima hominis est a Deo creata, spiritalis, propriaque substantia, sui corporis vivificatrix, rationalis quidem et immortalis, sed in bonum malumque convertibilis."[2] Practically the same definition is given by Isidore of Seville, except that he substitutes for "a Deo creata," "habens ignotam originem." The view of Faustus and Gennadius, that the soul is corporeal, because quantitatively localized, was immediately rejected by all.

2°. *Grace.*— In the West the decisions of Orange met with a general acceptance. All subsequent writers admit the necessity of grace, both for the beginning and perfecting of salutary actions; but at the same time they insist also on free human coöperation. "The supernal goodness," writes Gregory, "first acts in us without us, so that, when our own free will follows the impulse, He may accomplish together with us the good which we desire; which good, nevertheless, on account of the grace imparted, He so rewards in the last judgment as if it had been produced by us alone."[3] On predestination, the fate of unbaptized children, and the necessity of good works for salvation, the views of Augustine were commonly followed. Thus Isidore uses strictly Augustinian terms when he writes: "Grace is not conferred on account of any previous merits, but solely in consequence of the divine will. Nor is any one saved or lost, chosen or rejected, except in accordance with God's decree of predestination, who is just in reference to the reprobate and merciful in regard to the elect."[4] The number of the elect was generally looked upon as small.

The Eastern writers were little influenced by the discussions on the subject of grace that were finally terminated by the synod of Orange. They simply continued the teaching of their great fourth-century Fathers. As a general rule, they strongly emphasized the power of unaided nature to practice natural virtues, although they were at the same time careful

[2] De Anima, 2.
[3] Moral. 16, 30.
[4] Differ. 2, 19.

to note that salvation is impossible without the grace of God. Their position is perhaps best indicated by St. Cyril, when he writes: "There is one faith that depends on us, and another that is the gift of God. It belongs to us to begin the good work, to place all our trust and faith in God; and it belongs to the grace of God to give us perseverance in good and strength to accomplish." [5] Or as St. Nilus words it: "Although without God's help we can accomplish nothing, yet it is our duty to make a good choice and to strive after good, whilst it is the part of God to give our desires their realization." [6] They do not ascribe the bestowal of grace or the attainment of salvation to merely natural merit in any sense, yet they place a much stronger emphasis on the necessity of a person's good disposition antecedent to the divine help than do their Latin contemporaries. Still this does not prevent them from saying with Cyril: "It is not in the power of those who wish to live holily to do so in effect, unless they be called." [7]

3°. *Original Sin.*— The respective position of the Eastern and Western writers during this period with regard to original sin was practically the same as that in reference to grace. The West was strongly influenced by the condemnation of Pelagianism, and readily fell in with the views of Augustine; whilst the East seemed little aware of the fact that an authoritative decision had been given in the matter. Not that they were in any way infected with the Pelagian heresy, but they hardly treated the subject except in a casual way, as had been done by their Fathers of the fourth century. Some of them, like Cyril of Alexandria, Abbot Maximus, and Proclus of Constantinople, state quite plainly that "the heart of all men has been defiled by transgression in Adam," that "through Adam we have all subscribed to sin," that "Christ alone is free from the inherited stain"; yet others, like Theodoret of Cyrus, and Isidore of Pelusium, without actually denying the doctrine of original sin, dwell almost exclusively on the physical evils that have come to us through the fall of our first parents. Hence although the Council of Ephesus, in its letter to Pope Celestine,

[5] In Luc. 17, 5.
[6] Ep. 4, 15.
[7] In Luc. 13, 23.

subscribed to the sentence of Zozimus against the Pelagians, it appears that the Eastern writers in general failed to appreciate the position taken by the West.

4°. *Soteriology.*— The three different theories on the subject of redemption, which, as was stated in a previous chapter, were current during the fourth century, continued to be held by the writers of this period; with the difference, however, that a decided preference was given to the Realistic or Substitution Theory. The idea that a ransom had been paid to Satan was rejected by all, though preachers still emphasized the fact that, by his unjust proceedings against Christ, Satan had lost his power over the fallen race. Cyril in the East and Leo in the West strongly favored the Mystical Theory, conceiving it as more or less necessary that the corruption of fallen nature should have been healed by its physical contact with the Godhead in Christ. However along with this, they also endorsed the more common view, that "if Christ had not died for us, we should not have been saved"; or as Leo expressed it: "The passion of Christ contains the mystery of our salvation." The Incarnation as such was not sufficient for our redemption. St. Cyril develops this in detail, and his view continues to be that of the Greek Church. These writers also point out that no created being could have redeemed man: a God-Man was required to give condign satisfaction to God's offended Majesty. Christ's satisfaction, however, is not only condign, but also superabundant; for whatever He did or suffered had an infinite moral value.

5°. *Ecclesiology.*— As the Fathers of Chalcedon ascribed the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed to the Second General Council, this symbol was soon after received into the liturgy. In it occurs the phrase: We believe "in One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church." This may be said to represent, in general outline, the ecclesiological teaching of the period with which we are now concerned. As there is only one baptism, and one faith, the members of the Church are necessarily united into one body; and therefore the Church is One. Such was the view taken of it in the East, where the unity of government was ordinarily but little emphasized; whereas in the

West greater insistence was placed upon the unity that arises from due subjection of the faithful to a divinely constituted authority. This one Church was destined by Christ to embrace all mankind, and does so even now to a large extent; hence she is also Catholic, and outside her pale there is no salvation. Founded for the very purpose of sanctifying her members, she is necessarily Holy; yet this holiness does not mean that she is exclusively made up of the just, for she is a "corpus mixtum"; but rather that she offers to every one of her children efficacious means of salvation. Such the Church has been from the days of the Apostles, who preached the same faith, administered the same sacraments, and whose work is continued by the priesthood of to-day; consequently she is truly Apostolic.

All this, as will be readily noticed, marks no advance over the teaching of the fourth-century Fathers. Their views on the Church of Christ are preserved, but there is no attempt to lengthen the lines of development. In the West there was no need of it, as Augustine had practically accomplished the work at the beginning of the fifth century; but in the East there was both need and opportunity, at least of appropriating the clearer views of their Western contemporaries. And the reason why it was not done arose to a great extent from the subserviency of the episcopate to the secular power. Although individual bishops protested that they held their power from God, that lay persons might not presume to pass judgment upon them, that even the dignity of princes was inferior to theirs, yet as a body they weakly submitted to the arrogance of dogmatizing emperors, who, in not few instances, summoned and dissolved local synods without anybody's leave, accepted or rejected conciliar decisions as they saw fit, issued professions of faith as the spirit moved them, and acted in every way as if they were invested with supreme authority in the Church of Christ. By an unfortunate concession acquiesced in by the Councils of Constantinople and Chalcedon, although persistently opposed by the Popes, the Patriarch of Constantinople obtained the first place after the Bishop of Rome, and as he was frequently little more than a court-prelate, the emperors had a free hand.

This not only prepared the way for a final schism, but also sapped the vitality of Eastern Christianity while still in union with the Church of Christ.

However, with all this secularizing tendency, the East never ceased during these troublous times to acknowledge the Primacy of the Apostolic See. The Roman Church was to bishops and people the Church of Peter, and Peter was by all of them considered as the Rock upon which the Church was built. Theodoret, Flavian, John Talaias, and even Nestorius, Eutyches, and Sergius, appealed to the Popes as the highest authority in matters of doctrine and Church government; and no Patriarch of Constantinople ever regarded himself as firmly established in his see unless his election were ratified and confirmed by the Bishop of Rome. Hence there can be no doubt that during these centuries the entire Eastern Church recognized the Primacy of Rome, even if through self-interest many a bishop thrust it aside at critical moments. Celestine, Leo, Hormisdas, and Agatho were perfectly cognizant of this when they dictated the faith to Eastern Councils; and, as Eastern historians themselves testify, no one ever thought that in pursuing this course the Popes went beyond the legitimate extent of their authority.

In the West, during these same centuries, the Primacy of Rome was universally acknowledged; and this even notwithstanding the fact that, in opposition to the Fifth General Council and to Pope Vigilius, some Western provinces withdrew for a time from communion with Rome. Peter was believed to have been constituted by Christ as the foundation and head of the universal Church, her master and her infallible teacher, and Peter continued to live and teach in his successors. Hence in questions of doctrine and general discipline the decisions of the Pope were received as final, and his decretals had the same force as the canons of councils. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Maximus of Turin, Peter Chrysologus, and Venerable Bede bear witness to this; while Leo and Gregory frequently enlarge upon the authority of the Roman See as a fact that is understood and acknowledged by all.

6°. *The Sacraments.*— Sacramental theology was during

this period retarded in its development rather than advanced. This was largely owing to Isidore of Seville, who set aside the Augustinian definition of the sacraments as efficacious signs and reverted to the antiquated notion of mysteries. Speaking of the three sacraments of initiation, he says: "They are called sacraments because under the cover of corporeal things the divine virtue effects in a hidden manner the secret and sacred operations of salvation, which they were intended to confer."[8] The external rite is indeed a sign, and is accompanied by a spiritual effect in the soul, but its symbolic significance is pushed into the background. Instead of manifesting, it is intended to hide the "secret and sacred operations" of the Holy Spirit. Isidore's views were adopted by many subsequent writers, especially during the ninth century. The number of the sacraments, in so far as the use of the term itself came in question, was not yet determined. Isidore applies the term to baptism, confirmation, and the Eucharist; Leo designates holy orders as the "sacramenta sacerdotii," and Salvianus of Marseilles calls matrimony the "connubii sacramenta." In the East the Pseudo-Areopagite gave a list of six sacraments or mysteries; baptism, confirmation, the Eucharist, orders, monastic profession, and funeral rites. This list was often repeated by subsequent writers. Hence although, as was pointed out in a previous chapter, the seven religious rites, now exclusively designated as sacraments, were universally regarded as essential to the Christian religion, they were not yet gathered under one specific term which set them apart from other and somewhat similar rites.

In regard to the validity of the sacraments when administered by heretics there was still some confusion in the different churches. However, excepting holy orders, the mere fact of heresy by itself was hardly anywhere considered as invalidating the sacramental rite. All depended on the kind of heresy in which the sacraments were conferred. Thus whenever baptism was administered in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, it was not repeated either

[8] De Corpore et Sanguine Domini, 8.

in the East or the West; unless, indeed, the doctrine of the Trinity was denied by the heretics in question. Hence converts from heresy were usually reconciled by a simple imposition of hands *in poenitentiam,* though this was in some places accompanied by an unction with holy chrism. From this latter ceremony it has sometimes been inferred that confirmation was repeated, but the evidence is rather in favor of the contrary view.

Baptism and confirmation were still conferred on the same occasion; the former by a triple immersion which was accompanied by an invocation of the Blessed Trinity, and the latter by the imposition of hands and the anointing of the forehead with blessed chrism. For confirmation the *Egyptian Church Constitutions* give the formula: "I anoint thee through God the Father Almighty, and Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit."

The Holy Eucharist was to all the sacrament of the body and blood of Christ. Tixeront sums up the teaching of the Eastern Church at this time as follows: (1) In the Eucharist we receive really and truly the body and blood of Jesus Christ. (2) That body and blood are there through the efficacy either of the words of institution, or of the epiclesis, or of both. (3) Those words, or the Holy Spirit whom they invoke, produce in the oblata a μεταβολή (change), the mystery of which St. Cyril of Jerusalem and St. Gregory of Nyssa endeavored to explain. (4) The Eucharistic liturgy constitutes a sacrifice. (5) The reception of the Eucharist washes away our sins, unites us to God, and implants in our bodies a germ of life and immortality.[9]

With two slight modifications, this summary also represents the Western teaching on the Eucharist at the time. These two modifications are in reference to the epiclesis and the manner in which the Real Presence was considered. Although the epiclesis occurs in some Western liturgies, especially in those of the Gallican type, nevertheless the common teaching was that the change in the oblata must be attributed to the words of institution. Then as regards the Real Presence, this was held

[9] H. D. III, 226.

just as firmly in the West as in the East, but there was at work a tendency to emphasize the spiritual aspect of the Eucharist. It is not the mere eating of Christ's body and the drinking of His blood that profits unto salvation, but the becoming united with Him through faith and charity of which the Eucharist is a symbol. In this Augustine's influence is discernible, but there is nowhere a trace of a merely symbolic conception.[10]

Penance experienced a considerable transformation during this period, but wholly along disciplinary lines, and so it need not detain us here. The principle that grievous sins must be confessed in order to obtain forgiveness was in vigor everywhere, as indeed it had been from the beginning of Christianity. Nor did anyone question the traditional belief that this forgiveness was effected through the ministration of the Church. From the fifth century forward, public penance became less frequent, although it was still the rule for sins that caused great scandal. The duty of hearing confessions devolved more and more upon simple priests, and especially upon monks. Considerable attention was given to the classification of sins as venial and mortal, of which St. Cæsarius supplies us with the following example: "Although the Apostle mentions many capital sins, nevertheless, so as not to give cause for despair, we shall briefly enumerate which they are: sacrilege, homicide, adultery, false witness, theft, rapine, pride, envy, avarice; and, if it lasts for a long time, anger; also drunkenness if very great: these are accounted among their number." [11] Then turning his attention to venial sins, he says: "What sins are slight, although known to all, still it is necessary that we should mention a few of them. As often as one takes more food or drink than is required, he must understand that it is a slight sin; and also when one speaks more than is becoming, or is unduly silent." [12] Lists of this kind soon found their way into the so-called *Penitentials,* or books intended for the guidance of the confessor in determining the penance that was to be enjoined for the different sins. Needless to say, this

[10] Cfr. Pourrat, Teaching of the Fathers on the Real Presence, 38 sqq.

[11] Serm. 104, 2.

[12] Ibid. 3.

penance was very severe as compared to our modern practice.

Extreme unction is rather frequently mentioned, both in the East and West. It is recommended as being in conformity with the direction of St. James to anoint the sick. A little later St. Boniface directed his missionary priests not to go on a journey "without the chrism, the blessed oil, and the Eucharist," so that they might be always ready to minister to the spiritual needs of the faithful.[13]

Holy orders are spoken of in detail by the Pseudo-Areopagite, who mentions that the three higher orders are conferred by imposition of hands, and that in the consecration of a bishop the Holy Scriptures are held open over the head of the candidate. The Constitutions of the Egyptian Church give the prayers that accompany the imposition of hands. Besides the three higher orders there are those of the subdeacon and readers, but in conferring these the bishop simply recites a prayer and hands the book of the Epistles to the candidates. The same five orders are also mentioned by John Damascene, and they are found in the Greek Church to-day. For the Western Church similar ceremonies are prescribed in the *Statuta Ecclesiae Antiqua,* which, however, enumerate nine orders. To the three major and four minor orders, as we have them at present, is added that of psalmists, whilst bishops and priests are counted separately.

In the East it was quite a common practice during these centuries to reordain those who had received their ordination from heretical bishops, but up to the sixth century this was not done in the West. About that time, however, the custom was also introduced in some Western countries, notably in Britain, through the ruling of Theodore of Canterbury who before his elevation to that see was a Cilician monk. Similarly "the ordinations made by the intruded Pope Constantine in 768 were probably declared null. At all events, it is certain that Pope Sergius III (904–911), yielding to a sentiment of mean revenge, had the ordinations made by Pope Formosus repeated." [14]

[13] Statuta, 29, P. L. 89, 823.

[14] Cfr. Pourrat, Theology of the Sacraments, 157.

Matrimony was regarded by all as a state which Christ had sanctified by His presence at the marriage feast in Cana, and which, in consequence, the Church must also sanctify. In the West it was sometimes spoken of as a sacrament, but there is nothing definite to indicate explicitly that this term was taken in the strict sense. With regard to its permanency there were different views. The Eastern Church allowed absolute divorce on account of adultery, but only in favor of the husband. The Western Church, on the other hand, stood firm for absolute indissolubility, until Theodore of Canterbury introduced the Greek practice into Britain. From there it spread to some parts of Northern France, but it was vigorously opposed by Rome and gradually disappeared. Disparity of religion, affinity arising from baptism, consanguinity, rape, and sponsalia were some of the impediments that made marriage invalid.

These few remarks on the principal topics of general theology, as it is found in the writings that belong to the last three centuries of the Patristic age, might be very fittingly concluded by a brief analysis of the writings of St. John Damascene, who gave Greek theology the form which it has retained till the present time. However the compendious nature of this book makes it advisable not to attempt anything so pretentious. Nor is there real need of it as far as the demands of the History of Dogmas go. For John Damascene, although a Doctor of the Church, was not an original writer; he was a compiler and to some extent a systematizer. He faithfully gathered together what was contained in the writings of his predecessors, and then reproduced it in his *Sources of Knowledge* as a fairly compact system of theological teaching. Moreover the work which made him justly famous, his defense of the veneration of images, will be considered in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE IMAGE CONTROVERSY: THE SEVENTH GENERAL COUNCIL[1]

By images, in this connection, are understood representations of our Blessed Saviour, of angels, and of saints, whether in painting, mosaic, or statuary. In regard to them two things must be clearly distinguished: use and veneration. The use of images may be of various kinds: (a) for decorative purposes, whether in churches or out of them; (b) for instruction, in so far as they are a concrete representation of past events or mysteries of the faith; (c) for the promotion of piety, in as much as by their appeal to the heart they draw the beholder to God. Veneration consists in the outward manifestation of respect and reverence, and as such it may be absolute or relative. It is absolute when it terminates at the object towards which it is proximately directed; it is relative when it reaches beyond the immediate object and terminates at a prototype. The veneration of images is always relative, that is, it passes on to the person represented by the image. Again, this relative veneration may be an act of divine worship or of simple respect and reverence due to creatures, according as the image represents a divine or a created person. In the former case it is called adoration, in the latter it is now commonly designated by the generic term of veneration, although in past ages the term adoration, taken in a wider sense as equivalent to veneration, was quite frequently used.

The image controversy extended both to the East and the

[1] Cfr. Hefele, History of the Councils, V, 342–391; Tixeront, H. D. III, 420–467; Funk, Kirchengeschichtliche Abhandlungen, I; Wilpert, Die Malereien in den Katakomben Roms; Liell, Die Darstellungen der allerseligsten Jungfrau und Gottesgebaererin Maria auf den Kunstdenkmaelern in den Katakomben; McGinnis, The Communion of Saints, 258–327.

West, but under different aspects. In the East it involved not only the veneration but also the use of images, whereas in the West it was restricted to veneration only, no objection being made to the use of images even in churches.

A — Historical Aspect of the Question

It is historically certain that the Church made use of images from the earliest years of her existence. This appears to evidence from ancient writers and from discoveries made in the Catacombs. Nor was she at all particular about the objects represented, provided they bore some relation to persons or events or mysteries connected with the faith. They were taken indifferently from the Old and New Testament, or even from the lives of the saints. Thus in the Catacombs are found representatives of Noe and the Deluge, of Daniel in the lion's den, of Moses striking the rock, of the Good Shepherd, of the wise and foolish virgins, of the vine and the branches. There are images of the Saviour, of the Mother and Child, and of the martyrs of the faith. Baptism, the Eucharist, and other liturgical subjects are represented, either in painting or done in mosaic. Even a bronze statue of Sts. Peter and Paul, dating, it is commonly believed, from the second century, is among the objects unearthed from beneath the wreckage of ancient Rome.[2] Tertullian mentions that it was quite common to have images of the Good Shepherd engraven on the sacred vessels used in the liturgical service.[3]

Most of these representations date from times of persecution, when the Church was still forced to shun the light of day, and was therefore much restricted in developing the solemnity of her worship. After she had been set free by Constantine and was allowed to erect her magnificent basilicas, she had no hesitation about adorning their walls with the pictured story of her faith and worship, and so to assist the unlettered in realizing more intimately the full import of her teaching. Hence St. Basil, while delivering a panegyric on St. Barlaam, who had been martyred for the faith, thus appeals to the

[2] McGinnis, op. cit. 275.

[3] De Pudic. 7, 10.

artists for an exercise of their skill in the saint's honor: "Arise, O distinguished artists: perfect this poor word picture of the martyr. With deft stroke depict in vivid color the triumphs of this valiant athlete. Let him stand forth to the gaze a victorious champion. On your storied canvas depict also Christ, the Head of the martyrs." [4]

But whilst the common view and practice thus undoubtedly favored the use of images, there were not wanting some who thought it proper to raise their voices in protest. A few of them, like Tertullian and Clement of Alexandria, seemed to think that the Old Testament prohibition applied also to the New Dispensation, and so they would do away with all images; whilst others, among them Minutius Felix and Lactantius, did not object to images as such but only to those that represented God in human guise. Frequently, too, the Synod of Elvira in Spain, held about 305, is adduced as opposed to the use of images. It decreed "that pictures should not be painted in churches, and that objects which are worshiped and adored must not be painted on walls." [5] But whether this decree was inspired by opposition to the use of images or by the desire to correct abuses that had crept in is not altogether clear. At all events, there is no record of any general Church legislation on this matter, and yet the use of images was practically universal. Hence the necessary inference is that the Church considered it to be in no way opposed to the purity of her faith.

In regard to the veneration of images the practice of the early Church is less firmly established. The fact that images of our Blessed Saviour and His Holy Mother are found in the earliest places of worship may indeed well imply that some kind of veneration was paid them, and many modern writers maintain this; but the inference is perhaps not altogether certain. Though the Church even then approved of image veneration in principle as she does now, circumstances were such that one would hardly expect her to have encouraged it in practice. For large numbers of her children were converts

[4] Orat. in Barlaam, 3.

[5] Mansi, 2, 11; cfr. Funk, op. cit. I, 346–352.

from paganism, whose memories were still filled with recollections of idol-worship, and hence she might well fear that the veneration of images would be misunderstood or lead to abuse. Hence if the practice obtained at all, it is not likely to have been very common.

But however the matter may stand in this regard, it is quite certain that the Church regarded the veneration of images to be in perfect conformity with her belief. For as soon as conditions had sufficiently changed to make the practice safe, she allowed it to grow up without a word of protest. Scarcely half a century after she had been liberated by Constantine, Julian the Apostate reproached the Christians with adoring the wood of the cross and the painted images on the walls of their houses, which obviously supposes veneration of some kind.[6] About the same time Asterius of Amasea describes pictures that represented St. Euphemia, and adds that the cross was adored by Christian worshipers.[7] A century later, Theodoret of Cyrus refers to the adoration of the cross as a common practice among Greeks and Barbarians.[8] And similar testimonies are found in the works of contemporary Western writers.

Nor do these writers only bear witness to the fact, but they also explain the principle. Thus Cyril of Alexandria writes in the first part of the fifth century: "Though we make images of saintly men, we do not venerate them as gods, but merely wish to be inspired by their example to imitate them. But the image of Christ we make in order to fire our hearts with love for Him. Assuredly we do not adore a perishable image or the likeness of a perishable man. But since God, without changing Himself, condescended to become man, we represent Him as a man, though we are well aware that He is by nature God. We do not, therefore, call the image God, but we know that He whom it represents is God." [9]

A century later, the deacon Rusticus, nephew of Pope Vigilius, thus argues against the Monophysites: "We adore

[6] Cyril Alexand. Cont. Jul. 6; P. G. 48, 826.
[7] In Laud. S. Euphem. P. G. 40, 337.
[8] Graec. Aff. Curat. 6.
[9] In Ps. 113, 16.

the cross and through it Him whose cross it is; however we do not adore the cross along with Christ." [10] It is a divine worship, but only relative. It does not have the material cross for its object, but Christ who suffered on the cross for the redemption of the world. It is not the wood that is adored, nor the mere form of the cross, but the crucified God-Man who sanctified the wood of the cross by the outpouring of His blood. This was even more clearly explained by Leontius of Neapolis who wrote a few years later. "When the two parts of the cross are united," he says, "I adore it, because of Christ who was crucified thereon; when they are separated, I cast them aside and burn them. When we, the sons of Christians, adore the cross, we do not worship the substance of the wood; but we consider it as the seal and signature of Christ: through it we salute and adore Him who was crucified on it. Thus also, when we Christians possess and salute an image of Christ, or of an Apostle, or of a martyr, we think of Christ or His martyr." [11] Not even St. Thomas could have given a clearer or more orthodox exposition.

As is evident from the last part of the above citation, not only the adoration of the cross, but also the veneration of images representing saints was a well established practice towards the end of the sixth century, when Leontius wrote in its defense against those who charged the Christians with idolatry. This had grown up rather slowly, but there are records of it about a century earlier. Thus Theodoret relates that in Rome the Christians placed statuettes of Simon Stylites in the vestibules of their houses in order to secure the saint's protection.[12] When Fortunatus, in the early part of the sixth century, was suffering from a disease of the eyes, he was cured by using oil from a lamp that was kept burning before an image of St. Martin in one of the churches of Ravenna.[13] A similar practice grew up in the East, and by the beginning of the seventh century was firmly established in Christian communities. It is recorded by Maximus the Confessor how he and his companions, when gathered at a conference, fell on

[10] Cont. Acephal.; P. G. 67, 1218.
[11] Mansi, 13, 44–53.
[12] Hist. Relig. 26; P. G. 82.
[13] De Vita Mart. 6, 690.

their knees and kissed the holy Gospels, the venerable cross, and the image of our Lord and His Blessed Mother.[14]

Hence it was not only the common people, the simple and unlettered, but also priests and bishops, men well versed in Scripture and theology, who paid homage and religious veneration to the images of the saints. They understood perfectly well that the material object was not deserving of reverence, but through it they reverenced the saint whom it was intended to represent. As Leontius of Neapolis expressed it: "When we Christians possess and salute an image of Christ, or of an Apostle, or of a martyr, we think of Christ or His martyr." Yet it is quite possible that here and there abuses crept in. Some of the more simple might at times fail to distinguish between the representation and the person represented; others, again, though well understanding the nature of the cult, might nevertheless carry it to extremes, pinning their faith to pictures and statues and forgetting about the more solemn obligations of their religion: but as every good gift of God may be and is at times abused, the Church in spite of all these casual abuses never felt herself called upon to oppose the growing practice of venerating the images of God's saints. It was from other quarters that opposition finally came.

B — The Iconoclast Heresy

It appears that the first opposition to images and their veneration had its origin at Damascus in Syria, where the Caliph, instigated, it is said, by a Jewish magician, ordered the destruction of all paintings and statues venerated by his Christian subjects. His orders were immediately carried out by the Jewish and Mohammedan populace, who even went to such lengths as to whitewash the walls of the churches so as to blot out the images depicted thereon. However the storm in Syria was shortlived, owing to the death of the Caliph. His successor looked at the matter in a different light.

Then a similar storm broke out in the Eastern Empire. The originators were a number of discontented bishops, led

[14] P. G. 90, 156.

by Constantine of Nacolia, Thomas of Claudiopolis, and Theodosius of Ephesus, who prepared the way for the violent measures of Leo the Isaurian. Leo, who was but an ignorant soldier clad in royal purple, gave a willing ear to the suggestion of these bishops. The idea of suppressing this recrudescence of pagan idolatry, as the matter was represented to him, agreed well with his general plan of reforming Church and State. Hence in the year 726, he issued a decree ordering the removal of all holy images wherever found. This, however, met with considerable opposition. At Constantinople some of his officers, who tried to destroy an image of Christ in the imperial palace, were killed by the people. In Greece and the Cyclades islands a formal revolt broke out, and all Italy took forcible measures to frustrate the Emperor's designs. This made him hesitate for a while, but in 730 he deposed the Patriarch Germanus, whom he had failed to terrify into submission, and replaced him by Anastasius. This latter soon became a pliant tool of the government, and through his intervention most of the Eastern bishops were won over to the Emperor's views.

But the West remained firm in its opposition. Gregory II, whilst trying his best to preserve political union with Constantinople, threatened Anastasius with deposition unless he changed his course, and at the same time he wrote several letters to the Emperor trying to bring him to a saner state of mind. His successor, Gregory III, was equally firm, and after several vain efforts to come to an understanding with Leo, he convoked a synod at Rome (731), by which the following declaration was drawn up: "If any one hereafter, contemning those who follow the ancient custom of the Apostolic Church, is found to be an assaulter, destroyer, profaner, or blasphemer of the veneration of sacred images, to wit: Of God and our Lord Jesus Christ, of His Holy Mother the immaculate and glorious ever Virgin Mary, of the blessed Apostles and of all the saints, let him be debarred from the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, or be separated from the unity and communion of the whole Church." [15] The

[15] Lib. Pontif. I, 146.

Emperor's answer to this bold decree was a strong fleet, sent to subdue Italy by force; but it was wrecked in the Adriatic Sea, and so Italy continued in its opposition.

Already some years before this an able defender of the veneration of images had arisen in the East, who was soon looked up to as the champion of orthodoxy in every part of the Christian world. This was John Damascene. He wrote three different treatises on the subject (726-731), in which he explained the nature of the veneration of images and showed that it was in perfect accord with Christian principles. The prohibition of the Old Testament, touching this matter, he set aside as affecting only the Jews. Then, pointing out how this created world is an image of the Creator, how the Old Testament is an image of the New, how the Son is the Image of the Father, he showed from the nature of image-veneration itself, that, so far from being idolatrous, it contributes greatly to the honor and glory of God.

It is true, he says, these images are material and created things, but the question is precisely, whether material and created things cannot be an object of veneration. Are not the body and the blood of the Saviour created? Yet they are objects of adoration. Are not the chalices and other consecrated vessels material? Yet they are objects of veneration. Why, then, not the cross and images?

Furthermore, the veneration of the cross and of images is not absolute; it is only relative. It is not directed to the material objects, but to the persons represented. This fundamental principle was already proclaimed by St. Basil, who wrote: "The honor paid to images passes over to the prototype."

Again, one must distinguish between adoration in a strict sense and in a wider sense. The former is an act of divine worship, and as such can be directed only to a divine person, or, in a relative sense, to things in some special way consecrated by their intimate connection with the Godhead. The latter is simply a testification of respect and honor, on account of some created excellence, and may therefore be paid to persons or their representations without the least trace of idolatry. This

veneration is religious, when the excellence that calls it forth is of a religious nature; it is civil, when that excellence is merely natural. Hence if on account of some natural excellence, whether of person or position, civil veneration may be paid to masters, princes, and emperors, as all admit; why, on account of a higher excellence, may not religious veneration be paid to the saints of God, whether directly or through their images?

Add to this, that, aside from their veneration, images are very useful to the people: they are the books of the illiterate, reminders of God's goodness and the Saviour's mercy, preachers of holy lives, and channels of divine grace; hence to destroy them is as cruel as it is impious. And finally, whatever be the religious aspect of the question, it is certainly not for the Emperor to mix himself up with matters that lie beyond his jurisdiction: he has been appointed to rule the State, not to dominate over the Church of God.[16]

Leo died on June 18, 740, and was succeeded by his son, Constantine V, surnamed Copronymous. Owing to political troubles, Constantine allowed matters to rest until 753, when he thought himself strong enough to put his father's designs into execution. For this purpose he convened a council at Constantinople, at which, however, neither the Patriarchs of Antioch, Jerusalem, and Alexandria, nor the Pope were represented. It was presided over by the Iconoclast Theodosius of Ephesus, son of the former Emperor Tiberius II. The Acts of this synod, preserved by the Seventh General Council, give the following reasons for the condemnation of images:

1°. It is impossible to paint the image of Jesus Christ: because the artist either pretends to represent the God-Man, and then he circumscribes the divinity and confounds the natures, and thereby becomes a Monophysite; or he wishes to represent only the humanity, and then he divides the natures, and by so doing he becomes a Nestorian. Obviously those who venerate these images share in the one or the other heresy. The only true image of the Saviour, given us by Himself, is the Eucharist: let the faithful adore this.

[16] P. G. 94, 1232–1420.

2°. So, too, is it impossible to represent the Godhead, or any one of the three divine persons. Such representations all suppose that God is material and finite, which is obviously heretical.

3°. Images of the Virgin, and of the saints generally, are simply idols, and as such they cannot be tolerated among Christians: to venerate them is to practice idolatry.

4°. Furthermore, even if it were not idolatry, still it would not be right; for since the saints are with God, it would be an impious attempt to prolong their stay on earth by means of images and to represent their glorious persons by such vile matter.

5°. Finally, the veneration of images is evidently against the teaching of Holy Scripture and the Fathers.[17]

These several reasons adduced against the use and veneration of images are followed by a number of anathematisms, summing up the doctrine of the synod and condemning such persons as Germanus, the former patriarch of Constantinople, George of Cyrus, and above all Mansour, by which opprobrious epithet they designated John Damascene. Attention is also called to the lawfulness of the invocation of Holy Mary and of the other saints, so as to counteract extreme measures in this regard.

When the synod was over, the work of destruction began. Churches were profaned, images and statues were destroyed wherever found, and bishops, priests, and even the laity were required to subscribe the decisions of the synod. Most of the secular clergy yielded, but no impression could be made on the monks. They stood up bravely for the teaching and practice of the Church, ready to endure exile, torture, and death. The persecution reached its height in 761, when it almost looked as if the days of Diocletian had returned. Even Constantine, the original instigator of the whole trouble, fell a victim to the fury of the imperial tyrant. It was, however, mostly confined to the East, where it was kept up till the Emperor's death in 775.

[17] Mansi, 13, 208–356.

C — The Seventh General Council

During the short reign of Leo IV (775–780), who had succeeded Constantine Copronymus, the persecution practically ceased; and when on his death the Empress Irene was appointed regent for her infant son, the work of restoration commenced. The new patriarch, Tarasius, was a staunch defender of image veneration and made a strenuous effort to have the dispute finally settled by a general council. The Pope and the Empress both favored the patriarch's proposal, and after several futile attempts to hold the sessions at Constantinople, it was finally decided to convoke the council at Nicæa. There, on the 24th of September, 787, about 330 bishops convened, under the presidency of Tarasius, the Pope being represented by the Archpriest Peter and the Abbot Peter. Two monks, John and Thomas, acted as representatives of the Eastern patriarchs, who, on account of the Arab invasion, were unable to communicate with Constantinople.

Eight sessions were held, of which only three are of any dogmatic interest. In the second session the Pope's letters to Irene and Tarasius were read, and the latter declared that the doctrine contained therein should be accepted. In the fourth session passages were cited from Holy Scripture and the Fathers, whereby the lawfulness of invoking the saints and of venerating their images was proved. Finally it was decided that not only the images of the cross, but also those of the Saviour, of His Blessed Mother, and of the angels and the saints, should be exposed publicly, and that such veneration should be paid them as was due to the persons represented. The *cultus latriæ,* or divine worship, must be paid to God alone; but such other signs of religious veneration as kissing the images, lighting lamps before them, and burning incense, are rightly applicable to the representations of God's saints, as they are also applied to the venerable cross and the holy Gospels: for the honor paid to the image is referred to the original.[18]

These decisions of Nicæa officially closed the ecclesiastical

[18] Mansi, 12, 13.

dispute concerning the veneration of images, but it took about half a century longer before the disturbances caused by it entirely disappeared. Some of the subsequent Emperors followed more or less in the footsteps of Leo the Isaurian and Constantine Copronymus. Leo V (813–820) was especially fierce in his opposition to the Council, which was, however, strongly defended by the Patriarch Nicephorus and Theodore Studita. Conditions were almost as bad under Theophilus (829–842); but after his death, Patriarch John Hylilas held a synod at Constantinople, which accepted the decisions of Nicæa and anathematized the Iconoclasts, and with this the hundred years' war against the images came to a close in the East.

Meanwhile, however, trouble arose in the West. This was first occasioned by a defective translation of the Acts of Nicæa, which had been sent to Charlemagne in 788. Touching the veneration of images, it stated: "I receive and honorably cherish the holy and venerable images according to the worship of adoration, which I pay the consubstantial and vivifying Trinity; and whoso are not of a like mind, nor glorify (the sacred images), I segregate from the Holy and Apostolic Church and anathematize"; whereas the original had: "I accept and reverently kiss the holy and venerable images; but latreutical worship I reserve exclusively for the supersubstantial and vivifying Trinity."

In repudiation of the doctrine as set forth in the faulty translation, Charlemagne sent a number of *Capitula* to Pope Hadrian, pointing out how the Council had blundered into a most lamentable error. The Pope finally cleared up matters by a detailed answer to the *Capitula,* in which he says that the teaching of the Council is in perfect conformity with the doctrine of his predecessor and with his own, since it decrees that images should be venerated by kisses and salutations, but that divine worship should be paid to God alone.[19] And therefore, he adds, did we receive the Council. Thus the misunderstanding was indeed removed, but Charlemagne and his Franks

[19] Mansi, 13, 808; P. G. 98, 1291.

refused to come to terms. They approved of the use of images for decorative purposes, and also for instruction, but would have nothing to do with their veneration. This hostile attitude continued until after the Eighth General Council (869), which approved the decision of Nicæa.

Sometimes the Synod of Frankfort (794) is also adduced as opposed to the veneration of images, but this is a mistake; for the assembled bishops simply condemned the doctrine contained in the erroneous translation sent to Charlemagne, as appears from their own words: "The question was also raised concerning a recent Greek synod, which they held at Constantinople in regard to the adoration of images, and in the Acts of which it is written that those who do not worship and adore the images of the saints, as they worship and adore the vivifying Trinity, should be adjudged anathema." [20] This adoration of images they reject, but they do not touch the question of simple veneration as defined by the Council. It may be added that the synod of Constantinople, here mentioned, is the same as that of Nicæa; the confusion of names being due to the fact that the last session was held at Constantinople.

[20] Mansi, 13, 909.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE FILIOQUE CONTROVERSY: SPANISH ADOPTIONISM: THE EIGHTH GENERAL COUNCIL[1]

John Damascene (+ 754) and Isidore of Seville (+ 636) are usually considered as the last of the Fathers. With them Patristic theology came to a close. Neither of them contributed much of his own to the elucidation of theological questions, but both did good service in gathering together what their more gifted predecessors had worked out with patient skill during the ages that were past. Furthermore, they prepared the way for a new theology, that was to take its rise some three centuries later. Hence they stand, as it were, at the parting of the ways — harking back to the Patristic past and foreshadowing the Scholastic future.

Yet this new theology was slow in forming. There was no particular dearth of great men, who under more favorable circumstances might have made their own age as brilliant as any that went before in the history of theological development; but the confusion and disturbances that followed the irruption of Northern nations into the Roman Empire, together with the ecclesiastical dissensions between the East and the West, prevented them from doing more than to preserve the precious heirloom of past ages. Hence the eighth, the ninth, and the tenth centuries present little that is of real value to the History of Dogmas. We may, therefore, conclude this first volume with a few remarks on the last phases of the great Trinitarian and Christological controversies, as they appeared in the Filioque dispute and Spanish Adoptionism. A word or two on the Eighth General Council seems also in place.

[1] Cfr. Hefele, IV, 384–436, 2nd Germ. Edit. Tixeront, H. D. III, 501–523. Hergenroether, Photius, I; Marion, Histoire, de l'Eglise, I, 639–649; Hergenroether, Kirchengeschichte, II, 131–146.

A — The Filioque Controversy

Although the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son did not become a matter of controversy before the middle of the eighth century, still it had given rise to a diversity of opinions some time before that date. From the end of the fourth century forward, two opposite views gradually developed, one of which became peculiar to the East and the other to the West. All indeed were agreed that the Holy Ghost was the Spirit of the Father and of the Son; also that He proceeded from the Father through the Son; but how was this latter term, "through the Son," to be understood? It was on this point that views began in course of time to differ. Whilst Eastern theologians, at least after the fifth century, became more and more inclined to ascribe all causality in the procession of the Holy Spirit to the Father, so that "through the Son" meant little more to them than identification of nature between the Son and the Holy Spirit, together with priority of procession or generation on the part of the Son; those of the West placed the causality of the Son in this respect on the same plane with that of the Father, so that the Holy Ghost was conceived by them to proceed equally from both as from one principle of spiration. In this there was obviously not a mere question of terminology, but of doctrinal concepts as well.

However this difference of views between the East and West, as already stated, developed only in course of time. The fourth-century Eastern writers use expressions that may be interpreted either way, though the majority are undoubtedly in favor of deriving the Holy Spirit immediately from the Son. Thus Cyril of Jerusalem says that "the Father gives to the Son, and the Son communicates to the Holy Spirit";[2] and Didymus, commenting on John, 16, 13, paraphrases the words of Christ concerning the mission of the Holy Ghost in this manner: "For He shall not speak of Himself, that is, without me and without the Father's direction, as He is inseparable from mine and the Father's will. Because He is not of Him-

[2] Cat. 16, 24.

self, but from the Father and from me. For His very subsistence comes to Him from the Father and from me." [3] Epiphanius is equally clear: "Christ is held to be of the Father, God of God, and the Holy Ghost is of Christ, or of both, as Christ says: 'He proceeds from the Father,' and, 'He shall receive of me.'" [4] And to the question, why is not the Spirit also the Son of the Father, he replies: "Who are you that you should contradict God? For if He calls Him Son who is of Himself, and Him the Holy Ghost who is of both," is not that sufficient? [5] "Furthermore, the Holy Spirit is of both, Spirit of Spirit, for God is Spirit." [6] Athanasius usually speaks of the Holy Spirit as proceeding immediately from the Son. Thus: "The Spirit is said to proceed from the Father, because He flashes forth from the Logos, who is admitted to be of the Father." [7] Basil states that "the Son bears the same relation to the Father as the Holy Ghost bears to the Son," [8] although in another place he says that the Holy Ghost comes "from the Father through the Only-Begotten." [9] Finally, Chrysostom interprets the expression "per Filium" to have in this connection the same meaning as "ex Filio": "If the term 'per ipsum' is used, it is for no other reason than to prevent that any one should suspect the Son to be unbegotten." [10]

Gregory of Nyssa, on the other hand, was later on adduced by Greek writers as authority for the view that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father alone. The passage usually pointed to runs as follows: "While firmly adhering to the identity of nature, we do not deny the distinction between the principle and what proceeds from it. We find this distinction between them; we believe that one is the principle and that the other is from the principle, and in what is from the principle we find another distinction. For the one is from the first immediately, the other only mediately and through that which is immediately from the first, so that the character-

[3] De Spir. Sanct. 34.
[4] Ancorat. 67.
[5] Ibid. 71.
[6] Panar. 7.
[7] Epist. I ad Serap. 20.
[8] De Spir. Sanct. 43, 47.
[9] Ibid. 47.
[10] Hom. 5 in Joan. 2.

istic note of Only-Begotten belongs undoubtedly to the Son. On the other hand it is certain that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, for while the mediation of the Son preserves for Him the character of Only-Begotten, His natural relation to the Father does not exclude the Holy Spirit." [11]

If this be taken as it stands, it may, of course, be interpreted in the sense that the Father is the sole principle of the Holy Spirit, since "it is certain that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father," and since "one is the principle," and the others are from the principle. But if it be borne in mind that the Son is said to be "immediately" from the Father, and the Holy Ghost "only mediately" and through the Son, there seems to be also solid reason for the opposite interpretation; especially if it be recollected that according to the statement of Chrysostom, cited above, "through the Son" had among the Greeks of that period the same significance as "from the Son." Furthermore, in another place he expresses the common view rather clearly, when he says that the Holy Spirit "is from God and of Christ, as it is written, in this way that He does not share either with the Father in the property of not proceeding, or with the Son in the property of the Only-Begotten." [12]

During the following century the two views are found existing side by side in the works of Eastern writers, but in some places there is already noticeable a growing preference for the opinion attributed to Gregory of Nyssa. This is especially true of the followers of the Antiochene school of theology. Thus whilst Cyril of Alexandria clearly teaches that the Holy Spirit "is in the Son, and from the Son," [13] that He is the Spirit "of the Father and of the Son, and is substantially from both"; [14] Theodoret of Cyrus seems equally clear in advocating the contrary view. Replying to the ninth anathematism of Cyril, in which the Holy Ghost is said to be the Spirit of Christ, he says: "If he means that the Holy Spirit has the same nature as the Son and proceeds from the

[11] Ad Alab. versus finem.
[12] Adv. Macedon. 2.
[13] De Trin. Dial. 7.
[14] De Adorat. in Spir. et Ver. 1, 9.

Father, we shall confess the same and receive it as a pious statement; but if he holds that the Holy Spirit has his subsistance from the Son or through the Son, we reject it as blasphemous and impious." [15] It has however been suggested that Theodoret, in making this severe stricture, had in mind the teaching of the Macedonians, according to which the Holy Spirit was to be regarded as a creature of the Son. This may be so, but it does not appear very probable.[16] At all events, the same view, that the Holy Spirit did not receive His existence from the Son, is put forth by the author of a symbol which was rejected by the Council of Ephesus, and which is usually supposed to have been written by Theodore of Mopsuestia, the master of Theodoret.[17]

Still with all this, the older and common teaching continued to hold its ground in the East, at least in orthodox circles. For when in the first part of the sixth century, Pope Hormisdas stated in a letter to the Emperor that the Holy Spirit "proceeded from the Father and the Son, *sub una substantia deitatis,*" [18] the expression apparently excited no comment. But about a hundred and thirty years later, when Martin I used a similar expression in a letter to the Monothelites, he was immediately accused of heterodoxy. Abbot Maximus tried to defend him, but he did so by more or less explaining away the obnoxious expression. The Romans, he said, when using the phrase "ex Filio," did not mean to assert that the Son was really the cause of the Holy Spirit, since the Father alone is properly speaking the cause of the other two persons; but thereby they simply wished to indicate that the Holy Spirit was "per Filium," and had the same substance as the Son.[19] He states his own view by saying that the Holy Ghost "proceeds substantially and ineffably from the Father through the Son." [20]

St. John Damascene appears to have taken a somewhat intermediate position, in so far as the use of terms comes in

[15] Mansi, 5, 124.
[16] Cfr. Hergenroether, Photius, I, 686.
[17] Mansi, 4, 1347.
[18] Epist. 79 ad Justin.
[19] P. G. 91, 133, 136.
[20] Ad Thalass; P. G. 90, 672.

question. For on the one hand he states repeatedly that the Holy Spirit cannot be said to proceed from the Son, but must be held to proceed from the Father through the Son;[21] yet on the other hand he calls Him the Spirit of the Son, the image of the Son, and says that He is communicated by the Son,[22] and therefore in some way necessarily proceeding from the Son. Hence the most likely inference is that he regarded the Father as the sole cause in the sense that He alone is the principle of the Trinity, the productive activity of the Son being derived from the Father. This would in effect be the same view as that taken by the Latins, only it is expressed in different terms. Nevertheless it is especially to John Damascene that the Greek schismatics appeal as an authority for rejecting the *Filioque* doctrine of the Western Church.

Whilst the East was thus gradually drifting away from the teaching of its great Fathers, concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, the West placed that doctrine in an ever clearer light. Tertullian had coined the phrase, "a Patre per Filium," but he added almost immediately, "a Deo et Filio, sicut tertius a radice fructus a frutice";[23] thus obviously ascribing some casuality to the Son in the production of the Holy Spirit, although with a certain subordination to the Father. The same two expressions, "a Patre per Filium," and "a Patre et Filio," were used almost indiscriminately by subsequent writers, yet so as to make it clear that they looked upon the Son as an active principle along with the Father. Thus whilst Hilary terminates his prayer at the close of his great work *De Trinitate* with the words, "through Thy Holy Spirit, who is from Thee through Thy Only-Begotten,"[24] in the body of the work he states quite plainly that the Holy Spirit "must be held to be from the Father and the Son."[25] And commenting on the words of Christ as recorded in St. John, 16, 15, "He (the Paraclete) shall receive of mine," he says that to receive of the Son is the same as to receive of the Father; "nec differt a quo accep-

[21] De Fide Orthod. I, 8; I, 12; Hom. in Sabb. Sanct.; P. G. 96, 605.
[22] De Fide Orthod. I, 13; I, 8.
[23] Adv. Prax. 4, 8.
[24] Op. cit. 12, 57.
[25] Ibid. 29; P. L. 10, 69.

tum sit, quod datum a Patre, datum referatur a Filio." [26] Victorinus also puts this quite clearly, when he says: "The Holy Spirit is from the Son, as the Son is from the Father; and similarly the Holy Spirit is also from the Father." [27] Ambrose advances the same view. "According to the Sacred Scriptures," he argues, "the Holy Spirit is neither of the Father alone, nor of the Son alone, but of both." [28] And again: "The Holy Spirit also, since He proceeds from the Father and the Son, is not separated from the Father, is not separated from the Son." [29] Similar expressions are used by the other writers of this period. As already pointed out in a previous chapter, it was St. Augustine who formulated the doctrine in exact terms, emphasizing the fact that the Father and the Son are but one principle of spiration." [30] It was in this form that the doctrine was set forth by subsequent writers in the West.

From the sixth century forward, the expression "Filioque," or its equivalent, "a Patre et Filio," occurs not rarely in professions of faith as embodying the common teaching of the Church. Perhaps the earliest instance is that of the *Quicumque,* or so-called Athanasian Symbol, a fifth-century Western formula which became very popular after the seventh century. However it was not until 589, after the Council of Toledo, that an attempt was made to introduce the *Filioque* clause into the Liturgy. It was this that finally occasioned the controversy in the West, and incidentally accentuated the already existing differences between the Latin and the Greek Church.

The Council of Toledo, just referred to, was held on the occasion of the solemn abjuration of Arianism by the Gothic king Reccared and his subjects. The king first recited a profession of faith composed by himself, and then added the Nicene and Constantinopolitan Creeds, inserting into the latter the clause: "Credimus et in Spiritum Sanctum dominum et vivificantem, ex Patre et Filio procedentem." The assem-

[26] De Trin. 7, 20.
[27] Adv. Arium, 1, 13.
[28] De Spir. Sanct. 1, 11.
[29] Ibid.
[30] De Trin. 15, 29.

bled bishops approved the addition, "et Filio," and at the instance of the king ordered the Creed thus completed to be recited during Mass, immediately before the Pater Noster, as was the practice among the Greeks.[31]

About a century later the addition was also admitted into the Gallican liturgy, but was assigned its place in the preface. It appeared about the same time in England, closing the synodal letter of the council of Heathfield, held in 680.[32] This council was presided over by Theodore of Canterbury, who had formerly been a monk at Tarsus in Cilicia, and was therefore of Eastern origin and training.

Towards the close of the eighth century, the Greek custom of reciting the Creed during Mass had also been established in France, and in the Creed thus recited the Spanish addition was inserted. A few years later, Paulinus of Aquileia introduced the recitation of the amended Creed into the churches of Upper Italy, "on account of those who say that the Holy Spirit is only of the Father and proceeds from the Father alone."[33] Who these persons were, Paulinus does not state, but the inference is that he alluded to the Greeks. They were also attacked by Charlemagne in a letter to Pope Hadrian. Referring to a profession of faith read by the Patriarch Tarasius at the Seventh General Council, he says that Tarasius does not think rightly of the Holy Spirit, in as much as he declares him to proceed, not from the Father and the Son, according to the Nicene Symbol, but from the Father through the Son.[34] Of course, the Nicene Symbol here referred to is the amended form issued by the Council of Toledo.

Meanwhile trouble had arisen in Palestine, where a colony of Latin monks established at Bethlehem chanted the Creed at Mass with the addition of the *Filioque*. When the Greeks heard of this they treated them as heretics, and threatened to expel them unless they stopped the innovation. The monks thereupon appealed to Leo III, asking for instruction on the matter and pleading as an excuse for their conduct the precedent established by Charles in his own royal chapel. In

[31] Mansi, 9, 981.
[32] P. L. 95, 199.
[33] P. L. 99, 283, 293.
[34] Ibid. 87, 1220.

answer the Pope sent them a profession of faith, addressed also to the whole Eastern Church, in which he affirmed the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, without, however, pressing the point.[35] He also apprised Charles of the occurrence, who then commissioned Theodulphus of Orleans to write a treatise on the Holy Spirit. This treatise, in which the *Filioque* is defended, was approved by the Synod of Aix-la-Chapelle in 809.

After the Synod Charles sent the bishop of Worms and the abbots of Corbie and Saint Mihiel to the Pope, in order to obtain from him a formal authorization for the chanting of the Creed with the addition of the *Filioque*. They presented the Acts of the synod, together with a treatise on the Holy Ghost written by the abbot Smaragdus. The Pope received them graciously, and fully approved of the doctrine, but he refused to give the petitioned authorization. He added, however, that as the practice had already been introduced in France, he could not very well do anything else than let things go their way.[36] His immediate successors took the same stand, tolerating the recitation of the Creed during Mass in places where the practice had been introduced, but refusing to give their official approbation. Finally, however, in 1014, Benedict VIII, at the instance of St. Henry of Germany, gave his formal consent and thereby the Spanish custom won the day.[37]

The real reason why the different Popes, though strongly approving the doctrine, refused to give any official recognition to the insertion of the *Filioque* into the Creed, must be looked for in the hostile attitude of the Eastern Church. As already pointed out, the theologians of the East gradually departed from the more common teaching of the fourth-century Fathers, and by the time the controversy was started in the West, they were inclined to look upon the *Filioque* clause as heretical. Hence as there were not wanting strong indications that the Greek Church was wavering in its allegiance and submission to Rome, the Popes deemed it prudent to abstain from adding anything to the accepted Creed. Events that happened a few

[35] Ibid. 102, 1030.
[36] Ibid. 102, 1071.
[37] Ibid. 142, 1060, 1061.

decades later showed the wisdom of their ways, although that wisdom was not sufficient to prevent the final schism.

B — Spanish Adoptionism

At the time when this heresy first appeared, Spain was politically divided into three parts. In the center and the south was the kingdom of the Moors with Cordova as its capital. In the northwest lay the small native kingdom of Oviedo. In the northeast extended the duchies of Navarre and Gothia, belonging to the empire of Charlemagne. It was in the first of these three divisions, the kingdom of the Moors, that the trouble originated. The author was Elipandus, then Archbishop of Toledo, a haughty old man and noted for his violent temper. In a letter addressed to a certain bishop Migetius, who seems to have taught that God the Father had become incarnate in David, the Son in the man Jesus, and the Holy Ghost in the Apostle Paul, he wrote: "We do not believe that the Son, whom you assert to be equal to the Father and the Holy Spirit, is He who in these latter times was made of the seed of David according to the flesh; but He rather who was born of the Father before the beginning of time, and who, before assuming flesh, said through the Prophet: Before the hills were was I brought forth." [38]

Somewhat later, Elipandus wrote concerning this matter to Felix, bishop of Urgel in Gothia, a young but learned prelate. Felix was of the same mind, and so the two began to spread their views far and wide, through Languedoc, Galitia, and the Asturias. Many bishops joined them, asserting indeed that the Son as Word was consubstantial with the Father, and that under this aspect He was God's natural Son; but they maintained at the same time that Christ's human nature, though truly assumed by the Word in the unity of person, did not share in this divine sonship; that Christ as man, therefore, must be regarded as God's adopted son. The Saviour's natural sonship they admitted quite rightly to be founded on His

[38] Epist. ad Miget. 7; P. L. 96, 863; cfr. Hefele, op. cit. 628 sqq.

eternal generation, but His adopted sonship they based on the communication of grace.[39]

It seems, however, that this theory was fully developed only by Felix, who took adoption in a juridical rather than in a physical sense. According to him it was not the hypostatic union, but sanctifying grace from which the adoption resulted. In this respect, therefore, Christ as man is in the same category with other just men, except that He received sanctifying grace in a higher degree. As man He is truly a servant, and the Word is the master of that servant. As man He did not have perfection of knowledge, was not impeccable, had need of regeneration, and in general resembled those who are only in a wider sense sons of God. Sonship, according to Felix and his followers, is predicated not of the person, but of nature; and hence, although there is only one person in Christ, still there are two sons.[40]

In all this there is obviously a recrudescence of Nestorianism, notwithstanding the assertion that Christ is only one person. It is commonly supposed that these heterodox ideas had been derived from the works of Theodore of Mopsuestia and of other Eastern writers of the same school, which the Mussulmen had adapted to their own views and brought with them into Spain.

As these views were directly opposed to the teaching of the Fathers, and also to the definitions of Ephesus and Chalcedon, they were immediately attacked by many orthodox writers in Spain and abroad. The first to raise their voices in protest were Heterius, bishop of Osma, and Beatus, abbot of Libana in the Asturias. A letter of the two addressed to Elipandus is still extant. Paulinus of Aquileia, Alcuin, Agobard, and many others entered the lists in defense of the faith. Pope Hadrian also addressed a strong letter to the bishops of Spain, designating the teaching of Elipandus and Felix as a blasphemy which no heresiarch had ever dared to utter, save only the perfidious Nestorius.[41] All this, however, had little effect.

[39] Apud Agobard. Lib. adv. Felic, 16, 15; Symbol. Fid. Elip.; P. L. 96, 917; cfr. Tixeront, op. cit. 512, 513.

[40] Alcuin, Adv. Felic. 2, 14; 3, 3; 6, 3, 4.

[41] P. L. 98, 374.

Then Charlemagne intervened and cited Felix before a synod at Ratisbon. He appeared, and although his teaching, as explained by himself, was condemned, he was allowed to return to his own diocese, after he had made a retractation of his errors.[42] But in a short time he relapsed, and began anew to spread his heterodox views. He retracted a second time before the Synod of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 799.[43] Then he was given into the custody of Leidrad, bishop of Lyons in France, and for the rest of his days he conformed in everything to the teaching of the Church, even going so far as to compose a work in refutation of the errors of his former associates. However after his death a document was found among his writings in which he retracted his retractation, and so it appears that his conversion was only a matter of expediency, or that he relapsed into his former errors. Elipandus, protected by the Moors, persisted in his heterodox views till death. With his passing the heresy gradually died out, although traces of it were found as late as the middle of the ninth century.

In passing it may be mentioned that the Adoptionists, and more especially their leader Felix, endeavored to enforce their teaching by arguments drawn from a variety of sources. Holy Scripture, the works of the Fathers, and the very definitions of Councils were laid under contribution. According to Scripture Christ is both the Son of God and the son of David; yet this, it was contended, is intelligible only on the assumption that as man He was the son of David by generation and the Son of God by adoption. Patristic texts, especially those drawn from the works of Augustine, making Christ as man the object of gratuitous predestination, lead to the same conclusion. And so, too, do the definitions of Councils to the effect that there are two distinct natures in Christ; for where there are two natures there must be two sons. However their opponents made short work of these and similar arguments, as may be gathered from such of their works as are still extant.[44] And in a discussion with Alcuin, which lasted for

[42] Mansi, 12, 1031.
[43] Ibid. 13, 1035–1040.
[44] Cfr. Alcuin and Paulinus, P. L. 101, 87–230; 99, 243–468; 96, 883.

several days, Felix confessed himself completely worsted by his opponent.[45]

Of the many synods that were convened to extirpate Adoptionism, that of Frankfort on the Main, held in 794, has obtained the greatest celebrity. It was presided over by the Papal legates, and defined that in virtue of the hypostatic union there is in Christ only one Son of God, not an adopted son, but the Son of God by nature. About two years later this was approved by Hadrian I, and again by Leo III, in 799, in a council held at Rome.[46]

Thus the last Christological error was authoritatively condemned. It was the condemnation of this error that completed the Church's teaching on the person of Christ. Although the God-Man's human soul was perfected by sanctifying grace, and although sanctifying grace ordinarily results in divine adoption, nevertheless, because in Him the divine and the human are hypostatically united, such an adoption is impossible in His case. The proper object of adoption is not nature as such, but nature perfected by its own personality; in this case, therefore, it would be a human person extraneous to the Godhead, a supposition that evidently divides Christ. Hence the definition of Frankfort only stated explicitly what was already implicitly contained in the definition of Ephesus. Christ is one person, and therefore necessarily one Son of God.

C — The Eighth General Council

This Council was, in the first instance, not convoked to settle any doctrinal dispute, but rather to bring some sort of order out of the chaos that had resulted from the intrusion of Photius into the patriarchal see of Constantinople. Ignatius, the lawful patriarch, had been deposed by Michael the Drunkard, on account of his uncompromising stand against the scandalous proceedings at the imperial court. After his deposition the government offered the see to Photius, the secretary of state and captain of the life guard. As he was still a layman, he

[45] Alcuin, Epist. 117; cfr. P. L. 96, 883; Mansi, 13, 1035 sqq.

[46] Mansi, 13, 1031, 1032.

thereupon hurriedly received all the orders, and on Christmas day, 857, was consecrated patriarch by Gregory Asbestas, the excommunicated metropolitan of Syracuse in Sicily. Ignatius was thrust into prison, but although shamefully abused, he could not be induced to resign his see.

Meanwhile Photius, the Emperor, and the Cæsar Bardas, who was the ruling power behind the throne, tried to have these proceedings ratified by Rome; but unfortunately for their well laid plans, the Roman See was then occupied by a man whom contemporary writers very appropriately styled "a second Elias." This was Nicholas I. Although his own legates, misinformed perhaps of the true state of things, confirmed all that had been done, he himself did not rest until he had found out the whole truth, and then without ceremony deposed the intruder. The result was a schism, which lasted till 867, when Michael the Drunkard was murdered, and his successor, Basil I, sent Photius into banishment and recalled Ignatius. Almost the first act of the reinstated patriarch was to ask for a council, so that all the previous difficulties might be authoritatively settled. In this he was seconded by Basil, who forthwith despatched letters and envoys to Rome, for the purpose of inducing the Pope to accede to the patriarch's request.

Whilst these changes were going on, Pope Nicholas died, and was succeeded by Hadrian II, a man of almost equal ability and strength of character. He assembled a provincial synod at Rome, in which Photius was condemned for having attempted to excommunicate Pope Nicholas. On the same occasion Papal legates for the contemplated general council were appointed. The men chosen were Donatus, bishop of Ostia, Stephen, bishop of Nepi, and a deacon, Marinus by name. They arrived at Constantinople during the month of September, 869, and the Council opened in the *Hagia Sophia* on October the fifth. The attendance was very small, only 192 bishops, including the patriarchs, were present. The Papal legates presided; next to them sat Ignatius, then the legates of the Patriarchs of Antioch and Jerusalem. The representatives from Alexandria did not arrive until the ninth session.

At the beginning of the first session the legates were asked

to show their credentials from the Pope, so as to prevent a recurrence of the trouble caused by the legates of Nicholas I; and when this was complied with, all the bishops and patriarchs present signed the formula of Hormisdas, which clearly states the Primacy of the Pope. In the next session penances were imposed upon the repentant bishops who had followed Photius in his schism. Photius himself, however, who was summoned during the fifth session, refused to give any satisfaction, and in consequence he was excommunicated anew by the Council.[47]

One of the many charges which Photius had brought against the Church of Rome, and by which he endeavored to justify his schism, was the doctrine involved in the *Filioque* clause. However the Council does not seem to have taken any notice of it; at least there is nothing in the records that points to a discussion of the matter. Possibly it was not considered a safe topic to bring up under existing conditions. Only two points were touched upon that are of any doctrinal importance. The first regards the unity of the human soul, and the second is a reaffirmation of the lawfulness of venerating sacred images. Both the Old and the New Testament, it is stated in the eleventh canon, teach that man has only one rational soul, and the same is also held by the Fathers and teachers of the Church. However whether this definition formally implies the identity of the vegetative and sensitive principle with the rational soul, does not appear from the wording of the canon; nor can this be determined to a certainty from anything we know about the purpose of the definition. Hence, because of this uncertainty, the definition loses much of its value for dogmatic purposes.

Another point of interest, although only historically so, is the implicit confirmation of the pretensions of Constantinople to the first place in the order of dignity after the see of Rome. If the Anastasian recension is to be trusted, the claim seems to have been allowed as a fact that could no longer be changed.

The tenth and last session of the Council was held on February 28, 870. Then the canons were read and approved by all the bishops present. The Acts of the Council were sol-

[47] Cfr. Mansi, 16, 308–409.

emnly confirmed by Pope Hadrian II, and the Council has ever since been regarded as ecumenical, although the Photian party refused to acknowledge its authority. The peace thus reëstablished between the East and the West lasted only for about ten years, but it is well to notice that the last General Council of the Church, in which both of these great divisions of Christendom participated, explicitly acknowledged the Primacy of Rome, notwithstanding the fact that the attending bishops were nearly all from the East.

CONCLUSION

Leaving aside now the advance made along the various lines of theological thought during the second and third centuries, as a brief summary of that has already been given, the following may be put down as the achieved results of five hundred years of doctrinal development.

In the East, Christian thought was at first almost exclusively occupied with the fundamental doctrines of the Holy Trinity. In opposition to the denial of Arius the Council of Nicæa defined the true divinity of the Son, but omitted, as then and there uncalled for, a like definition in reference to the Holy Ghost. The Arian controversy during the next fifty years was concerned primarily with the appositeness of the terms used in the Nicene definition, but secondarily it involved also doctrinal differences, as many of the dissenting bishops held Subordinationist views regarding the divinity of the Son. These differences were gradually eliminated by the patient labors of the great champions of orthodoxy during the fourth century.

The rise of Macedonianism towards the end of the Arian controversy, and the dangers to the Trinitarian faith connected therewith, called for an explicit definition of the divinity of the Holy Ghost, which was in due time issued by the Second General Council, held at Constantinople in 381. This completed the Church's teaching on the Blessed Trinity, at least in its most fundamental aspect — one God, three divine persons; numerically one divine nature, common by identity to

Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. The same Council also defined the perfect humanity of Christ, in so far at least as it condemned the teaching of Apollinaris, who held that Christ as man had no rational human soul.

This condemnation of Apollinarianism did not give a final solution of the Christological problem, which began to attract the attention of theologians towards the end of the fourth century. The traditional teaching of the Church had always clearly maintained these three points: Christ is God, Christ is man, Christ is one. Hence the question: How can Christ be one, if He is both God and man? That question still remained to be solved. Nestorius tried to solve it by having recourse to a moral union, thus breaking up the unity of person. After a somewhat protracted discussion between him and Cyril of Alexandria, his view was rejected as heretical by the Council of Ephesus in 431. As instructed by Pope Celestine, the Council defined that the divine and the human nature in Christ are so united as to result in one person, the person of the Word. Along with this was also defined the Divine Motherhood of Mary, she being declared to be truly Theotokos, truly the Mother of God.

This definition of the unity of person in Christ, although it sufficiently safeguarded the distinction of natures, nevertheless emboldened the followers of Cyril to emphasize the union to such an extent as to speak of a physical confusion or mingling of the two elements in Christ. To counteract this extreme view, championed especially by Eutyches, the Council of Chalcedon, in 451, as directed by Pope Leo, defined the integrity and distinction of the natures, pointing out that the union between them is hypostatic.

This should have been a sufficient solution of the Christological problem, but it was not. Sergius of Constantinople revived Eutychianism in another form, maintaining that the human will in Christ was so subordinated to the divine as to be deprived of its own proper activity. Against him and his many followers the Sixth General Council, held at Constantinople in 681, defined, in accordance with instructions received from Pope Agatho, that, as there are two perfect natures in

Christ, so are there also two perfect wills and two distinct operations, the one human and the other divine.

With this definition the Christological contentions in the East came to a close, but they were revived about a hundred years later in the West, when some Spanish bishops contended that Christ as man was only the adopted son of God. The Council of Frankfort, approved by Pope Hadrian I, condemned this teaching as heretical, in 794, and thereby put the finishing touch to the Church's doctrine on the person of Christ. It was also in the West that the Trinitarian problem received its final solution, in as much as the doctrine concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son was there inserted in the Creed and thus became an article of the faith.

It must be noted that in the development of these fundamental doctrines, which, with the two minor exceptions just mentioned, were discussed almost exclusively in the East, it was invariably the West, speaking through the Pope, that determined the final decision. The East could and did raise many problems, but it was only Rome that was able to provide a satisfactory solution.

Whilst the East was thus occupied with questions touching the Blessed Trinity and the Incarnation, the West turned its attention to the eminently practical consideration of man's condition here on earth and his relation to God. The naturalism of Pelagius met with strong opposition from St. Augustine, whose teaching on original sin and the necessity of divine grace was, in part at least, adopted by the Church and sanctioned by her for all times. On the other hand, his perhaps somewhat extreme views on the total depravity of sin-stained nature and on predestination found a counter-poise in the writings of the Semi-Pelagians, whose aberrations on the sufficiency of the natural free will for the beginning of faith and salutary works were indeed condemned by the Church, yet they helped to bring out the true teaching on man's present condition, as formulated by the second Council of Orange in 529.

In opposition to the Donatists, St. Augustine also strongly

defended the traditional views on the Church and her sacraments, clarifying concepts which had till then been somewhat hazy, and formulating ecclesiological and sacramentary teaching with a precision that remained unsurpassed for many centuries. The nature of the sacraments, the conditions required for their validity, the sacramental character, were some of the chief points to which he devoted his attention in course of these controversies. Aside from this, he likewise contributed very much to the development of eschatological teaching, correcting some of the views of his predecessors, and developing the doctrine to such an extent that it has continued practically in the same condition till the present time.

Besides these particular doctrines, which, owing mostly to heretical vagaries, were more fully evolved, considerable development took place along nearly every line of theological thought. The Real Presence, Transubstantiation, the sacrificial character of the Mass, the efficacy of the Holy Sacrifice for the living and the dead, were by the end of the seventh century as clearly understood and as definitely taught as they are to-day. Penance, too, from the sixth century forward, appeared under its present form, whilst during the preceding centuries it had retained much of its primitive character. The same must be said about matrimony, both as regards canonical impediments and indissolubility, especially in the West. In the fifth century extreme unction appears as a well established religious rite, and a little later is often referred to in the legislation of bishops and provincial synods. The doctrine of purgatory was already definitely formulated by St. Augustine, and has received hardly any further development up to the present time.

A similar statement applies to the veneration of saints, which since the fourth century included virgins and confessors as well as martyrs. The veneration of images was of slower growth, but by the end of the seventh century it had become practically universal. Its lawfulness was doctrinally defined by the Seventh General Council in 787. Devotion to the Mother of God, which had indeed been in favor from the first, became more intense after the Council of Ephesus, and by the

ninth century had given rise to a considerable number of feasts, among which was that of the Immaculate Conception, although it was then not yet understood in precisely the same sense as we understand it to-day.

It is hardly necessary to remark that in all this progress and development the Church was ever conscious of being guided by the Holy Spirit. She saw the mustard seed of divine truth grow up into a great tree, but she was perfectly aware that in all its growth there was no change in kind. In root and trunk and branches, it ever was and still remained the self-same tree.

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VOLUME II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOGMAS DURING THE MIDDLE AGES AND AFTER, 869-1907

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FOREWORD

The first volume of this *Manual* traced the history of dogmatic development from the beginning of the second century to the end of the ninth; the second follows that development up to the present time. However, the greater part of these pages is devoted to the study of mediæval theology. The author deemed this course proper because the great Scholastics of the Middle Ages prepared the way for the important work accomplished by the Council of Trent, and thereby materially contributed to the full development of a large number of dogmas. Post-Tridentine theology has received rather scant attention — too scant, perhaps, in view of the intense activity displayed by its many eminent representatives. But, considering the purpose of the present work, that was unavoidable. For the *Manual* is primarily intended as a textbook, and as such it should not be too bulky. Hence, as it was impossible to attempt anything like a thorough review of the theology of both periods — for they cover a thousand years — it appeared preferable to accord a merely summary treatment to the less important of the two, and then give to the other all the attention which its valuable contribution to the history of dogmas seemed to demand.

Eastertide, 1918.

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A MANUAL OF THE HISTORY OF DOGMAS

INTRODUCTION

RISE, DEVELOPMENT, AND DECLINE OF SCHOLASTICISM[1]

In the study of doctrinal development during the Middle Ages, and also in modern times, no account need be taken of the Eastern Church. For after the schism caused by Michael Cerularius, patriarch of Constantinople (1053–1059), the East contributed nothing to the development of doctrine. Cut off by its own suicidal act from the source of ecclesiastical life, it became absolutely sterile. Its theology is to-day where it was left by John Damascene in the eighth century, except that along some lines it has actually fallen into error. Hence, while investigating this second period of dogmatic development, the student can give his undivided attention to the theology of the West.

In western lands, moreover, the learned world shifted its center of intellectual activity from the Latin to the Germanic nations. After the seventh century it was chiefly the British Isles, France, Germany, Northern Italy, and Visigothic Spain, that supplied the men who preserved what was still left of the old learning and prepared the way for the gradual development of the new. Venerable Bede, Aldhelm, and Al-

[1] Cfr. Grabmann, Geschichte der Scholastischen Methode, I, II; Ghellink, Le Mouvement Theologique du XII[e] Siecle; Denifle and Ehrle, Archiev fuer Litteratur-und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters: De Wulf, Scholasticism Old and New; *Rashdall, Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages; De Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy; *Taylor, The Medieval Mind; Denifle, Die Entstehung der Universitaeten des Mittelalters bis 1400.

cuin in England, Paulinus of Aquileia, Haymo and Rabanus Maurus of Fulda, Walafried Strabo of Reichenau, Servatus Lupus of Ferrieries, Druthmar, Paschasius Radbertus and Ratramnus of Corbie, Hincmar of Rheims, Prudentius of Troyes, and Aeneas of Paris, were some of the writers and theologians who bridged over the dark chasm that intervened between the Patristic past and the Scholastic future. None of them displayed much originality and independence of thought, but they were all industrious workers and did good service in preparing the way for the greater men that were to follow.

During the Patristic period, embracing, roughly speaking, the first seven centuries of the Christian era, there was not only a gradual and more or less continuous fixation of dogmas, but also a constant growth of theological knowledge, touching nearly every point of revealed truth. Even such doctrines as were not directly connected with what had been explicitly defined, or what had been embodied in the various symbols of faith, were in many instances placed beyond all reasonable doubt by the consensus of approved teachers and the universal acceptance of the faithful. The *Ecclesia docens* and the *Ecclesia discens* ever worked hand in hand to push forward the process of doctrinal development. Consequently, aside from defined truths, there was at the close of the Patristic age a large body of doctrines that were a matter of common belief, although strictly speaking they did not yet form a part of the Catholic faith. Many of them received their full development, and were incorporated into the faith, during the following centuries.

We shall witness the same harmonious coöperation of these two agencies during the Scholastic period. In one sense, however, the *Ecclesia discens,* precisely as represented by theologians of recognized authority, stands out with far greater prominence than at any previous time. Since the beginning of the Middle Ages comparatively few great heresies, attacking fundamental doctrines of the faith, called for conciliar or even for papal definitions of revealed truths; while the intensely speculative spirit of Scholasticism was ever ac-

tive in deducing new theological conclusions and in bringing out into clearer light the full contents of revelation. In this, great assistance was derived from the application of philosophical methods to the exposition of Christian doctrine, with the result that the *depositum fidei* and the contents of Christianized philosophy were brought into closest contact.

However, it must not be imagined that there was anything like an abrupt break between the two periods of doctrinal development just indicated. The transition from the one to the other was very gradual, extending over a space of fully three hundred years. Still less was there anything like a doctrinal change as Patristic theology passed into that of the Scholastic period. Scholastic theology is the legitimate offspring of Patristic teaching, having essentially the same contents although it differs somewhat in method and form. Both admit Augustine's "Intellige, ut credas," and its converse, "Crede, ut intelligas"; but each in its own way. The representatives of the Patristic age used reason but emphasized authority, while their successors of the Scholastic period used authority but emphasized reason.

Scholasticism

This term is used to designate both a pedagogical method and a doctrinal system, and as such it is applied to theology as well as to philosophy. In the present connection it need be considered only in reference to theology. Scholastic theology is distinguished from Patristic theology on the one hand, and from positive theology on the other. Its distinctive feature is speculative investigation of the data of revelation, chiefly by the aid of philosophical methods. In reference to this particular characteristic the Schoolmen themselves distinguish between *theologia speculativa seu scholastica* and *theologia positiva.* The latter gathers and coördinates the data of revelation, the former philosophizes about these data and deduces theological conclusions. However, it was not a barren speculation that interested the Schoolmen; they were ever intent on giving to their investigations a practical turn.

They speculated much, but primarily to enable the faithful to lead a fuller Christian life.

Historically the term Scholasticism, as now employed, probably dates back to the seventh century. By that time it seems to have become customary to call the head of any Christian institution of learning *magister scholae, capiscola,* or *scholasticus.* Furthermore, as it was then generally incumbent on the head of the school to teach dialectics, the usage gradually crept in to designate any branch of studies in which dialectics were used, whether its subject-matter was philosophy or theology, Scholastic studies, that is, studies which came primarily under the direction of the *scholasticus.* Hence Scholastic theology really means, as was stated above, a system of theological teaching in which the dialectic method prevails. It is moreover, though to a limited extent, the union of philosophy and theology in contents as well as in method.

Historical Development

It is customary to distinguish three different stages in the gradual development and decline of the Scholastic system, although there are no hard and fast lines of demarcation. From the tenth to the thirteenth century the system was and remained more or less in a state of preparation. During the thirteenth century it reached its full development and greatest perfection. From the beginning of the fourteenth century up to the end of the fifteenth it fell into a condition of decline, and finally lost much of its ancient prestige. A brief outline of this historical aspect of Scholasticism may here be given, as it will enable us to follow more intelligently the development of doctrine in its relation to the labors of the Schoolmen.

A — Preparatory Stage

The early Middle Ages received from the Patristic period a fairly complete body of formulated doctrines, built up on the basis of divine authority. The principle enunciated by Pope Hormisdas, "The first condition of attaining salvation

is to safeguard the rule of right faith and not to deviate from the teaching of the Fathers" [2] found universal acceptance. Hence the main effort of the earliest Schoolmen was to preserve what had been delivered to them by their forbears in the faith. As Rabanus Maurus expressed it: "It is above all things necessary to have the right and immaculate faith, and to know by heart the symbol drawn up by the holy Fathers, in accordance with the rule laid down by the teaching of the Apostles." [3]

From this dominating tendency of harking back to the Patristic past, both as regarded the contents of the faith and its outward expression, resulted in course of time the *Libri Sententiarum,* in which the teachings of different Fathers were collated and grouped under certain general heads of doctrine and more or less extensively commented upon by the author or compiler. Thus originated the Sentences of William of Champeaux, of Anselm of Laon, of Robert Pulleyn, the *Sic-et-non* of Abelard, and a little later the *Summa Sententiarum* of the Lombard. For their material these authors depended chiefly on the *Florilegia,* or *Catenae,* of Patristic excerpts, compiled in the preceding centuries. The works of Augustine, of Pseudo-Denis, of Gregory the Great, and of John Damascene, were in most instances the direct sources whence these excerpts had been taken; but through them, and therefore indirectly, the works of many other Fathers were also laid under contribution.

Up to the eleventh century Scholastic activities were almost exclusively directed by traditionalism, but thereafter a new tendency began to manifest itself. Men were no longer satisfied with repeating and systematizing traditional teaching, although the contents of this teaching were even then universally regarded as sacrosanct. They began to emphasize the rational side of revealed doctrines, to search for philosophical proofs, which, though in the very nature of things incapable of demonstrating the mysteries of Christian revelation, would at least be helpful towards showing their congruity and reasonableness to the inquiring mind. It was from these first

[2] Epist. 7, 9.

[3] De Ecclesiastica Disciplina, 3.

attempts at placing the faith, so far as might be, on a rational basis that Scholasticism in the strict sense of the term was born.

Anselm and Abelard

The two men who contributed most to the development of Scholasticism in its earlier stages, though along different lines of thought and method, were Anselm of Canterbury (+1109) and Abelard of Pallet (+1142). Both were true Scholastics in the sense that they brought reason to bear upon the data of revelation, but in their methods and viewpoints they stood worlds apart. They may be regarded as the founders of two different schools of theological thought, which existed and worked side by side during the Scholastic period. The one was inclined to mysticism and found its best representative in Bonaventure; the other emphasized intellectualism and reached its highest perfection in Aquinas.

In Anselm's case the following points are decisive in determining his position and his influence upon Scholastic speculation. 1°. He is to all intents and purposes an extreme realist. Universals are to him not a mere *flatus vocis,* nor mere mental concepts; they exist *ante rem* as objective realities, not indeed in the physical order of things, but in the mind of God.[4] Hence in his theological speculations he does not deal with forms only, but with things. From this results the elaboration of concepts in conformity with the reality which they express, the form being subordinated to the contents. 2°. A close follower of Augustine, he emphasizes the predominance of the will, both in God's government of the world and in man's correspondence with God's intentions. God's ruling will is supreme in the world, and man's free will is his noblest faculty. 3°. He admits that reason has its legitimate field of inquiry in matters theological, nevertheless in the study of revealed truths faith should precede reason.[5] The "Credo ut intelligam" comes first, and then the "Intelligo ut credam"[6] 4°. Furthermore, this *in-*

[4] Monol. 26–27.
[5] Cur Deus Homo? 1, 1–2.
[6] Proslog. 1.

telligere or understanding is not precisely the result of dialectic speculation, but rather of contemplation, of intuition. The mental process consists in experiencing rather than in reasoning. Hence Anselm is a Christian mystic, not a Christian rationalist.

In Abelard the entire viewpoint is different. 1°. Compared to Anselm, he is an anti-realist. Universals do not exist *ante rem,* nor merely *post rem,* but rather *in re.* They have no existence apart from the individual.[7] Their universality is conferred by the mind, which forms an abstract concept of what is common to the different individuals of the same species or genus. Hence he may be classed among the moderate realists, although his views on the subject of universals are rather undeveloped. 2°. He conceives the object of theological science to consist in the application of his *Sic-et-non method* to tradition and revelation, in as much as dialectical reasoning must show that apparently contradictory propositions in the writings of the Fathers and in Holy Scripture are in real agreement. 3°. He has no desire of doing away with authority, but he wishes to make it amenable to reason.[8] The part of reason, however, is not to demonstrate the truths of revelation, but rather to show that they are conformable to the requirements of the human intellect.[9] 4°. He regards it as a fundamental principle that the writings of the Fathers do not compel belief, but leave the reader's freedom of judging for himself intact. Holy Scripture alone is of itself infallible.[10] Hence the two chief sources of arguments are the Bible and reason. 5°. Intellectual processes in the domain of theology do not consist in contemplating and experiencing, but in analyzing concepts, in distinguishing propositions, and in deducing conclusions by dialectical methods. He is, therefore, not a Christian mystic, but a Christian rationalist.

It is thus in the writings of these two men that we find the sketchy beginnings of the whole Scholastic system. Both endeavor to combine authority and reason, but each in his own way. Anselm is wholly intent upon appropriating the con-

[7] Sum. Dial. 204.
[8] Introduct. ad Theol. 2, 3.
[9] Ibid. 2, 2.
[10] Sic et Non, Prolog.

tents of revelation, and then meditating on them for the purpose of showing forth their striking harmony with all the requirements of the human intellect; yet he is prepared at any moment to cling to revelation even where reason fails. Abelard criticizes received forms, weighs authorities, distinguishes what appears identical in meaning, combines what seems contradictory in expression, and thus gives full scope to the vast resources of keen dialectics. Anselm is speculative, Abelard is critical; Anselm deals exclusively with realities, Abelard operates chiefly with concepts. Both give reason its due; but while Anselm's reverence for tradition keeps him always within the lines of orthodoxy, Abelard's critical propensity brings him at times into conflict with the teachings of faith. Anselm Christianizes Plato and works in the spirit of Augustine; Abelard takes over the technique of Aristotle and discusses theological problems from the standpoint of a jurist.

Further Development

Whilst Anselm's views and methods commended themselves especially to mystic contemplation, Abelard's mode of procedure was admirably adapted to school purposes. It stimulated the speculative trend of the age, and in a short while found wide acceptance. At the same time, however, violent attacks were made on its rationalizing tendencies, which were regarded by many as inseparable from the new system of thought. Bernard of Clairveaux, William of St. Thierry, John of Salisbury, Walter of St. Victor, and the brothers Geroch and Arno of Reichersberg fought strenuously to counteract Abelard's influence in the schools. But when Peter Lombard (+1164) issued his *Summa Sententiarum,* Abelard's method, if not his views, gained the day. Peter had been a disciple of Abelard, but he was more conservative than his master, and in writing his great work he carefully eliminated all rationalistic elements, in so far as they tended to subordinate authority to reason. He did not escape condemnation on the part of such men as Walter of St. Victor,

but the intellectual world of the day decided in his favor, and so he became for all times the *Magister Sententiarum.*

With the *Summa Sententiarum* of the Lombard the first period of Scholasticism may be said to have formally opened. Up to that date matters were still in a state of transition. Even this great work appears somewhat sketchy as compared with the *Summae* that originated in the following century, but it marked a decided advance along the lines traced out by Abelard. It soon became the favorite text-book of the schools, and remained so till the end of the sixteenth century, when it yielded its place to the *Summa* of St. Thomas. Nearly all the great Scholastics wrote commentaries on its text, of which more than three hundred are still extant. The following is a brief sketch of its contents and the method of discussion adopted by the author.

Adhering rather closely to the general outline of systematic theology as found in the *De Doctrina Christiana* of St. Augustine,[11] Peter divided his subject matter into *res* and *signa* — realities and signs.[12] The *res* are subdivided into realities that are the object of fruition, and realities that are intended for use. The former are contained in the triune God as the *summa res,* the latter comprise the world and all created things. By signs are understood those religious observances, ceremonies, and rites, which symbolize something beyond their own constituent elements. They are of two kinds: Those which only symbolize that of which they are signs, and those which actually confer what they symbolize. To the former class belonged the sacraments of the Old Law, the latter class is made up of the sacraments of the New Law. This division is, however, only imperfectly carried through in the body of the work, especially as regards the *signa;* hence St. Thomas points out that the real principle of divisions underlying the *Sentences* is God as *principium* and *finis* — God as the source whence all creatures come, and God as the end to which all creatures must return.[13]

[11] Op. cit. 1, 2.
[12] Sent. I, d. 1, c. 1–2.
[13] In Sent. I, d. 2: Divisio Textus.

The body of the work is divided into four books. The first contains the teaching of the Church on the Blessed Trinity. The principal points discussed are: The existence of the mystery (d. 2–34), the generation of the Son (d. 4–91), the procession of the Holy Spirit (d. 10–18), the equality and circuminsession of the three divine persons (d. 19–21). Then follows a discussion on Trinitarian terminology (d. 22–26, 30), personal properties (d. 27–29, 33), and appropriations (d. 31–32, 34). The remainder of the first book treats of the attributes of God in reference to the world: omniscience, omnipresence, providence, predestination (d. 35–41). omnipotence (d. 42–44), and finally the will of God (45–48).

The second book treats of creation. The first part is devoted to a discussion of the Church's teaching on the angels (d. 1–11): their nature and endowments (d. 3–4), probation and fall (d. 5–7), evil spirits and good angels in their relation to the world (d. 8, 9–11). Then the creation of the material world is considered, the hexaemeron (d. 12–15), creation of man (d. 16–20). This is followed by treatises on the fall of our first parents (d. 21–23), on grace and free will (d. 24–29), on original sin (d. 30–44).

The third book has for subject-matter the Incarnation, infused virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The points considered in reference to the Incarnation are: The mystery and its causes (d. 1–5), the properties of the God-Man (d. 6–16), the work of redemption (d. 17–22). The second part discusses the theological virtues (d. 23–32), the cardinal virtues (d. 33), the gifts of the Holy Ghost (d. 34–35), the relation of the virtues (d. 36), and the law of the Old and New Covenant (d. 37–40).

The fourth book contains the theology of the sacraments (d. 1–42), and eschatology (d. 43–50).

The exposition runs on freely, without much attention to the *Videtur quod,* the *Videtur quod non,* and the strictly syllogistic forms of argumentation found in the works of later Scholastics. However, instead of simply citing a series of texts for and against a given point of doctrine, as Abelard had done in his *Sic-et-Non,* Peter usually interweaves with his

authorities his own speculations, though not to the same extent as the authors who wrote about a century later.

Among the Lombard's immediate successors must be mentioned Peter of Poitiers (+1205), who left a *Summa* divided into five books: Alanus of Lille, whose *Apologia Christiana, De Arte seu Articulis Fidei,* and *Regulae Theologicae* bear witness to his dialectical skill as well as to his theological learning; William of Auxerre (+1230), author of the *Summa Aurea,* in four books, in which a strictly logical method is followed; William of Auvergne (+1248), also called Parisiensis, whose treatises *De Fide, De Trinitate, De Causis, Cur Deus Homo, De Anima, De Sacramentis,* form the greatest achievement in Scholasticism prior to the *Summae* of Alexander Halensis and Thomas Aquinas.

Side by side with the Lombard and his disciples worked the representatives of mysticism, which had found a home in the Abbey of St. Victor at Paris. The best known writers of this school, commonly called the Victorines, are Hugh (+1141), Richard (+1173), and Walter (+c. 1190). To the "Credo ut intelligam" and the "Intelligo ut credam," they added a third principle, "Amo ut intelligam." They all strongly emphasized the insufficiency of reason for the proper study of things divine, but it is especially in the works of Walter that opposition to speculative learning is carried to great length. For him dialectics are simply "the devil's art." In a work commonly cited under the title *In Quatuor Labyrinthos Franciae* he denounces Abelard, Peter Lombard, Peter of Poitiers, and Gilbert de la Porrée as heretics because they had treated with "Scholastic levity" the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation. However, the opposition of the Victorines to dialectical reasoning had no effect in checking the rapid development of the Scholastic method.

B — The Golden Age of Scholasticism

A powerful impulse to the further development of Scholasticism was derived from the contact of the West with eastern learning during the Crusades. For although the East no

longer played a part in the development of doctrine, it was nevertheless the storehouse of earlier Patristic lore. Besides, it was there that the philosophy of Aristotle had been preserved from utter oblivion. The first Scholastics were familiar only with the *Categories* and the *De Interpretatione* — the *Dialectica Vetus* — of the Stagirite. Then in the first half of the twelfth century the whole *Organon* — the *Dialectica Nova* — was made available for school purposes in its translation by John of Venice. But it was not until a century later that all of Aristotle's works, Physics, Metaphysics, and Ethics, became known to the Christian scholars of the West. And yet it was upon the knowledge of these works that the progress of Scholasticism largely depended.

Unfortunately, it was an adulterated Aristotelian philosophy that was thus introduced into western lands. After the sixth century, when Justinian banished the Athenian philosophers, Aristotelianism had found a home in Syria, and there, in the course of time, the philosophers of Islam corrupted the original text to suit their own religious views. Neoplatonic pantheism, the unity of the active intellect, the denial of personal immortality, the principle that what is true in philosophy may be false in theology, were some of the many Mahometan errors interwoven with the teaching of the Stagirite. And it was this corrupted Aristotle that was then introduced into the schools of Christian Europe.

Hence it was that the Church took at first an antagonistic stand in reference to Aristotelian philosophy, and more especially to its use in theological speculations. In 1210, a provincial synod of Paris ruled: *Nec libri Aristotelis de naturali philosophia, nec commenta* (Averroes) *legantur Parisiis publice vel secreto, et hoc sub poena excommunicationis inhibemus.*[14] The prohibition was renewed in 1215 by the legate Robert: *Non legantur libri Aristotelis de Metaphysica et de naturali philosophia, nec Summae de eisdem.*[15] In 1231, Pope Gregory IX modified this ruling by adding: *Quousque examinati fuerint et ab omni errorum suspicione purgati.*[16]

[14] Chartul. Univ. Paris. I, 70.
[15] Ibid. I, 79.
[16] Ibid. I, 138.

With this proviso, the faculty of arts of the University of Paris, 1255, placed the writings of Aristotle on the list of books that must be read by the students. Finally, when about this time the Dominican William of Moerbeke, at the request of Thomas Aquinas, translated the works of Aristotle anew from the original text, all opposition on the part of the Church was withdrawn. It was then that Aristotle became to the Scholastics simply *the Philosopher.*

The second period of Scholasticism is coincident with the rise and first spread of the mendicant orders whose teaching members soon became its most distinguished representatives. There was also a gradual shifting of the centers of Scholastic activities. During the first period some of the principal seats of learning had been Tours, Rheims, Laon, Auxerre, and Chartres, in France; Fulda and Reichenau in Germany; Utrecht, Liege, Tournai, and St. Laurent, in the Low Countries. In the second period most of these lost their importance, chiefly owing to the rapid growth of the University of Paris. This latter drew nearly all the most famous teachers, and consequently vast numbers of students, to its schools. Next to Paris, Oxford, Cologne, Naples, and Bologna became famous during the golden age of Scholasticism.

A word may be said here about the methods of teaching that became more or less universal after the beginning of the thirteenth century. There were two principal forms, lectures and disputations. The lecture usually consisted in a running commentary on some text which the *magister* took as a basis of his instruction. In theology the first text was the Bible, which was studied from the literal standpoint, little or no attention being given to the scientific exegesis of the text. Then came the Sentences of the Lombard, which were analyzed, explained, and developed. This was followed by a thorough study and scientific exposition of the Sacred Scriptures. It was usually after having spent some years in working out and delivering this last form of lectures that the magister would gather together the ripe fruit of his many studies in a *Summa,* or a systematic presentation of the whole of theology.

The disputations were of two kinds: the *disputationes ordinariae,* which turned about the subject-matter of the lectures, and formed a part of the ordinary curriculum; and the *disputationes generales de quolibet,* which usually occurred twice a year, at Easter and Christmas. In these latter the topics discussed were exceedingly varied; masters, students, and any of the auditors being free to propose questions. To the difficulties thus proposed, either the presiding master, or a bachelor in theology under his guidance, would then and there give a detailed solution. Then, on some subsequent day, the master himself would give his *determinatio,* that is, sum up and arrange in their proper order the various questions and difficulties dealt with, and at the end give definite and final replies. It was chiefly from these *determinationes,* or closing exercises of the disputations, that the numerous *quodlibeta* of the Schoolmen originated.[17] This accounts for the many trifling and irrelevant questions discussed in their pages.

The first great master of the second period of Scholasticism, who may in fact be said to have inaugurated it, was Alexander of Hales (Halensis), *Doctor Irrefragabilis.* He was an Englishman, born at Hales in Northumbria. At first he taught as a secular priest at the University of Paris, but in 1225 he entered the Franciscan order. Although up to that time no religious had ever taught at the University, he was nevertheless allowed to retain his chair and continued teaching until his death in 1245. He was as much revered for his piety as he was respected on account of his learning.

Besides many exegetical writings, Alexander composed a *Summa Theologica,* most probably at the suggestion of Pope Innocent IV. In depth of thought and sublimity of ideas it

[17] The *modus procedendi* in the theological schools of the time is thus outlined by Peter of Capua, who wrote in the thirteenth century: "Modus autem tractandi quaestiones theologicas secundum Magistrum talis est. Primo jacietur fundamentum auctoritatum, secundo erigentur parietes argumentorum et quaestionum, tertio supponetur tectum solutionum et rationum, ut quod in domo Dei auctoritas quasi certum proponit, argumentatio sive quaestio discutiat, solutio sive ratio elucidet et clarum reddat." Cfr. Grabmann, Die Geschichte der Scholastischen Methode, II. 532.

may almost be compared with the corresponding work of St. Thomas, but in precision of reasoning and finish of expression it falls short of that masterpiece of the Schools. It was the first real theological *Summa* ever written, and, in respect of voluminousness, also the greatest. Still largely Platonic in speculation, but at the same time Aristotelian in method, it forms an easy transition from the theology of the twelfth to that of the thirteenth century. It is the original type of what afterwards became known as Franciscan theology.

Like the Sentences of the Lombard, the *Summa* of Alexander is divided into four parts, each of which is subdivided into *quaestiones,* these into *membra,* and the *membra* into *articuli.* The first part contains seventy-four *quaestiones,* treating of God, His existence, His attributes, and the Trinity. The second, comprising one hundred and eighty-nine *quaestiones,* investigates the subject of creation, of angels and men, and of sin. The third, in eighty-three *quaestiones,* has for its subject-matter the Incarnation, the person of Christ, the redemption, and grace. The fourth, numbering one hundred and fourteen *quaestiones,* sets forth the author's teaching on the sacraments. These several divisions embrace the whole of theology, both dogmatic and moral. The treatment, though not quite as formal, is practically the same as that followed later on by St. Thomas, being more or less a development of the *Sic-et-non* method of Abelard. Usually the article begins with a *Videtur quod non,* followed by a number of *Items.* Then comes the *Sed contra,* in its turn followed by the *Resolutio,* or *Corpus,* and lastly the *Ad primum, Ad secundum,* etc.

The work of Alexander was continued by St. Bonaventure (1221–1274), who, though probably not a pupil of the Doctor Irrefragabilis, was nevertheless thoroughly imbued with his spirit. Besides his large Commentary on the Sentences and another one on Holy Scripture, he composed a compendious *Summa,* entitled *Breviloquium Theologicae Veritatis,* which is considered the best presentation of the theology of those times. His *Itinerarium Mentis ad Deum* and his many mystical writings are also held in great repute, while in his

Centiloquium he has presented the world with a new and original *Summa Sententiarum.* Bonaventure and Alexander have been officially proclaimed by the Franciscans as the two great doctors of their order.

Towards the middle of the thirteenth century a powerful impulse was given to the further development of Franciscan theology by Robert Grosseteste (+1253), chancellor of the University of Oxford and later on bishop of Lincoln. Though not a Franciscan himself, he was a devoted friend and influential protector of the order. In his teaching and writings he usually followed the lead of Alexander of Hales. The best known of his works are his *Commentarius in Mysticam Theologiam S. Dionysii* and his *Dicta Theologica.* The latter contains discussions on one hundred and forty-seven different theological topics. He also wrote a *Summa,* but it is extant only in manuscript.

Another light at Oxford was Richard Middleton (Mediavilla), an English Franciscan (+1300), who wrote an excellent *Commentary on the Sentences,* and also a volume of *Quodlibeta.* Of all the Franciscan theologians, he approaches most closely to the method, viewpoint, and perspicuity of St. Thomas, although he attacked the latter on several points of doctrine.

Closely allied with the Franciscan school, though not exactly a follower of it, was Henry of Ghent (Gandavensis), at first a secular priest and later on a member of the Servite order (+1293). He was a pupil of Albertus Magnus, but an independent genius and at times somewhat erratic. Freer in method and form than St. Thomas, he was almost his equal in depth of thought and wealth of ideas. The best known of his works is his folio volume of *Quodlibeta,* but his genius appears to better advantage in his *Summa;* of this, however, only the first part is complete.

The Dominican school of theology properly begins with Albertus Magnus (1193–1280). He was, however, more of a philosopher and scientist than a theologian, and his chief merit consists in having popularized the philosophy of Aristotle. In theological knowledge, systematic treatment, and

clearness of exposition, he falls short of Alexander of Hales, and is in the same respects far surpassed by his pupil Thomas Aquinas. He began his dogmatic writings between 1240 and 1250, with a complete commentary on all the works of the Pseudo-Areopagite and on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. In his old age he composed a *Summa,* of which, however, only the first and second parts were completed. In this he supplements to some extent the *Summa* of St. Thomas. Earlier in life he wrote a *Summa de Creaturis,* which corresponds to the *Summa contra Gentiles* of St. Thomas. Besides these works, he also wrote a commentary on the four Gospels and nearly all the Prophets, and numerous homiletic and ascetic treatises.

Scholasticism reached its highest perfection in Thomas Aquinas, a pupil of Albertus Magnus (1225–1274). In accurate knowledge of Scripture and tradition, in depth of thought, wealth of ideas, clearness of expression, and orderliness of treatment he is facile princeps. He ranges over the whole field of philosophy and theology, apologetics and exegesis, and proves himself a master in every subject he treats. His principle works are the following:

1°. His *Commentum in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum.* This he wrote during his first years of teaching, and on many points of doctrine advanced in it he later changed his mind. Yet the clear explanation of the text and the organically arranged exposition of particular doctrines already reveal the mind of a master.

2°. The *Quaestiones Disputatae,* a collection of extensive monographs on the more important topics of theology and philosophy. There are in all sixty-three *quaestiones,* divided into four hundred *articuli.* In many respects they constitute his best work and contain the key to a right understanding of his *Summa Theologica.* They are all gathered under the general titles *De Potentia, De Malo, De Spiritualibus Creaturis, De Virtutibus, De Veritate.* In reference to their contents they might perhaps be better divided into the treatises *De Ente et Potentia, De Veritate et Cognitione, De Bono et Appetitu,* and thus they would form a complete system of on-

tology, epistemology, and ethics. The treatment is both philosophical and theological, according to the demands of the subject-matter. God, the Trinity, creation, the Incarnation, free will, grace, virtues, and sin are some of the chief theological subjects discussed.

3°. *Summa contra Gentiles.* This is in contents mainly a philosophical work, written against the errors of the day; but the topics treated have in one way or another a bearing upon theology, and some of them are strictly theological. It has been said that in no other human work is there such a wealth of ideas compressed into so small a compass. It is divided into four parts. The first two treat of the essence and existence of God and of creatures; the third discusses the tendency of creatures towards God and their union with Him; the fourth takes in theological subjects in one way or another connected with this tendency and union, as the Trinity, original sin, the Incarnation, the sacraments, and the resurrection of the dead. In this last part the arguments are chiefly drawn from Holy Scripture. The treatment is not dialectic, as is that of the *Summa Theologica,* but thetic. An excellent commentary on this monumental work was written towards the end of the fifteenth century by the Dominican Franciscus of Ferrara, usually cited as Ferrariensis.

4°. The principal work of St. Thomas, at least for theological purposes, is his *Summa Theologica.* It was composed towards the end of his life, for the purpose, as he states in the prologue, of putting into the hands of theological students a compendious presentation of the whole of Christian theology. However, like most other *Summae,* it was never completed, death putting an end to his labors whilst he was engaged on the third part. It ends abruptly in the middle of the treatise on the sacrament of penance. This *Summa* is divided into three parts. The first part corresponds to our treatises *De Deo Uno et Trino* and *De Deo Creante et Elevante;* the second, which is subdivided into *Prima et Secunda Secundae,* treats of the tendency of rational creatures towards God, thus roughly corresponding to our treatises *De Gratia* and *De Virtutibus,* but it is at once dogmatic and moral; the

third part has for its subject-matter the Incarnation, the person of Christ, and the means of grace, containing therefore the same matter as our treatises *De Verbo Incarnato* and *De Sacramentis.*

In treatment the *Summa Theologica* is strictly dialectic. Each part is divided into *quaestiones,* and each *quaestio* into *articuli.* The *articulus* invariably begins with a statement of the chief difficulties against the doctrine to be proved, embodied either in a *Videtur quod non* or a *Videtur quod.* Then comes the argument for the doctrine under discussion, introduced by the phrase *Sed contra.* This is followed by the corpus, the *Dicendum quod,* or exposition of the doctrine in question. Lastly, the difficulties proposed in the beginning of the *articulus* are answered in due order, *Ad primum, Ad secundum,* etc. As an organic whole, the *Summa* may be gathered up in this one phrase: *Ex Deo per Christum in Deum,* thus making God the beginning and end of all things.

5°. Besides these various works, St. Thomas began also a *Compendium Theologiae,* in which, following the footsteps of St. Augustine, he intended to explain the contents of revelation in reference to the three theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity; but only the first part is complete. The *Expositio Symboli Apostolorum* and the *Expositio Primae Decretalis* (Caput Firmiter, IV Lateranensis) are also valuable productions of his busy pen. To these must be added his *Commentarii in Sacram Scripturam,* his *Quaestiones Quodlibetales Duodecim,* and some minor works.

While St. Thomas stood thus head and shoulders above his contemporaries, several of his doctrines, especially that of the unity of the substantial form in man, aroused violent opposition on the part of his confreres in the order of St. Dominic, even as other points of doctrine brought him into conflict with the followers of the Franciscan school. Of his Dominican opponents the most prominent were Roland of Cremona, Richard Fitzacre, and Robert Kilwardby. Owing to the influence of the latter, who was archbishop of Canterbury, the University of Oxford carried its opposition to Thomism so far as to censure as dangerous the denial of the *rationes*

seminales and the doctrine of the unity of the substantial form in man. This occurred in 1277, three years after the saint's death; but the following year the general chapter of the order put a stop to the opposition in its own ranks, by decreeing severe penalties against those brethren "qui in scandalum ordinis detraxerunt scriptis venerabilis Patris Fratris Thomæ de Aquino."

But this authoritative coercion did not affect the Franciscans, who made common cause with the discontented Dominicans. Chief among them were William de la Mare, author of the *Correptorium Fratris Thomae;* Richard of Middleton, who was appointed to the Franciscan chair at Paris in 1281; John Peckham, who, after teaching at Paris, was chosen to succeed Kilwardby in the see of Canterbury; and Peter John Olivi, who in 1283 was condemned on account of his unorthodox teaching on religious poverty.[18]

This opposition, however, was as shortlived as it was violent. The number and influence of the defenders of St. Thomas grew steadily as time went on. First among these were Ulrich of Strasburg, a disciple of Albertus Magnus; Bernard of Hotun, bishop of Dublin; William Mackelfield, who taught at Oxford; the Augustinian Aegidius Romanus, *Doctor Fundatissimus;* Peter of Auvergne, and Godfrey of Fontaines; all of whom wrote towards the end of the thirteenth or during the first part of the fourteenth century.

[18] The state of mind which gave rise to this opposition on the part of the Franciscans appears from the words of Peckham: "Quod philosophorum studia minime reprobamus, quatenus mysteriis theologicis famulantur, sed profanas vocum novitates, quae contra philosophicam veritatem sunt in Sanctorum injuriam citra viginti annos in altitudines theologicas introductae, abjectis et vilipensis Sanctorum assertionibus evidenter. Quae sit ergo solidior et sanior doctrina, vel filiorum Beati Francisci, sanctae scilicet memoriae fratris Alexandri et fratris Bonaventurae et consimilium, qui in suis tractatibus ab omni calumnia alieni sanctis et philosophis innituntur, vel illa novella quasi tota contraria, quae quidquid docet Augustinus de regulis aeternis, de luce incommutabili, de potentia animae, de rationibus seminalibus inditis materiae et consimilibus innumeris, destruit pro viribus et enervat, pugnas verborum inferens toti mundo." It was the opposition of the old Platonizing theology to the new Aristotelian method and world-aspect.

After that the opposition practically ceased, although outside the Dominican order the different theological schools continued to defend their own views.

With St. Thomas Scholasticism reached the height of its development, and in less than a half a century after his death it began to decline. At the very beginning of this decline, though still belonging to the golden age of Scholasticism, appeared Duns Scotus (1266–1308), the *Doctor Subtilis.* He was a disciple of William Ware, the successor of de la Mare both in his chair of theology and in his opposition to Thomism. That Scotus was an intellectual giant, who boldly tackled even the most abstruse problems, is universally conceded; but at the same time he is not rarely accused of having used his extraordinary talents in tearing down rather than in building up. His was an analytical mind, and as a natural consequence he found much to criticize in the works of his predecessors and contemporaries. As a general rule, however, his criticism was objective, resulting from the keenness of his intellectual perceptions and not from an innate tendency to find fault. Unlike the great masters who preceded him, he wrote no commentary on Holy Scripture, and as a result the positive basis of his teaching is at times lacking in broadness and in depth. He was a man of intense piety, and also of most sincere orthodoxy, although he came occasionally very near the danger line in the logical trend of his reasoning.

The principal work of Scotus is his *Commentary on the Sentences* (*Opus Oxoniense*), written whilst he was teaching at Oxford. This is completed by the *Reportata Parisiensia,* in part compiled from the notes taken down by his pupils at Paris. He also published a number of *Quaestiones Quodlibetales,* and some *Opuscula,* treating of metaphysical topics. His reasoning is always clear, but is not as direct as that found in the works of St. Thomas. Besides, his profuse critical remarks make the study of his writings somewhat of a task. Owing perhaps to his critical attitude, he failed to work out a well-connected theological system, although he covered practically the whole field of theology. He is the founder of the Neo-Franciscan or Scotistic school of the-

ology, which occupies an honorable position in the theological world. In substance, however, this school does not differ very much from that founded by Alexander of Hales and developed by St. Bonaventure.

C — Decline of Scholasticism

After the death of Scotus, in 1308, the decline of Scholasticism was very rapid. Men wholly devoid of his intellectual powers, and in many instances sadly lacking in orthodox instincts, tried to imitate him in criticizing the theology of the past, with the inevitable result that they wasted their time and energy in the discussion of meaningless subtleties, and thus drew down the contempt of the world upon Scholasticism itself. It was not a question of the times having outgrown the system, as is frequently maintained; but of the system being too big for the times. The strong faith, the profound sense of the supernatural, and the prayerful intellectuality of the Middle Ages were on the wane, and deprived of these the fertile fields of Scholasticism were doomed to be changed into a barren waste. Empty sounds were made to function as ideas, very much as made-money is substituted for gold at times of national distress. An outward show of learning was maintained, but its substance had vanished.

It was in this condition of intellectual destitution and religious atrophy that nominalism, or terminism, as others prefer to call it, began to flourish in the schools. This was a modified form of the nominalism of ancient Greece, which had sporadically cropped out in various quarters during the Middle Ages. In the second half of the fourteenth century, and still more so in the fifteenth, it threatened to drive moderate realism entirely from the field. Its first influential representative was William Ockam (+1347), for whom the way had already been prepared by Durandus of St. Pourçain (+1332). Strictly speaking he was a conceptualist rather than a nominalist, in as much as he defined the universal as "an intention of the mind," but to all intents and purposes this is a distinction without a difference. Like a thorough-

going nominalist, he maintained that propositions, not things, are the object of all scientific knowledge, and consequently also of theology. *Scientia quaelibet, sive sit realis sive rationalis, est tantum de propositionibus tanquam de illis quae sciuntur, quod solae propositiones sciuntur.*[19] And again: *Omne enim universale est intentio animae, vel aliquod signum voluntarie institutum tale. . . . Universale non est aliquid extra animam; et certum est quod non sit nihil; ergo est aliquid in anima, . . . non objective tamen, . . . ergo subjective et per consequens est qualitas mentis.*[20]

The inevitable result of thus operating with merely subjective concepts, and equivalently with empty sounds, soon showed itself in an unwarranted distrust of the mind's reasoning powers in the attainment of truth. Such religious truths as the existence, unity, and infinity of God, the immediate creation of the universe by the Deity, the immortality of the soul, and many others, which the great teachers of the thirteenth century had proved by arguments drawn from natural principles, were held to be undemonstrable and therefore entirely relegated to the sphere of faith. On the other hand, the rôle of dialectics was unduly emphasized, and in course of time developed into mere logic-chopping. Along with this, new words and terms were constantly introduced, and before long the language of the schools became a jumble of outrageous barbarisms.

Ockam's work was continued by men like Gregory of Rimini, Robert Holcot, John Buridan, and Peter d'Ailly. Of these it was especially John Buridan who contributed powerfully to the success of terminism. As rector of the University of Paris, he wielded a wide influence, and during a quarter of a century he defended Ockam's teaching with great skill and boldness. After his time Ockamism spread very rapidly. Even Gabriel Biel (+1495), a man of great talent and sometimes called "the Last of the Scholastics," had nothing better to offer his pupils than a *Collectorium ex Occamo*. Outside the terminist school there were indeed a few earnest

[19] In I Sent. d. 2, q. 4, o. [20] Quod. lib. V, 12, 13.

and learned men who strove to preserve the glorious traditions of the thirteenth century, but they were not of sufficient influence to meet with permanent success.

This condition of things continued till the Council of Trent, when men like de Vittoria, de Soto, Salmeron, Toletus, and many others ushered in a second spring of Scholasticism. The revival was very rapid, and by the end of the sixteenth century theological learning had reached a state of perfection that was almost unprecedented. It was the classical age of Neo-Scholasticism, followed by the age of the "Epigones," in both of which the great masters of the thirteen century seemed to have come back to life. Of this, however, it will be better to give a brief outline later on in its own proper place.

D — Sources of Arguments

The work of the Fathers consisted primarily in proposing the faith as they found it contained in Holy Scripture and tradition, while the efforts of the Scholastics were largely directed towards placing this faith on a rational basis. Hence the writings of the Fathers are above all else practical, whereas those of the Scholastics are chiefly speculative. The latter no less than the former accepted St. Augustine's "Crede, ut intelligas," but they placed a greater emphasis upon his "Intellige, ut credas." During this period, therefore, our study of the development of dogmas must to a considerable extent be occupied with reviewing the arguments by which the great masters established the various doctrines of the Christian faith.

These arguments were drawn chiefly from three different sources: natural reason, tradition, and Holy Scripture. Those drawn from natural reason were used for a threefold purpose: First, to prove the existence of God and of revelation, or to establish the *praeambula fidei,* without a clear apprehension of which supernatural faith would be impossible; secondly, to demonstrate those points of faith that could be deduced from natural principles, as, for instance, the immortality of the soul; thirdly, to confirm supernatural truths that had been proved by arguments taken from revelation. In this latter instance they

were not advanced as conclusive proofs, but simply as *rationes congruentiae,* that is, as arguments which were put forward to show a certain degree of conformity between the revealed truths in question and the demands of right reason.

Referring to the first purpose which these arguments from reason were meant to subserve, St. Thomas states: "It is evident that faith flows from two sources: First, from God, by reason of an interior enlightenment upon which the assent of the intellect is made to rest; secondly, from the manner in which revealed truths are presented to the mind as objects to be believed. This presentation is related to the knowledge of faith in a manner similar to that in which sense perceptions are related to the cognition of first principles."[21] It is not, strictly speaking, the foundation of faith, but a prerequisite condition.

Tradition, as a source of theological arguments, was regarded by the Scholastics under a twofold aspect: First, as identified with the *vivum magisterium Ecclesiae* — the teaching authority of the Church herself, as exercised in each succeeding age through her legitimate representatives, that is, either the Pope alone or the bishops in union with the Pope. Taken in this sense, tradition was universally held to speak with an infallible voice, so that the truths thus borne witness to could not be rejected without an error in faith. In the second place, tradition was not rarely understood as synonymous with the teaching of the Saints or of the Fathers, either as presenting the views of individual Patristic writers or as embodying what was more or less commonly held by them as a class. Thus considered, the authority of tradition was again accepted as final, provided it could be shown that the consent of the Fathers regarding a point of faith or morals was practically unanimous. In other cases it was indeed commonly regarded with profound respect, but not as necessarily precluding deviation from the view in question. Thus it sometimes happened that the Scholastics set aside the opinions of individual Patristic writers, yet in so doing they always proceeded cautiously and with evident reluctance.

[21] In Boeth. de Trin. op. 63, q. 3, a. 1 ad 4[m].

The third source of theological arguments, or Holy Scripture as interpreted by the Church, was looked upon by the Scholastics as having the very highest authority. And the reason is that the Sacred Writings were accepted by all of them as God's word, which was held to carry with it the full authority of His essential truthfulness. "The author of Holy Scripture," says St. Thomas, "is God, and the human writer acts merely as His instrument. For other branches of learning are the fruit of human genius, but what is contained in Holy Scripture is the result of divine inspiration." [22] And this teaching of the Angelic Doctor agrees in substance with the views commonly held in the schools of the Middle Ages. Nearly all the Scholastics admitted a fourfold sense in the interpretation of Holy Scripture — the literal, the allegorical, the moral, and the anagogical; but it was from the literal sense only that they drew their dogmatic arguments.[23]

The respective values of the arguments derived from the three sources mentioned in the preceding paragraphs — natural reason, tradition, and Holy Scripture — are thus indicated by St. Thomas: "Sacred doctrine is especially based upon arguments from authority, in as much as its principles are obtained by revelation: . . . but it has also recourse to human reason, not, indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of faith would come to an end), but to make clear other things that are put forward in this doctrine. Since grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the natural bent of the will ministers to charity. . . . Consequently, sacred doctrine makes use also of the authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able to know the truth by natural reason. . . . Nevertheless, sacred doctrine has recourse to these authorities only as extrinsic and probable arguments; but appositely uses the authority of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible proof, and the authority of the Doctors of the Church as one that may properly be used, yet merely as probable. For our faith rests upon

[22] Sum. Theol. I, q. 1, a. 10; Quodl. 7, a, 16; Proem. Comment. in Psalmos.

[23] Cfr. Thomas, Quodl. 7, a. 14, 15; Halens. Sum. I, q. 1, m. 4, a. 4; Albert. Magn. In Sent. I, d. 1, a. 5.

the revelation made to the Apostles and Prophets, who wrote the canonical books, and not on the revelations (if any such there are) made to other Doctors." [24]

The need there is of supernatural revelation, in order to bring about the salvation of men, is thus explained by the same author: "It was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God, besides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is ordained to God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason. . . . But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to its attainment. Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths, which exceed human reason, should be made known to him by divine revelation. Moreover, even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, there was need of their being taught by the revelation of God; because otherwise they would be known only by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors: whereas man's whole salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of these truths. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught certain truths by divine revelation." [25]

[24] Sum. Theol. I, q. 1, a. 8. [25] *Ibid.* I, q. 1, a. 1.

CHAPTER I

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD: GOD'S ESSENCE

In tracing up the doctrinal development that took place during the Middle Ages, it appears advisable to arrange the various topics of dogmatic interest in the same order that is commonly observed in modern textbooks of theology. For thereby is secured that continuity of thought with which modern students are most familiar. This requires, indeed, some rearrangement of the subject-matter as treated by the Schoolmen, but only to a limited extent; because most modern authors retain the order of treatment established by the theologians of the Middle Ages. Furthermore, it is hardly necessary to remark, as the point is sufficiently obvious, that in the study of mediæval theology the writings of the most representative Scholastics call for special consideration, and that the works of less important writers need be studied in so far only as they contain points of special interest to the history of dogmas

A — The Existence of God

In all the great *Summae,* whatever be the date of their composition, one of the first questions turns about the existence of God. The old arguments made use of by the Apologists of the second century, and incidentally also by many of the later Fathers, were overhauled and scientifically examined. The arguments from design, from the different degrees of perfection, from the contingency of all finite beings, and from the obvious necessity of a *Causa Prima,* were all investigated and retained. Besides these, however, others also were excogitated, as may be seen by referring, for instance, to the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales.[1]

[1] Op. cit. q. 2, m. 3.

An entirely new argument to prove the existence of God, commonly called the *ontological argument,* was devised by St. Anselm. He derived it from the idea of a being than which none can be more perfect. This idea, he contended, is found in the mind of every man who uses his reason, and from its very presence there we may legitimately infer the objective existence of such a being. For if it did not actually exist outside of the thinking mind, we should have a contradiction in terms. Because, on the one hand, our idea represents the being in question as perfect in every respect, so that nothing can be added to its perfection; yet on the other hand, if it had no existence outside of our minds, it could obviously be more perfect. Hence the necessary inference seems to be that it has objective existence. And if so, then God exists: because a being than which none can be more perfect is the infinitely perfect God.[2]

Soon after its appearance the argument was attacked by Gaunilo, a monk of Marmoutiers. As Anselm in formulating it had alluded to the fool (*insipiens*) who, according to the Psalmist, "hath said in his heart: There is no God," Gaunilo entitled his critique, *Liber pro Insipiente.* His refutation of Anselm's reasoning is divided into two parts. First he calls in question the author's assumption that the idea of a most perfect being is found in the mind of every man who uses his reason. That is something that can be asserted, but nevertheless lacks convincing proof.[3] Then he points out that from the mere presence of an idea in the mind one is not entitled to infer the existence of a corresponding object. Thus if one has an idea of a most beautiful island, as situated somewhere in the broad ocean, is that any reason why the island should really exist? And so with the idea of a being than which none can be more perfect.[4]

Anselm replied to this criticism in a *Liber Apologeticus contra Gaunilonem,* in which he first thanks his adversary for his criticism and then proceeds to defend his own position.

Most of the subsequent Scholastics refer to Anselm's *onto-*

[2] Proslogium, c. 2; cfr. cc. 1, 3. [3] Op. cit. c. 2. [4] Ibid. c. 6.

logical argument, but there is little agreement in their views concerning its value. Alexander of Hales[5] and St. Bonaventure[6] seem inclined to accept it as conclusive, while St. Thomas rejects it on the ground that it implies an unwarranted transition from the ideal order of things to the real.[7] Scotus makes it his own, and endeavors to give it greater strength.[8] Some centuries later it was brought out in a different form by Decartes and Leibnitz.

It was chiefly St. Thomas who cast the traditional proofs for the existence of God in their present form. And in this, as in many other matters that have a philosophical bearing, he drew largely on Aristotle. By way of forestalling an obvious objection, suggested by the incomprehensibility of the divine nature, he first points out that in order to prove God's existence we need not have a perfect knowledge of His essence. Objectively the two are indeed identical, but their relation to the human mind is not the same. Hence whilst God's essence can be known to us here on earth only imperfectly, the same is not necessarily true of His existence. For if we cannot strictly demonstrate, by the use of an essential and convertible middle term, that God exists, we can at least prove it by a *reductio ad absurdum,* in as much as the supposition that there is no God necessarily leads to an absurd conclusion. It is, therefore, a *demonstratio quia,* not *propter quid.*

Having thus cleared the way, he advances five proofs for the existence of God, which are calculated to satisfy every reasonable mind. A brief outline of them may be indicated as follows.

The first proof is taken from motion. It is evident to our senses that some things are moved, that is, they pass from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality. Now nothing can be thus moved, except by something already in the state of actuality. Thus wood, which is potentially hot, is made actually hot by its contact with fire, which is actually hot.

[5] Sum. Theol. I, q. 3, m. 3.
[6] In Sent. I, d. 3, q. 2.
[7] Sum. Theol. I, q. 2, a. 2; Contr. Gent. I, 3, 9.
[8] In Libr. I Sent. d. 2, q. 2.

And so in every similar instance. This implies either a *processus in infinitum* of beings that move and are moved, or the existence of a being that moves and is not moved — a *Primum Movens non mobile.* The former supposition is obviously repugnant to reason; hence the latter must be admitted. But this First Mover, this *Primum Movens non mobile,* every one understands to be God.

The second proof is drawn from the nature of efficient causation, as observed in the world around us. Every efficient cause produces an effect different from itself. There is no cause that is self-productive, and the very concept of such a cause implies an evident contradiction. Hence we must admit either an infinite series of subordinated causes, each one of which has been produced by a preceding one, or an unproduced, self-existing First Cause. The former supposition is evidently absurd. For if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to put forward a First Efficient Cause, unproduced and self-existent, to which every one gives the name of God.

The third proof follows from the contingency of all mundane things. Whatever there is in the world is of such a nature that it can exist or not exist, as is quite obvious from the observed fact of generation and corruption. Hence follows the possibility that at some time there was nothing in existence. And this being so, there would be nothing in existence now, except on the supposition that beyond this contingent world there is a being the existence of which is necessary. This necessity of existence, moreover, cannot come from without, since that would lead to an infinite series of subordinate causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

The fourth proof is based upon the different degrees of perfection in the various beings of which this world is made

up. Some are more and some are less good, true, noble, and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things according as they resemble and share in the perfections of an absolute standard. For what is more complete in any genus is the cause of all in that genus. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

The fifth proof is taken from the governance of the world; for we see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for some purpose, which fact is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best results. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their purpose. Yet whatever lacks intelligence cannot achieve a purpose unless it be directed by some being endowed with intelligence and knowledge; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are ordained towards a definite purpose; and this being we call God.[9]

Duns Scotus reproduces these various proofs with some modifications, pointing out as a final conclusion that the existence of the world, both when considered in itself as a whole and when viewed in the manifold relations of its several parts, can be satisfactorily explained only by postulating the existence of a being that is at once the efficient and exemplary first cause, and also the final cause, of all else. And this threefold cause is God.[10]

The force of these different arguments was first called in question by Ockam, and after him by theologians of the Nominalist school in general. Human reason, Ockam contends, is impotent to prove either the existence of God or His infinite perfection.[11] Both of these truths must be accepted from revelation as contained in Holy Scripture and proposed by the Church.[12]

[9] Sum. Theol. I, q. 2, aa. 2, 3.; cfr. Contr. Gent. I, 11, 12.
[10] In Sent. I, d. 2, 10 sqq.
[11] Quodlib. VII, 17–21; II, 1.
[12] Ibid. III, 1, 3.

In this contention the Nominalists placed themselves in open opposition both to the teaching of Holy Scripture [13] and to the unanimous consent of the Fathers.[14] They, moreover, prepared the way for the traditionalism and skepticism of later ages, which received their final condemnation in the Vatican Council.[15]

Leaving aside these vagaries of a decadent Scholasticism, it may be said that with regard to the existence of God, and the source of our knowledge concerning it, all the great teachers of the Scholastic period were in perfect agreement on the following points:

1°. We can arrive at a certain knowledge of God's existence without any supernatural revelation. As Albertus Magnus expresses it, "the fact that God exists is not exclusively an article of the faith, but is presupposed to every article." [16] True, God has revealed His own existence, and in so far we know it from a supernatural source; but antecedent to this knowledge of faith, we have of it a natural knowledge, which properly belongs to the *praeambula fidei.*[17]

2°. We acquire this natural knowledge of God indirectly, that is, from a consideration of the world around us. The proposition, "God exists," is indeed self-evident *quoad se,* in as much as God is His own existence; but it is not self-evident *quoad nos,* since we do not have a perfect knowledge of God's essence.[18] Hence the existence of God cannot be demonstrated *a priori,* from the very concept of His being; but it must be proved *a posteriori,* that is, from the effects of which He alone can be the cause.[19]

3°. The immediate intuition of God's essence lies beyond the unaided powers of all finite nature. Hence even the writers of the mystic school of theological thought, of which the Victorines and St. Bonaventure are the best representatives, are careful to note that the divine illumination of which

[13] Wisdom, 13, 1–9; Rom. 1, 18–20.
[14] Cfr. vol. I, pp. 70, 71; Ibid. 256 sqq.
[15] Sess. III, de Revel. can. 1.
[16] Sum. Theol. tr. 3, q. 17.
[17] St. Thom. Sum. Theol. I, q. 2, a. 2 ad 1.
[18] St. Thom. Sum. Theol. I, q. 2, a. 2.
[19] Ibid.

they frequently speak does not terminate at a facial vision of God. "That refulgence of light," says St. Bonaventure, "by the aid of which God is seen face to face, does not belong to nature, but is a gift of divine condescension and grace." [20] And in another place, when speaking of the angels, he affirms that the intuitive vision of God is beyond their natural powers. "And this," he says, "is evident, because such a knowledge of God constitutes the first reward, in the possession of which the created mind rests as in its perfect beatitude. But this reward no one can obtain except by the help of a gratuitous gift of God." [21] Hence, when some fifty years later, the Beguines and Beghards asserted that "the soul has no need of being elevated by the light of glory — *lumine gloriae* — in respect of the vision and blessed fruition of God," the Council of Vienne, through the mouth of Clement V, condemned their teaching as heretical.[22]

4°. The knowledge of God and His existence is in no true sense innate. Most of the Scholastics, as also the Fathers before them, express themselves at times as if our knowledge of God were inborn. Thus St. Thomas states: "To know in a general and indefinite way that God exists is implanted in us by nature, in as much as God is man's beatitude." [23] But thereby they did not mean to assert a real inborn knowledge of God. Hence St. Thomas, in his commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius, clearly states: "Our knowledge of God is said to be inborn in as much as through our innate principles (of cognition) we can easily arrive at the knowledge of God's existence." [24] What is inborn is not the idea of God, but the rational faculty by the right use of which we can readily discover God in His creatures. And St. Bonaventure explains: "If any men of authority be found to say that God can be seen and beheld in the present life, they are not to be understood as teaching that He is seen in His essence, but that He is known by some interior

[20] In Sent. II, d. 3, p. 2, a. 2, q. 2.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Mansi, 25, 410A.
[23] Sum. Theol. I, q. 2, a. 2 ad 1.
[24] In Boeth. De Trin. q. 1, a. 3, ad 6.

effect produced by Him." [25] Later Ontologists appealed to both of these writers as fathering their peculiar views, but without just cause.

B — God's Essence

The various arguments made use of to demonstrate the existence of God, as outlined in the preceding section, point to Him as the efficient, final, and exemplary cause of the world. This necessarily implies that He contains in Himself all the perfections found in finite beings, possible as well as actual, since in the physical order of things there can be no perfection in any given effect which is not in some way precontained in its cause. Hence some Scholastic theologians, among whom is Duns Scotus,[26] infer from these same arguments that God is infinitely perfect; whilst others, as St. Thomas,[27] derive the infinite perfection of God from the established fact that He is being itself. But on the fact that God is infinitely perfect, all are agreed; and this fact immediately gives rise to two questions: First, what is God's essence? Second, what is the relation of the divine perfections as referred to one another and to the Godhead?

The first question admits of two different answers, according as we consider God's essence as a physical or a metaphysical entity. Considered as a physical entity, the essence of every being, and therefore also of God, is simply the sum total of perfections which constitute the being in question, aside from its accidents and relations. This is called the physical essence, about which, as referred to God, there is no difference of views among theologians. Considered as a metaphysical entity, the essence of a being is that particular perfection which is expressed in its essential definition. It is conceived as the ontological principle from which all essential properties or attributes emanate. As applied to God, and in our human way of considering the matter, it is that

[25] In Sent. II, d. 23, a. 2, q. 3.
[26] In Sent. I, d. 2, n. 20, 25, 30; cfr. Quodl. q. 7, n. 31.
[27] Sum. Theol. III, q. 4, a. 2.

divine perfection which is logically not derived from any other, and from which all others are conceived to flow as from their primary source. Theologians call it the *metaphysical* essence of God. It is with this that we are here concerned.

Patristic writers usually contented themselves with stating that "God is being itself — not being in the abstract, but in its very fullness; nor being in the passive sense, but as the source and fountainhead of all activity." [28] They did not, as a rule, enter into the particular aspects of the question of God's being. Thus St. Chrysostom says: "That God is without beginning and unbegotten and eternal, I know; but the manner of it all I do not know. For neither can it be shown by arguments, how He is a substance which received being neither from itself nor from another." [29] They pointed out with considerable clearness that the divine nature is necessarily unproduced, that God has the reason for His being within Himself, but beyond that they did not venture.[30]

Nor did the earliest Scholastics go much deeper into the subject, as it is here considered. Thus St. Anselm conceives God as a being than which none can be more perfect; [31] and after pointing out that God does not depend for His being on any cause outside of Himself, he states that the divine substance is through itself and of itself, and that God's essence is identical with His existence.[32] But he does not attempt to define what God's essence is. Nor is St. Bernard much more explicit. He answers the question, *Quid est Deus? What is God?* by saying: "Nothing occurs to the mind that is more to the point than *He Who Is.* Goodness, greatness, blessedness, wisdom, are all contained in the one word, *He Is.*[33] Hugh of St. Victor merely repeats the statement of St. Augustine that God does not produce Himself; [34] and the same is true of Peter Lombard.[35]

[28] Cfr. vol. I, p. 256 sqq.
[29] Hom. I, de Incompreh. Dei Natura, n. 3; MG, 48, 704.
[30] Cfr. August. De Trin. I, c. 1, n. 1; ML, 42, 820; Jerome, In Eph. 3, 14; ML, 26, 489.
[31] Proslog. c. 2.
[32] Monol. c. 6.
[33] De Consid. V, c. 6, n. 13.
[34] Sent. I, tr. 1, c. 11.
[35] Sent. I, d. 3, n. 23; d. 5, n. 1, 2.

Even the later commentators of the Lombard do not treat the question with that minute attention to details which we are accustomed to look for in the works of more recent theologians. They all show that God has the reason for His being within Himself, that He is infinitely perfect, absolutely simple, immutable, eternal; but they do not determine scientifically which of these perfections must be considered as the metaphysical essence of God. This is, to some extent, also true of St. Thomas, although he leaves us in no doubt concerning his own views on the matter.

Arguing from the established fact that "God is the first efficient cause," he concludes that "it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from His essence."[36] Furthermore, as God is an *actus purus,* without all potentiality, "it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence." Now "God is His own essence; if therefore He is not His own existence, He will not be the First Being — which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence."[37] Moreover, "God's existence includes in itself life and wisdom," and all other perfection, "because nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to Him who is the Self-subsisting Being."[38]

That he regards the perfection of self-subsistence as the most radical of all, he brings out more clearly when he speaks of the Divine Names. Putting the question, "whether this name, *He Who Is,* is the most proper name of God," he answers that it must be so considered for three reasons. The first of these reasons is taken from the signification of the term. "It does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other, it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form."[39] The second reason is derived from the universality of the term. "By any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this name,

[36] Sum. Theol. I, q. 3, a. 4.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid. ad 3.
[39] Ibid. q. 13, a. 11.

He Who Is, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it names the infinite ocean of substance itself." [40] The third is drawn " from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence does not know past or future." [41]

Hence, although St. Thomas, when speaking about the divine intellect and will, says that they are God's essence,[42] and elsewhere makes the general statement that whatever God has He is,[43] it is sufficiently evident from the above citations that he regards self-subsistence, the *esse a se,* as that which ultimately distinguishes God from every other being and which must be conceived as the ontological principle of all other divine perfections. Hence, according to St. Thomas, self-subsistence, or *aseity,* to use the term now commonly employed in this connection, is the metaphysical essence of God.

Duns Scotus took a different view. He looked upon *infinity* as the most perfect and most simple notion we have of God, " because it is neither an attribute nor a modification of him of whom it is predicated." [44] It is at once essential, distinctive, and underived.[45] No other concept of the Godhead can be compared to it in this respect — not even that of aseity.[46] This infinity he calls fundamental or radical, in contradistinction to formal infinity as predicated of every other divine attribute; " for each of them has its own formal perfection derived from the infinity of the essence as its root and foundation." [47] Hence this radical infinity — *infinitas radicalis* — is that fundamental attribute of the Godhead in virtue of which God necessarily possesses all other perfections, and in this sense it is conceived by Scotus and his followers as the metaphysical essence of God.

An entirely different view was taken by Ockam, Biel, and the Nominalist school generally. As they denied the objective value of universal concepts, they held that all divine

[40] Sum. Theol. I, q. 13, a. 11.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid. q. 14, a. 4; q. 19, a. 1.
[43] Ibid. q. 3, a. 3.
[44] In IV Sent. I, d. 3, q. 2, n. 17.
[45] Miscel. q. 5, n. 25.
[46] Ibid. n. 26, 27.
[47] In IV Sent. IV, d. 13, q. 1, n. 31; cfr. Quodl. q. 5.

names have the same signification, and consequently that all attributes of the Godhead equally designate the fullness of divine being. Hence they made no distinction between the physical and metaphysical essence of God. They described God's essence simply as the *cumulus omnium perfectionum,* the sum total of all His perfections. From this sum total, however, they excluded, as was evidently required by the teaching of the Church, the divine relations and hypostases.

* * * * *

Closely connected with the question of God's essence, as treated by the Scholastics of the Middle Ages, are the considerations of His simplicity, spirituality, unicity, and infinite perfection. A few words concerning these will here be in place.

1. *Simplicity.* — That there can be no real distinction in the essence of the Godhead, and consequently no physical composition, was clearly taught by the writers of the Patristic period. St. Gregory the Great neatly summarized their teaching in this one sentence: "Whatever God has, that He is; in Him it is not one thing to be and another to have." [48] This view was taken over by the early Scholastics, St. Anselm,[49] Richard of St. Victor,[50] Peter Lombard,[51] Alanus of Lille,[52] and also by St. Bernard.[53] At the same time, however, owing to the dissentient teaching of Gilbert of Porrée, the matter became the subject of a theological discussion, which was finally settled by an ecclesiastical definition.

Gilbert's views on the point in question may be thus summarized. In all things one must distinguish between what is common to the class and proper to the individual. Substance is the highest genus of all corporeal and spiritual beings. It is taken in a two-fold sense: as that which is, *quod est subsistens,* and as that by reason of which it is, *quo est subsistens.* The latter is identical with nature, and this is ultimately the substantial form.[54]

[48] Moral. XVI, c. 43; PL. 75, 1147.
[49] Monol. c. 16; Proslog. c. 22.
[50] De Trin. I, c. 13.
[51] Sent. I, d. 8, c. 3.
[52] Ars Fidei, I, 8.
[53] De Consid. V, c. 7.
[54] Gaufredi Ep. ad Albinum Card.

These two concepts of substances — *quod est subsistens* and *quo est subsistens* — apply also to God. The divine nature, or *deitas,* is distinct from the Self-subsisting Being, or *Deus.* Nature is the substantial form in God, through which God is God, even as man is man through his humanity. Hence such forms of speech as the Godhead is God, wisdom is God, goodness is God, and also such as God is wisdom, goodness, truth, are theologically incorrect.

Gilbert was at the time bishop of Poitiers, and exception was first taken to his views when he expressed them in one of his sermons. His arch-deacon, Arnaldus *" qui non ridet,"* pointed out to him that his teaching was untenable. When that had no effect, appeal was made to Pope Eugene III, who during the Eastertide of 1146 was staying in Paris. The Pope submitted the matter to a council, which he convened at Paris during the following year, and over which he himself presided. But as Gilbert denied that he had ever taught the errors laid to his charge, Abbot Gottschalk, a Premonstratensian, was appointed to examine his writings and then report to the council which was shortly to be held at Rheims.[55]

Gottschalk performed the task assigned to him, but as he was unable to discuss the matter properly before the assembled bishops, that part was entrusted to St. Bernard. The latter marked four errors as opposed to the common teaching. They are: 1. The divine substance or nature is not God. 2. The three persons are not one God, one substance. 3. The persons are three by reason of three unities (*unitatibus*), and are different on account of three properties, which are not the same as the persons themselves; but they are three eternal differences, both in respect of themselves and of the divine substance. 4. The divine nature did not become incarnate, nor did it assume the human nature.[56]

These points were thoroughly discussed at the Council, which was held in 1148. As the cardinals present were in favor of Gilbert, it was feared that the Pope would be prevailed upon to abstain from giving a decision in the matter.

[55] Ibid. [56] Mansi, 21, 712.

Hence the French prelates chose a committee of four, which was sent to the Pope with the following confession of faith: 1. We believe that the simple nature of the Godhead is God, nor can it in any Catholic sense be denied that the divinity is God and God the divinity. 2. When we speak of the three persons, Father and Son and Holy Ghost, we confess that the three persons themselves are one God, one divine substance. 3. We believe that only God the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost are eternal and that there is no property in God which is eternal and not God. 4. We believe that the Godhead itself, or the divine substance or nature, has become incarnate, but in the Son.[57]

When the Pope had read this confession of faith, he answered the deputation that the articles contained therein were in conformity with the teaching of the Catholic Church. Then he added that although some of the cardinals were in favor of the person of Gilbert, they nevertheless all rejected his teaching. Thereupon, in a plenary session of the Council, Gilbert voluntarily retracted his teaching as formulated in the four articles, which were then publicly condemned by the Pope.[58]

This is the account given by Gaudefredus, Abbot of Clairveaux, while Otto of Freising states that the Pope contended himself with ruling, "*ne aliqua ratio in theologia inter naturam et personam divideret, neve Deus divina essentia diceretur ex sensu ablativi tantum sed etiam nominativi.*"[59] Nearly seventy years later (1215), the Fourth Lateran touched this same point when it defined the Blessed Trinity as "one absolutely simple essence, substance, or nature."[60]

The absolute simplicity of God's essence having thus been defined by the Church, the great theologians of the thirteenth century, Alexander of Hales,[61] St. Bonaventure,[62] Albertus Magnus,[63] and St. Thomas,[64] set forth in detail how this

[57] Mansi, 21, 712.
[58] Gaufredi, loc. cit.
[59] Gest. Frid. I, 52.
[60] Mansi, 22, 982 sqq.
[61] Sum. Theol. I, q. 5, m. 1, 2, 3.
[62] In IV Sent. I, d. 8, p. 2, q. 1.
[63] Sum. Theol. I, tr. 4, q. 20, m. 1–4.
[64] Sum. Theol. I, q. 2, a. 3–8.

simplicity is to be understood. They point out that the very concept of the divine essence excludes all composition, physical, metaphysical, and logical. As God is an *actus purus,* reasons St. Thomas, there is in the Godhead no composition of matter and form, of potency and act, of essence and existence, of nature and personality, of substance and accident, of genus and species, of general and particular; for all these kinds of composition presuppose corresponding potencies, and every potency is necessarily excluded from the *Esse Purum.* Hence God is His own essence, and whatever He has, that He is. And hence also, there can be no strict definition of God.[65]

Yet this absolute simplicity of God is not such that our concepts of His perfections, as in some way distinct, are without objective value. A merely mental distinction, *distinctio rationis,* does not seem sufficient, nor can the distinction which we make between them be based solely on God's relation to the world of creatures. For God is good, and wise, and all-powerful, independently of creation. Moreover, as St. Thomas argues,[66] in Holy Scripture God reveals these different perfections, and surely He does not reveal mere names. Hence that which corresponds to our concepts is more than a mere mental relation; it must in some way have a foundation in God's being. What is this foundation?

St. Thomas reduces it to God's absolute perfection — *plena et omnimoda perfectio* — which no single concept of ours can ever adequately express. He reasons thus: "Those things which in creatures are diverse, are one in God on account of His absolute simplicity. Thus therefore it must be said, that in God is wisdom, goodness and the like, each one of which is the divine essence itself, and in this way all are one *in re.* Then because each one of them is in God after its truest significance, and because the nature of wisdom is not the nature of goodness, when formally considered as such, it follows that they are diverse, not only as viewed by the reasoning mind, but on the part of the object — *ex parte rei.* . . . And thus it is obvious that the plurality of those names

[65] Ibid. [66] Quaest. Disp. c. 1, a. 6; cfr. c. 7.

is not derived from our intellect alone, when it forms diverse concepts of God, . . . but also from the being of God Himself, in so far, namely, as there is something in God corresponding to all these concepts, that is, His full and absolute perfection; whence it comes about that every one of the names signifying these concepts is truly and properly predicated of God: not, however, in such a way that any diversity or multiplicity is, by reason of these attributes, affirmed in the object, which is God." [67]

Hence, according to St. Thomas, that which corresponds to our different concepts of God's perfections is more than a pure relation; it is something objective, something virtually distinct for each particular concept. This virtual distinction, however, reduces ultimately to God's infinite perfection and the limitation of our finite minds.

Henry of Ghent, a disciple of Albertus Magnus, comes practically to the same conclusion, though his method of reasoning it out is different. He admits, however, a threefold plurality in God — plurality of ideas, plurality of attributes, and a trinity of persons.[68] This peculiar view, at least as regards the divine intellect and will, was later on defended by Dionysius the Carthusian.[69]

Duns Scotus was not satisfied with these explanations. He regarded them as placing between the divine attributes a merely mental distinction, a *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis,* derived from God's relation to the created world. After arguing against them at great length, he states his own view as follows: "I maintain that between the essential perfections there is not merely a mental distinction, that is, of different ways of conceiving the same formal object; for such a distinction there is between the person who has wisdom and wisdom itself, and obviously a greater distinction between wisdom and truth: nor is there only a distinction of the formal objects as they are in the intellect, because, as was shown before, such a distinction is never found in intuitive cognition unless it is also in the object intuitively known. . . . Hence

[67] In Sent. I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 2, 3; cfr. De Poten. q. 7, a. 6.

[68] Quodl. 5.

[69] In Sent. I, d. 2, q. 2.

there is a third distinction, which precedes the intellect in every way; and it is this, that wisdom is in the object objectively, and goodness is in the object objectively. But wisdom in the object is formally not goodness in the object. And this statement is thus proved, because if infinite wisdom were formally infinite goodness, then wisdom in general would also formally be goodness in general; for infinity does not destroy the formal nature of that to which it is added. . . ."

" Hence there is a certain formal non-identity of wisdom and goodness, in so far as their definitions would be distinct, if they could be defined; but a definition does not indicate that alone which has its origin from the intellect, but also the nature of the object (*quidditatem rei*), and hence there is objectively no formal identity. I, therefore, understand the matter thus: The intellect, combining the ideas of the proposition, wisdom is not goodness formally considered, does not by its own act cause the truth of the combination, but finds the extremes, on account of whose combination its judgment is true, in the object. . . . Thus I concede that by way of identity truth is goodness objectively, but formally truth is not goodness.[70]

This " third distinction," which Scotus holds to lie midway between a real and a purely mental distinction, is usually called *distinctio formalis*, because it is based upon certain supposed *formalitates* in the absolutely simple essence of God. What these *formalitates* really are, neither Scotus nor his followers have ever made clear. That they are not distinct realities is conceded by all, and necessarily so; for the absolute simplicity of God, as taught by the Church, requires that whatever perfection is in the Godhead is God Himself. And yet if they are not distinct realities, they would seem to be neither more nor less than the *plena et omnimoda perfectio* of which St. Thomas speaks. Hence it is that, although the *distinctio formalis* of Scotus has never been condemned, nearly all subsequent theologians teach the virtual distinction formulated by St. Thomas — a mental distinction which is based

[70] In IV Sent. I, d. 8, q. 4.

upon God's infinite perfection, as containing *via eminentiae* all the perfection of our distinct concepts.

However, this virtual distinction was rejected by the Nominalists of the school of Ockam, as sinning by excess. According to them, all the names and attributes of God are synonymous *per se,* and offer no basis for a distinction except in their relation to the world of creatures. Hence whatever distinctions we make between God's essence and His attributes, or between His attributes referred to one another, can in the very nature of things be only logical, a purely mental distinction without a foundation in God's being. This exaggerated view of God's simplicity has not been explicitly condemned by the Church, but it is universally regarded as false and dangerous to the faith.

2. *Spirituality.*— This term is usually taken to imply three distinct concepts: immateriality, superiority to matter, and intellectuality. All three concepts are brought out by the Scholastics in connection with God's essence. Thus St. Anselm writes: "No nobler essence is known than that of spirit or body; and of these the spirit is nobler than the body: hence it is to be held that the divine essence is a spirit, and not a body."[71] The same view is taken by Hugh of St. Victor,[72] St. Bernard, Alanus of Lille,[73] Peter Lombard,[74] and all his commentators. The only exception, leaving aside Scotus Erigena, were some theologians of the pantheistic school of Chartres, especially Amalry of Bène and David of Dinant. Of these two St. Thomas relates that the former held God to be "the formal constituent principle of all things," whilst the latter "most absurdly taught that God was primary matter."[75] The spirituality of God, which was always treated as a matter of faith by theologians, was first explicitly defined by the Vatican Council, to offset the vagaries of modern errors.[76]

3. *Unicity.*— The unity of God, as opposed to plurality, was usually considered by the early Scholastics in connection

[71] Monol. c. 27.
[72] Didascal. VII, c. 19.
[73] Theol. Reg. 7.
[74] Sent. I, d. 35, 45.
[75] Sum. Theol. I, q. 3, a. 8.
[76] Sess. 3, c. 1.

with the mystery of the Blessed Trinity. They pointed out, as the Fathers had done before them, that, although the three divine persons are really distinct, yet there is only one God. Hence in that connection they took unity in the sense of unicity. On this point there never was any difference of opinion; nor could there be among Catholics, since the unicity of God had been recognized from the beginning as a fundamental dogma of the faith.

Some, moreover, like St. Anselm,[77] Hugh of St. Victor,[78] and Peter Lombard,[79] proved this doctrine by philosophical arguments. Nearly all of them based their reasoning upon the obvious necessity of one sole First Cause. The same line of reasoning was followed by St. Thomas in his *Commentary on the Sentences,*[80] but in his *Summa Theologica* he derives the unicity of God from the attribute of infinity.[81] This latter method was also adopted by Duns Scotus.[82]

4. *Infinity.*— St. Anselm puts forward the idea of God's infinity in his ontological argument for the existence of God, which, as was pointed out above,[83] is derived from the concept of a being than which none can be more perfect. But in another place he bases the infinite perfection of God upon His sovereign goodness, which necessarily implies plenitude of being.[84] St. Thomas takes self-subsistence as the basis of his argument. He reasons in this way. From a being whose very essence is self-subsistence all potentiality is necessarily excluded, hence it "must contain within itself the whole perfection of being."[85] A being is called infinite because it is not finite — its perfection is without limit; and this is necessarily implied in self-subsistence. Consequently, "it is clear that God is infinite and perfect."[86] The same conclusion is also deduced from the notion of first cause;[87] for the very idea of first cause implies all possible perfections and that without any limitation in their concept. This latter argument

[77] Monol. cc. 3, 4.
[78] Didascal. VII, c. 19; cfr. De Sacr. I, p. 3, c. 12.
[79] Sent. I, d. 2; II, d. 1.
[80] In Sent. II, d. 1.
[81] Sum. Theol. I, q. 11, a. 3, 4.
[82] In IV Sent. I, d. 10, 13, q. 5.
[83] P. XX.
[84] Monol. c. 15.
[85] Sum. Theol. I, q. 7.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid.

is also used by Scotus,[88] who deduces God's infinity directly from the proofs advanced for His existence. That God is infinite in every line of perfection, and therefore infinite in the strict sense of the term, is one of the doctrines explicitly defined by the Vatican Council.[89]

[88] Quodl. q. 7, n. 31.

[89] Sess. 3, c. 1.

CHAPTER II

THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD

By the attributes of God are understood essential perfections of the divine nature, which, in our human way of thinking, are conceived as emanating from God's metaphysical essence. Objectively, essence and attributes are indeed identical in the Godhead, so that it is perfectly true to say, God is wisdom, God is goodness, God is justice; but, as was pointed out in the preceding chapter, we necessarily place a virtual distinction between them, and thus rightly consider God's indivisible essence under many distinct aspects. These distinct aspects, based upon the plenitude of divine perfections, we call attributes.

Bearing in mind God's infinitude and our mental limitations, it is obvious from the very nature of the case that these attributes are exceedingly numerous. All the distinct perfections which we observe in the created world, and others which might acquire existence in any possible world, must necessarily be found in the Godhead. Not formally as created perfections, but as self-subsistent actuality, whence all created perfections are derived.

This immediately gives rise to the question, how are we to conceive these perfections to exist in the Godhead? Our concepts of them are derived from the consideration of creatures; can we predicate them of God as thus derived, or must they first be rectified in accordance with the requirements of the divine nature?

In answering this question, it is customary to divide created perfections into two classes. In the first class are gathered together all such as imply no imperfection in their concepts, and are therefore called simple perfections. In the other class all those are placed whose concepts do imply certain

imperfections, and these are termed mixed perfections. To the former belong such as wisdom, justice, and mercy; to the latter, rationality, animality, and in general all those that are in some way connected with matter. Simple perfections are said to be formally in God, in as much as they are predicated of Him in their own proper sense. Mixed perfections are attributed to God only *eminenter,* that is, whatever actuality they possess is in God, but in a different and higher sense. In either case, as attributed to God, these perfections must be conceived as infinite.

A further distinction must be made between these perfections in their relation to the divine essence. Some of them, as simplicity, unicity, spirituality, and infinitude, are attributes only in a wider sense of the term; because they belong to God's essence as such and cannot be conceived as emanating therefrom. Others are of a transcendental nature, in as much as their formal concept lies beyond all the categories of being. They are oneness, truth, and goodness. The former class has already been considered in connection with the divine essence; of the latter nothing further need be said than that their existence has always been a matter of faith.

Besides these there are the divine attributes strictly so called, which are conceived by us as superadded to God's essence, or as perfections emanating from the divine essence as their ontological principle. They are usually divided into negative and positive attributes. The former deny in God certain imperfections contained in their concepts as derived from creatures. Thus in regard to time and place God is said to be eternal, immutable, immense. They are also called incommunicable, as they can in no true sense be communicated to creatures. The other class comprises all simple perfections, which may be referred either to God's intellect, will, or power. They are communicable, in as much as they may be imitated in created beings.

Of the negative attributes little need be said in the present connection, since they do not readily lend themselves to doctrinal development. God's *eternity* is clearly taught in the Athanasian Symbol, and was correctly defined by Boethius as

"the whole and simultaneous possession of interminable life." [1] It is not merely duration without beginning and without end, but also without succession. It is the everlasting and unchangeable present, excluding from its concept both past and future. Hence the Scholastics usually derived this divine attribute from God's immutability.[2]

The *immutability* or unchangeableness of God necessarily follows from the fact that He is an *actus purus,* pure actuality, and also from the other fact that He is infinitely perfect. St. Thomas assigns both of these reasons,[3] while Scotus insists more upon the latter.[4] The early Scholastics observed a slightly different order of deduction. Thus St. Anselm derives God's immutability by way of corollary from the attributes of simplicity, eternity, and omnipresence; [5] whereas Hugh of St. Victor [6] and St. Bernard [7] deduce it directly from the simplicity of the divine essence. Peter Lombard bases his arguments for its existence exclusively upon Holy Scripture and the writings of the Fathers.[8]

God's *immensity* may be viewed under a twofold aspect: First, absolutely as it is in itself; and in this sense it excludes all spatial relations. By reason of His immensity God is above all space, as by reason of His eternity He is above all time. Secondly, immensity may be taken in a relative sense, as *omnipresence,* in as much as God is intimately present to all His creatures, and thus without change and extension fills all space. Under the former aspect God's immensity was admitted by all Scholastics, while under the latter it was at various times made a matter of discussion.

Thus Honorius of Autun answered the query, "where does God dwell?" by saying: "Although He is everywhere by His power, still by His substance He is only in the intellectual heaven," that is, in the place where He is seen face to face by the blessed.[9] A similar view was held by Theodoric of

[1] De Cons. Phil. V, 6; ML. 63, 858.
[2] Cfr. Thomas, Sum. Theol. I, q. 10, a. 1; Scot. Quodl. q. 6, n. 13–15; De Rerum Princ. q. 22, n. 5.
[3] Sum. Theol. I, q. 9, a. 1, 2.
[4] In IV Sent. I, d. 8, q. 5.
[5] Monol. c. 25.
[6] De Sacr. I, p. 3. c. 13.
[7] In Cant. Serm. 80, n. 5.
[8] Sent. I, d. 8, n. 2.
[9] Elucid. 3.

Chartres [10] although he is quite frequently accused of having taught pantheism. Scotus accepted the traditional teaching of the Church, that God is everywhere present by His essence, but he denied the force of the argument commonly advanced to establish this truth.[11] The same position was taken by the Nominalists.[12]

Others, however, as St. Anselm,[13] Hugh of St. Victor,[14] Walter de Mortagne,[15] Richard of St. Victor,[16] and Peter Lombard,[17] not only admitted the doctrine as contained in the teaching of the Church, but also assigned reasons for their belief. The statement of the Lombard, *quod Deus incommutabiliter semper in se existens, praesentialiter, potentialiter, essentialiter est in omni natura sive essentia sine sui definitione, et in omni loco sine circumscriptione, et in omni tempore sine mutabilitate,* was more fully developed by nearly all subsequent Scholastics. St. Thomas thus concludes his reasoning on the subject: "Therefore, God is in all things by His power, in as much as all things are subject to His power; He is in all things by His presence, in as much as all things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His essence, in as much as He is the cause of existence to all things." [18] And again: "Indeed, by the very fact that He gives existence to everything in every place, He fills every place." [19]

Of the positive attributes we can here consider only God's knowledge, His omnipotence, and the freedom of His will. The following is a brief summary of the most important points on the subject as treated by the Scholastics.

1. *Divine Knowledge.*— As God is self-subsistent being and the first cause of creatures, it necessarily follows that intellect and understanding must be predicated of Him as essential attributes. And as He is absolutely simple, it also follows that He is His own intellect and His own understanding. On these points there never was any difference of

[10] Cfr. d'Achery, Spicil. III, p. 522.
[11] Report. I, d. 37, q. 1.
[12] Cfr. Biel, Collect. I, d. 38.
[13] De Fide Trin. c. 4.
[14] Didasc. VII, c. 19.
[15] Cfr. d'Archery, op. cit.
[16] De Trin. II, 22.
[17] Sent. I, d. 37.
[18] Sum. Theol. I, q. 8, a. 3.
[19] Ibid. a. 2.

opinion, either among the Fathers or the Scholastics. "That which is knowledge in God," says St. Augustine, "the same is wisdom, and that which is wisdom, the same is (His) essence or substance." [20] Peter Lombard repeats this statement in the terse sentence: "God's knowledge, of course, is His essence." [21]

Assuming the fact of divine knowledge as sufficiently obvious, most of the Scholastics limited their investigation to its nature and object. How does God know, and what does God know?

In answer to the first question — how does God know? — all state, either explicitly or implicitly, that divine cognition is an absolutely simple act, in which intelligible species, intellect, and essence are all identified. St. Thomas puts his reasoning in this form: "Since God has nothing of potentiality, but is pure act, the intellect and its object in Him are altogether the same; . . . nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect." [22] And "thus it follows that in God the intellect, and the object understood, and the intelligible species, and His understanding act are entirely one and the same." [23] In substance this is the view of all Scholastics, except that Scotus introduces here his *distinctio formalis*.[24]

Furthermore, the one medium of divine cognition is God's essence itself, in the sense that no object apart from God has a determining influence on His intellect. "As existence follows on form,' writes St. Thomas, "so in like manner to understand follows on the intelligible idea. In God there is no form apart from His existence. Hence, as His essence itself is also His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His act of understanding itself must be His essence and His existence." [25] Scotus puts this same teaching in a slightly different form, when he says: "Assuming that there is a passive intellect in God, which needs a form or *quasi* form for its operation, this form may be said to be His own es-

[20] De Trin. XV, c. 13.
[21] Sent. I, d. 36, n. 1.
[22] Sum. Theol. I, q. 14, a. 2.
[23] Ibid. q. 14, a. 4.
[24] Report. I, d. 35, q. 1.
[25] Sum. Theol. I, q. 14, a. 4.

sence as such, which in its absolute perfection is the medium of knowing, not only itself, but also everything else that is in any way knowable." [26]

The object of divine cognition — what God knows — is twofold: First, His own being, or Himself as one in nature and three in person; secondly, things apart from Himself, whether at some time actually existing or merely possible.

Regarding the first, God's knowledge of Himself, there never was any difference of opinion. St. Thomas only formulates the common teaching on this point, when he writes that in God " the intelligible idea itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus He understands Himself by Himself." [27] And this understanding of Himself is comprehensive, or as infinitely perfect as is the divine essence. For " the power of God's own knowledge is as great as His actual existence; because from the fact that He is actuality separated from all matter and potentiality, He is knowable in a corresponding degree. It is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that reason He perfectly comprehends Himself." [28]

Things outside God, in the sense that they are not identified with His being, are of two kinds: First, beings which at some time or other have actual existence; secondly, beings which always remain in the state of mere possibility. The latter are subdivided into three classes: purely possibles; futuribles whose futurition is conditioned by the action of necessary causes; and futuribles whose futurition depends on the self-determination of free agents. Concerning divine cognition of these various classes of beings, different views were held by different theologians. Only a brief outline of the more important of them can here be given.

(a) Regarding the mere fact that God knows all things, whether actual or possible, there never was any disagreement among the Schoolmen; but, as St. Thomas points out, according to some " God knows other things (than Himself) only in general, that is, only as beings." [29] Against these he

[26] In Sent. I, d. 35, q. 1.
[27] Sum. Theol. I, q. 14, a. 2.
[28] Ibid. a. 3.
[29] Ibid. a. 6.

argues, that "as God's essence contains all the perfections contained in the essence of any other being, and far more, He can know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge." The same position had already been taken by Peter Lombard, who reasons that God's knowledge is necessarily eternal, essential, unchangeable, extending itself not only to the things that are or shall be, but also to such as are possible indeed yet are never realized.[30] St. Bonaventure expresses his view in similar terms; for answering the question whether God's knowledge can be increased or diminished, he says: "The knowledge of God is unchangeable as is His essence, and He always knows all things by one and the same act.[31] The contrary view he regards as heretical.

(b) All are agreed that God's knowledge of finite beings, in so far as they are considered in the state of possibility, is necessarily included in His comprehensive knowledge of His own essence; whether, as in the view of St. Thomas,[32] the possibles as such are conceived to be by supposition prior to divine cognition, or, as in the opinion of Scotus,[33] they are held to be formally constituted in the state of possibility by the act of divine knowledge. This cognition theologians usually call the knowledge of simple intelligence, to distinguish it from the knowledge of vision, which has for its object all finite beings in so far as they are at one time or another actually existing.

(c) As no finite beings exist from all eternity, and as God's knowledge of them is necessarily eternal, they are in one sense all known to God under the aspect of futurition; hence the question arises, what precise relation do future things bear to God's knowledge? Is God's knowledge of them the cause of their future existence, or is their future existence the cause of God's knowledge? Or is there a third way of conceiving the matter?

In answering the first question, the Scholastics distinguish between God's knowledge taken in an exclusive sense, simply as knowledge, and God's knowledge conceived as directive of

[30] Sent. I, d. 39, n. 5.
[31] In Sent. I, d. 39, 1, 4.
[32] Sum. Theol. I, q. 15, a. 2.
[33] Report. I, d. 35.

the divine will, or as knowledge of approbation. Taken in the former sense, divine cognition, as all are agreed, is purely speculative, and as such it cannot be regarded as the cause of anything; in the latter sense it is practical, and may be denominated the cause of things, but only on account of its connection with the will.[34] It is in this sense that St. Thomas writes: "It is manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His existence is His intelligence; and hence His knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it. Therefore, the knowledge of God as the cause of things is commonly called the knowledge of approbation." [35]

In this connection the Scholastics also note that God's foreknowledge of future events does not interfere with the free action of secondary causes. What God foreknows will come to pass, but as determined by the finite causes that bring it about. Thus God foreknew from all eternity the fall of Peter, and His foreknowledge of the event was infallible; hence as the object of God's eternal prevision the fall was inevitable, yet Peter fell by freely consenting to a temptation which he then and there might have resisted. And the ultimate explanation is that God foreknows all things as they are in themselves and in their relation to their proximate causes — the necessary as necessary, and the contingent as contingent.[36]

The second question, whether future things are the cause of God's knowledge, is by all Scholastics answered in the negative. They usually touch this point in explaining an apparent difficulty drawn from a text of Origen, namely: "A thing will not happen because God knows it as future; but because it is future, hence it is that it is known by God before it exists." Peter Lombard[37] and Alexander of Hales[38] call future events a *causa sine qua non* of divine cognition, in the sense of mere concomitance. The fact of

[34] Lomb. Sent. I, d. 38, n. 5; Halens. Sum. I, q. 33, m. 2; Bonavent. In Sent. I, d. 38, 1.
[35] Sum. I, q. 14, a. 8.
[36] Halens. op. cit. q. 23, m. 6.
[37] Sent. I, d. 38, 4.
[38] Sum. I, q. 23, m. 2.

its future occurrence is in a manner the reason why an event is foreknown, but it does not cause God's foreknowledge. Practically the same explanation is given by St. Bonaventure.[39] St. Thomas interprets Origen in this way: "When we say that God foreknows some things because they are in the future, this must be understood according to the cause of consequence; and not according to the cause of existence. If things are in the future, it follows that God knows them; but nevertheless the futurity of things is not the cause of God's knowledge."[40] Scotus agrees with this explanation, in as much as he holds that things apart from God are objects of divine cognition only *terminative*.[41]

(d) It was stated above that the sole medium of divine cognition is God's essence; and from what is said in the preceding paragraph it necessarily follows that God's essence is also its sole primary object. That essence is the archetype of all that is or can be, and as a *species intelligibilis* it exhibits to the divine intellect all that is knowable. In this sense St. Thomas states: "God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself by His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but in Himself; in as much as His essence contains the similitude of other things besides Himself."[42] And the same view is expressed by Scotus, when he says that God sees all things *mediante essentia sua infinita*.[43] This is, however, not merely a knowledge of the divine essence as imitable *ad extra*, but also of the things themselves. St. Thomas, after giving a rather lengthy illustration drawn from human cognition, arrives at this conclusion: "We must say therefore that God does not only know that things are in Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows them in their own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him."[44]

Here, however, a distinction is to be made between God's knowledge of necessary things and of things that are contingent. Necessary things are infallibly known by Him either

[39] In Sent. I, d. 38, 1.
[40] Sum. Theol. I, q. 14, a. 8 ad 1m.
[41] Report. I, d. 36, q. 1, n. 5–7.
[42] Sum. Theol. I, q. 14, a. 5.
[43] Loc. cit.
[44] Sum. Theol. q. 14, a. 6, ad 1m.

because they flow from His essence, or because they are determined by a decree of His will; and so a knowledge of them in their causes is sufficient. But the same does not hold true of contingent things. For as St. Thomas points out: "Whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural knowledge of it"; but divine knowledge is not conjectural — it is infallible. Hence, "God knows all contingent things not only in their causes, but also as each one is actually in itself." [45]

In this connection the difficult question suggests itself, how does God know these contingent things in themselves? St. Thomas answers: "Although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in themselves, as we do; but He knows them all at once; because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His existence; for eternity existing all at once comprises all time. Hence all temporal things are present to God from eternity, not only in such wise that He has the ideas of all things before Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things, as they are in their presentiality. Consequently, it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, in as much as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; still they are really future contingent things in relation to their own proximate causes." [46]

Substantially the same answer is given by St. Bonaventure, who says that all things are present to God, not according to the truth of their existence, but in reference to perfect cognition; and the reason of this intimate presentiality is that God's eternity comprises in the indivisible *now* all succession of time.[47]

However, this presentiality by itself does not seem to solve the difficulty, since it must always be held that the divine essence is the primary object of cognition. For how can that essence represent a future event that flows from a free cause? In other words, what is the ultimate reason of the eternal

[45] Ibid. a. 13. [46] Ibid. [47] In Sent. I, d. 35, dub. 6.

presentiality of contingent events to the divine intellect? No explicit answer is given by any of these writers, but they all seem to fall back upon some kind of divine causality in reference to the events in question. Thus St. Thomas says that "God knows all things apart from Himself in so far as He is their cause";[48] and St. Bonaventure holds that the divine will, fully known, is a sufficient reason for His knowledge of all other things.[49] Similar statements are found in the works of Albertus Magnus[50] and Alexander of Hales.[51] Of course, this causality may be conceived as identical with the divine *concursus,* necessarily postulated for every finite action; but modern writers are not agreed in their interpretation of the old Scholastic teaching on this point.

The position of Scotus in this respect is not altogether clear. He is not satisfied with the explanation given by St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, but postulates for the divine cognition of future contingent events a decree of futurition. The divine essence, he maintains, represents all things, in so far as they are future, in virtue of a determination of the divine will.[52] Some Scotists, like Mastrius,[53] interpret this decree of futurition to be merely concomitant, but others look upon it as antecedent to the action of the finite cause. And this, it seems, Scotus really had in mind; for he says: "It may be assumed that the divine intellect represents simple ideas, the combination of which is contingent in its actual existence; or that it represents a combination of ideas, which is still indifferent with regard to its actuality: and then the will, selecting one part or combination of ideas for actuation at a given point of time, makes the event definitely true."[54] God has indeed a certain knowledge of contingent events antecedently to His decree of futurition, but that is only a phase of His knowledge of purely possible events. Contingent events are known as future solely in virtue of a determination

[48] Cont. Gent. I, c. 49, 65; Sum. Theol. I, q. 14, a. 11.
[49] Op. cit. d. 35, q. 2, a. 2 ad 4m.
[50] Sum. I, tr. 15, q. 60, m. 4.
[51] Sum. I, q. 23, m. 3, a. 4.
[52] In Sent. I, d. 39, q. unic. n. 23; d. 41, q. unic. n. 10; Report. d. 40, q. unica.
[53] Disp. Theol. I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 8.
[54] In Sent. I, d. 39, n. 23.

of the divine will, although that determination does not interfere with the free action of the finite agent.

This looks very much like the teaching of the later Thomists, yet it is different from it in one very essential point. Scotus, as appears from the whole trend of his philosophical teaching, was decidedly opposed to the *praemotio physica* which is inextricably bound up with the *decreta voluntatis Dei* of the Thomists. Hence the decree of futurition, as understood by Scotus, would seem to be limited to the *concursus,* although his words cited above imply more.

The Nominalists, who in regard to many other points develop the views of Scotus, regard divine cognition of future contingent events as an inscrutable mystery. Hence they content themselves with pointing to the infinite perfection of God's intellect, which in some way must be able to know all things, whether actual or purely possible.[55]

Finally, it may be added that although the Scholastics speak of God's knowledge as extending to all contingent future events, they do not explicitly consider the question of divine cognition in reference to conditionally free actions of the future. Consequently, they divide God's knowledge into knowledge of vision and knowledge of simple intelligence, without saying anything about the *scientia media* which played such an important part in later theological discussions. Still, they state or imply all the principles upon which that knowledge is founded.

2. *The Divine Will.*— As the divine intellect and cognition, so are also, according to the teaching of the Scholastics, the divine will and volition identified with God's essence. Similarly, as God's essence is the primary object of divine cognition, so is that same essence also the primary object of divine volition. Lastly, as God knows things apart from Himself, so does He also will things apart from Himself. Still, His knowledge is more extensive than His volition; for while He knows evil, He cannot will evil — that is, in the moral order.

The attributes reducible to the divine will, which here call

[55] Cfr. Gregory of Rimini, In Sent. I, d. 39, q. 2, a. 2.

for special consideration, are omnipotence and freedom. For it was chiefly in regard to these that there was some difference of opinion among the early Schoolmen.

(a) *Omnipotence.*—Like all others of these attributes, omnipotence is predicated of God in reference to His actions *ad extra.* His own interior life does not, properly speaking, come within the sphere of His power. He exists necessarily, in the sense that He is self-subsistence; and by His very essence He is one in nature and three in person. Hence it is only in regard to things apart from Himself that His power can be exerted in the strict sense of the term. And in this sense His power is co-extensive with His practical knowledge; so that whatever He knows to be operable by an infinitely perfect being, the same He has power to execute both in the physical and moral order of things. Now, in the physical order everything is operable that does not imply a contradiction in terms; and in the moral order, everything that is not opposed to God's sanctity. In respect of all this, therefore, God is called omnipotent.

God's omnipotence, as thus understood, was first called in question by Abelard, according to whom God can do only what He at some time or other actually does; because God can do only what it becomes Him to do, and whatever it becomes Him to do He does not fail to do.[56] Abelard was strongly attacked by William of Saint Thierry,[57] St. Bernard,[58] Robert Pulleyn,[59] and Hugh of St. Victor.[60] His error was condemned by the Council of Sens, held in 1140. In his *Second Apology* he retracted his statements and subscribed to the proposition: "I believe that God cannot do anything that is not in harmony with Himself, but that He could have done many other things than those which He has done."

Omnipotence, as is obvious, may be viewed under a twofold aspect: First, absolutely, as it is in itself, without refer-

[56] Introd. ad Theol. III, c. 5; cfr. Theol. Christ. 5.
[57] Disp. adv. Abelard. c. 6; ML. 180, 266.
[58] Ep. 190, 5.
[59] Sent. I, n. 16.
[60] De Sacr. I. p. 2. c. 22; Sent. tr. 1, c. 14; Didasc. VII, c. 2.

ence to any decree of the divine will; and so viewed it is called *potentia absoluta.* Secondly, relatively, in reference to certain divine decrees, by which it is restricted in its operation; and in this sense it is termed *potentia ordinata* or *ordinaria.* By His *potentia absoluta* God could have decreed to establish a different order of things from that which He did establish; but having once decreed to establish this particular order, His *potentia ordinata* is limited in its operation by the scope of His decree.

This distinction is taken account of by all the early Scholastics, but they do not all make the same application of it in their reasoning on God's operations *ad extra.* Thus St. Thomas emphasizes God's wisdom as a directive norm of His power,[61] while Scotus admits no other norm than the divine nature itself.[62] In the theological system of St. Thomas, as is well known, it is the intellect that holds the primacy among attributes and faculties; whereas in the theology of Scotus this primacy is assigned to the will. The reasoning of St. Thomas, that in command and execution intellect and wisdom must ever be regarded as a directive norm, Scotus tries to refute by saying: "The divine will, which is the first rule of all that is operable and of all actions, and the action of the divine will whence the first rule is derived, constitute the first rectitude. . . . But whatever does not include a contradiction is absolutely not repugnant to the divine will, and therefore whatever God does or effects is by that very fact right and just." [63] Hence Scotus places a much greater emphasis upon the *potentia absoluta* than does St. Thomas, though not to such an extent as to make God's actions arbitrary. For they must always be in harmony with the sanctity of the divine nature.

This view of Scotus in reference to the *potentia absoluta* was taken over by the Nominalists and carried to its last extreme. Not only could the historical facts of God's world-plan have been different, as all Scholastics admitted, but the

[61] Sum. Theol. I, q. 22, a. 3; ibid. q. 19, a. 4.

[62] In Sent. IV, d. 49; Report. I, d. 10; Quodl. q. 16.

[63] Report. IV, d. 46, q. 4.

same must be said of what belongs to ethics and morality. Thus Ockam writes: *Odium Dei, furari, adulterari, . . . quantum ad esse absolute in illis actibus, . . . etiam meritorie possent fieri a viatore, si caderent sub praecepto divino, sicut nunc de facto eorum opposita cadunt sub praecepto divino.*[64] This teaching is only one short step removed from the blasphemous utterance of Calvin, that "God not only foreknew the fall of the first man and the ruin of his descendants, but ordained the same by an act of His sovereign will."[65]

(b) *Freedom of the Divine Will.*— The common teaching of the early Scholastics in reference to the freedom of God's will is thus formulated by St. Thomas: "The divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness necessarily." . . . But "since the goodness of God is perfect and can exist without other things, in as much as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition; for supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will is not mutable."[66] Hence God's will is not free in reference to its primary object, which is His own goodness; but it is free in respect of its secondary object, which includes all creatures in so far as they are expressions of His goodness in their being and actions.[67] This freedom, of course, does not suppose passive indifference on the part of God; nor does it extend to what is morally evil, except by way of permission.[68]

Scotus conceives the freedom of God's will in a somewhat different way. He distinguishes in God an essential and a contingent liberty. The former consists in the power of self-determination and of dominion;[69] the latter is a volitional indifference, not in respect of divine volition itself, but with regard to its objects or effects.[70] In view of this distinction

[64] In Sent. II, q. 19, litt. O.
[65] Instit. III, c. 21, n. 7.
[66] Sum. Theol. I, q. 19, a. 3.
[67] Cfr. Bonavent. In Sent. II, d. 25, p. 2, q. 1, 2, 3; d. 45, a. 2, q. 1.
[68] Thomas. op. cit. q. 19, a. 5, 9; Bonavent. op. cit. d. 45, a. 3, q. 1, 2.
[69] Report. I, d. 10; Quodl. q. 16.
[70] In Sent. I, d. 39, n. 21, 22.

he holds that God wills or loves freely, not only His creatures, but also His own nature and purely possible entities. With this difference, however, that His love of Himself proceeds from His essential liberty only, whilst His inefficacious complacency in purely possible entities, and His efficacious complacency in His creatures — past, present, and future — proceed both from His essential and contingent liberty. God's essential liberty is perfectly compatible with the necessity of willing and loving Himself, though this necessity excludes the liberty of contingence or contradiction.[71] In some respects, this view is a development of the teaching of St. Bonaventure on the freedom of immutability as predicated of the divine will.[72]

The will of God in reference to creatures and their actions, is usually divided by the Scholastics into the will of good pleasure or complacency and the will of expression — *voluntas beneplaciti et voluntas signi.*[73] The former is the divine will taken in its proper sense; the latter is attributed to God by way of metaphor and comprises the various outward manifestations of the divine will. These manifestations are commonly summed up as prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission. Thus St. Thomas, after explaining how these "five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will," concludes: "Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary, and counsel to good that is of supererogation.[74]

God's will of good pleasure or complacency was also distinguished by these writers into antecedent and consequent — *voluntas antecedens et voluntas consequens.*[75] Antecedent and consequent, in this connection, is a denomination that is taken, not from the will itself, but from the different condi-

[71] Quodl. q. 16; In Sent. III, d. 32, n. 2, 5.
[72] In Sent. I, d. 8, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, 2.
[73] Halens. Sum. I, q. 36, m. 1; Thomas, In Sent. I, q. 1, a. 4; Sum. I, q. 19, a. 11; Albert. Sum. I, tr. 20, q. 80.
[74] Sum. I, q. 19, a. 12.
[75] Halens. op. cit. I, q. 36; Thomas, Sum. I, q. 19, a. 6 ad 1m.

tions of the object of divine volition. This distinction was already frequently made use of by Patristic writers, in their efforts to uphold and explain the universality of God's salvific will. Thus St. John Damascene writes: "Antecedently God wills all men to be saved; for, as He is good, He did not create us for punishment, but that we might share in His goodness. However, as He is just, He wills that sinners be punished. The first will, therefore, is called antecedent and of good pleasure, and this proceeds from Himself; but the second is called consequent and permissive, and this is conditioned by our own action." [76] The Scholastics made a similar application of this distinction when treating the question of predestination and reprobation, as will be set forth in another chapter.

The nature of God and His attributes, which forms the subject-matter of this and the preceding chapter, is thus defined by the Fourth Lateran Council, held in 1215: "We firmly believe and sincerely confess that there is one sole true God, eternal, immense and immutable, incomprehensible, omnipotent and ineffable, . . . one essence, substance, or nature, altogether simple." [77]

[76] De Fide Orth. II, c. 29; ML. 94, 970.
[77] Mansi, 22, 982; DB. n. 428.

CHAPTER III

PREDESTINATION

PREDESTINARIAN CONTROVERSY: TEACHING OF THE SCHOLASTICS

As predestination consists in a divine decree which ordains the direction of rational creatures to their appointed end, theologians usually investigate this difficult question in connection with their treatises on the intellect and will of God. It is not the most logical order that could be adopted, for thus the fact of creation and elevation must be presupposed; but as it will serve our present purpose sufficiently well, there appears no need of rearranging what has the sanction of long usage. Hence in this chapter we shall give a brief review of both the historical and theological aspect of the chief points involved in the question of predestination.

A — Predestinarian Controversy

Predestination became a matter of controversy as early as the fifth century, owing to certain statements of St. Augustine which were interpreted as implying that God predestined some men to eternal punishment by refusing to give them sufficient grace for the working out of their salvation.[1] The Semi-Pelagians of Southern Gaul took up these statements and endeavored to show that they were out of harmony with the accepted universality of God's salvific will. At the same time a certain Lucidus, a priest of the diocese of Riez, openly taught that God predestined some men to hell as He predestined others to heaven, and that neither the one class nor the other could do aught to shape their eternal destiny. His

[1] Cfr. vol. I, p. 379 sqq.

teaching was condemned by the Council of Arles, held in 473. The teaching of St. Augustine remained meanwhile somewhat uncertain, but his friend St. Prosper gave the following interpretation of it in regard to the reprobate: "Of their own will they went out; of their own will they fell, and because their fall was foreknown, they were not predestined (to eternal life); they would however be predestined if they were to return and persevere in holiness. Hence God's predestination is for many the cause of perseverance, but for no one the cause of falling away." [2]

The controversy was revived towards the middle of the ninth century by Gottschalk, the son of a Saxon nobleman. While still a child he had been received as an oblate in a monastery at Fulda, and when arrived at man's estate he was refused permission to return to the life of a secular. Somewhat later he was transferred to a monastery at Orbais, in the diocese of Soissons. There, brooding over his uncongenial life, he sought consolation in the study of St. Augustine's teaching on predestination. The result of his studies is embodied in these three propositions: First, God predestines some men to eternal damnation in the same way that He predestines others to eternal life. Second, God's salvific will extends only to those who are saved. Third, Christ did not die for all men, but only for the predestined.

The first of these three points, which implicitly contains the other two, is clearly set forth in his *Chartula Professionis*, drawn up in 848.[3] However, in his *Confessio Prolixior*, composed in the following year, occurs the sentence: "I confess that Thou hast foreknown all future things, whether good or evil, but that Thou hast predestined only what is good." [4] Hence he certainly did not hold that God had predestined the reprobate to commit sin.

[2] Resp. ad Cap. Gall. 12.

[3] The profession reads: "Ego Gotteschalcus credo et confiteor . . . quod gemina est praedestinatio, sive electorum ad requiem, sive reproborum ad mortem. Quia sicut Deus incommutabilis ante mundi constitutionem omnes electos suos incommutabiliter per gratuitam gratiam suam praedestinavit ad vitam aeternam, similiter omnino omnes reprobos, qui in die judicii damnabuntur propter ipsorum mala merita, idem ipse incommutabilis

Protestants usually contend that Gottschalk's view on reprobation was solidly based upon the writings of the Fathers. Thus St. Fulgentius, they point out, uses the expression *predestinatio sive praeparatio ad poenam;*[5] and St. Isidore of Seville speaks of a twofold predestination, that is, a predestination of the elect to eternal life and of the reprobate to everlasting death.[6] Again, St. Augustine, they contend, suggests quite definitely that Christ died only for the elect.[7] However, aside from a certain similarity of the terms employed, the contention has no value. Thus St. Augustine states very clearly: *Pro omnibus passus est Christus,* for all men did Christ suffer.[8]

In itself, of course, the twofold predestination — *gemina praedestinatio* — may be understood in an orthodox sense, in as much as God not only predestines the elect to eternal life, but also predestines the reprobate to everlasting death by way of punishment for their sins. It is not here that the difficulty lies. For so long as He gives sufficient grace to all, and only decrees eternal punishment for those who culpably fail to coöperate with the grace that is given them, there is nothing arbitrary or unjust in His action. Predestination of the reprobate to the torments of hell becomes unintelligible only when it is taken independently of their evil deeds; or, as modern theologians express it, when it is held to be *ante praevisa demerita.* And this appears to have been the view of Gottschalk. For he says that God predestines the reprobate in precisely the same way as the elect — *similiter omnino* —; and the elect, according to him, are predestined *ante praevisa merita.*

At all events, this was the interpretation put upon his teaching by Hincmar, archbishop of Rheims, under whose presidency the Council of Quiercy, held in 853, condemned the views advanced and defended by Gottschalk. And the same

Deus per justum judicium suum incommutabiliter praedestinavit ad mortem merito sempiternam" (ML. 125, 89 sqq.).

[4] Ibid. 121, 349 D.

[5] De Verit. Praedest. 3, 5, 8; ML. 65, 656.

[6] Sent. 2, 6, 1; ML. 83, 606.

[7] In Ps. 64, 2.

[8] Serm. 304, 3.

position was taken by Rabanus Maurus of Mayence,[9] Amalarius of Metz,[10] and Scotus Erigena.[11] Gottschalk himself was sentenced to lifelong imprisonment in the monastery of Hautvilliers, where after twenty years of futile efforts to regain his liberty he died apparently unrepentant.

Hincmar's views on the subject of predestination, which were adopted by the Council of Quiercy,[12] involve the following points: Through the sin of Adam the whole human race was lost, yet God desired all to be saved. Hence (a), in accordance with His foreknowledge, He chose from this mass of perdition — *massa perditionis* — those whom through His grace He predestined to life; while He foreknew that the rest, whom by the judgment of His justice He left in the same mass of perdition, would perish forever. Yet He did not predestine them to perish; but because of His justice He decreed for them eternal punishment. (b) The freedom of the will in regard to supernatural actions, which had been lost through sin, was restored by Christ; consequently, assisted by grace, we all have the power to do good, but when deserted by grace, we are capable only of doing evil. (c) God has the sincere will to save all men. (d) Christ died for all without exception.[13]

Meanwhile many other bishops and theologians had been drawn into the discussion, and not a few of them defended Gottschalk's thesis on the twofold predestination. The most eminent among these latter were Ratramnus of Corbie,[14] Servatus Lupus of Ferrieres,[15] Prudentius of Troyes,[16] Remigius of Lyons,[17] and Magister Florus.[18] It must be noted, however, that the point at issue had been considerably modified as compared with the statement of Gottschalk that God predestined the elect and the reprobate in precisely the same way. The discussion now turned about the propriety of terms rather than about the doctrine itself. For both parties admitted that God decreed eternal punishment for the

[9] ML. 112, 1530 sqq.
[10] ML. 121, 1054.
[11] ML. 122, 347 sqq.
[12] Mansi, 14, 920 D sqq.
[13] Mansi, 14, 920 D sqq.
[14] ML. 121, 13 sqq.
[15] Ibid. 119, 606 sqq.
[16] Ibid. 115, 971 sqq.
[17] Ibid. 121, 985 sqq.
[18] Ibid. 119, 95 sqq.

reprobate only in view of their evil deeds; but while Ratramnus and his side affirmed that this decree must be called predestination, Hincmar and his followers contended that the term as used in this connection was inappropriate. Hence, while the one side defended the *gemina praedestinatio,* the other rejected it as inadmissible.[19] The former appealed, among others, to the authority of St. Augustine.[20]

In 855, the party opposed to Hincmar held a synod at Valence, and severely criticized the decisions given at Quiercy. These decisions are said to be inept, useless, harmful, and opposed to the truth. Emphasis is placed upon the fact that God foreknows the future actions of men, that He foresees how the good will coöperate with His grace and be saved, and how the wicked will follow their own evil counsels and be lost.[21] But by this divine foreknowledge, it is pointed out, the free will of man is in no wise interfered with. Hence, if the wicked are lost, it is not because they were unable to lead virtuous lives, but because they freely persevered in evil-doing.[22]

With regard to the redemption by Christ, the Synod es-

[19] Retramnus sets forth his views in the following terms: "Sicut enim novit (Deus) opera singulorum, id est, electorum et reproborum, sic quoque nec numerum eorum ignorat. Quapropter is qui singulorum actus intuetur, qui finem aspicit universorum, qui novit quid singulis retribuat, jam apud se praedestinatum habet, quid ex eis sit acturus, et qui in fine gloria regni donentur vel qui poenarum supplicio feriantur" (De Praedest. 8; Mansi, 121, 13).

[20] Thus Ratramnus: "Hac sententia ostendit venerabilis Augustinus malos propter iniquitatem superbiae damnationi praedestinatos, non ad peccatum, quoniam peccatum, non est a Deo. Neque enim auctor mali est Deus, poenae vero redditio ex Deo est" (Ibid.).

[21] The decision of the Council reads as follows: "Fidenter fatemur praedestinationem electorum ad vitam, et praedestinationem impiorum ad mortem: in electione tamen salvandorum misericordiam Dei praecedere meritum bonum: in damnatione autem perituroruм meritum malum praecedere justum Dei judicium. Praedestinatione autem Deum tantum statuisse, quae ipse vel gratuita misericordia vel justo judicio facturus erat" (DB. 322).

[22] The Council states its view in these terms: "Verum aliquos ad malum praedestinatos esse divina potestate, videlicet ut quasi alius esse non possint, non solum non credimus, sed etiam si sunt, qui tantum mali credere velint, cum omni detestatione, sicut Arausicana synodus, illis anathema dicimus" (Ibid. 322).

tablishes the following three points: First, Christ did not die for those who were already condemned to eternal punishment at the time of His passion. Second, all those who are at any time baptized and incorporated into the Church, were truly redeemed and obtained the forgiveness of their sins. Third, some of these latter may fall away and be eternally lost, while others are saved by reason of their free coöperation with the grace of God.[23]

At the suggestion of Charles the Bald, Hincmar next explained his position in the treatise *De Praedestinatione,* which is now lost; and three years later in a similar work entitled, *Posterior Dissertatio de Praedestinatione,*[24] in which he defends his view as formulated at the Council of Quiercy. Thereupon, the matter was again discussed at the National Synod of Savannierres, but without definite results. Finally the Synod of Toucy, in 860, commissioned Hincmar to compose a synodal letter, which was to be directed to all the faithful of France, so as to counteract the religious disturbances that had been occasioned by the discussions of the last few years. In this letter the *Capitula of Quiercy* were approved, and thus Hincmar's party carried the day. It was inevitable that, in spite of local opposition, this result should finally be reached; because Hincmar's view coincided with the traditional teaching of the Church.

Thereafter the term *gemina praedestinatio* was set aside, and in its stead were used *praedestinatio* and *reprobatio* as referred respectively to the elect and the reprobate. Thereby all confusion of ideas was avoided, and so peace was restored to the theological world. Incidentally it may be noted here, although the matter did not form a part of the discussion at the time, that most of the men engaged in the controversy regarded predestination to eternal life as absolute, that is, *ante praevisa merita.* In the order of execution merit must indeed come first; but in the order of divine decrees election of certain individuals to eternal life takes precedence, and thereupon follows the bestowal of efficacious graces from

[23] Ibid. 321, 324.

[24] ML. 125, 55 sqq.

which merit results through the free coöperation of the human will. Hence the Synod of Valence makes the unqualified statement: *In electione tamen salvandorum misericordiam Dei praecedere meritum bonum.* Another statement of the same Synod, namely, that Christ did not die for all, was corrected in the sense that God sincerely desired the salvation of all men, even after Adam's fall into sin.[25]

B — Teaching of the Scholastics

It was in this condition that the Scholastic theologians found the doctrine of predestination when they began to systematize the theological teaching of preceding ages. They developed it considerably, but mostly along lines of subordinate importance. The solution of the real difficulty connected with predestination lay beyond the reach of even their giant intellects. Nor could it be otherwise; for when all is said, only God knows why He deigns to save the one and suffers the other to perish. The following brief outline of Scholastic teaching on the subject of predestination will suffice for our purpose. In presenting this outline we shall follow the chronological order, as that will enable us to notice more readily what development took place.

The first theologian to be considered in this connection is St. Anselm, who sets forth his views in a work entitled, *De Concordia Praescientiae Dei cum Libero Arbitrio.* In the first part of this treatise he endeavors to show that the eternal and infallible prevision of God does not interfere with the actions of man's free will, while in the second part he brings his conclusions to bear upon predestination. He sums up the result of his inquiry in regard to this latter point as follows: "Just as foreknowledge in God, which is not deceived, does not foreknow anything else than the truth precisely as it will be in its future existence, flowing either from a necessary or free cause; so in like manner does predestination, which is not changed, not predestine anything else than what is contained in God's foreknowledge. And as that which is fore-

[25] Cfr. Hinkmar, De Praedest. c. 26.

known, although unchangeable in its eternal prevision, may nevertheless admit of change in time before it comes to pass; so it is also with regard to predestination." [26]

This obviously makes the final status of free beings, as foreknown and fore-ordained by God, dependent upon their own free actions under the influence of divine grace. Hence, according to St. Anselm, both predestination and reprobation follow upon God's prevision of each one's merits or demerits; so that both are *post praevisa merita.* In this sense the author uses the term predestination in reference to the reprobate as well as to the elect; for he says: "It must be understood that there is not only a predestination of the good, but also of the wicked; just as God is said to cause evil, not that He really causes it, but He permits it to come to pass. For He is said to harden a person's heart when He does not soften it, and to lead some one into temptation when He does not free him therefrom. It is therefore no impropriety of language when God in this manner is said to predestine the wicked, and also their evil deeds, since He does not correct the one or impede the other. But He is said in a special sense to foreknow and predestine what is good, because He effects that it is good; in regard to what is evil, on the other hand, He is indeed the cause of its physical entity, but not of its being evil.[27]

Peter Lombard follows closely in the footsteps of St. Augustine, and states the problem in this way: "Predestination bears reference to all that is connected with salvation, and is said of men who are to be saved. For as St. Augustine says: Predestination signifies the preparation of grace, which is impossible without foreknowledge on the part of God. However, foreknowledge is possible without predestination. By predestination indeed God foreknew what He would do at any future time; but He also foreknew what He would not do, that is, all the evils that ever come to pass. He predestined those whom He had chosen; but the others He reprobated, that is, He foreknew the eternal death of

[26] Op. cit. c. 3. [27] Ibid. c. 2.

sinners." [28] Hence the author seems to regard reprobation as a simple passing by on the part of God when He chose His elect.

The effects of predestination have a bearing upon both the good and the bad; but in a different way, as is thus explained by the author: "While predestination is the same as the preparation of grace, that is, a divine election by which God chose before the foundation of the world whomsoever it pleased Him to choose; reprobation, on the contrary, must be understood as a divine foreknowledge of the wickedness of some, and as a preparation of eternal punishment for their evil deeds. For just as the effect of predestination is the grace by which we are justified in the present life, and are enabled to live virtuously and to persevere in good; so reprobation on the part of God, who from all eternity rejected some by not choosing them, has a twofold effect, one of which He foreknew and did not prepare, that is, their wickedness; the other He foreknew and prepared, namely, their eternal punishment." [29]

Developing the subject still further, the author finally comes to the conclusion that the predestination of the elect is without any merit of theirs, while the reprobation of the wicked is consequent upon their iniquity as foreknown by God. He sums up in these terms: "Just as predestination on the part of God is, properly speaking, God's foreknowledge and His preparation of divine favors, by reason of which the elect are most certainly saved; so reprobation on the part of God is the same as His foreknowledge of the never ending wickedness of some, and the consequent preparation of everlasting punishment. And as the effect of predestination is the bestowal of grace, so in a manner the effect of eternal reprobation seems to consist in the obduration of the sinner. Not that God effects this obduration by the causing of malice, but rather by not bestowing His grace; as indeed they are not worthy to receive it." [30]

Alexander of Hales examines the question of predestina-

[28] Sent. I, d. 40, n. 1. [29] Ibid. n. 4. [30] Ibid. n. 4.

tion under a threefold aspect. First he inquires what the name itself imports; next he tries to determine the formal concept of predestination; lastly he investigates what it is in itself — *secundum rem.* The name, he says, imports two things: priority and destination. By reason of priority, predestination is eternal; under the aspect of destination it is a divine decree in reference to some good that is to be conferred in time. Considered in its formal concept, predestination is in the order of divine knowledge of good pleasure or approbation — *in genere scientiae beneplaciti sive approbationis.* In itself it is the preparation of grace for the present and of glory for the future.[31]

Hence, predestination necessarily implies an act of foreknowledge and an act of the divine will. The relation of these two acts is thus explained by the author: "Divine knowledge is the same with regard to all men: the divine will by itself is also the same in regard to all: but the divine will in conjunction with foreknowledge is not the same in respect to all men. However, this is not owing to any difference that results in the divine foreknowledge from the aforesaid conjunction; but it arises from the fact that we are not all in the same condition as known by God. Hence, predestination does not stand for the will of God alone, but for the will as guided by foreknowledge of the use which men will make of His gifts. Consequently, as John Damascene remarks, we must distinguish two wills in God: one that is antecedent and another that is consequent. By His antecedent will God wills all men to be saved; for this will regards the rational creature as capable of salvation: but by His consequent will, which is guided by His foreknowledge of the use which rational creatures will make of His gifts, He does not will all men to be saved, but only the elect. And in this sense the will of God is said to be rational; for if He willed the final salvation of one who abused his freedom of choice, He would not be just." [32]

Then examining the question whether a person's merits

[31] Sum. I, q. 28, m. 1, 2, 3. [32] Ibid. q. 28, m. 2.

are the cause of his predestination, he comes to this conclusion: "The terms predestination and reprobation signify several different things. For in predestination is included not only foreknowledge, but also grace and glory, which are the effects of predestination. So too are there three things to be considered in reprobation: foreknowledge, present wickedness, and future punishment. Hence, when we find it stated in the writings of saints that predestination and reprobation depend on the merits of the persons in question, we must make this distinction. If predestination be considered precisely as it is in God, it is not caused by the merits of those who are predestined; but if it be considered as it is in the persons themselves, it is the result of their merits. However, even in this latter case there is a difference between predestination and reprobation. For predestination, in so far as it is in God or signifies the bestowal of grace, is not of merit; but it is of merit only in so far as the conferring of final glory comes in question. Now in reprobation the matter is different: for there we have the act of reprobation itself as it is in God, the present iniquity of the sinner, and his future punishment. The first of these is not caused by the demerits of the reprobate, since it is identified with God's essence; but the other two are caused by these same demerits." [33]

St. Bonaventure repeats this reasoning of his master almost word for word, and makes it his own.[34] Then he proceeds to show that the fact of predestination and reprobation does not interfere with the freedom of man's will in regulating his moral conduct. He sums up in these terms: "The divine foreknowledge is of such a kind that God knows from all eternity what each one of us is able to think and to will, and together with this He sees in what direction our choice lies, and what manner of works we perform in the course of our lives. And because He sees all this together, what we can accomplish, what we actually choose, and what we do; hence it is that He cannot be deceived. Consequently, as

[33] Ibid. q. 28, m. 3.
[34] In Sent. I, d. 40, a. 1, q. 1; q. 41, a. 1.

predestination includes divine foreknowledge, it must be in conformity with our free will." [35]

Finally, touching the heart of the mystery, namely, why God elects one to eternal life and passes by the other, he says: "Care must be taken lest, while we desire to exalt the will of God, we rather dishonor it. For if there were no reason why He chose the one and not the other, except that it so pleased Him, there surely would be nothing hidden about the divine judgments; on the contrary, all would be manifest, since every one can understand that reason. Nor would the divine judgments be in any way wonderful, but merely arbitrary. Consequently, it must be held, as St. Augustine points out, that the eternal decree of predestination and the divine will are most reasonable, and are based upon the best of reasons; and as they are from all eternity, so too is there for them an eternal reason — not as regards the act itself in God, but in respect of its term in the creature. . . . And this may be shown by an example. Thus if it be asked, why does God wish that it should rain in winter rather than in summer, the answer is: Because in winter there is a greater abundance of watery vapor than there is in summer. In a similar way, if it be asked, why did God wish that Peter should be saved rather than Judas, we answer: Because Peter gathered merits for heaven, but Judas laid up punishment for hell." [36]

Albertus Magnus gives substantially the same exposition as the preceding two. "By His antecedent will," he says, "God wills the salvation of all men. . . . But by His consequent will, which takes account of our deeds, He wills the good to be saved and the wicked to be condemned. And this is the will that reference is made to in the definition of predestination; for it is by this that He wills only the good to be saved, because they alone are pleasing to Him." [37] And again: "Two things are to be noted: divine foreknowledge of those who are to be saved and the will of God predestinating just so many to salvation. This will of God has regard

[35] Ibid. d. 40, a. 2, q. 1.
[36] Ibid. d. 41, a. 1, q. 2.
[37] Sum. I, tr. 16, q. 63, a. 2, 1.

to our works, because He wills to save as many as make a good use of His grace, and not more; but if more were to make a good use of that same grace, then He would also from all eternity have willed that they should be saved." [38]

St. Thomas first shows that it belongs to the providence of God to direct created beings toward their proper end, and then points out that predestination is a part of Providence. He reasons in this way: "The end towards which created things are disposed by God is twofold: one that exceeds all proportion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life eternal, consisting in the beatific vision, which is above the nature of every creature. The other end is proportionate to created nature, and this end created beings can attain according to their natural powers. To that, however, which a creature cannot attain by the power of its own nature, it must be directed by some one else; thus an arrow is shot by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal life, is led towards it, as it were, directed by God. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the plan of the order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be Providence. The plan of something to be done, existing in the mind of the doer, is a certain pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the plan of the above-mentioned direction of a rational creature towards the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that predestination, as regards its object, is a part of Providence." [39]

As predestination is a part of Providence, it is, properly speaking, "not anything in the person predestined; but only in the person who predestines. . . . It is a kind of plan of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God." [40] And as it is in God, predestination is from all eternity, although its effects belong to time.[41] Neither grace nor glory come into the definition of predestination, as some-

[38] In Sent. I, d. 40, a. 11.
[39] Sum. Theol. I, q. 23, a. 1.
[40] Ibid. a. 2.
[41] Ibid. a. 2 ad 3m.

thing belonging to its essence; but they are related to it as effect to cause and object to act.[42]

To the predestination of the just corresponds the reprobation of the wicked. This too is a part of Providence. For to Providence it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are directed towards their end. "Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away and be lost. This is called reprobation. . . . Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation of account of that sin." [43] However, "reprobation acts quite differently in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined — namely, glory — and of what is received in this life — namely, grace. Reprobation, on the other hand, is not the cause of what is in the present — namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. And so too is it the cause of what is assigned in the future — namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the free will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace." [44]

The predestination of some and the reprobation of others necessarily implies election on the part of God. He chooses some whom He will save, and passes by others whom He suffers to be lost. From this, however, it must not be inferred that He does not sincerely desire the salvation of all men. In this connection the author brings in the distinction between the antecedent and consequent will of God. "God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is not to will absolutely but relatively; but not by His consequent will, which is to will absolutely." [45]

St. Thomas considers the relation of merit to predestination under the heading, whether God's foreknowledge of future merits is the cause of predestination. After rejecting several obviously false views, he answers with this distinc-

[42] Ibid. a. 2 ad 4m.
[43] Ibid. a. 3.
[44] Ibid. a. 3 ad 2m.
[45] Ibid. a. 4 et ad 3m.

tion: "We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination may be considered in a twofold light — in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent effect of a previous effect, as regards the final cause; and the previous of those that follow, as regards the meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter; as if we were to say that God preordained to give glory on account of merit, and that He preordained to give grace to merit the glory. In another way, the effect of predestination may be considered in general. And so considered, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination should have any cause as coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect of predestination; even the preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help, according to the Prophet Jeremias: 'Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted.' Yet predestination has in this way, in regard to its effect, the goodness of God for its reason; towards which the whole effect of predestination is ordained as to an end, and from which it proceeds as from its first moving principle." [46]

From this it is quite obvious that according to St. Thomas predestination in its adequate sense is not caused by the merits of the predestined. Nor is any other view possible; because considered adequately, predestination includes all graces, even the first, and without grace no one can merit. On the other hand, it is equally obvious that according to St. Thomas predestination in an inadequate sense, in so far as it signifies the bestowal of graces subsequent to the first and of final glory, may be merited. And this he teaches in many other places, as for instance in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, where he says: "In regard to final glory, predestination is in the order of distributive justice, and therefore we may say that God gives glory to this one and not to that one, because the former merited it and the latter did not; and in like manner does He will that this one should have glory and the other

[46] Ibid. a. 5.

should not, because this one was worthy and the other was not." [47] Many Thomists, however, refer all this exclusively to the order of execution, while on the other hand they limit predestination to the order of intention, and thence they conclude that St. Thomas taught predestination *ante praevisa merita.*[48]

In regard to the reprobate, St. Thomas makes some statements from which it has been inferred that he held negative reprobation. Thus he says: "God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect of those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, by sparing them; and in respect of others, whom He reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some, and rejects others. . . . Why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason; except the divine will." [49] And again: "Although anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the use of his free will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt." [50]

Others, however, contend that all these statements refer to positive reprobation, which follows upon the prevision of sin. And this they prove from the author's own teaching. Thus he states quite clearly: "As far as in Him lies, God is ready to give grace to all; for He wills that all should be saved and come to a knowledge of the truth. And those only are deprived of grace who put an obstacle in its way; and this is imputed to them as guilt, just as in the case of a person who shuts his eyes while the sun is shining and thereby causes some harm to follow: he is guilty by his own action, although without the sunlight he cannot see." [51] Again: "It must be held that those conditions by reason of which man fails to attain his end, and under which God does not will him to be saved, are of man's own making, and therefore all that follows is imputed to him as a sin." [52]

Duns Scotus takes a somewhat different view of predes-

[47] Op. cit. I, d. 41, q. 1, a. 4 ad 2m.
[48] Cfr. Gotti, I, tr. 6, q. 3.
[49] Sum. Theol. I, q. 23, a. 5 ad 3m.
[50] Ibid. a. 3 ad 3m.
[51] Contra Gent. III, c. 159.
[52] In Sent. I, d. 46, q. 1, a. 1 ad 5m.

tination. He is above all concerned about safeguarding the liberty of God to ordain what He pleases. This is entirely in harmony with the superiority of the will as compared to the intellect, both in the divine and the created order of things. Hence he is inclined to favor predestination *ante praevisa merita.*[53] But he staunchly defends the freedom of the human will in regulating its own choice. He also contends that sufficient grace is given to all,[54] and that no one is cast off by God except in view of final impenitence.[55] After trying to refute the opinion of Henry of Ghent, which is substantially the same as that of St. Bonaventure noted in a preceding paragraph, he concludes in these terms: "Therefore, lest one in his search of these deep matters plunge beyond his depth, it is better for him to choose that opinion which finds greater favor with him, making certain, however, that through it divine liberty suffer no injustice and that God's bounty in preëlecting be given just play. Should one make choice of any other view (than the one here proposed), he must meet the difficulties which have been urged against it." [56]

In regard to other points more or less intimately connected with predestination there was hardly any difference of opinion among the Scholastics. Thus all are agreed that no one can be certain of his being among the predestined, unless he receives a special divine revelation to that effect.[57] They are also agreed that predestination is unchangeable, and that therefore no one of the predestined can ever be lost.[58] However, this does not make prayers and good works useless; because it is only they that can make our salvation certain, as on account of them salvation is ultimately conferred.[59] According to the more common opinion the number of the predestined is absolutely fixed by God, so that when this number is actually saved the world will come to an end.[60] What this number is, no one can tell. St. Thomas speaks of it as fol-

[53] In Sent. I, d. 41.
[54] Ibid. q. 46, n. 3.
[55] Ibid. d. 41, n. 11.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Cfr. Thomas, In Sent. I, q. 23, a. 1 ad 4^{m}.
[58] Sum. Theol. q. 23, a. 6.
[59] Ibid. a. 8.
[60] Ibid. a. 7.

lows: "Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so many men will be saved as angels fell; some, however, so many as there were angels left; others, in fine, so many as the number of angels who fell, added to that of all the angels created by God. It is, however, better to say that to God alone is known the number for whom is reserved eternal happiness, as the prayer for the living and dead expresses it." [61]

[61] Loc. cit.

CHAPTER IV

THE BLESSED TRINITY[1]

All that is essential in the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity was already clearly taught in the Patristic age — the unity of the divine nature, the trinity of persons, the generation of the Son, the procession of the Holy Spirit, and the nature of the divine hypostases as *relationes subsistentes*.[2] On these points the East and the West were in full doctrinal agreement, although in course of time a difference arose in regard to the *principium quod* in the procession of the Holy Spirit.[3] When the Scholastics began their great work of doctrinal synthesis, the Church's teaching on this fundamental mystery of the Christian faith was almost fully developed, so that little remained to be done save along the lines of properly co-ordinating the different parts of the doctrines. However, along with this, there were a number of subordinate points that admitted of still further development, and these were investigated and discussed by nearly all the theologians of the Middle Ages. The following brief review of mediæval teaching on the mystery of the Blessed Trinity will be sufficient to bring out what is of special interest to the history of dogmas.

1. *Existence of the Mystery.*— In order to prove the truth that in the unity of the Godhead there are three persons, the Scholastics use two distinct series of arguments, one of which is drawn from Holy Scripture and tradition, and the other from the principles of natural reason. The former series is regarded by them as absolutely conclusive, so that the truth thus established is held to be of faith; whilst the latter is

[1] Cfr. Schwane, Histoire des Dogmes, t. IV, p. I, c. 2; De Regnon, Etudes sur la Trinite, t. II, III; Hefele, Conciliengeschichte, V.
[2] Cfr. vol. I, p. 260 sqq.
[3] Ibid. p. 490 sqq.

looked upon as having only suasive force, confirming in a manner by reason what is already known by revelation. The truth in question is, therefore, by all of them considered as a mystery in the strict sense of the term — a truth, that is, whose existence cannot be discovered by unaided reason, and whose intimate nature cannot be understood even when its existence is made known by revelation. It is in this sense that St. Thomas writes: "By natural reason we can know what belongs to the unity of essence, but not what belongs to the distinction of persons. Whoever, then, tries to prove the trinity of persons by natural reason, derogates from the faith."[4] And St. Bonaventure: "The trinity of persons can in no way be known by reasoning from the creature to God."[5] Even Abelard, who frequently speaks of this mystery as if it were a natural truth, explicitly states that the arguments drawn from reason cannot produce supernatural faith, but can only make the teaching of faith more acceptable.[6]

2. *Errors of Some Early Scholastics.*— The very concept of the Trinity, according to the teaching of the Church, implies not only distinction of persons, but also numerical identity of nature. This last point was denied by Roscelin, canon of Compiègne, who towards the end of the eleventh century taught in that city, and also at Besançon and Tours. His own writings, with the exception of a letter to Abelard,[7] have not been preserved, but his teaching on the point in question can be gathered from the refutation of it by St. Anselm,[8] Abelard,[9] John of Salisbury,[10] and Otto of Freising.[11]

Being a Nominalist in philosophy, he logically maintained that the idea of person can be realized only in an individually existing nature, distinct from all others of its kind, not only in personality, but also in substance. Hence he argued: "If there are in God three persons and only one substance (*una res*), and not three substances, each one separately by

[4] Sum. Theol. I, q. 32, a. 1.
[5] In Sent. I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 4.
[6] Introd. ad Theol. II, c. 3.
[7] Opp. Abelard. t. II, ed. Cousin.
[8] De Fide Trin. c. 1.
[9] Ep. 21.
[10] Metalog. II, 17.
[11] De Gest. Fred. I, c. 47.

itself, even as in the case with three angels or three souls, yet in such a manner that they are altogether the same by way of power and will, then the Father and the Holy Spirit have become incarnate together with the Son." [12] And again: "Whoso says that the Father is the Son, and that the Son is the Father, as he necessarily must if he holds that the three names signify the same substance, he confounds the persons. For all names of one and the same individual thing are predicated of one another. . . . The substance of the Father is nothing else than the Father, and the substance of the Son is nothing else than the Son, even as the city of Rome is Rome and the creature of water is water. Hence as the Father begot the Son, the substance of the Father begot the substance of the Son. Hence as the substance of him who begets is one and the substance of him who is begotten is another one, the one must be different from the other; . . . and therefore we cannot avoid making a separation in the substance of the Holy Trinity." [13]

This teaching, which is tritheism pure and simple, was condemned by the Council of Soissons (1093), which had been convened by Archbishop Raynold of Rheims. Roscelin retracted his error under the pressure of popular indignation, but shortly after he relapsed, as appears from his letter to Abelard. There he cites a large number of extracts from the writings of the Fathers, all of which, he contends, show that Christian antiquity never understood God to be only one being, numerically one nature subsisting in three persons. His error was thoroughly refuted by St. Anselm in his work *De Fide Trinitatis,* which was primarily written for that purpose.

About the same time Abelard fell into error by going to the other extreme, in as much as he seemed to identify the three divine persons with the attributes of power, wisdom, and goodness. In his *Introductio ad Theologiam,* he states the problem in this way: Christian faith teaches that there is only one God — not several gods — one Lord of all, one

[12] Cfr. Anselm, De Fide Trin. c. 1.

[13] Ep. ad Abelard., op. cit. p. 799, 800.

Creator, one Principle, one Supreme Good. Hence the two questions: What distinction is there between the three persons in the one divine nature? How is the trinity of persons compatible with the unity of nature?

He answers: The names of the three persons seem to express the perfection of the Supreme Good. The name of Father stands for power, that of Son for wisdom, and that of Holy Ghost for goodness or love. These are three fundamental concepts of the Divine Being. In their unity and distinction consists the Trinity. This, however, must not be so understood that the Father only is power, the Son only is wisdom, and the Holy Ghost only is goodness; but these attributes are peculiar to the three persons respectively, and so are distinctive of the same. The Father is power, because He is the unbegotten and absolute principle; the Son is wisdom, because He is the Word; the Holy Ghost is love or goodness, because He is the fountain of divine grace: yet the Son and the Holy Ghost, though derived from the Father, are also power.[14]

Then, to illustrate his teaching by examples, he makes use of expressions and comparisons which caused him to be accused of Modalism. A piece of brass, he says, upon which an artist engraves the likeness of the king, is essentially the same as the image, and the image is essentially the same as the brass; yet they are distinct in their properties as metal and image. Something very similar to this we find in the Trinity. For even as the seal is of the brass and has in a certain sense its origin therein, so has the Son His being of the substance of the Father, and in so far is He begotten of the Father. Then, as regards the Holy Spirit, some ecclesiastical teachers indeed hold that He is also of the substance of the Father, in as much as He is of one substance with Him; but this is not strictly true. Because if it were true, it would follow that He was begotten by the Father and the Son, whereas He only proceeds from them.[15] Since, then, both the Son and the Holy Spirit are of the Father —

[14] Introd. ad Theol. I, 5–10.
[15] Ibid. II, 13, 16; cfr. Theol. Christ. IV.

the one begotten, the other proceeding — generation differs from procession in this, that He who is begotten is of the very substance of the Father, as it is in the nature of wisdom, that is, of being, that it should be a certain power; whereas the effect of love is classed as goodness rather than as power.[16]

The first one in France to oppose Abelard was William of St. Thierry, who was soon joined by St. Bernard, Hugh of St. Victor, and others. St. Bernard sums up the errors in question as follows: "*Denique constituit Deum Patrem plenam esse potentiam, Filium quamdam potentiam, Spiritum Sanctum nullam potentiam: atque hoc esse Filium ad Patrem, quod quamdam potentiam ad potentiam, quod speciem ad genus, quod materiatum ad materiam, quod hominem ad animal, quod aereum sigillum ad aes.*" [17] These errors were condemned by the Council of Soissons (1121), and again by the Council of Sens (1141), which at the same time deprived Abelard of his license to teach.[18]

3. *Definition of Person.*— Early in the sixth century, Boethius had defined person as an individual substance of a rational nature — *Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia.* Some of the early Scholastics found fault with this definition as applied to the three persons in the Godhead. Thus Richard of St. Victor argued, since the divine nature is an individual substance, it ought, according to the Boethian definition, be a person; yet this conclusion runs counter to the teaching of the Church. Hence to make the definition applicable to divine persons, it should be modified in this way: *Persona divina est divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia* — a divine person is the incommunicable existence of the divine nature.[19] Alexander of Hales views the matter in practically the same light; hence he gives the following defintion: *Persona est existentia incommunicabilis intellectualis naturae vel existens per se solum secundum quemdam modum existendi.*[20] The same definition is later

[16] Introd. ad Theol. II, Martène, 1085.

[17] Tract. de Error. Abelard. c. 1, 2.

[18] Mansi, 21, 568; Hefele, V, 476.

[19] De Trin. IV, c. 22; cfr. c. 21.

[20] Sum. I, q. 56, m. 4.

on given by Scotus, who points out that incommunicability, taken as the *ratio formalis* of personality, implies not merely a negation of actual and aptitudinal communication, but a positive repugnance to the same; and therefore the concept of personality is not negative, but positive.[21]

However, the greater number of Scholastics accepted the Boethian definition, but in their application of it to the three divine persons they explained the two terms *substantia* and *individua*. The former term, they say, is taken in a general sense, prescinding from first and second, or singular and universal; whilst the other is added to restrict this general signification and at the same time to convey the idea of incommunicability.[22]

This more common view is thus expressed by St. Thomas: "In the opinion of some, the term substance in the definition of person stands for first substance, which is the hypostasis; nor is the term individual superfluously added, for as much as by the name of hypostasis or first substance the idea of universality and of part is excluded. For we do not say that man in general is an hypostasis; nor the hand, since it is only a part. But where individual is added, the idea of assumptibility is excluded from person; for the human nature in Christ is not a person, since it is assumed by a greater, that is, by the Word of God. It is, however, better to say that substance is here taken in a general sense, as divided into first and second, and when individual is added, it is restricted to first substance." [23]

4. *Principles of Divine Processions.*— According to the unanimous teaching of Patristic writers, the Son is begotten of the substance of the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeds of the substance of the Father and the Son. In view of this teaching, Peter Lombard opens his treatise on the Trinity with the question, "Whether the Father begot the divine essence, or whether the divine essence begot the Son, or whether

[21] In Sent. I, d. 23, n. 4; ibid. III, d. 1, q. 1, n. 10.

[22] Halens. Sum. p. 1, q. 56, m. 3; Bonavent. In Sent. I, d. 25, a. 1, q. 2; Thom. Sum. Theol. I, q. 29, a. 1 ad 2[m]; Albert. Magn. Sum. p. 1, tr. 10, q. 44, m. 2.

[23] Sum. Theol. loc. cit.

the essence begot the essence, or whether the essence neither begot nor was begotten.[24] His answer is: "In full agreement with Catholic writers on this subject, we say that the Father did not beget the divine essence, nor did the divine essence beget the Son, nor did the divine essence beget the divine essence," [25] but the Father begot the Son, and the Father and the Son breathed forth the Holy Spirit.

This teaching was attacked by some of Peter's contemporaries, and among others by Abbot Joachim de Floris. He contended that thus there was a fourth term introduced into the Trinity, which would necessarily result in a quaternity. The contention was settled by the Fourth Lateran Council, held in 1215. The Council sustained the Lombard, whom it mentioned by name, and defined that the essence "is neither begetting, nor begotten, nor proceeding; but it is the Father who begets, the Son who is begotten, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds." [26]

Taking this definition as their starting point, all subsequent Scholastics held that the *principium quod* — that which begets or breathes — is not the divine essence as such, but as it is found in the persons concerned, or rather the persons themselves to whom the productive actions are attributed. But there remained the further question about the *principium quo* — the power by which the persons are constituted productive principles. Is this something absolute or relative? Peter Lombard had already pointed out that it could not be anything purely absolute, but must in some way include a relation — *posse generare dicit quid, sed secundum respectum ad aliquid.* Others, among them William of Auxerre and Durandus of Saint Pourçain, considered it to be something purely relative. In his *Summa*, St. Bonaventure pronounces this last view as more probable,[27] but in his *Prologus ad II Sent.* he declares himself in favor of the Lombard. This latter position is also taken by Albertus Magnus, who holds that the *potentia generativa* is something intermediate between what is essential and what is per-

[24] Sent. I, d. 5.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Mansi, 22, 982; DB. 431.
[27] D. 7, a. unic. q. 1.

sonal.[28] St. Thomas expresses the same view, when, after a somewhat lengthy disquisition on the point, he concludes: "And therefore the power of begetting signifies the divine nature directly, but the relation indirectly."[29] Finally, Scotus thinks that the different views on this subject may be brought into agreement, and that the chief difference consists in the terms employed.[30]

A further question is, what is the *principium quo* of the two divine processions in itself, and how does it differ in the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit? Leaving aside the peculiar view of Richard of St. Victor, who looked upon divine love as the common source of the Son and the Holy Spirit, the unanimous answer of the Scholastics to this question is that the Son is begotten by way of nature or intellect, and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the divine will. On this they are all agreed, but in their explanation of this answer there is manifest a considerable difference of views. Thus Alexander of Hales makes the act of the notional intellect merely concomitant to the fecundity of the divine nature. Hence he says: *Cum ergo dicitur, intelligendo generat, vel intelligere est speciem generare, intelligitur per concomitantiam.*[31] Very much the same view is taken by St. Bonaventure.[32] St. Thomas, on the other hand, places a special emphasis on the divine intellect. "Procession," he says, "always supposes action, and as there is a procession *ad extra* corresponding to the act tending to external matter, so there must be a procession *ad intra* corresponding to the act remaining within the agent. This applies most conspicuously to the intellect, the action of which remains in the intelligent agent. Whenever we understand, by the very fact of understanding there proceeds something within us, which is a conception of the object understood, a conception issuing from our intellectual power and proceeding from our knowledge of that object. This conception is signified by the spoken word, and it is called

[28] In Sent. I, d. 7, a. 2.
[29] Sum. Theol. I, q. 41, a. 5.
[30] Report. d. 7, q. 1.
[31] Sum. q. 42, m. 2.
[32] In Sent. I, d. 6, a. unic.

the word of the heart signified by the word of the voice." [33] In this manner the Son "proceeds by way of intelligible action, which is a vital operation." [34]

Scotus adopts the terminology of St. Bonaventure, stating that the divine processions are *via naturae* and *via voluntatis*.[35] In opposition to St. Thomas, he denies that the act of simple cognition, even in so far as it connotes paternity, constitutes the generation of the Son. That generation, he contends, is logically posterior to cognition and proceeds from the *memoria fecunda,* that is, from the intelligence already in possession of its essential object.[36] Furthermore, whilst St. Thomas holds that the Son proceeds from the intellect in so far as it is expressive of all that is knowable,[37] Scotus restricts the generative action of the intellect to its cognition of the divine essence and attributes, including probably also a quasi abstract cognition of the persons.[38]

There is a similar difference of views with regard to the procession of the Holy Spirit. All are agreed that the Holy Ghost proceeds by way of the will, and that this is a procession of love. St. Thomas describes it as follows: "We must consider each procession similarly. For as when a thing is understood by any one, there results in the intelligent agent a conception of the object understood, which conception we call word; so when any one loves an object, a certain impression results, so to speak, of the thing loved in the affection of the lover. And by reason of this the object loved is said to be in the lover, as also the thing understood is in the one who understands; so that when any one understands and loves himself he is in himself, not only by real identity, but also as the object understood is in the one who understands, and the thing loved is in the lover." [39]

Scotus admits this reasoning in so far as it affirms that the Holy Spirit proceeds from an act of love, but he divides that love into two formally distinct acts. The first follows

[33] Sum. Theol. I, q. 27, a. 1.
[34] Ibid. a. 2.
[35] In Sent. I, d. 2, q. 7, n. 18–33.
[36] In Sent. I, d. 2, q. 7, n. 2–16.
[37] Sum. Theol. I, q. 34, a. 3; cfr. Cont. Gent. IV, c. 13.
[38] In Sent. I, d. 10; Report. I, d. 6, q. 2; In Sent. II, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2.
[39] Sum. Theol. I, q. 37, a. 1.

upon God's essential cognition and precedes both the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit. The second corresponds to the *memoria fecunda* in the generation of the Word, and constitutes the active spiration which is common to the Father and the Son.[40] Moreover, God's love of Himself is both free and necessary. It is free in so far as it comes within the scope of God's power and dominion, and it is necessary in as much as its object is infinite.[41]

That the Holy Spirit proceeds both from the Father and the Son was conceded by all to be an article of faith, as it had been authoritatively inserted in the Creed at the beginning of the eleventh century.[42] On account, however, of the opposition of the Greeks, both St. Anselm and St. Thomas wrote special treatises in support of the doctrine. Moreover all were agreed that the Father and the Son constitute only one principle of spiration, yet so that there are said to be two persons of whom the act of spiration is predicated.[43] St. Thomas puts his explanation in this form: "If we consider the spirative power, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as they are one in the power of spiration, which in a certain way signifies the nature with the property. . . . Nor is there any reason against one property being in two subjects that possess one common nature. But if we consider the subjects — *supposita* — of the spiration, then we may say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as distinct; for He proceeds from them as the unitive love of both."[44]

The teaching here set forth was thus defined by the Council of Lyons, held in 1274: "We profess that the Holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son, not as from two principles, but as from one principle, not by two spirations, but by one spiration. . . . But because some, through ignorance of the aforesaid irrefragable teaching, have

[40] Report. I, d. 6, q. 11.

[41] In Sent. I, d. 2, q. 7; Report. I, d. 10, q. 3; Quodl. 1, 16.

[42] Cfr. vol. I, p. 497.

[43] Cfr. Halens. Sum. p. I, q. 70, m. 3; Bonavent. In Sent. d. 11, a. unic. q. 1, 2; Albert. Magn. In Sent. d. 11, a. 3, 4, 5; Henr. Gand. Sum. a. 54, q. 6; Thom. In Sent. d. 11, q. 1, a. 2; Scot. In Sent. d. 12, q. 1.

[44] Sum. Theol. I, q. 36, a. 4 ad 1m.

fallen into various errors, we, wishing to close the way to these errors, with the approval of the sacred Council, condemn and reprobate those who presume to deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son; and also those who temerariously assert that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two principles, and not as from one."[45] A similar definition was given by the Council of Florence in 1439,[46] both definitions being occasioned by the attempted reunion of the Greek Church with the Holy See.

5. *Divine Relations.*— As there are processions in God, it necessarily follows that there are also divine relations. For, says St. Thomas, "when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of procession agree in the same order; and then they have real relations to each other."[47] Now as there are two processions in the Godhead, each involving a principle and a term, there must be four relations, two of origination and two of procession. The former two are paternity and spiration, the later filiation and procession.[48] These relations are, on the one hand, really identified with the divine essence; yet, on the other hand, as relations they are really distinct from one another.[49] Their real identity with the divine essence was affirmed by the Council of Rheims against Gilbert de la Porrée, who held that they were merely assistant or externally affixed to the nature of the Godhead; while their real distinction from one another is necessarily implied in the distinction of the persons. However in regard to both points there was some difference of views among the Scholastics, as there is among theologians to-day.

The first point is thus explained by St. Thomas: "It is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence; and only differs in its mode of intelligibility, in as much as it imports regard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of essence."[50] Hence he holds a

[45] Mansi, 24, 81B; DB, 460.
[46] Mansi, 31, 765E; DB, 691.
[47] Sum. Theol. I, q. 28, a. 1.
[48] Ibid. a. 4.
[49] Ibid. a. 3.
[50] Ibid. a. 2.

virtual distinction, which is based upon the different modes of intelligibility as proper to the essence and the relations. St. Bonaventure conceives the matter in very much the same way, but he contends that the distinction is more than merely virtual. He calls it a distinction of attribution, in as much as the concept of relation adds to the concept of essence a regard to something else.[51] Scotus introduces here his formal distinction — *distinctio formalis ex natura rei*,[52] which, according to some, is only a logical development of the *distinctio attributionis* of St. Bonaventure. The Nominalists, on the other hand, rejected all virtual distinction, contending that essence and relations, as also all absolute perfections in the Godhead, are distinguished only mentally — *distinctione rationis ratiocinantis*. This view, which St. Bonaventure and Alexander of Hales attribute also to Praepositivus, Chancellor of the Paris University early in the thirteenth century, was rejected by all the other Scholastics. And, in fact, it cannot be admitted without destroying the foundation of the real distinction of the divine persons.

The second point at issue, that the relations are really distinct from one another, was held by all Scholastics outside the Nominalist School. It is precisely the relations that constitute the distinction between the divine persons. For according to the fundamental law of the Trinity, first definitely formulated by St. Anselm[53] and later formally approved by the Council of Florence, in the Godhead all perfections are identical save where there is relative opposition — *in divinis omnia sunt unum ubi non obviat relationis oppositio*.[54] The reason for the distinction is thus given by St. Thomas: "The idea of relation necessarily means regard of one to another, according as one is relatively opposed to another. So as in God there is real relation, there must also be real opposition; but the very nature of relative opposition includes distinction. Hence there must be real distinction in God; not, indeed, according to that which is

[51] In Sent. d. 26, a. unic. q. 1.
[52] In Sent. d. 2, q. 7, n. 41; Quodl. 5.
[53] Monol. c. 2.
[54] Decret. pro Jacob.; Mansi, 31, 1735D; DB, 703.

absolute — that is the essence, wherein there is supreme unity and simplicity — but according to that which is relative." [55]

6. *Divine Persons.*— That the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are in a true sense divine persons, was accepted by the Scholastics as clearly contained in the teaching of the Church. This point had been firmly established by the great Fathers of the fourth century, and, in fact, had always been a matter of faith. Furthermore, that the divine persons are not something absolute but relative, was also admitted without controversy. In keeping with the teaching of St. Augustine, it was generally assumed that the persons in the Godhead are subsisting relations — *relationes subsistentes.* Hence St. Thomas writes: "Relation in God is not as an accident in a subject, but is the divine essence itself; and so it is subsistent, for the divine essence subsists. Therefore, as the Godhead is God, so the divine paternity is God the Father, who is a divine person. Therefore a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting. And this is to signify relation by way of substance, and such a relation is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, although in truth that which subsists in the divine nature is the divine nature itself." [56]

However, as the divine relations may be viewed either in their origin or in themselves, the question arose, under what aspect are they constitutive and distinctive of the persons? Are the persons constituted and distinguished from one another solely by their origin, or by the relations themselves, or by the two together? On this point the Scholastics entertained different views.

Praepositivus and others, whose view appears acceptable to the Lombard, held the divine persons to be distinguished by their origin only, so that the relations must be regarded as mere manifestations of the distinction already presupposed. St. Bonaventure also approves of this view, although he modifies it somewhat before he makes it his own. The persons are distinguished, he says, by their origin *inchoative,* and by the relations *formaliter;* or, which comes to the same, they

[55] Sum. Theol. I, q. 28, a. 3. [56] Ibid. q. 29, a. 4.

are distinguished by each separately, but only in so far as the one includes the other.[57]

St. Thomas rejects the opinion of Praepositivus and his followers "for two reasons: Firstly, because, in order that two things may be understood as distinct, their distinction must be conceived as resulting from something intrinsic to both; as in created things it results from their matter and form. But origin of a thing does not designate anything intrinsic; it means the way from something or to something. . . . Secondly, because the distinction of the divine persons is not to be so understood as if what is common to them all is divided, because the common essence remains undivided; but the distinguishing principles themselves must constitute the things which are distinct. Now the relations or the properties distinguish or constitute the hypostases or persons, in as much as they are themselves the subsisting persons; as paternity is the Father, and filiation is the Son, because in God the abstract and the concrete do not differ. But it is against the nature of origin that it should constitute hypostasis or person. For origin taken in an active sense signifies proceeding from a subsisting person, so that it presupposes the latter; while in a passive sense origin, as nativity, signifies the way to a subsisting person, and as not yet constituting the person."[58] Hence he concludes: "It is therefore better to say that the persons or hypostases are distinguished by relations rather than by origin."[59]

Scotus also rejects the opinion of Praepositivus, and holds with St. Thomas that the divine persons are constituted and distinguished by the relations.[60] However, as he regards incommunicability, in which he places the formal reason of personality, as something absolute, he holds that in so far even the absolute properties may be considered as constituting the divine persons.[61]

The fact that there are only three persons in the Godhead is, of course, an article of faith; for therein consists the

[57] In Sent. d. 26, a. unic. q. 3.
[58] Sum. Theol. I, q. 40, a. 2.
[59] Ibid.
[60] In Sent. I, d. 26; Report. I, d. 2, q. 7.
[61] In Sent. I, d. 26, n. 23–40.

mystery of the Blessed Trinity. But the Scholastics went beyond the mere fact and inquired into the reasons why there can be only three divine persons. Almost without exception, they find the explanation in the processions themselves. Only two processions are possible in the Godhead, because there are only two immanent actions in God from which divine processions can be derived — that of the intellect and will.[62] From these two processions there can result only three really distinct and subsisting relations, because real distinction between divine relations supposes relative opposition. This opposition is found between paternity and filiation, and between active and passive spiration. But active spiration is common to the Father and the Son, and hence, although it is a relation, it is not a personal property and therefore does not constitute a person. Consequently, there can be only three really distinct and subsisting relations — paternity, filiation, and procession; and these are respectively the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.[63] Furthermore, as the acts of God's intellect and will are infinite, each procession necessarily exhausts the fecundity of its own principle, both proximate and remote.[64]

From the nature of the divine processions it necessarily follows that the three divine persons are at once really distinct, consubstantial, and intimately present to one another. This threefold consequence is usually expressed by the term *circumincessio;* or as modern usage seems to prefer, by the term *circuminsessio.* "In the divine order," says St. Bonaventure, "there is a perfect circumincession. And the meaning of circumincession is this, that one is in the other and conversely. Properly speaking and in its perfection, this can have place only in God; because circumincession implies both distinction and unity. And because in God alone is found the most perfect unity together with distinction — so that the distinction is without confusion and the unity with-

[62] Thom. Sum. Theol. I, q. 30, a. 2; Scot. Report. I, d. 2, q. 7; Quodl. q. 2; Albert. Magn. In Sent. I, d. 10, a. 12; Halens. Sum. I, q. 45, m. 7.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Cfr. Thomas, Sum. Theol. I, q. 41, a. 6; Scotus, Report. I, d. 2, q. 7; Quodl. q. 2.

out distinction — hence it is that in God alone perfect circumincession can be found. The reason of this is obvious; because the formal concept of circumincession implies identity of essence and real distinction of persons." [65]

St. Thomas uses somewhat different terms, but comes to substantially the same result. Answering the question, whether the Son is in the Father and conversely, he says: "There are three points of consideration as regards the Father and the Son: the essence, the relation, and the origin; and according to each the Son and the Father are in each other. The Father is in the Son by His essence, forasmuch as the Father is His own essence, and communicates His essence to the Son not by any change on His part. Hence it follows that as the Father's essence is in the Son, the Father Himself is in the Son; likewise, since the Son is His own essence, it follows that He Himself is in the Father in whom is His essence. . . . It is also manifest as regards the relations, each of two relative opposites is in the concept of the other. Regarding origin also, it is clear that the procession of the intelligible word is not outside the intellect, in as much as it remains in the utterer of the word. What also is uttered by the word is therein contained. And the same applies to the Holy Ghost." [66]

[65] In Sent. I, d. 19, p. 1, a. unic. q. 4.
[66] Sum. Theol. I, a. 42, a. 5.

CHAPTER V

CREATION OF THE WORLD

The Church's teaching on the origin of the world, like that on the mystery of the Blessed Trinity, was bequeathed to the Scholastics of the Middle Ages in an almost fully developed state. The absence of a material cause, the unity of the efficient cause, and the transcendence of the final cause of creation were as fully understood and as clearly demonstrated by the theologians of the Patristic period as by their successors during the golden age of Scholasticism. Much work still remained to be done by way of synthesis and proper evaluation of the various subordinate parts of the doctrine, but the doctrine itself stood in no need of further elucidation.[1]

Still on the very threshold of Scholasticism the doctrine of creation was attacked by a man who was perhaps the most original thinker of his time. This was John Scotus Erigena, "*vir per omnia sanctus, qui potuit errare, haereticus esse noluit.*" Most probably a native of Ireland, he was towards the middle of the ninth century called to the court of Charles the Bald, where, besides being placed at the head of the palace school, he was asked by his royal patron to translate the works of Pseudo-Dionysius and of Maximus Confessor. Having accomplished this, he composed several original works, the most important of which is his treatise *De Divisione Naturae.* It is practically a reconstruction of Neo-Platonism, with little more than a mere veneering of Christian teaching. His views touching the origin of the world, as there expressed, are plainly pantheistic. God, he says, is the essence of all things, because He alone has existence in the true sense of the term. The being of all things is the supereminent being of the Godhead.[2] Hence when we hear it

[1] Cfr. vol. I, p. 284 sqq. [2] Op. cit. c. 3.

said that God made all things out of nothing, we must not understand this in any other sense than that God is in all things, that is, He subsists as the essence of all things." [3] Some have tried to interpret these and many similar expressions in an orthodox sense, but the whole trend of the book militates against such an interpretation.[4]

However this teaching of Erigena found no followers in the schools, except in that of Chartres, and there only indirectly and to a very limited extent. It is true, many of the Scholastics, and among them St. Thomas himself, speak of creation as a *processio vel emanatio creaturarum a Deo;* they say that the universe proceeded from God even as a river flows from its source, as a shadow is cast by the substance, as an image is reflected in a mirror: but at the same time they are careful to insist that God can in no sense be regarded as the material cause of creatures, and that no reality passes from the Creator into the created object. Even St. Anselm, whose realism in philosophy might easily have led him into error on this point, is a staunch defender of creation in the strict sense of the term. He holds, indeed, that creatures had a certain preëxistence in the mind and power of God, but only in so far as the Creator is the exemplary and efficient cause of all that exists. Before their creation all finite beings were simply nothing in the order of their own reality — *non erant quod nunc sunt, nec erat ex quo fierent.*[5]

The principal points to be considered in the Church's teaching on the origin of the world are the following: The creative act, the efficient cause, the exemplary cause, the final cause, creation in time, creation and conservation.

1. *The Creative Act.*— The two definitions of creation given by St. Thomas — creation is the production of being as being, and, creation is the production of the whole substance of a thing, with nothing presupposed [6] — were, with some slight verbal modifications, defended by all Scholastics.[7]

[3] Op. cit. c. 72.
[4] Cfr. W. Turner, The Irish Theological Quarterly, October, 1910, p. 391–401.
[5] Monol. c. 8, 9; cfr. c. 3, 4.
[6] Sum. Theol. I, q. 44, a. 2; Ibid. q. 65, a. 3.
[7] Cfr. Halens. Sum. p. II, q. 6, m.

The two definitions are essentially the same, and both emphasize the most fundamental concept of creation — the production of something from nothing, or of being from not-being. This constitutes the specific difference between the creative act and all other modes of production. In creation there is no transition from one mode of real being to another; there is simply an inception of the reality itself in obedience to the command of an omnipotent will. As St. Bonaventure words it: "The world was called into being, not only in its entirety, but in respect of its intrinsic principles, which are not from something else, but from nothing." [8]

St. Thomas, comparing creation to other modes of productions, describes it in this way: "We must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is God. Now what proceeds by particular emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from *not-man,* and white from *not-white.* Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being should be presupposed before this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a man is from the *not-being* which is *not-man,* so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from the *not-being* which is *nothing.*" [9]

The creative act has for its proximate principles the divine intellect and will, the one as directive and the other as executive principle. The ultimate principle is the divine nature, with which the act itself is identified. On this all Scholastics are agreed, though with some slight shades of difference in their views respecting the function of the intellect. But on two other points there was considerable difference of opinion, namely, whether the creative act should be called immanent, or transient, or a mere relation; and, whether the dependence

1, 2; Scotus, In Sent. II, d. 1, q. 2; Bonavent. In Sent. II, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1.

[8] Loc. cit.

[9] Sum. Theol. I, q. 45, a. 1.

of the creature on the Creator must be conceived as something superadded to its being.

In answer to the first question, all state that the creative act is not transient in the sense that there is any change or imperfection in the Creator. Hence some call the act simply immanent; while others prefer to regard it as formally immanent and virtually transient, because whilst the action itself remains entirely in God, its term is placed *ad extra*.[10] St. Thomas words his explanation somewhat differently, although his view does not seem to differ materially from the second one here given. "Creation," he says, "places something in the being created according to relation only; because what is created is not made by motion or by change. For what is made by motion or by change is made from something preëxisting. And this happens, indeed, in the particular productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the production of all beings by the universal cause of all beings, which is God. Hence God by creation produces things without motion. Now when motion is removed from action and passion, only relation remains. . . . Hence creation in the creature is only a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being." [11]

There was a similar difference of views with regard to the second question. Some there were who regarded the relation of the creature to the Creator as something really distinct from the created essence. This view is also taken by St. Thomas, who says that it is a relative accident superadded to the substance of the creature.[12] St. Bonaventure holds that it is really identical with the essence, but formally distinct from it as a relation.[13] Scotus, after a lengthy discussion of the point, comes to the same conclusion, holding that this is an instance where his *distinctio formalis ex natura rei* finds its proper application.[14]

[10] Cfr. Bonavent. loc. cit. a. 3, q. 2; Albert. Magn. Sum. I, tr. 13, q. 53, m. 2.

[11] Sum. Theol. I, q. 45, a. 3.

[12] In Sent. II, q. 1, a. 2 ad 4m; De Potent. q. 3, a. 3 ad 3m.

[13] In Sent. II, d. 1, p. 1, a. 3, q. 2.

[14] In Sent. II, d. 1, q. 2; Report. II, d. 1, q. 5, 6.

As creation is thus not a *processus physicus,* but simply an act of the divine will *ad extra,* God was free to create or not to create, to create this world or any other world, according to His own good pleasure. This was denied by Abelard, who contended that God was necessitated by His own goodness and perfection, not only to create, but to create the best possible world.[15]

This teaching of Abelard was immediately attacked by William of Saint Thierry, St. Bernard, and Hugh of St. Victor, and together with his many other errors was condemned by the Council of Sens. Alexander of Hales, discussing the matter of freedom in reference to the creative act, points out that God cannot be dependent on anything outside Himself, and therefore it follows that He was free in creating the world and in giving it what perfection He pleased; but having once decreed to call the world into being, the manner of accomplishing His work was most perfect.[16] Albertus Magnus distinguishes betwen the order of the universe as a whole and the perfection of individual creatures: in the former sense the world is most perfect, but not in the latter.[17]

The view of St. Thomas on this matter may be summed up as follows: In the first place, we must distinguish between the idea of the world in the mind of God and its realization in the order of things. The former has a necessary existence, since it is identified with God's essence; but the latter depends on God's free determination, since He is sovereignly independent of all that can have existence outside Himself. Then, as God creates by an act of His free will, He can communicate His goodness and perfections in whatever degree He chooses, and consequently create a world more

[15] He put his teaching in this form: "Necessario itaque Deus mundum esse voluit ac fecit, nec otiosus extitit, qui eum, priusquam fecit, facere non potuit, quia priusquam fecit, fieri eum non oportuit. Si enim prius fecisset, utique et prius eum fieri oportuisset, quia facere quidquam nisi opportunum non potest, immo nisi optimum, id est, tam bonum quantumcumque convenit, quod suo alto reservatur consilio" (Theol. Christ. V; cfr. Introd. ad Theol. III, c. 5).

[16] Sum. II, q. 21, m. 3, a. 1, 2.

[17] Sum. I, tr. 19, q. 77, m. 3, a. 1.

or less perfect according to His own good pleasure. Moreover, a world that could in no sense be more perfect, a *mundus absolute optimus,* would be a contradiction in terms.[18]

This careful analysis of the creative act, under all its different aspects, was at the time of great importance. For although the Neo-Platonic pantheism of Scotus Erigena had been condemned by the Church,[19] there was danger of a similar error finding its way into the schools through the Arabian philosophers, especially Avicenna (+1036) and Averroes (+1198), who were held in great esteem during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It was especially through a corrupted text of Aristotle that they propagated their pantheistic views. Postulating the existence of eternal matter, they at the same time explained the origin of the world by a series of emanations from the Supreme Intelligence, thus completely setting aside the idea of creation as contained in the teaching of the Church.[20] St. Thomas wrote special treatises to refute Averroes, but for all that he spoke of him with great respect and used his *Grand Commentary on Aristotle* as his model.

2. *Efficient Cause of Creation.*— That God is the author of all things, visible and invisible, is a truth that was defined by the First General Council. It was, moreover, fully explained and proved by many of the Fathers, especially St. Augustine, in their struggles against Manichaeism. In the early Middle Ages it was again denied by the Cathari, an heretical sect which under various names gained a strong foothold in France and Italy. In regard to creation they revived the Manichaean teaching that there are two First Principles, one being the author of what is good in the world, and the other of what is evil. They were condemned by several local synods, and finally by the Third and Fourth Lateran Councils. The latter thus defines Catholic teaching on the point in question: "We believe that there is one sole true God, . . . three persons indeed, but one essence, sub-

[18] Sum. Theol. I, q. 14, a. 8; q. 19, a. 4; q. 46, a. 6; q. 104, a. 3; QQ. DD. 3, a. 15.

[19] Mansi, 22, 1211.

[20] Cfr. Albert. Magn. In Sent. II, d. 1.

stance, or nature altogether simple, . . . one principle of all things, creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal, who by His omnipotent power, simultaneously with the beginning of time, created a twofold nature, spiritual and corporeal, namely, the nature of the angels and that of material things, and then human nature, which partakes of both, in that it consists of soul and body. For the devil and other demons were indeed good in their nature as created by God, but they made themselves bad by their own conduct; man sinned at the suggestion of the devil." [21]

The position of the Scholastics in this matter is clearly revealed by the following characterization of the Manichaean error by St. Bonaventure: "Every system of philosophy condemns the fundamental principle of this error — that there are two First Principles of things. For this being admitted, the order of the universe is destroyed and the power of God is limited; . . . and thence it follows that God is not God, and that there is nothing good." [22] In addition to this they pointed out that whatever is good in creatures comes from God, and what is bad results either from the limitation of finite natures or from the abuse of a created free will.[23]

As creation proceeds *ad extra,* the *principium quod* of the creative action is the whole Trinity, but so that there is only one Creator. St. Thomas explains this as follows: "To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the principle of action can be considered from the effect of the action; for it must be fire that generates fire. And therefore to create belongs to God according to His being, that is, His essence, which is common to the three persons. Hence to create is not proper to any one person, but is common to the whole Trinity. . . . Nevertheless the divine persons, according to the nature of their procession, have a causality respecting the creation of things. For . . . God is the cause of things by His intellect and His will, just as a craftsman is the cause of things by his craft. Now the craftsman works

[21] Mansi, 22, 982; DB. 428.
[22] In Sent. II, d. 1, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1.
[23] Cfr. St. Thom. Sum. Theol. I, q. 49.

through the word conceived in his mind, and through the love of his will regarding some object. Hence also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which is the Son; and through His love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so the processions of the persons are the *rationes* of the productions of creatures in as much as they include the essential attributes, knowledge and will." [24]

What St. Thomas here says about the part of the persons in the creative act because of the processions, is denied by Scotus, who regards the essential attributes of intellect and will as the proximate principle of the creative act, in so far as they are common to the three persons. Hence the mode of all production *ad extra* is independent of the processions.[25]

In connection with their speculations on the efficient cause of creation, the Scholastics considered the subordinate question, whether God can make use of instrumental causes in the creation of things. All admitted that creative power is exclusively proper to God, and also that God did not employ instrumental causes in creating the world; but in regard to the possibility of it opinions were divided. Thus an affirmative answer was given by Peter Lombard and some others; [26] whilst Durandus contended that the impossibility of a creature acting as the instrumental cause of creation cannot be demonstrated by any conclusive argument, so long as there is question only of some particular effect.[27] The more common view, however, subscribed to by Alexander of Hales,[28] St. Bonaventure,[29] St. Thomas,[30] and Scotus,[31] denies that creative power can in any sense be communicated to creatures. The principal reason of this denial is based upon the nature both of instrumental causality and of the creative act. St. Thomas, refuting the opinion of the Lombard, puts his view in this way: "The secondary instrumental cause does not participate in the action of the superior cause, except as much as by something proper to itself it acts

[24] Ibid. q. 45, a. 6.
[25] In Sent. II, d. 1, q. 1, n. 19–23.
[26] Sent. IV, d. 5, n. 3.
[27] In Sent. II, d. 1, q. 4.
[28] Sum. p. 2, q. 9, m. 7, 8.
[29] In Sent. II, d. 1, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2.
[30] Sum. Theol. I, q. 45, a. 5.
[31] In Sent. IV, d. 1, q. 1, n. 28.

dispositively to the effect of the principal agent. . . . Now the proper effect of God creating is what is presupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being. Hence nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally to this effect, since creation is not from anything presupposed, which can be disposed by the action of the instrumental agent. So therefore it is impossible for any creature to create, either by its own power, or instrumentally, that is, ministerially." [32]

3. *Exemplary Cause of Creation.*— That God is the exemplary cause of all things created is the common teaching of the Scholastics. They usually treat the subject in connection with the question of divine ideas. "As the world was not made by chance," says St. Thomas, "but by God acting by His intellect, . . . there must exist in the divine mind that form to the likeness of which the world was made." [33] This form or idea is, of course, identical with the divine essence, but as it is in the divine mind it exhibits the various modes in which that essence may be imitated in creatures. St. Thomas explains this by saying: "The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type of this or that created thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, in as much as many types are understood by the self-same essence." [34] The substance of this explanation is admitted by all Scholastics, but there is among them a considerable difference of opinion concerning points of minor importance.[35]

4. *The Final Cause of Creation.*— The final cause of a thing, taking the term in the strict sense, is that which the agent intends to attain and by which he is moved to act. In this sense there can be no final cause of creation, as God can be moved to act neither by His own goodness nor by any good apart from Himself. But taking cause in a wider sense,

[32] Sum. Theol. I, q. 45, a. 5.
[33] Ibid. q. 15, a. 1.
[34] Ibid. a. 2 ad 1m.
[35] Cfr. Halens. Sum. p. 1, q. 23, m. 4, a. 1; Albert. Magn. Sum. p. 1, tr. 13, q. 55, m. 2, a. 4; Bonavent. In Sent. I, d. 35, a. unic. q. 1; Scotus, In Sent. I, q. unic.; Durand. Sent. I, d. 36, q. 3.

as a sufficient reason for an end freely willed, the term is applicable to God in respect of His creative work. Not only did He ordain the attainment of His own extrinsic glory as the end to which all creation is directed, but He had a sufficient reason for willing this end. With the exception of Durandus,[36] all Scholastics are at one on the question so understood. And as such a sufficient reason they assign God's own goodness or glory — not to be acquired or increased, but to be manifested. As St. Thomas words it: "Every agent acts for an end; . . . but it does not belong to the First Agent, who is agent only, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends only to communicate His perfection, which is His goodness; . . . Therefore the divine goodness is the end of all things." [37]

Subordinated to this primary end, and materially identified with God's extrinsic glory, is the utility and happiness of rational creatures. In this sense St. Bonaventure writes: "The principal end of things created is God's glory or goodness, rather than the utility of creatures. . . . Therefore on account of His own glory did He create — not, indeed, that He might augment His glory, but that He might manifest and communicate it; and in this manifestation and participation consists the highest good of His creatures, namely, their glorification and beatitude." [38] Six hundred years later the doctrine thus set forth was defined in almost identical terms by the Vatican Council.[39]

5. *Creation in Time.*— Whether the world existed from all eternity, or was created in time, was during the Middle Ages a very live question; because the disciples of Avicenna and Averroes, who followed in this the teaching of pagan philosophers, stood strongly for the eternity of the world, at least in its material substratum. The Scholastics, with the exception of Abelard, were agreed on two points: First, that the created world is not necessarily from all eternity; secondly, that this world was de facto created in time. The first conclusion they derived from the freedom of the creative act, which is by

[36] Sent. II, q. 2, a. 1.
[37] Sum. Theol. q. 44, a. 4.
[38] In Sent. II, d. 1, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1.
[39] Cap. 1, can. 5; DB, 1783, 1805.

its very nature independent of time as well as of material causes. The second they proved directly from revelation, although the majority held that the same conclusion could also be derived from the principles of reason, as brought to bear upon the world in its concrete reality.

But there was a third question involved, namely, the possibility of eternal creation. On this point a sharp controversy was carried on for many years. Alexander of Hales,[40] St. Bonaventure,[41] Albertus Magnus,[42] Henry of Ghent,[43] Richard of Middleton,[44] and the vast majority of Scholastics denied absolutely that eternal creation was possible; whilst St. Thomas,[45] Scotus,[46] Durandus,[47] Biel,[48] and many Nominalists held that the impossibility of eternal creation could not be demonstrated with any degree of certainty. Most of these latter, however, limited their discussion to beings that are not subject to motion or change. St. Thomas is usually interpreted as holding the possibility of eternal creation in regard to changeable beings as well.

The arguments commonly adduced to show the impossibility of eternal creation are of two kinds. First, the very nature of finite beings is such that they cannot be from all eternity. For their very finiteness involves succession, and whatever involves succession is temporal in its beginning.[49] Secondly, creation is a *productio ex nihilo,* so that being necessarily follows upon not-being, and therefore creatures cannot be coextensive in duration with the Creator.[50]

St. Thomas examines these arguments very carefully, and then points out how they fail to prove the contention of the *Murmurantes.* The first argument, he says, would be conclusive in regard to changeable things, if it were evident that an infinite number is repugnant to reason; but as this is not

[40] Sum. p. 1, q. 12, m. 8; p. 2, q. 14, m. 1, a. 1; q. 9, m. 9.
[41] In Sent. II, d. 1, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2.
[42] Quodl. 1, q. 7.
[43] Sum. p. 2, tr. 1, q. 4, m. 2, a. 5.
[44] In Sent. II, d. 1, q. 3, a. 4.
[45] Cont. Gent. II, c. 18, c. 31–38; Sum. Theol. I, q. 46, a. 1, 2.
[46] Report. d. 1, q. 4; In Sent. II, q. 3.
[47] In Sent. II, d. 1, q. 4, a. 1.
[48] In Sent. II, d. 1, q. 3.
[49] Cfr. Albert. Magn. Sum. tr. 1, q. 1, a. 3.
[50] Cfr. Middl. In Sent. II, d. 2, a. 3, 1, 4.

evident, the argument has no force. The other contention, that in creation being follows upon not-being, rests upon the false supposition that this order of succession necessarily implies on the part of not-being priority of duration. This supposition is false, because priority of nature is quite sufficient to establish the required order of succession. Hence both arguments are inconclusive.[51]

With this reasoning Scotus was in full agreement, and in some ways even went beyond it, in as much as he held that reason cannot prove that the present world, with all its various changes, was created in time.[52] Subsequently most Thomists followed the teaching of St. Thomas on this point, but the greater number of theologians and philosophers preferred the view of Albertus Magnus and St. Bonaventure. The fact of creation in time or with time was defined by the Fourth Lateran, and more recently by the Vatican Council.[53]

6. *Creation and Conservation.*— There was also some difference of views on the nature of God's conservative action as distinguished from His productive act. All, indeed, admitted the fact and necessity of conservation; but whilst some regarded the conservative action of God as a mere continuation of His creative activity, others made a real distinction between the two. The matter is thus explained by St. Thomas: "As, then, it is impossible that the production of a thing should continue, when the action of the agent producing it ceases; so is it impossible that the being of the thing should continue, when the action of the agent ceases: for that action is not only the cause of the production of the thing, but of its being itself." [54] . . . "However, the conservation of things by God is not by way of a new action, but is a continuation of the action by which He gave existence to things; for that action is without motion and time, even as the conservation of light in the air is effected by a continued activity exercised by the sun.[55]

[51] Opusc. 22.
[52] Oxon. II, d. 1, q. 3.
[53] DB, 428, 1783.
[54] Sum. Theol. I, q. 104, a. 1.
[55] Ibid. a. 1 ad 4[m].

Alexander of Hales,[56] St. Bonaventure,[57] Albertus Magnus,[58] and Scotus[59] took practically the same view; but Henry of Ghent,[60] Durandus,[61] Richard of Middleton,[62] and others argued that if conservation and creation were not different actions in so far as they terminate at creatures, created beings would always be in a state of being produced, which is against common sense. As an ultimate reason for this conclusion they assign the fact that in created beings essence and existence are identified *in re*, and only *ratione* distinct.

[56] Sum. p. 2, q. 13, m. 3, 4.
[57] In Sent. II, d. 47, a. 1, q. 2.
[58] Sum. II, tr. 4, q. 3, m. 3, a. 2.
[59] In Sent. II, d. 2, q. 1, n. 3 sqq.
[60] Quodl. 10, q. 7; Quodl. 1, q. 9.
[61] In Sent. II, d. 1, q. 2.
[62] In Sent. II, d. 1, a. 2, q. 1–4.

CHAPTER VI

ANGELOLOGY

In their teaching on the angels, the Scholastics developed to a considerable extent what had been handed down to them in the writings of the Fathers. Yet, with the exception of a few points, all this development remained more or less a matter of speculation. Nothing has been defined in regard to the angels that was not already of faith before the end of the Patristic age. Their existence, their creation by God, the spirituality of their nature, the fact that some fell into sin and were lost, whilst others remained faithful and were saved; and the further fact that the fallen angels are bent upon bringing about man's ruin, whereas the good angels are appointed by Providence to be his faithful guardians — these points constitute the sum-total of the explicit teaching of the Church in reference to this part of God's creation. And all of these truths, except the spirituality of the angelic nature as now understood, were universally believed in the earliest ages of the Church. The Scholastics took these same truths as the starting points of their speculations and deduced from them conclusions of varying degrees of certitude. Some of the more important, together with the reasoning that led up to them, may here be briefly stated.

1. *Creation of the Angels.*— That the angels were created by God is usually touched upon only in connection with the question of creation in general. No special treatise was devoted by the Scholastics to this subject. Some, however, gave considerable space to the consideration of the subordinate question, at what particular time the angels were created. Nothing very definite had been established with regard to this point

by Patristic writers.[1] Nor did the Scholastics come to any general agreement, except that the angels were not created from all eternity. And this was defined by the Fourth Lateran, chiefly to counteract the growing influence of Averroism in Christian schools. St. Thomas states this point of doctrine as follows: "God alone, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is from eternity. Catholic faith holds this without doubt, and everything to the contrary must be rejected as heretical. For God so produced creatures that He produced them from nothing; that is, after there had been nothing." [2]

The more common opinion among the Scholastics was that the angels were created at the same time as the material universe. This view was based partly upon authority and partly upon reason. The authority specially appealed to was the statement of Holy Writ, that God "created all things together," [3] which expression was incorporated in the definition of the Fourth Lateran Council. However, neither Holy Scripture nor the Council seem to use the expression in reference to time. The principal argument from reason is thus stated by St. Thomas, in his answer to the question whether the angels were created before the corporeal world: "There is a twofold opinion on this point to be found in the writings of the Fathers. The more probable one holds that the angels were created at the same time as corporeal creatures. For the angels are part of the universe; they do not constitute a universe of themselves; but both they and corporeal natures unite in constituting one universe. This stands in evidence from the relationship of creature to creature; because the mutual relationship of creatures makes up the good of the universe. But no part is perfect if separate from the whole. Consequently, it is improbable that God, whose works are perfect, . . . should have created the angelic creature before other creatures. At the same time the contrary is not to be deemed erroneous; especially on account of the opinion of Gregory Nazianzen." [4]

2. *Elevation of the Angels.*— The only two points on which

[1] Cfr. vol. I, p. 293 sqq.
[2] Sum. Theol. I, q. 61, a. 2.
[3] Eccli. 18, 1.
[4] Sum. Theol. I, q. 61, a. 3.

all the Scholastics were agreed, as regards the elevation of the angels, are these: First, that they were all created for eternal happiness; secondly, that they had at least sufficient actual graces to merit heaven. On everything else widely different opinions were entertained. However, leaving aside the peculiar view of a few of the earlier Scholastics, all these opinions turn about the question whether the angels received sanctifying grace at the moment of their creation or some time later, after they had disposed themselves for its reception. The two different views held at the time are thus indicated by St. Thomas in his *Commentary on the Sentences:* "On this point there are two opinions: Some there are who say that the angels were not created in the state of grace, but of natural perfection only, and this opinion is the more common. Others, however, say that the angels were created in the state of grace. Which of these two views is the truer one, cannot be shown by any conclusive reason." [5] However he adds that the second view, according to which the angels were created in the state of grace, pleases him more, though without prejudice to the other.

The first opinion, that the angels were created in the state of natural perfection only, was defended by Peter Lombard,[6] Alexander of Hales,[7] Henry of Ghent,[8] St. Bonaventure,[9] Richard of Middleton,[10] and not a few others. The principal advocates of the other view, besides St. Thomas,[11] were Albertus Magnus,[12] Durandus,[13] and Dionysius the Carthusian.[14] Scotus considered both opinions as probable.[15]

Those who held that the angels were created in the state of merely natural perfection, rested their view chiefly on two principles: First, that rational creatures must dispose themselves, under the influence of God's special assistance, for the

[5] II, d. 4, q. unic. a. 3.
[6] Sent. II, d. 4.
[7] Sum. p. 2, q. 19, m. 2.
[8] Quodl. 8, q. 10.
[9] In Sent. II, d. 4, a. 1, q. 2.
[10] Sent. II, d. 4, a. 2, q. 2.
[11] In Sent. loc. cit.; Sum. Theol. I, q. 62, a. 3.
[12] In Sent. II, d. 3, a. 12; Sum. p. 2, tr. 4, q. 18, m. 1.
[13] In Sent. II, d. 4, q. 2.
[14] In Sent. II, d. 4, q. 2.
[15] In Sent. II et Report. d. 4, q. unica.

reception of sanctifying grace; secondly, that in the very act of being created such a disposition is impossible on the part of the creature. For the disposition must be positive, and for that there is need of free election, which necessarily presupposes actual existence. Hence at least one moment must elapse after the creative act, before sanctifying grace can be infused according to God's ordinary law of sanctification.

St. Thomas and his followers grant the first contention, but they point out that free election on the part of the creature may be simultaneous with creation. No priority of time is required in this matter, but only of nature; so that, at the very moment of its creation, the free will, supported by actual grace, turned deliberately to God as its supernatural end. The positive reasons for this second view are thus stated by St. Thomas: "Although there are conflicting opinions on the point, some holding that the angels were created only in a natural state, while others maintain that they were created in grace; it seems more probable, however, and more in keeping with the sayings of the Saints, that they were created in sanctifying grace. For we see that all things which, in the process of time, were produced by the work of Divine Providence, the creature operating under the direction of God, were produced in the first fashioning of things according to seedling forms, as Augustine says, such as trees, and animals, and the rest. Now it is evident that sanctifying grace bears the same relation to beatitude as the seedlike form in nature does to the natural effect; hence in the First Epistle of John (3, 9) grace is called the seed of God. As, then, in Augustine's opinion it is contended that the seedlike forms of all natural effects were implanted in the creature when corporeally created, so straightway from the beginning the angels were created in grace." [16]

On the further question, whether the fallen angels as well as those who remained faithful received sanctifying grace, there was likewise a difference of opinion, though not to the same extent as on the preceding point. All those who held

[16] Sum. Theol. I, q. 62, a. 3.

that the angels were created in the state or grace, gave an affirmative answer. Those, however, who favored the other opinion generally taught that Lucifer and his followers fell into sin before they had disposed themselves for the reception of sanctifying grace, and consequently never received that gift of God intended for all. This latter view has been set aside by most subsequent theologians.

3. *Nature of the Angels.*— Both the Fathers and the Scholastics are at one in teaching that the angels are spirits endowed with intellect and free will. However the term "spirit" was not by all of them taken in the same sense in which it is understood in this connection to-day. Not a few Fathers taught that the angels had bodies, which were composed of some kind of ethereal substance, ordinarily invisible to human eyes.[17] This view was taken over by many of the earlier Scholastics, whose teaching on the angels was little more than a restatement of what they found in Patristic writings. Rupert of Deutz,[18] St. Bernard,[19] and Peter Lombard [20] are quite definite on this point. Robert Pulleyn [21] and Hugh of St. Victor,[22] on the other hand, contended that the angels must be regarded as pure spirits.

During the first part of the thirteenth century this latter view became more common, possibly owing to the position taken by the Fourth Lateran Council. The doctrine was not directly defined, but as the Council divided all creatures into three classes — spiritual beings, beings composed of spirit and matter, and purely material beings — its mind on the point in question was made sufficiently clear. However the Franciscan school, represented by Alexander of Hales,[23] St. Bonaventure,[24] and Scotus [25] still continued to ascribe bodies to the angels, but in a somewhat different sense. Their position is most clearly explained by Scotus, who brought the theory to its last stage of development.

[17] Cfr. vol. I, p. 293 sqq.
[18] De Victoria Verbi, I, c. 28; ML, 169, 1262.
[19] Serm. 5 in Cant. n. 2; ML, 182, 790.
[20] Sent. II, d. 8.
[21] Sent. II, c. 2.
[22] De Sacram. c. 7.
[23] Sum. p. 2, q. 20, m. 2; q. 61, m. 1.
[24] In Sent. II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1 et 2.
[25] De Rerum Principiis, q. 7, 8.

According to Scotus all created beings — angels, human souls, and material substances — are composed of potency and act. This potency, which he calls a *potentia passiva,* is material in its nature. It is of three kinds, designated respectively as *materia primo prima, secundo prima, tertio prima.* The *materia primo prima* is absolutely indeterminate, and is in a condition to be ultimately the foundation or subject of any form whatever. In material substances it receives the *forma corporeitatis,* and together with this constitutes the *materia secundo prima.* When still further determined by a specific form, either spiritual or material, the result is the *materia tertio prima,* which exists in the natural order of things as a complete substance, and is not further determinable except by accidental forms.[26]

Now it is the *materia primo prima* that enters into the composition of angels and of human souls. As it is thus not completed by the *forma corporeitatis,* neither angels nor human souls are corporeal; they are spirits, but at the same time they are composed of matter and form. Hence according to Scotus, and the same is true in respect of the others mentioned above, God alone is a pure spirit. All other beings are in one way or another fashioned out of matter by the hand of God.[27]

The more common view, however, which had as its chief advocates Albertus Magnus,[28] St. Thomas,[29] Henry of Ghent,[30] Durandus,[31] Ægidius Romanus,[32] and Dionysius the Carthusian,[33] was entirely in favor of the spirituality of the angels in the strict sense of the term. All these writers re-

[26] De Rerum Principiis, q. 7, a. 1, 2, 3.

[27] Thus all creation is closely bound together by the *materia primo prima,* as he himself describes it in the following passage: "Mundus est arbor quaedam pulcherrima, cujus radix et seminarium est materia prima, folia fluentia sunt accidentia; frondes et rami sunt creata corruptibilia; flos rationalis anima; fructus naturae consimilis et perfectionis natura angelica. Unicus autem hoc seminarium dirigens et formans a principio est manus Dei" (Ibid. q. 7, a. 4, n. 30).

[28] Sum. tr. 1, q. 3, m. 3, a. 2; q. incid. 4.

[29] In Sent. II, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1; Sum. Theol. q. 50, a. 2; q. 75, a. 5; Cont. Gent. II, c. 50; De Spiritual. Creat. a. 1; De Substant. Separat. c. 5–8.

[30] Quodl. 4, q. 16.

[31] In Sent. II, d. 3, q. 1.

[32] In Sent. d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, a. 1.

[33] In Sent. II, d. 3, q. 1.

garded *materia prima* as a constitutive principle that is essentially limited to bodily substances. They did not admit the distinction between *materia primo prima* and *materia secundo prima,* and consequently destroyed the foundation upon which the Scotist reasoning was based. Their principle was: *Materia et forma dividunt substantiam materialem* — material substances, and material substances only, are composed of matter and form.

St. Thomas, after giving an exposition of the opinion held by the Arabian philosopher Avicebron, which is essentially the same as that of Scotus, refutes it in this way: "One glance is enough to show that there cannot be one matter of spiritual and of corporeal things. For it is not possible that a spiritual and a corporeal form should be received into the same part of matter, otherwise one and the same thing would be corporeal and spiritual. . . . It is, further, impossible for an intellectual substance to have any kind of matter. For the operation belonging to anything is according to the mode of its substance. Now to understand is an altogether immaterial operation, as appears from its object, whence any act receives its species or nature. For a thing is understood according to its degree of immateriality; because forms that exist in matter are individual forms which the intellect cannot apprehend as such. Hence it must be that every intellectual substance is altogether immaterial." [34] "In material things there is one thing which determines to a special grade, and that is the form; and another thing which is determined, and this is the matter; . . . whereas in immaterial things there is no separate determinator and thing determined; each thing by its own self holds a determinate grade of being." [35]

However, "although there is no composition of matter and form in an angel, yet there is act and potentiality." For "there still remains the relation of the form to its very existence, as of potentiality to act. And such a kind of composition is understood to be in the angels; and this is what some say, that an angel is composed of that *whereby he is*

[34] Sum. Theol. I, q. 50, a. 2. [35] Ibid. a. 2 ad 1m.

and that *which is,* or *existence* and *essence,* as Boethius says. For essence is the form itself subsisting; and existence is that *whereby* the substance *is,* as the running is that whereby the runner runs. But in God *existence* and *essence* are not different. . . . Hence God alone is pure act."[36]

The discussion about the spirituality of the angels led to another inquiry, namely, what is the relation of the angels to place? As they have no bodies, at least not in the strict sense of the term, can they be said to be in a place? To this question all Scholastics gave an affirmative answer, and St. Thomas considered the contrary opinion as heretical.[37] However, this local presence is not circumscriptive, as is that of bodies; it is a definitive presence, which is indeed limited to a certain portion of space, but without correspondence of parts to parts. The whole substance is in the whole place, and the whole is in every part thereof. This presence, moreover, the Scholastics derive, not from the exigencies of the angelic substance itself, but rather from the free ordination of the Creator. As the angelic substance is without extension, it is of its own nature outside the category of space. Hence its relation to place must ultimately come from the will of God.[38]

On these several points there was hardly any difference of views among the Scholastics; but on the further question, in what precisely does this relation to place consist, opinions differed. St. Thomas, with many others, held that it must be reduced to an application of the angelic power. Comparing the local presence of angels to that of bodies, he says: "A body is said to be in a place in such a way that it is applied to it according to the contact of dimensive quantity; but there is no such quantity in the angels, for theirs is a virtual one. Consequently an angel is said to be in a corporeal place by application of the angelic power in any manner whatever to any place. Accordingly there is no need for saying that an angel can be deemed commensurate with a place, or that he occupies a space in the continuous; for this is proper to a

[36] Ibid. a. 2 ad 3m.
[37] In Sent. I, d. 37, q. 3, a. 1.
[38] Cfr. Albert. Magn. In Sent. I, d. 37, a. 26; Scot. In Sent. II, d. 2, q. 6; Bonavent. In Sent. II, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1.

located body which is endowed with dimensive quantity. In similar fashion it is not necessary on this account for the angel to be contained by a place; because an incorporeal substance virtually contains the thing with which it comes into contact, and is not contained by it; for the soul is in the body as containing it, not as contained by it. In the same way an angel is said to be in a place which is corporeal, not as the thing contained, but as somehow containing it." [39]

Scotus, on the other hand, favored the opinion defended by Richard of Middleton, that the formal reason of this presence in a particular place is neither the angelic substance nor its operation, but a sort of local simultaneity (*simultas*), even as the formal reason of the application of a body to a place is its circumscription.[40] This view also had a considerable number of advocates, but none of them give a clear exposition of what the *simultas* really is in itself.

4. *Knowledge of the Angels.*— With the exception of Durandus, William of Auxerre, and some Nominalists, the Scholastics were agreed that the angels know things apart from their own being by means of *species* or intellectual representations, and not directly by way of their own essence. As regards the origin of these *species* there was some difference of opinion. All admitted that the angels received infused knowledge of things at the moment of their creation, and that this knowledge consisted in the intelligible species of the things known. But whilst many held with St. Thomas that the angels are incapable of acquiring new intelligible species through their own intellectual activity, St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and others contended that the acquisition of such new species on the part of the angels must necessarily be admitted. The ultimate reason of this difference of views is based upon the difference of concepts in regard to the angelic nature, about which something was said in the preceding number. Presupposing that difference of concepts, the two views of angelic cognition may here be briefly stated.[41]

[39] Sum. Theol. I, q. 52, a. 1.
[40] In Sent. I, d. 37, a. 2, q. 1.
[41] Cfr. Halens. Sum. p. 2, q. 24, m. 2, 3; Bonavent. In Sent. II, d. 3, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1; Scotus, In Sent. II, d. 30, q. 10, 11; d. 9, q. 2; Thom. In

As St. Thomas holds that the angels are pure spirits, as was explained above, he establishes an absolute difference between angelic and human cognition. All human cognition is ultimately derived from sense perception, and the proper object of the human intellect is the essence of material things, considered in its universality and necessary predicates. Hence in man there is an active and a passive intellect. The active intellect abstracts the intelligible idea from the sensible representation of material things as contained in the phantasm, while the passive intellect receives the idea thus abstracted and expresses it immanently in the form of knowledge. On the other hand, the proper object of the angelic intelligence is wholly immaterial, being necessarily in the same order with the nature of the angelic substance. Hence in the angels there is no active intellect, nor can they abstract any intelligible species from the material world. But neither is there in them a passive intellect, in the sense that they are sometimes understanding only in potentiality the things which they naturally apprehend. Their knowledge is always actual, in virtue of the intelligible species of things which they received from God together with their intellectual nature; and it is the more universal in proportion as the perfection of their being is more exalted.[42]

In accord with these fundamental principles, St. Thomas outlines the contents of angelic cognition as follows: The angels have actual knowledge of their own being and, in the natural order, also of God, by means of their essence, without needing any intelligible species. They know each other by the help of intelligible species infused by God at the moment of creation. In the same way they also know human souls and material objects, both in their individual existence and in their universal concepts. But they have no natural knowledge of future free actions, nor of the secrets of hearts, nor of the mysteries of grace. Their knowledge is not discursive, but intuitive. They apprehend in one glance all the principles and

Sent. II, q. 3, a. 1, 2, 3; Sum. Theol. I, q. 55, 56; Albert. Magn. In Sent. d. 3, q. 5, 6.

[42] Sum. Theol. I, q. 54–56; Cont. Gent. I, c. 95–100; De Verit. q. 8, a. 8, 9.

particular applications of universal propositions. However their knowledge of things is not simultaneous, in the sense that they actually know all things at once or by one idea. They know objects successively, by actuating any intelligible species they choose. In regard to the proper objects of their natural knowledge they cannot fall into error; but whilst they were *in via* they could err in reference to truths belonging to the supernatural order. This possibility of error, of course, still obtains in the case of the fallen angels.[43]

From this exposition of angelic cognition as given by St. Thomas, that of Scotus and his school differs considerably. Scotus also holds that there is a specific difference between angels and human souls, but not in that absolute sense insisted on by St. Thomas. His *materia primo prima* runs through the whole of God's creation. This brings the angelic and the human natures much closer to each other. He admits with St. Thomas the infusion of intelligible species, by reason of which angels have a much greater and higher natural knowledge than is attainable by man; but with regard to every other point he takes opposite views. According to him, the proper object of the human intellect is being itself, without connotation of particular or universal,[44] and this is also the proper object of the angelic intelligence. As there is a passive and an active intellect in man, so is there in angels. Hence they can abstract intelligible ideas from particular things; not by means of phantasms, but simply by making these things the object of their intelligence.[45] Moreover, angelic cognition is not necessarily intuitive; it may also be discursive. Nor is it limited to things present and past, and to future events that proceed from necessary causes; but it extends to all free acts of the present, to the secrets of hearts, and to all past and present mysteries of grace.[46] The knowledge of the fallen angels, however, is less extensive; not on account of any natural incapacity, but because in regard to some things, as

[43] Sum. Theol. I, q. 54–58; Cont. Gent. I, c. 95.

[44] In Sent. III, d. 14, q. 7; IV, d. 45, q. 3; Quodl. q. 13, n. 9; In Metaphys. VII, q. 15, 22.

[45] In Sent. II, d. 9, q. 2, n. 439, 130.

[46] In Sent. II, d. 1, q. 5, n. 3; Ibid. d. 9, q. 2, n. 27.

the secrets of hearts, God withholds His *concursus* from such cognition.[47]

5. *Volition of the Angels.*— As angels are intellectual beings created by God for the attainment of eternal happiness as a reward of their merit, it necessarily follows that they are endowed with free will. About this there never was any difference of opinion among the Scholastics. Views began to differ only when the nature of angelic volition came up for consideration. And in regard to this the same two schools of thought were opposed to one another as on the subject of angelic knowledge. In fact, one difference is necessarily connected with the other, and both harken back to a different conception of the angelic nature, as was indicated above. It will be sufficient here to indicate a few of the more important points.

St. Thomas and his school conceive the will as a natural tendency towards good, which finds expression in love. In human beings this tendency is of a higher and lower order, in keeping with man's composite nature; but in angels only the higher spiritual tendency is found, and this has for its object the universal good.[48] There exists in angels both a natural love and a love of choice. The former has for its proper object their own happiness as their last end, which they will and love by a necessity of their nature; the latter is directed towards the means by which their last end is attained, and in regard to them they enjoy freedom of election.[49] They can not turn away from their last end in the natural order, but they can turn away from their supernatural last end. Hence, whilst they were still on probation, they could sin by seeking their own good in opposition to the order established by God.[50] As they apprehend by one glance both their last end and the means thereto, any sin committed by them was necessarily opposed to their last end, and therefore mortal.[51] Their first choice, whether for good or for evil, determined their fate for all eternity; because their will attached itself to the object

[47] In Sent. IV, d. 10, q. 8, ad 3m.
[48] Sum. Theol. I, q. 60.
[49] Ibid. a. 1, 2, 3.
[50] Ibid. a. 1 ad 3m; De Malo, q. 16, a. 5.
[51] Ibid. ad 4m; Sum. Theol. I. II, q. 89, a. 4.

of their choice with full knowledge, uninfluenced by passion, very much the same way as the intellect attaches itself to evident first principles in the order of truth. Hence those who fell were thereby confirmed in evil, and irrevocably lost; while those who remained faithful were by that one act forever established in good, and forthwith admitted to eternal beatitude. In their present state, the good angels love God necessarily, and the bad angels hate God necessarily; hence in neither case is there further room for merit or demerit.[52]

The view of Scotus is opposed to this in nearly every particular. He holds that there is in the angels both a higher and a lower tendency towards good, as there is in human beings.[53] Moreover their will enjoys freedom of choice with regard to every object, and their free will must direct their natural inclination in its tendency towards good.[54] Their eternal condition was not irrevocably decided by one act. The fallen angels committed many sins, of which they might have repented whilst still *in via*.[55] They retained their free will even after they had been condemned to eternal punishment; but their inveterate malice prevents them from doing any good.[56] Conversion is indeed impossible for them, not because they haven't the exercise of their free will, but because God has decreed that there should be no conversion after the final sentence was passed; hence He now withholds His grace.[57] A similar condition obtains in the case of the good angels. Although they are in possession of their last end, nevertheless they still remain free. There is, however, no longer room for merit or demerit in either case, because the time of probation is past.[58]

6. *Mutual Relation of the Angels.*— Following the teaching of the Pseudo-Areopagite, the Scholastics commonly held that the nine choirs of angels, which are mentioned in Holy Scripture, constitute a celestial hierarchy, corresponding to the ec-

[52] Ibid. I, q. 62, a. 8; q. 63, a. 2; De Malo, q. 16, a. 5; Sum. Theol. I, q. 62, a. 8; q. 60, a. 5 ad 5[m].
[53] In Sent. III, d. 35.
[54] In Sent. II, d. 6, q. 2, n. 8, 9; Report. II, d. 6, q. 2, n. 9.
[55] In Sent. II, d. 6, q. 2, n. 16.
[56] Ibid. n. 24.
[57] In Sent. II, d. 6.
[58] Ibid. d. 7, q. unic. n. 28.

clesiastical hierarchy on earth. There are three divisions, each comprising three choirs. To the highest division belong the Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones; to the second, the Dominations, Virtues, and Powers; to the third, the Principalities, Archangels, and Angels. The principle underlying this division is variously assigned by the different authors. The more common opinion points to the relation of the angels to God in respect of their ministry and to the imparting of knowledge by the higher to the lower orders. However all this is more or less a matter of speculation; the only certain point is that there is a division into choirs, although even this has not been defined.[59]

In connection with this grouping of the angelic host into certain divisions, the Scholastics also speculated about the specific difference of the angels. St. Thomas, assigning quantified matter — *materia signata* — as the principle of individuation, consequently held that each angel constitutes a distinct species, whereas Scotus and others contended that the principle of individuation must be either the concrete nature itself or a perfection formally distinct from nature, and hence in either case several individual angels may belong to the same species.[60]

There was a similar difference of opinion about *illumination* and *locution.* All were agreed that one angel can communicate with another, and therefore impart knowledge and reveal his own mind after the manner of speech; but they differed considerably in their explanation of the admitted fact. Illumination, in the sense of instruction, was commonly restricted to the higher orders in respect to the lower; while locution was held to be common to all. It was particularly this latter which they found difficult to explain. St. Thomas makes locution exclusively a matter of the will. The mere fact that one angel wishes to communicate with another arouses the intellectual attention of the angel so addressed, no matter in

[59] Cfr. St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. I, q. 108, 106, 107; Scotus, In Sent. II, d. 9, q. 2; Report. d. 9, q. 2.

[60] Sum. Theol. I, q. 50, a. 3; In Sent. II, d. 3, q. 7.

what part of space he may happen to be.[61] St. Bonaventure agrees with this in so far as locution depends on the will of the speaker, but thinks that distance must be taken into consideration.[62] Others require, over and above a simple act of the will, some kind of spiritual sign, capable of attracting the attention of the one spoken to.[63] Scotus holds that angels can read one another's mind independently of any act of the will; but for locution, in the proper sense of the word, it is required that the speaker produce in the mind of the one addressed a concept of the matter he wishes to communicate. And this the angels can do in the same way as they produce a concept in their own mind.[64]

7. *Ministry of the Angels.*— That the good angels are the ministers of God in the government of the world is a matter of faith, and was accepted as such by the Scholastics. It is also a matter of faith that some angels are deputed by God to be the guardians of men, for the purpose of protecting and assisting them in the attainment of their last end. Neither of these truths has been defined by the Church, but both are clearly contained in Holy Scripture and tradition. That each and every person has his own special guardian angel is not of faith, but the doctrine was commonly held by the Scholastics.[65] St. Thomas states this common teaching as follows: "In this life man is on his way to heaven, along which way he is threatened by many dangers, both interior and exterior. . . . And thus in the same manner as guards are given to a wayfarer who must travel along dangerous roads, so to each human being, whilst still on the way, a guardian angel is assigned; but when the end of the journey is reached, he will no longer have a guardian angel; instead, if in heaven, he will have an angel reigning with him in glory, or, if in hell, a demon inflicting punishment." [66]

[61] Sum. Theol. I, q. 107, a. 1; In Sent. II, q. 2, a. 3.
[62] In Sent. II, d. 10, a. 3, q. 2.
[63] Cfr. Richard of Middleton, In Sent. II, d. 9, a. 2, q. 1.
[64] In Sent. II, d. 9, q. 2, n. 27; Ibid. n. 15, 28, 24.
[65] Cfr. Halens. Sum. p. 2, q. 41, m. 4, a. 1, 3; Bonavent. In Sent. II, d. 11, a. 1, q. 1; Scotus, In Sent. II, d. 11, q. unica; Thomas, In Sent. II, d. 11, q. 1.
[66] Sum. Theol. I, q. 113, a. 4.

As guardian angels are the ministers of Divine Providence in behalf of their wards, they assist those entrusted to their care in various ways. They are indeed incapable of acting in opposition to the laws of nature, and therefore unable to work miracles, nevertheless they have the power of acting upon both body and soul. By an application of their natural activities to bodies, they can move them locally, cause alterations in their composition, and thus use them for the production of effects that lie beyond the power of man. They can also act upon the imagination, and thereby indirectly enlighten the mind and fortify the will. Besides, God permitting, they may on occasions assume bodies and so appear in visible forms, without, however, informing these bodies after the manner of human souls.[67]

A similar influence upon human affairs can also be exerted by evil spirits, who are always intent upon bringing about man's ruin. By their action upon the senses they can suggest temptations, obscure man's spiritual vision, and thus incline his will to evil. On rare occasions God permits them even to take possession of men's bodies, and cause the unfortunate victims of their malice to act as if they were bereft of reason. When their power thus exercised extends to the whole bodily organism, it is called possession; when only to a part, it is termed obsession. However in neither case do the evil spirits have direct power over man's will; hence although they can cause him to utter blasphemous and indecent expressions, and to perform actions that are materially sinful, they can never force him to sin. He is still the object of a wise and loving Providence; and although his body be given over to Satan, his soul ever remains in the hands of God.[68]

[67] Ibid. q. 111, a. 1–4; Scotus, In Sent. II, d. 11, q. unica; Report. II, d. 11, q. 1; Halens. Sum. p. 2, q. 41, m. 4; Albert Magn. In Sent. d. 11, a. 6.

[68] Halens. Sum. p. 2, q. 100, m. 1, 2; Bonavent. In Sent. II, d. 8, p. 2, a. unic. q. 1–4; Thom. In Sent. II, d. 8, a. unic. q. 5; Albert. Magn. Sum. p. 2, tr. 7, q. 29.

CHAPTER VII

ANTHROPOLOGY

In their dissertations on the creation of man, the Scholastics were agreed on the following three points: First, man was made to the image and likeness of God; second, the soul of the first man owed its origin to a creative act; third, man's body was the immediate result of a divine operation. These points are all contained in Holy Scripture, and the Scholastics, following the example of the Fathers, accepted them according to the obvious meaning of the sacred text.

In reference to the first point, that man is the image of God, they distinguish between image and trace — *imago et vestigium*. The latter is found in all creatures, in as much as they are the effects of a divine causality; for every effect is assimilated to its cause. But the concept of image implies over and above mere similarity an express intention in the agent to make the effect a formal representation of his own nature and personal being. This is called a specific likeness. Now this specific likeness to God can be realized only in rational beings — angels and men. God made them of express purpose like unto Himself in that He gave them being, life, and the power of understanding.[1]

Moreover, man is not only the image of the divine nature, but also of God as He exists in three persons — of the Blessed Trinity. St. Thomas explains this as follows: "Some effects represent only the causality of the cause, but not its form; as smoke represents fire. Such a representation is called a trace; for a trace shows that some one has passed by but not who it is. Other effects represent the cause as regards the similitude of its form, as fire generated represents fire gen-

[1] Sum. Theol. I, q. 93, a. 2.

erating; and a statue of Mercury represents Mercury; and this is called the representation of image. Now the processions of the divine persons are referred to the acts of intellect and will, as was said above. For the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love of the will. Therefore in rational creatures, possessing intellect and will, there is found the representation of the Trinity by way of image, in as much as there is found in them the word conceived, and the love proceeding." [2]

Scotus words this somewhat differently, though he comes to practically the same result. Man is the image of the Trinity, he says, not only in so far as he has an intellect and will, but also because the first man, at the first instant of his existence, elicited an act of understanding and love; and so in the fecundity of his nature, through his intellect and will, he represented the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. These three, the memory — *memoria fecunda* — the intellect, and the will, are consubstantial on the part of the soul, yet they are distinct in their acts.[3]

The creation of the first soul is necessarily implied in the creation of all things by God, and about this there was no difference of views among the Scholastics. The production of the human body by a special divine operation was also commonly accepted. Some of the Franciscan school still harked back to the *rationes seminales* made rather much of by St. Augustine, but even they attributed the formation of the body of Adam to the immediate operation of God.[4] St. Thomas explains the statement of St. Augustine, that the body of the first man was produced according to its *causales rationes* in the work of the six days, in this way: "That which is said to exist in creatures according to their causal reasons may be understood in two ways. One way in respect of active and passive potency, so that there is not merely an objective possibility of something being produced from preëxisting matter, but that there also preëxists a creature which can produce

[2] Ibid. q. 65, a. 7.
[3] In Sent. I, d. 3, q. 9.
[4] Cfr. Bonavent. In Sent. II, d. 18, a. 1, q. 3, Scholion — Quaracchi Ed.

this something. Another way in respect of passive potency only, so that this something can be produced from preëxisting matter by God alone; and in this way does St. Augustine say that the body of man preëxisted in the works already produced according to its causal reasons." [5]

His own reasons for the production of the first human body by God Himself he states in this way: "The formation of the human body could not be effected by any created power, but only by the immediate intervention of God. . . . For as God alone by His omnipotent power can create matter, He alone can produce a form in matter without the help of any preceding material form. And hence it is that the angels cannot so change bodies as to fit them for any particular form, except in so far as the form already preëxists by way of seed. Consequently, since there was not as yet a human body, in virtue of whose generative power a similar body might be formed, it was necessary that the first human body should be formed immediately by God." [6] However "it may well be that the angels performed some ministerial function in the formation of the body of the first man, as they will also do in the final resurrection, by gathering together the dust." [7]

Closely connected with the question of man's origin is that of his essential constitution. For clearness' sake, the subject may here be divided into these three points: First, the essential identity of the rational and sensitive soul in man; secondly, the origin of individual souls; thirdly, the union of soul and body.

1. *Essential Identity of the Rational and Sensitive Soul.*— This question, about which there had been some difference of views in Patristic times, was to all intents and purposes closed by the Eight General Council, held in 869. For in its eleventh canon, the Council declares that both the Old and the New Testament, and also the Fathers of the Church, teach that man has only one "rational and intellectual soul"; and then it condemns those who foolishly maintain that "he has two souls." It anathematizes not only the authors and propagators

[5] Sum. Theol. I, q. 91, a. 2 ad 4m.
[6] Ibid. a. 2.
[7] Ibid. a. 2 ad 1m.

of "this impiety," but also all others who entertain similar views.[8]

Whether this declaration of the Council was directly intended as a definition of the essential identity of the rational and sensitive principle in man, or merely of the oneness of the rational soul, is not altogether clear. Some theologians think that we have here nothing more than a condemnation of Manichaean dualism; while others are of opinion that the absolute oneness of the human soul was defined, but that there are no proofs to establish the fact as a certainty. Aside from this, however, the doctrine itself is sufficiently certain from an earlier definition of the Church, which was directed against the Origenists and Apollinarians. In it Christ as man is declared to be consubstantial with us, being composed of a rational soul and a body.[9] Hence the rational soul is evidently assumed to be the only vital principle in man.

And this was accepted by the Scholastics as the teaching of the Church. Several of them defended the doctrine against the error of Averroes, according to which all men have numerically the same rational soul, so that only the sensitive soul is multiplied in individuals. Under a somewhat different form, this teaching of Averroes was condemned by the Fifth Lateran Council, which sat from 1512 to 1517.[10]

Although the intellectual soul is thus the sensitive and vegetative principle, it is nevertheless incorruptible. St. Thomas gives three reasons for this. First, the soul is a pure spirit, in the sense that it is not composed of matter and form. It is, therefore, a subsisting form; and as a form cannot be separated from itself, it is impossible that the soul should be subject to corruption. Secondly, although some hold that the soul is in a manner composed of matter and form, yet even so it must be incorruptible. For corruption can only result from contrary elements, and from the intellectual soul as such contrary elements are necessarily excluded. This is manifest from its highest operation, which is altogether spiritual. Thirdly, as the intellect apprehends being under an absolute

[8] Mansi, 15, 403B, 432C; DB, 338.
[9] Mansi, 9, 533A.
[10] Mansi, 32, 842A; DB, 738.

form, the soul naturally desires to exist forever; and as this natural desire cannot be of anything unattainable, its very presence indicates that the soul is an incorruptible substance.[11]

2. *Creation of Individual Souls.*— In Patristic times, the question of the creation of individual souls was regarded as still open for discussion, although the weight of authority was in favor of Creatianism.[12] But when the Scholastics began to write their *Summae* and *Commentaries,* all discussion of the matter had come to an end. This was owing, in part at least, to the position taken by the Church, as indicated by the symbol which Leo IX, in 1050, presented to Bishop Peter of Antioch for subscription. It contains this confession of faith concerning the point in question: "I believe and profess that the soul is not a part of God, but is created out of nothing, and that, without baptism, it is in original sin."[13] As the soul "in original sin" is said to be created, the Pope evidently refers, not to the soul of Adam, but to individual souls.

Hence, although a few of the earlier Scholastics still regarded Creatianism as only more probable, the general consensus was that the creation of individual souls could not be called in question. Thus Peter Lombard states quite definitely: "The Church teaches that souls are created at their infusion into the body."[14] St. Thomas is still more emphatic; for he says: "It is heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted by way of generation."[15] Others do not give the same theological note to the doctrine of creation as here set forth, but they entertain no doubt regarding its truth.

St. Thomas thus indicates the various opinions that had been held on the subject at different times: "Regarding this question various opinions were expressed in times past. Some held that the soul of the child is propagated by the soul of the parent, just as the body is propagated by the body. Others said that all souls are created apart; but maintained that they were all created together in the beginning, and afterwards

[11] Sum. Theol. I, q. 75, a. 6.
[12] Cfr. vol. I, p. 299 sqq.
[13] Mansi, 19, 662B; DB, 348.
[14] Sent. II, d. 18, n. 8.
[15] Sum. Theol. I, q. 118, a. 2.

were united to procreated bodies, either by their own free volition, or, as others would have it, by the command and action of God. Others, again, declared that the soul at the moment of its creation is infused into the body. Though for a time these several views were upheld, and though it was doubtful which came nearest the truth, . . . nevertheless the Church subsequently condemned the first two, and approved the third." [16]

3. *Union of Soul and Body.*— On this point there was considerable discussion, and also some difference of opinion, among the Scholastics. All agreed, however, in rejecting Plato's theory of a merely mechanical union *per modum motoris.* And to this they were necessarily led by their teaching on the oneness of the vital principle in man. For not only man's thoughts and volitions, but also his sensations are immanent actions, and consequently there must be an intrinsic union between soul and body. It is indeed true that intellectual activity is intrinsically independent of the bodily organism; but that is owing to the fact that the soul is a subsistent form, which in being and activity transcends the limitations of material substances. By reason of its sensitive powers the soul constitutes with the body one principle of action; and by reason of its spiritual faculties it forms a principle of action by itself, except in so far as it needs the presence of phantasms for its spiritual operations. The one does not interfere with the other.[17]

As the intrinsic union of the soul with the body requires that the material element be specifically determinable, all Scholastics admitted some kind of *materia prima;* but there was no agreement in regard to its nature. Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and the whole Franciscan school held that both soul and body are composed of potency and act, or of matter and form; while Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas, and very many others denied the composition of both soul and body. This point has already been touched upon in the preceding chapter, where a short explanation is given of the

[16] De Potentia, q. 3, a. 9.
[17] Cfr. St. Thom. Sum. Theol. q. 76, a. 1.

Scotistic view on the nature of the angels. The same principles there set forth are applied by the Franciscan school to the two constitutive elements of human nature. Hence a few extracts from their writing will here suffice to give us a fair understanding of their teaching on the subject now under consideration.

Alexander of Hales, speaking of the human soul, thus states his view regarding its nature: "It must be held that the human soul is composed of matter and form; but it can in nowise be said that it has matter and form in the same sense as bodies have. . . . For corporeal matter is the foundation of magnitude; not so spiritual matter. . . . Still nothing can be the agent and the receiver of one and the same thing in itself. Hence as to act is proper to the form and to receive is proper to matter, it follows that the human soul, which performs both functions, is composed of matter and form.[18] . . . Besides, it seems very probable that all corporeal substances, as regards their matter, were produced in the six days of creation; hence for the same reason the soul also, as it is not entirely simple, was then produced as regards its matter: but that matter can only be spiritual, and therefore the soul was then produced as regards its spiritual matter." [19]

Then, referring to the union of soul and body, he says: "It must be noted that there is a first form whose function it is to perfect matter; as, for instance, elementary forms; and in their case the form directly perfects the whole matter and its every part. . . . But the soul has something over and above its own matter, which cannot be said of the first form; hence the soul does not actuate the matter of the body, but the natural body itself already complete in respect of its natural form: and this form is called the corporeal form — *forma corporalis.*" [20]

St. Bonaventure followed the teaching of his master, and expresses it in almost identical terms. The soul, he says, is a something that acts and is acted upon, that moves and is moved, and therefore there is in it a material principle from

[18] Sum. II, q. 61, m. 1.
[19] Sum. II, q. 60, m. 2, a. 1.
[20] Ibid. q. 63, m. 3.

which it has its existence, and a formal principle from which it has its being. However, that material substratum is outside the category of extension, and above all tendency to privation and corruption; and therefore it is called spiritual matter.[21] In regard to the union of the soul with the body he states: "Although the rational soul is composed of matter and form, nevertheless it has a tendency to perfect corporeal nature; similarly as the organic body, composed of matter and form, has a tendency to receive the soul."[22]

Henry of Ghent defended the same doctrine, and advanced a number of theological arguments in support of his view. Thus he pointed out, that, if the *forma corporeitatis* be admitted, it is much easier to explain the identity of Christ's body during the *triduum mortis,* to defend Mary's title of Mother of God, and to give a reasonable exposition of other facts belonging to the faith.[23]

Scotus, as was explained in the preceding chapter, divides the material elements of things into *materia primo prima, materia secundo prima,* and *materia tertio prima.* The first is pure potency devoid of all forms, and as such it is the substratum of all created beings. The second is actuated by a substantial form, the *forma corporeitatis,* which determines it quantitatively and makes it a fit substratum for specific organic and inorganic beings. The third is the complete substance, specifically determined by an ultimate substantial form. This is not subject to further determination, except by way of accidental forms.[24]

It is, therefore, the *materia secundo prima* which constitutes the body of which the rational soul is the substantial form. It has already been placed in the order of bodies by the *forma corporeitatis,* but it becomes a human body by being still further determined by the spiritual soul. So determined, it constitutes together with the soul the *compositum humanum,* which is truly an *unum per se.* The soul does not communicate to this body being simply, but specific being; and in so far only can it be called the substantial form of the body.

[21] In Sent. II, d. 17, a. 1, q. 2.
[22] Ibid. q. 2 ad 6m.
[23] Quodl. 4, q. 13.
[24] De Rerum Princ. q. 8, a. 3.

Over against this somewhat theoretical exposition, which is still advocated by many, stands the more direct and simple explanation of Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas. Both of them follow closely the teaching of the Stagirite, but neither of them simply transcribes his thoughts. The views of Albertus on the matter now under consideration may be reduced to the following points. 1. The soul is essentially simple, and therefore not composed of a really distinct act and potency.[25] 2. The rational soul is immediately united to the body as its substantial form.[26] 3. The soul gives to the body its specific, numerical, and substantial unity.[27] 4. The soul is the *actus corporis* in the sense that it communicates to the *materia prima* the *esse corporis* as well as the *esse vivum et sensitivum*.[28]

St. Thomas takes this teaching of his master and develops it in his own inimitable way. "To seek the nature of the soul," he says, "we must premise that the soul is defined as the first principle of life in those things which live: for we call living things animate (souled); and not-living things inanimate (soulless)."[29] Now, "it must necessarily be admitted that the principle of intellectual operation, which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent." . . . For it "has an operation of its own apart from the body. But only a self-subsisting thing can have an operation of its own; for nothing can operate but what is actual."[30] Moreover, "the intellectual soul itself is an absolute form, and not something composed of matter and form. For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be received into it as individuals, and so it would know only the individual; just as it happens with the sensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal organ. . . . It follows, therefore, that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form."[31]

[25] Sum. II, tr. 12, q. 2, m. 2.
[26] Ibid. q. 72, m. 2.
[27] De Creat. II, tr. 1, q. 4, a. 5.
[28] De Hom. tr. 1, q. 7, a. 1.
[29] Sum. Theol. I, q. 75, a. 1.
[30] Ibid. a. 2.
[31] Ibid. a. 5.

Again, "it is well to remark that if anyone holds that the soul is composed of matter and form, it would follow that in no way could the soul be the form of the body. For since the form is an act, and matter is only a potentiality, that which is composed of matter and form cannot be the form of another by virtue of itself as a whole. But if it is a form by virtue of some part of itself, then that part which is the form we call the soul, and that of which it is the form we call the primary animate."[32] Yet "we must assert that the intellect, which is the principle of intellectual operation, is the form of the human body. For that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be attributed. . . . But the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment, feeling, and local movement; and likewise the primary principle whereby we understand. Therefore this principle by which we primarily understand, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form of the body."[33]

This excludes, first of all, Plato's idea of a merely extrinsic union *per modum motoris*. "For that which is moved is neither generated by the application of the moving power, nor does it corrupt by the withdrawal of that power; because there is no dependence in respect of being, but only in respect of movement. If, therefore, the soul be united to the body only in the function of mover, it follows that in the union of soul and body there is no generation, nor in their separation is there corruption; and thus death, which consists in the separation of soul and body, does not mean a corruption of the animal nature; which is obviously false."[34]

Hence the union of soul and body is necessarily intrinsic; and this follows obviously from the nature of the *compositum* that is formed by their union. "For to be and to act is not predicated of the form alone, nor of the matter alone, but of the composite resultant: to be and to act is attributed to both in common, in so far as the one discharges the functions of form and the other that of matter. For we say that a man is healthy in respect of his body and health, and that he is

[32] Ibid. q. 76, a. 1.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Cont. Gent. II, 57.

wise in respect of his soul and wisdom; in which predication wisdom is taken as the form of him who is wise, and health as the form of him who is healthy. But to live and to feel is attributed to soul and body; for we are said to live and to feel by reason of our soul and our body, but so that the soul is the formal principle of life and sensation. Therefore the soul is the form of the body," and this by intrinsic union.[35]

From this intrinsic union of soul and body it necessarily follows that "it is impossible for another substantial form besides the soul to be found in man." . . . For "the substantial form gives simple existence; therefore by its coming a thing is said to be generated simply; and by its removal to be corrupted simply." . . . But, "if besides the intellectual soul there preexisted in matter another substantial form by which the subject of the soul were made an actual being, it would follow that the soul does not give existence simply; and consequently that it is not the substantial form: and so at the advent of the soul there would not be simple generation, nor at its removal simple corruption; all of which is clearly false. Whence we must conclude, that there is no other substantial form in man besides the intellectual soul; and that, as the soul virtually contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so does it virtually contain all inferior forms, and itself alone does whatever the imperfect forms do in other things." [36]

A little later, Peter John Olivi, a Franciscan and opponent of St. Thomas, explained the union of soul and body in a manner that induced the Council of Vienne to define at least one part of the teaching set forth in the preceding paragraphs, namely, that the rational soul is of itself and essentially the true form of the body — *per se et essentialiter vera forma corporis*. Whether the Council meant also to define the essential identity of the rational and sensitive soul, is not quite clear; although many theologians interpret the definition in this sense.

The principal difficulty experienced in determining the full meaning of the definition given by the Council arises from the

[35] Ibid. [36] Sum. Theol. I, q. 76, a. 4.

uncertainty about the exact import of Olivi's teaching. There are no Acts of the Council, and Olivi's own works have perished. However some years ago a copy of his *Quodlibeta* was found, and from them some idea may be obtained as regards the general trend of his thoughts on the point in question. Speaking of the union of soul and body, he says: "Their union is intimate, but not immediate; because by the mediation of the sensitive soul they are inclined to one another, and so they are united. . . . But how this union can be understood and be consubstantial in such a way as not to be formal, may easily be gathered from this, that the sensitive soul is united with the intellectual soul in a common spiritual matter; or, so to speak, in one subject of the rational soul." [37]

This can hardly mean anything else than that the rational and sensitive soul in man are really distinct; and so Olivi's teaching was understood by Scotus, who was practically his contemporary. He does not mention Olivi by name, but he cites his words and then points out that they imply a real distinction between the rational, sensitive, and vegetative principles in man.[38] Most modern theologians give the same interpretation.

Against this teaching, whatever way it was then understood, the Council of Vienne, convened in 1311, issued the following definition: "Whosoever shall hereafter pertinaciously presume to assert, defend, or teach, that the rational or intellectual soul is not *per se* and essentially the form of the human body, shall be considered a heretic." [39] This definition clearly lays down three points. 1. That the rational soul is in a true sense the substantial form of the body. It is not an accidental or mere assistant form. 2. It is the form of the body *per se;* that is, of itself, and not through the instrumentality of the sensitive or vegetative soul. 3. It is the form of the body essentially, or by reason of its essence; not merely, therefore, through some accidental influence it may be said to exercise on the body. In more recent years the definition was

[37] Cfr. Palmieri, De Deo Creante, p. 772 sqq; Zigliara, De Mente Concilii Viennensis, p. 115 sqq.

[38] De Rerum Princ. q. 9, a. 2, s. 1.

[39] Mansi, 25, 410E; DB, 481.

interpreted by Pius IX in the sense that there is only one principle of life in man, and that this is the rational soul, " from which the body also receives movement and life and every sense." And this teaching, he declares, " is in such wise connected with the dogma of the Church, that it is its only legitimate and true interpretation, and consequently cannot be denied without an error in faith." [40]

It must be noted, however, that the Council did not touch the further question, whether the rational soul, as the form of the body, is united to the *materia prima* in the Thomistic or Scotistic sense of that term. It did not condemn the teaching of Scotus and his Franciscan brethren on the *forma corporeitatis.* In the definition the rational soul is said to be the *forma corporis,* not the *forma materiae primae.* It remains for theologians to determine what is meant by *corpus* in this connection.

[40] Ep. "Dolore haud mediocri," ad Episc. Wratislaviensem, 30 Apr. 1860; DB, 1655, note 1.

CHAPTER VIII

STATE OF ORIGINAL JUSTICE

In reference to the primitive condition of our first parents, the early Scholastics did little more than restate the teaching of the Fathers. Thus St. Anselm followed closely the lines of thought marked out by St. Augustine, and hardly anywhere reached beyond the results already achieved by that profound thinker. Both regarded original justice primarily as a supernatural rectitude of the will, which manifested itself in a fixed tendency towards God as the object of eternal blessedness. This rectitude, however, they conceived to be based upon a gratuitous intrinsic gift, which by its own nature and by the will of the Giver permanently inhered in the soul, yet could be preserved only by the free subjection of the creature to the Creator. It was the *gratia justitiae,* or sanctifying grace, whereby human nature was elevated to a condition of divine sonship.[1]

Furthermore, along with this rectitude of the supernaturally elevated will, Adam received, according to both authors, certain prerogatives that perfected his lower nature, and made his existence on earth a life of singular blessedness. Among these prerogatives were especially freedom from inordinate concupiscence, immunity from bodily infirmities, and immortality of the body. And all these gifts were bestowed upon Adam, not only as a personal possession, but as a sacred heirloom of the whole race, which it was his duty to transmit intact to his posterity. This transmission, however, as also his own permanent possession of these prerogatives, was made dependent on Adam's fidelity to his Creator.[2]

Practically the same view was taken by Hugh of St. Victor,

[1] De Conc. Grat. et Lib. Arbit. 13. [2] De Conc. Virg. 2.

except that he entertained some doubt as to whether Adam had infused charity before the fall, although he held that the moral virtues were certainly connected with the other gifts received by our first parents.[3] By way of knowledge, moreover, Adam was gifted with an intuition of divine things, a power of contemplation which held a middle place between faith and the beatific vision. By this intuition Hugh seems to have understood that enlightened knowledge of God and divine things which the mystic school in general looked upon as the special privilege of perfect souls.[4]

Peter Lombard restated and somewhat developed the same doctrine. With Hugh of St. Victor, he held that Adam enjoyed the privilege of contemplating God in a very special manner; by a vision, not indeed so perfect as that of the blessed in heaven, but neither so imperfect as that which is granted to us here on earth.[5] When speaking of the graces that were bestowed upon Adam, he follows St. Augustine's exposition step by step. Adam was made right, and by the grace of his state he could live without sin, although he needed another grace in order to merit eternal life.[6]

Great progess along these lines was made by Alexander of Hales, who considered the state of original justice under all its different aspects. Accepting the teaching of his predecessors as regards the fact of original justice, he inquired more deeply into its inmost nature. Our first parents, he notes, were free from inordinate concupiscence,[7] immune from bodily sufferings and death,[8] and endowed with a high degree of the knowledge of God.[9] It was in these prerogatives that original justice properly consisted. But along with them, though not as forming an essential part of original justice, our first parents also received the *gratia gratum faciens,* or sanctifying grace, which must be considered as a gratuitous gift of God, exceeding all natural exigencies and capacities of human nature. In order to preserve this grace, there was

[3] De Sacr. VI, c. 17.
[4] Ibid. c. 14.
[5] Sent. II, d. 23, n. 4.
[6] Ibid. d. 24, n. 1.
[7] Sum. II, q. 87, m. 1.
[8] Ibid. q. 88, m. 1–4.
[9] Ibid. q. 92, m. 1–4.

placed at their disposal the *gratia gratis data,* which, besides the virtues proper to their state, included also a special help of God, enabling them to persevere in good and to merit eternal life.[10]

Sanctifying grace the author speaks of as a *sublimatio creaturae rationalis* — an elevation of the rational creature above its own nature. Referring to the complacency which the Creator takes in the creatures of His hands, he says that this complacency is of three degrees. First, all creatures are acceptable to God in as much as by their nature they are all good; secondly, rational creatures are more acceptable to God, precisely in so far as they are rational; thirdly, rational creatures are in a very special and most proper sense acceptable to God because they are consecrated to Him, so that they are His temple, His children, and united to Him as His spouses. "And this sublimation of the rational creature," he continues, "is a *supra naturale complementum* — a perfection that is above the nature of the recipient; and therefore neither the aforesaid consecration, nor the adoption, nor the assumption, is effected through the instrumentality of anything that belongs to nature, but by means of a gift that is superadded to nature, which consecrates the soul, makes it into a temple, assimilates it to God, to the end that it may be His son or daughter — links or unites it to God through conformity of the will, so that it may be His spouse." [11]

This sanctifying grace was possessed by our first parents in the state of original justice, but not from the very beginning. It was not communicated to them at the moment of their creation, but only some time before their fall into sin. On this point, the author says, there were two contrary opinions in his day. His own words are: "Some hold that the first man was created in the state of sanctifying grace. And the reason which moves them to hold this view is God's perfect liberality and man's sufficient disposition. Others hold that he was created only in his natural state, not in the state of sanctifying grace; and this opinion is to be adopted rather than the other,

[10] Ibid. q. 91, m. 1, 2.

[11] Ibid. q. 91, m. 1, a. 2 ad 1m.

because it is more in conformity with reason, is supported by the weight of authority, and manifests more clearly the divine excellence." [12] God could indeed have adorned human nature with sanctifying grace at the moment of its creation; but it was more in harmony with His general way of acting in the supernatural order, that He should require some kind of positive disposition produced by man's free coöperation with actual grace.[13]

For the necessity of grace, both actual and habitual, Alexander assigns these two reasons: First, human nature, because of its animal proclivities, does not readily and expeditiously tend toward God as its last end, even in the natural order; secondly, as man was destined for a supernatural end, he had need of supernatural means. "He could, indeed, reach out to the things that were within the order of nature; but he could do nothing towards attaining the end that was above nature." [14] For that he needed a *bonum ultra terminos naturae sive supra omnem naturam* — a help that was strictly supernatural.[15]

Along with sanctifying grace, Adam received also the infused virtues of faith, hope, and charity, as without them it would have been impossible for him to merit heaven. The knowledge of God is twofold: natural and supernatural. The former we gather from God's creatures around us, and by it we apprehend God as the highest natural good; the latter comes to us by way of revelation, and leads us to some understanding of the inner life of God. And so is there a twofold love of God: one that is natural, in as much as it flows from our natural knowledge of God; and another that is supernatural, and this has its source in the supernatural knowledge of faith.[16] Unlike the Lombard and Scotus, Alexander places a real distinction between charity and sanctifying grace.

St. Bonaventure follows rather closely the lines of thought traced out by his master. Like him, he understands by the *justitia originalis* the gift of integrity, in virtue of which hu-

[12] Ibid. q. 90, m. 1, a. 1.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Sum. II, q. 91, m. 3, a. 2.
[15] Ibid. m. 2, a. 3.
[16] Ibid. q. 92, m. 1, 2.

man nature was, in all its faculties and powers, properly disposed in itself and in reference to God as its last end. This gift consisted principally in the prerogatives of bodily immortality and of freedom from concupiscence.[17] They were not strictly supernatural, since there is an aptitude for them in nature; but they were nevertheless a largess of grace —*quantum ad aptitudinem fuit (immortalitas) a natura, quantum ad complementum fuit a gratia.*[18] Together with these prerogatives, Adam possessed a special knowledge of God, which was more perfect than the knowledge derived from creatures and less perfect than the knowledge of vision. The author calls it *scientia apparitionis et contemplationis.* Owing to the perfection of his state, Adam did not have the knowledge of faith.[19]

In his explanation of the *gratia gratum faciens* which was conferred upon our first parents, St. Bonaventure uses the identical terms employed by Alexander. Through it the soul is consecrated as a temple of the Godhead, is adopted as God's own child, and is received by Him as His spouse. Thus the soul is intrinsically sanctified, is made like unto God, and endowed with a most surpassing spiritual beauty. In itself this sanctifying grace is a *supra naturale complementum omnis creaturae* — a gratuitous gift that is in no sense due to any created nature.[20] Without it man is neither acceptable to God in the supernatural order, nor can he merit eternal life. However, this gift was not bestowed at the moment of creation, but only after our first parents had disposed themselves for its reception by faithful coöperation with God's helping grace.[21]

Albertus Magnus also distinguished between the *justitia originalis* and the *gratia gratum faciens,* understanding by the former a preternatural order and harmony of all the faculties and powers of human nature, and by the latter an elevating principle whereby Adam became capable of supernatural merit.[22] The gift of integrity or original justice was con-

[17] In Sent. II, d. 19, a. 3, q. 1, 2.
[18] Ibid. q. 1.
[19] Ibid. q. 23, a. 2, q. 1, 3.
[20] Ibid. d. 29. q. 1; cfr. d. 26, a. unic. q. 1.
[21] Ibid. d. 29, q. 2.
[22] Sum. II, tr. 14, q. 85.

ferred at the moment of creation, and if Adam had remained faithful it would have been bestowed upon all his descendants; but sanctifying grace was not given until Adam had disposed himself for its reception.[23] However, he received it before the fall, and thus was placed in a condition in which he could have remained faithful to God and merited eternal life.[24] Sanctifying grace is a universal habit or quality, which inheres both in the soul and all its faculties; although in the latter it inheres rather by reason of the accompanying virtues.[25] These virtues are intimately connected with sanctifying grace, as are also the gifts of the Holy Spirit.[26]

St. Thomas developed this teaching of his predecessors in his own clear way, and on some points departed from their views. Speaking of original justice and sanctifying grace, he says: "It must be noted that in relation to the first man there is question of a twofold justice: The one is original justice, which bears reference to the due subordination of the body to the soul, and of the lower powers to the higher, and of the higher powers to God. In the primitive state, this justice was by the divine goodness conferred upon human nature itself; and therefore, if Adam had remained faithful, he would have transmitted it to his descendants. There is also another gratuitous justice, which is the principle of supernatural merit; and in regard to this there is a twofold opinion." [27]

This "twofold opinion" refers both to the time when sanctifying grace was bestowed on Adam and to its transmission to his posterity. He states the two views in this way: "Some say that the first man was created only in the state of perfect nature, and not in the state of grace. The reason assigned for this view is, that for the reception of such a grace there was need of a personal preparation on the part of the recipient. As a necessary consequence, in this opinion the grace thus conferred was a personal gift to the soul, and therefore would in no sense have been transmitted, except in so far as there would have been an aptitude in all to receive it. But others

[23] Ibid. q. 90, m. 1.
[24] Ibid. m. 3.
[25] Ibid. tr. 16, q. 98, m. 4.
[26] Ibid. tr. 14, q. 90, m. 4, 5.
[27] In Sent. II, d. 20, q. 2, a. 3.

say that man was created in the state of grace, and according to this view the gift of grace was conferred on human nature itself: hence grace would have been transmitted together with nature." [28] This latter view St. Thomas definitely adopted in his *Summa Theologica,* where he says: "But since the root of original justice, which conferred righteousness on the first man when he was made, consists in the supernatural subjection of reason to God, which subjection results from sanctifying grace, . . . we must conclude that if children were born in original justice, they would also have been born in grace." [29]

Hence St. Thomas established a much closer connection between sanctifying grace and the preternatural gifts of original justice than any of his predecessors had attempted. Alexander of Hales and Albertus Magnus considered these gifts as standing by themselves; and the same view was taken by St. Bonaventure: while St. Thomas makes them rest upon sanctifying grace as their supernatural foundation. Hence he gives this reason for holding that Adam received sanctifying grace at the moment of creation: "The very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was endowed by God, seems to require that, as others say, he was created in grace. . . . For this rectitude consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul: and the first subjection was the cause of both the second and the third." . . . For "if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were subject to the soul through grace existing therein." [30]

The following is a brief outline of the teaching of St. Thomas on the various perfections with which Adam was endowed in the state of original justice. He studies successively the perfections of the intellect, of the will, and of the body.

1. *Perfections of the Intellect.*—"The first man did not see God through His essence if we consider the ordinary state of that life; unless, perhaps, it be said that he saw God in a vision, when God cast a deep sleep upon Adam. . . . Nevertheless he

[28] Ibid. q. 1, a. 1.
[29] Op. cit. I, q. 100, a. 1 ad 2m.
[30] Sum. Theol. I, q. 95, a. 1.

knew God with a more perfect knowledge than we do. Thus in a sense his knowledge was midway between our knowledge in the present state and the knowledge we shall have in heaven, when we see God through His essence." And the reason for this higher knowledge must be sought in the fact that "the first man was not impeded by exterior things from a clear and steady contemplation of the intelligible effects which he perceived by the radiation of the first truth, whether by a natural or by a gratuitous knowledge." [31]

Adam's knowledge was intended not only for his own personal ends, but also for the instruction and government of others; hence he "was established by God in such a manner as to have knowledge of all those things for which man has a natural aptitude. And such are whatever are virtually contained in the first self-evident principles, that is, whatever truths man is naturally able to know. Moreover, in order to direct his own life and that of others, man needs not only those things which can be naturally known, but also things surpassing natural knowledge; because the life of man is directed to a supernatural end: just as it is necessary for us to know the truths of faith in order to direct our own lives. Wherefore the first man was endowed with such a knowledge of these supernatural truths as was necessary for the direction of human life in that state. But those things which cannot be known by merely human effort, and which are not necessary for the direction of human life, were not known by the first man; such as the thoughts of men, future contingent events, and some individual facts." [32] However, "as long as the state of innocence continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to assent to falsehood as if it were truth," even as regarded things to which man's knowledge did not extend; for such possibility of deception would not have been befitting the integrity and rectitude of the primitive state.[33] Hence, "although the woman was deceived before she sinned in deed, still it was not till she had already sinned by interior pride." [34]

[31] Ibid. q. 94, a. 1.
[32] Ibid. a. 3.
[33] Ibid. a. 4.
[34] Ibid. a. 4 ad 1m.

2. *Perfections of the Will.*— As the lower powers were subject to the higher, and the higher powers were subject to God, the will of the first man, so long as he continued in the state of innocence, was never disturbed or weakened by the influence of passions. In their actual tendency towards their proper object, they existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason. And even in this sense there were no passions save those only that "are ordered to what is good"; "such as joy and love, desire and hope that casteth not down."[35] Hence the will could always exercise its full power in the pursuit of virtue.

The perfection of the primitive state required also that the first man should in a certain sense possess all the virtues. For "the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby reason is directed to God, and the inferior powers are regulated according to the dictate of reason." Here, however, a distinction is to be made as regards habit and act. Some of these virtues involve no imperfection in their nature, such as faith, hope, charity, and justice; and they existed "in the primitive state absolutely, both in habit and in act. But other virtues are of such a nature as to imply imperfection either in their act, or on the part of the matter. If such imperfection be consistent with the perfection of the primitive state, the virtues necessarily existed in that state; as faith which is of things not seen, and hope which is of things not yet possessed. For the perfection of that state did not extend to the vision of the divine essence, and the possession of God with the enjoyment of final beatitude. . . . But any virtue which implies imperfection incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, could exist in that state as a habit, but not as to the act; for instance penance, which is sorrow for sins committed; and mercy, which is sorrow for another's misery; because sorrow, guilt, and misery are incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state."[36]

As man in the state of innocence had a free will, and also the assistance of God's grace, he could perform meritorious

[35] Sum. Theol. I, q. 95, a. 2. [36] Ibid. a. 3.

actions. In one sense these actions were more meritorious than corresponding actions in the state of reparation, and in another sense they were less so. For merit as regards degree may be gauged either by the grace and charity of the agent, or by the proportionate difficulty of the action. "We conclude therefore that in the state of innocence man's works were more meritorious than after sin was committed, if the degree of merit on the part of grace be considered; which would have been more copious as meeting with no obstacle in human nature: and in like manner, if we consider the absolute degree of action; because, as man could attain to greater virtue, he would perform greater actions. But if we consider the proportionate degree, a greater reason for merit exists after sin, on account of man's weakness; for a small deed is more beyond the capacity of one who works with difficulty than a great deed is beyond that of one who performs it easily." [37]

3. *Perfections of the Body.*— The chief perfections of man's body in the primitive state were immortality and impassibility. The former was a *posse non mori* — the perpetual preservation from death of a mortal nature. Man did not possess the natural incorruptibility of the angels, nor the incorruptibility of glory enjoyed by the blessed in heaven; but an incorruptibility of a lower order gratuitously conferred on him by his Creator. "For man's body was indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, but by reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby it was enabled to preserve the body from corruption so long as it remained itself subject to God. This entirely agrees with reason; for since the rational soul surpasses the capacity of corporeal matter, . . . it was most properly endowed at the beginning with the power of preserving the body in a manner surpassing the capacity of corporeal matter." [38]

Impassibility is divided by St. Thomas into two kinds, according to the nature of the passion or suffering it excludes from its subject. "For passion may be taken in two senses.

[37] Ibid. a. 4.

[38] Sum. Theol. I, q. 97, a. 1.

First, in its proper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer when changed from its natural disposition. For passion is the effect of action; and in nature contraries act on, or suffer from, one another, accordingly as one thing changes another from its natural disposition. Secondly, passion can be taken in a general sense for any kind of change, even if belonging to the perfecting process of nature. Thus to understand and to feel are said in a sense to be passive. In this second sense, man was passible in the state of innocence, and was passive both in soul and body. In the first sense man was impassible, both in soul and body, as he was likewise immortal; for he could curb his passion, as he could avoid death, so long as he refrained from sin." [39]

Scotus agreed with this teaching of St. Thomas in its main outlines, but departed from it on some minor points. He held that Adam was created in the state of original justice, and this state was not merely a condition of natural rectitude, but was the result of preternatural prerogatives gratuitously bestowed on human nature by the Creator. It consisted in a perfect tranquillity of the soul and all its powers, so that man's inferior nature did not tend to go contrary to the dictate of reason; or if of itself it was inclined so to do, it could easily be regulated and reduced to order, without causing any difficulty to his higher nature, or any sadness to his lower nature.[40]

The proximate cause of the condition of perfect tranquillity was a *complexus habituum* — so many particular gratuitous gifts, which resided in the will and the other faculties. Thus the will was so disposed by an inherent power, that it could withdraw itself with pleasure from any object craved by the lower appetite.[41] These permanent dispositions of the faculties must, however, not be confounded with the infused virtues; nor with habitual grace. They were special virtues, entirely proper to the state of innocence. Hence the state of original justice as such was independent of sanctifying grace. In fact, however, sanctifying grace was an integral part of

[39] Ibid. a. 2.

[40] In Sent. II, d. 29, n. 2, 4.

that state as ordained by God.[41] Whether Adam was created in sanctifying grace, is not clearly stated by Scotus. Some interpret his teaching in this sense, although he is usually cited as an authority for the contrary view.[42]

In explaining man's bodily immortality in the primitive state, Scotus rejects the teaching of St. Thomas, that its proximate cause was an intrinsic power of the soul over matter, communicated to it by God. According to him, Adam always retained the *potentia ad mori*, but by a special intervention of Providence that *potentia* could not be reduced to act, so long as the state of innocence continued. Hence in his own being Adam was simply mortal; but whilst he remained faithful, God warded off all danger to his life, and before the time of natural dissolution approached, He would have taken him up to heaven.[43]

Finally, all these prerogatives of original justice were intended for the entire human race, although their transmission was made dependent on Adam's fidelity. Each human being was to have received them at the moment of birth, not as an inheritance from Adam, but as a free gift of God. However, all would have been subjected to a probation, with the same chances of failure that proved the undoing of the first man.[44]

Comparing now the teaching of the most representative Scholastics, as outlined in the preceding paragraphs, we may put down the following points as common to all.

1. Man's primitive condition was a state of righteousness, which resulted from certain gifts of God not due to human nature.

2. These gifts affected both soul and body, and all man's faculties. They included enlightenment of the intellect by infused knowledge, steadfastness of the will under the influence of grace, a perfect harmony between man's higher and lower nature through immunity from concupiscence, immortality of the body, and a corresponding freedom from suffering.

[41] Ibid. n. 5; I, d. 32, n. 19.
[42] Cfr. In Sent. II, d. 29, q. unic. n. 7; Report. q. 2.
[43] In Sent. II, d. 19.
[44] Ibid. d. 20, q. 1.

3. Over and above these preternatural gifts, the first man received sanctifying grace, which is strictly supernatural. Through it he became an adopted son of God, with the right and title to an eternal inheritance. By it he was also placed in a position to perform meritorious actions, to persevere in his happy state, and finally to claim heaven as his reward. With sanctifying grace were connected all those virtues that were not repugnant to the state of innocence, and also a right to necessary actual graces.

4. In one sense all these gifts and graces were bestowed upon Adam as personal favors, in as much as he could enjoy and use them for his own advantage; but in another sense they were the property of the whole human race, since by the intention of the Giver Adam was to transmit them, with the one exception of infused knowledge, to all his descendants. Their bestowal upon Adam was absolute, yet their continuance in his own case and their transmission to his posterity was conditioned by his own fidelity.

These four points, leaving aside all explanations as regards details, constitute the common teaching of the Schoolmen. They had been taken over by the Scholastics from the works of the Fathers, and somewhat later, at the Council of Trent, they received the solemn approval of the Church.[45]

[45] Sess. 5, Decretum de Pecc. Originali; Mansi, 33, 27A sqq.; DB. 787 sqq.

CHAPTER IX

ORIGINAL SIN

The existence of original sin had been defined against the Pelagians of the fifth century,[1] and no subsequent theologian called it in question. Nor was there among the Schoolmen any serious doubt in regard to its being a sin in the strict sense of the term. Abelard, indeed, held that nothing was transmitted by Adam to his posterity except the *reatus poenae* — a mere liability to punishment; but his view was condemned by the Council of Sens, in 1141, and also by Pope Innocent II.[2] There was, however, among the Scholastics no agreement about the precise nature of this sin, nor about the manner of its transmission. The following outline will be sufficient to indicate the historical development of the doctrine in question.

1. *The Nature of Original Sin.*— St. Augustine had defined original sin as a *reatus concupiscentiae* — the guilt of concupiscence, without making it altogether clear in what objective reality or condition this guilt must be conceived to consist. This guilt, moreover, he held to be transmitted through concupiscence, which accompanies the act of procreation.[3] His teaching was restated in practically the same terms by Pope Gregory I, and thenceforth it was universally accepted and defended by Western theologians until the end of the eleventh century.

The first one to break with this traditional teaching, and to place the nature of original sin in a somewhat clearer light, was St. Anselm. He subjected the whole question of original sin to a thorough examination in his treatise *De Conceptu Virginali et Peccato Originali,* in connection with the sinless

[1] Cfr. vol. I, p. 358.
[2] Mansi, 21, 568C; DB. 376.
[3] Cfr. vol. I, p. 364 sqq.

conception of the Savior. Setting aside the teaching of St. Augustine, without, however, mentioning his name, he thus proposes his own view: "By original sin, then, I understand nothing else than the sin that is in the child as soon as it has a rational soul. . . . And this sin, which I call original, I cannot understand in these children in any other sense than that it is a privation of original justice, brought about by the disobedience of Adam. Through this privation all are children of wrath, because the deliberate casting off of justice rendered guilty the nature which God had made in Adam." [4]

This view of the matter places the essence of original sin in the privation of original justice, in so far as that justice had been conferred by God as a prerogative of human nature itself. Original justice, however, is here not taken as designating sanctifying grace, but as standing for the preternatural prerogatives which formally constituted the state of innocence.[5] Hence the author defines justice, in this connection, as a rectitude of the will preserved for its own sake — *rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata.* In this rectitude Adam was created, and God willed that it should be the prerogative of Adam's posterity. Hence the privation of it is against the will of God, and constitutes in every one of Adam's descendants a sin in the strict sense of the term. "In Adam the person made human nature sinful, because when Adam sinned, man sinned. . . . In children it is human nature that makes the person sinful," because that nature is against the will of God deprived of original justice.[6] "In this manner the person despoiled human nature of justice in Adam; and thus despoiled, human nature causes all persons, whom it begets of itself, to be sinful and unjust." [7]

Hence St. Anselm's formal concept of original sin differs considerably from that of St. Augustine, but it also differs considerably from that of present day theologians. He made a great advance over his predecessors by placing the essence of original sin in the privation of justice, but he retarded, and to some extent rendered futile, his own advance, by failing to

[4] Op. cit. c. 27.
[5] C. 3, 5, 7, 19.
[6] Ibid. c. 23.
[7] Ibid.

make this justice chiefly consist in sanctifying grace. Hence he experienced the same difficulty, as did St. Augustine before him, in explaining the blotting out of original sin by baptism. He states the difficulty in this way: "I said that the inability of possessing justice does not excuse the injustice of children. Hence some one will perhaps ask: If sin, that is injustice, is in the child before baptism, and the child's inability of possessing justice, as you say, is no excuse, and yet in baptism no sin is remitted except that which existed before, then, since the child after baptism, so long as it is a child, is without justice, nor can be understood to preserve justice, how is it not still unjust, although it has been baptized?" [8]

This is a fair statement of the difficulty, which was necessarily involved in his theory on the nature of original sin. If original sin is a privation of some perfection that God willed to be in human nature, then it can be removed only by supplying that perfection. Yet baptism does not restore original justice, hence it would seem that baptism does not remove original sin.

St. Anselm's answer is this: "I answer this question by saying that the sins which existed before baptism was received, are entirely blotted out by baptism. Hence the original inability of possessing justice is not imputed as a sin to those who are baptized, as it was imputed to them before. Just as the inability of not possessing justice did not excuse its absence before baptism, because this absence was real guilt; so it does altogether excuse the same after baptism, because it remains without any guilt. Hence it is that the justice which was demanded of children before baptism, without admitting any excuse on their part, is not exacted of them after baptism as something which they owed." [9] This answer, as is obvious, really explains nothing. It makes the blotting out of original sin consist in a mere non-imputation of guilt.

Anselm's teaching on original sin was taken but little notice of by the theologians of the twelfth century. Only two of them, Odo of Cambrai (+ 1113) and Honorius of Autun

[8] Ibid. c. 29.

[9] Ibid.

(1150), adopted his views. All the other more notable writers of that period, such as Robert Pulleyn,[10] Hugh of St. Victor,[11] Peter Lombard,[12] and Pope Innocent III,[13] followed the lead of St. Augustine. They all regarded original sin as a *reatus vel vitium concupiscentiae,* which is propagated *per libidinem,* in some mysterious way stains the *semen,* and then in a still more mysterious way infects the soul at its union with the body. Thus the Lombard writes: "What, then, is original sin? It is the touch-wood of sin, namely, concupiscence or the concupiscible power, which is called the law of the members, or the languor of nature, or the tyrant which is in our members, or the law of the flesh." [14] It is not the act of concupiscence, but the habit — a radical vice that inclines to evil. "And that this vice exists as a corruption in the flesh before its union with the soul is proved by the effect produced in the soul upon its infusion into the body; for it is stained by the corruption of the flesh — just as it is known that there was impurity in the vessel, when the wine which is poured into it becomes sour." [15]

A slight change was introduced into this teaching by Alexander of Hales, who sought to combine the views of St. Anselm and St. Augustine. With this object in view, he writes: "Original sin is guilt which consists in the privation of a justice that is due, or a certain deformity by which the soul itself is deformed. Concupiscence is the punishment of sin, . . . original sin is the privation or absence of a justice that is due." [16] "This definition," he says, "is formal, drawn from the efficient cause; while the other definition usually given — original sin is a vice resulting from the corruption of the *semen* in man — is material or taken from the material cause.[17] Here appears for the first time the famous distinction between the formal and material element of original sin, which finally enabled the Scholastics to get away from the view of St.

[10] Sent. VI, 1.
[11] De Sacr. I, p. 7, c. 28; Sent. III, 11.
[12] Sent. II, d. 30, c. 7; d. 31, c. 6.
[13] In VII Ps. Poenit. 4; ML, 218, 1058.
[14] Sent. II, d. 30, c. 7.
[15] Ibid. d. 31, c. 6.
[16] Sum. II, q. 106, m. 2, n. 1, 3.
[17] Ibid.

Augustine, without placing themselves in open contradiction with his theory.

The distinction thus introduced was taken up by St. Bonaventure, who tried to explain the nature of original sin by comparing it to actual sin. "As actual sin," he says, "does not consist exclusively in privation, since it is not only an aversion but also a conversion, . . . so the same must in its own way be held in regard to original sin. . . . Thus original sin is said to be in a person, not only because he is deprived of original justice, but also because he has a certain inclination to evil and is under the power of concupiscence. . . . Hence when it is asked, what is original sin? it is perfectly correct to answer that it is concupiscence; and it is also perfectly correct to answer that it is the privation of original justice: for the one answer is contained in the other; although the one emphasizes the inclination to evil that is in original sin, and the other that of privation. . . . Hence it must be conceded that original sin is concupiscence, not any concupiscence whatever, but the concupiscence that includes the privation of original justice." [18]

It must be noted, however, that St. Bonaventure, like St. Anselm, the Lombard, and Alexander of Hales before him, understands by original justice merely the aggregate of preternatural gifts proper to the state of innocence, without including sanctifying grace. Hence his difficulty in explaining the blotting out of original sin by baptism. In regard to this he writes: "Hence it is that, as the Master says, in baptism original sin passes away as to its guilt, but remains as regards its reality — *transit reatu et remanet actu;* because although concupiscence remains, yet it does not remain in so far as it implies guilt and a liability to punishment. . . . When, therefore, original sin is blotted out, it is not blotted out in such a way that it does not at all exist, but only in such wise that it is not a sin. . . . Nor must it be imagined "that original justice itself is restored, but rather that a certain compensation is made by way of conferring sanctifying grace." [19]

[18] In Sent. II, d. 30, a. 2, q. 1.

[19] In Sent. II, d. 32, a. 1, q. 1.

Albertus Magnus made a similar attempt to reconcile the two opposite views, although his dissertation on the nature of original sin is almost entirely taken up with its material element. He defines original sin as "a proneness to evil which includes the privation of a justice that is due." [20] And of concupiscence, as found in the members of the body, he says: "This concupiscence is in the body as a punishment only, for the reason that the body is not a rational substance and therefore not susceptible of guilt. And hence when concupiscence infects a subject that is susceptible of guilt, the latter is immediately present together with the former. Thus it is that the soul becomes infected, and is made subject both to guilt and punishment." [21]

As will have been noted, all the writers thus far mentioned, with the sole exception of St. Anselm, conceived original sin to consist in some kind of physical stain, which is first in the body and then in some inexplicable way transmitted to the soul. That this was a fundamentally wrong concept is sufficiently obvious; for the soul, as a spiritual substance, cannot be defiled by a bodily stain. Concupiscence is indeed also in the soul, but it is there independently of the body. Hence it was necessary to eliminate this theory of defilement by contact, before real progress could be made in the rational exposition of the nature of original sin. And this elimination was effected by St. Thomas, who subjected the whole question of original sin to a very thorough investigation. The following is a brief summary of his views on the nature of original sin.

He first rejects the view of his predecessors, that original sin is connected with a physical stain in the body, whereby the soul is contaminated. All such explanations, he says, are necessarily insufficient, since the stain in question, whatever may be said about its transmission to the soul, lacks the formal element of sin, which is obviously a deordination in the moral order.[22] Next he gives a general definition of original sin, pointing out that it must in some way be a *habitus,* in as much as it is a certain inordinate disposition, resulting from the

[20] In Sent. II, 30, 3.
[21] Ibid. a. 1.
[22] Sum. Theol. I. II, q. 81, a. 1.

dissolution of that harmony in which original justice consisted. In this sense, original sin is called a languor of nature.[23] It is not an infused habit; nor one that is personally acquired, except on the part of our first parent: but it is inborn in us because of our vitiated origin.[24]

After this general description of original sin, he proceeds to an investigation of its intrinsic constituents. He accepts the definition given by St. Augustine — *Concupiscentia est reatus peccati originalis,* but he explains it in his own way. "The species of a thing," he says, "is taken from its form. Now, as was said above, the species of original sin is derived from its cause; hence it follows that, what is formal in original sin, must be derived from the cause whence this sin originated. But of opposites there are opposite causes; and therefore it must be noted that the cause of original sin is bound up with the cause of original justice, but by way of opposition. Now the orderly condition of original justice had its source in this, that the will of man was subject to God. And the whole subjection was first and chiefly brought about by the will, whose function it is to direct all other powers to their proper end. Hence, because of the turning away of the will from God, there followed a corresponding insubordination in all the other powers of the soul. Thus, therefore, the privation of original justice, through which the will was subject to God, is the formal element in original sin; and every other kind of inordination of the powers of the soul belongs to the material element. But the inordination of the other powers of the soul consists chiefly in this, that they tend inordinately towards the attainment of what is passing and changeable; and therefore this inordination may well be called concupiscence. And thus original sin, considered in its material element, is concupiscence; but considered in its formal element, it is the privation of original justice." [25]

Now the material element of original sin, which is here said to be concupiscence, may be considered in one of two ways: either as something consequent upon the formal element, or

[23] Ibid. q. 82, a. 1.
[24] Ibid. a. 1 ad 3[m].
[25] Sum. Theol. I. II, q. 82, a. 3.

as a constituent part of original sin itself. In what sense the term is used by St. Thomas is not altogether clear. His modern followers usually hold that he took it in the former sense, and the text cited above may well be adduced in support of that interpretation. For it was "because of the turning away of the will from God that there followed a corresponding insubordination in all the other powers of the soul"; and "this insubordination may well be called concupiscence." But in not a few other texts he speaks of concupiscence as if it were a constituent part of original sin. Thus, for instance, he says: "Just as in artificial things . . . the matter is predicated of the whole, so that one may say, the knife is iron; even in such wise is concupiscence said to be original sin." [26] Again: "Ignorance and the inclination to evil are the material element in original sin, just as the turning to a changeable good is the material element in actual sin." [27] And still more explicitly: "Concupiscence in the newly born is the cause of original sin by way of matter, which is of the essence of a thing." [28] Hence all his followers before the Council of Trent, among them Capreolus, Ferrariensis, and Cajetanus, interpreted him as having taken the material element in the strict sense of the term, or as a constituent part of original sin.

There is also some difficulty in connection with the formal element, in so far as it is at first sight not clear what exact meaning St. Thomas attached to the term "original justice," as used in this connection. All his predecessors had taken it in an exclusive sense, as distinct from sanctifying grace; and he himself, in those places where he explicitly treats of the nature of original sin, seems to prescind from sanctifying grace altogether. However this difficulty is more apparent than real. For according to him, sanctifying grace is the root and foundation of original justice, so that all other supernatural gifts in the state of innocence depended for their continuance upon the presence of sanctifying grace in the soul. Hence he says quite explicitly: "The root of original justice,

[26] In Sent. II, 30, q. 1, a. 3.
[27] De Malo. q. 3, a. 7.
[28] Ibid. q. 4, a. 2.

in whose rectitude man was made, consists in a supernatural subjection of his reason to God, and this is brought about by sanctifying grace." [29] And again: "Hence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the soul through grace existing therein." [30] Consequently, he must have held that the formal element of original sin consisted ultimately in the privation of sanctifying grace, although he does not state this explicitly in his exposition of the nature of original sin. At all events, he laid down the principles which were adopted by the Council of Trent, and which enabled later theologians to work out a consistent theory on this difficult matter.

Still further progress was made by Scotus, who likewise adopted St. Anselm's view as his own. Rejecting the opinion of those who held that original sin consisted in concupiscence, he says: "In regard to this matter there is another way, which was followed by Anselm in the whole first book of his work *De Conceptu Virginali,* where he treats the subject of original sin. . . . I say, therefore, that original sin, which is the privation of original justice, is nothing else than the privation of a justice that is due. And if it be objected that some saints seem to say that original sin is concupiscence, my answer is this: Concupiscence in the sensitive appetite cannot in itself be sin; and concupiscence in the will is a merely material element of sin." [31] And this material element can only be taken as such in a wider sense of the term, as simply an inordinate disposition of the will resulting from original sin. The material element in the strict sense is the obligation man is under to possess justice — *debitum habendi justitiam.* Hence "in the constitution of original sin two elements concur: The privation of justice as its formal element, and the obligation of possessing justice as its material element; just as in the constitution of other privations, there is a concurrence of the privation itself and of the aptitude for the opposite perfection." [32]

[29] Sum. Theol. I. II, q. 100, a. 1.
[30] Ibid. q. 95, a. 1.
[31] In Sent. II, d. 32, n. 7.
[32] Ibid. n. 15, 7.

Thus Scotus definitely eliminated concupiscence as a constituent element of original sin, and this was a decided step forward. But his teaching on the nature of the privation in which original sin formally consists is less satisfactory. Instead of adopting the view of St. Thomas, he returned to that of St. Anselm. Although he admitted, as was shown in the preceding chapter, that in its adequate sense original justice included sanctifying grace, yet in connection with original sin he took it inadequately, as exclusive of the *gratia gratum faciens.* This appears especially in his exposition of the effect of baptism, where he says: "I say that in baptism the obligation of possessing original justice is taken away, and is commuted into an obligation of having an equivalent gift, namely, sanctifying grace. And this second obligation thereafter always remains, nor does the first ever return; and he who is without the second gift, thus due to him, sins more grievously than he who is without the first; but he is not now a sinner because of original sin, for the obligation of possessing that justice does not return." [33]

2. *The Transmission of Original Sin.*— In reference to the transmission of original sin, the followers of St. Augustine assumed the principle that it is not generation but actual concupiscence which transmits original sin — *non generatio sed libido transmittit peccatum originale.* This *libido* was supposed to stain the *semen* in the act of procreation, and that stain would in some way defile the soul on its union with the body. This view was defended by Hugh of St. Victor, Robert Pulleyn, Peter Lombard, Henry of Ghent, and Pope Innocent III. The last named writes: "Therefore of the defiled and corrupt seed a corrupt and defiled body also is conceived, and when the soul is finally infused into this, it likewise becomes corrupt and defiled. . . . Just as a liquid is corrupted when it is poured into an unclean vessel." [34] It was at best a very unsatisfactory theory, and its abandonment was only a question of time.

St. Anselm, consistently with his view on the nature of

[33] Ibid. n. 16.

[34] In VII Ps. Poenit. 4; ML, 218, 1058.

original sin, offered a better explanation. Setting aside the *libido* as a cause of transmission, he had recourse to the connection which exists between the person of Adam and human nature on the one hand, and human nature and the persons of Adam's descendants on the other. The person of Adam despoiled human nature, and that despoiled human nature made all his descendants sinners. Generation was thus conceived as a *conditio sine qua non* of transmission, a bond that links Adam and all his descendants together in the common misery of sin. In the last instance, of course, it was the will of God that ordained the law of transmission; but in this matter the will of God is the final explanation of every other law that one may try to establish.[35] God so ordained that Adam should transmit the prerogatives of original justice to all his descendants by way of generation, and hence when he had despoiled himself of these gifts, he transmitted a despoiled nature by the same way.[36] And this despoiled nature, because of its spoliation, is infected with original sin.

Alexander of Hales cites the definition given by St. Anselm, that original sin is the privation of a justice which by the will of God was due to human nature, and in connection with that gives this exposition of the way in which original sin is transmitted: "The reason underlying the transmission of original sin seems to be this: The prohibition was put upon Adam in as far as he contained the whole human nature in himself, since all others were to descend from him by way of generation. And thus the prohibition extended not to him alone, but also to those others who were seminally contained in him."[37] Hence Adam was the head of the whole race, not only in the physical but also in the moral order. His disobedience, therefore, was not merely a personal act; it was the disobedience of the entire human race as seminally contained in him. Just as the obedience of Christ, the moral head of mankind in the order of redemption, was the obedience of all.[38]

Thus the ultimate reason for the transmission of original

[35] Op. cit. c. 23; cfr. c. 29.
[36] Ibid. c. 10.
[37] Sum. II, 105, m. 3.
[38] Ibid.

sin is the divine decree which constituted Adam the moral head of his descendants. But the means or the instrumental cause of the transmission is the act of procreation. This the author explains in his answer to the question, whether original sin is transmitted through the flesh. He says: "As original sin involves both guilt and punishment, it is transmitted in a different way in regard to each of the two. In so far as it involves punishment it results from the defilement which is in the flesh; for as soon as the soul is infused into the defiled flesh, so soon is itself defiled; just as wine becomes corrupt through the impure condition of the vessel into which it is poured. But in so far as it involves guilt, it proceeds from the privation of that justice which should have been in the nature thus generated." [39]

Practically the same position was taken by St. Bonaventure, who took special pains to explain the connection between the defilement of the flesh and the resultant guilt in the soul. "In order to understand," he says, "how from the defilement of the flesh there can arise a culpable corruption in the soul, these three points must be presupposed as evidently true: First, that the defilement of the flesh can cause the body to rise in rebellion against the spirit; secondly, that the soul united to the body either lifts it up or is dragged down by it, on account of the intimate union that exists between the two; thirdly, that the soul by its own power cannot rule the rebellious flesh, unless it be assisted by divine grace. From these three presuppositions it necessarily follows, that if the soul be united to a body thus defiled, it is dragged down by it and is through concupiscence inclined to evil. But being inclined to evil is nothing else than being in a state of perversion; and perversion in a rational substance, which is capable of possessing justice, is nothing else than injustice and guilt. From this, therefore, it is clear that the defilement which is in the flesh can bring it about that the soul, united to it, is sinful. And because this defilement is derived from the first parent, from whom all his descendants have their origin according to the

[39] Sum. II, q. 105, m. 4.

law of propagation, hence it is that by way of the flesh original sin is transmitted to all." [40]

The most serious drawback of this teaching is the undue emphasis it places upon concupiscence in the transmission of original sin. Concupiscence in the parent defiles the flesh in the child, and the flesh thus defiled in its turn through concupiscence defiles the soul. The whole process of transmission is thus limited to the physical order. Excepting St. Anselm, all these theologians commit themselves to the same untenable view. And to some extent, this is also true of St. Thomas, especially in his earlier works. Thus in his *Commentary on the Sentences* he says: "The soul is not infected by the infection of the body, in the sense that the body acts upon the soul; but by way of the intimate presence of the one to the other." [41] For the rest he gives the following very clear exposition of the law of transmission.

"The guilt of original sin comes from this, that the gift which was gratuitously conferred on Adam, namely, original justice, was not conferred on him personally, but in so far as he had such a nature; so that all those in whom the same nature should exist as derived from him, should be entitled to the same gift; and hence original justice should have been propagated together with the flesh. Hence it was in the power of nature always to preserve original justice in itself; and therefore the want of it, considered in reference to that nature, constitutes guilt in all those who derive their nature from the person who sinned. Now as this want of justice, together with the nature itself, is through the origin of the flesh derived by way of generation, hence the person is said to have infected nature. But because in these other persons original sin is present as derived from the first person who generated, it does not have the formality of guilt from themselves, since they do not incur this sin by their own personal will, but it has this formality only in so far as they receive the nature together with the guilt. Hence it is, in the second place, that the person is said to infect the nature." [42]

[40] In Sent. II, d. 31, a. 2, q. 1.
[41] In Sent. II, d. 30, q. 1, a. 2 ad 5[m]; cfr. De Malo, IV, 6 ad 16[m].
[42] In Sent. II, d. 31, q. 1, a. 1.

In his *Summa Theologica* he places a much stronger emphasis upon the solidarity of human nature as the proximate reason of the transmission of original sin by way of generation. After eliminating altogether the physical transmission of guilt, he continues: "Hence we must proceed along another way, which comes to this, that all men, who are born of Adam, can be considered as one man, in so far as they have a common nature which they received from their first parent; on the same principle as in the civil order all men belonging to the same community are considered as one body, and the whole community as one man. . . . Thus, therefore, many human beings have descended from Adam as so many members of one body. But the act of any one bodily member, as for instance the hand, is not voluntary by the will of the hand itself, but by the will of the soul, which imparts motion to the member; and hence homicide, committed by the hand, is not imputed to the hand as a sin, if the hand be considered in itself as distinct from the body; but the homicide is imputed to it in so far as the hand is a part of man which is moved by the first motive principle of man. . . . And just as actual sin, which is committed by some member, is not the sin of that member, except in so far as that member is a part of the man himself, on account of which connection it is called a human sin; so is original sin not the sin of the person, except in so far as that person received his nature from the first parent: hence it is called the sin of nature." [43]

He further emphasizes the fact that only those contract original sin who descend from Adam by way of the active principle of generation — *per virtutem activam in generatione.* This is what is understood by being seminally contained in Adam. "But if any one were formed from human flesh by divine power, it is manifest that in such a case the active principle of generation was not derived from Adam; and hence that person would not contract original sin." [44]

Scotus viewed the law of transmission in a somewhat different light. The inclusion of human nature as a whole in

[43] Op. cit. I. II, q. 81, a. 1. [44] Ibid. a. 4.

Adam, emphasized both by St. Anselm and St. Thomas, according to him does not explain anything. "For this numerical nature which is in the child was not in Adam, although there was in him a nature of the same species. Therefore that particular nature was not endowed with original justice; and therefore it cannot be held responsible for its loss." [45] His own explanation is this: "When the gift (of original justice) was made to the will of Adam, it was made in such a way, that by the same act of giving, so far as it came in question, it was made likewise to every single will of all his descendants, with the proviso that no obstacle should be put in the way of its being actually received by them." [46]

He rejects very definitely the teaching of St. Bonaventure, Alexander of Hales, and others in regard to the part played by concupiscence in the transmission of original sin. He accepted and used the expression, *anima contrahit mediante carne,* but he explained it in his own way. Thus he writes: "It is said that the soul contracts original sin by way of the flesh, but this is not to be understood as if the flesh, through a certain quality caused in it, were the cause of original sin; but in this other sense, that from the flesh conceived under the influence of concupiscence there is formed an organic body, into which the soul is infused and thereby constitutes a person, which person is the child of Adam; and for this reason said person is under obligation of possessing original justice, which was given to Adam himself for all his descendants, and yet is deprived of it. I say, then, that original sin does not result from the action of the flesh upon the soul. . . . From the flesh nothing else results in the child than the relation of being by nature the son of Adam; and upon this relation is consequent the obligation that was imposed by the divine law." [47]

Thus the teaching of the Scholastics on the subject of original sin ran through its successive stages of development. One by one its inconsistent elements were eliminated, divergent views were drawn more closely together, obscure concepts

[45] In Sent. II, d. 32, n. 9.
[46] Ibid. d. 33, n. 18.
[47] In Sent. II, d. 32, n. 4–11.

were clarified, the various details were duly coördinated, and so there finally resulted a theory that satisfied the demands of reason and was in perfect harmony with the data of revelation. All the essential parts of the doctrine thus retained in its ultimate development — the nature of original sin as a privation of justice, its presence in every one as his own proper sin, its voluntariness as derived from the will of the first parent, its transmission by way of generation, Adam's moral headship of the race — all these were incorporated by the Council of Trent in its decree on the nature and propagation of original sin.[48] Some minor points still remained involved in obscurity, as for instance the *vulneratio humanae naturae in naturalibus,* but all that is essential was clearly set forth and firmly established for all times.

[48] Sess. V, Mansi, 33, 27A sqq.; DB, 787 sqq.

CHAPTER X

CHRISTOLOGY

SOME CHRISTOLOGICAL ERRORS: CHRISTOLOGY OF THE SCHOLASTICS

There is no doctrine of our holy faith that was so thoroughly investigated during Patristic times as that of the Incarnation. And for this fact two reasons may be assigned. First, the doctrine is so fundamental that with it Christianity must either stand or fall. Secondly, no other doctrine was so fiercely and so constantly attacked by men of heretical tendencies, who called in question now one now another truth connected with this central mystery of Christian belief. As a consequence, when the Patristic age came to a close, Christology had been fully developed, and at the same time there seemed to be no room left for new heresies to spring up along the lines of Christological teaching. Nor did really new heresies arise in this matter during all the centuries that followed, but some old errors were revived and presented in a new form. One or two of them may be briefly noted, before we proceed to review the Christology of the Scholastics.

A — Some Christological Errors

Spanish Adoptionism, which was really a recrudescence of the Nestorian heresy,[1] was condemned by the Council of Frankford in 794. However, in one form or another, traces of it continued to appear for hundreds of years after its formal condemnation. Thus Roscelin contended that, as nature and person are identical, one must necessarily admit a human person in Christ, since it is of faith that He has a human nature.

[1] Cfr. vol. I, p. 498 sqq.

His error, which is Nestorianism pure and simple, was combatted by St. Anselm, in his treatise *De Fide Trinitatis.*[2] "The Word made flesh," St. Anselm argues, "assumed another nature, not another person. For when the term man is used, it signifies the nature which is common to all men; but when we denominate in the concrete this or that man by the name of Jesus, we designate the person, having together with nature an aggregate of properties by which man, taken in a general sense, becomes an individual and is distinguished from other individuals."[3] And Christ is only one such individual; hence He is only one person.

However, it was principally by Abelard and his school that Adoptionism was revived. This revival seems to have been the outcome of a wrong conception of the hypostatic union, through which the humanity of Christ was assumed into the unity of person. According to Abelard, the hypostatic union is neither intrinsic nor substantial. A truly substantial union, he contends, would lead to an identification of the humanity with the Godhead of the Word, and thus introduce a created and finite person into the Trinity. Hence such expressions as God is man, this man is God, must always be taken in an improper or figurative sense.[4] The connection between subject and predicate in these propositions is purely accidental; it does not imply a communication of properties in any true meaning of the term.

It was this misconception of the nature of the hypostatic union that gave rise to the doctrinal error known in history as *Christological Nihilism.* Its teaching is summed up in the phrase, *Christus in quantum homo non est aliquid* — Christ as man is not anything. It was not meant as a denial of the reality of Christ's body or soul, but of the substantial union between His human nature and the person of the Word, by reason of which the one can in the concrete be predicated of the other. The Word took a real body and a real soul, but did not assume them into the unity of person. They are

[2] Op. cit. c. 6.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Introd. ad Theol. III; ML. 178, 1107; cfr. Bach, Dogmengeschichte, II, p. 391–395.

realities, but not a substantial reality of the Word Incarnate. They are in the Word, but not one with the Word. The Son of God clothed Himself with the humanity as with a garment, that He might appear to men; He used the humanity as an instrument, that He might perform human actions. Hence the expression, *Deus factus est homo,* can only mean, *Deus accepit hominem;* and the corresponding expression, *Deus est homo,* merely stand for, *Deus est habens hominem.*[5]

Furthermore, the better to uphold this peculiar view of the hypostatic union, not a few of its defenders denied that Christ's human soul and body were united so as to form a complete human substance. For the result of such a union would necessarily be an individual substance of rational nature, and therefore a person. But in Christ there is no human person, and consequently there can be no complete human substance. The two constituent elements of such a substance are there, but in a state of separation. Hence the Word Incarnate is in no sense a new reality; He is only the recipient of a new *modus — habitu inventus ut homo.*[6]

Logically this view of the humanity of Christ excludes all filiation, so that Christ as man is neither the Son of God by nature nor by adoption; and not a few theologians of the school of Abelard drew that inference. If the humanity was not even a complete rational substance, adoption in the true sense of the word was obviously out of the question. For adoption means the free assumption of an extraneous person to the right of inheritance; but where there is no complete rational substance, there is no person.[7]

Although this Christological error was most widespread in France, owing to the many disciples and admirers of Abelard, it found followers also in other countries of Europe. Abbot Gerhoh of Reichersberg, who was one of its most formidable opponents, relates that when he visited Rome under Honorius II (1124–1130), he met there a certain Luitolf who openly taught that Christ as man was the adopted son of the Father;

[5] Epitome, c. 27; ML, 178, 1737; cfr. Bach, op. cit. II, 391–395.

[6] Cfr. John of Cornwall, Eulogium; ML, 199, 1047.

[7] Cfr. Sum. Sent.; ML, 176, 76.

and also a canon of the Lateran by the name of Adam, who held that Christ was partly God and partly man.[8] In Germany similar views were defended by Folmar, Abbot of Triefenstein near Wuerzburg, who went even so far as to assert that Jesus Christ was neither the Son of God nor equal to God, and that it would be unlawful to accord Him divine honors. It was against Folmar that Gerhoh wrote his treatise *De Gloria et Honore Filii Hominis,* in which he goes to the other extreme of teaching that the divine attributes had been communicated to the humanity of Christ, not only by way of predication, but in reality and in being, that is, in a Eutychian sense.[9]

These Adoptionist errors, propagated by the disciples of Abelard, were discussed at the Council of Tours in 1163, and again at the Council of Sens in 1164; but without definite results. A few years later, however, Pope Alexander III, condemned them in three successive letters, in the last of which, addressed to William of Champeaux, then archbishop of Rheims, he says: "Since Christ is perfect God and perfect man, it is strange that some should go so far in their temerity as to assert that Christ as man is not anything (*non sit aliquid*). In order that such an abuse may not creep into the Church of God, we, by these Apostolic Letters, command Your Fraternity to interdict under anathema, by Our Authority, the presumptuous assertion that Christ is not anything; because as He is true God, so is He also true man, subsisting in a rational soul and human flesh." [10]

This condemnation put an end to all theological discussion on the controverted point, and the last traces of Adoptionism gradually disappeared. Later Scholastics qualified the statement, *Christus in quantum homo non est aliquid,* simply as heretical;[11] and *a fortiori* that as man He is not the natural Son of God. However in the fourteenth century another form of Adoptionism made its appearance, which seems to

[8] Ep. ad Coll. Card.; ML, 193, 576.

[9] ML, 184, 1174; cfr. Pez, Thesaur. Anecdot. ML, 193, 478.

[10] Mansi, 21, 1081C; DB, 393.

[11] Cfr. Thomas, Sum. Theol. III, q. 2, a. 6.

have been originated by Durandus. He admitted that, in virtue of the eternal generation of the Word, Christ as man was the natural Son of the Father; but he thought that over and above this, in view of the rights conferred on the humanity of Christ by the hypostatic union, He might also be called the adopted son of God.[12] Similar views were held by Gabriel Biel and other Nominalists. Although never condemned by the Church, these peculiar opinions are generally regarded as untenable.

B — Christology of the Great Scholastics

Nearly all the most eminent writers of the golden age of Scholasticism built their systems of theological thought upon the foundation laid by Peter Lombard, in his famous *Sententiarum Libri Quatuor*. In regard to Christology, however, this foundation was in many respects unsatisfactory. It was wanting both in depth of thought and in systematic arrangement of the subject-matter. In fact, what he has on the subject is little more than a faint echo of Patristic teaching, supplemented by not a few rather doubtful opinions that were current in his day. Still, on account of the great authority which he enjoyed in the schools, it will be helpful to give in this connection a brief summary of his Christological teaching, as contained in the third book of his Sentences.

Although any one of the three divine persons might have become incarnate, nevertheless it was more befitting to the Son than to the Father or the Holy Spirit; because as in the Godhead He is the Son of God, so was it becoming that in the humanity to be assumed He should become son of man.[13] The Incarnation is the work of the whole Trinity, but it is rightly attributed to the Holy Spirit; because He is the charity and the gift of the Father and the Son, and it was through the ineffable charity of God that the Word became man.[14] The Son assumed the entire human nature, body and soul, for the reason that the entire nature had been corrupted by sin.

[12] In Sent. III, d. 4, q. 1.
[13] Op. cit. d. 1.
[14] Ibid. d. 4.

However He assumed an individual nature, not human nature in general.[15] Both soul and body were united to the Godhead, but the body *mediante anima.*[16]

He took real flesh of the Virgin, who had been purified from all stain before His conception. He was conceived and born without sin, and although a descendant of Adam, he was free from all concupiscence.[17] He took upon Himself not sin, but the punishment of sin.[18]

In Peter's time it was a much mooted question, whether the nature of the Word or the person had become incarnate. His answer is: "The person of the Son assumed human nature, and the divine nature was united to the human nature in the Son. . . . For although it is said that the Son alone took the form of a servant, nevertheless by this the divine nature is not excluded, but only the persons of the Father and the Holy Spirit." [19] However it is not proper to say that the divine nature became flesh, because this would seem to do away with the distinction of the two natures.[20] Nor can it be said that the Word assumed a human person; because, although soul and body were united so as to form a human nature, that nature had no personality of its own: they were united in their assumption by the Word.[21] As the human soul, which is indeed an individual substance of rational nature, is not a person when united to the body, though it is a person when separated from it by death; so is the human nature of Christ not a human person in its union with the Word.[22]

In connection with the foregoing question, he considers the meaning of the expressions, God became man, God is man. He first states the three different views then current. He words them as follows: "There are some who say that in the very incarnation of the Word an individual man was formed, consisting of a rational soul and human flesh, as every other true man, and that this man began to be God — not indeed the divine nature, but the person of the Word; and that God began

[15] Ibid. d. 2.
[16] Ibid. n. 2.
[17] Ibid. d. 3.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid. d. 5.
[20] Ibid. n. 3.
[21] Ibid. n. 4, 5.
[22] Ibid. n. 5.

to be that man. . . . And there are others who in part agree with the aforesaid, but who besides contend that the man, who is thus said to be God, consists not only of a rational soul and a body, but of the human and the divine nature, that is, of three substances, the divinity, the body, and the soul; and this Jesus Christ they hold to be only one person, but so that before the Incarnation the person was simple, while in the Incarnation the same person became composite, being made up of the divinity and the humanity. . . . And others there are who not only deny that in the incarnation of the Word there took place a composition of the natures in respect of the person, but also that there was formed an individual man or any other substance, composed of soul and body. These two, soul and body, were united to the person or nature of the Word in such a way that from the two or the three no nature or person resulted; but rather in such wise that the Word of God was clothed with the soul and the body as with a garment, so that He might in a becoming manner appear to mortal eyes." [23]

In his critical review of these three opinions, he brings forward objections against the first and the second without giving a definite and final answer. If the first be admitted, he says, then God is now a substance which was not always God, and a substance is God without being divine. If the second be accepted, then God and man are each a part of the person of the Son, and before the Incarnation that person was not complete, but was completed and perfected in the union. Against the third opinion he urges no objections, and in so far he seems to make it his own.[24] However, he concludes by asking the reader to give the matter still further study, and meanwhile to hold firmly that God assumed human nature in such a way that man was not changed into God, nor God into man.[25]

Next he examines the question, whether it can be said that the divine nature, which became incarnate, was born of the Virgin. He answers in the negative, and assigns as a reason for his answer that the divine nature was not born of the

[23] Ibid. d. 6.
[24] Ibid. d. 7.
[25] Ibid. n. 14.

Father. It was only the person of the Word that was generated by the Father, and this alone can properly be said to have been born of Mary.[26] However Christ has two nativities, the one eternal according to His Godhead and the other temporal according to His manhood; and in this sense He was twice born.[27]

In regard to the worship that is due to the humanity of Christ, he simply states the two opposite views that were held at the time. Some thought that Christ as man should only be venerated as are the saints of God, but in a higher degree; while others maintained that even as man He must be worshiped with divine honors. The author does not decide the question, but he seems to be in favor of the latter view.[28]

Although Christ as man is not a human person, He is nevertheless a rational substance composed of body and soul; and therefore the statement, *Christus in quantum homo non est aliquid*, is false.[29] According to His human nature He was predestined to be the Son of God, not by nature but by grace.[30] Yet, although the Son of God only by grace, He is not an adopted son; because He never was a person extraneous to the Godhead. His divine sonship, in so far as He is man, is based upon the grace of union.[31] Nor can He be called a creature, except in a figurative way. His human nature is indeed a created substance, but He to whom that nature is united is the Creator Himself.[32] Neither is it proper to say that He had a beginning, for it was only His humanity that began to exist in time.[33] That humanity could have been produced by a creative act, but it was more becoming that it should have its origin by generation from the race of Adam, of which Christ was to be the Redeemer.[34]

In consequence of the hypostatic union, the soul of Christ received from the first moment of its existence grace and knowledge without measure.[35] Although it is said in Holy

[26] Ibid. d. 8.
[27] Ibid. n. 2.
[28] Ibid. d. 9.
[29] Ibid. d. 10.
[30] Ibid. n. 3.
[31] Ibid. n. 4.
[32] Ibid. d. 11.
[33] Ibid. d. 12.
[34] Ibid. n. 2.
[35] Ibid. d. 13.

Scripture that the child Jesus increased in wisdom and grace, yet this cannot be understood in the sense that He did not already possess the plenitude of both. It only means that He manifested His wisdom and grace more fully as He advanced in years.[36] His human will was free, but because of its union with the Word it was confirmed in grace and made impeccable.[37] His human intellect was endowed with infused knowledge, so that Christ as man knew all that He knew as God, but not in the same excellent and perfect way.[38] However as man He could not do all that He could do as God, because human nature is incapable of receiving unlimited power.[39] Moreover His human nature was passible both in soul and body, and therefore as man He was subject to all the infirmities of a passible nature, in so far as these infirmities did not involve sin and were not unbecoming to the dignity of the God-Man.[40]

Upon this foundation, laid by the *Magister Sententiarum,* most of the Scholastics based their system of Christological thought. However, they added much of their own, and at the same time sought to develop what the Sentences contained only in germ. In the following survey it will be best to gather the views of the most prominent Schoolmen under certain headings, so that one may see at a glance what was more or less common to all and what was peculiar to each.

1. *Preliminary Questions.*— Nearly all the great Scholastics consider by way of introduction a number of questions whose solution is intended to prepare the way for a thorough study of the mystery itself. These questions deal chiefly with the possibility, the fitness, and the final cause of the Incarnation. A few remarks in reference to each will be sufficient to indicate the general trend of thought which they involve.

The possibility of the Incarnation is, of course, implied in the accomplished fact as set forth by the teaching of the Church; and in so far it was presupposed by the Scholastics. But they made it a subject of special inquiry for the purpose

[36] Ibid. n. 2–5.
[37] Ibid. d. 12, n. 3, 4.
[38] Ibid. d. 14.
[39] Ibid. n. 2, 3.
[40] Ibid. d. 15.

of forestalling objections and making the mystery acceptable to reason. Hence they point out that the Incarnation is but one of the many ways in which God may communicate His goodness to His creatures.[41] As it is not a change of God into the creature, nor of the creature into God, but only an extension of the divine personality to human nature, it lies entirely within the sphere of omnipotence. For since one divine nature subsists in three persons, there appears no reason why it should be impossible for two natures to subsist in one person.[42] And as the person of the Son was from all eternity an hypostasis in respect of the divine nature, why could not the same in time become also the hypostasis of a human nature?[43] For neither is its terminating power in itself limited, nor is human nature incommunicable to a higher personality.[44] All this can indeed not be demonstrated by positive arguments, because there is question of a mystery; but it can at least be shown not to imply an evident contradiction.[45]

The fitness of the Incarnation all these writers prove by pointing to the striking manifestation of God's various attributes in this mystery — of His power which brought together the highest and the lowest into so intimate a union; of His mercy which had so tender a compassion on man's weakness and misery; of His wisdom which found so excellent a way of repairing the ravages of sin; of His justice which demanded from human nature the full payment of the debt it had incurred; of His goodness which communicated His own being in the highest possible measure to the creature He had made.[46] And it was especially befitting that the person of the Son should become incarnate, although the Father and the Holy Spirit might also have assumed human nature.[47] The reasons

[41] Thomas, Sum. Theol. III, q. 1, a. 1.
[42] Id. In Sent. III, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1.
[43] Bonavent. In Sent. III, d. 1, a. 1, q. 1.
[44] Scotus, In Sent. III, d. 1, q. 1, n. 1.
[45] Cfr. Halens. Sum. III, q. 2, m. 1, 2; Albert. Magn. In Sent. III, d. 1, a. 1; Bonavent. loc. cit.; Thomas, loc. cit., et Cont. Gent. IV, c. 39, 40; Scotus, loc. cit., et Report. III, d. 1, q. 1.
[46] Halens. Sum. III, q. 2; Thomas, In Sent. III, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2; Bonavent. Ibid. a. 2, q. 1; Albert. Magn. Ibid. a. 1.
[47] Halens. loc. cit. m. 5; Thomas, Sum. Theol. III, q. 3, a. 5; Bonavent. In Sent. III, d. 1, a. 1, q. 4.

for this special fitness are thus given by St. Thomas: Man was created through the Word; therefore it was becoming that after the fall he should be restored by the Word. Man was predestined to become the son of God by adoption; therefore it was fitting that he should possess this dignity through Him who is Son of God by nature. Man strayed from God by an inordinate thirst for knowledge; therefore it was proper that he should be led back to God by the eternal Wisdom.[48]

The final cause of the Incarnation, as of anything else, is the end to be attained. This is ultimately the manifestation of God's glory. On this point all the Scholastics were necessarily agreed, as it was evidently contained in the teaching of the Church. Their discussions turned about the proximate final cause, or the chief reason why God decreed to manifest His glory through the Incarnation. In trying to solve this question, they generally spoke with great reserve. St. Thomas says that it is a matter which He alone knows who was born and offered up for our redemption because He willed it.[49] However He ventures the opinion that the redemption must be regarded as the chief motive of the Incarnation. For "since everywhere in Holy Scripture the sin of the first man is assigned as the reason of the Incarnation, it is more in accordance with this to say that the work of the Incarnation was ordained by God as a remedy for sin; so that, had sin not existed, the Incarnation would not have been. However, the power of God is not limited to this; hence even if sin had not existed, God could nevertheless have become incarnate." [50]

The same view is taken by St. Bonaventure, who says that "the principal reason of the Incarnation seems to have been the redemption of mankind, although with this principal motive there were connected many other reasons of fitness.[51] Alexander of Hales gives no definite solution, but simply states: "It may be said without prejudice to truth, that, if human nature had not fallen into sin, the Incarnation would still have been befitting.[52] Albertus Magnus solves the ques-

[48] Sum. Theol. III, q. 3, a. 8.
[49] In Sent. III, d. 1, q. 1, a. 3.
[50] Sum. Theol. III, q. 1, a. 3.
[51] In Sent. III, d. 1, a. 2, q. 2.
[52] Sum. III, q. 2, m. 13.

tion in the same way as St. Thomas,[53] while Richard of Middleton gives arguments for both sides, without coming to a decision on the point at issue.[54] Scotus, on the other hand, holds that the redemption of mankind can be considered only as a secondary motive of the Incarnation; while the primary motive was the manifestation of God's glory in this mystery of divine love. Hence, although he does not positively assert that the Word would have become incarnate even if human nature had not fallen into sin, nevertheless the general import of his teaching points to that conclusion.[55] And in this view he has always had many followers, even outside the Franciscan school of theology.

2. *The Person Assuming Human Nature.*— When speaking of the assumption of human nature by the Word, nearly all Scholastics consider these three questions: Whether to assume is proper to a divine person? Whether the divine nature can assume? Whether one person can assume without the others? In connection with these questions they also speculate about other points, such as the incarnation of the three divine persons in the same human nature, and in different natures; the assumption of irrational creatures, and other matters of a similar import: but all this may here be passed by, as it has little or no dogmatic value. It will be sufficient to make a few observations in reference to the first three questions mentioned above.

The term, "to assume," as Richard of Middleton explains, may be taken in three different meanings. In the first it signifies simply to take and unite; in the second, to take and unite to oneself; in the third, to take and unite to one's person.[56] In accordance with this threefold meaning of the term, the Scholastics teach that in the first sense the assumption is common to all three persons, because the Trinity united human nature with the person of the Son; in the second sense the assumption belongs to the divine nature, in as much as it caused the human nature to be together with itself in the same

[53] In Sent. III, d. 20, a. 4.
[54] Ibid. a. 2, q. 4.
[55] Ibid. d. 7, q. 3; Report. ibid. q. 4–6.
[56] In Sent. d. 5, a. 1, q. 1.

person; in the third sense the assumption is proper to the person of the Son, since it is to His person alone that the human nature is united.[57]

St. Thomas formulates this common teaching as follows: "The act of assumption proceeds from the divine power, which is common to the three persons, but the term of the assumption is a person. . . . Hence, what has to do with action in the assumption is common to the three persons; but what pertains to the nature of the term belongs to one person in such a manner as not to belong to another; for the three persons caused the human nature to be united to the person of the Son."[58] Again: "To be the principle of the assumption belongs to the divine nature itself, because the assumption took place by its power; however to be the term of the assumption does not belong to the divine nature in itself, but by reason of the person in whom it is considered to be. Hence a person is primarily and more properly said to assume, but it may be said secondarily that the nature assumed a nature to its person. And after the same manner the nature is said to be incarnate, not that it changed to flesh, but that it assumed the nature of flesh."[59]

3. *The Human Nature Assumed by the Person of the Word.* — It is a matter of faith that Christ has a true and complete human nature, composed of body and soul, each one of which has its own proper faculties and senses. In accordance with this teaching of faith, the Scholastics point out that the Word assumed human nature not in the abstract, but in the concrete;[60] not as multiplied in many, but as individualized in one.[61] Abstract human nature, representing the species, could not be thus assumed; for, as St. Thomas argues, "this assumption is terminated in a person, and it is contrary to the nature of a common form to be thus individualized in a

[57] Halens. Sum. III, q. 5, m. 1, 2, 3; Thomas, In Sent. III, d. 5, q. 2, a. 1, 2; Bonavent. Ibid. a. 1, q. 1-3; Albert. Magn. Ibid. a. 1, 3, 4, 6; Scotus, Ibid. 1, 1.

[58] Sum. Theol. III, q. 3, a. 4.

[59] Ibid. a. 2.

[60] Halens. Sum. III, q. 4; Bonavent. In Sent. III, d. 5, a. 2, q. 1; Albert. Magn. Ibid. a. 5.

[61] Bonavent. Ibid. d. 2, a. 1, q. 3; Thomas, Ibid. q. 1, a. 2.

person."[62] Nor would it have been befitting "for human nature to be assumed by the Word in all its supposita. First, because the multitude of supposita of human nature, which are natural to it, would have been taken away. . . . Secondly, because this would have been derogatory to the dignity of the incarnate Son of God, as He is the First-born of many brethren. Thirdly, because it is fitting that as one divine suppositum is incarnate, so He should assume one human nature, so that on both sides unity might be found."[63]

Thus the Word assumed all the essential parts of human nature. He assumed a real body, made up of flesh and blood; for that belongs to the essence of man, and it would not have been becoming Him to have anything fictitious in His work; besides this is the teaching of Holy Scripture.[64] And He assumed a rational soul, through which the body received its specific being. This appears both from the Sacred Writings and from the purpose and truth of the Incarnation.[65] Moreover soul and body were substantially united, so as to form a complete and individual human nature.[66] However the body was assumed *mediante anima,* in the sense that it was made assumable by its relation to the rational soul, and that the soul, on account of its higher dignity, occupies a middle place between it and God; but not in the sense that the soul is the formal bond of union.[67]

However, although the Word thus assumed a complete and individual human nature, He did not assume a human person. This is evident for three reasons: First, if the human person existed before its assumption, the Word would not have been conceived by Mary; secondly, if only in its assumption, it would have been consumed rather than assumed; thirdly, if it continued to exist after the assumption, there would be two

[62] Sum. q. 4, a. 4.
[63] Sum. Theol. III, q. 4, a. 5.
[64] Halens. Sum. III, q. 4, m. 4; Bonavent. In Sent. III, d. 2, a. 2, q. 1; Thomas, Ibid. q. 1, a. 3; Albert. Magn. Ibid. a. 1, q. 1; Scotus, Ibid. q. 2, 3.
[65] Cfr. Ibid., et Rich. Middleton, In Sent. III, d. 2, a. 1, q. 1; Ægid. Rom. Ibid. q. 1, a. 1.
[66] Cfr. Thomas, Sum. Theol. III, q. 2, a. 4, 6.
[67] Halens. Sum. III, q. 4, m. 5; Albert. Magn. In Sent. III, d. 2, a. 9, 10; Bonavent. Ibid. a. 3, q. 1; Thomas, III, q. 6, a. 1; Scotus, In Sent. Ibid. q. 2, n. 5.

persons in Christ, which it is heretical to say.[68] Hence, while complete in every other respect, the human nature as assumed by the Word was without its own proper personality.

4. *Definition of Human Personality.*— Nearly all Scholastics accepted the Boethian definition of person, so that they regarded a human person as an individual substance of a rational nature. It is true, Richard of St. Victor, Alexander of Hales, and Duns Scotus, as was pointed out in the chapter on the Blessed Trinity, modified this definition somewhat; but that modification did not introduce any substantial change. They all insist that a substance, in order to be properly denominated as a person, must be separated from others of its kind by a threefold distinction — of singularity, incommunicability, and dignity. A substance is said to be singular when it is undivided in itself, and divided from every other substance. It is incommunicable, when it has no natural aptitude to become in any sense a part of another being. These two distinctions constitute the substance in question a *suppositum.* When to these is added the distinction of dignity, which consists in rationality or intellectuality, there results a *person.* Here it must be noted, however, that in every rational subject the suppositum and the person are identical. Hence a human person is a rational suppositum.[69]

On these points the Scholastics were agreed, except that a few of them placed a distinction between the suppositum and the person in the same subject.[70] But in regard to the further question, what is it precisely that distinguishes the person from the rational nature, or what does personality add to rational nature so as to make it a person, their agreement was not so perfect. The question is in itself purely philosophical, and as such they did not give to it any special consideration; but they incidentally indicate their views regarding it when speaking of the hypostatic union. Although even in that connection hardly any of them state explicitly in what the formal reason of personality consists.

[68] Cfr. Bonavent. loc. cit. d. 5, a. 2, q. 2.

[69] Cfr. Thomas, Sum. Theol. III, q. 2, a. 3.

[70] Ibid.

Thus Alexander of Hales, after explaining the threefold distinction noted above, goes on to say that if a rational nature is created so as to exist by itself, it is a person; but if at the moment of creation it is united to another personality, it is not a person, although it is a complete rational nature.[71] Hence he seems to imply that the formal reason of personality, presupposing a complete rational nature, is nothing else than the fact of independent existence. The same view is taken by St. Bonaventure, who says that the human nature of Christ is not a person, simply because it is united to the person of the Word.[72] Scotus is somewhat more explicit. He holds that personality is the ultimate complement whereby a rational nature, complete in itself, is made actually incommunicable; but this complement adds nothing to the complete nature except the double negation of actual and aptitudinal communication. "That negation of dependence . . . actual and aptitudinal, constitutes the formal reason of personality."[73] Henry of Ghent, though not quite so explicit, gives a similar explanation.[74] Hence although the concept of personality is fundamentally positive, in as much as person is the same as a separately existing complete rational nature; still formally considered it is negative, since it implies no physical reality distinct from the complete nature itself.

St. Thomas looks at the matter in a somewhat different light, but according to many of his interpreters comes to practically the same result. "Person," he says, "has a different meaning from nature. For nature . . . designates the specific essence which is signified by the definition. And if nothing was found to be added to what belongs to the notion of the species, there would be no need to distinguish the nature from the suppositum of the nature, which is the individual subsisting in this nature. . . . Now in certain subsisting things we happen to find what does not belong to the notion of the species, namely, accidents and individuating principles, which appear chiefly in such as are composed of matter and form. Hence in such as these the nature and the suppositum really

[71] Sum. III, q. 4, m. 6.
[72] In Sent. d. 5, a. 2, q. 2.
[73] In Sent. III, d. 1, q. 1, n. 9.
[74] Quodl. 5, q. 8.

differ, not indeed as if they were wholly separate, but because in the suppositum is included the nature, and certain other things outside the species are added. . . . And what is said of a suppositum is to be applied to a person in rational or intellectual creatures; for a person is nothing else than an individual substance of rational nature, according to Boethius." [75]

From this exposition many have inferred that St. Thomas regarded personality as something positive, really distinct from the complete nature — either a *modus realis* or the *actus existendi.* But that such was not his mind appears from his solution of such difficulties as were drawn from the acknowledged fact that Christ's human nature is a complete rational substance. Thus when the objectors urged that Christ's human nature answers the Boethian definition of person, he replied: "We must bear in mind that not every individual in the genus of substance, even in rational nature, is a person, but that alone which exists by itself, and not that which exists in some more perfect thing. . . . Therefore, although this human nature is a kind of individual in the genus substance, it has not its own personality, because it does not exist separately, but in something more perfect, namely, in the person of the Word." [76] And to the statement, that the Word assumed whatever perfection He had sown in our nature, and therefore human personality, he replied: "Its proper personality is not wanting to the nature assumed through the loss of anything pertaining to the perfection of human nature, but through the addition of something which is above human nature, namely, the union with a divine person." [77] Hence whatever physical perfection is found in human nature existing by itself apart, is also found in the human nature assumed by the Word; and the only reason why it is not a human person is the fact that it does not exist apart. And this the author expressly states in answer to another difficulty, when he says: "If the two natures together with their properties were separated, there

[75] Sum. Theol. III, q. 2, a. 2.
[76] Sum. Theol. III, q. 2, a. 2 ad 3[m].
[77] Ibid. q. 4, a. 2 ad 2[m].

would be on both sides that totality which is required by the notion of person; but while they are united there is only one totality, and therefore only one person." [78]

In the light of these and similar texts, the other statements of St. Thomas, that person and nature are really distinct, that person adds something to nature, evidently bear reference only to specific nature, or to nature in the abstract; not to nature in the concrete. Hence, if according to his teaching, as some of his followers contend, the formal notion of personality is something positive in itself, it is at most a *modus*, not positively, but only negatively distinct from the complete nature. And this was also the teaching of Albertus Magnus. "Were Christ," he says, "to lay aside His humanity, that which was so laid aside would be an individual substance of rational nature, and therefore a person. And if some one were to ask, what conferred upon it the personality which it did not have before, the answer would be that it was the singularity which it did not have before, or the incommunicability, as others say; for properly speaking it is singularity that causes rational nature to be a person. And if it were asked still further, what gave it singularity, one would have to answer that it was division which gave it *per accidens*. For although *per se* division removes something, still *per accidens* it causes that which is divided to be one and separate from the other, and that is singularity." [79]

On the other hand, Durandus and the Nominalists went still farther than Scotus in their identification of nature and person. According to them the distinction between the two is merely a matter of concept; it is in no sense real.[80] This, however, ill accords with the oneness of person in Christ, and hence their view is commonly rejected as untenable.

5. *The Hypostatic Union.*— When the Scholastics began their speculations regarding the mystery of the Incarnation, two fundamental points in reference to the union itself had been clearly defined: First, that the union resulted in oneness

[78] In Sent. III, d. 5, q. 1, a. 3 ad 3^m.

[79] Ibid. d. 5, a. 12.

[80] Durand. Ibid. q. 2; Biel, Ibid. d. 5, q. unica.

of person; secondly, that in spite of this oneness of person, the two natures with all their properties remained really distinct in the union.[81] Hence it is the common teaching of the Scholastics that the union between the divinity and the humanity of Christ is hypostatic or personal. The human nature is united to the divine nature, but in the person of the Son.[82]

This hypostatic union they, first of all, try to illustrate by various examples found in nature; but they are careful to point out that all these examples fall short of a real explanation. The one most commonly used is that of grafting. The inserted shoot becomes in a manner one suppositum with the tree upon which it is engrafted, yet the natures of the two remain really distinct; they do not form a new or third nature.[83] A similar example is found in the union of soul and body, which had already been employed in the Athanasian Symbol. It is true, soul and body form not only one person, but also one nature; still in that nature the one constituent element is not changed into the other, and in so far the example illustrates the hypostatic union. St. Thomas thought it was the best example that could be found in created things.[84]

In the next place they inquire whether anything intervenes between the two extremes of the union, or between the person of the Word and the human nature. On this point they restrict their inquiries to the question of grace; that is, whether habitual grace can in any sense be considered as a medium in which the union took place. With the exception of Alexander of Hales, they all answer the question in the negative.[85] Alexander taught that grace must be considered as a necessary disposition of the human nature, in order that it might fittingly be assumed by the Word. Hence he called it the grace of union.[86] The others also admitted that the human nature of

[81] Cfr. vol. I, p. 396 sqq.; 404 sqq.

[82] Halens. Sum. III, q. 4; Bonavent. In Sent. III, d. 5, a. 1; Thomas, ibid. q. 2; Scotus, ibid. q. 1.

[83] Halens. Sum. III, q. 7, m. 1, a. 1; Bonavent. In Sent. III, d. 6, a. 2, q. 1; Thomas, ibid. d. 1, q. 1, a. 1.

[84] QQ. DD. de Unione Verbi, a. 1.

[85] Bonavent. In Sent. III, d. 2, a. 3, q. 2; Middleton, ibid. a. 2, q. 3; Dionys. Carth., ibid. q. 5; Scotus, ibid. q. 2, 3; Ægid. Rom., ibid. q. 2, a. 3.

[86] Sum. III, q. 7, m. 2, a. 1.

Christ was adorned with sanctifying grace, but held that it was consequent upon the union *in ordine naturae*, if not in point of time.

The common teaching on the point in question was thus formulated by St. Thomas: "In Christ there was the grace of union and habitual grace. Therefore grace cannot be taken to be the means of the assumption of the human nature, whether we speak of the grace of union or of habitual grace. For the grace of union is the personal being that is given gratis to the human nature in the person of the Word, and it is the term of the assumption. While the habitual grace pertaining to the spiritual holiness of the man is an effect following the union. . . . But if by grace we understand the will of God doing or bestowing something gratis, the union was effected by grace, not as a means, but as the efficient cause." [87]

Considered in itself, the hypostatic union consists in the relation which resulted from the act of assumption, and in so far it is something created. "The union of which we are speaking," says St. Thomas, "is a relation which we consider between the divine and the human nature, in as much as they came together in one person of the Son of God. Now . . . every relation which we consider between God and the creature is really in the creature, by whose change the relation is brought into being; whereas it is not really in God, but only in our way of thinking, since it does not arise from any change in God. And hence we must say that the union of which we are speaking is not really in God, except only in our way of thinking; but in human nature, which is a creature, it is really. Therefore we must say it is something created." [88]

Although the hypostatic union thus formally consists in a created relation, it is nevertheless the most intimate of all unions. except that of the nature and persons in the Blessed Trinity. In respect of the distance of the terms brought together, of the power that united them, of the term in which the union resulted, of the indissoluble perpetuity of its duration —"in respect of all these conditions," says St. Bonaventure, "there

[87] Sum. Theol. III, q. 6, a. 6. [88] Sum. Theol. III, q. 2, a. 7.

is no other union that is at all similar to it; because it exceeds all nature and all ordinary graces; for it is the indissoluble union of the divine and human nature in one person brought about by the power of God." [89] St. Thomas derives the intimate nature of the union chiefly from its term; " for the unity of the divine person, in which the two natures are united, is the greatest." [90] And as this unity " is greater than the unity of person and nature in us, hence also the union of the Incarnation is greater than the union of soul and body in our nature." [91]

It is because of this intimate union that Christ is strictly one — one person, one suppositum, one being, although the natures remain distinct and retain their own properties.[92] In itself the person or hypostasis of Christ is altogether simple; yet as one subsisting being in two natures, He is in so far said to be a composite person.[93] Hence one nature may in the concrete be predicated of the other, so that in view of the union it is perfectly correct to say, God is man, man is God.[94] One may also say, God became man; but its converse, man became God, would be an error in predication.[95] And as the two natures may thus be predicated of one another, so also may the attributes of the natures when taken in the concrete. Hence it is perfectly orthodox to state that the immortal is mortal, the passible is impassible. The justifying reason of these and similar predications is the oneness of person; because it is always the person that forms the proper subject of predication in the concrete.[96]

6. *Consectaria of the Union.*— As the human nature is united to the Godhead in a personal union, it necessarily shares in such properties of God the Son as are communicable to a creature. The first of these is divine sonship. Not only Christ as God, but also Christ as man is the natural Son of God. Nor can He in any sense be called God's adopted son. Some

[89] In Sent. III, d. 6, a. 2, q. 2.
[90] Ibid. a. 9.
[91] Ibid. a. 9 ad 3m.
[92] Halens. Sum. III, q. 6, m. 2; Bonavent. In Sent. III, d. 6, a. 1; Thomas, ibid. a. 2; Scotus, ibid. q. 2.
[93] Loc. cit.
[94] Cfr. Thomas, Sum. Theol. III, q. 16, a. 1, 2.
[95] Ibid. a. 4, 5.
[96] Ibid.

of the earlier Scholastics fell into error on this point, as was indicated in the first section of this chapter; but their successors were at one in defending Christ's natural sonship. Filiation, they insisted, is a personal property; and as there is only one person in Christ, so can there be only one filiation.[97] Scotus, indeed, called in question the principle that filiation is exclusively a personal property; but he accepted the doctrine of one sonship in Christ from the teaching of the Church.[98]

Since Christ as man is thus the natural Son of God, it necessarily follows that He must be adored with the adoration of *latria,* which has for its formal object God's uncreated excellence. On this point there was no dissension after the time of the Lombard. But it was a moot-question whether the humanity might at the same time be venerated with the cult of *dulia,* which is due to created beings on account of their supernatural excellence. St. Bonaventure and others regard the question as purely theoretical and then solve it in the affirmative;[99] while St. Thomas considers it as practical, and also gives an affirmative answer. Thus he writes: "Adoration is due to the subsisting hypostasis: yet the reason for honoring may be something non-subsistent on account of which the person, in whom it is, is honored. And so the adoration of Christ's humanity may be understood in two ways. First, so that the humanity is the thing adored: and thus to adore the flesh of Christ is nothing else than to adore the incarnate Word of God, just as to revere a king's robe is nothing else than to revere a robed king. And in this sense the adoration of Christ's humanity is the adoration of *latria.* Secondly, the adoration of Christ's humanity may be taken as given by reason of its being perfected with every gift of grace. And in this sense the adoration of Christ's humanity is the adoration not of *latria* but of *dulia.* So that one and the same person of Christ is adored with *latria* on account of His divinity, and with *dulia* on account of His perfect humanity." [100]

[97] Halens. Sum. III, q. 10; Bonavent. In Sent. III, d. 8, a. 2; Albert. Magn. ibid. a. 2; Thomas, Sum. Theol. III, q. 35, a. 5.

[98] In Sent. III, d. 10, q. unica.

[99] Ibid. d. 9, a. 1, q. 1.

[100] Sum. Theol. q. 25, a. 1, 2.

Strictly consequent upon the hypostatic union are certain created perfections, which are found in the faculties of Christ's human soul — in his will and intellect. These were treated by the Scholastics under the headings of grace and knowledge. Only a few of the more important points can here be indicated.

In the matter of grace, aside from the grace of union and substantial sanctity, they held that Christ as man was endowed with habitual grace, and also with gratuitous graces, or *gratia gratis data.* The former was in Him the same as in other just men, only He possessed it in an incomparably higher degree. Though finite in itself, it did not admit of an increase as possessed by Him.[101] With it were connected all the virtues and gifts, excepting such as in their formal concept conflicted with the perfection of the state of personal union. To this latter class belong faith and hope, when taken in their full significance; because Christ's human soul enjoyed from the first moment of its existence the beatific vision.[102] He also possessed all the gratuitous graces that may be communicated to human nature, and that in the highest possible degree.[103] And all these graces and gifts were proper to Him both as an individual man and as the head of the Church.[104] Under the latter aspect they are called the *gratia capitis.*

Although in Christ as man there was thus the fullness of all graces, nevertheless His human will remained free; not in regard to final beatitude of which His soul was already in possession, but in reference to the choice of good actions which He performed during His life on earth.[105] At the same time, however, it was so determined to good that the very possibility of sinning was excluded. For this impeccability three reasons are assigned — the fullness of grace, the beatific vision, and the hypostatic union.[106] Scotus, however, did not

[101] Halens. Sum. III, q. 8, m. 3; Bonavent. In Sent. III, d. 13, a. 1; Albert. Magn. ibid. a. 1; Scotus, ibid. d. 18, q. 3.

[102] Thomas, Sum. Theol. III, q. 7.

[103] Ibid. a. 7, 8; Bonavent. In Sent. III, d. 13, a. 2.

[104] Ibid.

[105] Cfr. Thomas, Sum. Theol. III, q. 18, a. 4.

[106] Halens. Sum. III, q. 5, m. 2, a. 2; Bonavent. In Sent. III, d. 12, a. 2; Albert. Magn. ibid. a. 4-6; Thomas, ibid. q. 2, a. 1; Scotus, ibid. q. unica.

admit that the hypostatic union necessarily excluded the possibility of sin.[107] In this he was followed by Durandus, who held that if the humanity had been assumed without being perfected by grace, Christ could have sinned and even lost his soul.[108]

In the human intellect of Christ the Scholastics recognized a threefold knowledge — *scientia beata, infusa, acquisita.* The first is the intuitive vision of God, which Christ's human soul enjoyed from the first moment of its existence; the second was produced in the intellect by a special divine operation, also at the first moment of His earthly life; the third was acquired by a natural use of His faculties during His sojourn on earth. By the knowledge of beatific vision "the soul of Christ knows in the Word all things existing in whatever time, and the thoughts of men," but not all those possibles that "are in the divine power alone."[109] By the infused knowledge "the soul of Christ knew: First, whatever can be known by the force of man's active intellect, as, for example, whatever pertains to human sciences; secondly, all things made known to man by divine revelation, whether they belong to the gift of wisdom or the gift of prophecy, or any other gift of the Holy Ghost; . . . Yet He did not know the essence of God by this knowledge, but by that of vision alone."[110]

Coexisting with these perfections of intellect and will, there were in the soul and body of Christ "those defects which flow from the common sin of the whole nature, yet are not repugnant to the perfection of knowledge and grace."[111] Hence He experienced hunger, thirst, pain, and the agony of death. All these defects or infirmities were proper to the nature assumed by the Word; for that nature was passible and did not as yet enjoy all the effects of the beatific vision.[112]

In this brief outline are contained the chief points discussed by the Scholastics in their Christological teaching. Comprehensive and thorough as that teaching was, it did nevertheless

[107] Loc. cit.
[108] Ibid. q. 2.
[109] Cfr. Thomas, Sum. Theol. III, q. 10, a. 2.
[110] Ibid. q. 11, a. 1.
[111] Ibid. q. 14.
[112] Ibid.

not add very much to the development of dogmas connected with the mystery of the Incarnation. And the reason is that nearly all of them had received their full development during Patristic times.[113] When the Scholastics began their speculations, the oneness of person in Christ, the duality of natures, faculties, and operations, His natural sonship as God and as man, and His title to divine worship, had all been defined as so many dogmas of the faith; and to these nothing really new was added by later definitions. But the studies of the Schoolmen did excellent service in making these various dogmas, and many important points of doctrine connected with them, more accessible to reason.

[113] Cfr. vol. I, p. 308 sqq.; p. 387 sqq.; p. 498 sqq.

CHAPTER XI

SOTERIOLOGY

SOME SOTERIOLOGICAL ERRORS: SOTERIOLOGY OF THE SCHOLASTICS

The teaching of the Fathers on the redemption of the world not only emphasized the fact that Christ was sent by God as the Savior of our fallen race, but also set forth with considerable attention to details the nature of the redemptive work. They regarded the incarnation of God's own Son as a deification of our vitiated nature, and in His sufferings and death they recognized a superabundant satisfaction for all the sins of the world. He was to them the second Adam, who by His perfect obedience undid the harm that had been wrought by the disobedience of the first Adam. He overcame Satan, conquered death, opened up the sources of divine grace, and in all things acted as mediator between sinful men and their offended God.[1] This teaching was taken over in its entirety by the Scholastics; and, excepting a few minor points, was without further development incorporated in their theological system.

A — Some Soteriological Errors

In a previous chapter it was pointed out that Abelard and his school fell into a very serious error regarding original sin. They looked upon it not as a moral stain implying guilt, but as a mere liability to punishment. Human nature, according to them, was not intrinsically vitiated, and therefore stood in no need of restoration. Nothing was required but a remission of the punishment which rested heavily upon the race on account of the sin committed by the common ancestor. And for this the Son of God need not have become man.[2]

Such a view of original sin necessarily led to a misappre-

[1] Cfr. vol. I, p. 316 sqq.

[2] In Epist. ad. Rom. c. 5.

hension of the redemptive work of the Savior. It was the example of right living that mankind needed, not the healing touch of a divine physician. And this formed the burden of Abelard's soteriological teaching, as appears from many parts of his works. Thus he writes: "It seems to us that in this we are justified and reconciled to God, in the blood of Christ, that, through a singular grace conferred on us, the Son took our nature, and persevered in instructing us by word and example even till death, drawing us so closely to Him by the bonds of love, that, inflamed by the thought of so great a benefit of divine grace, we might in our charity not be afraid to bear all for His sake. . . . Hence our redemption is that exceeding great love of Christ which He showed forth in His sufferings; for thereby we were not only set free from the servitude of sin, but also acquired the true liberty of the children of God; so that now we do all things, not through fear but through love." [3]

The enlightenment that comes to us from Christ's instructions, the encouragement afforded by His heroic example, the graces obtained for us by His prayer — these, according to Abelard, constitute the work of redemption. "When God caused His Son to become man, He made Him subject to the law which was common to all men. Hence it was necessary that He should love His neighbor as Himself, and infuse into us the grace of His charity, both by instructing us and by praying for us." [4]

These vagaries of Abelard were at once strongly attacked by William of Saint Thierry and by St. Bernard. William went to the root of the error by pointing out that original sin is in the true sense of the term a vitiation of human nature, and that the nature so vitiated needed more than example and instruction to raise it from its moral degradation. It was the death of the God-Man that wrought the redemption.[5] Christ's death was a vicarious satisfaction for sin. He was in truth the second Adam, by whom spiritual life was restored to the fallen race.[6]

[3] Loc. cit.; cfr. Theol. Christ. I, 4.
[4] Loc. cit.
[5] Ænigma Fidei, p. 111.
[6] Ibid. p. 123.

St. Bernard's refutation follows the same line of thought. "The original fault," he says, "was in truth a grievous sin, which infected not only the person of Adam but the entire race." [7] God thought it proper that the redemption should be wrought by the outpouring of blood. "Why, you ask, should He effect by the outpouring of blood what He could have effected by instruction? Ask Him. For me it is enough that so it was decreed." [8] Yet it was not death as such, but rather the obedient will that was efficacious: "Not death, but the ready will of Him who died was acceptable; and so by that death He overcame death, effected our salvation, and restored us to innocence." [9] Christ accepted His sufferings and death freely; but we had urgent need of them for our redemption. "For human perversity can indeed kill, but it has no power to restore life. . . . He alone could in such wise lay down His life, who by His own power rose from the dead." [10]

Another erroneous conception of the redemption is usually ascribed to St. Anselm; not in regard to the nature of the redemptive work in itself, but in reference to its necessity. He develops his theory of the redemption in the treatise which he entitled, *Cur Deus Homo?* The following outline will suffice to make clear his views on the subject.

His fundamental thought on the point in question is this: Every reasonable creature is bound to obey God; "this is the sole and entire honor which we owe our Maker.[11] Whosoever does not give to God this honor which is His due, takes away from Him what is His own, and thereby dishonors Him." [12] Now the human race by committing sin disobeyed God, and therefore deprived Him of the honor to which He had a right; it took away from God what was His own. Consequently, "so long as man does not restore what he snatched away, he remains guilty. Nor is it sufficient to restore that only which was thus unjustly taken from God; but, on account of the affront implied in that unjust action, even more than

[7] In IV Hebd. Sanct. n. 7.
[8] De Error. Abelard. c. 5.
[9] Ibid.
[10] In IV Hebd. Sanct. n. 3.
[11] Op. cit. I, 11.
[12] Ibid.

was taken away must be given by way of restoration." [13]

This, then, was the position of the fallen race. Might its disobedience have been forgiven, without demanding satisfaction? No: "because all God's ways are well ordered; and right order demands that sin not satisfied for be punished. For it is by punishment that God subjects the recalcitrant sinner to Himself." [14] Hence "it is necessary that every sin be followed either by satisfaction or by punishment." [15] But the punishment and consequent loss of all mankind would interfere with the purpose which God had in view when He created man; "for He intended that human nature, which He created free from sin, should fill up the number of the angels who had fallen away." [16] Besides "it was not becoming that what God had proposed concerning man should be entirely frustrated." [17]

Hence satisfaction was necessary. But man could not make due satisfaction: First, because he already owed God everything; secondly, even if he did not, he could never make satisfaction in proportion to the gravity of the sin committed.[18] If you doubt this, "you have not considered what the weight of sin is." [19] Due satisfaction for sin is "something far greater than every conceivable thing besides God." [20] Hence God's goodness must complete the work which it began in the act of creation.[21] And because no one can give due satisfaction except God, and no one must give it except man, hence it was necessary that it should be given by a God-Man.[22] This is the answer to the question, *Cur Deus homo?* God became man that He might in His human nature render satisfaction for the sins of men.

Through Christ a way was opened for the sinful race to effect its reconciliation with God. He was in a position to make atonement for all the sins of the world, and to do so through His human nature. For although as man He owed

[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid. I, 12; I, 15.
[15] Ibid. I, 15.
[16] Ibid. I, 16.
[17] Ibid. I, 4.
[18] Ibid. I, 20.
[19] Ibid. I, 21.
[20] Ibid. II, 6.
[21] Ibid. II, 5.
[22] Ibid. II, 6.

God obedience, yet He was under no obligation to suffer and to die as He did. He accepted death freely, and by His ready obedience fulfilled all justice.[23] Hence one can truly say: *"Illum tale quid sponte dedisse Deo ad honorem illius, cui quidquid, quod Deus non est, comparari non potest, et quod pro omnibus omnium hominum debitis recompensare potest."* [24] God alone can be compared to what He gave, and therefore it was an adequate compensation for the sins of men.

Such a gift, coming from Christ, necessarily called for a reward; "but as Christ did not stand in need of anything, He graciously allowed His followers, to whom by dying He gave an example of dying for justice's sake, to become sharers in His merit; so that what they owed for their sins might be canceled, and what was wanting to them on account of their sins might be given to them," namely, the grace of God. "Nothing more reasonable, nothing sweeter, nothing more desirable, could the world ever conceive." [25] In this the mercy of God, so to speak, exhausted itself. "So great do we find this mercy, so perfectly in accord with the demands of justice, that neither a greater nor one more just can be conceived." [26]

This, then, is Anselm's theory: Redemption through the incarnate Son of God was necessary; because it was unbecoming that God should either forgive man's sins without requiring satisfaction, or that He should allow all mankind to perish forever; and, on the other hand, man was altogether incapable of rendering due satisfaction: therefore the redemption must be brought about by the expiatory death of the God-Man. It must, however, be borne in mind that the author bases his reasoning exclusively on natural principles, without reference to revelation. Hence Boso, his interlocutor, says very much to the point: *"Sic probas Deum fieri hominem ex necessitate, ut etiam, si removeantur pauca, quae de nostris libris posuisti (ut quod de tribus personis Dei et de Adam tetigisti), non solum Judaeis, sed etiam paganis sola ratione satisfacias."* [27]

[23] Ibid. I, 9; II, 19.
[24] Ibid. II, 19.
[25] Ibid. II, 20.
[26] Ibid. II, 21.
[27] Ibid. II, 23.

B — Soteriology of the Scholastics

In their soteriological discussions the Scholastics enter into so many details and side issues that it is impossible even to mention them in a compendious work like the present. Nor is such an enumeration at all necessary; for many of the points discussed are mere speculations, and are not likely to develop at any future time into dogmas of the faith. In the following outline, therefore, only such questions will be briefly touched upon as are more or less essential to a full understanding of the redemptive work of Christ as set forth by the Schoolmen.

1. *Necessity of the Redemption.*— It is sometimes said that St. Anselm had no followers among the Scholastics in his theory on the necessity of the redemption. This statement is true in so far as his theory is interpreted as implying necessity in the strict sense of the term, and on the part of God. But not a few of the Scholastics gave a different interpretation of it. Thus St. Bonaventure says that it must be understood *in quantum est ex parte nostra, praesupposita dispositione divina, qua nos sic, et non alio modo, liberare decrevit.*[28] And the same interpretation is given by St. Thomas: *Anselmus loquitur quantum est ex parte nostra, supposita Dei ordinatione.*[29] If this interpretation be correct, which does however not appear very probable, it must be said that St. Anselm had nearly all the most representative Scholastics on his side. For, with the exception of Scotus and a few others, they are all agreed that man was entirely unable to make due reparation for his sins, and that therefore in the present order of Providence redemption by the God-Man was necessary. They usually bring out the following points.

Due satisfaction for sin must imply a twofold reparation: First, of God's personal honor which was outraged by sin; secondly, of the loss sustained by God in the corruption of the human race. Now whatever may be said about the possibility of a creature, assisted by grace, repairing the loss caused by sin; no creature whatever, even the holiest, could possibly

[28] In Sent. III, d. 20, a. unic., q. 6 ad 2m.
[29] Ibid. a. 4 ad 2m.

repair the injury done to God's honor. That injury is measured by God's infinite dignity, and in this sense the evil of sin is infinite; whereas the moral value of any satisfaction that might be rendered by a creature is necessarily finite. Hence in the supposition that God demanded adequate satisfaction from human nature, there was no other means of redemption besides the incarnation of God's own Son.[30]

However with this more common teaching of the most representative Scholastics, Scotus, Durandus, and the Nominalists generally, do not agree. They deny the very foundation upon which it is made to rest, namely, that sin is in any real sense an infinite moral evil. It is true, God's offended majesty is infinite, but that infinity, they say, has only an extrinsic relation to sin. Hence they hold that human nature endowed with the fullness of grace, but without being hypostatically united to the Godhead, might have made adequate reparation for all sins and thus have redeemed mankind. It is true, God would have been under no obligation to accept this satisfaction, but neither was He under obligation to accept the satisfaction rendered by Christ.[31]

On the other hand, all are at one in holding that God might have been satisfied with an inadequate reparation, such as it was in the power of man to make. The common teaching on the point is thus set forth by St. Thomas. "Satisfaction may be said to be sufficient in two ways: First, perfectly, in as much as it is condign, being adequate to make good the fault committed, and in this way the satisfaction of a mere man cannot be sufficient for sin, both because the whole of human nature has been corrupted by sin, whereas the goodness of any person or persons could not make up adequately for the harm done to the whole of the nature; and also because sin committed against God has a kind of infinity from the infinity of the divine majesty; for the greater the person we offend, the more grievous the offence. Hence for condign satisfaction it

[30] Halens. Sum. III, q. 1, m. 6; Bonavent. In Sent. III, d. 20, a. unic., q. 3; Albert. Magn. ibid. a. 6, 7; Thomas, ibid. a. 2; Sum. Theol. III, q. 1, a. 2.

[31] In Sent. d. 20, q. unic. n. 3 sqq.; Durandus, ibid. q. 2.

was necessary that the act of the one satisfying should have an infinite efficiency, as being of God and man. Secondly, man's satisfaction may be termed sufficient imperfectly, that is, in the acceptation of him who is content with it, even though it is not condign, and in this way the satisfaction of a mere man is sufficient." [32] Scotus, however, as was pointed out in the preceding paragraph, held that this "imperfectly sufficient satisfaction" might have been accepted by God as condign.

Furthermore, all are agreed that God might have freed mankind from sin without requiring any satisfaction whatever; for the manner of forgiveness rests with the person who is offended by sin. "If He had willed to free man from sin without any satisfaction," argues St. Thomas, "He would not have acted against justice. For a judge, while preserving justice, cannot pardon faults without penalty, if the faults have been committed against another. . . . But God has no one higher than Himself, for He is the sovereign and common good of the whole universe. Consequently, if He forgive sin, which has the formality of fault in that it is committed against Himself, He wrongs no one: just as any one else, overlooking a personal trespass, without satisfaction, acts mercifully and not unjustly." [33] However such forgiveness, they all hold, would have been less in accord both with God's perfections and the needs of man.[33]

2. *The Atonement.*— It is the common teaching of the Scholastics that Christ merited during the whole time of His earthly existence, from His conception till His death; and in that sense every action of His life contributed to the atonement for man's sins.[34] However, they ascribe the atonement in a special sense to His passion and death, as it was through them that God wished to effect the full redemption of the world. In themselves neither sufferings nor death would have been necessary to render God condign satisfaction; but there were special reasons of congruity why He wished the redemption

[32] Sum. Theol. III, q. 1, a. 2 ad 2m.

[33] Ibid. q. 46, a. 2 ad 3m.

[34] Halens. Sum. III, q. 16, m. 2; Bonavent. In Sent. III, d. 18, a. 1; Albert. Magn. ibid. a. 6; Thomas, ibid. a. 3; Scotus, ibid. q. unica.

to be accomplished in this way. "That man should be delivered by Christ's passion," writes St. Thomas, "was in keeping with both His mercy and His justice. With His justice, because by His passion Christ made satisfaction for the sin of the human race; and so man was set free by Christ's justice: and with His mercy, because since man of himself could not satisfy for the sin of all human nature. . . . God gave him His Son to satisfy for him." [35]

Then there were special reasons on the part of man, besides deliverance from sin. Those commonly given by the various writers are thus summarized by St. Thomas: "In the first place, man knows thereby how much God loves him, and so is stirred up to love Him in return, and herein lies the perfection of human salvation. . . . Secondly, because thereby He set us an example of obedience, humility, constancy, justice, and the other virtues displayed in the passion, which are requisite for man's salvation. . . . Thirdly, because Christ by His passion not only delivered man from sin, but also merited justifying grace for him and the glory of bliss. . . . Fourthly, because man is all the more bound to refrain from sin, when he bears in mind that he has been redeemed by Christ's blood. . . . Fifthly, because it redounded to man's greater dignity, that as man was overcome and deceived by the devil, so also it should be a man that should overthrow the devil: and as man deserved death, so a man by dying should vanquish death." [36]

The moral value of Christ's sufferings and death are thus indicated by St. Bonaventure, in answer to an objection that the Savior's passion was not sufficient to blot out all sins: "This one passion of Christ was not only sufficient to satisfy for the sin of Adam, but also for the vast number of all other sins. Hence the death of Christ was of avail also for His slayers, if they were willing to be converted; for the merit of the suffering Christ was infinitely greater than the sin of Judas who betrayed Him, than the sin of the Jews who instigated the Gentiles to crucify Him; because the goodness of Christ far exceeded their malice." [37]

[35] Sum. Theol. III, q. 46, a. 1.
[36] Ibid. a. 3.
[37] In Sent. III, d. 20, a. unic., q. 5 ad 6m.

In another place the same author states that the merit of Christ is of infinite moral value, and this arises from the fact that "His soul is united to a divine person, on account of which union not only man but God Himself is said to die; whence it follows that His merit is infinite, not by reason of created grace, but because of the infinite dignity of His person." [38] St. Thomas expresses this view in almost identical terms, when he says: "The dignity of Christ's flesh is not to be estimated solely from the nature of flesh, but also from the person assuming it — in as much as it was God's flesh, the result of which was that it was of infinite worth." [39]

It was, however, not exclusively from the dignity of Christ's person that the satisfactory worth of His sufferings and death was derived. Other elements also contributed thereto, as is thus stated by St. Thomas: "He properly atones for an offence who offers something which the offended one loves equally, or even more than he detested the offence. But by suffering out of love and obedience, Christ gave more than was required to compensate for the offence of the whole human race. First of all, because of the exceeding charity with which He suffered; secondly, on account of the dignity of His life which He laid down in atonement, for it was the life of one who was God and man; thirdly, on account of the extent of the passion and the greatness of the grief endured. . . . And therefore Christ's passion was not only a sufficient but a superabundant atonement for the sins of the human race." [40]

Hence in estimating the moral value of the satisfaction rendered by Christ, two distinct sources must be considered. The first is the physical goodness of the action, as derived from its productive principle, its circumstances, and its object. The second is the same goodness as elevated in the moral order by the dignity of the person of whom the action is predicated. Under the first aspect, the satisfaction of Christ has a finite moral value; because its productive principle — Christ's human nature — its circumstances, and its object are all finite. Un-

[38] Ibid. d. 13, a. 1, q. 3.
[39] Sum. Theol. III, q. 48, a. 2 ad 3m.
[40] Ibid. a. 2.

der the second aspect its moral value is infinite; because the person of the Word, as its elevating principle, is of infinite dignity. Nor is this infinite moral value, as derived from the person of the Word, something merely extrinsic to Christ's human actions; because in virtue of the hypostatic union, the dignity of the person is communicated to the human nature in such wise that its actions are in a true sense the actions of God. Hence it is perfectly correct to say that the satisfaction of Christ is intrinsically of infinite moral value.[41]

On this last point, however, different views were entertained by some of the Scholastics. Thus Scotus maintained that the satisfaction of Christ, and His merit in general, must be considered simply as finite. He states his view in these precise terms: "I say that the merit of Christ was finite: because it essentially depended on a finite principle, and therefore, even considering all its circumstances, its relation to the person of the Word, its connection with the end to be obtained, it was simply finite; for all these relations were finite."[42] Still he admits that in its relation to the person of the Word it may be termed extrinsically infinite; because on account of this relation it was of such a nature that it might be accepted by God as of infinite value. This was also the view taken by the Nominalists, who laid down the general principle: "*Meritum quodcumque tantum et pro tantis potest acceptari passive, quantum et pro quantis vult tota Trinitas active.*"[43]

3. *Effects of the Atonement.*— From what has been said in the preceding paragraphs, it is clear that the Scholastics looked upon the satisfaction rendered by Christ as a compensation offered to God's offended majesty for the dishonor and loss caused by man's sins. This concept, though occurring quite often in the writings of the Fathers, was first fully developed by St. Anselm, as was pointed out at the beginning of this chapter. The later Scholastics adopted it as developed by him, and made it the central idea of their soteriological system. Hence, according to them, the first effect of Christ's redemptive work is the reconciliation of the sinful world with God.

[41] Cfr. Thomas, Sum. Theol. III, q. 46, a. 4, 12.

[42] In Sent. III, d. 19, n. 7.

[43] Cfr. Biel, ibid. note 3.

Christ placated God by restoring that which sin had unjustly taken away. This is the proper effect of the redemption taken in the sense of atonement or satisfaction. It directly terminates in God, and has only an indirect bearing upon the redeemed world.

However this placation of God must not be understood in the sense that God was at enmity with the world, but rather that the world was at enmity with God. God loved the world even when buried in sin, and hence He sent His own Son to pay the price of redemption demanded by His justice; but without the payment of that price He would not grant the graces that were necessary for the world's salvation. Hence whilst the redemption is in one sense a compensation made to God, it is in another sense a source of merit both for the Redeemer Himself and for all those who were redeemed by Him. It is more particularly under this second aspect that the Scholastics consider the effects of the redemption in detail. In this connection they inquire what the Savior merited for Himself, and what for those whom He had come to save.

That all the requisite conditions for merit were found in Christ's actions, is thus briefly pointed out by St. Thomas: "For merit three things are required: A person who can merit, a meritorious action, and a reward. . . . Now all three of these are found in the case of Christ. For although in one sense He was *in termino,* namely, in regard to those operations of His soul by reason of which He enjoyed the beatific vision; nevertheless there was still something wanting to Him in respect of glory, namely, in so far as He was passible both in soul and body and was subject to bodily death: and therefore in this respect He was a *viator,* in the state of acquiring something further. In like manner all His actions were meritorious by reason of charity; and again, He had dominion over His actions on account of the liberty of His will; and therefore He merited by every one of His actions." [44] Lastly, the third condition, that there was a reward in store for Him, is necessarily implied in the preceding two; since the merit of

[44] In Sent. III, q. 18, a. 2.

His actions was in proportion to any reward that God could bestow.[45]

The common teaching of the Scholastics regarding the object of Christ's merit for Himself is thus formulated by the same author: "Since all perfection and greatness must be attributed to Christ, consequently He must have by merit what others have by merit; unless it be of such a nature that its want would detract from His dignity and perfection more than would accrue to Him by merit. Hence He merited neither grace nor knowledge nor the beatitude of His soul, nor the Godhead, because, since merit regards what is not yet possessed, it would be necessary that Christ should have been without these at some time; and to be without them would have diminished Christ's dignity more than His merit would have increased it. But the glory of the body, and the like, are less than the dignity of meriting, which pertains to the virtue of charity. Hence we must say that Christ had by merit the glory of His body and whatever pertained to His outward excellence, as His ascension, veneration, and the rest." [46]

In regard to the first point, however, William of Auxerre and a few others maintained that Christ also merited for Himself life eternal, although His soul was in possession of the beatific vision from the moment of His conception.[47] This view was regarded by Albertus Magnus as probable.[48] The second point was admitted by all, except that Scotus held that Christ merited the glory of His body only indirectly. According to him the direct object of Christ's merit in this respect was the cessation of the miracle by which the glorification of the body was withheld during the Savior's earthly life.[49] St. Thomas and others look upon this withholding of glory from Christ's body as a special dispensation, "in order that He might procure His bodily glory with greater honor, when He had merited it by His passion." [50]

[45] Ibid.; cfr. a. 3, 4.
[46] Sum. Theol. III, q. 19, a. 3.
[47] Sum. Aurea, III, tr. 1, c. 7.
[48] In Sent. III, d. 18, a. 4.
[49] Ibid. q. 1, n. 15.
[50] Sum. Theol. q. 19, a. 3 ad 3m.

The object of Christ's merit in our regard includes all the graces and favors that come to us in the supernatural order of our existence. The Scholastics usually gather them under these heads: Deliverance from sin, from the power of the devil, from the debt of punishment; reconciliation with God; opening of the gates of heaven.[51] However the various benefits here enumerated are not the immediate results of Christ's redemptive work; they can be realized in individual souls only by a faithful use of the spiritual graces merited by Christ. Hence the first effect of the redemption in our regard consists in the grace of God, freely offered to us as a means of working out our eternal salvation.

By deliverance from sin the Scholastics understand forgiveness of all sins, original and personal, obtained by an application of the merits of Christ through the ordinary channels of grace. "The passion of Christ," writes St. Thomas, "is the proper cause of the forgiveness of sins in three ways. First of all, by way of exciting our charity, because . . . it is by charity that we procure the pardon of our sins. . . . Secondly, Christ's passion causes forgiveness of sins by way of redemption. For since He is our head, . . . He delivered us as His members from our sins, as by the price of His passion. . . . Thirdly, by way of efficiency, in as much as Christ's flesh, wherein He endured the passion, is the instrument of the Godhead, so that His sufferings and actions operate with divine power for expelling sin."[52] Or as St. Bonaventure puts it: "*Justificatio nostra attribuitur passioni Christi per modum meriti intervenientis, exempli provocantis et exemplaris dirigentis.*"[53]

Deliverance from the power of the devil is effected in three ways: First, "in as much as the passion is the cause of the forgiveness of sins"; secondly, "in as much as it reconciled us with God"; thirdly, "in as much as in Christ's passion he exceeded the limit of power assigned him by God, by conspir-

[51] Halens. Sum. III, q. 17, 18; Bonavent. In Sent. d. 19, a. 1; Scotus, ibid. q. unic.; Albert. Magn. ibid. a. 1.

[52] Sum. Theol. III, q. 49, a. 1.

[53] In Sent. III, d. 19, a. 1, q. 1.

ing to bring about Christ's death, who, being sinless, did not deserve to die." [54]

We were delivered from the debt of punishment both directly and indirectly. Directly, "in as much as Christ's passion was sufficient and superabundant satisfaction for the sins of the whole human race; but when sufficient satisfaction has been paid, then the debt of penalty is abolished. Indirectly, in so far as Christ's passion is the cause of the forgiveness of sin, upon which the debt of punishment rests." [55]

There are also two ways in which we may be said to have been reconciled to God. First, because Christ's passion "takes away sin by which men became God's enemies." Secondly, because "it is a most acceptable sacrifice to God. Now it is the proper effect of sacrifice to appease God; just as man likewise overlooks an offence committed against him on account of some pleasing act of homage shown him." [56]

Lastly, by Christ's passion the gates of heaven were opened, in the sense that by the forgiveness of sin, obtained through the merits of the Savior, the obstacle to the intuitive vision of God was removed. For this obstacle was the twofold sin which prevented men from entering into the kingdom of heaven — original sin and personal sin. "Now by Christ's passion we have been delivered not only from the common sin of the whole human race, both as to its guilt and as to its debt of penalty, for which he paid the penalty on our behalf; but, furthermore, from the personal sins of individuals, who share in His passion by faith and charity and the sacraments of faith. Consequently, the gates of heaven's kingdom are thrown open to us through Christ's passion." [57]

From the foregoing exposition of the redemptive work of the Savior, which was accomplished by His human nature as united to the person of the Word, it necessarily follows that Christ is mediator between God and men. For, as St. Bona-

[54] Thomas, Sum. Theol. III, q. 49, a. 2.

[55] Ibid. a. 2; cfr. Halens. Sum. III, q. 17, m. 4; Bonavent. In Sent. III, d. 19, a. 1, q. 4; Scotus, ibid. d. 14, q. 1.

[56] Thomas, Sum. Theol. III, q. 49, a. 4.

[57] Ibid. a. 4; cfr. Bonavent. In Sent. III, d. 18, a. 2, q. 3.

venture says, a mediator is a link that unites two extremes and exercises the function of reconciliation.[58] Christ is both God and man, and thus unites in Himself the offended Godhead and human nature gone astray from its Maker. As man He physically performs the actions which are required to pay the debt; as God He communicates to these actions an infinite moral value, so that the payment may be adequate. Thus as God-Man He brings about the reconciliation of man with God. Hence the mediatorship of Christ is not based upon His human nature alone, nor upon His Godhead alone; but upon the two united in the one person of the Word.[59] However, to be mediator properly belongs to Him as man, and not as God; for as God He does not differ from the Father and the Holy Ghost either in nature or in power of dominion, while as man He differs from God in nature and from men in dignity of both grace and glory.[60]

Furthermore, to be a mediator between God and men is proper to the office of priesthood; therefore Christ is not only our mediator but also our eternal high priest.[61] And as He offered Himself as a sacrifice for our salvation, He is at the same time a victim immolated in our behalf — a victim for sin, a peace-offering, a perfect holocaust.[62] His priesthood, moreover, He communicates to others in such wise that He "is the fountain-head of the entire priesthood: for the priest of the Old Law was a figure of Him; while the priest of the New Law works in His person." [63]

4. *The Death of Christ.*— For the fitness of the death of Christ St. Thomas gives these five reasons: "First of all that He might satisfy for the whole human race, which was sentenced to die on account of sin. . . . Secondly, that He might show the reality of the flesh assumed. . . . Thirdly, that by dying He might deliver us from the fear of death. . . . Fourthly, that by dying in the body to the likeness of sin — that is, to its penalty — He might set us the example of dy-

[58] Ibid. d. 19, a. 2, q. 2.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid. cfr. Thomas, Sum. Theol. III, q. 26, a. 2.
[61] Ibid. q. 22, a. 1.
[62] Ibid. a. 2.
[63] Ibid. q. 22, a. 1.

ing to sin spiritually. . . . Fifthly, that by rising from the dead, and manifesting His power whereby He overthrew death, He might instil into us the hope of also rising again." [64]

In His death, Christ's soul and body were separated from one another, but both remained united to the divinity.[65] Hence, on the one hand, Christ truly died, and in consequence He was no longer man in the strict sense of the term; and, on the other hand, the hypostatic union continued uninterrupted. With regard to the first point, however, Peter Lombard and a few others held that Christ's soul, whilst separated from the body, was truly a person.[66] The second point, which was admitted by all, is thus explained by St. Bonaventure: "Speaking of the union in its active and passive sense, it is to be held that the body and soul were united to the Word by one union; but speaking of the same union as a relation, it must be said that before death there was one union actually and several potentially, while after death there were actually several unions." [67]

After death Christ's soul, united to His divinity, descended into hell, by which place the Scholastics understand the *Limbus Patrum,* where the souls of the just were detained till the opening of heaven's gates.[68] This descent was real, and nearly all are agreed that Christ admitted the holy souls immediately to the beatific vision. Durandus, however, maintained that Christ's descent into hell was only virtual, it being nothing more than an exercise of His power in that place of waiting.[69] The same view had been held by Abelard, whose teaching on that point was condemned by the Council of Sens. The doctrine of the real descent was confirmed by the Fourth Lateran, when it declared against the Albigenses: *Descendit in anima et resurrexit in carne.*[70] Some held, furthermore, that Christ also appeared to the poor souls in purgatory, and freed them

[64] Ibid. q. 50, a. 1.
[65] Halens. Sum. III, q. 19; Thomas, In Sent. d. 21, q. 1; Bonavent. ibid. a. 1, 2; Scotus, ibid. q. unica.
[66] Sent. III, c. 2.
[67] In Sent. III, d. 21, a. 1, q. 3.
[68] Bonavent. In Sent. III, d. 22, a. unic. q. 4; Thomas, ibid. q. 2; Albert. Magn. ibid. a. 4.
[69] Ibid. q. 4.
[70] Mansi, 22, 982; DB. 429.

from their sufferings; but this view was commonly regarded as improbable.[71]

These are the chief points in the soteriological teaching of the Scholastics. Most of them are directly or indirectly a matter of faith, and taught as such by the Church. Thus the Fourth Lateran restated the article of the Creed, that Christ "suffered and died on the wood of the cross for the salvation of the human race, and descended into hell."[72] Pope Clement VI, in 1343, declared that, because of the hypostatic union, the merits of Christ are an "infinite treasure."[73] The Council of Trent defined that Christ is the meritorious cause of our justification; and declared that He merited justification for us by His most holy passion on the wood of the cross, that we are justified by the merits of the one Mediator, and that all those are anathema who say that men are justified without the justice of Christ, by which He merited our justification.[74] Moreover all these points, as was indicated at the beginning of the present chapter, were already clearly contained in the teaching of the Fathers; and in so far there was little or no development in the doctrine of the redemption as presented by the Scholastics.

[71] Cfr. Thomas, Sum. Theol. III, q. 52, a. 8.
[72] Loc. cit.
[73] DB. 550.
[74] Decretum de Justificatione, DB. 799 sqq.

CHAPTER XII

THE CHURCH OF CHRIST: THE PAPACY

St. Augustine, in his contentions with the Donatists, had frequent occasion to set forth and also to develop the traditional teaching on the Church — on her constitution, her powers, and distinguishing marks. Hence, at the time of his death, Latin ecclesiology presented a fairly complete system of theological thought, which needed only a few finishing touches to bring it to its final stage of development.[1] This system was taken over by the Scholastics of the Middle Ages, and then was handed down by them, practically in the same condition in which they had received it, to their successors who came after the Council of Trent. A few points, indeed, were somewhat further developed, but that was owing to incidental causes rather than to the systematic labor of theologians. Most of the Scholastics touched the subject only in connection with other matters, and even then merely in a passing way. However, the following summary of what may be gathered from their writings will be of some help to the student in determining the general trend of dogmatic development along these lines.

A — The Church of Christ

Some interesting remarks on the Church and her relation to the State are made by Hugh of St. Victor, who touches the subject in his treatise *De Sacramentis*. According to him, the Church is the assemblage of all the faithful, forming together one body, of which Christ is the head and the Holy Spirit the

[1] Cfr. vol. I, p. 323 sqq.

vivifying principle.[2] The unity of this body is conserved by faith under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.[3]

The Church and the State are the two powers instituted by God for the right government of the people. Each of them is entitled to make its own laws, and to enforce their observance by means proportionate to the end to be attained. Both are monarchical in constitution, and therefore the supreme power resides in one individual, who communicates it in varying degrees to many others for the good of all. Compared to the State, the Church is the higher power; because she must lead men to their eternal salvation, while the State provides for their temporal welfare. The State has the king as its head; but the head of the Church is the Pope.[4]

As both powers are immediately from God, and as the spiritual power is the higher of the two, the Pope can be judged only by God Himself. On the other hand, the temporal power, in so far as it is vested in a particular person, may be constituted and judged by the spiritual. However, the spiritual power cannot proceed arbitrarily in this matter, but must be guided by the true interest of the people.[5]

As there are thus two powers constituted by God, so are there also two classes of people, each with its own well defined rights and duties. The first of these two classes comprises all the clerics, who are consecrated or deputed to the service of God; the second is made up of laics, to whatever state in life they may belong. The two together form the walls of the Church; both were prefigured in the Old Testament, the clerics by the tribe of Levi, and the laics by the other eleven tribes.[6]

Peter Lombard has a few scattered remarks on the Church in his commentaries on the Epistles of St. Paul, but practically

[2] He says: "Caput enim est Christus; membrum Christianus. Caput unum, membra multa: et constat unum corpus ex capite et membris, et in uno corpore Spiritus unus" (Op. cit. c. 1).

[3] His words are: "Ecclesia sancta corpus est Christi uno spiritu vivificata, et unita fide una et sanctificata. . . . Quid est ergo Ecclesia nisi multitudo fidelium, universitas Christianorum?" (Ibid. c. 2).

[4] Ibid. c. 4.

[5] Ibid. c. 4.

[6] Ibid. c. 3.

omits the subject in his four books of the Sentences. As this work later on became the textbook of the schools, it was most likely owing to his example that subsequent theologians barely touched the various doctrines concerning the Church.

Alexander of Hales devotes a few articles of his *Summa* to a consideration of the Church, but has nothing of value. According to him, the Church of Christ began with Abel, whose faith in the future Redeemer was manifested through his sacrifice. He also prefigured the sanctity of the Church in his exemplary life, and was the first to suffer martyrdom for the sake and the name of Christ. Of this Church, which formed then as now Christ's mystical body, Christ was even then the chief and the head. The fact that the Church is the mystical body of Christ, and also His spouse, necessarily implies that she is indefectible. Her power may wax or wane according to the varying conditions and circumstances of time and place, but she shall never be vanquished by evil or cease to exist till the end of time. Furthermore, this indefectibility is assured to her by Christ's own promise, as recorded in the Gospel: "Lo, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world." [7]

A somewhat lengthier exposition is found in the Summa written by Moneta of Cremona (+ 1250), against the Cathari and the Waldensian heretics. He proves the Apostolic origin of the Church of Rome, her freedom from error, the uninterrupted succession of her bishops, her legislative power, her right to own temporal possessions for the attainment of her God-appointed end, and other points of a kindred nature.[8] However, he does not contribute anything of special value to the further development of ecclesiological teaching.

St. Thomas has some very valuable points on the Church, but he too treats the matter only in passing. He specially emphasizes the importance of unity, both among the members themselves and between the members and the head. That unity is essential in as much as the Church is an individual organism, an organized community, the kingdom of God,

[7] Sum. IV, q. 2, m. 4.

[8] Op. cit. L. V.

whose members must hold fast to the truth as an object of faith, and must ever live together in the spirit of love and peace.[9] The visible Church on earth is a copy of the invisible Church in heaven, and has for its chief and head the visible representative of the invisible Christ, even as the blessed have for their head the glorified God-Man Himself.[10]

Protestants not rarely blame the Scholastics for having unduly emphasized the external and visible element of the Church, almost to the entire neglect of the interior spirit which escapes the eyes of man. But this accusation is based upon an entire misunderstanding of their viewpoint. The very fact that they regarded the Church as a living organism, vivified by the Holy Spirit, sufficiently shows that they looked upon the interior and spiritual element as the fountainhead of all true ecclesiastical life. Nor did they fail to point this out when occasion offered. Thus, for instance, St. Thomas states quite definitely: "The beauty and perfection of the Church consists chiefly in what is interior, and to the same also belong all her outward actions, in as much as they proceed from the interior spirit, and are directed towards the preservation of the beauty that is from within."[10a] What the soul is to the body, that the spiritual gifts and endowments, together with the Holy Spirit Himself, are to the Church.

The truth is that the Scholastics, in this matter as in all others, followed the golden mean in the expression of their views. They maintained, indeed, that the Church was intended by her divine Founder to be a visible institution — visible in her regimen, in her sacraments, in her cult; but they also taught that to this visible institution must ever correspond a spiritual reality perfectly known to God alone. In this sense they admitted even an invisible Church, made up of all those who are actually united to God in faith and love and in the fervent practice of perfect virtue. Yet, on the other hand, in maintaining this, they were far removed from the later Protestant idea of the invisibility of the Church of Christ; and also from the unreasonable contention of Wiclif and Hus that the Church

[9] Cont. Gent. IV, 76.
[10] Ibid.
[10a] In Sent. IV, d. 15, q. 3, a. 1.

of Christ consists only of the predestined. For, as St. Thomas points out, the invisible Church is nothing else than a perfect realization of the visible Church in its individual members, and is essentially dependent on it for all its perfection.[11]

In their relation to the faithful, the Apostles and their successors must be regarded as the vicars of Christ. They must foster the life of the Church in her members by preaching the faith and by administering the sacraments. St. Thomas speaks of them as follows: "It is to be held that the Apostles and their successors are the vicars of God, in so far as the government of the Church, the preaching of the faith, and the administration of the sacraments come in question. Hence, as it is not lawful for them to found another church, neither is it lawful for them to preach another faith, or to institute other sacraments; but through the sacraments that flowed from the side of Christ, as He was hanging on the cross, is the Church said to have been established and built up." [12]

In virtue of her divine institution, the Church has full administrative powers over all the treasures of grace which Christ intended to communicate through external rites. She has not, it is true, the power of absolute authority in this matter — *potestas auctoritatis,* for that belongs to God alone; nor does she have the power of excellence —*potestas excellentiae,* since that is proper to Christ the author of our redemption; but she has a ministerial power — *potestas ministerii,* communicated by the Founder of the Church to the Apostles and their successors, and exercised under the direction of the Pope as the supreme pastor of all the faithful. This comprises the power of orders and the power of jurisdiction. The former has for its chief object the true or Eucharistic body of Christ, and as such is shared in equal degree by priests, bishops, and the Pope. The latter is exercised over the mystical body of Christ, or the faithful as constituting the Church, and is possessed in all its fullness only by the Pope, in a limited degree by bishops, and with still greater limitations by priests. It finds application both in the internal and external forum,

[11] Ibid. d. 19, q. 1.

[12] Sum. Theol. III, q. 64, a. 2.

according as it is used in the administration of the sacraments or in the enactment of laws and whatever is connected therewith by way of enforcement or dispensation.[13]

The power of jurisdiction, as already stated, resides primarily in the Sovereign Pontiff, and it is conferred on him not by sacramental consecration, but in virtue of his election to the primatial dignity. Upon other prelates it is conferred by way of declaration on the part of their superiors.[14] Jurisdiction *in foro interno,* for the absolution of penitents, can be given to all priests; but jurisdiction *in foro externo,* that is, for the purpose of governing, making laws, judging, and punishing, belongs to the bishops under the authority of the Pope, and to such as have been legitimately delegated by him.[15]

This brief outline contains the gist of the ecclesiological teaching of St. Thomas, and comprises practically all that is found in the writings of his predecessors and contemporaries. The matter was somewhat further developed in the *Summa de Ecclesia* of Torquemada, who, as cardinal of the Roman Church, took part in the Council of Constance, and also in that of Basle and Florence. But the work was not published until the middle of the sixteenth century.

B — The Papacy

At the beginning of the Middle Ages, that is, from the ninth century forward, the Papacy was for some time in a deplorable condition. Unworthy Popes, like Benedict IX, brought disgrace upon the See of Peter and were a cause of scandal to the Christian world. However, towards the middle of the eleventh century a reform movement began, which resulted in the election of a succession of Sovereign Pontiffs who proved themselves in every way worthy of their high station. The first of these was the saintly Leo IX, who defended the prerogatives of the Roman See against Michael Cerularius, the chief author of the Greek schism. He displayed great zeal in laboring for the reformation of morals and the cor-

[13] In Sent. IV, d. 7, q. 3, a. 1; d. 13, q. 1, a. 1.

[14] Ibid. d. 24, q. 3, a. 2.

[15] Ibid. d. 19, q. 1, a. 3.

rection of abuses both among the clergy and laity. His immediate successors, Victor II and Nicholas II, continued the work which he had so well begun. But it was especially Gregory VII (1073–1085) who restored to the Papacy all its ancient splendor, although he died in exile for justice' sake. The full result of his labors became apparent only under Innocent III (1198–1216), who was "the living embodiment of Papal power at its apogee." With occasional slight yieldings, this position was maintained till the death of Boniface VIII (1303), when a new decline set in that was considerably accelerated by the secularizing influence of the Renaissance.

From this brief sketch it will be seen that the golden age of Scholasticism coincided with the period when Papal power was at its highest. And to this coincidence the theological writings of the time bear no uncertain testimony. The supreme power of the Pope, not only in matters ecclesiastical, but to a considerable extent also in secular affairs of world-wide interest, stands out most prominently. It is not referred to as something that needs to be proved, but as a universally acknowledged fact, which may be used as a source of arguments for the confirmation of other doctrines. Or if occasionally a proof is introduced, it is only by way of assigning the reason for a fact that is accepted by all. In the following summary we shall first present an outline of what was held by the Scholastics in regard to the spiritual supremacy of the Pope, and then add a few remarks in reference to the relation of Church and State as commonly understood and accepted in those times.

1. *Spiritual Supremacy of the Pope.*— The position of the Church during Patristic times, in regard to the supremacy of the Pope, appears most clearly from the formula subscribed to by the Eighth General Council, held in 869. It reads as follows: "It is impossible to set aside the ordination of our Lord Jesus Christ, who said: 'Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church.' The truth of these words has been abundantly proved by subsequent events, because by the Apostolic See the Catholic religion has always been preserved

immaculate, and sound doctrine has ever been taught. Therefore, not wishing in any way to be separated from its faith and teaching, and following in all things the example of the Fathers, and particularly the ordinations of the Pontiffs of the Apostolic See, we anathematize all heresies." [16]

This testimony of the Eastern Church, all the more valuable because it was given at a time when the schism was already in preparation, also voiced the firm belief of the West. Only a few years before the Eighth General Council was held, Rabanus Maurus bore witness to that belief in these terms: "We see that the authority of the Roman Pontiff extends itself to all the churches of Christ, so that all bishops acknowledge him as their head, and that all ecclesiastical transactions are subject to his judgment; hence according to his decision, what has been established remains in force, what has been done amiss is corrected, what needs to be enacted is approved. . . . The decrees of the Roman Pontiffs are sent to all the churches, both in the East and the West, and they are received and observed by the faithful as having the force of ecclesiastical laws." [17]

The Popes themselves also took the same view of their position in the Church of Christ. Thus Leo IX stated the supremacy of the Roman See in no uncertain terms, when, on the occasion of the Greek schism, he wrote to Michael Cerularius: "Is it not true that by the See of the Prince of the Apostles, namely by the Roman Church, both through the same Peter and through his successors, the lying inventions of all heretics have been laid bare and condemned?" And farther on: "Just as a hinge, remaining itself immovable, opens and shuts the door, so Peter and his successors exercise judiciary authority over the whole Church, and their firm position no one must attempt to shake; because the Supreme See is judged by no one — *quia Summa Sedes a nemine judicatur.*" [18]

This is the teaching faithfully echoed by the Scholastics in their more or less casual remarks on the subject, as suggested

[16] Mansi, 8, 351.

[17] Cont. Graec. II, 4; cfr. ML. 121, 343.

[18] Ep. 55, ad Michaelem Cerularium et Leonem Acridanum, c. 7 et 32; cfr. Mansi, 19, 638 B sqq.

by other matters that claimed their attention at the moment. Thus Alexander, while speaking of the priest's power to absolve from sin, points out how the use of this and other powers is subject to the authority of the Pope. "It is to be held," he says, "that this subordination was intended for the good of the Church. For God willed that certain persons in authority should have power over many others; and over these, others in smaller number should have authority; and so on until we arrive at one, namely the Pope, who is subject immediately to the Lord, according to the saying of Ecclesiastes: 'He that is high hath another higher.' . . . And besides, there is a king who commandeth the whole earth, namely the Pope, who calls himself the servant of the servants of God; so that, just as the Church triumphant is one, so also the Church militant, and the body of the Church triumphant together with that of the Church militant is united in one under the Supreme Head." [19]

Albertus Magnus regards the supremacy of the Pope in all things ecclesiastical as the very foundation of that unity which is an essential mark of the Church. It was for the preservation of this unity that Christ committed the keys to one individual, "so that in him might be found the plenitude of power, and that from him all others should derive their authority in keeping with the charge committed to their care." [20]

Hence the Pope is bishop of bishops as well as of the faithful in general, and he exercises immediate jurisdiction over all without exception. Albertus expresses his views in these terms: "A superior has either limited powers or he has the plenitude of power; this latter is the prerogative of the Pope, who is the ordinary of every one of the faithful. . . . Hence as the ordinary of all, he has power over his subjects independently of their consent; because he holds the place of God on earth." [21]

Furthermore, as head of the Church, the Pope is infallible in deciding questions of faith. For speaking of the common

[19] Sum. IV, q. 79, m. 6, a. 3.
[20] De Sacrific. Missae, tr. 8, c. 6, n. 9.
[21] Sum. Theol. II, tr. 24, q. 141, m. 3.

usage of reserving to the Pope the granting of plenary indulgences, the author says: "It is in no way to be admitted that the head of the Church could lead anyone into error, when there is question of matters that the whole Church receives and approves. Yet it is known to all that he preaches, and causes to be preached by others, that indulgences are valid before God." [22] Here it must be noted that the phrase, "what the whole Church receives and approves — *quae tota Ecclesia recipit et approbat,*" is not intended to make the Pope's infallibility dependent on the approbation of his teaching by the universal Church; but, as is clear from the author's own explanation, it is meant simply to indicate a prerequisite condition of infallibility, namely, that the Pope must speak as the supreme teacher of the whole Church. The same condition was also put down by the Vatican Council.[23]

St. Thomas reasons about the supreme power of the Pope in this way: "As the Church is a living organism, essentially one and visible, she must have one head living visibly among men; her oneness, moreover, demands that this head have supreme authority in matters of faith, so that he may decide questions and solve difficulties connected therewith. Then, as the Church is expected to be governed in a perfect manner, hers must be a monarchical constitution; finally, as she is an image of the Church triumphant in heaven, of which Christ is the head, the one who holds the supreme power must be the representative of Christ here on earth." [24]

What appears thus so reasonable from the very nature of the Church, is, furthermore, also clearly taught in Holy Scripture. Christ, argues the author, is indeed the invisible head of the Church, as He is also the author of grace; yet, as in the administration of the sacraments He wished to be represented by a visible minister, so too in the government of the Church did He wish to be represented by a visible head. Hence He appointed Peter to the office of chief pastor, and in Peter all his successors. It was to signify the prerogative of Peter that He gave the keys to him, and that He confirmed him in the

[22] In Sent. IV, d. 20, a. 17.
[23] DB. 1839.
[24] Cont. Gent. IV, 76; In Sent. IV, d. 24, q. 3.

faith. Consequently, as the Sovereign Pontiff is the successor of Peter, he has by divine right full jurisdiction over the whole Church, and holds the place of Christ in regard to pastors and flock alike.[25]

This supreme jurisdiction of the Pope extends itself to everything that concerns the welfare of the Church — the administration of the sacraments, legislative enactments, matters of discipline and dispensations. In consequence, he has power over all that is merely accidental in the administration of the sacraments; he can depute simple priests to give confirmation and confer minor orders; he can restrict their power of absolving from sin, reserve certain cases to himself, and grant indulgences.[26] He can also for a reasonable cause abrogate Apostolic enactments — *agere contra Apostolum,*[27] and has power to dispense from vows and oaths.[28]

In regard to the faithful, this supreme jurisdiction is immediate, so that he can act as their bishop and their parish priest by a direct exercise of his power. That this is really the case is quite obvious; for bishops and priests derive their jurisdiction from him; hence if in particular cases he wishes to exercise that jurisdiction personally, there is nothing to prevent him from so doing.[29]

As sovereign lawgiver, the Pope does not fall under the penal laws which he enacts; consequently these laws are for him merely directive norms.[30] Nevertheless, like any one else, he is subject to fraternal correction; and when he publicly endangers the faith, this correction too may be administered in public.[31]

Speaking of the value of indulgences before God, St. Thomas touches incidentally the question of the Church's infallibility in matters of faith, and points out that it is ultimately a prerogative of the Sovereign Pontiff as supreme teacher of the whole Church. He says: "The universal Church cannot

[25] Ibid. q. 3, a. 2 ad 1m.
[26] Ibid. d. 7, q. 3, a. 3; d. 20, q. 1, a. 4; Sum. Theol. III, q. 72, a. 12.
[27] In Sent. IV, d. 20, q. 1, a. 4.
[28] Sum. Theol. II. II, q. 88, a. 12; q. 89, a. 9.
[29] In Sent. IV, d. 24, q. 3, a. 2; d. 17, a. 3 ad 3m quint. quaest.
[30] Ibid. d. 19, q. 2, a. 2.
[31] Sum. Theol. II. II, q. 33, a. 4 ad 2m.

fall into error: because He who in all things was heard for His reverence said to Peter, upon whose confession the Church was founded: 'I have asked for thee, that thy faith may not fail.' But the universal Church approves indulgences: therefore indulgences are of value before God." [32]

It is because of this infallibility that opposition to the teaching of the Church causes a person to be regarded as a heretic. And this is also borne witness to by the practice of all past ages. For we find that "after anything pertaining to the faith had been decided by the authority of the universal Church, and some one opposed that decision, he incurred forthwith the stigma of heresy. Now this authority resides chiefly in the Sovereign Pontiff." [33] Again: "It belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff to determine those things that are of faith, so that they may be firmly believed by all." [34]

St. Thomas also considers the Pope's relation to general councils. He sets forth his view in the following terms: "Just as a subsequent council has the power of interpreting a symbol drawn up by a preceding council, and of adding thereto by way of explanation, as appears from what has been said; so in like manner can the Roman Pontiff do the same by his own authority. Furthermore, it is only by his authority that a council can be convened, and it belongs to him to confirm the decisions of the council. Finally, it is lawful to appeal from the council to him. All this is evident from what was done at the Council of Chalcedon. Nor is it even necessary to convene a general council for matters of this kind, as in times of war it would be impossible to do so." [35] Hence, according to the teaching of St. Thomas, not only is the Pope's authority above that of a general council, but it is also from him as head of the universal Church that general councils derive their infallibility in deciding questions of faith.

The infallible teaching authority of the universal Church, and consequently of the Pope, has for its proper object all revealed truths that must be believed by the followers of Christ.

[32] In Sent. IV, d. 20, q. 1, a. 3.
[33] Sum. Theol. II. II, q. 11, a. 2 ad 3m.
[34] Ibid. q. 1, a. 10.
[35] QQ. DD. De Potentia Dei, q. 10, a. 4.

" This," St. Thomas argues, " follows from the ways of Divine Providence, which directs the Church by the Holy Spirit, so that she may not fall into error; and the same was also promised by Christ, when he said that the Holy Spirit would come and teach all truth in matters necessary for salvation. Hence it is plainly impossible that the judgment of the universal Church should err in those things that pertain to the faith; and as it belongs to the Pope to decide questions of faith, his decisions have greater weight than the views of all men whatever, no matter how well versed in Holy Scripture they may be." [36]

That the Pope enjoys the same infallibility in regard to questions and facts connected with faith, is, according to St. Thomas, a matter of pious belief. To this category belongs the canonization of saints. Having pointed out that the Pope may err in other cases where his decision depends on the truth of human testimony, he proceeds: " The canonization of saints holds a middle place in regard to inerrancy. However, as the honor which we pay the saints is in a way a profession of faith, in as much as we believe that they have attained to glory, it is to be piously believed that in this matter also the judgment of the Church is not subject to error." [37]

Hence, as appears from the foregoing citations, the teaching of St. Thomas on the supremacy of the Pope may be summed up in these points: 1. The Pope is the primate of all bishops. 2. He has preëminence over the whole Church. 3. In the Church he has plenitude of power. 4. He has the same power that Christ gave to Peter. 5. The final decision in matters of faith rests with him. 6. Submission to the Pope in things spiritual is required of all.— As a mere glance suffices to show, this teaching is in all essentials identical with the doctrine defined by the Vatican Council just six hundred years later.

St. Bonaventure advances substantially the same views. Like St. Thomas, he points out that the supremacy of the Pope is necessary for the well-being of the Church, and especially for

[36] Quodl. 9, c. 16. [37] Ibid.

the maintaining of unity.[38] Hence it was that Christ appointed Peter as the prince of the Apostles and chief of the whole world, and provided also that this plenitude of power should be possessed by Peter's successors, the canonically elected bishops of Rome.[39]

The power thus conferred on the head of the Church is threefold: "First, the Sovereign Pontiff alone has the whole plenitude of authority which Christ gave to His Church; secondly, he can exercise this authority in any and all particular churches in the same way as he does at Rome; thirdly, from him all authority and jurisdiction possessed by other dignitaries throughout the whole Church are derived, just as in heaven all glory of the saints flows from the one fountain of infinite goodness, which is Christ Jesus." [40] It is true, bishops have by divine right full power in their own dioceses, in as much as Christ instituted the episcopal office and dignity; but this power they enjoy only so long as they are in communion with the Pope, and at the same time the Pope has immediate jurisdiction over the faithful in every diocese.[41]

St. Bonaventure explains the infallible teaching authority of the Church in the same way as does St. Thomas, as will appear with sufficient clearness from one or two citations. Thus, speaking of religious poverty, he says: "If at the time of the legal priesthood it was morally wrong to contravene the judgment of the high priest, and was punished with death; how much more is not this the case under the dispensation of revealed truth and grace, when it is known that the plenitude of power has been entrusted to the vicar of Christ. Hence this evil is in no way to be tolerated, that in matters of faith and morals any one should teach what is contrary to his decisions; approving what he has reprobated, building up again what he has torn down, defending what he has condemned." [42]

He also points out that the infallibility of the Pope extends to the approbation of religious orders and their rules. "It is

[38] In Expos. Regul. c. 9.
[39] In Sent. IV, d. 25, a. 1, q. 1.
[40] Opusc.: Quare Fratres Minores praedicent.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Apol. Paupert. c. 1.

manifest," he argues, "that the sixth rule of St. Francis was approved and confirmed by Pope Honorius. But if he fell into error in giving this approbation, he has led the whole Church into error; for it is well known that the universal Church, throughout the world, receives such religious orders as are approved by the Pope; and therefore the whole Church was deceived and led into error by her divinely constituted head."[43] Of course, the conclusion is inadmissible; therefore also the premise from which it follows, namely, that the Pope fell into error when he approved the aforesaid rule.

Duns Scotus is equally emphatic in his statements regarding the universal jurisdiction and infallible teaching authority of the Pope. To the Sovereign Pontiff alone, he says, does it belong to fulminate a sentence of major excommunication, which entirely cuts off the delinquent from the Church.[44] The infallible teaching authority of the Pope is identified with that of the universal Church, and dogmatic decrees of the Sovereign Pontiffs have the same force as those of general councils. All decisions regarding doubtful points in Holy Scripture and tradition are reserved to the Pope, in the sense that his decision alone is binding.— These various points Scotus brings out repeatedly in his teaching on the sacraments.

What has been said in the foregoing paragraphs represents in substance the common teaching of the Scholastics on the rights and prerogatives of the Holy See in the sphere of religion. On only one point was there some difference of opinion, namely, whether the jurisdiction of bishops is derived immediately from Christ or mediately, that is, through the Pope. This latter view was defended by Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, and nearly all representative Scholastics; while the former was held by Henry of Ghent and a few others.[45] But even with regard to this point, all admit that no bishop can exercise his jurisdiction without the consent of the Pope. Hence the view of some later Nominalists, which prevailed at the Council of Constance (1431–1434), that the jurisdiction of a general council is above that of the Pope,

[43] De Paupert. Christi, a. 2.
[44] Report. IV, d. 19, q. 1.
[45] Quodl. 9, q. 22.

was directly opposed to the teaching of mediæval theologians.

The chief points set forth in this section, namely, the primacy of the Roman See, the universal jurisdiction of the Pope, his right to decide questions of faith and morals, and his position of supreme judge to whom appeal may be made by any one of the faithful throughout the world, were all embodied in the profession of faith exacted from Michael Palaeologus by the Second Council of Lyons, held in 1274.[46] It is true, the Council did not directly define the Pope's infallibility in matters of faith and morals; but it indicated its mind quite clearly on the subject, when it stated: "As he, before all others, is bound to defend the faith, so in like manner does it belong to him, when questions of faith arise, to decide them according to his own judgment." [47]

2. *Relation of Church and State.*— That during the Middle Ages the State was regarded as subject to the Church in all spiritual matters need not be pointed out; for that follows necessarily from the universally accepted idea of the supremacy of the Pope, as set forth in the preceding section. As head of the Church, the Pope was believed to have full jurisdiction in all things spiritual, not only over individuals, but also over every form and kind of society made up of Christians, and therefore over the Christian commonwealth. Hence the point now at issue regards solely the relation of Church and State in temporal matters.

Protestants quite commonly accuse the Popes of the Middle Ages of having dominated, or tried to dominate, over temporal sovereigns to such an extent that no king or emperor enjoyed untrammeled freedom in carrying on the government committed to his charge. To all intents and purposes, as they see it, the Popes aimed at nothing less than to establish themselves as feudal overlords of the whole Christian world. They not only exacted the payment of tribute from many countries which they regarded as papal fiefs, but without their good will no king or emperor ever felt quite safe on his throne. By the terrible weapon of excommunication any sovereign could be

[46] Mansi, 24, 70 A sqq. [47] Ibid.; cfr. DB. 466.

brought to his knees, as was Henry IV of Germany when forced to implore the mercy of Gregory VII at Canossa.[48] In confirmation of these and similar statements, Protestant writers not only adduce certain facts of history, such as the case of Henry IV just referred to, but also cite the teaching of Popes and theologians to the same effect. As regards the teaching of the Popes, it is especially the *Dictatus Papae,* sometimes ascribed to Gregory VII, and the Bull, *Unam sanctam,* of Boniface VIII, that are made to do service.

That these charges are grossly exaggerated need hardly be pointed out; still there is sufficient truth in them to make them plausible. The fact of the matter is this: The Christians of the Middle Ages knew from bitter experience that in certain contingencies they had no protection against the tyranny and arbitrary violence of wicked rulers, except such as might be afforded them by the Sovereign Pontiff. Hence in most cases they were more than willing to acknowledge him as their overlord, in so far as he used his spiritual power to check the excesses of their kings or emperors. Again, rulers of smaller countries, who had always more or less reason to dread attacks from their more powerful neighbors, not rarely considered it a privilege to enfeoff their domains to the Holy See, so that for the payment of the nominal tribute they might enjoy its powerful protection. Consequently, if in this sense the Popes were to some extent feudal lords, the position was not of their own seeking; it was thrust upon them by the condition of the times or the devotion of the people.

Nor did they claim the power and privilege of appointing or dethroning temporal rulers; but they did claim the right to cut them off from ecclesiastical communion, if against the laws of the land they misused their authority to the destruction of the Christian commonwealth and obstinately refused to be corrected by gentler means. But this only shows that they considered the high and the low to be on an equal footing in the Church of God. If either of them chose to lead a life unworthy of the Christian name, he must be satisfied to be ex-

[48] Cfr. Hinschius-Sehling, Real-encyklpaedie fuer Protestantische Theologie und Kirche, 14, 663.

cluded from the benefits of the Christian Church. It is true, such an excommunication, if persistently disregarded, might in the case of princes lead to the loss of their throne, because it was usually understood to release subjects from their oath of allegiance; but on the part of the Popes this was no more than an acknowledgment of the people's natural right to defend themselves against an unjust aggressor. No doubt, this power of excommunication might be abused, and perhaps sometimes was abused; but so is every other power under the sun.

Beyond what is conceded in the two preceding paragraphs, neither Popes nor theologians made any claims in regard to the subjection of the temporal power to the spiritual. Even if the *Dictatus Papae* were certainly the "sayings" of Gregory VII, which they most probably are not; or if they faithfully reflected the attitude of the mediæval mind on this matter, which in regard to most of the "sayings" may be conceded; even then, nothing could be proved from them beyond what has been admitted. In fact, only two of them have any bearing on this matter at all. They read as follows: 1. *Quod illi liceat imperatores deponere* — That it is lawful for him (the Pope) to depose emperors. 2. *Quod a fidelitate iniquorum subjectos potest absolvere* — That he (the Pope) can absolve the subjects of wicked (princes) from their oath of allegiance.[49] If these "sayings" be taken in the sense explained above, both may be admitted to be genuine expressions of the mediæval mind on the matter in question; on the other hand, if they be interpreted to imply the claim of arbitrary power by the Pope, there is not a shred of evidence to support the interpretation.

The same is true of the Bull, *Unam sanctam,* of Boniface VIII. In it occurs the sentence: *Porro subesse Romano Pontifici omni humanae creaturae declaramus, dicimus, definimus et pronuntiamus omnino esse de necessitate salutis* — Furthermore, We declare, say, define and pronounce that it is necessary, by way of salvation, for every human being to be

[49] Ep. 55; Mansi, 20, 168.

under (the power of) the Roman Pontiff.— As it stands, this looks rather sweeping, but it need not mean that the Pope claimed direct power over the temporal affairs of princes. In fact, when Louis the Fair of France interpreted it in this sense, Boniface declared without hesitation: "It is now forty years since We began to be versed in the law, and We know that there are two powers established by God: who, then, ought or can believe that such fatuity, such foolishness, ever entered Our head?" [50]

The teaching of theologians on this subject is neatly summarized by Hugh of St. Victor, who was practically a contemporary of Gregory VII. He says: "The Church and the State are the two powers instituted by God for the right government of the people. Each of them is entitled to make its own laws, and to enforce their observance by means in keeping with the end to be attained. . . . Compared to the State, the Church is the higher power; because she must lead men to their eternal salvation, while the State provides for their temporal welfare. . . . As both powers are immediately from God, and as the spiritual power is the higher of the two, the Pope can be judged only by God Himself. On the other hand, the temporal power, in so far as it is vested in a particular person, may be constituted and judged by the spiritual. However, the spiritual power cannot proceed arbitrarily in this matter, but must be guided by the true interest of the people." [51]

In regard to the deposition of princes by the Pope, St. Thomas reasons as follows: "When a Christian prince falls away from the faith, he may be punished by a judicial sentence; and the proper punishment in such a case would be to deprive him of the power to rule over Christian subjects; for if he continues to rule over them, there is imminent danger of his turning them also away from the faith. Hence, as soon as the sentence of excommunication has been pronounced against an apostate prince, his subjects are by that very fact freed from his dominion and released from their oath of allegiance." [52]

[50] Cfr. DB. 468, note.
[51] De Sacr. c. 4.
[52] Sum. Theol. II. II, q. 12, a. 2.

As is obvious, this power of excommunication can not be used against sovereigns who have never been baptized. And hence St. Thomas remarks: "Infidelity in itself is not incompatible with the right to rule; because that right was introduced by the law of nations, which is a human law — *jus humanum*." [53] No, it is not infidelity as such that justifies the Pope to proceed against any sovereign; but the infidelity of one who had a right to the crown only because he was supposed to be a Christian.

[53] Ibid. q. 12, a. 2.

CHAPTER XIII

ACTUAL AND SANCTIFYING GRACE: JUSTIFICATION AND MERIT

Patristic teaching on the subject of divine grace was mostly concerned with its supernatural character and its absolute necessity for the attainment of eternal life. What was its precise nature, what its various divisions, what its mode of operation, were questions that received only a passing attention as occasion demanded.[1] It is chiefly on these points that Scholastic speculation supplements the teaching of the Fathers as regards the question of grace. The following is a brief summary of what was thus accomplished by the most representative of the Schoolmen.

A — Actual and Sanctifying Grace

A fair outline of Scholastic teaching on the subject of grace is presented by Peter Lombard, whose brief statements were afterwards developed by his commentators. On some points, however, as will be noted in the proper place, his views were set aside as untenable.

Referring to the teaching of St. Augustine, whom he follows rather closely, he first points out the need we all have of a special divine help in order to work out our salvation. "The will of man," he says, "when left to its natural resources, has not the power either to will efficaciously what is supernaturally good, or to accomplish it. For this it needs the grace of God, by which it is liberated and assisted. It is liberated in this sense, that stirred up by grace it really wills; and it is assisted in the sense that it successfully accomplishes the work to be done." [2]

[1] Cfr. vol. I, p. 369 sqq.

[2] Sent. II, d. 25, n. 16.

This grace of God, which is given for the performance of supernaturally good works, may be considered in itself or in its relation to the action of the will. In the first case it is called operating grace — *gratia operans;* for the reason that it exerts an influence on our intellect and will, and disposes these faculties for the eliciting of salutary acts. In the second it is termed coöperating grace — *gratia cooperans;* because it concurs with the actions of our faculties as prepared by its supernatural influence.[3] Hence the operating grace of God is in us without our own doing; it anticipates the salutary action of our will and makes it possible, and hence it is also called preventing or prevenient grace. It is purely a gift of God's gratuitous mercy.[4] However, strictly speaking, this is true only of the first grace that is given us, which is the gift of faith; for if we coöperate with that, we can merit the bestowal of other graces and thus with God's help work out our salvation.[5] Hence we are bidden to pray for the further help of God; so that what He has begun in us, He may also accomplish.[6]

Entitatively considered, preventing and helping grace — *gratia operans et cooperans* — are the same. They are one and the same gratuitous gift of God, but bear a different relation to the activity of the will in respect of supernatural actions. Preventing grace calls forth that activity by soliciting the will to act and making it capable of so doing; while cooperating grace acts together with the will in exerting its activity for the attainment of a supernatural end. Consequently, grace and free will constitute one principle of action, which is at the same time supernatural and free — supernatural, because of grace; free, because of the free coöperation of the will.[7]

When it comes to the heart of the question, namely, what actual grace really is in itself, the author is not very definite. In the first place, he points out that it cannot be a movement of

[3] The author's own words are: "Haec est gratia operans et cooperans. Operans enim gratia praeparat hominis voluntatem ut velit bonum; gratia cooperans adjuvat ne frustra velit" (Ibid. d. 26, n. 1).

[4] Ibid. n. 1, 2.

[5] Ibid. n. 3, 4, 5.

[6] Ibid. n. 5.

[7] Ibid. d. 26, n. 9; ibid. n. 3.

the faculties — *motus vel affectus mentis* — in so far as that might be said to have its origin from the faculties themselves; for if it were, grace would not be the gift of God. Next he considers the opinion of some who hold that grace is a supernatural quality or form of the soul — *bonam mentis qualitatem sive formam, quae animam informat.* And this, he thinks, is about all that can be said concerning so abstruse a matter. Hence he concludes by stating: *Et illa gratia virtus non incongrue nominatur, quia voluntatem hominis infirmam sanat et adjuvat.*[8]

Finally, although grace is necessary for salutary actions, nevertheless, even after the fall, man's free will retains the power of performing naturally good works. Thus, if a Jew or a bad Christian were to give an alms to a poor man, with the intention of relieving the sufferings of a fellow human being, his action would be praiseworthy; but, unless moved thereto by the grace of God, it would have no bearing upon eternal life.[9]

The question of sanctifying grace is touched only incidentally by the Lombard, and what he does say about it is very unsatisfactory. As will be pointed out in the following chapter, he identified the virtue of charity with sanctifying grace, and then both with the Holy Spirit. Not indeed in the sense that the Holy Spirit might be said to inhere in the soul as an intrinsic form, but rather that He must be conceived to dwell therein as the efficient and exemplary cause of the soul's supernatural life." [10] The special indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the souls of the just is, of course, admitted by all theologians; but the Lombard's inference that this same indwelling is identical with sanctifying grace finds no defenders, and was unanimously rejected by his own commentators.

Alexander of Hales begins his treatise on grace with a very complete division of the various supernatural gifts in one way or another designated by that term. He proceeds as follows: " Grace therefore, according to the common acceptation of the term, is either an uncreated gift, or a concreated gift, or a

[8] Ibid. d. 27, n. 1–3.
[9] Ibid. d. 41, 3.
[10] Cfr. Sent. I, d. 17, n. 1–6.

superadded gift. Again, there is a grace that makes us pleasing to God, and a grace that is the first supernatural power in the soul, and a grace that is the first effect of grace after the fall, and a grace that signifies certain spiritual prerogatives, and a grace that is a sign of grace, and a grace that is the reward that follows upon grace.[11]

These various graces he divides into two distinct classes: the first contains the *gratia gratum faciens* or sanctifying grace; and the other, the *gratia gratis data.* By this latter term he designates, not only the *charismata,* as we do to-day, but also all actual graces and infused virtues. This use of the term was quite common in the schools up to the time of St. Thomas.

In his division of actual graces he follows the Lombard, who, it may be noted in passing, had taken his terminology and principle of division from St. Augustine. "The free will of man," he says, "may be considered in reference to grace in two different ways: as the subject that receives grace and as the faculty that is moved to act." As received into the will, grace is called operating or preventing grace; as acting with the will, it is termed coöperating grace. Then he continues: "In the reception of grace, that is, when grace prepares the will, the action of grace is first; thereupon follows the consent of the free will, or its coöperation in yielding its consent to the movement of grace; and for this reason grace is called operating or prevenient. But the free will is said to coöperate with grace when it performs the good action through grace; because the action proceeds from the power of the free will as assisted by grace: and therefore the free will itself is said to act, while grace contributes its help to it as the coöperating principle."[12] The two act together, yet the entire effect is attributable to each.[13]

[11] Sum. III, q. 61, m. 1.

[12] Sum. III, q. 61, m. 3, a. 2 ad 2m.

[13] In this exposition he closely follows St. Bernard, who, in his treatise *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio,* puts the matter very clearly in these terms: "Sic autem ista cum libero arbitrio operatur, ut tantum illum in primo praeveniat, in ceteris comitetur; ad hoc utique praeveniens, ut sibi deinceps cooperetur. Ita tamen, quod a sola gratia coeptum est, pariter ab utroque perficiatur; ut mixtim, non singillatim; simul, non vicissim, per singulos profectus operentur. Non partim gratia, partim liberum arbitrium, sed totum singula opera

Like the Lombard, Alexander holds that preventing and co-operating grace are entitatively the same, and he gives this reason: "Because both are related to the will as its moving cause." [14] Preventing grace is in the will both as a supernatural disposition and as an impulse to action, and when the will yields to this impulse, the same grace acts together with the will and is then properly termed coöperating grace.[15] It may be noted here, that the author does not restrict the term, preventing grace, to the first indeliberate acts of the faculties that result, so to speak, from the divine touch; but extends it to the whole process by which the faculties are elevated and prepared for salutary action. Hence, in this connection, he does not use the two terms, *praeveniens* and *operans*, as synonymous.[16]

The *gratia gratum faciens*, or sanctifying grace, is something objective and permanent in the soul. He speaks of it as follows. "It must be held that the grace by which one becomes pleasing to God, necessarily places something supernatural in the person, which is the reason of his being thus pleasing to God. And this particular something is the same as that by which a person becomes deiform or is made like unto God; and hence a person is said to be pleasing to God when he is like unto Him." [17]

Furthermore, this grace is both increate and created. For he continues: "It must be maintained that in the just there is a created grace and an increate grace. The increate grace is the Holy Spirit: and the Holy Spirit is called grace in as much as He is a gift; and He is termed a gift in as much as He is love: for by way of appropriation the Holy Spirit is said to

individuo peragunt. Totum quidem hoc, et totum illa; sed ut totum in illo, sic totum ex illo" (Op. cit. c. 14).

[14] Loc. cit. a. 1.

[15] Ibid.

[16] He explains the terms as follows: "Eadem est gratia operans et praeveniens, sed differenter; quia utraque comparatur respectu liberi arbitrii ut causa movens ipsum; sed praeveniens dicitur in quantum semper praesto est ut causa bonae voluntatis, etsi in effectu non causet; operans vero efficit bonam voluntatem. Unde gratia praeveniens et operans dicuntur causa bonae voluntatis, sed praeveniens dicit causam secundum habitum, operans vero dicit causam secundum actum" (Ibid. m. 3, a. 2).

[17] Ibid. m. 2, a. 1.

be love. . . . Since therefore the Holy Spirit is love, . . . hence it is that when He is given to us, He transforms us into a special divine likeness, so that our soul itself is made like unto God. But besides this increate grace, we must also hold that there is a created grace, which is a certain divine likeness and supernatural disposition on the part of the rational soul, and by reason of this the soul is pleasing to God and is made like unto Him. Hence there is in the soul a transforming form, and this is increate grace; and there is in like manner also a transformed form, which remains permanently in the soul as the effect of the aforesaid transformation, and this is created grace." [18]

The question whether sanctifying grace, as distinct from the Holy Spirit, is an accident or a substance, he answers with a distinction: "It is to be held that created grace has a twofold relation to the soul: First as regards the essence of the soul, or its nature; secondly, as regards the perfection of the soul in the supernatural order. In its first relation, I say that grace is an accident; because it is superadded to the soul when already complete in its essential perfection. In its second relation, grace is a substantial disposition; nevertheless it is not a substance." [19] Hence sanctifying grace is a supernatural quality, which permanently inheres in the soul and is the foundation of all other divine gifts. It is in this sense that the author favors the opinion of those who hold that the relation of sanctifying grace to the infused virtues is the same as that of the soul to its faculties.[20]

St. Bonaventure does little more than reproduce the teaching of Alexander, and hence there is no need of examining his

[18] Ibid. m. 2, a. 2.

[19] Ibid. m. 2, a. 3.

[20] Ibid. m. 2, a. 4. Besides the citations in the text, the following may also be noted: "Gratia duplex est, scil. gratum faciens et gratis data, et haec non est gratum faciens, sed tamen disponens. . . . Gratia gratis data proprie dicitur donum infusum rationali naturae sine meritis, . . . disponens ad salutem propriam, vel aedificationem alterius. . . . Ad differentiam gratiae gratum facientis, quae non est sicut dispositio ad salutem, quasi distans, sed est dispositio salutis, quia habens illam dignus est salute aeterna; immo gratia gratum faciens est ipsa salus, ad quam disponit gratia gratis data" (Loc. cit. m. 6, a. 3 ad 1[m]; ibid. q. 63, m. 2, 3).

views in detail. He gives the same division of grace into *gratia gratum faciens et gratis data,* and uses the latter term to designate all divine gifts distinct from sanctifying grace. He refutes Peter Lombard who denied that sanctifying grace must be considered as a permanent created gift, really distinct from the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. The opinion of those, he says, who maintain that sanctifying grace is a created gift, a permanent supernatural accident of the soul, is safer and more reasonable. It is safer, because it is commonly held in the schools — *Doctores enim Parisienses communiter hoc sentiunt et senserunt ab antiquis diebus.* It is more reasonable, because it is unintelligible how supernatural effects, such as we observe in the just, should be produced by the soul without an inherent supernatural form.[21]

Sanctifying grace purifies the soul, elevates it to the supernatural state, makes it like unto God, and is the principle of all supernatural merit.[22] It is not merely a superficial ornament of the soul, but penetrates its very being and faculties, vivifying all the infused virtues, and making their actions meritorious for heaven. In regard to this last effect he compares sanctifying grace to material light, which brings out all the beautiful colors inherent in the objects of sense.[23]

Unlike Alexander, who considered the increase of sanctifying grace to consist in an intensification of its power and in the conferring of a more perfect likeness to God,[24] St. Bonaventure explains it by an addition of new degrees, which result in a quantitative augmentation of sanctifying grace. Moreover the increase of grace is not merited *de condigno,* nor *de congruo,* but by a sort of intermediate merit.[25] This last kind of merit was not generally admitted in the schools.

Albertus Magnus gives substantially the same exposition as

[21] In Sent. II, d. 26, a. unic. q. 2.

[22] Breviloq. V, 3, 4.

[23] His own words are: "Quemadmodum enim color qualitas est corporis terminati, quae a praesentia luminis influxi venustatur et completur, ut possit movere visum, sic virtus, quae est habilitatio potentiae, absque gratia gratum faciente informis est sicut color sine lumine; sed ea adveniente, ex qua tota anima in se et in suis potentiis decoratur, formari et vivificari dicuntur virtutum actus et effici Deo accepti" (In Sent. II, d. 27, a. 1, q. 2; cfr. ibid. d. 26, q. 2).

[24] Sum. q. 69, m. 2.

[25] In Sent. II, d. 27, a. 2, q. 2.

Alexander and St. Bonaventure. In regard to sanctifying grace he points out that its relation to the infused virtues resembles that which exists between the soul and its faculties, and that therefore it has only a mediate influence upon salutary acts. "It is evident," he says, "that sanctifying grace is primarily not a perfection of the potencies, but of the essence of the soul, and through this only does it exercise its influence upon these same potencies." [26]

St. Thomas, in keeping with his customary mode of procedure, draws largely on the known facts of nature, when he comes to consider the various questions connected with the subject of grace. In the order of nature God is the first cause: as creator, He produces all secondary causes; as preserver, He sustains them in being; as ruler, He directs them to their proper end. He concurs with all their activities in such a way, that the effects depend on Him as well as on these secondary causes themselves. And the same is also true in the supernatural order. Grace is the result of His goodness and mercy; He infuses it into the soul or its faculties, and through it He moves man to the practice of virtue and the final attainment of Life eternal.

The activity of grace is exercised in a two-fold manner. First, it serves as a remedy against the moral weakness caused by sin, and in so far it is of a medicinal nature. Secondly, it confers a mode of action that lies beyond the reach of man's natural powers in any state, and as such it is a principle of supernatural merit. Taken in the first sense, grace belongs properly to the state of fallen nature; in the second, it is a necessary complement of the powers of every rational creature destined for a supernatural end.[27]

In his classification of grace, St. Thomas uses the same terms as Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, and Albertus Magnus; but he attaches to them a different sense. Thus by the term *gratia gratum faciens* he designates all supernatural helps and gifts conferred for the recipient's own sanctification, comprising both habitual and actual graces. On the other

[26] In Sent. II, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1; Sum. II, tr. 16, q. 101.
[27] Sum. Theol. I. II, q. 109, a. 2.

hand, the term *gratia gratis data* he restricts to such gratuitous gifts or charismata as are intended for the good of others rather than for that of the recipient. He puts his division in these terms: "According to this, there are two kinds of grace: one, namely, through which the recipient himself is united to God, and this is called a grace that makes one pleasing to the Giver — *gratia gratum faciens;* another, again, through which one person assists others, for the purpose of leading them back to God; and a gift of this kind is termed a grace gratuitously bestowed — *gratia gratis data.*" [28] In another sense, however, both kinds of grace are gratuitous gifts, excluding not only all natural merit, but also rising above the exigencies of human nature.[29]

Again, the *gratia gratum faciens* is also of two kinds: habitual and actual. "For the right ordering of his life," he says, "man needs a two-fold help of God: one by way of a permanent gift, through which corrupted human nature is healed, and when healed is elevated, for the purpose of performing actions that are meritorious of life eternal, and that exceed the powers of unaided nature. In another way man needs the help of grace in order that he may be moved by God to perform actions that are necessary for the attainment of salvation." [30] This latter help is called actual grace.

Actual grace is a movement of the faculties produced by God; habitual grace is a supernatural quality infused into the soul. He describes both in these terms: "It was said above that man is gratuitously assisted by God in two ways: one way, in as much as man's soul is moved by God to know something, or to will, or to act; and when assisted in this way, the gratuitous effect produced in man is not a quality, but a certain movement of the soul; for the act of him that moves is movement in him who is moved. In another way, man is assisted by the gratuitous will of God in the sense that a permanent gift is infused by God into his soul. And this gift is infused into the soul because it would be unbecoming that God should be less generous to creatures destined for a supernatural

[28] Ibid. q. III, a. 1.
[29] Ibid. a. 1 ad 2m.
[30] Ibid. a. 9.

end than to those destined merely for a natural end. For to these latter He not only imparts the requisite movements in respect of their natural actions, but He also endows them with permanent forms, and certain powers, which are so many principles of action in accordance with the movements which He imparts. In this way the movements produced in them by God are connatural to these creatures, and render easy the exercise of their powers, according to the saying of Wisdom: 'He disposed all things sweetly.' With far greater reason, therefore, does He infuse certain forms, or supernatural qualities, into those creatures that He directs towards the attainment of a supernatural and eternal good, so that in accordance with them they may be moved by Him to the acquisition of the aforesaid eternal good both sweetly and promptly. And in this sense, grace is a certain quality." [31]

This quality, in which habitual grace consists, is distinct from the infused virtues. And the reason is that the infused virtues presuppose a permanent elevation of the soul to the supernatural order, just as the acquired virtues presuppose the soul's essence. Hence sanctifying grace is related to the infused virtues very much the same way as nature is related to its potencies.[32]

As a logical consequence, sanctifying grace has for its immediate subject of inhesion, not the faculties, as is the case with infused virtues, but the substance of the soul itself. "It follows therefore," he argues, "that as habitual grace is prior to the virtues, it has for its subject something that is prior to the potencies of the soul; and this is the soul's substance. For just as man by reason of his intellectual faculty participates in divine cognition through the virtue of faith, and by reason of his volitional faculty participates in divine love through the virtue of charity; so does he by reason of the substance of his soul participate according to a certain similitude in the

[31] Ibid. q. 110, a. 2.

[32] He sums up his argument in these terms: "Sicut igitur lumen naturale rationis est aliquid praeter virtutes acquisitas, quae dicuntur in ordine ad ipsum lumen naturale; ita etiam ipsum lumen gratiae, quod est participatio divinae naturae, est aliquid praeter virtutes infusas, quae a lumine illo derivantur, et ad illud lumen ordinantur" (Ibid. a. 3).

divine nature through a spiritual regeneration and supernatural elevation." [33]

Both actual and habitual grace are divided into operating and coöperating grace. He explains the division in this way: "Considered in either sense, grace is properly divided into operating and coöperating grace. For the operating or producing of an effect is not attributed to the thing moved but to the mover thereof; hence in the production of that effect in respect of which our mind is moved and not moving, but God alone is moving, the operation is attributed to God; and in this sense the movement is termed operating grace: but in the production of that effect in regard to which our mind is both moving and moved, the operation is attributed not only to God, but also to the soul; and in this sense the movement is called cooperating grace." [34] However, habitual grace does not act effectively, but formally: "just as whiteness is said to make the surface of a body white." [35] Operating and coöperating graces are entitatively the same, but they are distinguished in their relation to the effect produced.[36]

As operating or preventing grace stands exclusively for the operation of God in the soul, it is obvious that in relation to this grace there can be no question of freely accepting or rejecting it. Precisely because it is preventing or prevenient grace, hence it comes to us without our own deliberate concurrence — *est in nobis sine nobis.* But the question is, how does it affect the will? Does it leave the will free to make it cooperative, so that the efficacy of connection, as it is called, comes from the free will prepared by grace? Or does it contain that same efficacy in itself, so that in its presence the will is not free to withhold its coöperation? How does St. Thomas answer this very fundamental question?

In one sense it may be said that he did not answer it at all, in as much as he never proposed the question in that particular form. But in another sense he answered it very fully, in so far, namely, as he laid down principles from which it necessarily follows that in his view the efficacy of connection comes

[33] Ibid. a. 4.
[34] Ibid. q. III, a. 2.
[35] Ibid. a. 2 ad 1^{m}.
[36] Ibid. a. 2 ad 4^{m}.

from man's free will. Thus, for instance, he says that God "acts upon man's free will in such a way as to impart to it the power of acting, and to bring it about that the will acts together with Him; without, however, interfering with the free determination of the will in respect of the action to be performed and the end to be attained. Hence the will retains the dominion over its own action." [37] And again: "Man's will would not be free unless it belonged to him to determine the course of his own actions, and to choose by his own proper judgment either the one or the other." [38] Statements of this kind are met with over and over again in the writings of St. Thomas, and therefore the only possible inference is that he held the efficacy of connection to come from man's free will and not from grace. Nor is this inference at all weakened by the fact that in many other texts he ascribes the consent of the will to the action of grace; for they need mean no more than that grace prepares the will to give its free consent when it still may withhold the same. Hence the contention of later Thomists, that the Angelic Doctor taught anything like their *praemotio physica*, is absolutely without foundation in fact.

Duns Scotus proposes practically the same doctrine as regards actual grace, and is quite definite in asserting the freedom of the human will as moved by God. That freedom is not merely a matter of terms, but it implies the power of freely choosing either the one or the other of two opposite actions at the very instant when the choice is made.[39] Grace and free will act together in producing the same effect, and that effect may be impeded by the withdrawal of either of the two causes.[40] Hence the efficacy of connection is derived immediately from the free will, and mediately from grace; in as much, that is, as grace prepares the will to give its free consent.[41]

On the other hand, the teaching of Scotus on sanctifying grace is, to say the least, peculiar. In the first place, he identifies sanctifying grace with the theological virtue of charity.

[37] In Sent. II, d. 25, q. 1, a. 1 ad 3[m].
[38] Ibid. d. 28, q. 1, a. 1.
[39] Ibid. I, d. 39, n. 16.
[40] Ibid. II, d. 37, n. 14.
[41] Ibid.

"The Holy Ghost," he says, "does not move the will to the meritorious love of God by a habit distinct from charity, nor does He by a habit distinct from charity dwell in the soul; and this habit is grace, and grace itself is charity." [42] Thus sanctifying grace and charity are essentially the same; nevertheless as referred to God they are distinct, but only *distinctione formali*.[43]

Next he holds that sanctifying grace has for its immediate subject of inhesion, not the substance of the soul, but the will; for the will is the immediate subject of charity, and charity is the same as grace. Furthermore, although the will through charity participates in divine love, and the intellect through faith participates in divine knowledge; yet the soul through sanctifying grace is not made a partaker of the divine nature. The reason he assigns for this is twofold: First, because the divine nature so far transcends all created beings that it cannot be represented in them by a proper image of itself, such as participation implies; secondly, this participation would necessitate the inhesion of sanctifying grace in the substance of the soul; and this is against the well known fact that the loss of grace manifests itself first in the loss of love, which is in the will.[44]

In this reasoning the author obviously loses sight of two facts pointed out by St. Thomas: First, that the participation of the divine nature through sanctifying grace is only analogous, consisting as it does in a certain accidental likeness to God; secondly, that the infused virtues do not flow physically from sanctifying grace, and consequently there is no necessary connection between the loss of grace and of the virtues. Charity is indeed lost together with grace, but that is because of its essential opposition to every mortal sin.

B — Justification and Merit

According to the common teaching of the Scholastics, justification is effected through the infusion of sanctifying grace

[42] In Sent. II, d. 27, n. 35.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid. d. 26, n. 1.

into the soul by God. In its final term it is an instantaneous change, which offers four distinct points for consideration. Alexander of Hales describes it in the following manner: "In justification there are two terms: the term whence and the term whither — *a malo ad bonum.* Hence on the part of God there is something required in regard to the term whence, and also in regard to the term whither: in like manner there is something required on our part in regard to each. . . . Now on the part of God there is required, in respect of the term whither, the infusion of sanctifying grace; and in respect of the term whence, the forgiveness of sin. On our part, in reference to the term whither, is required the turning of our free will to God through faith; and in reference to the term whence, contrition or the detestation of sin." [45]

This exposition, as is obvious, presupposes that the person to be justified has attained to the use of reason; for in infants justification is entirely the work of God, and as such comprises only the infusion of grace and the remission of original sin. The matter is treated in the same way by St. Bonaventure,[46] and also by St. Thomas.[47] In fact, as regards the four points themselves, enumerated by Alexander, there is no difference of opinion among the Scholastics. All admit that without true conversion of heart on the part of man, and the infusion of grace together with forgiveness of sin on the part of God, there can be no justification of the adult sinner. A mere imputation of the justice of Christ, such as was excogitated by the sixteenth-century Reformers, is never referred to by them as even thinkable. But there is not the same agreement among them when the above-mentioned four points are considered in their relation to one another. In the order of time they are simultaneous, but in the order of nature priority of one to the others must be admitted. Which of them has the precedence? It is on this that opinions differ. A few words must suffice to indicate the nature of the contention.

St. Thomas answers the question of priority in this way: "It is to be held that the aforesaid four points, which are re-

[45] Sum. IV, q. 17, m. 4, a. 6 ad 4[m].
[46] In Sent. IV, d. 17, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1.
[47] Sum. Theol. I. II, q. 113, a. 6.

quired for the justification of the sinner, are indeed simultaneous in time — because justification is not successive; but in the order of nature one comes before the other. And in this order, first of all occurs the infusion of grace; next comes the turning of the free will to God; then the free will turns against sin; and in the fourth place is granted the remission of guilt." [48] This order, he argues, must be observed because in the matter of justification God takes the initiative, and He acts through the infusion of grace. It must be noted, however, that in this explanation he considers justification under its formal aspect. Hence in another place he says that the ultimate disposition required for justification, or the act of contrition, proceeds from sanctifying grace then and there infused into the soul; *quia secundum ordinem causae formalis, efficientis et finalis infusio gratiae natura prior est.* On the other hand, if justification be considered with reference to the material cause — *secundum ordinem causae materialis* — the forgiveness of sin precedes the infusion of grace, and is in its turn preceded by the turning of the will to God and away from sin; because this is required by way of disposition on the part of the soul, which is related to grace as matter to its form.[49] Hence, in the view of St. Thomas, sanctifying grace is the formal reason of the expulsion of sin from the soul.

Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure conceive the matter somewhat differently. According to them, the production of grace in the soul is indeed prior to the expulsion of sin; but the expulsion of sin, in its turn, is prior to the information and sanctification of the soul by grace. In a similar manner, the act of contrition on the part of the subject precedes the infusion of grace and the expulsion of sin, but only as attrition; the moment that grace is infused, it becomes contrition in the strict sense of the term, and then sin is expelled by grace.[50] Hence in their view also, sanctifying grace expels sin formally from the soul. The whole process of justification is beautifully described by St. Bonaventure in his *Breviloquium*.[51]

[48] Ibid. q. 113, a. 8.
[49] In Sent. IV, d. 17, q. 1, a. 4; De Verit. q. 28, a. 8.
[50] Loc. cit.
[51] Op. cit. V, 3.

Duns Scotus regards justification in an altogether different light. He conceives it to consist in two divine operations: the forgiveness of sin and the interior renovation of the soul through sanctifying grace. The two are simultaneous in time, but in the order of nature the forgiveness of sin precedes the infusion of grace.[52] Hence grace does not expel sin formally from the soul, but only by way of moral exigency, in as much as its presence in the will is a cogent reason why God should forgive sin. It is, therefore, absolutely possible that mortal sin and sanctifying grace should be in the soul at one and the same time.[53] Conversely, of course, mortal sin does not formally expel sanctifying grace, but only by way of demerit.[54] This peculiar view of Scotus on justification is based upon an equally peculiar view on the nature of habitual sin, that is, of sin as it exists in the soul after the sinful act has ceased. Such a sin, according to him, does not consist in the privation of sanctifying grace, nor in anything positive in the soul; but simply in a liability to punishment — *nihil aliud nisi ista relatio rationis, scilicet ordinatio ad poenam.*[55]

Closely connected with the question of justification is that of merit. For, in the first place, although justification in its ultimate term is an instantaneous operation, nevertheless the whole process consists of many acts of the will elicited under the influence of actual grace; and in regard to these acts the question immediately arises whether they have any meritorious value. In the next place, justification is not intended for its own sake, but is meant as a preparation for the attainment of eternal life; hence the same question of merit recurs in regard to actions performed after justification. Hence the following few points in the teaching of the Scholastics on the subject of merit may be added to what has been said on the question of justification and grace.

The first point that deserves consideration in this connection is the possibility of merit. For merit, as St. Thomas

[52] In Sent. I, d. 17, q. 2; Report. IV, d. 16, q. 2, n. 23.

[53] Report. IV, d. 16, q. 2; cfr. Mastrius, Scotus Academicus, IX, tr. 3, d. 3, q. 2, 3.

[54] In Sent. IV, d. 1, q. 6.

[55] Ibid. d. 16, q. 2.

observes, is in the order of justice; and as God cannot be under obligation of justice in regard to His own creatures, it would seem that merit on the part of man is impossible. He solves the difficulty by distinguishing between justice according to absolute equality and justice according to a certain proportion. The former can indeed have no place between man and God, but the latter may; in so far, namely, as man does what in him lies to comply with the demands of God in using the powers given him for the attainment of a certain end. Hence, in this connection, merit presupposes a divine ordination in virtue of which certain actions are entitled by way of reward to an equivalent of their moral value in the eyes of God.[56]

In regard to the conditions put down for merit, presupposing the divine ordination just mentioned, there is no disagreement. All postulate the *status viae,* freedom of choice, and the assistance of divine grace. Thus St. Thomas, after pointing out the necessity of grace, says very briefly: *Quia creatura rationalis seipsam movet ad agendum per liberum arbitrium; unde sua actio habet rationem meriti.*[57] And Scotus defines meritorious actions in these terms: *Actus potentiae liberae et secundum inclinationem gratiae elicitus, acceptus a Deo ut praemiabilis beatitudine.*[58] Furthermore, when there is an equality of proportion between the meritorious action and the reward, merit is said to be condign — *de condigno;* when that equality is wanting, but still there is a certain fitness that the action should receive some remuneration, merit is termed congruous — *de congruo.* Both kinds of merit are admitted by the Scholastics.

The object of merit varies with the conditions of the person who performs the meritorious action. In the first place, if he is in the state of mortal sin, he is incapable of meriting *de condigno;* because no one is entitled to a reward who is not united to God through sanctifying grace.[59] Secondly, if he is in the state of grace, he can merit *de condigno* both an increase of sanctifying grace and life eternal. In regard to the

[56] Sum. Theol. I. II, q. 114, a. 1.
[57] Ibid.
[58] In Sent. I, d. 17, q. 3, n. 25.
[59] Cfr. Thomas, Sum. Theol. I. II, q. 114, a. 5.

second point, namely, that life eternal can be merited *de condigno,* there never was any difference of opinion among the Scholastics; they all admitted that heaven was promised not only as an inheritance but also as a reward. On the other hand, with regard to the increase of sanctifying grace opinions were divided. Thus, for instance, St. Bonaventure contends that although such an increase may be merited, still the merit in question can only be *de congruo.* And the reason is that there is a want of proportion between the lower degree of grace, which is the foundation of merit, and the higher degree which is conferred as a reward. But at the same time it is fitting that the good works of the just should be rewarded by an increase of grace, and hence there is room for merit *de congruo.*[60]

St. Thomas solves this difficulty by distinguishing between the quantity of grace and its power of meriting. "The increase of grace," he argues, "is not above the meriting power of the grace already existing in the soul, although it exceeds that same grace in quantity. And this may be illustrated by an example taken from the growth of a tree; for although the tree exceeds the seed in quantity, nevertheless it was evidently not beyond the power of the seed to produce it."[61] And in keeping with this solution he makes the general statement, that the object of merit comprises everything for which grace is given; and grace is given not only for the actual attainment of eternal life, but also for the growth in sanctity as implied in a proper preparation for that life. And in this sense the increase of sanctifying grace falls under merit *de condigno.*[62]

The object of merit in a wider sense of the term, or of merit *de congruo,* may comprise even the spiritual good of others. Thus a just man by his prayers and good works may merit the conversion of sinners, or an increase of perfection for those who are already in the state of grace. Of course, what is merited in this case is not sanctifying grace itself, but the bestowal of actual graces that lead to the end intended.

[60] In Sent. II, d. 27, a. 2, q. 2.
[61] Sum. Theol. I. II, q. 114, a. 8 ad 2m.
[62] Ibid. a. 8.

Hence, although no one can merit the first grace for himself, he may merit it for others. St. Thomas argues the point in this way: "Because a just man fulfills the will of God, hence it is fitting that God also, in consideration of their mutual friendship, should have regard to his will in reference to the conversion of others." [63]

The chief points contained in the present chapter, especially those referring to actual grace and justification, were incorporated by the Council of Trent in its dogmatic decree on the justification of sinners.[64] Further particulars regarding the definition of the points in question will be given in another chapter.

[63] Ibid. a. 6.

[64] Cfr. DB. 793 sqq.

CHAPTER XIV

INFUSED VIRTUES: THEOLOGICAL AND CARDINAL

Most of the Scholastics treat the subject of infused virtues in connection with Christology. Peter Lombard introduces it in these terms: "As we have shown above that Christ was full of grace, it will not be out of place here to inquire whether, besides charity, He had also faith and hope. For if He was without these, it seems that He did not have the plenitude of grace. Now, in order to make this matter clear, we must consider each of these two virtues by itself." [1] Then he gives a brief dissertation on faith and hope, and points out in what sense they were found in Christ. After this he presents an outline of his views on the four cardinal virtues, justice, fortitude, prudence, and temperance,[2] to which he adds a somewhat fuller exposition of the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost.[3]

This arrangement and disposition of the subject-matter was retained by his commentators, but they expanded his brief statements into numerous and lengthy articles. However, in so doing they did not indulge in profitless speculations; on the contrary, they contributed very much to the development of a doctrine which had only been touched upon in a general way by Patristic writers. The following points may be put down as constituting the more important results of their laborious investigations.

1. *Nature of Infused Virtues.*— Alexander of Hales terms the infused virtues *gratiae gratis datae,* to distinguish them from the *gratia gratum faciens* or sanctifying grace; [4] while Peter Lombard and most of his commentators speak of them as gratuitous habits — *habitus gratuiti.* They agree

[1] Sent. III, d. 23, n. 1.
[2] Ibid. d. 33.
[3] Ibid. d. 34.
[4] Sum. III, q. 63.

with acquired habits in this, that they are permanent dispositions of their proper subject in the order of operation. But they are distinguished from them in their origin, in their sphere of activity, and in their relation to the end for the attainment of which they are intended. Acquired habits are the result of a repeated and systematic exercise of man's natural faculties; of themselves they operate exclusively in the natural order, and tend towards the more ready attainment of a natural end. As a consequence, they may be either good or bad, according as they incline the will to what is morally good or morally evil. Infused habits, on the other hand, are a free gift of God, and as such they are produced in their subject without any operation on its part; their purpose is not to facilitate but to make possible the connatural production of supernatural acts, and their tendency is always towards a supernatural end. Hence they are necessarily good, and have no part in the doing of evil.[5] It is because of this that they are called virtues; because a virtue is defined as "a habit that perfects a human potency in respect of good acts."[6]

As these gratuitous habits have thus an essential relation to activity, their proper subject is not the substance of the soul, but the faculties through which the soul exerts its own activity as a rational being.[7] Hence they reside in the intellect and will, and are *ad modum potentiae.* St. Thomas, however, holds that they may also reside in the sensitive potencies "*sed secundum quod sunt rationales per participationem, ut obedientes rationi.*[8] Scotus says that they immediately perfect the soul.[9]

Although the infused habits, or virtues, are really distinct from one another, yet they are all connected among themselves, and with sanctifying grace. On this general statement all Scholastics are agreed, but they are at variance in regard

[5] Cfr. Thomas, In Sent. III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1–5; Bonavent. ibid. a. 1; Halens. Sum. III, q. 68, m. 3.

[6] Thomas, In Sent. III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 4.

[7] Halens. loc. cit. m. 3, 8; Thomas, loc. cit. q. 2, a. 3; Albert. Magn. In Sent. III, q. 23, a. 6; Bonavent. Ibid. a. 1, q. 2.

[8] Sum. Theol. I. II, q. 50, a. 3.

[9] In Sent. III, d. 34, n. 6.

to some particular aspects of the point in question. The Lombard and a few others seem to hold that grace and the infused virtues are essentially the same, but their position in reference to this matter is not very clear.[10] St. Bonaventure expresses his view in these terms: "Because of its perfection, by reason of its dignity and eminence, grace confers on man all the habits that constitute the integrity of justice in relation to the various acts and objects, conditions and opportunities, which are found *in statu viae.*"[11] However this "conferring" does not imply efficient causality on the part of grace; it denotes only a certain concomitant exigency, in view of which God produces the virtues in the soul.[12] In this sense they have their origin in grace, and in so far grace may be regarded as their source.[13] They have each their own proper form which bears a relation to specifically different acts, and hence they are essentially and formally distinct.[14]

St. Thomas teaches practically the same. "Just as the potencies," he says, "which are certain principles of action, flow from the essence of the soul; so also do the virtues flow from grace into the potencies of the soul, which are thereby moved to their own proper acts."[15] And again: "Grace is reduced to the first species of qualities; however it is not the same as virtue, but is by way of habitude, which is presupposed to the infused virtues as their principle and root."[16]

Alexander of Hales develops these points at considerable length, while the others touch upon them more or less incidentally. He points out the distinction between sanctifying grace and the infused virtues; their relation to one another and to salutary acts; their connection with the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and their distinction from the same. On all these questions his teaching is essentially the same as that set forth in the preceding paragraphs.[17]

2. *Division of Infused Virtues.*— Infused virtues, writes

[10] Sent. d. 26, n. 4.
[11] In Sent. III, d. 34, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3.
[12] Ibid. II, d. 27, a. 1, q. 2 ad 1m.
[13] Ibid. III, d. 34, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2.
[14] Ibid. d. 33, a. unic. q. 2.
[15] Sum. Theol. I. II, q. 110, a. 4 ad 1m.
[16] Ibid. a. 3 ad 3m.
[17] Sum. III, q. 62–64.

Alexander of Hales, are classed according as they are *in finem* or *ad finem*. To the former class belong the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity; to the latter, the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.[18] This is the same division as that given by the Lombard, and was adopted by most of the Schoolmen. By some, however, it was rejected as unduly multiplying the number of infused virtues. Thus Scotus denies that any solid reason can be assigned for holding that moral virtues are infused by God; because the acquired virtues under the influence of faith and charity are quite sufficient to regulate man's moral conduct.[19] The same position was taken by Henry of Ghent,[20] Durandus,[21] and most of the Nominalists.

The necessity and nature of the theological virtues is thus indicated by St. Thomas: "Man is perfected by virtue in respect of the acts that place him in due relation to beatitude. . . . Now man's beatitude or happiness is twofold: One that is in proportion to human nature, and to which man can attain by the proper use of his natural principles of action; another that exceeds man's nature, and which he can reach only through divine power by way of a certain participation of the divinity. . . . And because this beatitude exceeds the capacity of human nature, hence man's natural principles of action . . . are not sufficient to place him in due relation to it; and therefore it is necessary that other principles be divinely bestowed on him, by which he is so disposed in respect of supernatural beatitude, as he is disposed by natural principles of action in regard to his connatural end, though not without the assistance of divine grace. Now these principles are called theological virtues; both because they have God for their object, in as much as by them we are placed in the proper relation to God; and because they are infused into us by God alone; and also because their existence is known to us only by divine revelation as contained in Holy Scripture." [22]

These theological virtues are really distinct from intellec-

[18] Ibid. q. 68.
[19] In Sent. III, d. 36, n. 28.
[20] Quodl. 6, q. 12.
[21] In Sent. III, d. 33, q. 6.
[22] Sum. Theol. I. II, 62, a. 1.

tual and moral virtues. Because "habits are distinguished according to the formal difference of their objects; but the object of the theological virtues is God Himself, the ultimate end of things, in so far as He exceeds the cognition of our reason; while the object of intellectual and moral virtues is something that can be comprehended by human reason: therefore the theological virtues are specifically distinct from intellectual and moral virtues." [23]

There are only three theological virtues — faith, hope, and charity. This follows from their very nature, since they are in us as so many permanent dispositions towards God as our last end. For in every one who strives to attain an end, two prerequisites must be found before he can act — knowledge of the end and an intention of attaining the end. But in order to have such an intention, two further prerequisites are necessary: First, the possibility of attaining the end, for no one is moved to strive for what is impossible; secondly, the goodness of the end, because no one intends except what is good. Therefore faith is required in order to make the end known; hope is necessary to give confidence of attaining the end; charity is needed to incline the agent to the end as his own good. And besides these nothing else is requisite by way of placing man in a proper relation to the attainment of his last end, which is God.[24]

However, as these theological virtues have God for their object, there must be other infused virtues whose object consists in the things that lead us to God; and these are the infused moral virtues. They bear the same relation to the theological virtues as the acquired intellectual and moral virtues bear to our natural principles of action.[25] They are in the same general order of operation as the acquired moral virtues, but they are specifically distinct from them; because their formal object is different, in as much as they regulate man's activity according to the supernatural norm of rectitude.[26]

3. *The Virtue of Faith.*— Faith, says St. Bonaventure, is not only a virtue, but it is the pilot or helmsman of all virtues;

[23] Ibid. a. 2.
[24] In Sent. III, d. 33, q. 1, a. 5.
[25] Sum. Theol. III, q. 63, a. 3.
[26] Ibid. a. 4.

because without faith there is no knowledge of God as our supernatural end, and without such knowledge no infused virtue could exert its activity along its own proper line of operation.[27] It is a virtue that captivates the intellect in the obedience of Christ and clings to the First Truth on account of Itself and above all things.[28] In regard to it, authority takes the place of reason; not any authority whatever, but the Supreme Authority, God Himself, who is infallible in His testimony to the truth.[29]

Most of the Scholastics evolve the definition of faith given by St. Paul — *Now faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not.*[30] "This designation of faith," writes St. Thomas, "is a most complete definition; not that it is put in the accustomed form of a definition, but in it all those things are touched upon which are required for a definition of faith." [31] Here we have the material object of faith in the *things that appear not;* the act of faith in the *evidence* of the same things; and the end of faith in the *substance of things to be hoped for.*[32] Or as St. Bonaventure puts it: "The habit of a virtue must be designated with respect to two things — its end and its object. The end of faith consists in eternal beatitude, which we hope to attain, and therefore in the *things to be hoped for;* the object of faith consists in the truth that is not seen, and therefore in the *things that appear not.*" [33]

In connection with this definition of faith given by the Apostle, St. Thomas defines the virtue of faith as a "habit of the mind, by reason of which eternal life has its inception in us, in as much as it causes the intellect to give its assent to things that are not seen." [34] In substance this definition is admitted by the other representative Scholastics, although they use somewhat different terms. In the first place, they are all agreed that faith, whether it is considered in one and the same individual or in several, is specifically one virtue; because a

[27] In Sent. III, d. 23, a. 1, q. 1.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid. ad 3m.
[30] Hebr. 11, 1.
[31] De Verit. q. 14, a. 2.
[32] Ibid.
[33] In Sent. III, d. 23, a. 1, q. 5.
[34] Loc. cit.

virtue is specified by its principal act, and the principal act in its turn is specified by its proper object, and the proper object of faith is one — the First Truth.[35] Furthermore, all are at one in assigning the intellect as the subject of the virtue of faith; but there is some difference of opinion among them as to whether faith is properly in the speculative or practical intellect. The latter view is taken by Albertus Magnus,[36] Richard of Middleton,[37] and a few others. St. Thomas holds that the virtue of faith "is in the speculative intellect, although it is there as the remote occasion of operation; hence operation is not attributed to it except as under the influence of charity. However it must be noted that it is not in the speculative intellect absolutely, but in so far as the latter is subject to the dictate of the will."[38] The matter is viewed in practically the same light by St. Bonaventure;[39] while Alexander of Hales holds that if faith be considered materially it must be said to be in the speculative intellect, but if taken formally it is in the practical intellect.[40]

The object of faith is twofold — material and formal. The former consists in the truths that must be believed; the latter, in the reason upon which this belief is made to rest. The Scholastic teaching on both points may be given in a few words.

In the first place, all admit that the material object of faith comprises in a general way all the truths revealed by God, in the sense that belief in them can be made to rest upon the infallible authority of God's word.[41] In so far there is full agreement of views; but this agreement ceases when the question is asked, whether truths that are clearly apprehended by man's natural reason may at the same time be an object of faith. On this there are the following two sets of opinions.

[35] Bonavent. In Sent. III, d. 23, a. 1, q. 3; Albert. Magn. ibid. a. 12; Middleton, ibid. a. 4, q. 3; Halens. Sum. III, q. 68, m. 4.

[36] Loc. cit. a. 6.

[37] Loc. cit. a. 6, q. 2.

[38] De Verit. q. 14, a. 4; In Sent. III, d. 23, q. 2, a. 3.

[39] In Sent. III, d. 23, a. 1, q. 1.

[40] Sum. III, q. 68, m. 3.

[41] Halens. loc. cit. m. 7, a. 6; Bonavent. loc. cit. q. 2; Thomas, Sum. Theol. III, q. 1, a. 1; Scotus, In Sent. III, d. 23, n. 6.

The question is answered negatively by St. Thomas, who expresses his view in these terms: "A thing may be credible in two ways: First, simply, in the sense that it exceeds the capacity of all men whilst they are *in statu viae* — such as the truth of the Trinity, and others of the same kind. Concerning these it is impossible that any man should have natural knowledge; hence, everyone of the faithful gives his assent to them because of the testimony of God, to whom they are ever present and known. Secondly, a thing may be credible not simply, but only in respect of some particular person; for the reason that it does not exceed the capacity of all men, but of some only; such as the truths that can be known by demonstration. Of this kind are the truths that God is one and incorporeal, and others of the same nature. In regard to them there is no reason why they should not be known to some by way of demonstration, and believed by others who for one reason or another do not perceive the force of the demonstration: but it is impossible that they should be both known and believed by the same person." [42] The position thus taken by St. Thomas was endorsed by Scotus,[43] and is defended by many modern theologians, although the majority reject it as untenable. On the other hand, St. Bonaventure,[44] Alexander of Hales,[45] Albertus Magnus,[46] Richard of Middleton,[47] and Durandus,[48] took the opposite view. St. Bonaventure argues the point in this way: "The reason why such knowledge is compatible with faith in regard to the same object, so that the one cognition does not expel the other, is this, because knowledge which results from the light of reason, although it affords some certainty and evidence in reference to divine things, does nevertheless not make that certainty and evidence quite clear so long as we are on the way to God. For although we may be able to show by conclusive reasons that God exists and that God is one, still we are not able to see the divine essence itself, nor the unity of God, nor

[42] De Verit. q. 14, a. 9.
[43] In Sent. III, d. 23, n. 17.
[44] Ibid. a. 2, q. 3.
[45] Loc. cit. m. 7, a. 3.
[46] In Sent. III, d. 15, a. 9.
[47] Ibid. d. 24, q. 5.
[48] Ibid. q. 1.

how that unity does not exclude the plurality of persons, unless we are purified by the justice of faith. . . . Hence, as was pointed out above, just as faith is compatible with external vision, because something remains hidden about the person of Christ; so must it also be understood in regard to the habit of faith and this manner of knowing, namely, that they are compatible with each other in the same person and in respect of the same material object." [49]

The truths to be believed are in the present order of Providence unchangeable, so that the material object of faith admits neither of increase nor diminution. However men's knowledge of what is contained in the material object of faith grows with the lapse of time; "because what at one time was believed only implicitly, as involved in some article of the faith, was later on explained and thereupon became an object of explicit belief." [50] In this sense, therefore, faith may also be said to grow objectively; not by addition to the truths revealed, but by a clearer exposition of them as occasioned by the circumstances of time.[51]

The formal object of faith, as was stated above, is the reason upon which supernatural faith is based. This reason, according to the common teaching of the Scholastics, is the Supreme Truth bearing witness to Its truthfulness and authority in the revelation made to men. Thus St. Bonaventure, answering the objection that to believe without reason is worthy of blame, says: "This is very true in cases where authority does not supply the place of reason. But where authority does supply the place of reason it is not blameworthy but commendable. Thus it is in faith; for although no reason presents itself to the intellect on account of which it ought to give its assent to the truth, nevertheless there is present to it the authority of the Supreme Truth which exerts its suasion on the heart; and we know that the Supreme Truth cannot lie, and therefore it is impious not to believe Its testimony." [52]

[49] In Sent. III, d. 24, a. 2, q. 3.
[50] Ibid. d. 25, a. 2, q. 1.
[51] Albert. Magn. ibid. q. 1; Thomas, ibid. q. 2, a. 2; Middleton, ibid. a. 5, q. 1; Scotus, Report. III, d. 25, q. 1; In Sent. IV, d. 11, q. 3, n. 5.
[52] In Sent. III, d. 23, a. 1, q. 1.

Or as Scotus puts it very briefly: *"Fides infusa assentit alicui revelato, quia credit Deo, vel veracitati Dei asserentis illud."* [53] And St. Thomas: *"Ratio assentit alicui ex hoc quod est a Deo dictum."* [54]

However the intellect does not give its assent precisely as compelled by the evidence of the revealed truth; faith is a free act and depends partly on the bidding of the will as moved by divine grace. "Faith," says St. Thomas, "is not in the intellect except in so far as commanded by the will, . . . Hence although the act of the will can be said to be accidental to the intellect, yet it is essential to faith." [55] On the other hand, the act of the mind is not a blind assent; the light of faith itself makes it reasonable.[56] The intellect is elevated and enlightened by the First Truth, and so disposed, it is inclined by the will, also elevated by divine grace, to yield its assent to the truth proposed.[57]

The certainty of faith, therefore, is not in proportion to the light of evidence, but to the weight of God's authority. St. Thomas presents this aspect of faith as follows: "Certainty imports two things: First, firmness of the assent given, and in this respect faith is more certain than all cognition and knowledge; because the First Truth, which causes the assent of faith, is a more powerful cause than the light of reason which causes the assent in natural cognition. Secondly, certainty imports also the evidence of that to which assent is given, and in this respect there is no certainty in faith." [58]

St. Bonaventure puts the same teaching in a somewhat different form. Speaking about the action of grace in the matter of faith, he says: "Since man must give credence to the truth, and greater credence to the greater truth, and the greatest credence to the greatest truth; and since the truth of the First Principle is infinitely greater than all created truth, and infinitely more luminous than all the light of his intellect, it necessarily follows that his intellect, in order to show itself

[53] Ibid. d. 23.
[54] De Verit. q. 14, a. 2.
[55] Ibid. a. 3 ad 10m.
[56] Ibid. corp.
[57] Bonavent. In Sent. III, d. 23, a. 1, q. 1 ad 3m.
[58] De Verit. q. 14, a. 1 ad 7m.

properly disposed in the matter of belief, must give greater faith to the first Truth than to itself, and thus yield itself to the obedience of Christ, so that he not only believes those things that appear to be in conformity with reason, but also those that are above reason and in opposition to the experience of the senses. If he refuses to do this, he fails to show the proper reverence that is due to the Supreme Truth, preferring as he does the judgment of his natural reason to the dictate of the Eternal Light." [59]

Hence the certainty of faith consists in only one thing — in the firmness with which the mind clings to the First Truth.[60] From this it naturally follows that faith does not necessarily exclude from the mind involuntary doubts in regard to the truths that are believed, although its certainty is of a higher order than that which can be found in any natural knowledge; because in faith "the intellect is not in the quiescent state that results from the evidence of vision." [61]

4. *The Virtue of Hope.*— Hope is defined by the Lombard as "a virtue by which spiritual and eternal things are hoped for, that is, are looked forward to with confidence." [62] "This expectation," comments St. Bonaventure, "consists in a certain reaching out to the good things of eternity, which arises from the confidence with which the soul, in all the abandon of its strength, leans upon God Himself." [63] Almost the same terms are used by St. Thomas, when he says that "hope implies a certain reaching out of the appetite to what is good." [64]

All are agreed that hope is a theological virtue, and nearly all that it is really distinct from faith and charity.[65] Its real distinction from the other two theological virtues was called in question by a few obscure writers, whose view, Scotus says, "is opposed to the authority of the saints as based upon the

[59] Breviloq. V, 7.
[60] Bonavent. In Sent. III, d. 23, a. 1, q. 3.
[61] Thomas, ibid. q. 2, a. 2, sol. 3 ad 2m.
[62] Sent. III, d. 26, c. 1.
[63] In Sent. III, d. 26, a. 1, q. 3 ad 4m.
[64] Sum. Theol. I. II, q. 40, a. 2.
[65] Albert. Magn. In Sent. III, d. 26, a. 2; Bonavent. ibid. a. 1, q. 2, 3; Thomas, ibid. q. 2, a. 3; Middleton, ibid. a. 3, q. 3; Durandus, ibid. q. 2.

teaching of St. Paul." [66] The reason why hope is to be considered as a theological virtue is thus given by St. Bonaventure: "Hope must undoubtedly be classed as a theological virtue; and the reason for this assertion is taken both from the object and the subject of hope. From the object, because, just as faith in the act of believing gives its assent to God as dictating what is true, so does hope rely upon Him as promising what is great. Hence just as the object of faith, which acts by way of motive, is something uncreated, which is God, and for that reason faith is counted among the theological virtues; so the same must be said and understood in regard to hope. From the subject also a similar reason may be taken; because as the superior part of the soul must be perfected by the theological virtues, and as hope is one of the virtues that perfects this part of the soul, it follows necessarily that hope is a theological virtue." [67] St. Thomas puts this very briefly, when he says: "Hope has God for its object, and therefore it is a theological virtue." [68] And it is distinct from faith and charity, because while faith simply gives knowledge of man's last end, and charity embraces it as the highest good, hope tends to it as attainable.[69]

The material object of hope, according to the Scholastics, is God Himself to be possessed in eternal beatitude. "The good we must properly and chiefly hope for from God," says St. Thomas, "is infinite and in proportion to God's assistance; and this is life eternal, consisting in the fruition of God Himself." [70] And St. Bonaventure: "Whatever hope expects, it expects not only from God but also in God, so that possessing God it may possess all that is good." [71] Hence the material object of hope does not consist in formal beatitude, which is something created, and finite, but in beatitude taken objectively, which is God Himself as the object of blessed fruition. The only one of the Scholastics who held a different view on this point was Durandus, in as much as he made formal beatitude, or the fruition of God apart from God Him-

[66] Ibid. q. unic. n. 2; cfr. n. 10.
[67] In Sent. III, d. 26, a. 1, q. 3.
[68] Ibid. q. 2, a. 2.
[69] Ibid. q. 2, a. 3.
[70] Sum. Theol. II. II, q. 17, a. 2.
[71] In Sent. III, d. 26, a. 1, q. 2.

self, the immediate object of the virtue of hope.[72] Scotus is sometimes cited as holding that objective and formal beatitude together constitute the material object of hope, but he states quite distinctly and definitely that hope tends to a good which is infinite and eternal, and this is God Himself.[73]

However, as is quite obvious, since no one can hope to possess God except by the help of divine grace, the material object of hope must also include the means that are necessary for salvation. Hence these means constitute the secondary object of hope. In this sense Scotus writes: "We expect an infinite good from God, who liberally communicates Himself to us in view of the graces previously conferred."[74] In the same sense also St. Thomas writes: "Hope looks chiefly to eternal beatitude, and in reference to it all other things are asked of God"[75] And this is the common teaching of the Schoolmen.

The formal object of hope, if taken in a general sense, is the possession of God regarded under the aspect of possibility. However, as the possession of God is difficult of attainment, the formal object of hope is commonly designated as *summum bonum in quantum summum arduum* — it is the Supreme Good as possible of attainment indeed, but not without great difficulty. This is the explanation given by St. Thomas, who says: "Hope implies a motion of the appetite towards a good that is commensurate with the strength of him that hopes: for it neither regards a good that is unattainable, nor a good that is esteemed as nothing; but such a good only as can be attained, yet the attainment of which is difficult. For this reason it is termed a *bonum arduum*."[76] Others use practically the same terms, though some of them attach a slightly different meaning to the term *arduum*.[77]

From the fact that hope has the attainment of good for its object, it necessarily follows that it is a virtue which resides in the will. On this point all Scholastics are agreed.

[72] Ibid. q. 2.
[73] Ibid. d. 26, n. 11.
[74] Loc. cit.
[75] Sum. Theol. II. II, q. 17, a. 2 ad 2m.
[76] In Sent. III, q. 26, a. 2.
[77] Cfr. Bonavent. In Sent. III, d. 26, a. 2, q. 4.

But there is no strict agreement as regards the number of potencies that must be distinguished in the will. Some few hold that the irascible part of the will constitutes a distinct potency, and is therefore really distinct from the concupiscible part. Others identify the irascible and concupiscible parts so completely as to make them absolutely one potency of the rational soul.[78] Others, again, distinguish the two, but maintain that the irascible part, as referred to the rational soul, must be taken in an improper sense. The concupiscible and the irascible parts constitute really one potency, which is the rational will; but they imply different tendencies of the will towards its object. This is the more common view, and is defended by St. Thomas,[79] St. Bonaventure,[80] Scotus,[81] and many others.

However, notwithstanding this diversity of views in regard to the potencies of the will, there is found a general agreement among the Scholastics in reference to the proper subject of hope. They all maintain that the virtue of hope resides primarily in the irascible part of the will. The *summum arduum,* which they regard as the formal object of hope, in one way or another implies difficulties that must be overcome; and it is to the irascible part of the will that the overcoming of difficulties properly belongs. However, as hope also looks forward to the fruition of the *summum bonum,* in so far it may be said to reside secondarily in the concupiscible part of the will.[82]

Although the act of hope is essentially an act of the will, since the virtue resides in the will as its proper subject, nevertheless the more representative Scholastics hold that hope has a certainty of its own, distinct from that of faith. "It is, however, a difficult thing," says St. Bonaventure, "to define in what this certainty consists."[83] St Thomas puts his explanation in this form: "The certainty of faith and hope differ in four respects: First in this, that the certainty of faith is in the intellect, whereas the certainty of hope is in

[78] Cfr. Henry of Ghent, Quodl. I, q. 13.
[79] In Sent. III, d. 26, q. 2, a. 3.
[80] Ibid. d. 26, a. 2, q. 5.
[81] Ibid. d. 34, n. 13.
[82] Loc. cit.
[83] In Sent. III, d. 26, a. 1, q. 5.

the affections; secondly, because the certainty of faith can never fail, while the certainty of hope may fail *per accidens;* thirdly, because the certainty of faith is *de complexo,* whereas the certainty of hope is *de incomplexo,* which is the object of the appetite; fourthly, because the certainty of faith is opposed to doubt, while the certainty of hope is opposed to diffidence or hesitation." [84] This certainty of hope comes ultimately from God.

5. *The Virtue of Charity.*—All Scholastics are at one in holding that charity is a theological virtue, but there is no agreement regarding its distinction from sanctifying grace. Scotus,[85] Durandus,[86] Henry of Ghent,[87] and nearly all the Nominalists follow the view taken by the Lombard, that charity and sanctifying grace are essentially the same, although there is between them a *distinctio rationis.* "The same *habitus,*" says Scotus, "which is grace is also charity." [88] And again: "By the same *habitus* by reason of which the Holy Spirit dwells in our soul, the will is inclined to its own meritorious acts." [89] Henry of Ghent is even more explicit, when he says: "Grace and charity do not really differ; nay, that which in the essence itself is grace, in so far as it is considered absolutely or by way of essence, the very same is there also charity, in so far as it is considered under the aspect of potency." [90]

On the other hand, St. Thomas,[91] Albertus Magnus,[92] Ægidius Romanus,[93] and some others maintain that charity and sanctifying grace are really distinct. Their relation to one another is somewhat like that of potency and essence, if the terms be taken in a wider sense. St. Thomas points out that in the natural order of things there are three requisites for the attainment of any given end: A nature that is in proportion to the end proposed; an appetitive inclination towards its attainment; and an actual tendency in its direction.

[84] Ibid. q. 2, a. 4 ad 5[m].
[85] In Sent. II, d. 27, q. unic.
[86] Ibid. d. 26, q. 1.
[87] Quodl. 4, q. 10.
[88] In Sent. II, d. 27, n. 35.
[89] Ibid. I, d. 17, q. 3.
[90] Quodl. 4, q. 10.
[91] In Sent. II, d. 26, a. 4; Sum. Theol. I. II, q. 110, a. 3.
[92] In Sent. II, d. 26, a. 11.
[93] Ibid. q. 2, a. 1.

By analogy, then, it follows that similar requisites must be found in the supernatural order, so that man may be enabled to attain the end that lies beyond the reach of his natural powers. This being premised, the author continues: "Hence it is necessary that something be bestowed upon man by reason of which he is not only enabled to strive for the end, or has an inclination thereto, but his nature itself is elevated to a certain degree of dignity, so that it be in proportion to the supernatural end; and for this purpose grace is bestowed; but for the purpose of inclining the will to the same end, charity is given; while for the performance of actions by which the end is actually attained, other virtues are infused. And therefore just as in the natural order of things nature is distinct from its inclination to the end and from its operation, so likewise in the supernatural order is grace distinct from charity and other virtues." [94]

Between these two opposite views there is a third, advocated among others by St. Bonaventure [95] and Alexander of Hales.[96] According to this, there is not merely a *distinctio rationis* between charity and sanctifying grace, but neither is there between them a *distinctio realis.* They are distinguished not *per essentiam,* but only *comparatione* and *secundum esse.* St. Bonaventure illustrates his distinction as follows: "Just as the productive principle in man, because of its great perfection in giving natural life, not only causes life *in actu primo* but also *in actu secundo,* which consists in operation; so likewise does the principle of reparation give life to the spirit in the supernatural order, both as regards the life itself and the operation that follows." [97] Hence in the supernatural order, sanctifying grace is the remote principle of action; just as nature is the remote principle of action in the natural order: hence grace compared to charity, even as light compared to color, "is not different in essence, but only by way of comparison and in its mode of existence." [98]

The proper subject of the virtue of charity is simply the

[94] De Verit. q. 27, a. 2.
[95] In Sent. II, d. 27, a. 1, q. 2.
[96] Sum. II, q. 61, m. 2, a. 4.
[97] Breviloq. V, c. 4.
[98] In Sent. II, d. 27, q. 2.

rational will itself, though a few of the Scholastics assigned as its subject the concupiscible part of the will. Concerning these latter St. Thomas says: "Some say that charity resides in the concupiscible part, but this cannot be; because the concupiscible part belongs to the sensitive appetite. And if it be said that the concupiscible part is human, this is not true except because of its being under the direction of reason; unless perhaps they intend to call, by way of equivocation, the will itself an irascible and concupiscible potency."[99] And this some of them did intend, as for, instance, St. Bonaventure, who, on the one hand, held that the virtues of hope and charity reside in the rational will, and yet, on the other hand, assigned as their respective subjects the irascible and concupiscible part of the will.[100]

The material object of charity is in a way twofold: primary and secondary. The primary object is God Himself, the Supreme Good, to be possessed in eternal beatitude. The secondary object comprises all rational creatures in so far as they are capable of possessing God.[101] Hence the fallen angels and lost souls are not properly included in the secondary object of the virtue of charity.[102]

The formal object of charity is God as the absolute and supreme good, to be loved for His own sake. "Faith and hope," says St. Thomas, "do indeed reach out to God, but only in so far as from him comes the knowledge of what is true and the possession of what is good; whereas charity embraces God Himself for the purpose of resting in Him, and not that thence any advantage may accrue to us."[103] Hence charity is first and foremost a love of benevolence, because it intends the good of the beloved; but as the possession of God constitutes our eternal beatitude, it in so far also includes the love of concupiscence.[104]

Although the virtrue of charity, like that of faith and of

[99] In Sent. III, d. 27, q. 2, a. 3.
[100] Ibid. a. 1, q. 1; d. 26, a. 2, q. 5.
[101] Cfr. Bonavent. ibid. d. 27, a. 2, q. 4; Thomas, Sum. Theol. II. II, q. 23, a. 5; q. 25, a. 1; Albert. Magn. In Sent. III, d. 27, a. 7.
[102] Cfr. Thomas, In Sent. III, d. 28, q. 2, a. 5; Bonavent. ibid. a. unic. q. 2.
[103] Sum. Theol. II. II, q. 23, a. 6.
[104] Id. In Sent. III, d. 29, q. 1, a. 4; Bonavent. ibid. d. 27, a. 2, q. 2.

hope, is really distinct from sanctifying grace; yet unlike them, it does not remain when grace is lost. This difference is owing to the different opposition of the three theological virtues to mortal sin. Thus faith is opposed only to the sin of infidelity, either partial or total; hope, to the sin of presumption and despair; but charity is opposed to all mortal sins. Hence, while faith and hope may exist in a soul that is deprived of grace, charity cannot.[105] Finally, while faith and hope cease on the threshold of heaven, in the sense that they issue respectively into vision and possession; charity remains formally as it is, only it blossoms into greater perfection. This, however, does not necessarily imply that whatever perfection there is in the virtues of faith and hope is lost; but only that all imperfection has been removed from their corresponding acts.[106]

6. *The Cardinal Virtues.*—"The general purpose of virtue," says St. Bonaventure, "is twofold: First, that they may give a right direction to the powers of the soul by counteracting man's natural obliquity of inclination; secondly, that they may strengthen these same powers against the difficulties that must be overcome." [107] Now man has a threefold relation — to God, to himself, and to the neighbor. The right ordering of his relation to God is affected by the three theological virtues; but as they do not touch his relation to himself and the neighbor, other supernatural virtues must be infused for this purpose. These are the moral virtues: justice, fortitude, prudence, and temperance. The last three regulate man's conduct in respect to himself, while the first orders his relations with his neighbor. Each one of these four has other moral virtues connected with it, and therefore they are called principal or cardinal virtues. They have their own proper object, and are distinct from corresponding acquired habits.[108] Scotus, however, as was pointed out above, does not admit the existence of infused moral virtues.[109]

[105] Ibid. q. 4; Albert. Magn. ibid. a. 3.

[106] Loc. cit. d. 31, a. 3, q. 1; Thomas, ibid. q. 2, a. 1.

[107] In Sent. III, d. 33, q. 1.

[108] Cfr. Thomas, QQ. DD., De Virt. Cardinal.; Bonavent. In Sent. III, d. 33; Dionys. Carth. ibid. q. unica.

[109] The relation of all these vir-

The principal points in this teaching of the Scholastics on the infused virtues have been embodied by the Council of Trent in its decree on justification, and by the Council of the Vatican in its definitions of matters pertaining to faith, as will be pointed out in a later chapter. It must be noted, however, that the declarations of these two councils bear almost exclusively on the existence and nature of the theological virtues; the moral virtues are referred to only in passing, without even any direct affirmation of their existence. Hence the view taken by Scotus and his followers is free from all ecclesiastical censure, but it is rejected by most modern theologians. The Council of Vienne, held in 1311–1312, left the question still open, whether sanctifying grace and the virtues are infused in the baptism of children;[110] but the Council of Trent decided it in the affirmative, by defining in a general way that justification is obtained in baptism, and that in justification the virtues of faith, hope, and charity are infused together with sanctifying grace.[111]

tues to sanctifying grace, and their connection with one another, is thus beautifully described by St. Bonaventure: "De ramificatione igitur gratiae in habitus virtutum haec tenenda sunt, quod una sit gratia gratificans animam, septem tamem sunt virtutes gratuitae, quibus regitur vita humana: tres quidem theologicae, scilicet fides, spes et caritas: quatuor cardinales, scilicet prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo et justitia, quae uno modo est virtus communis et generalis, alio modo specialis et propria. Haec autem septem virtutes, licet sint distinctae et proprias excellentias habentes, sunt tamen connexae et aequales ad invicem in eodem; et licet sint gratuitae per gratiam informatae, possunt tamen fieri informes per culpam, sola caritate excepta, et iterum reformari per poenitentiam adveniente gratia, quae est habituum virtualium origo, finis et forma" (Breviloq. V, c. 4).

[110] Cfr. BD. 583.

[111] Cfr. Ibid. 800.

CHAPTER XV

THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL

DEFINITION AND EFFICACY OF THE SACRAMENTS

St. Augustine, when speaking of baptism, states that a sacrament consists of two things: a material or sensible element and the word — *accedit verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum.*[1] By the word he most likely understood, not only the prayer used in the consecration of the material element, but also the sacramental form. The combination of the word and the element he designated on various occasions as a *visible word, a sacred sign, the sign of a sacred thing, a sign of grace,* or simply as a *sacrament.* In his usage of them, all these terms stand for the outward sacramental rite. Then, with this outward rite he connected an inward effect, a *res sacra* or *gratia,* which he usually called the power of the sacrament — *virtus sacramenti.* The production of this inward effect he attributed to the Holy Spirit, as operating in and through the sacramental rite.[2]

These fundamental concepts, considerably clarified though not all first introduced by St. Augustine, were looked upon as a sacred heirloom by most subsequent theologians. Up to the twelfth century, and even till somewhat later, sacramental theology did not pass beyond that stage of development to which it had been advanced by the labors of Augustine in his contention with the Donatists. Then his studies of the sacramental system were taken up again with renewed ardor, and for nearly three hundred years continued to be a subject of special interest to the greatest of the Schoolmen. What he had barely touched upon they subjected to a searching inquiry, with the result that they rounded out and completed the sys-

[1] Ad Catech. 3.

[2] Cfr. vol. I, p. 347 sqq.

tem in all its parts. The contents of the present and the following chapter will give us some idea of the fruitfulness of their labors.

1. *Definition of a Sacrament.*— During the ninth and tenth centuries, St. Augustine's definition of a sacrament as a sacred sign had been, to a great extent, replaced by that of St. Isidore of Seville, according to which a sacrament is a sacred secret or a mystery. But with the advent of Scholasticism the Augustinian definition came again into favor. Abelard expanded it somewhat, without, however, introducing any substantial modification. "A sacrament," he says, "is a visible sign of the invisible grace of God." [3] This definition, as is obvious, may be applied to any sacred ceremony, and for that reason it was soon found to be of little practical value to the scientific study of the sacraments.

About the same time, Hugh of St. Victor defined a sacrament as "a corporeal or material element, which in its outward application is perceptible by the senses, by its similitude represents some invisible spiritual grace, by reason of its institution signifies that grace, and because of its sanctification contains the same." [4] This is a rather cumbersome definition; and, moreover, it is applicable only to those sacraments that are partly made up of a "corporeal or material element," which is not the case with penance, orders, and matrimony. Besides, when the author says that a sacrament "contains" grace, he seems to hold that grace is stored up in the sanctified element as in a vessel; and this he actually asserts a little further on.[5]

A better definition is found in the *Summa Sententiarum,* which in the past was commonly ascribed to Hugh of St. Victor but is now considered by many to be the work of some unknown twelfth-century writer. Discussing the Augustinian definition, he says: "A sacrament is a visible form of the invisible grace conferred in it, which grace the sacrament itself confers. For a sacrament is not merely a sign of a sacred thing, but also exerts efficiency in its respect. And this is the

[3] Introd. ad Theol. I, 2.
[4] De Sacram. I, p. 9, c. 2.
[5] Ibid. c. 4.

difference between a sign and a sacrament: in order to be a sign nothing is required except that it signifies the thing of which it is a sign, without in any way bestowing the same; but a sacrament furthermore also bestows that of which it is a sign or expression." [6]

This marks an immense advance over the definition given by Hugh. It places an essential distinction between sacramental rites and all other sacred ceremonies, by attributing to the former an efficacy in the production of grace which is denied to the latter. Practically the same definition is found in the *Sentences of Magister Bandini.* He puts it in this form: "That is properly said to be a sacrament which signifies grace in such a way as also to confer it. And by this the difference between the old and the new sacraments is clearly manifested: for they only promised and signified, whereas these signify and give grace." [7]

Almost the same terms are used by Peter Lombard in the definition which in one form or another recurs in the works of all his commentators. After briefly explaining the various kinds of signs and their purport, he states that a sacrament is not a natural but a conventional sign, but of such a kind that it bears the likeness of the thing signified; and then he proceeds: "For that is properly said to be a sacrament which is in such a manner a sign of the grace of God and a form of invisible grace, that it bears its image and is its cause. It was not therefore merely to signify grace that the sacraments were instituted, but also to confer sanctification." [8] It is this that distinguishes the sacraments of the Old and the New Law: the former "only promised and signified, the latter give salvation." [9] Hence every sacrament is indeed a sign, but not every sign is a sacrament.[10]

Later Scholastics frequently shortened the definition given by the Lombard, but they all kept its essential elements. Thus St. Thomas states briefly: "A sacrament is a sign of a sacred thing in so far as it sanctifies men." [11] It is its objective con-

[6] Op. cit. tr. 4, c. 1.
[7] Op. cit. IV, d. 1.
[8] Sent. IV, d. 1, c. 4.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Sum. Theol. III, q. 60, a. 2.

nection with grace that differentiates a sacrament from all other sacred rites and ceremonies. This, therefore, is the specific difference that restricts the generic term, "sacred sign" or "sign of a sacred thing," in its signification, and limits it to a particular class of sacred signs, which finally came to be exclusively designated as sacraments.

While the Scholastics thus gradually succeeded in working out a satisfactory definition, they also investigated the nature and composition of the external rite or sign. They soon recognized that the "element" and the "word," spoken of by St. Augustine, are not only found in every sacrament, but bear a very definite relation to one another in the constitution of the "sacred sign." The element is always more or less indefinite in its signification, and this indefiniteness is taken away by the words used in its application. Thus water, which is the "element" in baptism, may be employed either for cooling or cleansing purposes; but when the "word," I baptize or wash thee, is added, the purpose of the ceremony is definitely determined. And so proportionately in all other sacramental rites, even in those which do not consist of a corporeal element and formal words. The analogy between this observed fact and the constitution of bodies, as explained by the Scholastics, was too striking to remain long unnoticed. Hence early in the thirteenth century, William of Auxerre originated the theory of matter and form as applied to the sacramental sign.[12] Alexander of Hales adopted the terms in his exposition of the sacramental rite,[13] and after him St. Thomas permanently introduced them into the theological language of the Schoolmen. What formerly went by the general name of thing, was thenceforth spoken of as matter; and what till then had been designated as words, was thereafter simply called form.[14]

This theory was still further developed by Duns Scotus, who distinguished two kinds of matter: remote and proximate. The remote matter, according to his distinction, is the indefinite element in itself; as, for instance, the water used in baptism or the chrism employed in confirmation. While the prox-

[12] Cfr. Schanz, Die Lehre von den heiligen Sacramenten, p. 103.

[13] Sum. IV, q. 5, m. 3, a. 1.

[14] Sum. Theol. IV, q. 60, a. 6, 7, 8.

imate matter is the application of the indefinite element or remote matter to the recipient of the sacrament; as ablution and chrismation in baptism and confirmation respectively.[15] All this, as is obvious, introduced no real change in sacramental theology, but it was helpful towards clarifying ideas. Scotus, it may here be noted, made some reservation in applying the theory of matter and form to the sacrament of penance, in so far as he did not consider the acts of the penitent constituent parts of the sacrament.

2. *The Efficacy of the Sacraments.*— St. Augustin, in his contention with the Donatists, had already clearly pointed out that the Christian sacraments produce their effects independently of the moral disposition of the minister; and had also made it clear that the sanctification of the subject is objectively connected with the sacramental rite. It was this teaching, called to mind at a time when violent discussions were carried on regarding the validity of sacraments conferred by excommunicated ministers, that introduced the phrase *opus operatum* into sacramental theology. It was at first used to distinguish the sacramental rite, as objectively posited, from the action of the minister considered subjectively, although later on it became customary to apply the same distinction also to the actions of the recipient. Its earliest use is thus indicated by Peter of Poitiers, who died in 1205: *Baptizatio dicitur actio illius qua baptizat, quae est aliud opus quam baptismus, quia est opus operans, sed baptismus est opus operatum, ut ita liceat loqui.*[16] A few years later Pope Innocent III used the term in a similar connection. Speaking of the administration of the sacraments by an unworthy minister, he says: *Quamvis igitur opus operans aliquando sit immundum, semper tamen opus operatum est mundum.*[17]

After the middle of the thirteenth century, the two terms, *ex opere operato* and *ex opere operantis,* were also quite generally used to indicate the difference between the Christian sacraments and the Mosaic rites. As already pointed out

[15] In Sent. IV, d. 7, q. 1; cfr. ibid. d. 3, q. 3.

[16] Sent. V, c. 6.

[17] Cfr. Pourrat, Theology of the Sacraments, p. 163.

in a preceding paragraph, the difference between the two was held to consist chiefly in their connection with grace. It is true, some of the Scholastics, among whom was Peter Lombard,[18] went so far as to assert that the sacraments of the Old Law were of no spiritual benefit whatever, even to those who used them piously; but the majority of mediæval theologians regarded them in some way as means of grace, although not in the same sense as the Christian sacraments. According to Hugh of St. Victor and a few others, their connection with grace was objective but indirect, in the sense that they foreshadowed the sacraments of the New Law, and by this foreshadowing caused grace in the recipient.[19] St. Thomas, on the other hand, and indeed the greater number of the Scholastics, denied them all objective efficacy and held that they sanctified the recipient because of the faith and charity with which he received them. Hence their efficacy was entirely *ex opere operantis,* whereas that of the Christian sacraments is *ex opere operato.*

From this use of the term, *ex opere operato,* it is sufficiently clear that the Scholastics ascribed some kind of causality to the sacraments of the New Law. And this appears also from the definition of the sacraments as signs that sanctify, signs that signify and cause grace. But what kind of causality did they have in mind? In precisely what sense must the Christian sacraments be considered as causes of grace? On this point there was no agreement, even at the time of St. Thomas; for he says: "All are forced to admit that the sacraments of the New Law are in some manner causes of grace; for this is the express teaching of authority. But different men regard that causality in a different way."[20] These different views held by different theologians during the Middle Ages, are usually reduced to three distinct systems of sacramental causality. The following is a brief outline of them, as gathered from the works of the most representative Scholastics.

The first is the system of *occasional causality,* which was most ably defended by St. Bonaventure and Duns Scotus. The

[18] Sent. IV, d. 1, c. 4.
[19] Sum. Sent. tr. 4, c. 1, 2.
[20] In Sent. IV, d. 1, a. 4.

former speaks of it in these terms: "There is also the opinion of other great men, who say that, in the sense of quality or absolute property, there is no causality in the sacraments, nor any power productive of grace, either by way of efficiency or disposition; but that grace is produced by reason of a certain divine assistance. For they say that the divine power, which is the cause of grace, is present in the sacrament, and that the faith and devotion of the recipient act by way of disposition for the reception of grace. And this they explain by an example: At the word of Eliseus, Naaman, washing himself, was cleansed of his leprosy; in this case the divine power effected the cure, and the devotion and obedience of Naaman acted by way of disposition, but there was no causality either in the word of Eliseus or in the water of the Jordan. Now, if the Lord had so decreed that at the word of Eliseus, not only Naaman himself, but also all others coming for this purpose to the Jordan should be cured, and then by a kind of covenant had promised His perpetual assistance, that water would be said to cure and heal leprosy, and also to be the cause of such cures and to have the power of healing. And so, they say, it is in the case of the sacraments; so that, at the uttering of the word, the divine power is present in the water and thus infuses grace and regenerates the recipient, while he submits himself by a profession of faith and by obedience. In this sense, they hold, the sacraments are said to have power, to be causes, to produce effects, on account of the divine power which is present." [21]

Then, after explaining more in detail how all these terms, power, efficiency, causality, are taken in a wider sense — *extenso nomine* — when applied to the sacraments, and how grace is produced entirely in virtue of a divine ordination that became effective at the time when the sacraments were instituted, he concludes by saying: "To this position the piety of faith is not opposed, and reason gives its approval." [22] In another place he assigns as his reason for adopting this view the fact that the efficiency of the sacraments, taken in the

[21] In Sent. IV, d. 1, p. 1, a. unic. q. 4.

[22] Ibid.

strict sense of the term, in regard either to the production of grace or of a disposition thereto, is unintelligible.[23]

Scotus explains his position in practically the same terms. The sacraments, he says, are not the cause of grace by reason of any intrinsic form or property; but they may be said to produce grace by a kind of concomitance, in as much as, in consequence of the order established by God, they induce a natural condition in the subject on account of which God causes grace in the soul. Hence their efficacy in relation to grace is not raised above the natural order, and even this dispositive efficacy is the result of a divine agreement, or compact, as the author calls it, by which God bound Himself to impart His grace to all those who receive the sacraments with the proper disposition. A sacrament, therefore, is merely the occasion on which God recalls His promise, and then on account of His promise produces grace in the soul.[24] This occasional causality of the sacraments, as it is usually called, was also defended by Durandus,[25] Ockam [26] and the Nominalists generally.

Another explanation of the efficacy of the sacraments was outlined by Alexander of Hales, and afterwards further developed by St. Thomas. Like Peter Lombard, Alexander distinguished two effects produced in the reception of the sacraments — the *sacramentum et res* and the *res tantum*. By the former he understood the sacramental character, or, when there was question of sacraments that do not imprint a character, a spiritual ornament produced in the soul; by the latter he designated the grace conferred in the administration of the sacraments. The character or the ornament of the soul, as the case might be, he conceived to be efficiently produced by the sacraments, with a view to dispose the soul for the reception of grace; [27] while grace itself, thus called for by the dis-

[23] In Sent. III, d. 40, dub. 3.
[24] In Sent. IV, d. 1, q. 4, 5; Report. IV, d. 1, q. 4, n. 8.
[25] In Sent. IV, q. 4.
[26] Ibid. IV, q. 1, 6.
[27] His own words are: "Sine praejudicio melioris sententiae opinando dico, nihil asserendo, quod sacramenta sunt causae alicujus effectus in anima, non dico solum disponendo, sed efficiendo; efficiunt enim simpliciter characterizando et ornando. Unde dico, quod singula sacramenta aliquo modo ornant

position effected in the soul through the sacramental rite, must be caused directly and exclusively by God.[28] Hence the sacraments act directly only as dispositive causes of grace. Thus their causality is indeed saved, but it has only an indirect bearing on the production of the grace which they are said to confer.

This view was adopted by St. Thomas, at least in his earlier works; for in his *Commentary on the Sentences* he says: "Others there are who maintain that in the reception of the sacraments two things are effected in the soul; one is the *sacramentum et res,* as the character, or an ornament of the soul in the case of sacraments that do not imprint a character; the other is the *res tantum,* as grace. In respect of the first effect the sacraments are in some way efficient causes; but in respect of the second they are dispositive causes, inducing such a disposition as necessitates the infusion of grace, unless there be an impediment on the part of the recipient. And this view seems more in conformity with the teachings of theologians and the sayings of the saints." [29]

However, as there appears to be an insuperable difficulty in the supposition that a physical and material rite produces a supernatural and spiritual effect, whether that effect be sanctifying grace or merely a disposition thereto, St. Thomas found himself under the necessity of introducing here the distinction between principal and instrumental causes. The principal cause of the sacramental character or ornament of the soul, as well as of sanctifying grace, is God, whose causality alone bears a due proportion to the effect produced; but the instrumental causes of this same effect are the sacraments, in so far as they are subservient to God's power and intentions. Thus he says: "In so far as they are the instruments of the divine mercy which justifies man, they produce instru-

animam, vel imprimendo characterem, vel alio modo signando" (Sum. IV, q. 5, m. 3, a. 5 ad 1m).

[28] "Solus Deus operatur gratiam et animae infundit; sed sacramenta Novae Legis disponunt ipsum susceptibile, efficiendo aptiorem ad gratiae susceptionem et faciunt, quod gratia efficax sit" (Ibid. a. 5 ad 2m).

[29] In Sent. IV, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4.

mentally in the soul some effect that bears a direct proportion to the sacraments, such as the character or something of that kind. But to the ultimate effect, which is grace, they do not attain even instrumentally, except by way of disposition strictly as such. Hence what the sacraments directly produce is a disposition that necessitates, so far as it comes in question, the infusion of grace." [30]

Then, in order to show the possibility of this instrumental causality as predicated of the sacraments, he enters into a rather minute discussion on the difference between the action of principal and instrumental causes. "The power of acting," he says, "is always in proportion to the agent. Therefore it is necessary to suppose one kind of power in the principal agent, and another in the instrumental agent. The principal agent acts always according to the exigencies of his own form, and therefore his active power is some form or quality that is complete in the order of nature. But the instrument acts only as moved by another, and hence it must have power in proportion to this movement. Now movement is not a complete entity, but is the way to it, holding a middle place between pure potency and complete actuality. . . . Hence, as the sacraments are instrumental agents, their spiritual power is not a complete entity, but is incomplete." [31] And again: "In a corporeal thing there cannot be a spiritual power that is complete in itself; but it can be there by way of intention, just as art is said to exist in the instruments employed by the artist." [32]

This view of St. Thomas was adopted by many of his followers, and up to the sixteenth century it was commonly defended as his genuine and exclusive teaching. Then, however, owing to the sharp criticism of Cardinal Cajetan,[33] it was by many set aside in favor of another view, which St. Thomas apparently defended in his *Summa Theologica.* Whether he really did change his mind is even now a matter of dispute, but all indications are that he did. For in the

[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid. a. 4 ad 4[m].
[33] In Sum. III, q. 62.

Summa, which is the last work he wrote, he puts aside the distinction between the *sacramentum et res* and the *res tantum,* and states without any modification whatever that the sacraments are the instrumental causes of grace. Furthermore, he answers the objection that grace, being a participation of the divine nature, can be produced only by God without the concurrence of a created instrument, by explaining how the effect is assimilated not to the instrumental but to the principal cause, and that consequently the nature of grace does not make impossible the instrumental causality of the sacraments.[34] Some writers, like Cardinal Billot, maintain that this teaching of the *Summa* should be interpreted by what St. Thomas holds in his *Commentaries on the Sentences;* but modern Thomists generally contend that the Angelic Doctor changed his mind with advancing years.

According to this latter interpretation, then, St. Thomas finally decided in favor of the system that advocates the physical perfective causality of the sacraments, in the sense that the sacraments are physical instrumental causes, not merely of a disposition to grace, but of grace itself. By virtue of a divine power, in some way transiently communicated to them, they exercise an immediate physical influence on the production of grace in the soul. However, that the sacraments, according to the teaching of St. Thomas, are physical instrumental causes is not conceded by all those of his genuine followers who admit that he finally abandoned the idea of dispositive causality. In various places, they point out, there occur expressions which indicate that he was rather in favor of causality in the moral or intentional order. Thus he says that the sacraments are causes by way of signification,[35] that their causative virtue is present after the manner of intention — *per modum intentionis,*[36] and that in baptism the water produces its spiritual effect in the soul in so far as it is recognized by the intellect as a sign of supernatural cleansing.[37] Expressions of this kind occur quite frequently in his writings, and their import seems to be that the causality of

[34] Sum. Theol. III, q. 62, a. 1, 4.
[35] QQ. DD., q. 27, a. 4 ad 18[m].
[36] In Sent. IV, d. 1, a. 4 ad 4[m].
[37] QQ. DD., q. 27, a. 4 ad 2[m].

the sacraments belongs to the moral or intentional rather than to the physical order. At all events, it is not likely that a unanimous verdict on the teachings of St. Thomas in regard to sacramental causality will ever be reached.

CHAPTER XVI

THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL

SACRAMENTAL GRACE: THE CHARACTER: NEED OF INTENTION: THE NUMBER SEVEN: INSTITUTION OF THE SACRAMENTS

Since all the sacraments have the same essential definition, it necessarily follows that they have certain properties in common. The more important of them will be briefly outlined in the present chapter.

1. *Sacramental Grace.*— St. Bonaventure cites three different views on the nature of the grace conferred by the sacraments, each one of which had its defenders among the Scholastics. Those who held the first view maintained that sacramental grace did not differ intrinsically from ordinary sanctifying grace, the term sacramental being applied to it simply for the purpose of indicating its origin. Others, who defended the second view, contended for an essential difference between the two kinds of grace. Ordinary sanctifying grace, according to them, has for its object the performance of good works, whereas sacramental grace is primarily intended to repair the ravages of sin. Hence there may be two different kinds of sanctifying grace in the soul. St. Bonaventure himself took a middle stand, holding on the one hand that all sanctifying grace is essentially the same, and on the other that sacramental grace connotes different effects because of the purpose for which it is given.[1]

The position of St. Thomas in this matter is not quite clear. In his *Commentary on the Sentences* he says that the grace conferred by the sacraments is distinct from the grace of virtues and gifts, or from ordinary sanctifying grace;

[1] In Sent. IV, p. 1, a. unic., q. 6.

and also that sanctifying grace is of one kind in so far as it is in the essence of the soul, and of another kind in so far as it perfects the potencies.[2] On the other hand, in the *Summa* he seems to hold that sanctifying grace is essentially the same whatever be its origin, and that the grace derived from the sacraments merely connotes different helps intended for the attainment of the end proper to each sacrament.[3] Practically the same indefinite position had been taken by Alexander of Hales.[4] However, the opinion defended by St. Bonaventure finally gained the day.

According to the common teaching of the Scholastics, sacramental grace is ordinarily conferred at the time when the sacraments are received; however, if there be an obstacle in the recipient, which on the one hand does not invalidate the sacrament and on the other impedes its effect, the bestowal of grace is deferred until the obstacle has been removed. This deferred bestowal of grace is now known as the *reviviscence* of the sacraments. The doctrine of *reviviscence* is clearly taught by St. Thomas in respect of the three sacraments that imprint a character.[5] Scotus refers to it only when speaking of baptism, and then he says that as soon as the obstacle is removed by proper penance, baptismal grace is conferred in virtue of the baptism already received.[6]

2. *The Sacramental Character.*— The doctrine of the sacramental character, and also of the consequent initerability of the sacraments by which it is imprinted, was brought to practically its full development by St. Augustine. His teaching on this point was accepted by the whole Western Church, and remained a directive norm till about the end of the seventh century. But from that time on, at least so far as appearances go, little attention seems to have been paid to the doctrine of the sacramental character. Owing to the disorder caused by schism, moral corruption, and the encroachment of the civil authority upon the rights of the Church, theological learning was at a low ebb, and in places practices sprang up

[2] Op. cit. IV, d. 1, q. 1, a. 5.
[3] Op. cit. III, q. 62, a. 2.
[4] Sum. IV, q. 5, m. 4, a. 2.
[5] In Sent. IV, d. 4, a. 2.
[6] Ibid. IV, q. 5, n. 2, 3.

that were directly opposed to the teaching of Christian antiquity. Among these abuses was that of reordaining persons upon whom orders had been conferred by simoniac or deposed bishops, or of declaring their orders null and void. In the contentions that thereupon ensued, little or no reference was ever made to the fact that an indelible character imprinted by the sacrament of orders would make such reordinations sacrilegious. And hence the logical inference seems to be that the doctrine of the sacramental character had more or less fallen into oblivion.[7]

However, the correctness of this inference is not clearly established. Even to what extent the practice of reordination was carried is historically uncertain. Saltet appears to take an extreme view when he states: "In the struggle of the Church against simoniacs and intruders, until the twelfth century, the chief instrument of warfare, sometimes of the enemies of the Church, sometimes too, nay most often, of the best sons of the Church and of several Popes, was simply to declare void and to repeat ordinations that were certainly valid." [8]

At all events, during the twelfth century the doctrine of the character was thoroughly familiar to theological writers. This appears clearly from the manner in which Innocent III answered the question, whether those who had been baptized whilst asleep, or whilst out of their mind, had received the sacramental character. Neither the question nor the answer admits of any doubt regarding the doctrine that in baptism a character is impressed on the soul. The only point on which the questioners were in doubt touched the validity of baptism under the given conditions. And this doubt the Pope solved by saying that, if the persons in question had previously intended to be baptized, the sacrament so administered was valid.[9] Hence the contention of some Protestant writers, that Innocent III introduced the doctrine of the sacramental character, only shows that either they have not read or else must have misinterpreted his answer to the proposed question. And

[7] Cfr. Morin, De sacris Eccl. ordinat. III, exerc. 5, c. 5.

[8] Bulletin de litt. eccl. 1901, p. 229, 230.

[9] DB. 441.

the same must be said with regard to some fourteenth-century theologians, among whom were Scotus and Durandus. The former admitted the existence of the sacramental character only because it was taught by the Church in his day,[10] while the latter based his acceptance of the doctrine on the prevailing opinion of the schools.[11]

In the early part of the thirteenth century, the Scholastics began to inquire into the nature of the character, as imprinted on the soul by baptism, confirmation, and orders. On this point there was quite a diversity of opinion. Thus William of Paris thought that the sacramental character must be regarded as a certain kind of sanctity, somewhat like that which results from the consecration of churches, altars, and liturgical vessels.[12] In maintaining this view, he had no followers except Durandus, who, about a century later, described the sacramental character in these terms: *Character non est aliqua natura absoluta, sed est sola relatio rationis, per quam ex institutione vel pactione divina deputatur aliquis ad sacras actiones.*[13]

Peter Lombard barely refers to the sacramental character, but Alexander of Hales gives a full exposition of the doctrine. According to him, the character imprinted by the sacraments is an objective and absolute reality that adheres to the soul. It belongs to the first species of qualities, which is termed *habitus*. Its primary purpose is to dispose the soul for the reception of grace, and to mark it as belonging to the flock of Christ. Each of the three characters is the foundation of a peculiar relation to the Savior. That of baptism makes the recipient like unto Him as Head of the Church; that of confirmation produces a somewhat similar likeness to Him as King of the sacred hosts; while that of orders assimilates the newly ordained to Him as Sovereign Priest. Its proximate subject is not the substance of the soul, but the potencies, and through them it inheres in the soul itself. It is especially attributed to the intellect, as that faculty is more expressive of the divine image in man. By divine ordination it is indeli-

[10] In Sent. IV, d. 6, q. 9, n. 14.
[11] Ibid. d. 4, q. 1.
[12] De Sacrament. c. 3.
[13] In Sent. IV, d. 4, q. 1.

ble, and therefore will remain in the soul for all eternity.[14]

St. Bonaventure gives the same exposition, both as regards the nature and purpose of the sacramental character and its proximate subject. He explicitly refutes five different views on the nature of the sacramental character, which were held in his day. The first regarded the character as a mere consecration of the soul; the second, as a potency; the third, as a passible quality; the fourth, as a form or figure; the fifth, as some unclassified infused quality. After giving the reason for rejecting these views, he establishes his own, holding with Alexander that the sacramental character is an indelible *habitus,* which, residing proximately in the faculties, disposes the soul for the reception of sanctifying grace.[15]

Albertus Magnus takes practically the same position, except that he favors the opinion which makes the intellect the proximate subject of the sacramental character.[16] St. Thomas, on the other hand, looked at the matter in quite a different light. In the first place, he set aside the opinion, rather common in his day, that the character is a *habitus;* and the reason he gives for this is that no virtuous habit, such as the character would have to be if it were a *habitus,* can be used indifferently for good or evil, as is the case with the sacramental character. Then, as the character is permanent and indelible, it can evidently not be a *passio,* which is a merely transient modification; hence he concludes that it is a *potentia.*[17]

This conclusion, moreover, he reasons out by a consideration of the end for which the sacraments were instituted. Their purpose is not only to serve as a remedy against sin, as was commonly held at the time, but furthermore to perfect the soul in those things which pertain to the service of God according to the Christian manner of life. Hence some sacraments imprint a character, in order to fit man for this service.[18] Now, divine service consists either in receiving something sacred for oneself or in giving it to others; and for both purposes a certain power is required, passive in one case

[14] Sum. IV, q. 8, m. 8, a. 1.
[15] In Sent. IV, d. 6, p. 1, a. unic. q. 1, 2.
[16] Ibid. d. 6, a. 3, 4.
[17] Sum. Theol. III, q. 63, a. 2.
[18] Sum. Theol. III, q. 63, a. 1.

and active in the other. Consequently, the sacramental character imparts a certain spiritual power, whose direct object is the service or worship of God. Still, this power, and therefore the character itself, is, properly speaking, not in any genus or species, but is reducible to the second species of quality, and in this sense it is a *potentia.*[19]

Considered in relation to its primary purpose, the sacramental character is a participation in the eternal priesthood of Christ, whence the Christian manner of worship is derived. Hence every one of the faithful, by the very fact of his baptism, is clothed with a priesthood like that of the eternal High Priest. This likeness is perfected in confirmation, and brought to its highest perfection in the sacrament of orders.[20] On the other hand, the sacramental character may also be considered as a configuration or resemblance of the soul to the Blessed Trinity, but only through Christ, who is the brightness of God's glory and the figure of His substance.[21]

Finally, as the sacramental character is a *potentia,* and is primarily imprinted for the purpose of fitting the recipient for rendering God due service, either by receiving the sacraments himself or by administering them to others, its proximate subject is not the substance of the soul but its faculties.[22] And as, moreover, the reception and administration of the sacraments is in a certain manner a profession of faith, the character is properly said to reside in the intellect.[23]

For a time this teaching of St. Thomas gained many followers, but later theologians, with the exception of the Thomists, quite generally set it aside as being more or less arbitrary. For whatever be said about the baptismal and sacerdotal character in this respect, it seems quite obvious that the character bestowed in confirmation does not confer any power, either active or passive, which is not already possessed in virtue of baptism. And this is admitted by St. Thomas himself. Hence, outside the Thomistic school, it has become the common teaching of theologians that the character is simply

[19] Ibid. a. 2.
[20] Ibid. a. 3.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid. a. 4.
[23] Ibid. a. 4, ad 3[m].

a supernatural quality which places the soul in a special relation to Christ, and in view of its sacramental origin entitles man to those abundant helps to salvation which the sacraments were intended to confer.[24]

A word may here be added in reference to the rather peculiar position of Duns Scotus. After rejecting the arguments of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, which were advanced by these authors for the express purpose of proving that the sacramental character must be regarded as an absolute quality, he states his own view in the following terms: "Notwithstanding these reasons, which do not conclude, it may be said that the character is only some kind of extrinsic relation of the soul itself, caused directly by God in the reception of the sacraments that are initerable; for putting the matter in this way, all that is commonly said about the character is perfectly safe." [25] This extrinsic relation is supposed to be real, and has the will for its proximate term.[26] Hence the view of Scotus regarding the sacramental character is different from that of Durandus, but its drawbacks are hardly less serious; for it is impossible to conceive a real relation of this kind without some absolute quality as its foundation in the soul. For this reason modern followers of Scotus usually interpret his teaching on the sacramental character as postulating such an absolute quality; yet, to all appearances, he himself did not consider it necessary.

3. *Need of Intention.*— That neither sanctity nor faith is required for the valid administration of the sacraments is the common teaching of the Scholastics.[27] But not the same unanimity is found in their statements regarding the need of intention. Thus Rolandus held that baptism would be valid even if the minister had no intention whatever, provided he administered the sacramental rite according to the prescription of the Church.[28] Hugh of St. Victor, on the other hand, regarded this view as absurd.[29] So did the author of the

[24] Cfr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogm. VI, n. 189 sq.
[25] In Sent. IV, d. 6, q. 10, n. 2, 13.
[26] In Sent. IV, d. 6, q. 11.
[27] Cfr. Thomas, Sum. Theol. III, q. 64, a. 5, 9.
[28] Sent. Gietl, p. 206.
[29] De Sacr. II, 6, 13.

Summa Sententiarum,[30] and Peter Lombard.[31] But Robert Pulleyn, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, tried to refute the arguments of Hugh, and stated in very explicit terms: "Baptism is valid when the rite is outwardly performed in its entirety, whatever be the inward intention of him who baptizes or of him who is baptized." [32]

A little later Alexander of Hales formulated a rule in regard to baptism which was generally adopted by later Scholastics, and applied to other sacraments as well. He expresses it in this way. "Whenever anyone uses the proper words and has the intention of doing what the Church does, although he understands not what that may be — that is, he intends to do what the Church has been accustomed to do — that baptism is valid." [33] Yet, even he admitted that the want of intention on the part of the minister might be supplied by Christ, at least in the case of those sacraments that are necessary for salvation.[34] Some also interpret a passage in the works of St. Thomas as upholding this view, but others understand it in a different sense.[35] Innocent IV is frequently cited in favor of the opinion that there is no need of an interior intention; but without just reason. He treats the question of the validity of baptism in his commentary on the third book of *Decretals,* which he wrote before his elevation to the pontifical chair; and although he maintains that the minister need not "bear in mind to do what the Church does," or "may even have the contrary in mind," still in this contention he refers merely to the minister's understanding of the end intended, not to the fact of an interior intention as such. Hence his further statement: "The baptism is valid, provided he intends to baptize." [36]

At all events, the general teaching of the thirteenth-century and later Scholastics is that an interior or mental intention is required on the part of the minister for the valid administration of the sacraments. The principle underlying this teach-

[30] Sent. IV, d. 6, 5.
[31] Op. cit. tr. 6, 9.
[32] Sent. V, c. 16.
[33] Sum. IV, q. 8, m. 3, a. 1.
[34] Loc. cit.
[35] In Sent. IV, d. 6, q. 1, a. 2.
[36] Tit. 42, c. 2; cfr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogm. VI, p. 120.

ing is thus stated by St. Thomas: "When a rite is of such a nature that it may indifferently signify many things, it must be determined in its signification by something else. Now, the sacramental rites are of this kind; thus ablution in baptism may have for its end either bodily cleanness, or bodily health, or mere enjoyment, or many other things of a similar kind; and therefore it is necessary that it be determined by the intention of the minister to signify one of them, that is, to signify the sacramental effect."[37] And that he understands this intention to be interior or mental, the author indicates in his answer to an objection drawn from the distractions that may occur during the performance of the sacramental rite; for he says: "If, while making ready to baptize, the priest intends to do in baptism what the Church does, then, even if during the rite his thoughts wander to something else, the sacrament is valid in virtue of the intention which he actually had before he began to baptize."[38] This teaching had already been embodied in the profession of faith which Innocent III required of converts from the Waldensian error.[39]

A similar intention was also required in the recipient of the sacraments. Hence the same Pope decided that those who approach baptism induced by fear of punishment, and those who are baptized while unconscious or asleep, do not receive the sacrament unless they have an actual or habitual intention to that effect.[40]

4. *The Number Seven.*—Before the number of the sacraments could be determined, there was need of an exact definition which marked off the sacramental rites from all other sacred ceremonies. Such a definition was worked out in the twelfth century, and it was at that time that seven religious rites began to be exclusively designated as sacraments. All of them had been known to Patristic writers, and the Church had used them from the beginning of her existence; but so long as there was no strict definition of a sacrament, the term was applied indiscriminately to all rites and ceremonies that had a religious character. Hence, what the Scholastics achieved

[37] Sum. Theol. III, q. 64, a. 8.
[38] Ibid. a. 8 ad 3[m].
[39] DB. 424.
[40] Ibid. 411.

was not the invention of sacramental rites, but their proper classification by means of an exact definition. It was this classification that the unknown author of the *Summa Sententiarum* had in mind when he wrote: "A sacrament is not merely a sign of a sacred thing, but it also exerts efficacy in its respect. And this is the difference between a sign and a sacrament: in order to be a sign nothing is required except that it signifies the thing of which it is a sign, without in any way bestowing the same; but a sacrament furthermore also bestows that of which it is a sign or expression."[41]

The work of classification itself proceeded slowly, even after the principle upon which it was to rest had been clearly enunciated. This was partly owing to the want of proper terms for sacred rites that were not productive of grace. It was not until Alexander of Hales coined the term *sacramental* that the name *sacrament* could be used in an exclusive sense. Hence the earliest attempts at classification distinguished between *sacramenta majora* and *minora,* that is, between sacred rites that were held to be of great importance because of their intimate connection with salvation, and others that were considered of less importance. That distinction is already found in the works of Abelard,[42] of Hugh of St. Victor,[43] and Alger of Liege,[44] all of whom wrote in the first half of the twelfth century. They, however, enumerate only five sacraments among the *majora:* Eucharist, baptism, confirmation, matrimony, and extreme unction; or as Alger gives them: Eucharist, baptism, chrisma (confirmation), confession, and orders.[45]

At the same time, or perhaps a little later, the author of the *Summa Sententiarum* speaks about "all the sacraments," and then treats of baptism, confirmation, the Eucharist, penance, anointing of the sick, and matrimony; thus leaving out the sacrament of orders; but to that he refers in connection with the keys which are given at the consecration of the priest.[46] Meanwhile in Abelard's own school penance and

[41] Op. cit. tr. 4, c. 1.
[42] Epit. Theol. Christ. 28.
[43] De Sacr. I, 9, II, 9, 1.
[44] De Misericord. et Just. I, 62–70.
[45] Loc. cit. ML, 180, 884.
[46] Op. cit. tr. 5–7.

orders, which he himself had passed by, were also counted with the other five. Thus Rolandus[47] and Omnebene[48] speak first in a general way of the *sacramentum Incarnationis,* and then of baptism, confirmation, the sacrament of the body and blood of Christ, penance, the conferring of the keys, and matrimony. At the same time, however, all these authors still apply the name sacrament also to other religious rites; and so too did the Third Lateran, 1179, and a synod of London held in 1237.[49] It was Peter Lombard who first enumerated the seven sacraments in their present order, and designated them exclusively as sacraments;[50] but it took some little time before his terminology was universally accepted.

From the foregoing brief statements it appears sufficiently clear that the classification of seven religious rites as sacraments did not result from the individual speculation of the Lombard, as is frequently maintained by Protestant writers. He merely gave the finishing touch to a development that had been going on for generations. Nay, it seems that even independently of his speculations the same classification resulted spontaneously from the traditional teaching of the Church. For in a sermon which was written down at the very latest towards the middle of the twelfth century, we find this striking passage: "As I am about to depart from you, I deliver to you what was delivered unto us by the Lord, a pledge of the holy faith between you and God, namely, the seven sacraments of the Church, as the seven sanctifying gifts of the Holy Spirit. . . . For your sake I deem it proper to enumerate them once more, and to point out which they are — baptism, confirmation, the anointing of the sick, the Eucharist, the reconciliation of sinners, matrimony, and orders. . . . Wherefore retain them with all honor and reverence, love and revere them; teach them to your children, so that they may know them by heart and diligently guard them for all future generations."[51]

After the twelfth century theologians no longer inquired

[47] Cfr. Gietl, 157 sqq.
[48] Cfr. Denifle, ALKG, I, 467.
[49] Mansi, 22, 221; 23, 448.
[50] Sent. IV, d. 2, 1.
[51] Cfr. Bolland. I, Jul. 396; Monum. Germ. Hist. Script. 20, 732.

into the number of the sacraments, but they displayed considerable ingenuity in thinking out reasons why there should be seven. They were convinced that Christ had given seven sacraments to His Church, neither more nor less; but why seven? In answer to this question they advanced a great variety of divergent views. Thus Albertus Magnus thought that the sacraments were instituted as so many remedies against the seven capital sins.[52] St. Bonaventure coördinated them with the three theological and the four cardinal virtues.[53] St. Thomas pointed out the evident correspondence that is found between man's natural and supernatural life, and thence derived reasons of congruity as to why there should be five sacraments to provide for man's spiritual needs in so far as he is an individual human being, and two others to be of help to him in his relation to society.[54] It must be noted, however, that as all these authors presuppose the existence of seven sacraments, the various reasons advanced by them are not intended to prove anything else than the fitness of the divine institution.

5. *Institution of the Sacraments.*— The traditional teaching of the Church in regard to the institution of the sacraments was thus formulated by a fourth- or fifth-century writer, to whom the treatise *De Sacramentis* is attributed: "The author of the sacraments? Who is he, if not the Lord Jesus? The sacraments have come down from heaven."[55] This traditional view, in so far as it merely asserts that the sacraments were in some way instituted by Christ, was universally adopted by the Scholastics. But on the further question, whether Christ instituted the sacraments immediately, in person, or through the agency of others, there was no absolute agreement. Thus Hugh of St. Victor and Peter Lombard held that extreme unction was instituted by the Apostles;[56] and the same was taught by Alexander of Hales[57] and St. Bonaventure.[58] The latter expressed a similar view with re-

[52] In Sent. IV, d. 2, a. 1.
[53] Breviloq. VI, 3.
[54] Sum. Theol. III, q. 65, a. 1.
[55] Op. cit. ML, 16, 439.
[56] Hugh, De Sacr. II, 15, 11; Lomb. Sent. IV, d. 23, c. 3.
[57] Sum. IV, q. 9, m. 1, 2.
[58] In Sent. IV, d. 23, a. 1, q. 2.

gard to confirmation,[59] while the former attributed the institution of that sacrament to the Council of Meaux, held in 845. Before that time, he contended, the Holy Ghost had been imparted to the faithful without the medium of any sacramental rite.[60]

St. Bonaventure, however, seems to have changed his mind towards the end of his life. For in his *Breviloquium* he says: "Christ instituted the aforesaid sacraments in different ways. Some of them he instituted by confirming, approving, and perfecting what already existed, as matrimony and penance; some others, by insinuating and initiating them, as confirmation and extreme unction; others again, by initiating, consummating, and receiving them Himself, as the sacrament of baptism, the Eucharist, and orders. These three He instituted fully, and He was also the first to receive them."[61] Even Alexander states in one place that all the sacraments were instituted either by Christ Himself or by the Apostles, in virtue of His authority.[62]

Albertus Magnus,[63] St. Thomas,[64] and Duns Scotus[65] attribute the institution of all the sacraments immediately to Christ, so that the Apostles simply used and promulgated what Christ had established. St. Thomas, while speaking of extreme unction, expresses his view in these terms: "In regard to this sacrament there are two opinions. Some there are who say that Christ did not institute extreme unction and confirmation in person, but commissioned the Apostles to institute them; because these two, on account of the fullness of grace which is conferred in them, could not be instituted before the final sending of the Holy Spirit. . . . Others say that Christ instituted all the sacraments in person; but that He personally promulgated only those which present greater difficulty in the way of belief, while He left it to the Apostles to promulgate the others, such as extreme unction and confirmation. And this opinion appears all the more probable

[59] Ibid. d. 7, a. 1, q. 1.
[60] Loc. cit. m. 1.
[61] Op. cit. VI, c. 4.
[62] Op. cit. q. 5, m. 2, a. 1.
[63] In Sent. IV, d. 7, a. 1–3.
[64] Ibid. q. 1, a. 1–3.
[65] Ibid. d. 2, q. 1.

as the sacraments belong to what is fundamental in the New Law, and therefore their institution pertains to the Lawgiver Himself." [66] And where he speaks of the sacraments in general, he simply states that they were instituted by God *potestate auctoritatis,* and by Christ *potestate excellentiae.*[67]

After the time of St. Thomas the immediate institution of the sacraments by Christ was universally taught in the schools, and not until the seventeenth century was the mediate institution of some of the sacraments again defended by theologians. Then, however, the question was proposed in a different form, namely, whether Christ determined the sacramental rite *in genere* only or also *in specie.* Thus put, the question is still waiting for a solution.

The principal points contained in the foregoing two chapters, which set forth the teaching of the Scholastics on the sacraments in general, were embodied by the Council of Trent in its various definitions of doctrines then under discussion. The septenary number of the sacraments, their institution by Christ, their efficacy *ex opere operato,* the conferring of grace, the impression of a character by baptism, confirmation, and orders; the difference between the sacraments of the Old and New Law, the need of an intention on the part of the minister, the validity of the sacraments conferred by ministers in the state of mortal sin — all these points were clearly defined and proposed for the acceptance of the faithful.[68] It is true, not all of the doctrines thus defined had been brought to their full development by the labor of the Scholastics; but in no other field of theological inquiry did the Schoolmen achieve more satisfactory results than in sacramental theology.

[66] Sum. Theol. Suppl. 29, a. 3.
[67] Ibid. III, q. 64, a. 2, 3.
[68] DB, 844–856.

CHAPTER XVII

BAPTISM: CONFIRMATION

After considering the points that are common to all the sacraments, or at least to several of them, the Scholastics proceed to investigate each sacrament in particular. They inquire into the time and circumstances of its institution, its nature, effects, and the manner of its administration. In this study they are, as a general rule, rather diffuse, considering not only dogmatic questions, but also such as have an exclusively moral bearing. Hence in the following chapters it will be impossible to do more than give the barest outline of their teaching, setting forth only such points as are of more particular interest and importance in the history of dogmatic development.

A — Baptism

Peter Lombard describes baptism in these terms: "Baptism is called a dipping in — *intinctio* —, that is, an external washing of the body done while pronouncing a prescribed formula. For, if the washing be not accompanied by the pronouncing of the words, no sacrament is had, but when the washing in the water is accompanied by the pronouncing of the words, it becomes a sacrament; the water itself does not, indeed, become a sacrament, but the washing in the water." [1]

Hence the sacrament of baptism consists of two parts: a bodily ablution with water and a prescribed form of words. The bodily ablution was considered by the Scholastics both under an active and a passive aspect. Under its active aspect they understood by it the action of the minister in so far as he applies the baptismal water to the subject and pronounces the

[1] Sent. IV, d. 3, c. 1.

prescribed form. Under its passive aspect they considered the ablution precisely as received by the subject. From this distinction arose the question, under which of these two aspects does the ablution properly constitute the sacrament of baptism? Some answered this question by saying that the sacrament is properly in the person who is regenerated by it, and therefore it is the ablution in its passive sense that constitutes the sacrament.[2] Others made a distinction between the sacrament as a sign of grace and a cause of regeneration. In the former sense the sacrament was said to consist in the ablution as applied by the minister; in the latter, as received by the subject.[3] Others, again, argued that the sacrament is primarily an efficacious sign of grace, and therefore it is the ablution taken in an active sense that properly constitutes its essence.[4]

In connection with this discussion a distinction was made between the remote and proximate matter of baptism, and thereby different definitions were more or less reconciled. The remote matter is the water itself that is to be used in the sacramental rite; and it was with this before his mind that Hugh of St. Victor said: "Baptism is the water that is sanctified for the blotting out of sin."[5] The proximate matter is the application of the baptismal water to the subject, or the bodily ablution taken in an active sense; and referring to this the Lombard defined baptism as a bodily ablution under a prescribed form of words.[6]

Again, in the same connection a distinction was made between the sacrament only, the sacrament and the thing, and the thing only — *sacramentum tantum, sacramentum et res, res tantum.* The first is the sacramental rite in itself, the second is the character, the third is sacramental grace. In reference to this St. Bonaventure states: "Baptism is sometimes denominated a sacrament from the *sacramentum et res,* which is the character; hence the Damascene writes: 'Bap-

[2] Cfr. William of Auxerre, Sum. IV, tr. 3, c. 2.

[3] Cfr. Bonavent. In Sent. IV, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2.

[4] Cfr. Thomas, Sum. Theol. III, q. 66, a. 1.

[5] De Sacr. III, p. 6, c. 2.

[6] Loc. cit.

tism is the principle of spiritual life, a seal and safeguard and an illumination of the mind.'"[7] And thus the various definitions are substantially the same, only they refer to different aspects of baptism.

Regarding the form of baptism, all the Scholastics were agreed that in their day the invocation of the Blessed Trinity was of obligation. The majority also held that the Trinitarian form was necessary for the validity of the sacrament. However, Hugh of St. Victor[8] and Peter Lombard[9] were of opinion that baptism administered in the name of Jesus might still be considered valid. On the other hand, they all held that baptism in the name of Jesus, without an explicit invocation of the Blessed Trinity, had been both valid and licit in the first ages of the Church. To this conclusion they argued from what they found in the Acts of the Apostles,[10] from a statement of St. Ambrose,[11] and from a decision given by Pope Nicholas I.[12] They pointed out, however, that the primitive usage rested upon a special dispensation from the general law of baptism under the explicit invocation of the Blessed Trinity. And the reason for this dispensation they found in the fact that in the beginning the name of Jesus was still unknown, or where known it was generally despised; and therefore, in order to cause this name to become known and honored, it was ordained that for some time it alone should be used in the administration of the baptismal rite.[13]

That according to the ordinary law of baptism an explicit invocation of the Blessed Trinity is essential, is thus taught by St. Thomas, with whom St. Bonaventure and others are in full agreement. "The sacraments," he says, "have their efficacy from the institution of Christ. And therefore if any of those things be omitted which Christ instituted in regard to any one of the sacraments, it is without efficacy; except when the omission occurs in virtue of a dispensation granted

[7] In Sent. IV, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1 q. 1.
[8] De Sacr. II, p. 6, c. 2.
[9] Sent. IV, d. 3, c. 4.
[10] Op. cit. 2, 38; 8, 16; 10, 48.
[11] De Spirit. Sanct. c. 3.
[12] Ad Bulgaros, DB. 335.
[13] Thomas, Sum. Theol. III, q. 66, a. 6 ad 1m; Bonavent. In Sent. loc. cit. a. 2, 1, 2 ad 3m.

by Him who connected His own power with the sacramental rite. Now Christ ordained that the sacrament of baptism should be conferred under the invocation of the Trinity; and therefore if anything be wanting to the full invocation of the Trinity, the integrity of baptism is thereby destroyed. Nor is this conclusion invalidated by the fact that in the name of one person that of another is understood (thus in the name of the Father the Son is understood), or that he who names one person only can have the right faith concerning the three: because just as sensible matter is required for the sacrament, so likewise is there required a sensible form. Hence a mere understanding of the doctrine or interior faith in the Trinity does not suffice for the validity of the sacrament, unless the Trinity be also mentioned in words that can be perceived by the senses." [14]

Besides the three holy names, the form of baptism must also express the act of baptizing. The reason for this is thus given by St. Bonaventure: "As stated by Alexander, the word expressing the act of baptizing is essential to the form. And the reason for it is the institution of the sacrament itself. Furthermore, the reason why the sacrament was thus instituted is this, because in administering the sacrament there is need of an intention; then, too, this sacrament is necessary for salvation and is conferred on some one distinct from the minister. Hence to avoid the danger of not having the proper intention, it is necessary that this intention be expressed by a proper word in the form." [15]

St. Thomas gives a different reason. "Baptism," he says, "is consecrated by its form. . . . Therefore it is necessary that in the form of baptism the cause of baptism be expressed. Now the cause is twofold: the one is the principal cause, from which baptism has its power, and this is the Blessed Trinity; the other is the instrumental cause, namely, the minister, who confers the exterior sacrament. Hence it is necessary that in the form of baptism mention be made of both. Now the ministerial cause is mentioned by saying: I baptise thee; and

[14] Sum. Theol. III, q. 66, a. 6. [15] In Sent. IV, d. 3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1.

the principal cause, by saying: In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." [16]

The manner of baptizing was still in a state of transition, from immersion to affusion. Peter Lombard mentions immersion only, but later writers refer to both as being in use simultaneously in different churches. St. Bonaventure states that although baptism by affusion is customary in some places, the Roman Church still baptizes by immersion.[17] Albertus Magnus considers baptism by immersion more praiseworthy,[18] and St. Thomas speaks of baptism by affusion as being more or less exceptional.[19] However the general rule laid down was, that the custom of the place where baptism was administered should be observed.

In regard to the effect produced by baptism it was customary to make a threefold distinction. In the first place, all hold that baptism imprints an indelible character on the soul, and this effect is produced by every valid baptism.[20] Secondly, all are agreed that in a properly disposed subject sin and the punishment due to sin are entirely blotted out.[21] Thirdly, they are also agreed that when adults are baptized, and are properly disposed, they receive sanctifying grace together with the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.[22] The amount of grace, however, in the case of adults, varies according to the different dispositions with which the sacrament is received. The person who is better disposed receives more grace, and the one who is less well disposed receives less grace.[23]

When there is question of the baptism of infants, all teach that a character is imprinted on the soul and that original sin and its punishment are blotted out; but there is some difference of opinion in regard to infusion of grace and the accompanying virtues. St. Thomas speaks of this diversity of

[16] Loc. cit. a. 5; Sent. d. 3, c. 7.
[17] In Sent. d. 3, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1.
[18] Ibid. a. 5.
[19] Op. cit. q. 66, a. 7.
[20] Cfr. Bonavent. Op. cit. d. 6, p. 1, a. unic. q. 4; Thomas, op. cit. q. 69, a. 8.
[21] Cfr. Thomas, In Sent. IV, d. 4, q. 2.
[22] Bonavent. op. cit. d. 4, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3.
[23] Ibid.; Thomas, Sum. Theol. III, q. 69, a. 8.

opinion as follows: "Some of the older teachers held that in the baptism of children grace and the virtues were not infused, but that the character of Christ was imprinted on their souls, in virtue of which, when arrived at the age of reason, they received grace and the virtues. But this appears to be false for two reasons: First, because children, the same as adults, are in baptism made members of Christ; and hence it is necessary that they receive from the Head an influx of grace and virtue. Secondly, because according to this, children dying after baptism would not attain eternal life, as it is said that *the grace of God is life everlasting;* and thus it would be of no benefit to them to have been baptized. The cause of the error lay in this, that they did not know how to distinguish between the virtues and their acts; and hence seeing that children are incapable of eliciting acts of virtue, they thought that after baptism they in no way had the virtues themselves." [24]

The question had already been referred to by Innocent III in 1201, but was left undecided.[25] Clement V took the matter up again at the Council of Vienne, held in 1311, and gave his decision in these terms: "The second opinion, which holds that in baptism sanctifying grace and the virtues are conferred on children as well as on adults, is more in harmony and concord with the sayings of the saints and the teaching of modern theologians; and therefore, with the approval of this holy Council, we have thought proper to give it the preference." [26] This view was adopted as certain by the Council of Trent.[27]

In the case of adults, the principal effect of baptism, that is, the infusion of grace and the blotting out of sin, may also be obtained by the baptism of desire, which consists in an act of perfect contrition and the intention of receiving the sacrament at an opportune time. "God," says St. Bonaventure, "obliges no one to do the impossible, . . . and therefore it must be admitted that the baptism of desire without the baptism of water is sufficient, provided the person in question has the

[24] Sum. Theol. III, q. 69, a. 7.
[25] DB. 410.
[26] Mansi, 25, 410; DB. 483.
[27] DB. 800.

will to receive the baptism of water, but is prevented from doing so before he dies." [28] Or as St. Thomas words it: "Although the effect depends on the First Cause, nevertheless the Cause exceeds the effect and is not dependent thereon. And for that reason one may obtain the effect of the sacrament aside from the baptism of water, namely through the sufferings of Christ, in so far as one becomes conformable to Him in suffering for His sake. . . . And for the same reason one may also obtain the effect of baptism through the power of the Holy Spirit, not only without the baptism of water but also without the baptism of blood; namely, in so far as anyone's heart is moved by the Holy Ghost to believe and to love God, and to do penance for his sins; hence it is also called the baptism of penance." [29]

What St. Thomas here says about the baptism of blood, that it justifies before God without the baptism of water, is the common teaching of the Scholastics, and was taught by the Church from the beginning. Still they generally point out that *per se* it frees from venial sins only; because mortal sins, if there be any, must be blotted out by charity, without which even martyrdom "would be of no avail unto salvation." [30]

There is no complete agreement among the Scholastics in regard to the time when baptism was instituted. "Concerning the institution of baptism, as regards the time," says the Lombard, "there are various opinions. Some say that baptism was instituted when Christ said to Nicodemus: *Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven.* Others hold that the institution of baptism took place when He said to the Apostles: *Go, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.*[31] Alexander of Hales [32] and Albertus Magnus [33] make a distinction between formal and material institution. Baptism, they say, was formally instituted after Christ's resurrection, when He sent

[28] In Sent. IV, d. 4, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1.
[29] Sum. Theol. III, q. 66, a. 11.
[30] In Sent. IV, d. 4, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1; Cfr. Thomas, II. II, q. 124, a. 2 ad 2[m].
[31] Sent. d. 3, n. 5.
[32] Sum. IV, q. 8, m. 2, a. 3.
[33] In Sent. d. 3, a. 8.

His Apostles to baptize all nations; it was materially instituted when Christ Himself was baptized by John. However, according to the more common view, held by St. Bonaventure,[34] St. Thomas,[35] and Duns Scotus,[36] the sacrament was instituted before Christ's sufferings and death, and probably at the time of His own baptism.

The obligation of receiving baptism did not come into force until after the death of Christ, as is admitted even by those who hold that the sacrament was instituted before He suffered; but on the further question, how soon after His death that obligation arose, there is no agreement. St. Thomas[37] and Albertus Magnus[38] consider it probable that it began immediately, so that after Christ had died for the sins of the world, baptism became forthwith the ordinary means of justification for all men. On the other hand, Alexander of Hales,[39] St. Bonaventure,[40] Richard of Middleton,[41] and Scotus[42] hold that the obligation to receive baptism did not begin until the law had been sufficiently promulgated; which promulgation took place gradually, up to the fall of Jerusalem.

B — Confirmation

In regard to confirmation comparatively little is said by the Scholastics. The Lombard puts all he has to say on the subject in two short paragraphs. The form, he says, is known to all; the sacrament can be administered only by a bishop; it must be received by all Christians; it confers the Holy Spirit, and for that reason it is of a higher dignity than baptism; it cannot be repeated.[43] These few points were taken by his commentators and made the headings of so many distinct questions or articles, to which were usually added a few subordinate considerations by way of clearer and fuller exposition.

Although in olden times confirmation was intimately connected with baptism, yet most Scholastics simply assume that

[34] Ibid. p. 2, a. 1, q. 1.
[35] Ibid. q. 1, a. 3.
[36] Ibid. q. 4, n. 2.
[37] Ibid. q. 1, a. 5.
[38] Ibid. a. 6.
[39] Op. cit. q. 8, m. 2, a. 3.
[40] Loc. cit. a. 3, q. 1.
[41] Ibid. a. 5.
[42] Ibid. q. 4.
[43] Sent. d. 7, n. 2.

it is a distinct sacrament. St. Thomas, however, thinks it proper to give a proof to that effect. He proposes it in these terms: "The sacraments of the New Law were instituted for the production of special effects in the order of grace. Hence, wherever a special effect of grace is produced, there we must admit a distinct sacrament. . . . Now it is manifest that in man's bodily life a certain perfection is acquired when he arrives at mature age, and in consequence is capable of performing perfect actions; . . . and hence it is that besides generation, from which he receives bodily life, there is also the movement to augmentation, by which he is brought to a perfect state. And so man receives spiritual life through baptism, which is a spiritual regeneration; but in confirmation he attains to a certain maturity in the spiritual life. . . . And therefore it is manifest that confirmation is a special sacrament."[44]

The external rite of confirmation, according to all the Scholastics, comprises the anointing of the forehead with consecrated chrism and the verbal form: *Consigno te signo crucis, et confirmo te chrismate salutis, in nomine Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti.*[45] The previous consecration or blessing of the chrism by a bishop is regarded as essential, so that without it the sacrament would not be valid. The reason usually assigned for the necessity of this consecration is that Christ Himself did not consecrate the matter of this sacrament by His own use. For He did not receive confirmation, and so He did not impart a blessing to its material element. Yet, on the other hand, only consecrated material elements can be used in the administration of the sacraments; hence, as the bishop cannot consecrate chrism by simply using it, he must do so by a previous blessing.[46]

Furthermore, according to Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure, as was pointed out in the preceding chapter, Christ did not designate the matter and form of confirmation, although the efficacy of the sacrament must in the last instance be attributed to Him. Hence these authors regard

[44] Sum. Theol. III, q. 72, a. 1.
[45] Ibid. a. 4.
[46] Cfr. ibid. a. 3; Bonavent. In Sent. IV, d. 7, a. 1, q. 2.

the sacramental rite of confirmation as having a purely ecclesiastical origin, and consequently as needing a special consecration, so far as its material element comes in question, before it may be used to confer the Holy Spirit. St. Thomas and others set aside this aspect of the question. They hold that Christ not only instituted the sacrament of confirmation in the sense that He is the author of the grace conferred thereby, but that He also designated the very matter and form that were used in after ages. Hence, according to them, the Apostles usually administered confirmation not by a mere imposition of hands and a suitable prayer, but by the use of chrism and a corresponding form.[47] Thus the historical difficulty arising from an apparent change of matter and form, which exercised the ingenuity of later theologians, had practically no existence for these writers.

The ordinary minister of confirmation is the bishop, and the bishop only, although the Pope, in the plenitude of his power, may at times depute a simple priest to administer the sacrament.[48] St. Bonaventure assigns two reasons why it is that bishops alone can confirm in virtue of their ordinary power. The first is that it was so in the beginning; for then confirmation was reserved to the Apostles, and it is only the bishops who are properly speaking their successors. The second consists in the fact that the bishops are the highest prelates in the Church, and it is their office to provide such things as are necessary for the defense of their flock.[49] The same reasons are also given by St. Thomas.[50] But as St. Bonaventure remarks, many others might be assigned, as this is a matter of fitness rather than of necessity.[51]

The effect of confirmation is twofold: it confers sanctifying grace and imprints a sacramental character. Concerning the former St. Bonaventure remarks: "Theologians agree in this, that confirmation confers sanctifying grace. But it must be noted that grace is termed sanctifying in two ways: First, when it makes one pleasing to God who before was not pleas-

[47] Loc. cit. a. 2.
[48] Ibid. a. 11; Bonavent. op. cit. d. 7, a. 1, q. 3.
[49] Loc cit.
[50] Loc. cit.
[51] Loc. cit.

ing to Him; and such is the grace of baptism and of penance. Secondly, when it makes one who is already pleasing to God more pleasing to Him; and such is the grace of confirmation, which augments and confirms the grace already present in the soul." [52] St Thomas infers the bestowal of sanctifying grace in confirmation from the fact that the Holy Spirit is given — *missio seu datio Spiritus Sancti non est nisi cum gratia gratum faciente.*[53] And this grace is not given for the blotting out of sin, as is that of baptism; but for the increase and greater stability of justice.[54] Hence confirmation is a sacrament of the living, and consequently it must always be received in the state of grace. However, if any one receives confirmation in the state of mortal sin, of which he is not conscious and for which he is not perfectly contrite, grace is nevertheless given him by the sacrament, provided he is sincere in receiving it under these conditions.[55]

Connected with sanctifying grace, as bestowed in confirmation, are certain special helps which enable the recipient to profess his faith boldly under difficult circumstances. Hence the phrase commonly used by the Scholastics in this connection: *Spiritus Sanctus datur ad robur.* It is to indicate both the strength thus imparted and the obligation assumed that the recipient is anointed on the forehead.[56]

Confirmation, like baptism, imprints an indelible character on the soul; and this follows from the very end and purpose of the sacrament. For in confirmation the Christian becomes a soldier of Christ, and as such he must have his badge of special allegiance and service. In virtue of this character, says Scotus, man is permanently enrolled in the spiritual militia of Christ, for the purpose of defending the grace merited for him by the Saviour of the world.[57] Or as St. Thomas puts it: "In baptism man receives the power of working out his salvation in so far as he lives an individual life; but in confirmation he receives power to carry on a spiritual warfare against the

[52] In Sent. IV, d. 7, a. 2, q. 1.
[53] Sum. Theol. III, q. 72, a. 7.
[54] Ibid. ad 1m.
[55] Ibid. ad 2m.
[56] Ibid. a. 9.
[57] In Sent. IV, d. 7, q. 1, n. 4.

enemies of the faith. . . . And hence it is manifest that the sacrament of confirmation imprints a character." [58]

Although confirmation is not strictly necessary for salvation, as all Scholastics are agreed, nevertheless, unless they have a valid excuse, the faithful are under obligation to receive the sacrament. "It is the law of the Church," argues St. Bonaventure, "that all must receive this sacrament, so that they may be brave in the battle of life: and therefore if anyone, to whom place and time and opportunity are not wanting, contemptuously neglects to receive confirmation, he exposes himself to danger." [59] And again: "The grace of confirmation is not such that one absolutely cannot be saved without it; but it is such that without it one is not prepared to battle for salvation." [60] St. Thomas derives the necessity of confirmation chiefly from the fact that God intends all men to reach spiritual perfection, for which it is necessary that they be assisted by the grace of confirmation, as thereby they grow in holiness and are firmly established in justice.[61]

Nearly all the chief points contained in the foregoing summary of Scholastic teaching on baptism and confirmation were later on embodied in the *Decretum pro Armenis,* which Pope Eugenius IV issued while the Council of Florence was in session, 1438–1445. That document can indeed not be said to contain new definitions of the faith, yet it offers at least an authoritative declaration of the accepted teaching of the Church.[62] Furthermore, what touches the nature of the two sacraments, their matter and form, their institution by Christ, and their principal effects, was defined by the Council of Trent.[63]

[58] Loc. cit. a. 5.
[59] Op. cit. d. 7, a. 3, q. 2.
[60] Ibid. ad 3m.
[61] Sum. Theol. III, q. 72, a. 8.
[62] DB. 695 sqq.
[63] DB. 844 sqq.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE HOLY EUCHARIST

THE REAL PRESENCE: TRANSUBSTANTIATION: THE MANNER OF CHRIST'S PRESENCE: THE ACCIDENTS OF BREAD AND WINE

The Eucharist was from the beginning the central point of Christian faith and worship. Christ had indeed ascended into heaven, yet He had not thereby deprived the earth of His personal presence. He was no longer visible to the bodily eyes of His followers, but He continued to be discernible by the eyes of faith in His mysterious presence under the Eucharistic veil. There the faithful still felt the enduring love of His human heart; there they still recognized the shrouded majesty of His incarnate Godhead. Christ risen from the dead dieth no more: true indeed, but Christ risen from the dead is forever an immolated victim on the altar of sacrifice. Around that altar gathered the martyrs of old; around the same altar gathered the believers of all succeeding ages. Without Christ there is no Christianity; without the Eucharist there is no Christian worship.

All this was from the very first so clearly and thoroughly realized that during the seven centuries of Patristic theology, which were for the most part centuries of great religious strife, no one ever thought of calling in question the Church's teaching on the sacrament of Christ's love. The Church used the Savior's own words in the celebration of the Sacred Mysteries — *this is my body, this is the chalice of my blood* — and these words were understood by all His followers in their literal sense. That sums up the faith of the Patristic age in regard to the Blessed Eucharist.[1]

[1] Cfr. vol. I, p. 352 sqq.; 472 sq.

And this simple faith was taken over by the Scholastics of the Middle Ages. They accepted the teaching of the Fathers on this point practically without comment, and incorporated it in their general system of theology. Most of them treat the subject with considerable attention to detail, but even in so doing they contribute little by way of doctrinal development. If we except the nature of the Eucharistic change, which they set forth with remarkable clearness, there is hardly any aspect of the Blessed Sacrament that received a more definite treatment in the works of the Scholastics than in those of the Fathers. And the reason is that the doctrine was almost fully developed before the Apostles laid down their lives for the faith which they had delivered to their successors in the teaching office of the Church.

In their work of systematizing the teaching of the Fathers on this matter, the Scholastics say very little about the sacrificial aspect of the Eucharist. But that need not appear strange; for they speak of this mystery of our holy religion almost exclusively in connection with the other sacraments, and so it was more or less natural that its sacramental aspect should chiefly engross their attention. It is for the same reason that they discuss the Eucharist as a sacrament before they consider the doctrine of the Real Presence. In their day it was perfectly safe to assume Christ's presence on the altar as something that was admitted by all, and from that assumption to proceed without delay to an exposition of the sacrament. At the present time his could hardly be done, and therefore in the following resumé the teaching of the Scholastics on the Real Presence is put in the first place. It must be noted, however, that this inversion of their order of treatment introduces no change whatever in the exposition of their doctrine.

1. *The Real Presence.*— It is quite commonly assumed by Protestant writers that the ninth-century Eucharistic controversy, carried on principally by Radbertus and Ratramnus, both of Corbie in Picardie, was concerned with the real presence of Christ's body and blood in the Holy Eucharist. But this assumption is altogether false. The one point at issue was, whether Christ's Eucharistic body and blood, which both

contestants held to be real, must be conceived as subject to the laws of space in the same way as was His historic body whilst tarrying here on earth. While Radbertus gave an affirmative answer, and in this sense contended that Christ's Eucharistic body is the same as that which was born of the Virgin Mary, Ratramnus answered the question in the negative, and in consequence maintained that in respect of its relation to space the historic body of Christ is not present in the Eucharist. The issue appears at times confused, owing to the inappropriate terms that were employed in the controversy; but at no time was the reality and truth of Christ's presence called in question.[2]

It was nearly two hundred years after the death of Radbertus and Ratramnus that the real presence of Christ's body and blood in the Holy Eucharist was attacked, and then the attack was made in the interest of dialectics. It was Berengarius of Tours (+1088) who first tried to set aside the traditional teaching of the Church, and contended for a merely virtual presence. In discussing the mystery of the Eucharist, he put forward the principle: *Maxime plane cordis est ad dialecticam confugere, quia confugere ad eam ad rationem est confugere.*[3] He belonged to the school of Fulbert of Chartres (+1028), and through him was connected with Gerbert, afterwards Pope Sylvester III. Besides a few letters and some fragments from an early controversial work, his treatise *De Sacra Coena adversus Lanfrancum* and the *Acta Concilii Romani in Causa Berengarii* are the only two of his works that have come down to us.

His error in regard to the Eucharist appeared first in a letter to Lanfranc, written in 1050. He professed to follow the teaching of Ratramnus, but wholly misinterpreted the views of that author. Ratramnus had designated Christ's sacramental body as a figure of His historic body, intending thereby merely to indicate that its presence in space was not the same as that which is proper to His body in heaven; whereas Berengarius

[2] Cfr. Bach, Dogmengeschichte des Mittelalters, I, p. 166 sqq.; 192 sqq.

[3] De Sacra Coena, ed. Vischer, 101.

took the term "figure" in its literal sense, and thence argued to a purely symbolic or virtual presence in the Eucharist. At Easter of the same year he was condemned by a synod then held in Rome, and a few months later by another synod which convened at Vercelli. However, he continued to defend his view, until in 1059 Nicholas II forced him to recant. On that occasion he accepted the following formula, presented to him by Cardinal Humbert: *Panem et vinum, quae in altari ponuntur, post consecrationem non solum sacramentum, sed etiam verum corpus et sanguinem Domini nostri Jesu Christi esse (confiteor) et sensualiter, non solum sacramento, sed in veritate manibus sacerdotum tractari, frangi, et fidelium dentibus atteri.*[4]

Although Berengarius attacked the formula which he had been induced to sign, still for about ten years after the Council he abstained from open controversy, and even enjoyed the protection of Hildebrand, afterwards Pope Gregory VII. But in 1069 he returned to his former position and published a controversial treatise against Nicholas II and Cardinal Humbert, which is no longer extant. He was answered by Hugh, bishop of Langres,[5] Lanfranc, archbishop of Canterbury,[6] Guitmund, a pupil of Lanfranc,[7] and others. In answer to Lanfranc, Berengarius wrote his still extant work *De Sacra Coena,* which was published towards the end of the year 1076. For some time no measures were taken against him, but at a synod held in Rome during the Eastertide of 1079, Gregory VII required him to confess: *Panem et vinum, quae ponuntur in altari, per mysterium sacrae orationis et verba nostri Redemptoris substantialiter converti in veram et propriam et vivificatricem carnem et sanguinem Jesu Christi.*[8] On his return to France, he repudiated his profession of belief in the Real Presence and returned to his old error. However, a year later he made a final retractation, and eight years later died in peace with the Church.

[4] Lanfranc, De Corpore et Sanguine Domini, 2.
[5] Tractatus de Corpore et Sanguine Domini.
[6] Op. cit.
[7] Libri Tres de Corporis et Sanquinis Christi Veritate.
[8] Mansi, 19, 762 E.

As appears from the formulas which were presented to him for subscription, Berengarius not only denied the conversion of the Eucharistic elements into the body and blood of Christ, but also defended a purely intellectual or spiritual presence. And the same may be inferred from various statements found in his works.[9] Protestant writers usually contend that he simply restated the teaching of St. Augustine, which had fallen into oblivion; but that contention rests entirely upon a misinterpretation of St. Augustine's doctrine.[10]

These discussions contributed considerably towards the clearing up of certain hazy concepts, which are met with in not a few writers of the period. Thus, to rectify a rather common misconception in reference to persons who communicate in the state of mortal sin, Lanfranc pointed out that they truly receive the body and blood of Christ, but only to their spiritual detriment.[11] Guitmund showed that at the consecration the bread and wine are converted in such a way that the whole Christ is in the entire species and also in each single part thereof.[12] He further called attention to the fact that the changes to which the accidents of bread and wine are subject do not affect the body and blood of Christ present under the consecrated species.[13] St. Anselm explained the doctrine of concomitance, showing that the whole Christ is received under each separate species, whether it be that of bread or of wine.[14] While Gregory VII, in the formula presented for subscription to Berengarius, indicated that the Eucharistic conversion is effected by the words which our Savior used in the institution of the Holy Eucharist.[15]

The thirteenth-century Scholastics touch these discussions only incidentally, while affirming the Real Presence as based upon the faith of the Church and the words of our Savior. Thus St. Thomas, after citing a number of texts from the writings of the Fathers and from Holy Scripture, concludes his article on the Real Presence with this brief statement:

[9] Ep. ad Adelman, fragm. 3.
[10] Cfr. vol. I, p. 352.
[11] Op. cit. 20.
[12] Op. cit. I; ML. 149, 1434 B.
[13] Op. cit. III.
[14] Epp. IV, 107; ML. 159, 255.
[15] Loc. cit.

"Some, not bearing in mind what is here said, held that the body and blood of Christ are not present in this sacrament except figuratively — *in signo* —, which opinion must be rejected as heretical, because it is opposed to the words of Christ. Hence, also Berengarius, who was the first author of this error, was compelled to retract his erroneous teaching and to confess the truth."[16] And St. Bonaventure briefly remarks: "As the Master says in passing, it was the opinion of some, and a most wicked error it was, that Christ is present on the altar only *in signo*, and that to eat His body means simply to eat the sign of His body. . . . But this is the worst of errors and opposed to the piety of faith."[17]

2. *Transubstantiation.*— From their brief references to the Real Presence the Scholastics pass on to the question of Eucharistic conversion or transubstantiation. This, again, they treat not as something new, but as a doctrine that was clearly contained in the teaching of the Church. Still there were some different views on the matter, four of which are thus indicated by the Lombard: 1. *Substantia panis fit corpus Christi . . . sicut farina fit panis.* 2. *Illud quod erat panis . . . post consecrationem est corpus.* 3. *Ubi erat panis, nunc est corpus Christi . . . substantia panis in nihilum redigitur.* 4. *Substantia panis remanet et ibidem corpus Christi est.*[18] The first and the fourth of these views he rejects as absolutely inadmissible, and then argues from the promise of the Savior, as contained in the sixth chapter of St. John, that in the consecration the bread is changed into the identical body which Christ has in heaven. However, he does not enter into any speculations as regards the intimate nature of this change, but contents himself with the statement that after the consecration nothing remains of the bread and wine except their accidents.[19]

St. Bonaventure mentions some other views, which, he says, had come into vogue since the time of the Lombard. Some hold that as the accidents of bread and wine remain, the matter

[16] Sum. Theol. III, q. 75, a. 1.
[17] In Sent. IV, d. 10, p. 1, a. unic. q. 1.
[18] Sent. IV, d. 11, c. 3, 4.
[19] Op. cit. d. 11, c. 4.

of their substance must also remain, although the form is changed. Others, on the contrary, seeing that the accidents have an operation of their own, contend that the substantial forms of bread and wine remain, and that the matter alone is changed. He rejects both of these views as utterly untenable, and then continues: "It is the common teaching of theologians that the whole substance is converted into the whole body and blood of Christ — *totum transit in totum* —, and that for a necessary and useful reason the accidents alone remain. And therefore, setting aside the first opinion which denies the conversion of the matter, and also the second which denies the conversion of the form, we hold as more Catholic that the whole bread is converted into the whole body of Christ, and this conversion is most aptly called transubstantiation." [20]

The discussion of St. Thomas proceeds along the same lines. He first rejects the opinion of those who hold that the substance of bread and wine remain on the altar together with the body of Christ. If the bread and wine remain, he reasons, then the truth of the sacrament is destroyed. For there is no sacrament unless the body and blood of Christ be really present, and yet they can become present only by way of conversion.[21] Then he refutes the view of those who assert that the substantial form of the elements remains. If this were true, he says, the bread would not be changed into the whole body of Christ, but into its matter only; and then the form of the sacrament, *This is my body,* would be false.[22] In the consecration, he argues, "the whole substance of the bread is converted into the whole substance of the body of Christ, and the whole substance of the wine is converted into the whole substance of the blood of Christ. Hence this conversion is not formal but substantial; nor is it contained in any species of natural changes, but is denominated by its own proper term of transubstantiation." [23]

The technical term "transubstantiation," which is used by all the later Scholastics to designate the Eucharistic conversion,

[20] In Sent. IV, d. 11, p. 1, a. unic. q. 3.
[21] Sum. Theol. III, q. 75, a. 2.
[22] Ibid. a. 6.
[23] Ibid. a. 4.

is of uncertain origin. As far as can now be determined, it occurs for the first time in a sermon formerly attributed to Hildebert of Lavardin, archbishop of Tours (+1133), but now usually ascribed to Peter Comestor, who died after 1170.[24] It occurs also in the *Tractatus de Sacramento Altaris,* which was written either by Stephen I or Stephen II of Autun. The former died in 1139, and the latter in 1189. Shortly after the middle of the twelfth century the term seems to have been in common use in the schools, as it is found again and again in theological treatises belonging to that period.[25] Likely enough it originated in the discussions with Berengarius, but there is no documentary evidence to prove that it did.

Most of the Scholastics proved the doctrine of transubstantiation from the words of institution, pointing out that these words would not be true except on the supposition that the whole substance of the bread and wine are changed into the body and blood of Christ. Duns Scotus, however, did not consider this argument conclusive, if used independently of the traditional teaching of the Church. His final conclusion is: "It is therefore to be held that the substance of the bread ceases to be there in virtue of a conversion, and that its ceasing to be is a conversion into the body of Christ. And this I hold principally on account of the authority of the Church, which cannot fall into error regarding those truths that belong to the faith." [26] This was also the position taken by the Nominalists. Thus Ockam,[27] D'Ailly,[28] Gabriel,[29] and others of the same school, personally favored the impanation theory, namely, that the substance of the bread and wine remain on the altar together with the body and blood of Christ; but on account of the clear teaching of the Church they professed their belief in transubstantiation.

[24] The passage in which it is used reads as follows: "Cum profero verba canonis et verbum transsubstantiationis, et os meum plenum est contradictione et amaritudine et dolo, quamvis eum honorem labiis, tamen spuo in faciem Salvatoris" (Serm. 93; ML, 21, 776).

[25] Cfr. Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, t. 5, col. 1290 sqq.

[26] Report. IV, d. 11, q. 3, n. 13.

[27] In Sent. IV, q. 6 D.

[28] In Sent. IV, q. 6 E.

[29] Exposit. Can. Missae, lect. 41 J; cfr. In Sent. IV, 11, q. 1, a. 1, note 1.

It is, then, in virtue of the consecration that Christ is really and personally present on the altar, because thereby the substance of bread and wine are changed into His body and blood; but in what precise manner does the conversion thus effected bring about Christ's personal presence? All Scholastics are agreed that the Eucharistic conversion does not effect a local change in Christ. And this is quite obvious: for although He becomes truly present on the altar, yet He ever remains unchanged in heaven. But aside from this one point, which is a matter of faith, there is no agreement among mediæval theologians in reference to the proposed question. A few remarks about the two principal views entertained by them must here suffice.

In the first place, Alexander of Hales,[30] St. Bonaventure,[31] and St. Thomas[32] maintain that the reason of Christ's presence on the altar lies in the fact that the Eucharistic conversion is a productive action, in the sense that it is equivalent to the production of an already existing term or reality. They do not actually use the term *production* in this connection, but that is obviously what they have in mind. Thus St. Bonaventure compares the conversion of the bread and wine to the act of creation and to other productive changes, although, as he remarks, in some particulars it differs from each and all.[33] St. Thomas explains that the body of Christ becomes present through the conversion of the substance of the bread into itself;[34] and, again, that the entity of the one is changed into

[30] Sum. IV, q. 10, m. 7, a. 3 ad 6m.

[31] In Sent. IV, d. 11, p. 1, a. unic. q. 2.

[32] Sum. Theol. III, q. 75, a. 4.

[33] His words are: "Dicendum, quod haec est mutatio singularis, quae nullum simile plenum habet; assimilatur tamen in aliquo. Quia enim in hac mutatione nihil commune manet; assimilatur creationi. Quia vero principium initiale non est nihil, sed aliquid; ideo dissimilis est creationi et similis generationi. Quia vero terminum finalem non habet aliquid de novo factum, sed prius existens; ideo est dissimilis generationi et similis augmento. Quia vero corpus Christi ex hoc non crescit, sed in pluribus locis existit; ideo dissimilis augmento et similis loci mutationi. Quia vero in alio loco existit et a proprio non recedit, sed aliquid in ipsum transit; ideo omni motui et mutationi dissimilis est et est prorsus mutatio singularis" (Loc. cit.).

[34] Answering the question whether the bread is converted into the body of Christ, the author says: "Cum in hoc sacramento sit verum

the entity of the other.[35] True, the reproduction of an already existing reality is something that baffles all human understanding, but so does everything else that is attempted by way of explanation in reference to the question under discussion. In this matter one feels inclined to rest satisfied with the saying of Pope Innocent III: *Ego nescio quomodo Christus accedit; sed et quomodo recedit, ignoro. Novit ille qui nihil ignorat.*[36]

Duns Scotus brings forward many arguments against the view taken by St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, and then attempts an explanation of his own. Transubstantiation, he holds, is not the formal reason of Christ's sacramental presence; that presence can be explained only by postulating such a change in the body of Christ that in virtue of it there results a new relation to place, yet without any local change properly so called.[37] As interpreted by his commentators, he distinguishes between passive and active transubstantiation. By the former he understands the substance which ceases to be and that which succeeds it, together with their mutual relations of *terminus a quo* and *terminus ad quem;* by the latter he designates the conversive action of the agent, which is in itself neither productive nor adductive, but simply expresses the order and relation of change. But concomitantly this action may be either productive or adductive, according as a new term is produced or merely a new presence of an already existing term. Similarly the term of transubstantiation is twofold. The one formal, namely, the substance of the body of Christ

corpus Christi, nec incipit ibi esse de novo per motum localem, cum etiam nec corpus Christi sit ibi sicut in loco, ut ex dictis patet, necesse est dicere quod incipiat ibi esse per conversionem substantiae panis in ipsum" (Loc. cit.).

[35] To the objection, "non potest esse quod haec materia panis fiat haec materia qua individuatur corpus Christi," he replies by saying: "Ad tertium dicendum, quod virtute agentis finiti non potest forma in formam mutari, nec materia in materiam sed virtute agentis infiniti (quod habet actionem in totum ens) potest talis conversio fieri, quia utrique formae et utrique materiae est communis natura entis; et id quod est entitatis in una potest auctor entis convertere in id quod est entitatis in altera, sublato eo per quod ab illa distinguebatur" (Loc. cit. ad 3[m]).

[36] De Sacro Altaris Mysterio, 4, 16.

[37] In Sent. IV, d. 10, q. 1, n. 5 sqq.; q. 3.

already existing; the other concomitant, namely, the new relation to place of that same body. In the former there is no production, as the same body of Christ which is in heaven is also on the altar; in the latter there is a new presence, by reason of which Christ's body is really and truly in the Holy Eucharist. Hence, Christ is present on the altar not by way of reproduction, but by way of simple adduction.[38]

Apparently this is a much more rational explanation than that offered by St. Thomas; yet the difficulties involved in it are hardly less formidable. For if this new presence is something real, a real *ubi intrinsecum,* there is a real though accidental change in the body of Christ, which theologians are unwilling to admit; if it is not something real, a mere *ubi extrinsecum,* how can it be adductive in respect of the body of Christ? And so in either case, there seems to be no way out of the difficulty, and one feels again inclined to say: *Novit ille qui nihil ignorat.*

3. *The Manner of Christ's Presence.*— In regard to the manner of Christ's presence on the altar, the Scholastics first of all teach that He is whole and entire under the species of bread, and whole and entire under the species of wine. In virtue of the consecrated words, they point out, only the body of Christ is under the species of bread, and only the blood under the species of wine; but by reason of a natural and real concomitance, the whole Christ is under each separate species. "Because the bread has a likeness only to the body," says St. Bonaventure, "therefore it was ordained to be converted only into the body; and the sanctifying word, namely: *This is my body,* signifies that it is converted into the body; neither into the divinity, nor into the soul, nor into the blood, is anything of the bread converted. Neither, however, is the body in the sacrament without them; for although they are not there on account of the conversion, still they are there because of their inseparable connection or indivisible conjunction. For the blood is there by reason of its commingling, the soul by reason of its conjunction, the divinity by reason of its union."[39]

[38] Cfr. Rada, Controvers. p. 4, controv. 6.

[39] In Sent. IV, d. 11, p. 1, a. unic. q. 4.

St. Thomas gives the same explanation, and then adds: "The blood of Christ is now no longer separated from the body, as it was at the time of His suffering and death; hence if the Eucharist had then been celebrated, under the species of bread would have been the body without the blood, and under the species of wine would have been the blood without the body, just as body and blood were then separated in reality."[40]

As the whole Christ is present in the Eucharist, it follows that His body and blood are there with their own proper quantity; and this is the common teaching of the Scholastics, against Durandus[41] and a few Nominalists. However the secondary effects of quantity, such as actual extension and impenetrability, are impeded; and hence the quantity of the body and blood of Christ is present after the manner of substance — *ad modum substantiae*. Consequently Christ is in the Eucharist *totus sub toto et totus sub qualibet parte*.[42] In this sense, therefore, He is definitely present; yet, on the other hand, as His presence is not limited to the space occupied by the consecrated species, it is not properly speaking definitive but sacramental.

St. Bonaventure, citing Pope Innocent III, gives this exposition of Christ's presence in the Eucharist: "As Innocent words it, 'just as the Son of God has a threefold presence according to His divinity, in as much as He is in all things by His essence, in the just by His grace, in Christ through the hypostatic union; so the body of Christ is locally in heaven, personally in the Word, sacramentally on the altar.' According to this third manner of presence, he says, Christ is in many places; because there are many consecrated species under which He is contained. Hence properly speaking, as an individual He is in only one place, in which He is contained; but because many (substances of bread and wine) are converted into Him, and they are in different places, consequently He Himself is in different places after that manner

[40] Sum. Theol. III, q. 76, a. 2.
[41] In Sent. IV, d. 10, q. 2.
[42] Thomas, loc. cit. a. 4.

of presence according to which they are converted into Him, and thus He is in the sacrament." [43]

The objection that Christ must be in the Eucharist either definitively or circumscriptively, is thus answered by St. Thomas: "I reply that the body of Christ is not present definitively in this sacrament; because in that case it would not be anywhere else except on the altar where the sacrament is consecrated, whereas it is in its proper form in heaven, and under the sacramental species on many altars. In like manner it is also plain that the body of Christ is not circumscriptively present in this sacrament; because it is not there after a manner commensurate with its own proper quantity, as was said in the body of this article. The fact that the body of Christ is limited in its sacramental presence to the consecrated species, and is not in any other place on the altar, is no indication that it is present either definitively or circumscriptively, but results from the fact that there only did it begin to be in virtue of the consecration and conversion of the bread and wine." [44]

Because the whole Christ is thus sacramentally present under the entire species, hence it follows that He is present in the same way under each part independently of actual division. On this point there seems to have been some differences of opinion among the Scholastics, which is thus referred to by St. Thomas: "It is manifest that the whole Christ is present under each part of the species of bread, even while the host remains entire, and not only when it is broken, as some say. They argue from the example of an image in a mirror, which is only one so long as the mirror remains whole; but when it is broken, the image is multiplied according to the number of parts. Now in this there is no parity; because the multiplication of images results from the different reflections as caused by the different parts of the mirror; whereas in the Eucharist there is only one consecration by reason of which the body of Christ is present in the sacrament." [45]

4. *The Accidents of Bread and Wine.*— According to the

[43] Loc. cit. d. 10, a. unic. q. 3.
[44] Loc. cit. a. 5 ad 1m.
[45] Sum. Theol. III, q. 76, a. 3.

common teaching of the Scholastics, as was pointed out above, the substance of bread and wine ceases to be by being converted into the body and blood of Christ. On the other hand, the accidents of bread and wine, as all admit, remain unchanged. Hence the question arises, how do they exist? They can obviously not inhere in the body of Christ, as that in its sacramental presence is without extension. Nor can they naturally exist without inhering in some subject, as their very essence implies an exigency to inhere. Consequently, their separate existence must be based on some special intervention of God's wisdom and power.

On this point all the Scholastics are agreed, but they do not all take the same view of the nature of God's special intervention. "Some there are," says St. Thomas, "who hold that the accidents inhere in the circumambient air as their subject. But this cannot be; first, because the air cannot receive accidents of this kind; secondly, the accidents are not in the same place as the air, and even expel the air when moved about; thirdly, accidents cannot pass from one subject to the other and remain numerically the same; fourthly, the air has its own proper accidents and it cannot have others along with these. Nor can it be said that this is effected miraculously in virtue of the consecration; because the words of consecration do not signify this, and they effect only what they signify." [46]

Then he continues: "It remains therefore that the accidents in this sacrament are without a subject of inhesion, and this indeed can be brought about by divine power. For since the effect has a greater dependence on the first cause than on the second, God, who is the first cause of substance and accident, can by His divine power conserve the accident in being, after withdrawing the substance through which it was conserved as through its proper cause; and this He can do in the same way in which He also produces other effects of natural causes independently of these same causes, as when He formed a human body in the womb of the Virgin without the concurrence of a male agent." [47]

[46] Ibid. q. 77, a. 1.

[47] Ibid.

St. Bonaventure uses almost the same terms, when he says: "It is to be held that the accidents can, by way of miracle, exist without a subject or substance. For since they differ essentially from their subject of inhesion, there is no repugnance in their being separated from it by divine power." [48] Then rejecting the same opinion referred to by St. Thomas, he states: "It is the common teaching of theologians that the Eucharistic accidents exist without a subject." [49] With this common teaching Scotus is in full agreement; but he points out that as absolute accidents have their own proper essence, they must also have their own proper existence, and so divine power can, without any contradiction, cause them to exist outside the subject in which they naturally inhere.[50]

With the exception of Durandus and some Nominalists, who deny all distinction between quantity and quantified substance, the Scholastics are at one in holding that the Eucharistic accidents inhere proximately in the quantity of bread and wine, and that this is sustained in being by the power of God. Hence when they are said to exist without a subject of inhesion, it is the remote subject, or the substance, that is referred to.[51] However, even with this, the question still remains, how does God sustain them in being? Does He miraculously provide some permanent mode, which takes in their regard the place of substance? Or are they sustained in being by His direct efficient intervention?

St. Thomas seems to favor the former of these two possible suppositions. For replying to a difficulty bearing on that point, he says: "While inhering in the substance of bread and wine, these accidents, like all others of a similar kind, did not have their own proper existence; but it was through them that their subjects were of such or such a kind, just as snow is white by reason of its whiteness: but after the consecration these same accidents, which remain, have existence, and hence they are then composed of existence and that which exists, as it was said in the first part in respect of the angels;

[48] In Sent. IV, d. 12, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1.

[49] Ibid. q. 3.

[50] Report. IV, d. 12, q. 1, n. 3–9.

[51] Cfr. Bonavent. In Sent. IV, d. 11, p. 1, q. 2.

and together with this there is in them the composition of quantitative parts." [51a] This seems to imply that the new *esse* is some kind of permanent mode, by reason of which the accidents exist apart from their proper subject. And the same reasoning he repeats a little farther on in regard to quantity, the proximate subject of these accidents.[52]

Scotus, on the other hand, rejects this permanent mode, and holds that the accidents are sustained in being by the direct efficient influence of divine power. Together with the quantity of bread and wine, all the absolute qualities naturally inherent therein constitute a physical complexus, and to this God's sustaining power is efficiently applied.[53] St. Bonaventure seems to favor the same view, although he does not express himself clearly on the point.[54]

While thus existing in a state of separation from their proper subject, the accidents are capable of producing all their natural effects, both physical and chemical. They act and are acted upon in the same way as if the substance of bread and wine were present. It is by reason of them that the sacramental body and blood of Christ can be moved from place to place; [55] it is they that are touched and broken and divided, not the body and blood of Christ; [56] it is they that corrupt under the influence of external agents, and thereby cause Christ's sacramental presence to cease; [57] it is they that nourish the flesh, while Christ's body and blood refresh the spirit.[58]

In regard to this last point there was considerable discussion among the Scholastics. "Some hold," says St. Bonaventure, "that the Eucharistic accidents do not nourish the body in any way; but this is against the testimony of our senses. Others maintain that, when the Real Presence ceases, the accidents already in a state of corruption are converted into

[51a] Sum. Theol. III, q. 77, a. 1 ad 4[m].
[52] Ibid. a. 2, ad 1[m].
[53] In Sent. IV, d. 12, q. 1.
[54] Ibid. p. 1, a. 1.
[55] Cfr. Thomas, Theol. Sum. III, q. 76, a. 3; ibid. q. 77, a. 3.
[56] Cfr. Halens. Sum. IV, q. 10, m. 9, a. 1, 2; Scotus, In Sent. IV, d. 12, q. 4.
[57] Cfr. Halens. op. cit. m. 7, a. 1; Albert Magn. In Sent. IV, d. 12, a. 16.
[58] Cfr. Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 8, q. 36; Albert. Magn. op. cit. d. 13, a. 9, 10.

the same substance into which bread and wine would have been converted if they had been present, and thus they nourish the body. This opinion is sufficiently probable. Others, again, contend that the accidents are not converted into substance, but that the substances of bread and wine return, when, owing to the corruption of the accidents, the sacramental presence ceases. This is the explanation given by Innocent III, and I consider it probable and safe, especially on account of his great authority." [59]

St. Thomas refers to these different explanations in his *Commentary on the Sentences,*[60] without definitely stating his own view; but in the *Summa* he says: "It seems preferable to hold that in the consecration the accident of quantity becomes the primary subject of all subsequent forms, and as this is proper to matter, quantity thereby becomes capable of discharging all the functions of matter in its natural condition." [61] Scotus rejects all these explanations and holds that God directly supplies the substance which ought to be there in the natural process of decomposition to which the accidents are subjected.[62]

There was a similar discussion in regard to the breaking of Christ's body — *fractio corporis Christi.* In the formula of Cardinal Humbert, which Berengarius was ordered to subscribe, it is said in reference to the body of Christ, *non solum sacramento, sed in veritate manibus sacerdotum tractari, frangi, et fidelium dentibus atteri.* Some took this in a literal sense, but the common interpretation of the Scholastics was that all these expressions can be directly applied only to the consecrated species. "The body of Christ," argues St. Bonaventure, "is truly taken into the stomach, and there it remains so long as the consecrated species are incorrupt; but it is not masticated, nor is it broken." [63]

[59] In Sent. IV, d. 12, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1.
[60] Op. cit. d. 12, q. 1, a. 2.
[61] Op. cit. q. 77, a. 5.
[62] In Sent. IV, d. 12, q. 7.
[63] Loc. cit. a. 3, q. 1.

CHAPTER XIX

THE HOLY EUCHARIST

THE FORM OF CONSECRATION: THE MATTER OF CONSECRATION: THE CONSECRATING MINISTER: THE EUCHARIST AS A SACRAMENT: THE EFFECTS OF THE SACRAMENT: THE EUCHARIST AS A SACRIFICE

As Christ becomes present on the altar in virtue of the consecratory action of the priest, the Scholastics enter into considerable detail regarding the consecration of the bread and wine. They investigate both its formal and material element, and in the same connection study the sacramental and sacrificial aspect of the Eucharist. The following is a brief summary of what they accomplished along these lines.

1. *The Form of Consecration.*— There is a general agreement among the Scholastics that the form of consecration consists of the words of institution, exclusive of the *epiclesis* or invocation of the Holy Spirit. For the consecration of the bread they assign the four words, *Hoc est corpus meum;* and for the consecration of the wine they designate the corresponding form, *Hic est calix sanguinis mei.* In regard to this latter, however, St. Thomas seems to hold that the words which follow it in the Roman missal — *novi et aeterni Testamenti, mysterium fidei, qui pro vobis et pro multis effundetur in remissionem peccatorum* — are also necessary;[1] but whether he considers them as belonging to the substance of the form, so that without them there would be no consecration, is not quite certain.

There was some difference of opinion in regard to the manner of reciting these words. In the first place, Innocent

[1] Sum. Theol. III, q. 78, a. 3.

III [2] and Præpositivus [3] seem to have held that they should be spoken by way of recitation only, in as much as the consecrating priest simply states the historic fact that Christ spoke them "the day before He suffered." This view is rejected by St. Thomas,[4] St. Bonaventure,[5] Scotus,[6] and the Scholastics generally, who hold that the words of consecration must be spoken both in a recitative and assertive way. The priest uses them not only as having once been spoken by Christ, but also to indicate the effect which they here and now produce. The two forms are not merely speculative propositions; they are practical, effecting what they signify.

In the second place, there was considerable discussion in reference to the truth of these propositions. What meaning must be attached to the pronouns *hoc* and *hic,* as they are spoken at the beginning of the two forms? What the priest holds in his hands at the moment when he utters them is simply bread, or the chalice containing wine; while at the completion of the forms the bread has been changed into the body of Christ, and the wine has been changed into the blood of Christ. What, therefore, do these pronouns indicate if they are used by way of assertion?

St. Thomas, after adverting to the fact that the forms are practical propositions, and that transubstantiation is effected instantaneously when the last syllable is pronounced, maintains that the pronouns *hoc* and *hic* indicate in an indeterminate way what is common to the terminus *a quo* and the terminus *ad quem.* Hence, in the consecration of the bread, the sense of the proposition is: *That which is contained under these species is my body;* and in the consecration of the chalice the corresponding proposition signifies: *That which is contained under these species is my blood.*[7]

[2] De Sacro Altaris Mysterio, c. 17.

[3] Sum. p. 4.

[4] In Sent. IV, d. 8, q. 2, a. 1.

[5] Ibid. p. 2, a. 1, q. 1.

[6] Ibid. d. 8, q. 2, n. 12 sq.

[7] "Sic ergo hoc pronomen *hoc* neque demonstrat terminum ad quem transubstantiationis determinate, . . . neque iterum demonstrat terminum a quo determinate. Relinquitur ergo quod demonstret hoc quod est commune utrique termino indeterminate. . . . Communia sunt accidentia sensibilia. . . . Unde sensus est: 'Hoc contentum sub his speciebus est corpus meum'" (Loc. cit).

St. Bonaventure regards this explanation as probable, but does not consider it quite satisfactory. The chief objection to it, he says, is that the pronoun thus really points out, not the body of Christ, but the substance of bread in so far as it is perceptible by reason of its accidents. To escape this difficulty, he holds that the pronoun in the form of consecration appeals partly to the senses and partly to the intellect. In so far as it appeals to the senses it points out the substance that is to be converted; in so far as it appeals to the intellect it designates the body or blood of Christ which are the terms of this conversion, and of which the bread and wine are sensible signs.[8] With some slight modifications the same view is also defended by Alexander of Hales[9] and Richard of Middleton,[10] while Scotus is in favor of the explanation given by St. Thomas.[11]

In regard to the causality of the forms of consecration there existed the same difference of opinion as in reference to sacramental causality in general, concerning which an explanation has been given in a previous chapter. While some ascribed an instrumental efficacy to the words, others considered them merely as a *conditio sine qua non* of the effect produced by the omnipotence of God.[12]

2. *The Matter of Consecration.*— The proper matter for consecration, according to the common teaching of the Scholastics, is wheaten bread and wine of the grape — *panis triticeus et vinum de vite.* To this conclusion they reason from the fact that Christ consecrated bread and wine, and that, in the common acceptation of the terms, bread is supposed to be made of wheaten flour and wine to be pressed from the grape. St. Thomas, after referring to some antiquated heretical views, says: "All these and similar errors are excluded by the fact that Christ instituted this sacrament under the species of bread and wine."[13] And then to the question, whether bread must be made of wheat flour, he replies: "The kind of bread to be used is determined by

[8] In Sent. IV, d. 8, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1.
[9] Sum. IV, q. 10, m. 4, a. 2.
[10] In Sent. IV, d. 8, a. 3, q. 1.
[11] Ibid. q. 2, a. 1.
[12] Op. cit. d. 10, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3.
[13] Sum. Theol. III, q. 74, a. 1.

the more common meaning attached to the term as employed by men. Now people more commonly use wheaten bread; for other kinds of bread seem to be mere substitutes for it." [14] In a similar manner he reasons about the wine.[15]

The bread, moreover, should be unfermented; but this is not necessary for the validity of the sacrament. St. Thomas states the accepted views of theologians on this point as follows: "It is necessary indeed that the bread should be wheaten; for otherwise the sacrament would be invalid. But it is not necessary for the validity of the sacrament that the bread should be either unfermented or fermented. . . . It is, however, proper that each one should observe the rite of the church in which he celebrates." [16] Nor is it necessary for the validity of the sacrament that a small quantity of water should be mixed with the wine, although it is enjoined under grave obligation. By the water thus added is typified the people of God, who share in the sacrament; and thereby is also recalled the flowing of water from the side of Christ as He hung upon the cross.[17]

3. *The Consecrating Minister.*— That the priest alone has power to consecrate the Eucharist is assumed by all Scholastics as a matter that admits of no discussion. "Only priests can consecrate," says St. Bonaventure, "and if any one else attempts it, he accomplishes nothing. This is the teaching of our faith, which we have received from the Apostles." [18] But on the further question, whether all priests can consecrate, there is found among them some difference of opinion. Thus Hugh of St. Victor,[19] Peter Lombard,[20] and the author of the *Summa Sententiarum,*[21] hold that excommunicated priests are deprived of the power of consecrating. Peter Lombard assigns this reason for his view: *Illi vero, qui excommunicati sunt, vel de haeresi manifeste notati, non videntur hoc sacramentum posse conficere, licet sacerdotes sint; quia nemo dicit in ipsa consecratione offero, sed offerimus, quasi ex persona Ec-*

[14] Ibid. a. 3.
[15] Ibid. a. 5.
[16] Ibid. a. 4.
[17] Ibid. a. 7.
[18] In Sent. IV, d. 13, a. 1, q. 2.
[19] In Ep. S. Pauli, q. 102.
[20] Sent. d. 13, c. 1.
[21] Op. cit. tr. 6, c. 9.

clesiae. Et ideo, cum alia sacramenta extra Ecclesiam possint celebrari, de hoc non videtur.[22]

Later Scholastics, on the other hand, unanimously reject this reasoning and hold that the power of consecrating, which is received in ordination to the priesthood, cannot be lost. St. Thomas answers the difficulty, noted above, in this way: "In the prayers of the Mass the priest speaks indeed in the person of the Church, to the unity of which he belongs, but in the consecration he speaks in the person of Christ, whose place he holds through the power of ordination. And therefore when an excommunicated priest celebrates Mass, he truly consecrates by changing bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ; because he has not lost the power received in his ordination. But because he is separated from the unity of the Church, hence his prayers have no efficacy." [23] Then, speaking of priests who have been degraded from their priestly rank, he says: "The power of consecrating the Eucharist pertains to the sacerdotal character. Now the character, because conferred by a certain consecration, is indelible. . . . Hence it is manifest that the power of consecrating is not lost through degradation." [24]

In this connection the Scholastics also consider the question, whether a Mass celebrated by a good priest is of greater value than a Mass celebrated by a bad priest. The answer had already been given by Innocent III, who embodied this clause in the profession of faith required of the Waldensians: *In quo (sacrificio) nihil a bono majus, vel a malo minus perfici credimus sacerdote, quia non in merito consecrantis, sed in verbo efficitur Creatoris et in virtute Spiritus Sancti.*[24a] The common teaching of the Scholastics on the point in question is thus formulated by St. Bonaventure: "Speaking of the Mass, we must first of all consider what is its substantial value, namely, the consecration of the body and blood of Christ, and this is the same in all cases; because one and the same thing is in this regard effected by all priests. Next

[22] Loc. cit.
[23] Sum. Theol. III, q. 82, a. 7, ad 3[m].
[24] Ibid. a. 8.
[24a] DB. 424.

there are in the Mass certain accidentals, such as petitions, prayers, impetrations, and fervor; in respect of these the Mass of a good priest is of greater value, because they lead to greater devotion in those who assist. And if any one would rather hear Mass when celebrated by a more devout priest, I believe that he does well; provided, however, that he at the same time believes that there is no difference as regards the substantial value. Otherwise he would fall into a dangerous error." [25]

4. *The Eucharist as a Sacrament.*— According to the teaching of the Scholastics, the Holy Eucharist is a sacrament in the true sense of the term, but at the same time it is in some respects different from all other sacraments. The common view is thus presented by St. Thomas: "A religious rite is called a sacrament from the fact that it contains something sacred. Now a thing may be sacred in one of two ways: absolutely or relatively. And this is the difference between the Eucharist and other sacraments that are partly made up of sensible matter: the Eucharist contains something that is absolutely sacred, namely, the very body of Christ; whereas baptism, for instance, contains something that is sacred only in relation to something else, namely, the power of sanctifying: and the same is to be said in regard to confirmation and other similar sacraments. Hence the sacrament of the Eucharist is completed in the very consecration of the matter, while other sacraments are completed only in their application to the one who is to be sanctified. And from this also another difference arises: for in the sacrament of the Eucharist that which is the *res et sacramentum* is found in the matter itself; and that which is the *res tantum* is in the recipient, namely, the grace which is conferred: in baptism, on the other hand, both are in the recipient; namely, the character, which is the *res et sacramentum,* and the grace of justification, which is the *res tantum.* And it is the same in the case of the other sacraments." [26]

Hence the sacrament of the Eucharist does not consist pre-

[25] In Sent. IV, d. 13, a. 2, q. 1. [26] Sum. Theol. III, q. 73, a. 1.

cisely in the words or action of transubstantiation, as St. Thomas was inclined to hold when he wrote his *Commentary on the Sentences;* but it is essentially constituted by the consecrated species of bread and wine, in so far as they connote and contain the body and blood of Christ. The species, which naturally indicate bodily sustenance, in virtue of the consecration signify the presence of spiritual sustenance — the body and blood of Christ — and this in its turn signifies the grace to be conferred in the reception of the sacrament. Substantially the same explanation is given by Alexander of Hales,[27] Albertus Magnus,[28] St. Bonaventure,[29] and Scotus.[30]

Although the Eucharist consists of two distinct species, that of bread and wine, it is nevertheless only one sacrament. This is the teaching of the most representative Scholastics, such as Alexander of Hales,[31] St. Bonaventure,[32] Duns Scotus,[33] and St. Thomas.[34] The reason given by them is, that the two species together represent one spiritual refection. "A thing is said to be one," argues St. Thomas, "not only because it is indivisible, or continuous, but also because it is perfect — as one house and one man. Now a thing is one in the order of perfection by reason of all those integrating parts that are necessary for the attainment of its end. Thus man is integrally made up of all the members that are required for the operation of his soul, and a house of all those parts that are necessary to fit it for a habitation. And in like manner this sacrament is said to be one; because it is intended for a spiritual refection, which is conformable to bodily refection in that it consists of food and drink." [35]

On the other hand, from the fact that the two species constitute but one sacrament, it does not follow that the Eucharist must be received by all under both species. During the thirteenth century the practice of the Church in regard to lay communion was in a state of transition. In some places the

[27] Sum. IV, q. 10, m. 3, a. 3.
[28] In Sent. IV, d. 8, a. 12.
[29] Ibid. p. 2, a. 2, q. 1.
[30] Ibid. q. 1.
[31] Loc. cit. a. 1.
[32] Loc. cit. q. 2.
[33] Loc. cit. q. 1, n. 4.
[34] Ibid. q. 1, a. 1.
[35] Sum. Theol. q. 77, a. 2.

laity still received under both species, and in others only under the species of bread. St. Thomas, who gives the common teaching on the point in question, presents the matter in these terms: "Regarding the use of the sacrament two points may be considered: one in reference to the sacrament itself, and one in reference to those who receive it. As regards the sacrament itself, it is indeed becoming that both be received, that is, the body and the blood, because the perfection of the sacrament consists of both; and therefore, as it belongs to the priest to consecrate and complete the sacrament, he must in no way receive the body of Christ without also receiving His blood.

"But on the part of those who receive it, there is required the greatest reverence and caution, lest something should happen that would desecrate so great a mystery. This is especially the case with regard to the receiving of the blood, which, if taken without proper caution, might easily be spilled. And because in the ever increasing multitude of Christians there are old people and young, and children, many of whom have not the necessary discretion, nor take the proper precautions, in receiving this sacrament, hence it has been very wisely ordained in some churches that the laity do not receive communion under the species of wine, but the priest only." [36]

5. *Effects of the Sacrament.*—"This sacrament produces no effect," says St. Bonaventure, "except in him who receives it worthily; and he alone receives it worthily who prepares himself for its reception as he ought." [37] Then to the question, whether it has any efficacy in the sinner, he replies: "We do not wish to put limits to the generosity of God, who may and perhaps sometimes does grant the remission of all sins in this sacrament; but it must be said that in accordance with the common law and general reason for its institution, this sacrament is intended as food for those who are in the body of Christ, and all such have charity; therefore it exerts its efficacy only in the just. And its effect in the just is libera-

[36] Ibid. q. 80, a. 12.

[37] In Sent. IV, d. 12, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1.

tion from venial faults and preservation from mortal sin." [38] A little farther on he shows how this general effect is attained by a most intimate union with Christ.[39]

St. Thomas considers the matter somewhat more in detail. This sacrament produces grace, because it contains the author of grace; it represents the sufferings of the Savior; it is given as spiritual food; it is the sign of union with the God-Man.[40] Mortal sin is an impediment to its reception, because food is not for the dead.[41] However, if a person receives in good faith, not being conscious of the fact that he is in mortal sin, and at the same time is sorry for whatever sins he may have committed, he receives forgiveness through the sacrament.[42]

6. *The Eucharist as a Sacrifice.*— Alexander of Hales,[43] St. Thomas,[44] and some other Scholastics give a detailed and minute description of the Mass, but none of them examine into the intimate nature of the Eucharistic sacrifice. Their remarks about it are incidental, and hardly ever touch the points that caused so much discussion in later centuries. The following statements of St. Thomas contain practically all that can be gathered from their writings.

"This sacrament," he says, "is both a sacrifice and a sacrament. It is a sacrifice in so far as it is offered to God; it is a sacrament in so far as it is received by men. Hence it has the effects of a sacrament in him who receives it; and the effects of a sacrifice in him who offers it up, or also in those for whom it is offered." [45]

In another connection he gives this descriptive definition of a sacrifice in the proper sense of the term: *Sacrificia proprie dicuntur, quando circa res Deo oblatas aliquid fit; sicut quod animalia occidebantur, et comburebantur: quod panis frangitur, et comeditur, et benedicitur; et hoc ipsum nomen sonat, nam sacrificium dicitur ex hoc, quod homo facit aliquid sacrum: oblatio autem directe dicitur, cum Deo aliquid offer-*

[38] Ibid. q. 2.
[39] Ibid. q. 3.
[40] Sum. Theol. III, q. 79, a. 1.
[41] Ibid. a. 3.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Sum. IV, q. 10, 11.
[44] Op. cit. q. 83.
[45] Op. cit. q. 79, a. 5.

tur, etiamsi nihil circa ipsum fiat; sicut dicuntur denarii offerri, vel panes in altari, circa quos nihil fit: unde omne sacrificium est oblatio, sed non convertitur.[46]

Applying this to the Eucharistic rite, he says that it may be considered as an immolation of Christ as He becomes present under the sacramental species. And this for two reasons: First, because the rite is representative of the sufferings and death of Christ on the cross, when He was truly immolated for the sins of the world. Secondly, because through the Eucharist we are allowed to share in the effects of Christ's true immolation.[47] Again: "The celebration of this sacrament is a certain representative image of the passion of Christ; and therefore it is said to be an immolation of Christ Himself."[48] Hence too, the Christian altar represents the cross, whereon Christ was immolated.[49]

Furthermore, this representation of Christ's immolation on the cross is verified in the consecration itself, and therefore it is not lawful to consecrate the body without the blood.[50] This rite is a sacrifice precisely in so far as it represents the passion of Christ, in which He offered Himself to God as a victim for sin.[51] In the Eucharistic sacrifice as well as in the sacrifice of the cross, Christ Himself is both priest and victim; the officiating priest is merely His ministerial representative, acting in His name and person.[52] Hence, although the Eucharist is celebrated in many different places, and by many different priests, it is nevertheless only one sacrifice — a renewal and representation of the one sacrifice offered up on the cross.[53]

With this teaching of St. Thomas Duns Scotus agrees in so far as he also holds that the sacrifice of the Mass is an objective representation of the sacrifice of the cross,[54] that therein Christ is both victim and priest,[55] and that the officiating priest acts in His name and person; but he differs from it when he places the essence of this sacrifice, not in the

[46] II. II, q. 85, a. 3 ad 3m.
[47] Sum. Theol. q. 83, a. 1.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid. a. 1 ad 1m.
[50] Ibid. q. 80, a. 12 ad 3m.
[51] Ibid. q. 79, a. 7.
[52] Ibid. q. 83, a. 1 ad 3m.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Quodl. q. 20, n. 22.
[55] Ibid. n. 22, 2.

consecration itself, but in the oblation that follows.[56] He also points out that, although the value of the Eucharistic sacrifice is in itself infinite, nevertheless as offered by the Church it is finite in its application to the faithful.[57]

Of the several points touched in these two chapters, some have been defined by the Church, others represent the common teaching of theologians, while still others are little more than theological speculations. To the first class, with which we are here more directly concerned, belongs the Real Presence, transubstantiation, the existence of the accidents of bread and wine independently of their natural subject of inhesion, the form and matter of consecration, the power of every priest to consecrate, the freedom from mortal sin as a necessary disposition for a worthy reception, the increase of sanctifying grace in the worthy recipient, and the fact that the Holy Eucharist is both a sacrament and a sacrifice. It must be noted, however, that nearly all these definitions were occasioned by the cavils of heretics, and that they simply formulate in a clear and definite way what had always been held to be an object of faith.

[56] In Sent. IV, d. 13, q. 2. [57] Quodl. 20, n. 22.

CHAPTER XX

PENANCE

PRACTICE OF THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES: TEACHING OF THE SCHOLASTICS

In a certain sense, penance is to the fallen Christian what baptism is to the unregenerated heathen — a plank of safety out of the shipwreck. And as such has it always been regarded in the Church of Christ. In fact, the comparison was already a commonplace in the third century. And so, too, was all that is essential in the doctrine and administration of penance. On the other hand, in the matter of accidental details many changes were introduced in the course of time. Some of these appear at first sight so striking that not a few thoughtless critics have been led to deny the continuity of the penitential rite itself. Such a denial is, of course, without warrant; for while in the course of many centuries the external form of penance has undergone various changes, the essentials of both doctrine and practice have always remained the same. The following remarks on the penitential practices of the early Middle Ages will make this sufficiently clear.

A — Practice of the Early Middle Ages

During Patristic times, penance as administered by the Church was of two kinds: private and public. In private penance both the confession of sins and the rite of reconciliation were secret; in public penance sacramental confession was also secret, but the works of satisfaction enjoined and the final reconciliation were public. Moreover, under ordinary circumstances, reconciliation was not granted until due satisfaction had been made. It was chiefly in regard to public penance

that changes were gradually introduced. These changes were determined partly by altered social conditions and partly by the varying attitude of the faithful in regard to public penance. And rightly so: for as public penance was in great part merely a matter of discipline, it was quite proper that the Church should accommodate her regulations in this respect to the needs of the times and the greater good of those whom she desired to benefit. Hence we find that in some countries public penance was never in force. This was the case in England, and probably also in Ireland. In regard to the former country the *Poenitentiale Theodori* explicitly states: *Reconciliatio ideo in hac provincia publice statuta non est, quia et publica poenitentia non est.*[1]

It was principally since the seventh century that public penance began to be discontinued in the various countries in which it had been in vogue during Patristic times. Thus in France, during the disorders of the Merovingian period, it fell into almost complete desuetude. And this state of things continued even after public order had been restored, as is evident from a statement of the Synod of Chalons, held in 813. The statement reads as follows: *Poenitentiam agere juxta antiquam canonum institutionem in plerisque locis ab usu recessit.*[2] The same Synod, however, passed this decree: *Si quis publice peccat, publice mulctetur poenitentia et secundum ordinem canonum pro merito suo excommunicetur et reconcilietur.*[3] During the next two centuries this legislation was regarded as the general norm of procedure — public penance was to be imposed upon public sinners, at least in cases where the sin had caused considerable scandal. At the same time, however, excommunication was not inflicted except when the sinner refused to do penance. Similar conditions obtained also in other countries.

A further mitigation was introduced in regard to the time of reconciliation. For many centuries reconciliation was ordinarily granted only after the penance enjoined had been duly performed. Practically the only exceptions to this rule

[1] Op. cit. 13, 4; cfr. Hadden and Stubbs, Councils, III, 187.

[2] Mansi, 14, 98.

[3] Ibid.

were those in favor of the dying. To them immediate reconciliation was granted even if they had put off doing penance, although in that case its effectiveness was not rarely called in question. Thus, in the sixth century, St. Cæsarius of Arles stated in reference to such persons: "If any one, when in danger of death, asks to be admitted to penance, and, the favor having been granted, he departs this life after being thus reconciled, I confess, we do not deny him what he asks, but at the same time we do not presume that he has died well." [4] With reference to the dying in general, Rabanus Maurus, towards the middle of the ninth century, gives this direction to his clergy: "In regard to those who are at the point of death, account must be taken of their sincere conversion rather than of the time still left them for doing penance." [5] And even before this, immediate reconciliation was already extended to those in health; for the *Statuta Bonifatii* contain this general direction: "Let every priest see to it that penitents be reconciled immediately after their confession." [6] However, as appears from the *Libri Poenitentiales,* this did not apply to cases of great public scandal. By the beginning of the eleventh century immediate reconciliation had become the general rule, even in the case of public sinners; and thereafter public penance practically disappeared.

During all these centuries, private penance, including sacramental confession, was much insisted upon. Confession was considered to make even the most grievous sins venial, that is, easily forgiven. Thus Alcuin states: "Believe me, whatever sin you may have committed becomes venial, if you are not ashamed to confess it and to do penance. . . . The Lord is waiting for the sacrifice of your confession, so that He may show you the sweetness of His mercy; for He wishes all men to be saved and desires no one to perish." [7] And again: "God desires our confession, so that He may have a just reason for granting pardon." [8] In the sacred tribunal of penance the priest is at once intercessor, advocate, and

[4] ML. 67, 1082 C.
[5] Poenit. 14; ML. 110, 483.
[6] Mansi, 12, 386.
[7] De Confess. Pecc. 2; ML. 101, 622.
[8] Ibid. 622 A.

physician. He reconciles the sinner to God, and, in virtue of the authority conferred upon him by the Church, loosens the bonds of sin.[9] The form of absolution was still deprecatory, and the declarative form did not come into common use until about 1200.[10] Even then some Scholastics still disputed the lawfulness of its use.[11] However, the final acceptation of this form shows that it had always been the common persuasion that the priest really absolved from sin, even if he granted absolution in the form of a prayer.

How the sacrament of penance was regarded in the early Middle Ages appears most clearly from the Pseudo-Augustinian treatise *De Vera et Falsa Poenitentia.* This work was probably composed at the beginning of the eleventh century, although Gratian, about 1140, regarded it as a genuine work of St. Augustine. The points of most interest in the present connection are the following:

1. The proper object or matter of the sacrament of penance are mortal sins: *Sunt quaedam peccata venialia, quae oratione Dominica cotidie solvuntur, . . . alia vero, quae sunt ad mortem, non sic, sed per fructum poenitentiae solvuntur.*[12] *Agenda est poenitentia, ut deleantur crimina.*[13]

2. However venial sins may also be confessed; and when they are frequently committed, confession is very advisable: *Ista assidua et quodam modo necessaria assidua laventur confessione, assidua restaurentur confessione;*[14] *est enim poenitentia assidue peccantibus assidue necessaria.*[15]

3. The confession of sins by catechumens is not necessary: *Poenitentia baptizandis non est necessaria.*[16]

4. The life of a Christian is necessarily a penitential life: *Quantum sit appetenda gratia poenitentiae . . ., omnis bonorum vita conatur ostendere;*[17] *fides fundamentum est poenitentiae.*[18]

5. This penance may be repeated as often as seems good;[19]

[9] Ep. 112; ML. 100, 337, sqq.
[10] Regino, De Ecclesiast. Discipl. I, 300; ML. 132, 252.
[11] Morinus, 8, 9, 23; p. 537 sq.
[12] Op. cit. 4, 10; ML. 1116.
[13] Ibid. 8, 22; 1121.
[14] Ibid. 8, 21; 1120.
[15] Ibid. 8, 20; 1119.
[16] Ibid. 8, 19; 1119.
[17] Ibid. 1, 1; 1113.
[18] Ibid. 2, 3; 1113.
[19] Ibid. 3, 5–15.

but if public penance must be done, that may be performed only once.[20]

6. Normally all men are at one time or another guilty of mortal sin; hence, referring to John 8, 7–9, the author says: *Nullus erat sine peccato. In quo intelligitur omnes crimine fuisse reos, nam veniale semper remittebatur per cerimonias; si quod igitur peccatum in eis erat, criminale erat.*[21]

7. True penance consists first of all in a contrite confession of the sins committed: *Quem igitur poenitet . . . representet vitam suam Deo per sacerdotem, praeveniat judicium Dei per confessionem. . . . Ex misericordia enim hoc praecepit Dominus, ut neminem poeniteret in occulto. . . . Fit enim per confessionem veniale, quod criminale erat in operatione.*[22]

8. If no priest be at hand, and there is danger of death, it is advisable to confess even to a layman: *Tanta itaque vis confessionis est, ut si deest sacerdos, confiteatur proximo; . . . fit dignus venia ex desiderio sacerdotis.*[23]

9. The priest acts as the messenger of God — *nuntius Dei;*[24] he exercises the power of a judge — *in potestate judicis;*[25] he is vested with judicial power — *judiciaria potestas.*[26]

10. For secret sins private penance suffices, but for public sins public penance is proper: *Si peccatum occultum est, sufficiat referre in notitiam sacerdotis. . . . Docemur publice peccantibus non proprium, sed ecclesiae sufficere meritum; . . . qui enim multos offendit peccando, placare multos oportet satisfaciendo.*[27]

11. In order to satisfy completely for one's sins, one must be assiduous in performing works of penance: *Qui perfectam vult consequi gratiam remissionis, fructificet in poenitentia.*[28]

12. True penance shows itself in mortification, sorrow of heart, and alms-giving: *Abstineat a multis licitis, . . . semper offerat Deo mentis et cordis contritionem, deinde et*

[20] Ibid. 11, 26.
[21] Ibid. 20, 36; 1129.
[22] Ibid. 10, 25; 1122.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid. 15, 30; 1125.
[26] Ibid. 20, 36; 1129.
[27] Ibid. 11, 26; 1123.
[28] Ibid. 15, 31; 1126.

quod potest de possessione, ut semper puniat se ulciscendo, quod commisit peccando; poenitere enim est poenam tenere.[29]

13. Those who neglect to do penance here on earth shall be punished in purgatory: *Prius purgandus est igne purgationis, qui in aliud saeculum distulit fructum conversionis.*[30]

14. If any one dies without repenting of his sins, he is condemned to the pains of hell: *Qui autem impoenitens moritur, omnino moritur et aeternaliter cruciatur.*[31]

The same general outlines of early mediæval teaching on penance might also be drawn up from the sermons of St. Peter Damian, who died in 1072. Of those who contritely confess their sins he says: *In fide Ecclesiae credat sibi peccata dimitti.*[32] It is only after the *oris confessio,* sacramental confession, that works of penance are in place.[33] If sufficient satisfaction for sins is not rendered here on earth, the penitent must submit to the pains of purgatory: *Cum in purgatoriis ignibus perficiendum sit, quidquid hic minus feceris, quia dignos poenitentiae fructus quaerit Altissimus.*[34] He calls penance the sacrament of confession — *sacramentum confessionis.*[35] It is the ordinary means of sanctification for saint and sinner alike: *Via communis ad Deum, fons tam justis quam peccatoribus patens.*[36]

From the foregoing summary it ought to be sufficiently clear that private sacramental penance did not grow out of monastic practices, as is so frequently contended by Protestant writers on the subject. It was in vogue all over the Christian world, and the obligation of submitting to it was insisted upon by the secular clergy as well as by the monks. Nor were the clergy themselves exempt from this obligation, although they usually were exempt from the obligation of submitting to public pennance. Much less can it be held, as many Protestants do hold, that the obligation of sacramental confession had its origin in the legislation of the Fourth Lateran Council, convened in 1215 under Innocent III. All that the Council did was to

[29] Ibid. 10, 25; 1122.
[30] Ibid. 18, 34; 1128.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Serm. 58; ML, 144, 832 D.
[33] Ibid. 832 D; 833 A.
[34] Ibid. 831 A.
[35] Serm. 69; ML, 901 A.
[36] Ibid. 901 A.

prescribe certain limits, beyond which the faithful must not neglect to confess their sins.[37] The obligation itself had existed from the beginning of the Church, but it was only when the faithful had become careless in this respect that the Church found it necessary to enforce it by a general law. Moreover local synods had passed similar laws centuries before, but the Fourth Lateran legislated for the whole Church.

B — Teaching of the Scholastics

Most of the Scholastics consider penance under two distinct heads: penance as a virtue and penance as a sacrament. But they do not all follow the same order of treatment. Some discuss first the virtue of penance and then pass over to its sacramental aspect; while others first explain what belongs to the sacrament and thereupon treat of the virtue in connection with the effects and acts of penance. The former arrangement seems the more logical, and will be followed in this brief review of their teaching.

1. *The Virtue of Penance.*— The question whether penance must be regarded as a virtue is variously answered by the Scholastics. St. Bonaventure enumerates four different views on this point, each one of which had its defenders among the Schoolmen. "Some there are," he says, "who hold that penance is not a virtue, but an act of virtue; not of one virtue in particular, but of all together — they all concur in the production of that act. Just as the chords of the lyre give out one musical note when touched in accord with the rules of the musician's art, so do the virtues produce this one act under the direction of prudence. . . . Others say that penance is a *habitus,* not of virtue but of grace; nor does it refer only to the substance of grace, but also to its act. As the grace of baptism is called innocence, so is the grace of justification called penance. . . . A third opinion admits that penance is a virtue, but only in the wider sense of the term. For virtue in the proper sense directs the agent towards good, while penance recalls him from evil. . . . The last view is that pen-

[37] DB. 437.

ance is a habit of virtue — *habitus virtutis* — and of virtue in its proper acceptation, not merely in a general sense. And this, I believe, is the more probable view." [38]

This "more probable view" was held by nearly all the most representative Scholastics,[39] Albertus Magnus being the only one of note who considered penance as a virtue in the wider sense of the term.[40] Then the further question arose whether penance must be regarded as a special virtue distinct from all others. In respect to this there was again some difference of views, in as much as a few identified penance with justice, while all the others held it to be a special virtue. Thus St. Thomas argues: "Habits are distinguished according to the specific difference of their acts; hence where there are specifically different praiseworthy acts, there it must be admitted that they are elicited by a special virtue. Now it is manifest that in penance there is found a specifically different praiseworthy act, namely, to bring about the destruction of past sin in so far as it is an offence against God, which does not belong to any other virtue. Hence it necessarily follows that penance is a special virtue." [41] St. Bonaventure words his reasoning somewhat differently, but comes to the same conclusion. "Penance," he says, "is a special virtue, because it has a bearing upon evil as committed against God, whereby man has made himself deserving of punishment." [42]

However, although penance is thus a special virtue, it is nevertheless reducible to the cardinal virtue of justice, of which it is a part. On this point nearly all were agreed, only a few contending that penance must be reduced to charity. The more common view is thus set forth by St. Thomas: "Penance is a special virtue not only for the reason that it causes grief for sins committed, because for that purpose charity would suffice; but rather for the reason that the penitent

[38] In Sent. IV, d. 14, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1.

[39] Cfr. Halens. Sum. IV, q. 12, m. 1, a. 1; Thomas, in Sent. IV, d. 14, q. 1, a. 1; Scotus, ibid. q. 2; Middleton, ibid. a. 1, q. 1.

[40] Ibid. a. 3.

[41] Sum. Theol. III, q. 85, a. 2.

[42] In Sent. IV, d. 14, p. 1, a. 1. q. 2.

grieves for sins committed in so far as they are an offence against God, and at the same time resolves to make amends. Now to make amends for an offence committed against some one does not consist merely in a cessation of the offence; but furthermore requires that a certain compensation be made to the person offended, just as sin demands punishment. . . . But compensation and punishment belong to the matter of justice, because there is a commutative aspect in both. Hence, it is manifest that penance, in so far as it is a special virtue, is a part of justice." [43] However, as it is the virtue of an inferior in respect of his superior, it is not commutative justice in the strict sense of the term; because that has no place except between equals.[44]

Again, as penance is a part of the virtue of justice, its proper subject is the will. Hence, too, repentance is an act of the will, although it usually also manifests itself in the affections.[45] Its proper act consists in the detestation of sin and the firm purpose of amendment, so that thereby due compensation may be made to God for the offence that resulted from past sins.[46]

Penance as a virtue is infused by God. This is the common teaching of the Scholastics against Scotus.[47] Considered as an act, penance arises from a variety of motives. The whole process of repentance is thus described by St. Bonaventure: "First it is necessary to know God's goodness and justice, to which every sin is an offence and as such calls for punishment — and one must be conscious of having done something that is displeasing to God's goodness; this is the consciousness of guilt, and thence results the apprehension of punishment as inflicted by divine justice. It is also necessary to know God's mercy, by reason of which He is prepared to grant forgiveness to everyone who sincerely repents of his sins. From the first knowledge arises fear; from the second hope of forgiveness: then from the two together springs the desire and the determination of returning to God, of becoming reconciled to Him,

[43] Sum. Theol. III, q. 85, a. 3.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid. a. 4; Bonavent. In Sent. IV, d. 14, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Cfr. supra, "Infused Virtues."

and of rendering Him due satisfaction by sorrow of heart and other penitential works. If a person thus starts out to do what in him lies, he is disposed for justification." [48]

This is substantially the common teaching of the Scholastics, though not by all of them expressed in the same terms. St. Thomas, for instance, puts it this way: "Of penance we can speak in two ways: one way in as much as it is a *habitus* and as such it is immediately infused by God, we only contributing thereto by way of disposition; another way in as much as it is an act, in which we coöperate with God through penance. Of these acts the first principle is God's operation in so far as He converts the heart, according to Lament. ult., 21: 'Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted.' The second is an act of faith; the third is an act of servile fear, by which one is drawn away from sin through the fear of punishment; the fourth is an act of hope, by which one in expectation of forgiveness resolves upon amending one's life; the fifth is an act of charity, by which one detests sin as it is in itself and not merely for fear of punishment; the sixth is an act of filial fear, by which one through reverence for God freely offers to make amends. And thus it is clear that the act of penance proceeds from servile fear as the first movement of the affections ordained to this end; but from filial fear as its immediate and proper principle." [49]

If a person is truly repentant and prepared to comply with all the conditions laid down by God for justification, he infallibly obtains the grace of God, no matter what sins he may have committed.[50] In connection with this they usually inquire into the measure of sanctifying grace that one receives in thus rising from grievous personal falls. By mortal sin sanctifying grace is lost, by penance it is recovered; but in what measure is it recovered as compared to the grace possessed before sin was committed? Obviously, three suppositions are

[48] In Sent. IV, d. 14, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2.

[49] Sum. Theol. III, q. 85, a. 5.

[50] The common teaching of the Scholastics on this point is thus formulated by St. Bonaventure: "Concedendum igitur, quod omnis agens poenitentiam super culpam secundum assignationem praedictam, quantumcumque peccaverit, invenit gratiam" (In Sent. IV, d. 14, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1).

possible. First, that penance places man in the same position where he was before he sinned; so that he has the same amount of sanctifying grace and the same merits for heaven. Secondly, that penance restores the full amount of grace and all the merits possessed before sin was committed, and adds thereto whatever is due to the supernatural acts of penance itself; whence it would follow that the sinner after his conversion possesses a higher degree of grace and more merits for heaven than he did before he sinned. Thirdly, that penance does not restore the grace and merits lost through sin, and that therefore the penitent after his conversion has only that degree of grace and those merits which correspond to the supernatural acts involved in the process of his repentance.

Different answers are given to the question by different Scholastics. Some hold that penance restores the same grace that was lost by sin; others say that penance restores the grace that was lost and besides adds thereto in proportion to the fervor of repentance; others, finally, maintain that the grace conferred by penance is simply in proportion to the disposition of the penitent, and that all lost merits are merely the cause of accidental glory in heaven. This last seems to be the view of St. Thomas, for he says: "The penitent who rises from his sins in a lower degree of charity, will indeed obtain an essential reward in proportion to the degree of charity which he is found to possess; nevertheless he will have greater joy on account of the good works which he did in his first charity, over and above that which results from the works he performed after his conversion; and this belongs to his accidental reward." [51] The same is also held by Alexander of Hales [52] and Richard of Middleton.[53] In this view, therefore, the merits lost by sin do not revive through penance.

On the other hand, St. Bonaventure [54] and Duns Scotus [55] are in favor of a full restoration of all previous merits. The former says: "It is the common opinion of theologians that

[51] In Sent. III, d. 31, a. 4, quaestiunc. 1, 2, 3; Sum. Theol. III, q. 89, a. 5 ad 3m.
[52] Sum. IV, q. 12, m. 4, a. 5.
[53] In Sent. III, d. 31, a. 1, q. 2.
[54] In Sent. IV, d. 14, p. 2, a. 2, q. 3.
[55] Ibid. d. 22, q. unic. n. 8, 9, 10.

works which were at first meritorious, because they were performed in the state of grace and therefore deserving of an eternal reward, become dead through sin — because as long as there is guilt they are on account of the person's sinful condition no longer deserving of reward — but when grace returns and makes the penitent worthy of life eternal, these same works also deserve a reward, and are therefore restored and vivified." [56] Scotus points out that if these meritorious works are not restored at the moment of conversion, on account of the penitent's imperfect disposition, then they are restored later on when his disposition is more perfect; or at all events at the moment of death.[57]

2. *The Sacrament of Penance.*—"The perfection of penance," argues Peter Lombard, "consists of three things: sorrow, confession, satisfaction — *compunctio cordis, confessio oris, satisfactio operis.*" [58] These three are essential on the part of the penitent, and when to them is added the absolution of the priest, there results the sacrament of penance. True, actual satisfaction is not a constituent part of the sacrament, but by way of satisfaction the penitent must at least have the sincere will to perform the penance enjoined by the confessor. In this sense, satisfaction as well as sorrow and confession is an indispensable requisite for a valid absolution. Moreover, sorrow for sins must necessarily include a firm purpose of amendment; for without such a purpose, either expressed or implied, it would not be true sorrow. Hence the sacrament of penance comprises five distinct parts: sorrow for sins, a purpose of amendment, confession, satisfaction, and absolution. The first four of these must obviously be supplied by the penitent, and the last just as obviously by the priest who receives the confession.

So far all are agreed; but if it be asked whether all these parts enter the constitution of the sacrament, so that they in some way belong to its essence, there is some diversity of opinion. Scotus and his followers contend that the acts of the penitent are indeed necessary conditions for a valid absolu-

[56] Loc. cit.
[57] Loc. cit.
[58] Sent. IV, d. 16, c. 1.

tion, but deny that they enter the constitution of the sacrament. Scotus himself gives this definition of the sacrament of penance: *Absolutio hominis poenitentis, facta certis verbis, cum debita intentione prolatis, a sacerdote jurisdictionem habente, ex institutione divina efficaciter significantibus absolutionem animae a peccato.*[59] According to his view, it is the absolution alone that constitutes the sacramental sign. And this he expressly states, when he says in another place: *Hoc sacramentum non habet nisi unum signum ut verba prolata, habet tantum formam et non proprie materiam.*[60] Or again: *Poenitentia, sacramentum, nihil aliud est quam forma audibilis verborum prolatorum super poenitentem a sacerdote.*[61] Hence he says in regard to the acts of the penitent: *Sunt quaedam dispositiones congruae praeambula convenientia ad susceptionem congruam poenitentiae sacramenti.*[62] Sorrow for sins, a purpose of amendment, confession, and satisfaction are all necessary; but only as requisites for absolution, not as parts of the sacrament. Substantially the same explanation is given by Durandus.[63]

However, the greater number of the Scholastics took a different view of the point in question. The matter is most clearly set forth by St. Thomas, who begins his treatise on penance with a brief consideration of the sacramental rite. He first points out that penance is a true sacrament of the New Law, since the acts of the penitent and the absolution of the priest together constitute a sacred sign which was instituted for the sanctification of men.[63a] Then to the objection that there is no corporeal element in penance as there is in baptism, he replies: "By the term corporeal things, taken in a wider sense, are also understood exterior actions which can be perceived by the senses, and in this sacrament they take the place of water in baptism or of chrism in confirmation. But it must be noted that in those sacraments which confer a more excellent grace, a grace which surpasses the reach of all human acts, some corporeal matter is used by way of exterior appli-

[59] In Sent. IV, d. 14, q. 4, n. 2.
[60] Report. IV, d. 16, q. 6, n. 6.
[61] Ibid. n. 12.
[62] In Sent. IV, d. 16, q. 1, n. 13.
[63] Ibid. d. 16, q. 1.
[63a] Sum. Theol. III, q. 84, a. 1.

cation; thus in baptism, which confers a full remission of sins, both as to guilt and punishment; and in confirmation, which gives the fullness of the Holy Spirit; and in extreme unction, which bestows perfect spiritual health, flowing from the power of Christ as from a certain extrinsic principle. Hence, if in such sacraments there occur any human acts, they do not belong to the essence of the sacramental rites, but are merely requisite dispositions for the proper reception of those sacraments. Whereas in those sacraments which produce effects corresponding to human acts, these sensible human acts themselves constitute the matter of the same sacraments, as happens in penance and matrimony." [64]

From the fact that the acts of the penitent constitute the matter of the sacramental rite, it necessarily follows that in this sacrament the minister does not apply the matter to the recipient. These acts are inspired by God, are then presented by the penitent in the tribunal of penance, and thereupon receive their sacramental character from the absolution of the priest.[65] In a certain sense, the sins confessed by the penitent may be considered as the remote matter of the sacrament of penance; for it is upon them that the acts of the penitent, as the proximate matter of the sacrament, are made to bear.[66] And these sins comprise all personal sinful acts, venial and mortal, although it was chiefly for the forgiveness of mortal sin that the sacrament of penance was instituted.[67]

The form of the sacrament of penance consists in the words, *Ego te absolvo;* all that precedes these words by way of prayer is simply intended to obtain the grace of a proper disposition for the penitent. This form is taken from the promise which our Savior made to Peter, when He said: *Quodcumque solveris super terram, etc.*[68] It was then that He determined what should be required on the part of the minister, although He did not indicate its efficacy and the origin of its power until after His resurrection.[69]

As regards the power of the keys, which the priest uses in

[64] Sum. Theol. III, q. 86, a. 1.
[65] Ibid. a. 1 ad 2m.
[66] Ibid. a. 2.
[67] Ibid. a. 1 ad 3m.
[68] Ibid. a. 3.
[69] Ibid. q. 84, a. 7.

sacramental absolution, there is no perfect agreement among the Scholastics. In this matter two things must be distinguished: guilt and punishment. According to some, the priest in giving absolution simply declares that the guilt, or sin itself, has been taken away by God, and then remits part of the punishment due to sin. This is the view taken by Peter Lombard,[70] Richard of St. Victor [71] and probably also by St. Bonaventure. The latter holds that the power of the keys extends itself to the forgiveness of sin by way of prayer, but not by way of imparting pardon for sin.[72] Prayer, he says, obtains grace; but absolution presupposes it.[73] In accordance with this view, he interprets the words of our Lord, *whose sins you shall forgive, etc.,* as having been spoken merely *quantum ad ostensionem, vel quantum ad poenam.*[74]

However, by far the greater number of Scholastics understood the power of the keys in a different sense. Thus St. Thomas, refuting the view of the Lombard, according to whom the words, *ego te absolvo,* signify, *ego te absolutum ostendo,* states very clearly: "It must be said that the interpretation of *I absolve thee,* as *I declare thee to have been absolved,* is indeed partly true, but not altogether. For the sacraments of the New Law not only signify, but also effect what they signify. Hence, just as the priest when he baptizes some one declares by his words and actions that the recipient is interiorly cleansed, not only significatively but effectively; so likewise when he says I absolve thee, does he declare the penitent to be absolved, not merely significatively but effectively. Nor does he say this in any uncertain way; for just as the other

[70] Sent. d. 18, n. 4, 5.

[71] De Potest. ligandi et solvendi.

[72] "Si ergo quaeratur, utrum potestas clavium se extendat ad delendam culpam, dicendum, quod bene potest se extendere per modum deprecantis et impetrantis: et illud significatum est in benedictione sacerdotum, Numero sexto; sed per modum impertientis non. Quoniam ergo potestas sonat per modum activi et impertientis ex se; hinc est quod potestas clavium, proprie loquendo, non se extendat supra culpam" (In Sent. IV, d. 18, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1).

[73] "Deprecatio gratiam impetrat, sed absolutio praesupponit. Nunquam enim sacerdos absolveret quemquam, de quo non praesumerat, quod esset absolutus a Deo" (Ibid.).

[74] Ibid. q. 1, ad 1m.

sacraments of the New Law have of themselves an infallible effect because of the passion of Christ, although that effect can be impeded on the part of the recipient; so it is also in the case of this sacrament. . . . Consequently, a better interpretation is this: *I absolve thee,* that is, *I impart to thee the sacrament of absolution.*" [75]

True, the action of the priest in giving absolution is only ministerial, but so it is in the administration of all other sacraments. Hence the objection that God alone can forgive sins, St. Thomas answers by saying: "It is to be held that God alone can absolve from sin by His own authority, and thus remit sin; nevertheless priests do both by reason of their ministerial office, and that in as much as the words of the priest in this sacrament operate as the instrument of divine power, just as in the other sacraments. For it is the divine power that operates interiorly in the case of all sacramental signs, whether they are things or words, as was said above. Hence, our Lord mentioned both, the absolving from sin and the remission of sins; for in Matthew He says, *whatever you shall loosen upon earth, etc.,* and in John, *whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them.* Nevertheless, the priest says, *I absolve thee,* rather than, *I remit thy sins,* because this is more in accord with the words used by our Lord when He conferred the power of the keys by which priests absolve. However, since it is only as God's minister that the priest absolves, it is fitting that something expressive of God's authority be added, namely, that he say: *I absolve thee in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,* or, *by the power of the passion of Christ,* or, *by the authority of God.* . . . Still, since this is not determined by the words of Christ, as it is in baptism, the addition is left to the judgment of the priest." [76]

The sacrament of penance is necessary for salvation, but not in the same sense as baptism. The latter is necessary for all alike, whereas the former is necessary only for those who after baptism have fallen into mortal sin.[77] Nor is it even for them absolutely necessary, but only on the supposition that

[75] Sum. Theol. III, q. 84, a. 3 ad 5m.

[76] Ibid. q. 84, a. 3.

[77] Ibid. a. 5.

they have an opportunity of receiving it; for where there is a good will and true sorrow, and a sincere desire to confess, God is always able and willing to forgive sins without the sacrament.[78]

The effect of the sacrament of penance, presupposing the good disposition of the penitent, consists in the remission of all sins truly repented of, and in the canceling of the eternal punishment due to sin.[79] Temporal punishment may also be canceled, but that depends on the degree of coöperation on the part of the penitent.[80]

For the worthy reception of the sacrament of penance, as was remarked above, three things are required on the part of the penitent: true sorrow for sins, including a firm purpose of amendment; confession of all mortal sins, in so far as he can call them to mind by diligent examination of conscience; and the will to render due satisfaction according to the judgment of the confessor. In regard to these requisites there is substantial agreement among the Scholastics, and a few remarks will suffice to indicate the trend of their teaching.

In the matter of sorrow for sins, or contrition, they distinguish between perfect and imperfect contrition; or also between contrition and attrition. However, they do not always take this distinction in precisely the same sense as do modern theologians. Both agree in attributing to perfect contrition the power of blotting out sin, and for that reason they call it perfect; while they regard imperfect contrition as being merely a disposition thereto, and in so far they consider it imperfect. But besides this, the Scholastics frequently use the two terms in reference to the presence or absence of sanctifying grace in the soul of the penitent. Thus taking one and the same act of sorrow, so long as the penitent is without sanctifying grace, they call it imperfect contrition or attrition: and the moment he receives sanctifying grace, they term it simply attrition. In this sense St. Thomas says: *Omnis dolor de peccato in habente gratiam est contritio.*[81] And in the same sense St. Bonaventure states: *In contritione gratiae est contritio ad*

[78] Ibid. q. 86, a. 2.
[79] Ibid. a. 1, 4.
[80] Ibid. a. 4 ad 2m.
[81] De Verit. q. 28, a. 8.

generandum vas novum et solidum per humorem gratiae et lacrymarum; et ideo recte dicitur contritio, non attritio, quia partium tritarum est unio.[82]

The perfection or imperfection of contrition depends ultimately on the motives by which sorrow for sin is inspired. Thus perfect contrition is conceived to flow from the consideration of sin precisely as it is an offense against God, who is infinitely good and deserving of all our love; while imperfect contrition is held to proceed from a less perfect motive, such as the intrinsic deformity of sin, the loss of eternal happiness, or even the fear of positive punishment. In reference to this St. Thomas says that the act of penance, which leads to the forgiveness of sin, takes its rise from servile fear, but has filial fear as its immediate and proximate principle.[83]

The question, what kind of contrition, perfect or imperfect, is required for a worthy reception of the sacrament of penance, is variously answered by the Scholastics, in keeping with the different views they entertain in respect to the power of the keys. In the first place, those who hold that the confessor merely declares the penitent to be absolved from his sins by God, consequently maintain that ordinarily perfect contrition is required. Thus St. Bonaventure compares penance in this respect to the reception of the Eucharist. In both cases, he says, the recipient must have at least probable reasons for believing that he has perfect charity, in order to be properly disposed for a worthy reception of the sacraments.[84]

On the other hand, those who hold that the priest really absolves from the guilt of sin, although only as the instrument

[82] In Sent. IV, d. 16, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1.

[83] Sum. Theol. III, q. 85, a. 5.

[84] He proposes his view in these terms: "Sicut dictum est, quod non tenemur ad Eucharistian accedere cum caritate secundum veritatem, sed sufficit, quod secundum probabilitatem; sic dico, quod ad sacramentum poenitentiae non est necesse, quod accedat habens caritatem vel dispositionem ad caritatem sufficientem secundum veritatem, sed sufficit secundum probabilitatem. Haec autem dispositio attritio est, quae frequenter ob confessionem superadjunctam et absolutionem sacerdotis formatur per gratiam, ut fiat contritio" (Ibid. d. 17, p. 2, a. 2, q. 3). Hence it is only by way of exception that attrition suffices for a worthy reception of the sacrament of penance.

of God, contend that attrition is always sufficient for a worthy reception of the sacrament of penance; provided, of course, that it flows from some supernatural motive. Hence, when St. Thomas defines contrition in so far as it is necessary for sacramental absolution, he derives its origin from only two motives: fear and hope. Fear, he says, is the principal motive, and with this is associated hope of forgiveness; for without hope, fear would degenerate into despair.[85] He adduces five different definitions of contrition as found in the works of the Fathers, and in not one of them is there question of perfect charity. As an example take the definition he quotes from St. Isidore of Seville: *Contritio est compunctio et humilitas mentis cum lacrimis, veniens de recordatione peccati et timore judicii.* Or that cited from St. Gregory the Great: *Contritio est humilitas spiritus, annihilans peccatum inter spem et timorem.* Both are identical with our definition of attrition. And these definitions St. Thomas makes his own.[86]

This more common view is also defended by Duns Scotus. He defines contrition in a general way as a detestation of past sins — *displicentia de peccato commisso*,[87] which includes or has connected with it a firm purpose of amendment — *propositum cavendi de caetero*.[88] Without such an act of contrition there is no forgiveness; because as sin turns man away from his last end, so must contrition turn him back to that same end.[89] When distinguishing between perfect and imperfect contrition, he uses the terminology rather common at the time, according to which contrition was denominated perfect from the presence of sanctifying grace in the soul, whereas it was called imperfect in so far as it preceded the advent of sanctifying grace.[90] In reference to this use of terms, he distinguishes two kinds of attrition: one that merits justification *de congruo* without the actual reception of the sacrament, and another that justifies only when the sacrament is actually received.[91] In substance, this latter kind of attrition is identical

[85] Sum. Theol. III, Suppl. q. 1, a. 1.
[86] Ibid.
[87] In Sent. IV, d. 14, q. 2.
[88] Ibid. q. 4, n. 9.
[89] Ibid. n. 18.
[90] Ibid. n. 14, 15.
[91] In reference to this second kind of attrition he says: "Ita ut parum attritus, attritione quae non habet

with that required by St. Thomas, as explained in the preceding paragraph.

In regard to the second requisite on the part of the penitent, namely, confession, there is practically no disagreement among the Scholastics. The common teaching is thus set forth by St. Thomas: "There is a twofold obligation to confess our sins. The first arises from the divine law which made confession a medicine for sin; and by this law not all are bound, but those only who commit mortal sin after baptism. The second obligation results from an ecclesiastical law, enacted in a general council under Innocent III, and by this all are bound. The purpose of the law is to bring all to a realization of their sinfulness, since we all have sinned and need the grace of God; a further purpose is to prepare the faithful for a proper reception of the Eucharist; and finally, to enable pastors to know their subjects, and so to discover the wolves that may lie hidden among the flock." [92]

Here it must be noted that St. Thomas extends the obligation of confession even to those who are guilty of only venial sins, because of the law passed by the Fourth Lateran in regard to yearly confession. This was the more common interpretation of that law during the Middle Ages. Hence, St. Bonaventure says in regard to venial sins: *Venialia igitur non tenetur quis confiteri propter vinculum peccati, sed hoc solum est propter obligationem praecepti, quae obligat unumquemque ad confitendum. Et ideo, si non habeat nisi venialia, tenetur illa confiteri; unde si haberet mortalia, quae confiteretur, non teneretur ad venialia.*[93] However, St. Thomas admits the other interpretation as probable, even from the wording of the law, which says that *all* sins must be confessed; for no one can call to mind *all* his venial sins. Hence, he concludes, if a person has no mortal sins to confess, he complies with the law by

rationem meriti ad remissionem peccati, . . . recipiat effectum sacramenti, scilicet gratiam poenitentialem, non quidem ex merito, quia dispositio interior non erat sufficiens per modum meriti, sed ex facto Dei assistentis sacramento suo" (Ibid. n. 14).

[92] Suppl. q. 6, a. 3.

[93] In Sent. IV, d. 17, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1.

presenting himself to his pastor and informing him of his immunity from mortal sin.[94]

All mortal sins must be confessed *in specie;* or as St. Bonaventure words the common teaching of that time: *Omnis peccati mortalis differentiam necesse est confiteri, sive sit latens, sive manifestum, sive sit cordis, sive sit oris.*[95] In regard to the circumstances that accompany mortal sin, a distinction is made by the Scholastics between those that simply aggravate the guilt and those that change the species or kind of the sin committed. According to some, both kinds of circumstances must be confessed, while others hold that there is no obligation to confess merely aggravating circumstances. This latter seems to be the more common view among the Scholastics, and is expressed by St. Thomas in these terms: "To confess all circumstances is impossible, yet there are some which it is necessary to confess: but in this matter there is a difference of opinion. Some hold that all circumstances which add notably to the gravity of sin must be confessed, if they occur to the mind of the penitent. Others contend that it is not necessary to confess the circumstances of sins committed, except when they are such as to change one sin into another; and this is the more probable opinion: but it must be added, that even then confession of the circumstances is necessary only when the second sin is also mortal. And the reason of this is, that there is no obligation of confessing venial sins, but such only as are mortal." [96]

Sacramental confession can be made only to priests who have jurisdiction over the penitent; for they alone can absolve from sin. But merely as an act of virtue, one may confess his sins to any one, lay or cleric, from whom it is reasonable to expect advice or the help of prayer. And in case of necessity this is very advisable, although the obligation of afterwards confessing to a priest still remains.[97]

On the part of the priest, confession induces the obligation

[94] Suppl. q. 6, a. 3.

[95] In Sent. IV, d. 17, p. 3, a. 2, q. 2.

[96] Ibid. d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, quaestiunc. 5.

[97] Cfr. Bonavent. op. cit. d. 17, p. 3, a. 1, q. 1, 2; Thomas, Suppl. q. 8, a. 2–6.

of the *sigillum* or seal of secrecy.[98] This extends itself directly only to the sins that have been confessed, but indirectly also to other things, the revelation of which would be to the detriment of the penitent or bring odium upon the sacrament.[99]

The last requisite on the part of the penitent is satisfaction. The purpose of satisfaction is partly to satisfy the justice of God for the debt of temporal punishment that may still be due after the guilt of sin has been blotted out, and partly to be of spiritual benefit to the penitent himself. Under this latter aspect it is intended both as a medicine against past sins and as a preservative against future falls.[100] The general concept of satisfaction, as found in the works of the Scholastics, is thus presented by Duns Scotus: *Operatio laboriosa vel poenalis voluntarie assumpta ad puniendum peccatum commissum a se et hoc ad placandam divinam offensam.*[101] However, the two terms, *poenalis* and *voluntarie,* are taken in a rather wide sense, as it is commonly admitted that any good work and inevitable afflictions may serve the purpose of satisfaction.[102]

The different kinds of satisfactory works are commonly reduced to these three: alms-giving, fasting, and prayer. St. Thomas shows their appropriateness in this way: "Satisfaction ought to be such that through it we deprive ourselves of something for the honor of God. Now we have only three kinds of goods, namely, goods of the soul, goods of the body, and goods of fortune, that is, external goods. We deprive ourselves of the goods of fortune by alms-giving, and of the goods of the body by fasting; yet of the goods of the soul we ought not to deprive ourselves of anything in regard to their essence, so that they are thereby diminished, for it is through them that we are acceptable to God; but in this way, that we submit them entirely to God; and this we do through prayer." [103]

In connection with the sacrament of penance, the Scholastics

[98] Cfr. Thomas, op. cit. q. 11, a. 1–5.
[99] Ibid.
[100] Ibid. q. 12, a. 3.
[101] In Sent. IV, d. 15, q. 1, n. 11.
[102] Cfr. Thomas, op. cit. q. 15, a. 1, 2.
[103] Ibid. a. 3.

also treat of ecclesiastical censures, as the inflicting of them implies the power of the keys *in foro externo*. The subject does not properly belong to the history of dogmas, except in so far as the power of the Church to inflict censures comes in question. And on this point there was no difference of opinion in the Middle Ages.[104]

[104] Cfr. Thomas, op. cit. q. 21, 22.

CHAPTER XXI

INDULGENCES

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT: THEOLOGICAL EXPOSITION

It was the common teaching of the Scholastics, as it had been of the Fathers before them, that the remission of sin does not necessarily include the remission of all punishment due to sin. In this matter they distinguished between eternal and temporal punishment. Eternal punishment as such, they said, does not remain when the guilt of mortal sin is blotted out: it is either commuted into temporal punishment, as some contended; or it is simply canceled, as others taught. But of the temporal punishment, either resulting from commutation or due for other reasons, a part usually remains, which must be expiated by works of penance. It is the removal of this punishment, which remains after sin itself has been remitted, that forms the end and object of indulgences. Hence an indulgence essentially consists in the remission of temporal punishment due to sin, after the guilt of sin has been forgiven, either through an act of contrition or the sacrament of penance.

As will be pointed out farther on in this chapter, the remission of temporal punishment, as gained by means of an indulgence, is not directly due to the works of penance a person may perform; nor, on the other hand, is it purely the effect of absolution pronounced by competent ecclesiastical authority. It is effected by an authoritative substitution of the satisfactory merit of Christ or His saints, made dependent for its efficacy on the fulfillment of certain conditions. When there is question of indulgences for the living, these conditions must be complied with by the beneficiary himself; when indulgences are applicable to the dead, there is required a

vicarious fulfillment of the conditions laid down. These conditions always consist in the performance of some work of piety, either by way of prayer, penance or alms-deed. In regard to indulgences as thus understood, two points come up for consideration: the historical development of the doctrine, and its theological exposition. Both may be briefly outlined as follows.

A — Historical Development

Most Protestant writers, when referring to indulgences, date both doctrine and practice from the early Middle Ages. In Patristic times, they say, indulgences were unknown. It was only when the faithful had lost their fervor, and could no longer be induced to perform the severe penances imposed for certain sins, that recourse was had to the expedient of redemptions and commutations; and from these, towards the middle of the twelfth century, developed that ill-begotten progeny of sloth and covetousness which found a place in later Catholic theology under the name of indulgence. In their view, consequently, an indulgence is a purely human invention; an invention, moreover, that is evil in root and branch.[1]

Passing by for the present the moral aspect of the doctrine in question, we shall in this section trace its origin and development, in so far as that is possible, by making a critical use of the historic data at our disposal. And for this purpose we shall divide the centuries to be considered into several periods of time, so that it may appear at a glance what development or change there was as the one passed into the other. The division commonly adopted, and the one that seems most reasonable, is the following. First period: from the first century to the seventh. Second period: from the seventh century to the twelfth. Third period: from the twelfth century to the Council of Trent, in the sixteenth. After that the question is of no further historical interest, because the doctrine had reached its full development.

[1] Cfr. *Lea, A History of Auricular Confession and Indulgences, vol. III; *Brieger, Das Wesen des Ablasses am Ausgange des Mittelalters.

1. *From the First Century to the Seventh.*— This period, as will be noted, embraces practically the whole Patristic age. During all these centuries, we are told, indulgences were unknown. In one sense this statement is true; in another it is false. Indulgences were unknown as general ecclesiastical grants in favor of all who cared to comply with certain fixed conditions for obtaining the remission of temporal punishment due to sin; but they were quite well known as particular grants in favor of individuals who for one reason or another appeared deserving of leniency in the matter of penance. By the beginning of the third century it was a well established custom to remit part of the imposed canonical penance at the instance of those who had suffered for the faith. In these cases it was the bishop who granted the remission, but in consideration of the intercession and sufferings of some particular member of the Church. And the remission thus granted was believed to be valid before God, so that the temporal punishment due to sin was canceled. To this belief St. Cyprian, among many others, bears witness. "Those," he says, "who have received the benefit of a martyr's intercession, are thereby enabled to satisfy the justice of God." [2]

Now, if we look only to what is essential in the matter of indulgences, namely, the authoritative substitution of the satisfactory merit of Christ or His saints, we have here an indulgence in the strict sense of the term. It was the satisfactory merit of the martyr, substituted by the authority of the bishop for the canonical penance still to be performed, that was believed to satisfy the justice of God and thereby cancel the temporal punishment due to sin. Whether that belief was well founded has for the present nothing to do with the case. The only point at issue now is the historical fact that indulgences were known and granted in the primitive Church. And from what has been said, that point appears to be beyond reasonable doubt.

Nor is this the only form of indulgence we meet with in the early centuries. More than one council acknowledged the

[2] Ep. 18 (H 2, 523 sq.); cfr. Tertul. Ad Martyr. c. 1; ML, 1, 621.

right of bishops to shorten the time of canonical penance for any reasonable cause, and thereby show mercy to well disposed penitents.[3] Yet any one who is familiar with the spirit that guided the primitive Church in her dealing with penitents, or with her valuation of things temporal and eternal, must understand that this "mercy" was not supposed to consist in a mere relaxation of canonical penance as such; but in a remission of punishment before God. Neither councils nor bishops considered it a "mercy" to be spared suffering in this world and to be made liable to it in the world to come. On the contrary, the chief reason why such severe penances were enjoined was the well founded hope of thereby saving penitents from the necessity of enduring much greater sufferings after death. And hence dispensation from these penances, without a corresponding remission of punishment, would have been the very opposite of "mercy."

In this sense, therefore, it is historically certain that indulgences were as well known in the early ages of the Church as they are to-day. Perhaps they were not as freely granted as they are now, but that is not to the point. The doctrine that the Church has power to grant indulgences was firmly established in Patristic times. It was not invented by theological speculation during the Middle Ages, but it is an heirloom of Apostolic preaching faithfully transmitted by the primitive Church.[4]

2. *From the Seventh Century to the Twelfth.*— During this second period indulgences appear mostly in the form of commutations and redemptions. And in so far the statement of Protestant writers, as noted above, is true to facts. Penances as then imposed were almost as severe as those that had been in use during the early centuries of the Church. In fact, when there was question of public penance, they were substantially the same. They went by the name of canonical penance, because they were in conformity with the canons or rules established in past ages. Yet under the changed con-

[3] Cfr. Conc. Ancyr. can. 2, 5; Conc. Nicaen. can. 12; Conc. Arelat. I, can. 12.

[4] Cfr. Hefele, Conciliengeschichte, I, 226, 415.

ditions of society, and partly also because there was a lack of fervor on the part of penitents, it was not always feasible to exact the rigorous performance of penances thus imposed. Hence, when in individual cases there appeared sufficient reason for so doing, these penances were commuted or changed into others of a less burdensome nature or of shorter duration. Sometimes the penance thus substituted consisted in prayers to be recited or some good work to be performed; at other times in the payment of a certain sum of money to be used for a religious or charitable purpose. In the first case we have what is technically called a commutation; in the second, what is technically known as a redemption.

This practice seems to have originated in Ireland, where it existed as early as the seventh century. Thus the *Canones Hibernenses,* dating from about that time, recognize the established custom of changing long fasts and other severe penances into the singing of psalms or good works more in keeping with the strength of the penitent.[5] A little later the same practice appears among the Franks. In some places the custom crept in of allowing the penitent to hire a person who would perform the imposed penance in his stead. Thus the *Poenitentiale Cummeani* contains the following direction: "If a penitent does not know the psalms or is unable to fast, let him choose some pious person who is willing to perform the penance enjoined, and for this let him pay an equivalent either in money or labor."[6] However, this was generally looked upon as an abuse, and hence in the *Poenitentiale Merseburgense* we read: "If any one has received payment for fasting, in case he did it through ignorance, let him fast so long for himself as he promised the other, and let him give to the poor what he received for his promise. Furthermore, whosoever thus takes the sins of another upon himself, is not a true Christian."[7]

Commutations to the payment of money for some charitable purpose came into vogue about the same time. Thus in the

[5] Op. cit. II; cfr. Wasserschleben, p. 139.

[6] Op. cit. Prolog.; cfr. Wasserschleben, p. 463.

[7] Op. cit. 44.

Pseudo-Beda, a *Poenitentiale* that dates from the beginning of the eighth century we read: "If perhaps some one is not able to fast, let him pay a redemption if able to do so. If he be rich, let him pay twenty solidi instead of fasting for seven weeks. But if he has not sufficient means, let him give ten solidi; and if he is very poor, let him give three. . . . At the same time, let each one well understand for what purpose he must make his contribution; whether it is to be given for the redemption of captives, or for the sanctuary, or for the poor of Christ." [8] That this practice was open to abuse is quite obvious, and hence it was at times strongly opposed by theologians. In fact, the Council of Chalons, held in 813, stigmatized some of these penitential manuals as utterly untrustworthy, "filled with errors concocted by unknown authors — *quorum sunt certi errores et incerti auctores.*" [9]

On the other hand, it had the support of men of undoubted learning and approved sanctity. Thus St. Peter Damian, about the middle of the eleventh century, laid down the principle that relaxation of penance might be conceded in proportion to the alms given by the penitent. He says: *Cum a poenitentibus terras accipimus, juxta mensuram muneris eis de quantitate poenitentiae relaxamus.*[10] And a provincial council held in 895 gives the following rule to be adhered to in the reconciliation of those who have committed murder. The penance to be imposed on such a person is to last for seven years. During all this time he remains excluded from divine service; but already during the first year of his penance, if on a journey or sick, he can be dispensed from fasting on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays. However, instead of fasting he must give each day one-twelfth of a solidus by way of alms. During the second and third year he is, on the days mentioned, entitled to a redemption without further condition. Finally, from the fourth to the seventh year included, he is obliged to keep every year three lents of forty days each; but at other times he is dispensed from fasting

[8] Op. cit. c. 41.
[9] Conc. cit. can. 38; Mansi, 14, 101.
[10] Ep. 12, ML, 144, 323 C.

on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, while on Mondays and Wednesdays he is entitled to a redemption.[11]

When this remission of penance by way of commutation and redemption became general, indulgences as at present understood had come into existence. For the substituted work was understood to be effective in removing the punishment still due to sin, and therefore it was not merely a relaxation of canonical penance. At the same time there was no longer question of particular grants to individual penitents, as had been the case in Patristic times and also in the seventh and eighth centuries; but certain conditions were put down on the fulfillment of which penitents, otherwise disposed, gained either a partial or a full remission of whatever temporal punishment might still remain after they had duly confessed their sins. In this we have not only the essential requisites of an indulgence as understood to-day, but also its outward form.

At what precise time this last development took place is not certain. The ruling of Tribur, referred to in a preceding paragraph, indicates the transition. It is general, but only in regard to one class of penitents. About a century later the development seems to have been accomplished. For in an old document, bearing the signature of Archbishop Pontius of Arles (995–1030) and of his successor Raimbaldus, we meet with an indulgence in its modern form. It is granted to all those who visit the monastery of Mons Major and there contribute an alms for the erection of a church. The grant reads as follows: "If a penitent comes to the aforesaid church, on the day of its dedication or once a year, and there holds vigil and gives an alms to promote the building of the Church of Holy Mary, which is now in course of construction, . . . let him be absolved from a third part of the penance imposed on him for the greater sins: and this remission is to be reckoned from the very day on which he holds his vigil to the same day the next year. . . . Then, in the case of those who have confessed less grievous sins and received penance for the

[11] Conc. Tribur. c. 56–58; Mansi, 18, 157.

same, if they come to the dedication, . . . we absolve them from one half of the penance received." [12]

A few years later indulgences of this kind began to multiply. They were usually granted by bishops for the building of churches or monasteries, or for the promotion of similar pious works. They were all partial indulgences, and the alms was supposed to bear some proportion to the means of the giver — *tale sit, quatenus possunt.*[13] However, a plenary indulgence was granted by Pope Alexander II, in 1063, to all Christians who would take up arms against the Saracens in Spain. The grant reads: "We release them from their penance and concede them the remission of their sins — *Poenitentiam eis levamus et remissionem peccatorum facimus.*" [14] In 1095 Urban II granted similar indulgences to the Crusaders; [15] and a century later, Innocent III extended the privilege of gaining these indulgences to all those who in any way contributed to the recovery of the Holy Land.[16]

3. *From the Twelfth Century to the Council of Trent.*— During the twelfth century the practice of granting indulgences increased very rapidly. But this was owing almost entirely to the action of individual bishops; for the Holy See, as even Protestant writers admit, constantly exercised a restraining influence in this matter.[17] The reason for the stand thus taken by the Sovereign Pontiffs was the fear that by an undue multiplication of indulgences the Church's penitential discipline would be relaxed. This is clearly stated by the Fourth Lateran Council, held under Innocent III. The practice, it says, is to be restricted, "because by the granting of indiscreet and superfluous indulgences . . . the keys of the Church are brought into contempt and sacramental satisfaction loses its force." [18] And in accordance with this, the Council enacted the following law: "When a church is dedicated, the indulgence granted must not exceed one year,

[12] D'Archery, Spicilegium, VI, 427 sq.
[13] Ibid. 428.
[14] Cfr. Loofs, Dogmengeschichte, p. 494. The expression, *remissionem peccatorum,* will be explained farther on.
[15] Mansi, 20, 816 E.
[16] Mansi, 22, 1067 D.
[17] Cfr. Brieger, Realencyk. 9, 79.
[18] Mansi, 22, 1050.

whether one bishop be present at the dedication or several; and the indulgence granted on the anniversary of the dedication must not exceed forty days of the penance that had been enjoined." [19] Besides, forty days is to be the limit for all indulgences that may be granted by a bishop on other special occasions.[20]

The first Jubilee was published by Boniface VIII in 1300. It was a plenary indulgence which could be gained by all those who visited Rome in the course of that year, and during fifteen days performed their devotions in the Basilicas of the Apostles. The Jubilee itself was termed " the year of full remission and of the reconciliation of the human race — *annus plenariae remissionis et reconciliationis humani generis.*" This indulgence was at first intended to be repeated only once every hundred years, but Clement VI reduced the term to fifty years, Urban VI to thirty-three, and Paul II to twenty-five years. Since the fifteenth century the Jubilee indulgence may be gained even without a visit to Rome, but usually a year after it has been proclaimed in Rome itself.

In this connection a word must be said about the expression, " a plenary indulgence of punishment and guilt "— *indulgentia plena a poena et culpa* — which occurs in some Papal documents. The phrase, as it stands, is ambiguous, and it has proved a stumbling block to both Catholics and Protestants. Some of the former, when brought face to face with it refused to believe that it was authentic. This position was taken by Maronis, a Scholastic who wrote at the beginning of the fourteenth century. " Such an indulgence," he says, " never was granted by the Holy See, nor ought it to be taught as legitimate." [21] He had many followers, and among them Cardinal Cusa, who held that the expression was simply an interpolation introduced by some irresponsible indulgence preacher. Protestants, on the other hand, eagerly seized upon it as an irrefutable piece of evidence that the Popes were carrying on a most shameless traffic in pardons for sins.[22]

Although there is perhaps no direct proof for the genuine-

[19] Ibid. can. 62.
[20] Loc. cit.
[21] In IV Sent. d. 19, q. 3.
[22] Cfr. Brieger, RE, 9, 84 sqq.

ness of the phrase as it stands, still its equivalents occur again and again, and that in connections which exclude all suspicion of interpolation. Thus in the Bull of Martin V, *Inter cunctas,* is found the expression, "indulgences for the forgiveness of sin"—*indulgentias in remissionem peccatorum.*[23] It is true, the meaning is clear enough from the context: because one of the conditions required for the gaining of such indulgences, as is there stated, consists in contrite confession; but the ambiguous expression is certainly genuine. And so it is admitted to be in other Bulls, even where the meaning is not so clear. However, it was never used in the sense ascribed to it by Protestant writers, namely, that the indulgence itself was supposed to effect the forgiveness of sin. And this is now commonly admitted by those who have studied the documents in question at first hand.[24]

A very clear explanation of this whole matter is given by John of Palts, who preached the Jubilee under Alexander VI. He was a fellow religious of Luther, and his exposition is accepted as correct even by Brieger, a most rabid and bigoted Protestant writer on the question of indulgences. "Properly speaking," writes Palts, "in virtue of an indulgence no one is ever absolved from punishment and guilt, but from punishment only. However, it is commonly said that during the Jubilee one is absolved from both—*a poena et culpa.* And that saying is true, because a Jubilee is more than a mere indulgence; it includes authority to confess and absolve and together with this the power to remit punishment by way of indulgence. In this way it includes the sacrament of penance and together with it an indulgence properly so called. For the clearer understanding of the aforesaid, it must be noted that the term indulgence may be taken in one of two ways. In one way, in so far as it properly signifies the mere remission of punishment, and in this sense it does not imply the remission of guilt; and in another way, in as much as in a wider sense it stands for the Jubilee, or for the letter including the Jubilee, and then it extends itself to the remission

[23] Mansi, 27, 1211 B; DB, 676. [24] Cfr. Brieger, loc. cit.

of sin. And the reason is that usually when the Pope grants a Jubilee, he does not concede a simple indulgence, but also the faculty of confessing and absolving from all sins. And in this way the guilt is taken away by the sacrament of penance, which there intervenes; while the punishment is canceled by the indulgence, which is there granted." [25]

That indulgences may also be applied to the dead, simply by way of help, without the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the strict sense of the term, seems to have been commonly held by mediæval theologians. But, as far as can now be ascertained, the first authoritative reference to this matter occurred only in the fifteenth century. Then Pope Sixtus IV granted an indulgence that could be applied to the souls in purgatory. On that occasion he used the expression "by way of help"— *per modum suffragii* — which seems to have caused a great deal of discussion as to its precise meaning. Hence a few years later, in 1477, he published a Bull in which the term was explained. He says that he makes use of the treasure of the Church, which consists of the merits of Christ and the saints, and this is of benefit to the poor souls if applied to them by those who fulfill the conditions on which the indulgence is granted. *Per modum suffragii,* therefore, means that the indulgence is offered as a help; it is not a canceling of the temporal punishment by an act of jurisdiction.[26]

This may be said to complete the development of the doctrine on indulgences. And if we now gather together what has been brought out more or less clearly in the preceding paragraphs, we come to the following result. 1. In the early centuries the substance of the doctrine was well known, but it was presented under a different form. An indulgence then consisted in a relaxation of canonical penance, which was believed to be valid before God, and in that sense to remit temporal punishment due to sin. This relaxation was always a matter of individual concession. 2. From the seventh century forward, simple relaxation gave place to commutation

[25] Quoted by Brieger, op. cit. 88. [26] Ibid. 92.

and redemption. This transition implied no change of principle, but only a variation of form. The difference between the severer penance first imposed and the lighter into which it was changed, corresponded to the relaxation of earlier times. Here, too, the application was to individuals. 3. During the first half of the eleventh century there was a further transition from individual to general concessions, so that any penitent might shorten his penance by the fulfillment of certain fixed conditions. In this transition the modern form of indulgences first appeared.

As regards indulgences under this new form, these further points may be noted. 1. Like the commutations and redemptions, the earliest indulgences of this kind were episcopal, and were granted to those who visited a certain church, either on the day of its dedication or at some other fixed time, and there made an offering for some pious purpose. 2. Originally they were all partial indulgences, one-half, or one-third, or one-fourth of the imposed penance being remitted. 3. During the eleventh century there was as yet no technical term for these indulgences. 4. Up to the twelfth century they affected ecclesiastical life very little; but after that they seem to have seriously interfered with the spirit of penance, so that the Popes found it advisable to restrict the power of the bishops in the matter of granting indulgences. 5. Plenary indulgences were usually granted by the Pope, and as a general rule but sparingly. 6. It was never taught by those in authority that an indulgence, in the proper sense of the term, was equivalent to a remission of sin.

B — Theological Exposition

Indulgences had practically no place in theology until the first half of the thirteenth century. Theologians accepted the fact of commutations and redemptions as explained in the preceding section, but seldom stopped to speculate concerning their precise nature. Even Peter Lombard passes them by with the vague remark that the prayers and alms of friends may be

accepted as a vicarious penance in the case of the dying.[27] The first one to attempt anything like a theological exposition of indulgences was Alexander of Hales.[28] He was followed by St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas. The former of these two copied him almost word for word, while the latter took the substance of his teaching and presented it in his own way. Even later Scholastics added little of their own, so that our present theology of indulgences is little more than the teaching of Alexander arrayed in a modern garb.

The first question which he proposes to himself is, whether indulgences or relaxations really remit temporal punishment due to sin. He answers that there are two opinions concerning this matter. The first holds that indulgences are simply a relaxation of the penance imposed by the Church, and that therefore they are valid only in her forum and not in the forum of God — *in foro Ecclesiae, non in foro Dei.* This view he rejects as altogether untenable. And the reason is that the universal Church has always taught the contrary; yet the universal Church cannot fall into error concerning matters of this kind. Nor is there any doubt as regards the teaching of the Church; because when the Apostle said, "what I have pardoned that Christ also hath pardoned," he referred also to the remission of punishment by way of indulgence; and the power of the Sovereign Pontiff is not less than that of the Apostle. Moreover, as bishops share in the power of the Church, it must be admitted that relaxations granted by them are also valid before God.[29]

Then, in the body of the article, he explains how indulgences may be granted without in any way failing to satisfy the demands of divine justice. Because, aside from the personal satisfaction of the penitent, there is the satisfactory merit of Christ and of the Church; and this is offered to God when a relaxation of penance is conceded.[29a] Hence the penitent really satisfies for his sins, but he does so by drawing on the treasury of the Church.[30]

[27] Sent. IV, d. 20, c. 4.
[28] Sum. IV, q. 83.
[29] Ibid. m. 1, a. 1 ad 1m.
[29a] Loc. cit.
[30] Ibid. a. 1 ad 4m.

In connection with the foregoing, the author inquires whether one person can satisfy divine justice in place of another. He answers with a distinction. Sometimes, he says, penance is imposed by way of medicine; and then, of course, the penitent is bound to perform it in person. At other times it is enjoined as a compensation for the injury done to God by sin; and in that case it may be performed by some one else. For the Church is the mystical body of Christ, in which the members are all intimately united and mutually helpful the one to the other. However, this vicarious satisfaction is not a matter of individual choice; it is of value only when approved by lawful superiors. Moreover, in authorizing it, superiors must have due regard to the disposition of the penitent and the amount of penance that is to be imposed upon his substitute. On the part of the penitent there must be real need of this substitution; and then as regards the amount of penance, it must be borne in mind that vicarious penance is less efficacious than that performed by the penitent in person, and therefore it ought to be more severe in order to give the same satisfaction to divine justice.[31]

Touching the question of authority in the matter of granting indulgences, he teaches that it belongs exclusively to bishops and the Pope; so that neither priests nor prelates of the lower grades, such as priors and abbots, have any jurisdiction in this respect. And the reason is that indulgences are nothing else than an application of the supererogatory satisfaction of Christ and His saints. This satisfaction constitutes the spiritual treasury of the Church, which can only be at the disposal of those through whom the Church is espoused to Christ. It is through the Pope and the bishops that children are begotten unto Christ the Redeemer, and hence it is their exclusive right to dispose of the Church's spiritual treasures in favor of these same children.[32] Furthermore, the plenitude of this right and power is found only in the Sovereign Pontiff; because to him is entrusted the welfare of the whole Church, and therefore all others in a position of

[31] Ibid. a. 2.

[32] Ibid. m. 3.

authority depend for the exercise of their jurisdiction on his will and direction.[33]

The conditions on which the gaining of indulgences is made to depend, although they may be of various kinds, ought in some way to be connected with sacrifices in the material order. For, first of all, this follows from the usage established in the Church; in as much as indulgences are commonly granted on the condition that alms be given, pilgrimages be made, and visits be paid to churches and shrines. In the next place, indulgences are a relaxation of the penance that should be performed after the guilt of the sin has been forgiven; but this penance is always some exterior work, such as fasting, mortification, and so forth; consequently the conditions on which indulgences are granted should also be something exterior, or some sacrifice in the material order. Of this kind are alms for the building and beautifying of churches, taking part in the deliverance of the Holy Land, fasting, bodily austerities, and pilgrimages.[34]

Furthermore, other conditions are required, both on the part of the person who wishes to gain an indulgence and on the part of him who grants it. The former must be in the state of grace, believe in the efficacy of indulgences, and perform the prescribed works in a spirit of devotion. The latter must have a sufficient reason for disposing of the satisfactory merits that are in the spiritual treasury of the Church. Such a justifying reason is found, for instance, in the need there is of promoting works of piety. But in all cases there must be due proportion between the value of the indulgence granted and the difficulty of the conditions enjoined.[35] Finally, if there be a sufficiently grave reason, the Pope may grant a plenary indulgence, which cancels all temporal punishment due to sin.[36]

Indulgences may also be applied to the souls in purgatory, because the Sovereign Pontiff has the right to dispose of the spiritual treasure of the Church in favor of all who need it and who are in a condition to benefit by his liberality.

[33] Ibid. ad 2[m].
[34] Ibid. m. 4.
[35] Ibid. m. 5.
[36] Ibid. m. 6.

Now when the poor souls departed this life, they were in communion with the Church, and they still are her children although suffering in another world. Hence they are in a condition to be helped by her in their present need. However, as they are no longer under the Pope's jurisdiction, he cannot grant them an indulgence by way of a judiciary sentence; but only by way of help and impetration — *per modum suffragii et impetrationis.*[37] It must be noted, therefore, that in regard to this one point alone — the manner of application — does an indulgence for the dead differ from that for the living.

St. Bonaventure, as noted above, made the teaching of Alexander his own. He insists very strongly that indulgences are valid before God, because if they were not, the Church's action in granting them would not be merciful but cruel, and she would make herself guilty of deceiving those whom she was commissioned by Christ to guide in the way of truth.[38] When speaking of indulgences for the dead, he is inclined to favor the opinion of those who hold that in granting them the Pope uses his judiciary power.[39] In this view he differed from his master.

Albertus Magnus adds nothing to the exposition given by Alexander. He calls attention to the following two definitions of indulgences given by contemporary theologians: *Magistri definiunt relaxationem sic: Est satisfactionis majoris in minorem competens et discreta commutatio. Alii sic: Relaxatio est poenae temporalis debitae promissa diminutio.*[40] This latter, he holds, is the more proper of the two; and so did many before his time, although the matter had been but little discussed in a speculative way.

St. Thomas puts the teaching of Alexander in a somewhat different form, but agrees with it on nearly every point. In his first article he shows that indulgences are not merely a relaxation of canonical penance, but are valid for the remission of temporal punishment due to sin. And this remis-

[37] Ibid. m. 5.
[38] In Sent. IV, d. 20, p. 2, a. unic. q. 2.
[39] Ibid. q. 5. concl. 4.
[40] In Sent. IV, d. 20, a. 16.

sion holds good for the dead as well as for the living. After calling attention to the fact that an indulgence can be gained only when the guilt of sin has been remitted, either by an act of contrition or in the sacrament of penance, he points out the reason why indulgences are effective in remitting temporal punishment. The chief reason, he says, is the unity of the mystical body of Christ, many members of which have gathered more satisfactory merits than they need for themselves, and to that body also belong the merits of Christ. Now, as one person may satisfy for another, it stands to reason that those who have need thereof may be benefited by this supererogatory merit. However, as neither the saints nor Christ made over their satisfactory merits to individual persons, but left them as a spiritual treasure to the Church, it is only the head of the Church who can dispose of them by reason of the authority received from Christ to this effect. This is in perfect accord with the practice of every other society of men. Community goods are distributed to individuals by the head of the community. Hence, just as one would obtain the remission of punishment if some one else were to satisfy the justice of God in his place, so does he obtain the same remission if the satisfaction of some one else is distributed to him by one who has authority to that effect.[41]

Hence an indulgence, even in case of the living, is not a simple act of absolution from the liability to punishment; but it is an authoritative substitution of one satisfaction for another. By a judiciary sentence, the penitent receives a designated amount of the spiritual treasure of the Church, and therewith he pays to that extent his indebtedness to God.[42] In itself every indulgence is of such value as is determined by the person who has authority to grant it, and in this sense it is independent of the disposition of the recipient. But, on the other hand, unless the recipient is united to Christ by charity, he does not fulfill the conditions required for the gaining of an indulgence; hence in so far the efficacy of the indulgence depends on his disposition. St. Thomas sums up

[41] Suppl. q. 25, a. 1.

[42] Ibid. a. 1 ad 1m et 2m.

this point as follows: "It must he held that the value of indulgences is that which is stated in their promulgation, provided, of course, the one who grants them has due authority and the one who receives them is endued with charity and the object of their granting is some pious cause, which embraces God's honor and the neighbor's advantage." [43]

The authority to grant indulgences resides in those who are entrusted with the government of the Church, that is, the bishops and the Pope. However, the Pope alone can make use of this authority as may seem good to him; while the power of the bishops in the matter of indulgences is limited by his ordinations.[44] The *pietas causae* is sufficiently verified if the end ultimately intended is of a spiritual nature; hence anything temporal may be included among the conditions on which an indulgence is granted, provided it be directed to a spiritual end.[45] If the conditions are not complied with, the indulgence is not gained; even if the want of compliance was the result of an oversight or of inability.[46]

Duns Scotus gives a similar exposition of the doctrine on indulgences. His teaching is neatly summed up in the following definition: "An indulgence is the remission of the temporal punishment due to the actual sins of the repentant and left standing after sacramental absolution, a remission granted for reasonable cause by ecclesiastical prelates out of the Church's treasury, that is, the merits of Christ and the saints.[47]

Nearly all the chief points brought out in the foregoing paragraphs were embodied by Clement VI in the Jubilee Bull of 1343. After explaining the meaning of the spiritual treasury of the Church, he proceeds: "(Christ), indeed, founded this treasury that it might be dispensed to the faithful unto their salvation through the offices of St. Peter, the key-bearer of heaven, and of his successors, Christ's vicars upon earth, always for proper and reasonable cause, now for the complete and now for the partial remission of the tem-

[43] Ibid. a. 2.
[44] Ibid. q. 26, a. 1–3.
[45] Ibid. q. 25, a. 3.
[46] Ibid. q. 27, a. 3.
[47] Quaest. Miscellan. q. 4, n. 4.

poral punishment due to sins — a treasury to be devoted mercifully in general as well as for particular occasion, as under God they deem expedient, to those who are truly contrite of heart and have confessed their sins." [48]

[48] Cfr. DB. 550–552.

CHAPTER XXII

HOLY ORDERS: EXTREME UNCTION: MATRIMONY

Concerning the last three sacraments of the New Law only a few remarks need be made in the present connection. Holy orders and extreme unction are treated rather briefly by the Scholastics themselves, and although a great deal is said by them about matrimony, still that is mostly in regard to impediments, with which we are not directly concerned in the history of dogmas. Hence the following brief outline of Scholastic teaching on the three sacraments now under consideration will suffice for our purpose.

A — Holy Orders

A neat summary of what is to be held in regard to holy orders is thus given by St. Bonaventure in his *Breviloquium:* "This, in brief, is the doctrine to be held concerning the sacrament of orders, that it is a sealing (or sign) by which spiritual power is imparted to the one ordained. Orders, though but one of the seven sacraments, comprises nevertheless seven grades. The first is that of door-keeper, the second that of lector, the third that of exorcist, the fourth that of acolyte, the fifth that of subdeacon, the sixth that of deacon, the seventh that of priest. Preparatory to these, on the one hand, the clerical tonsure is given and also the office of psalmist; on the other hand, they find their complement in the added grades of episcopacy, patriarchate, and papacy. By persons enjoying these latter dignities orders are conferred, and they must be dispensed with due attention to the external sacramental signs, both as regards the matter and the form, and the proper

solemnity should be observed as to time, place, office, and person." [1]

The first part of this extract contains the definition of holy orders as commonly given by the Scholastics, and is taken from the *Sentences of the Lombard.*[2] Order, as a sacrament, is a certain seal or sign, by which spiritual power is imparted to him who is ordained. As St. Thomas explains it. "The term *signaculum* is here not meant to designate the interior character, but signifies the external rite, which is at once a sign and the cause of interior power; and thus it is understood in the given definition. However, if it were taken for the sacramental character, it would not imply any impropriety of speech. For the division of a sacrament into those three — *sacramentum tantum, res et sacramentum, res tantum* — is not, properly speaking, a division into integral parts. Because that which is the *res tantum* is not of the essence of a sacrament, and that which is the *sacramentum tantum* passes away, while that which is the *sacramentum et res* is said to remain. Hence it follows that the interior character itself is essentially and principally the very sacrament of orders." [3]

That the rite of ordination is a true sacrament, at least when there is question of the major orders, is directly inferred from the fact that it is an external sign instituted for the sanctification of the recipient. "In the reception of orders," says St. Thomas, "there is a certain consecration imparted to man by means of visible signs, and hence it is obvious that order is a sacrament." [4] And that the rite confers sanctifying grace he proves from the fact that the spiritual power is conferred by it, which necessarily implies the grace requisite for its proper use. "Hence just as in baptism, through which man becomes capable of receiving the other sacraments, sanctifying grace is conferred, so likewise in the sacrament of orders, by which man is ordained for the dispensation of other sacraments." [5]

The sacrament of orders is one, but there are several sacra-

[1] Op. cit. VI, c. 12.
[2] Sent. IV, d. 24, c. 10.
[3] Suppl. q. 34, a. 2 ad 1m.
[4] Suppl. q. 34, a. 3.
[5] Ibid. q. 35, a. 1.

mental rites of ordination, in each one of which the definition of a sacrament is verified.[6] The matter is thus explained by St. Thomas, and substantially the same explanation is also given by most other Scholastics. "The division of orders," he says, "is not that of an integral into its parts, nor that of a universal, but that of a potestative whole; and the nature of it is this, that the whole according to its complete perfection is in one, and that in others there is a certain participation of the same. And so it is here: the whole plenitude of this sacrament is in one order, namely, in the priesthood; but in the others there is a certain participation of the same order. . . . And for this reason all the orders are one sacrament."[7] Or as St. Bonaventure puts it: "All grades of the orders together constitute one sacrament, nevertheless to each grade the term order is applied."[8]

Scotus, however, looks at the matter in a somewhat different light.[9] He holds that the term order, as designating one of the seven sacraments, is taken in a generic sense; and that consequently the different grades are so many specifically distinct sacraments.[10]

The generic unity of these specifically different sacraments is derived from the common end for which they were all instituted, namely, the worthy celebration of the Eucharistic rite.[11]

The Scholastics distinguish seven different orders, which are divided into two groups and are respectively designated as sacred and non-sacred; or major and minor, as they are known to-day. Various reasons are assigned by them why the number of orders should be neither more nor less than seven.

[6] Ibid. Cfr. DB. 958.

[7] Suppl. q. 37, a. 1 ad 2m.

[8] In Sent. IV, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 4.

[9] He first gives this general definition of orders: "Ordo est gradus eminens in hierarchia ecclesiastica, disponens ad congrue exsequendum aliquem actum excellentem in Ecclesia." And by the "actum excellentem" he understands any act intimately connected with the consecration of the Holy Eucharist (Report. IV, d. 24, n. 8).

[10] Then he adds: "Sacramentum ordinis est unum genere, habens sub se plures species, . . . quae sunt diversae rationis et alterius speciei, non tantum ejusdem rationis et speciei, et diversae numero" (In Sent. IV, d. 24, n. 13).

[11] Ibid. n. 14.

St. Bonaventure enumerates and rejects three different views, and then proposes his own. The priest, he says, in whom the sacrament of orders is found in all its fullness, has two different spiritual powers: one over Christ's true body in the Holy Eucharist, and another over Christ's mystical body as composed of the faithful. In the exercise of each of these powers he needs assistants. In the consecration of Christ's true body he is assisted by the deacon and the subdeacon, who provide the matter for the consecration. Hence the orders of these two as well as that of the priest, because of their close connection with the Holy Eucharist, are termed sacred orders. Then in the exercise of his power over the mystical body of Christ, the priest is assisted by the ostiarius, who admits the faithful to the place of worship; by the lector, who reads to them the sacred text; by the exorcist, who gives them aid against the inroads of the devil; by the acolytes, who edify the faithful by their good example as typified by the burning candles which they carry. All this is likewise referred to the Holy Eucharist, but only distantly, and hence the orders in question are called non-sacred.[12] The exposition given by St. Thomas differs somewhat in regard to the minor orders, but is based upon the same fundamental idea that the division of orders was made in reference to the Holy Eucharist.[13]

In this connection the question arises, whether all seven orders are to be regarded as sacraments, in the sense explained in a preceding paragraph. The Scholastics usually put the question in this form: Does each one of the seven orders imprint a sacramental character? In this they seem to take for granted that all are sacraments, so that the only question open for discussion is, whether in each ordination a character is imprinted. And nearly all of them give an affirmative answer, holding that this is to be considered as the more probable view. Durandus, however, contends that the priesthood alone is a true sacrament; all other orders must be considered as sacramentals.[14]

St. Thomas presents the more common view in these terms:

[12] In Sent. IV, d. 24, p. 2, a. 2, q. 4.

[13] Suppl. q. 37, a. 2.

[14] In Sent. IV, d. 24, q. 1, n. 9.

"Some there are who say that in the priesthood alone is a sacramental character imprinted; but this is not true, because no one except a deacon can licitly discharge the duties connected with that office, and thus it is quite manifest that he has a spiritual power in regard to the dispensation of the sacraments which others do not have. And for this reason others say that all the sacred orders imprint a character, but not so the minor orders. Yet this again is not to the point; because every order places the recipient above the laity in some grade of power respecting the dispensation of the sacraments. Hence, as the character is a sign whereby the recipient is distinguished from others, it follows that in all the orders a character is imprinted. And a further sign of this is the fact that these orders always remain, and are never repeated. This is the third opinion, which is more common." [15]

Of course, as all true sacraments of the New Law have been instituted by Christ, it follows from this "third opinion" that the minor orders were also instituted by Him. And so these authors commonly maintain. There is indeed the historical difficulty that the minor orders do not seem to have been in existence before the third century; but that is explained by saying that they were all contained in the diaconate. "In the primitive Church," says St. Thomas, "all the minor offices were entrusted to the deacons, because of the scarcity of ministers. . . . Nevertheless the aforesaid powers were all contained in the one power of the deacon. But later on divine worship developed more fully, and then the Church explicitly gave to different ministers the powers that were implicitly contained in one order." [16]

In this connection the question is also asked, whether the episcopate must be considered as a distinct order, and consequently as a true sacrament. Modern theologians answer the question in the affirmative, but in this they depart from the more common view of the Scholastics. With the exception of William of Auxerre,[17] Scotus,[18] and Durandus,[19]

[15] Suppl. q. 35, a. 2.
[16] Suppl. q. 37, a. 2 ad 2m.
[17] Sum. p. 5, tr. 8, q. 1.
[18] In Sent. IV, d. 24, q. unic. n. 5.
[19] Ibid. q. 6, n. 8.

practically all of them agree with St. Bonaventure, when he says: "The episcopate in so far as it implies the priesthood, is properly called an order; but as distinct from the priesthood, it signifies only a certain dignity or office connected with it, and is not properly an order, nor is a sacramental character imprinted by it, nor a new power given, but by it the power of the priesthood is amplified." [20] St. Thomas holds that the episcopate is a distinct order in respect of certain hierarchical powers over the mystical body of Christ, but not in respect of Christ's real body in reference to which orders constitute a true sacrament.[21]

Like all other sacraments of the New Law, that of holy orders is made up of matter and form. On this general fact all Scholastics are agreed; but there is a considerable difference of opinion as to what part of the ordination rite constitutes the sacrament of orders, and consequently as to precisely what part is the matter and what part is the form of the sacrament. Up to the ninth century, both the priesthood and the diaconate were conferred by the imposition of hands and an accompanying prayer, to which rite was later added the presentation of the chalice and paten.[22] Hence the early Scholastics, such as Hugh of St. Victor,[23] Peter Lombard,[24] and Innocent III,[25] commonly state that the power of orders is conferred by the imposition of hands and the prayer that accompanies it; while the fact of this power having been conferred is more distinctly expressed by the presentation of the chalice and paten. The same is taught by St. Bonaventure,[26] and as regards the diaconate also by Durandus.[27] These theologians, therefore, would regard the imposition of hands as the matter of the sacrament of orders, when conferred on the priest and the deacon, and the accompanying prayer as the form.

But towards the middle of the thirteenth century theological opinion in this respect began to undergo a change. The imposition of hands was indeed still regarded as being an in-

[20] Ibid. p. 2, a. 2, q. 3.
[21] Suppl. q. 40, a. 5.
[22] Cfr. Amalarius, De Eccl. Offic. II, c. 12; ML. 105, 1086.
[23] De Sacr. II, p. 3, c. 12.
[24] Sent. IV, d. 24, c. 9.
[25] De Sacro Altaris Myst. I, c. 9; ML. 217, 779.
[26] Op. cit. d. 24, p. 2, a. 1, q. 4.
[27] Ibid. q. 3, n. 6.

tegral part of the rite of ordination; but equal, if not greater, importance was attached to the tradition of the instruments — *traditio instrumentorum.* Hence, St. Thomas, although a contemporary of St. Bonaventure and on most other points agreeing with him in doctrine, refers only to the *traditio instrumentorum* when he explains the rite of ordination in respect to the different orders. After touching upon the relation of the sacrament of orders to the Holy Eucharist, he says in regard to the ordination of priests: *Et ideo cum ordinantur, accipiunt calicem cum vino, et patenam cum pane, accipientes potestatem conficiendi corpus et sanguinem Christi.* And then with reference to the deacon and subdeacon: *Et ideo accipiunt calicem de manu episcopi, sed vacuum, cum ordinantur.*[28] This *traditio instrumentorum* he regards as the matter of the sacrament of orders, while he considers the accompanying words, *Accipe* or *Accipite, etc.,* as the form.[29] By this rite alone is the character imprinted.[30]

This became practically the common view of the later Scholastics, and was embodied in the *Decretum pro Armenis,* issued by Pope Eugenius IV.[31] As to the doctrinal value of that decree, and also in regard to the intention of the Pope in issuing it, the opinion of theologians is divided; but they commonly agree that it was not intended as a definition in the strict sense of the term. The matter is too intricate to be dealt with here, nor is a discussion of it necessary for our purpose.

The valid reception of holy orders presupposes the baptismal character in the recipient,[32] but not necessarily that of confirmation; although it is unlawful to confer the sacrament on one who has not been confirmed.[33] Only a member of the male sex can be validly ordained.[34] For the licit reception of holy orders a certain definite age and adequate mental and moral fitness are required; but. excepting the episcopate, ordinations are valid even if conferred upon one who has not yet reached the age of discretion.[35]

[28] Suppl. q. 37, a. 2.
[29] Ibid. q. 34, a. 4.
[30] Ibid. q. 37, a. 5.
[31] DB. 701.
[32] Thomas, op. cit. q. 35, a. 3.
[33] Ibid. a. 4.
[34] Ibid. q. 39, a. 1.
[35] Ibid. a. 2–5.

The administration of the sacrament of orders belongs to the bishop; he alone has power to ordain priests and deacons, although simple priests may be delegated to confer minor orders.[36] The power to ordain is not lost either by heresy, simony, or any other crime.[37] Concerning this last point there was considerable discussion during the early Middle Ages, as was pointed out in a previous chapter; but during the twelfth century the matter was definitely settled by the decision of several councils.[38]

B — Extreme Unction

All Scholastics definitely teach that extreme unction is a true sacrament of the New Law, but some call in question its immediate institution by Christ. Thus Hugh of St. Victor,[39] Peter Lombard,[40] Alexander of Hales,[41] and St. Bonaventure,[41a] expressly teach that extreme unction was instituted by the Holy Spirit through the Apostles. St. Thomas refutes the arguments advanced by these authors, and then states the more common view as follows: "For this reason others say that all the sacraments were instituted by Christ Himself; but some of them, because they presented greater difficulty to the belief of His followers, He also promulgated; while others, such as extreme unction and confirmation, He reserved for the Apostles to promulgate. And this view is all the more probable, because the sacraments belong to the very foundation of the law, and for that reason their institution pertains to the lawgiver; and again because it is from their institution that they have their efficacy, and this can only come from a divine source.[42]

The sacramental rite, according to all, consists in the anointing of the bodily senses with oil and the accompanying prayer said by the priest. Hence oil is the matter of the sacrament, and the prayer of the priest is its form. By oil, in this con-

[36] Cfr. Bonavent. In Sent. IV, d. 25, a. 1, q. 1; Thomas, op. cit. q. 38, a. 1.
[37] Ibid. q. 2, 3.; ibid. q. 38, a. 2.
[38] Mansi, 20, 1209; 19, 509.
[39] De Sacr. II, p. 15, c. 2.
[40] Sent. IV, d. 23, c. 2.
[41] Sum. IV, q. 9, m. 1, 2.
[41a] In Sent. d. 23, a. 1, q. 2.
[42] Suppl. q. 39, a. 3.

nection, they understand olive oil; for, says St. Thomas, that is the proper meaning of the term.[43]

Thus far all are agreed; but on two further points there is among them a difference of opinion. First, what is the effect of the consecration of the oil by the bishop? Secondly, is the form of this sacrament deprecatory or indicative?

In regard to the first point St. Bonaventure says: "There are some who hold that the oil itself is the matter of this sacrament, and that by the episcopal consecration of the oil the sacrament is constituted; then the anointing that follows is simply the use or dispensation of the sacrament. But this is contrary to the very name of the sacrament, and also to the common view of theologians. Hence, it is better to say that, just as in baptism, the matter of the sacrament is water, and in confirmation it is chrism, so in extreme unction it is oil consecrated by the bishop." [44] St. Thomas refers to the same difference of opinion, and gives the same solution as St. Bonaventure.[45] Moreover the consecration of the oil by a bishop is necessary for the validity of the sacrament.[46]

There is a similar but more pronounced difference of opinion in regard to the form. In the various liturgical books of the time, and in others of a later date, there is found a vast variety of forms, some of them deprecatory and others indicative.[47] Hence, as St. Bonaventure states, some theologians went even so far as to say that no definite form was required in extreme unction.[48] However, this view is rejected by nearly all Scholastics of any note. Yet there is no agreement among them as to what the proper form ought to be. Thus St. Thomas contends that the form must be deprecatory, and for this view he assigns the following reasons. First, because the deprecatory form is evidently indicated by the words of St. James; secondly, because it is the form used by the Church of Rome; thirdly, the nature of the sacrament itself requires it, since it is administered to the dying who are thereby recom-

[43] Ibid. a. 4.
[44] In Sent. d. 23, a. 1, q. 3.
[45] Suppl. q. 29, a. 5.
[46] Ibid. a. 6.
[47] Cfr. J. Kern, Tractatus de Extrema Unctione, c. 3.
[48] Loc. cit. q. 4.

mended to the mercy of God.[49] The same view is also taken by St. Bonaventure, who reasons about the matter in a similar way.[50]

Albertus Magnus, on the other hand, while admitting that the deprecatory form is valid, argues that the indicative form ought to be used. For he says, speaking of the Church in Germany, "in this part of the world all the most ancient liturgical books have the indicative form, and conclude the rite by a prayer. And these are the words written in those most ancient books, which, because of their great antiquity, I can heardly read: *Ungo hos oculos oleo sanctificato in nomine, etc.;* to which is added: *Per istam sanctissimam unctionem et suam piissimam, etc.*[51] This appears really to be a mixed form, but the author takes the first part only as the form proper. Richard of Middleton [52] and some others took a similar stand.

The subject of extreme unction is any person who has come to the age of discretion and is in danger of death from sickness. This sacrament, says St. Thomas, is a spiritual medicine, and as bodily medicine is not administered to those who are in health, neither must this spiritual medicine.[53] Furthermore, it is the last remedy against the ills of the soul that the Church has at her disposal, and therefore it ought not to be given to any one who is suffering from a slight ailment, but to those only who are about to depart this life. Hence, it is properly called the sacrament of the dying.[54] However, it ought not be deferred till the last moment, but should be administered when it is reasonably supposed that the sickness may prove fatal.[55]

As extreme unction does not imprint a character, it may be repeated on given conditions. Precisely what these conditions are is not so clear from the writings of the Scholastics. Before the twelfth century it seems to have been more or less customary, at least in many places, to repeat extreme unction

[49] Op. cit. q. 29, a. 8.
[50] Loc. cit.
[51] Ibid. a. 4.
[52] Ibid. a. 1, q. 4.
[53] Op. cit. q. 32, a. 1.
[54] Suppl. q. 32, a. 2.
[55] Ibid. a. 2 ad 1m.

in the same sickness and even in the same danger of death, if it so happened that the sick person appeared to be in need of special spiritual help.[56] Then a discussion arose concerning this practice, and thereafter most theologians decided that extreme unction ought not to be administered more than once in the same danger of death. Not a few, however, made an exception in favor of those who were grievously sick for more than a year.[57] In keeping with this, many Manuals for the use of priests in those times have this rule in regard to the repetition of extreme unction: *Potest iterari, sed non pro eadem infirmitate, nisi ultra annum protrahatur.*[58]

St. Thomas decides the question as follows: "In regard to the administration of this sacrament, one must not only consider the fact of sickness, but also the gravity of the sickness in question: for it ought not to be given except to those sick persons who, according to human judgment, seem to be nearing death. Now certain sicknesses are not of long duration; hence, if in these the sacrament be then administered when the patient seems to be in danger of death, it is reasonable to assume that he does not recover from that dangerous condition except by a cure of the illness itself, and thus he should not be anointed again. But if he suffers a relapse, that must be considered another sickness, and then he can again be anointed. Other forms of sickness, however, are of long duration, such as hectic fever, dropsy, and the like: in such cases extreme unction should not be given except when there appears to be danger of death; and when the patient recovers from that particular danger, the same sickness remaining, and then is again reduced to a similar condition, he can again be anointed; because it is a new state of sickness, although the sickness itself remains the same." [59]

St. Bonaventure looks at this matter in a somewhat different

[56] Cfr. Kern, op. cit. p. 331 sqq.

[57] Thus Hugh of Strasburg, a pupil of Albertus Magnus, writes: "Si saepe infirmatur quis ad mortem saepe potest inungi; sed in una infirmitate non debet quis bis inungi, nisi eadem infirmitas ultra annum protrahatur, ita quod in uno anno propter eandem infirmitatem nemo bis inungatur" (Opera B. Alberti, t. 34, p. 232).

[58] Cfr. Launoi, opp. t. 1, p. 553.

[59] Suppl. q. 33, a. 2.

light. According to him, the proper effect of extreme unction is the remission of venial sins, and as one may commit venial sins after having been anointed, it is obvious that the administration of the sacrament may be repeated. Still in the practical application of this fundamental idea, he comes to practically the same conclusion as St. Thomas. "When there is question of a protracted illness," he says, "some hold that extreme unction may be repeated after a year has elapsed; but that position is altogether absurd — as if the administration of the sacraments were to be regulated by the movements of the stars. It is therefore better to say that no sick person should be anointed except when he is presumably approaching his end; and this will be in such a state of his sickness that nature cannot long bear up under it, and so he will either overcome it or be overcome by it. If therefore he recovers somewhat and continues to live, although he is not really cured, still he is cured of an extremely dangerous condition: and hence, if his condition again becomes worse, he can and should receive the sacrament of extreme unction again, because he may again have fallen into venial sin." [60]

There is found among the Scholastics a similar diversity of opinion in regard to the principal effect of extreme unction, as distinct from sanctifying grace which is either conferred or augmented by every sacrament. St. Bonaventure, as stated in the preceding paragraph, holds that it is the remission of venial sins in so far as they would be an obstacle to the soul's immediate entrance into heaven. During life, he says, it is very difficult to avoid venial sins, and they may almost be regarded as an incurable evil; but when death draws nigh that evil can be cured in respect of its consequences, and so the merciful God has provided extreme unction as a means to take away the guilt of venial sins, and also part of the punishment due to them. "Hence," he continues, "this sacrament was principally instituted for the healing and alleviating of man's spiritual infirmity, that is, of venial sin; and secondarily also for

[60] In Sent. IV, d. 23, a. 2, q. 3 ad 3m.

the cure and alleviation of his bodily infirmity, by way of strengthening the soul which rules the body." [61]

He calls this the common view of theologians, and he defends it against the opinion of those who held that extreme unction was directly intended as a remedy against the consequences and remains of sin, both personal and original, and indirectly against the ills of the body as resulting from sin.[62] Substantially the same view as that of Bonaventure is taken by Alexander of Hales,[63] Richard of Middleton,[64] Duns Scotus,[65] Durandus,[66] and many others. However, it can hardly be termed the " common " view of the Scholastics, as not a few of them, among whom are Albertus Magnus[67] and St. Thomas,[68] defended the opinion rejected by St. Bonaventure. Pointing out that extreme unction was instituted by our Savior as a spiritual medicine, St. Thomas draws this conclusion: " The purpose of medicine is to expel sickness. Hence this sacrament was chiefly instituted to cure the sickness of sin. . . . Consequently it is intended as a remedy against those defects by reason of which man is spiritually infirm, in the sense that he does not have perfect vigor as regards the acts of grace during life or of glory after death. Now these defects are nothing else than a certain debility and ineptitude left in us as a consequence of actual or original sin; and against this debility man is strengthened through the sacrament of extreme unction." [69]

Hence, all the Scholastics are agreed that the sacrament of extreme unction is in one way or another a remedy against sin or its consequences; and as sin usually enters the soul through the senses of the body, it follows naturally that these senses should be anointed in the administration of the sacrament. And this appears to have been the common teaching of theologians during the Middle Ages. " The soul," says St. Bonaventure, " rules and guides the body by reason of a threefold power: that of sensation, procreation, and locomotion;

[61] Ibid. a. 1, q. 1.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Sum. IV, q. 5, m. 7, a. 2.
[64] In Sent. IV, d. 23, a. 1, q. 3.
[65] Ibid. q. unic.
[66] Ibid. q. 1.
[67] Ibid. a. 1, 14.
[68] Sum. Theol. III, q. 65, a. 1.
[69] Suppl. q. 30, a. 1, 2.

hence the organs of these powers should be anointed. And as there are five organs of sensation, namely, the mouth, the eyes, the nostrils, the ears, and the hands, and as the loins are for the purpose of generation, and the feet for the purpose of locomotion, it is these seven parts that are anointed." [70]

However, although there are thus seven distinct anointings, each with its own form, there is only one sacrament of extreme unction. For as all the members which are anointed constitute one nature, and it is for this one nature that the remedy is provided, the different anointings constitute one sacramental rite.[71] Or as St. Thomas puts it: "Although the sacramental actions in this case are many, nevertheless they are all united in one perfect action — the unction of all the external senses, which are the source of man's internal ills." [72]

C — Matrimony

"A sacrament," reasons St. Thomas when speaking of matrimony, "provides for man, by means of some sensible sign, a remedy of divine grace against sin; and as this is verified in the case of matrimony, the matrimonial rite must be numbered among the sacraments." [73] The conclusion is accepted by all Scholastics, although Peter Lombard [74] and Durandus [75] are sometimes adduced as denying that the sacrament of matrimony produces grace. And most probably even these two are accused unjustly, as both of them teach that matrimony provides a remedy against concupiscence, which remedy must finally be reduced to the grace of God.[76] However, some early canonists seem to have taken the position just mentioned, and it is probably to them that St. Bonaventure refers when he says: "Some there were who said that this sacrament does not confer any grace; and to the objection that all the sacraments of the New Law give grace, they replied by saying that this must be understood of the sacraments insti-

[70] In Sent. d. 23, a. 2, q. 3.
[71] Ibid. q. 3 ad 3m.
[72] Suppl. q. 29, a. 2 ad 2m.
[73] Ibid. q. 42, a. 1.
[74] Sent. IV, d. 2.
[75] In Sent. V, d. 26, q. 3, n. 12.
[76] Cfr. Pesch, Praelect. VII, p. 316, 317.

tuted in the New Law." [77] This answer implies the view, also held by some others, that matrimony, even as a sacrament, was already instituted in paradise.

That matrimony is a true sacrament according to the teaching of the Church, is thus stated by Scotus: *Communiter tenet Ecclesia sacramentum matrimonii esse septimum inter ecclesiastica sacramenta, et de sacramentis Ecclesiae non est aliter sentiendum quam sentit Ecclesia Romana.*[78] And he defines the sacrament of matrimony as follows: *Signum sensibile, ex institutione divina significans efficaciter gratiam conferri contrahentibus ad conjunctionem eorum in contractu perpetuo observandam.*[79] This definition embodies the common teaching of the Scholastics, although most of them define matrimony in reference to the union between man and woman. Thus Peter Lombard writes: *Sunt igitur nuptiae vel matrimonium viri mulierisque conjunctio maritalis inter legitimas personas, individuam vitam retinens.*[80] This union or *conjunctio,* as St. Thomas points out, consists primarily in a contract which unites two individuals in reference to the procreation and education of their offspring, and to common domestic life; then, consequent upon this, but not constituting the essence thereof, is the union of bodies and of souls between the contracting parties.[81] Consequently, matrimony is essentially complete without the act of procreation.[82]

Hence the external sign of the sacrament consists in the marital consent of man and woman, in so far as that consent signifies the union of Christ with His Church. "Since matrimony is a sacrament," argues the Lombard, "it is both a sacred sign and the sign of a sacred thing, namely, of the union of Christ with His Church, according to the teaching of the Apostle." [83] Thus the natural contract, which from the beginning of the human race constituted matrimony as an *officium naturae,* was elevated by Christ to the dignity of a sacrament. Viewed under its material aspect, therefore,

[77] Op. cit. d. 26, a 2, q. 2.
[78] In Sent. IV, d. 26, n. 13.
[79] Report. IV, d. 26, n. 20.
[80] Sent. d. 37, c. 2.
[81] Suppl. q. 44, a. 1.
[82] Ibid. q. 42, a. 4.
[83] Sent. d. 26, c. 6.

Christian marriage is the same as that of pre-Christian times; only its formal aspect, or sacramental significance, is different.[84]

From this it follows that the ministers of the sacrament are the contracting parties themselves, and they are also the proximate efficient cause of the marital bond which results from the sacramental contract. However the remote efficient cause of that bond is God, who instituted the sacrament as the source of an indissoluble union between man and woman, and therefore its perpetuity depends on His will. As a consequence, when matrimony has been consummated by the bodily union of husband and wife, it is dissoluble only by the death of one of the parties; but so long as it has not yet been thus consummated, it may be dissolved by one of the contracting parties entering religion and taking the solemn vow of chastity. The former of these two conclusions follows from the very nature of Christian marriage,[85] and the latter is known from the teaching of the Church.[86]

The matter and form of this sacrament consist of the words or actions of the contracting parties by which their mutual consent is expressed. "Just as in the case of penance," argues St. Thomas, "the sacrament of matrimony is perfected by the acts of the persons to whom the sacrament is applied. And therefore, as in penance there is no other matter than that which consists in the acts of the penitent, which themselves hold the place of matter, so it is also in matrimony."[87] And again: "The words by which the matrimonial consent is expressed are the form of this sacrament; while the blessing of the priest is merely a sacramental, and in no wise the sacramental form."[88] However, not any kind of consent given with a view to marriage constitutes a matrimonial contract or a sacramental rite. It must first of all have a bearing upon marriage as here and now contracted: if it is merely given in reference to a future marriage, it results simply in an engage-

[84] Cfr. Thomas, Suppl. q. 42, a. 2; ibid. q. 45, a. 1; Bonavent. In Sent. IV. d. 26, a. 2, q. 1.

[85] Cfr. Ibid. d. 27, a. 3, q. 1; Thomas, Suppl. q. 62, a. 1–5.

[86] Ibid. q. 61, a. 1–3; Bonavent. loc. cit. q. 2.

[87] Suppl. q. 42, a. 1 ad 2[m].

[88] Ibid. a. 1 ad 1[m].

ment of the parties concerned.[89] Secondly, it must be the consent of persons who are in every way free and competent to enter a matrimonial contract. Nor is it sufficient that the persons in question be naturally competent, but they must also be free from all impediments that have been established by the positive law, either divine or ecclesiastical.[90]

Finally, although all the Scholastics speak of matrimony with due respect, and look upon it as a holy state, nevertheless they are unanimous in placing perpetual virginity on a higher level of Christian perfection. This conclusion they derive both from the example of Christ, the teaching of St. Paul, and from the nature of the two states in respect to the service of God. Matrimony is good, but perpetual virginity freely vowed to God is better.[91]

[89] Ibid. q. 43, a. 1.

[90] Cfr. Thomas, Suppl. q. 50, a. unicus; Bonavent. In Sent. IV, d. 36–42; Scotus, Ibid. d. 34–42.

[91] Cfr. Thomas, Sum. Theol. II. II, q. 152, a. 4, 5; Bonavent. op. cit. d. 39, a. 2; Middleton, ibid. a. 4, q. 2.

CHAPTER XXIII

MARIOLOGY

SANCTIFICATION BEFORE BIRTH: IMMACULATE CONCEPTION: DIVINE MOTHERHOOD: VENERATION

With the exception of a few subordinate points, dogmatic Mariology was fully developed during Patristic times. Mary was universally honored as the Virgin Mother of God, free from all stain of sin, full of grace, the holiest of God's creatures, conformable to her divine Son in His untold sufferings and the dissolution of death, but also sharing with Him the glory of His resurrection by being herself raised from the dead and assumed into heaven. All this was a matter of Catholic belief before the Scholastics began to systematize the teaching of the Fathers.[1] Hence there was little room for development in the Mariological teaching of the Church, except by way of setting forth certain details which had been only lightly touched upon by Patristic writers. And to this the Scholastics chiefly devoted themselves in their studies of the many privileges and prerogatives of the Mother of God.

A — Sanctification Before Birth

"That the Blessed Virgin was sanctified in her mother's womb," writes St. Bonaventure, "is a matter which the Church holds to admit of no doubt. And this appears from the fact that the whole Church celebrates the feast of her nativity, which she would certainly not do if Mary had not been sanctified before her birth." [2] And then, to show the reasonableness of this teaching, he argues from the principle laid down by St. Bernard, who says: "That which we read to

[1] Cfr. vol. I, p. 441 sqq.

[2] In Sent. III, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3.

have been conferred on others, cannot be held to have been denied to the Virgin." Holy Scripture bears witness that the Prophet Jeremias and John the Baptist were thus privileged, and how much more should not this same privilege have been granted to the Virgin, who exceeded them both in purity and perfection of virginity? They indeed were distinguished for their virginity, but in her to perfect virginity was joined miraculous fecundity. They were sanctified in the womb because they were sent to announce the Holy of Holies, how much more, then, was it not becoming that she should be thus sanctified who was to bear God in her womb? [3]

This reasoning of the Seraphic Doctor summarizes the arguments that were commonly advanced by the Scholastics to prove the point in question. It is ultimately her divine motherhood to which Mary owes all her privileges, and as this is a dignity that exceeds all others ever granted to any creature, her privileges are in consequence the very highest that God can bestow. In this sense St. Thomas argues, when he says: "It is reasonable to believe that she, who brought forth the Only Begotten of the Father full of grace and truth, received greater privileges of grace than all others." [4]

This sanctification in the womb was so perfect, that in view of it the Blessed Virgin was preserved from all personal sin. On this point all Scholastics are agreed. St. Thomas outlines the common reasoning as follows: "God so prepares and endows those whom He chooses for some particular office, that they are capable of fulfilling it. . . . Now the Blessed Virgin was chosen by God to be His Mother. Therefore there can be no doubt that God, by His grace, made her worthy of that office. . . . But she would not have been worthy to be the Mother of God, if she had ever sinned. First, because the honor of the parents reflects on the child, . . . and consequently, on the other hand, the Mother's shame would have reflected on her Son. Secondly, because of the singular affinity between her and Christ, who took flesh from her: . . . Thirdly, because of the singular manner in which the Son of

[3] Ibid.

[4] Sum. Theol. III, q. 27, a. 1.

God, who is divine wisdom, dwelt in her, not only in her soul but in her womb. . . . We must therefore confess simply that the Blessed Virgin committed no actual sin, neither mortal nor venial; so that what is written is fulfilled: *Thou art all fair, O my love, and there is not a spot in thee.*" [5]

To these reasons for belief in Mary's sinlessness, which are all taken from her relation to her divine Son, St. Bonaventure adds another which is based upon her relation to the fallen race and her triumph over the devil. "It was also becoming," he argues, "that the Blessed Virgin, through whom our disgrace was to be taken away, should conquer the devil so completely that she did not yield to him in the slightest degree. Hence, it is to her that St. Bernard and St. Augustine apply the verse in Genesis: *'She shall crush thy head.'* If then the suggestion of evil is the head of the devil, no suggestion of this kind ever found entrance into the mind of the Virgin, so that she was preserved from both mortal and venial sin. . . . Consequently, as the Blessed Virgin is the advocate of sinners, the glory and crown of the just, the spouse of God, the bridal bed of the whole Trinity, and in a most special manner the couch whereon the Son reposes, it was but right that, by a special grace of God, in her sin should have no place." [6]

In connection with Mary's preservation from all personal sin, the Scholastics discuss the question whether also the inclination to sin — the *fomes peccati* — was extinguished in her sanctification. On that point there is no agreement in their views. All indeed admit that Mary's natural inclinations were fully subject to reason assisted by grace, but there is a difference of opinion as to what this subjection really implied. In regard to the point in question, the Schoolmen usually distinguished a twofold sanctification of the Blessed Virgin: the first took place before her birth, as already indicated; the second was effected at the moment when she conceived her divine Son. This latter was regarded as a complement of the former, in the sense that it increased sanctifying grace in her soul and

[5] Ibid. a. 4.

[6] In Sent. III, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1.

thereby rooted her more firmly in her opposition to sin. In accordance with this distinction, the following three views were formed in regard to the extinction of the *fomes peccati.*

Some there were, as St. Bonaventure testifies,[7] who denied the extinction of the *fomes* altogether, but held that it was put to sleep or fettered in the first sanctification, so that thereafter the natural appetite never rose in rebellion against the dictate of reason. Then, in the second sanctification, this condition of inactivity on the part of the natural appetite was intensified by an increase of grace; but the *fomes* still continued to exist.

Others admitted the extinction of the *fomes,* but in this respect made a distinction between person and nature. This was the view taken by Alexander of Hales. In the first sanctification, he says, the *fomes* was extinguished as regarded the person of the Blessed Virgin, but in the second as regarded her nature. In the first she was purified in such a way that she never fell into sin; in the second, so as to bring forth her child without sin. In the first sanctification the *fomes* was extinguished in so far as it would have made her prone to evil; in the second, furthermore, in so far as it would have been an obstacle to good.[8] This view St. Bonaventure terms unintelligible.[9]

Others, finally, held that in the first sanctification the *fomes* was fettered, and in the second it was extinguished. This is the view taken by St. Thomas,[10] St. Bonaventure,[11] Albertus Magnus,[12] Richard of Middleton,[13] Ægidius Romanus,[14] and Durandus.[15] St. Thomas puts it in this way: "In order to understand the question at issue, it must be observed that the *fomes* is nothing else than a certain inordinate, but habitual, concupiscence of the sensitive appetite; for actual concupiscence is a sinful motion. Now sensual concupiscence is said to be inordinate, in so far as it rebels against reason; and this it does by inclining to evil, or hindering from good. Consequently it is essential to the *fomes* to incline to evil, or

[7] In Sent. III, d. 3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2.
[8] Sum. III, q. 9, m. 2, a. 5.
[9] Loc. cit.
[10] Sum. Theol. III, q. 27, a. 3.
[11] Loc. cit.
[12] In Sent. III, d. 3, a. 6.
[13] Ibid. a. 1, q. 4.
[14] Ibid. q. 1, a. 4.
[15] Ibid. q. 3.

hinder from good. Wherefore to say that the *fomes* was in the Blessed Virgin without an inclination to evil, is to combine two contradictory statements.

" In like manner it seems to imply a contradiction to say that the *fomes* remained as to the corruption of nature, but not as to personal corruption. For, according to Augustine, it is lust that transmits original sin to the offspring. Now lust implies inordinate concupiscence, not entirely subject to reason: and therefore, if the *fomes* were entirely taken away as to personal corruption, it could not remain as to the corruption of nature.

" It remains, therefore, for us to say, either that the *fomes* was entirely taken away from her by her first sanctification or that it was fettered. Now that the *fomes* was entirely taken away, might be understood in this sense, that, by the abundance of grace bestowed on the Blessed Virgin, such a disposition of the soul's powers was granted to her, that the lower powers were never moved without the command of reason; just as we have stated above to have been the case with Christ, who certainly did not have the *fomes* of sin; as also was the case with Adam, before he sinned, by reason of original justice: so that in this respect the grace of sanctification in the Virgin had the force of the primitive gift of righteousness. And although this appears to be part of the dignity of the Virgin Mother, yet it is somewhat derogatory to the dignity of Christ, without whose power no one had been freed from the first sentence of condemnation. . . . Consequently, just as before the immortality of the flesh of Christ rising again, none obtained immortality of the flesh, so it seems unfitting to say that before Christ appeared in sinless flesh, His Virgin Mother's or anyone else's flesh should be without the *fomes* which is called *the law of the flesh* or *of the members.*

" Therefore it seems better to say that by the sanctification in the womb, the Virgin was not freed from the *fomes* in its essence, but that it remained fettered: not indeed by an act of her reason, as in holy men, since she had not the use of reason from the first moment of her existence in her mother's womb, for this was the singular privilege of Christ: but by way of the

abundant grace bestowed on her in her sanctification, and still more perfectly by Divine Providence preserving her sensitive soul, in a singular manner, from any inordinate movement. Afterwards, however, at the conception of Christ's flesh, in which for the first time immunity from sin was to be conspicuous, it is to be believed that entire freedom from the *fomes* redounded from the Child to the Mother." [16]

This view was commonly held by the more representative Scholastics up to the time of Scotus. He, however, was not satisfied with it; but instead defended the opinion, rejected by St. Thomas, that the *fomes* was entirely extinguished by the Virgin's first sanctification.[17] This has since become the common teaching of theologians, and is certainly more in keeping with the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception.

Along with the extinction of the *fomes,* the Scholastics also defend Mary's confirmation in grace. This they usually connect with the second sanctification; although even before that sanctification took place, Divine Providence preserved her from all personal sin. Hence, in a certain sense, Mary was impeccable. However, her impeccability differed both from that of Christ and of the blessed in heaven. Mary was a pure creature and still on her way to the state of final blessedness; hence she was rendered impeccable exclusively through the abundance of grace which she received. St. Thomas explains it in this way: "The power of sinning may be taken away in one of two ways: First, by the union of the free will with its last end, which so entirely fills it that no defect remains; and this is brought about by the vision of God in glory; hence, in no person who is still on the way to heaven is the power of sinning taken away in such a manner. . . . Secondly, the power of sinning may be removed by the infusion of such an abundance of grace that thereby all defects are expelled: and so it was removed in the case of the Blessed Virgin when she conceived the Son of God. All power of sinning was taken away, although the Virgin herself still remained in *statu*

[16] Sum. Theol. III, q. 27, a. 3.

[17] In Sent. II, d. 29, n. 4; d. 32, n. 4; III, d. 3.

viae." [18] Or as St. Bonaventure briefly puts it: "Not only was sanctifying grace given to the Virgin in her second sanctification, but also the grace whereby she was confirmed in good; and this was granted to her because she was so closely united to her Son that He could in no way permit her to be separated from Himself." [19]

B — The Immaculate Conception

Nearly all Patristic writers laid down principles from which belief in the Immaculate Conception flows as a natural consequence; although there is hardly one among them who taught the doctrine so explicitly that his words do not admit of a different explanation.[20] The fact, too, that from the middle of the eighth century forward the feast of the Conception of the Virgin Mary was observed in ever widening circles, with at least the tacit acquiescence of the Church, is a sign that Christian consciousness was fast awaking to the truth of this doctrine. The impulse came from the East, but it found a ready response among the faithful in western lands.

It was in this stage of its development that the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception was subjected to a thorough study by the Scholastics, and, strange to say, it was by nearly all of them set aside as not sufficiently in harmony with the Church's teaching on the universality of original sin and of the redemption. St. Anselm, St. Bernard, Peter Lombard, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Albertus Magnus, and St. Thomas, though tenderly devout to God's holy Mother and ever ready to defend her many privileges and prerogatives, nevertheless taught quite definitely that she was conceived in sin as all the rest of mankind. Christ alone, they held, was immune from the original stain.— In this we seem to have a striking proof of the fact that sometimes the *sensus fidelium* is a safer guide in matters of faith, not yet clearly defined, than the prevailing views of theologians.

[18] In Sent. III, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2.
[19] In Sent. III, d. 3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3.
[20] Cfr. vol. I, p. 443 sqq.

However, by way of explanation of the strange phenomenon just referred to, it must be noted that at the time there stood some serious difficulties in the way of a theological exposition and acceptance of the doctrine in question. First of all, most of the theologians of the day, as was shown in a previous chapter, had only an imperfect understanding of the nature and transmission of original sin. Secondly, a way had to be found of reconciling the doctrine of the universality of the redemption with the exemption from all sin of one who had descended from the fallen Adam. Thirdly, the biological fact of conception itself was not well understood, it being the common teaching at the time that the spiritual soul was not infused into the body of the child until the organism had sufficiently developed. In consequence, many interpreted the Immaculate Conception to mean either that the act of procreation was without sin on the part of the parents, or that the body of the child was preserved from contracting the original stain. Hence the strange question found in the works of nearly all Scholastics: "Whether the Blessed Virgin was purified from original sin before animation?" As is obvious, in such a confused state of things there is much to excuse the erroneous teaching to which even the greatest thinkers of the golden age of Scholasticism committed themselves.

With this premised, we may first give a brief résumé of the arguments usually advanced against the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, and then indicate those that were urged in its favor.

Among the first who came out clearly against the Immaculate Conception, as then understood, was St. Bernard. His presentation of the question brings out strikingly the confusion of ideas referred to above. Protesting against the contemplated introduction of the feast in the church of Lyons, he asks: "Whence therefore comes the sanctity of the conception? Is she said to have been prevented by sanctification, so that she was holy when conceived, and for this reason her conception itself was holy, just as she is said to have been sanctified in the womb, and in consequence was holy in her birth? But she could not be holy before she existed; for in

truth she had no existence before she was conceived. Or was there perhaps in the marital embrace of her parents sanctity communicated to the conception, so that she was at the same time sanctified and conceived? But how could there be sanctity without the sanctifying Spirit, or how could there be an association of the Holy Spirit with sin? Or surely, how was there no sin, where concupiscence was not absent? Unless perhaps some one would say that she was conceived of the Holy Ghost and not of man. But such a thing is hitherto unheard of."

From this it will be seen that the writer makes all manner of suppositions, except the right one — that her soul might have been sanctified by the infusion of sanctifying grace when united to the body. And in keeping with his false suppositions, he draws his false conclusion: "If therefore she could in no way be sanctified before her conception, because she did not yet exist; and neither in her conception on acount of the sin that was there; it remains that we must believe her to have been sanctified after her conception when already existing in the womb, and that in consequence the exclusion of sin caused her birth to be holy, but not her conception." [21]

St. Anselm, whose concept of original sin was substantially the same as that of modern theologians, and who stated so clearly that under God nothing could be conceived to be more pure than the Virgin Mother,[22] nevertheless fell into the same error concerning the Immaculate Conception. Thus when Boso, his interlocutor in the *Cur Deus Homo*, makes the statement that the Virgin was conceived in original sin, because she too had sinned in Adam, he answers: "We ought not to think it strange if we cannot see the reason why the wisdom of God so disposed matters, but we must admit with due reverence that in His hidden ways there is something we do not understand." [23]

Alexander of Hales, at the very beginning of his inquiry, enunciates the principle that whatever grace could be conferred upon the Blessed Virgin, was conferred upon her; but

[21] Ep. 174, n. 7.
[22] De Concept. Virgin. c. 18.
[23] Op. cit. II, c. 16.

among these possible graces he does not find that of the Immaculate Conception. He points out that she could not be purified before her conception, nor in her conception, nor before the infusion of her soul; but only after she had been conceived, as other saints had also been purified, and therefore her birth was holy.[24]

St. Bonaventure, in some respects, comes nearer to the point, but in the end he also decides against the doctrine. Putting the question whether the soul of the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before contracting original sin, he answers: "Some there are who say that in the soul of the glorious Virgin the grace of sanctification prevented the stain of original sin. And they assign this reason: It was becoming that the soul of the glorious Virgin should be sanctified in a more excellent manner than the souls of all other saints, not only as regards the abundance of sanctity, but also in respect of the acceleration of time; and therefore at the very instant of creation grace was given her, and in the same instant her soul was infused into the body." [25]

In this there is obviously no misunderstanding of the true doctrine; but though the doctrine is thus rightly understood, the author does not see his way towards making it his own. For he continues: "But the position of others is this, that the sanctification of the Virgin followed the contraction of original sin; and for this reason, that no one was free from the guilt of original sin save only the Son of the Virgin. For as the Apostle says in the third chapter of his Epistle to the Romans: *All have sinned and need the glory of God.* . . . And this manner of speaking is more common and more reasonable and more safe. More common, I say, because nearly all hold that the Blessed Virgin was infected with original sin. . . . More reasonable, because nature precedes grace, either in the order of time or in the order of nature; and hence St. Augustine says that one must first be born before one can be reborn. . . . Hence, it is necessary to hold that the infection of original sin preceded sanctification. More

[24] Sum. III, q. 9, m. 2. [25] In Sent. III, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2.

safe, because it is more in harmony with the piety of faith and the authority of the saints." [26]

Albertus Magnus summarizes his view on the subject in these terms: "It must be held that the Blessed Virgin was sanctified in the womb before her birth; but what precise day or hour this was accomplished, no man can know, except by way of revelation: unless one wants to hold that it took place shortly after animation." [27]

The same position is taken by St. Thomas, although since the end of the fourteenth century ever so many attempts have been made to show that he did not oppose the doctrine as rightly understood. He treats the subject in many different places, but the following extracts will suffice to indicate his mind on the point in question.

In his *Summa Theologica* he first gives several reasons why the Blessed Virgin could not have been sanctified before animation, and then gives this general argument: "And thus, in whatever manner the Blessed Virgin would have been sanctified before animation, she could never have incurred the stain of original sin: and thus she would not have needed redemption and salvation which is by Christ, of whom it is written: *He shall save His people from their sins.* But this is unfitting, through implying that Christ is not the Saviour of all men, as He is called. It remains, therefore, that the Blessed Virgin was sanctified after animation." [28] Then to the objection that "the purity of the Blessed Virgin would have been greater if she had never been stained by the contagion of original sin," he replies: "If the soul of the Blessed Virgin had never incurred the stain of original sin, this would be derogatory to the dignity of Christ, by reason of His being the universal Saviour of all. Consequently after Christ, who, as the universal Saviour of all, needed not to be saved, the purity of the Blessed Virgin holds the highest place. For Christ did not contract original sin in any way whatever, but was holy in His very conception, according to Luke 1, 35: *The Holy which shall be born of thee, shall be called the Son*

[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid. a. 5; a. 3, 4.
[28] Op. cit. III, q. 27, a. 2.

of God. But the blessed Virgin did indeed contract original sin, but was cleansed therefrom before her birth from the womb." [29]

Then the further objection, that "no feast is celebrated except of some saint, and that some keep the feast of the Conception of the Blessed Virgin," he answers by saying: "Although the Church of Rome does not celebrate the Conception of the Blessed Virgin, yet it tolerates the custom of certain churches which do keep that feast; wherefore this is not to be entirely reprobated. Nevertheless the celebration of this feast does not give us to understand that she was holy in her conception. But since it is not known when she was sanctified, the feast of her Sanctification, rather than the feast of her Conception, is kept on the day of her conception." [30]

He proposes the same doctrine in his *Commentaries on the Sentences,* where he says: "The sanctification of the Blessed Virgin could not fittingly precede the infusion of her soul, because then she was not capable of sanctification; but neither could it take place at the very instant when her soul was infused into her body, so that through grace she was preserved from incurring original sin. For of all the human race Christ alone has this singular privilege that He does not need redemption, because He is our Head; but all others must be redeemed by Him. Now this could not be, if another soul were found that had never been infected with the original stain; and therefore this was not conceded even to the Blessed Virgin, nor to any one else besides Christ." [31]

The same reasoning recurs, almost word for word, in his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans,*[32] in his *Quodlibeta.*[33] in his *Expositio Salutationis Angelicae,*[34] and in his *Compendium Theologicum.*[35] Hence, any effort to make St. Thomas an advocate of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, or to show that he was not opposed to the doctrine as understood at the present time, is at best misdirected. His

[29] Ibid. ad 2m.
[30] Ibid. ad 3m.
[31] In Sent. III, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1 ad 1m.
[32] Op. cit. in V, 12.
[33] Op. cit. 6, a. 7.
[34] Op. cit. 1.
[35] Op. cit. c. 224 (al. 232).

arguments are not urged against a misinterpretation of the doctrine, but against the doctrine itself. This does not detract from his fame as a theologian, or as a devout client of the Mother of God; but only shows that even in theology there is such a thing as development.

However, although the most representative Scholastics prior to the fourteenth century were thus resolutely opposed to the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, there were never wanting others, though of lesser fame, who with equal resolution defended Mary's prerogative by every means in their power. Among these was Vincent of Beauvais, a Dominican and contemporary of St. Thomas, who, referring to the feast of the Conception, says very definitely: "But now, because she is venerated by the authority of the whole Church, it is evident that she was preserved in every way from original sin, and by her was not only taken away the malediction of mother Eve, but all were filled with blessing. The Virgin was subject to no fault when she was born, nor did she contract original sin before she was sanctified in the womb." [36]

The doctrine was also defended by Eadmer, disciple and biographer of St. Anselm. He uses practically the same argument that was some two hundred years later employed by Scotus — *potuit, decuit, fecit.* "Could not God," he asks, "grant to the human body of which He prepared for Himself a temple, in which He dwelt corporeally, and of which He assumed human nature into the unity of person, that, although conceived amid the thorns of sin, it should nevertheless be altogether preserved from the sting of these thorns? He evidently could. If, then, He willed, He did. And indeed, whatever in the order of dignity He willed in regard to anyone apart from His own person, that, O Most Blessed of women, He surely willed in regard to thee. . . . Out of the sinful mass, therefore, He could preserve a human nature free from all stain of sin, and from it unite a human nature to His own person, so that He was a true man and yet in no way detract from the holiness of His divinity." [37]

[36] Laudes V. Mariae, c. 5, 6.

[37] De Conceptione Sanctae Mariae, n. 8.

Besides these two, there were many others who defended the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, as is quite evident from the statement of St. Bonaventure referred to in a previous paragraph. However, it was reserved for Duns Scotus to turn the tide of theological opinion completely in its favor. This he did chiefly by removing the principal difficulty urged against it, namely, that such a privilege conferred on a pure creature would be derogatory to the dignity of Christ as the universal Savior; and secondarily also by clarifying the concept of original sin.

Assuming the principle upon which the adversaries of the Immaculate Conception built their arguments, namely, that Christ is the redeemer and mediator of all, he makes it the foundation of his own arguments for the doctrine. "The most perfect mediator," he argues, "has a most perfect way of mediating for any person in whose behalf he mediates. But Christ is the most perfect mediator. Therefore Christ had the most perfect way possible of mediating in behalf of any creature or person in respect of whom He was the mediator. But in respect of no person had He a more excellent way than in respect of Mary; therefore, etc. But this would not have been the case unless He merited for her preservation from original sin. And this I prove in three ways: First, in reference to God to whom He reconciled her; secondly, in reference to the evil from which He freed her; thirdly, in reference to the obligation under which He was in regard to the person whom He reconciled." [38]

Then, after completing the argument, he answers the objection that Mary was subject to the punishment consequent upon original sin, and therefore to original sin itself. His answer is: "A mediator can reconcile a person in such a manner that all useless punishment is taken away, while afflictions that are useful remain. Original guilt would not have been useful to Mary; but temporal pains were useful to her, because by bearing them she merited; therefore, etc." [39]

Finally he sums up the whole question in this way: "God

[38] In Sent. III, q. 1, n. 4 sqq. [39] Ibid. n. 8.

could bring it about that she never contracted original sin; He could also have brought it about that she should have been in the state of original sin for only one instant; He could also have brought it about that she should have been infected with original sin for some time, and in the last instant of that time have been purified therefrom. . . . Which of these three possible ways He actually did choose, God knows. If it does not contravene the authority of the Church and of Holy Scripture, it seems probable that what is more excellent must be attributed to Mary."[40] Hence, he does not wish to decide the question on his own authority, but he makes it quite clear what he thinks of the doctrine under discussion.

The position taken by Scotus in favor of the Immaculate Conception proved decisive. His own order took up the defense without delay, in which it was soon joined by the Benedictines, the Cistersians, the Carmelites, and the Augustinians. The Dominicans alone held back, owing to the authority of St. Thomas, whom they all interpreted as being against the doctrine. At the same time the University of Paris censured a thesis which John de Montesa, a Dominican, had presented for his doctorate, and in which he stated: *Beatam Mariam Virginem et Dei Genitricem non contraxisse peccatum originale est expresse contra fidem;* and later on exacted from all candidates for the doctorate a promise under oath that they would defend the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. In 1439, the Council of Basle, after it had become schismatical, declared that the doctrine was conformable to faith and reason, and prohibited all further arguing against it. Still the contention on the part of the Dominicans was continued, until Sixtus IV, in 1483, issued the Constitution *Grave nimis*, in which he reprobated all opposition to what had meanwhile become the accepted teaching of the Church. Thereafter it was regarded as a matter of reproach to speak against the Immaculate Conception, and finally, in 1854, the doctrine was defined by Pius IX, in the Bull *Ineffabilis Deus*.[41]

[40] Ibid. n. 9.

[41] DB. 1641.

C — Divine Motherhood

Mary's right to the title, Mother of God, was proclaimed by Christian antiquity and solemnly defined by the Council of Ephesus.[42] The reason for the title is thus stated by St. Thomas: "Every word that signifies a nature in the concrete can stand for any hypostasis of that nature. Now, since the union of the Incarnation took place in the hypostasis, as was above stated, it is manifest that this word *God* can stand for the hypostasis having a human and a divine nature. Therefore whatever belongs to the divine and to the human nature can be attributed to that person: both when a word signifying the divine nature is employed to stand for it, and when a word is used signifying the human nature. Now, conception and birth are attributed to the person and hypostasis in respect of that nature in which it is conceived and born. Since, therefore, the human nature was taken by the divine person in the very beginning of the conception, as stated above, it follows that it can be truly said that God was conceived and born of the Virgin. Now, from this is a woman called a man's mother, that she conceived him and gave birth to him. Therefore the Blessed Virgin is truly called the Mother of God. For the only way in which it could be denied that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God would be one of these two: either that the humanity was first subject to conception and birth, before this man was the Son of God, as Photinus said; or that the humanity was not assumed into unity of the hypostasis or person of the Word of God, as Nestorius maintained. But both of these opinions are erroneous. Therefore it is heretical to deny that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God." [42a]

This is the common teaching of the Scholastics as regards the fact of Mary's divine motherhood; but there is some difference in their views in reference to her coöperation in the conception of her Son. St. Bonaventure puts the state of the question this way: "Since Mary is the Mother of Christ and truly conceived Him, it must be held without all doubt that

[42] Cfr. vol. I, p. 396 sqq.

[42a] Sum. Theol. III, q. 35, a. 4.

she truly coöperated with the Holy Spirit in the conception of her Son, and this is commonly and generally held by teachers of theology. But regarding the manner of coöperating different men have different views. Some prefer to say that the Virgin Mary coöperated only by supplying the material principle. But others hold that she coöperated in the eduction of the ultimate form and in the preparation of the matter, although not in the whole process. And others, finally, hold a view that is intermediate between these two." [43]

Then, after refuting the first and second opinion, he gives his own in these terms: "Because the first opinion claims too little and the second too much, hence their untenableness directs us in the way to the truth. And for this reason it seems preferable to hold the intermediate view, namely, that power was divinely communicated to the Blessed Virgin, by which she supplied the matter for the conception — the matter, I say, not only in so far as it had the nature of matter or passive potency, but also in the sense that it was disposed and suitable for the production of the child. However, as the operation of this power was necessarily successive, and as the body of Christ could not fittingly be produced by successive operation, hence it was that the Holy Spirit by His infinite power brought the matter to its ultimate perfection. . . . Hence the whole substance of Christ's body was taken from His Mother; and therefore if we wish to think and speak logically, we must say that the Virgin was the Mother of Christ in a truer sense than any other mother is the mother of her own child." [44]

St. Thomas also refers to the three different opinions mentioned above, and after a brief discussion of them adopts the first, namely, that Mary was simply passive in the conception of her Son. And he takes this view, because in generation, according to Aristotle, all activity is on the part of the father. Hence he says: "Since, therefore, the Blessed Virgin was not Christ's father, but His mother, it follows that it was not given to her to exercise an active power in His conception. . . . We must therefore say that in Christ's conception itself

[43] In Sent. III, d. 4, a. 3, q. 1. [44] Ibid.

she did not coöperate actively, but merely supplied the matter thereof. Nevertheless, before the conception she coöperated actively in the preparation of the matter, so that it should be apt for the conception." [45] Hence "this conception had three privileges — that it was without original sin; that it was not of man only, but of God and man; that it was a virginal conception. And all three were effected by the Holy Ghost." [46]

In keeping with this difference of views, the Scholastics also differ in answering the further question, whether the conception of Christ was natural or miraculous. St. Bonaventure answers that under one aspect it was natural and under another it was miraculous. It was natural in so far as the Virgin had the natural power to prepare the matter for the conception; it was miraculous in so far as the Virgin had received the supernatural power to coöperate in the conception itself.[47] St. Thomas agrees that the conception was both natural and miraculous, but as he denies that the Virgin actively coöperated in the conception, he gives a different reason. He says: "Besides the union of two natures in one person, which was effected in the conception of Christ, and which is the miracle of all miracles, there was also this other miracle that the Virgin, remaining a virgin, conceived the God-Man. For in order that a conception may be said to be natural, it is necessary that it be affected by the agent in a natural manner, and by means of matter that is naturally apt for the conception. . . . Now the matter supplied by the Virgin was the same as that from which the body of man may be formed naturally; but the power forming the body was divine. Hence it must be said that the conception of Christ was simply miraculous, but natural in some respect." [48]

In the divine motherhood thus understood, the Scholastics recognized the source of all the graces and privileges bestowed on Mary. St. Thomas formulates the common teaching in this way: "In every genus, the nearer a thing is to the principle, the greater also is the part which it has in that principle; whence Dionysius says that angels, being nearer to God, have

[45] Sum. Theol. III, q. 32, a. 4.
[46] Sum. Theol. III, q. 32, a. 4.
[47] In Sent. III, d. 4, a. 3, q. 2.
[48] Ibid. q. 2, a. 2.

a greater share than men in the effects of the divine goodness. Now Christ is the principle of grace, authoritatively as to His Godhead, instrumentally as to His humanity: whence it is written: *Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.* But the Blessed Virgin Mary was nearest to Christ in His humanity: because He received his human nature from her. Therefore it was due to her to receive a greater fullness of grace than others." [49] Hence, too, "there is no doubt that the Blessed Virgin received in a high degree both the gift of wisdom and the grace of miracles and even of prophecy, just as Christ had them. But she did not so receive them as to put them and suchlike graces to every use, as did Christ: but according as it befitted her condition of life." [50]

D — Veneration of Mary

The principle that underlies all true devotion to the Blessed Mother of God is thus neatly expressed by St. Bonaventure: "Whatever terms are used to set forth the Christian faith, they must be far removed from error and expressive of devotion; and this in a most special manner when they refer to the Virgin Mary. For by conceiving and bringing forth the Truth Itself, she has exterminated all heresy throughout the whole world, and also merited reconciliation for the entire race; and therefore devotion to her ought to burn with great intensity in the hearts of all Christians." [51]

And this is the common view of all the Schoolmen, nearly every one of whom manifested a tender devotion to the Mother of God. As Mother of the Redeemer, she was regarded as the cause of the world's salvation — a thought that had been expressed over and over again in the earliest ages of Christianity. Furthermore, as the recipient of the most extraordinary graces, among which shone in a special manner her virginal purity, she was endowed in her own person with an attractiveness that led all hearts captive, and bound them to herself in the most ardent love and tender devotion. Hence the many

[49] Sum. Theol. III, q. 27, a. 5.
[50] Ibid. a. 5 ad 3[m].
[51] In Sent. III, d. 4, a. 3, q. 3.

panegyrics that were preached in her honor by the most learned men of the day, the numerous treatises composed to set forth her virtues, the multiplication of feasts and pious practices in every part of the Christian world. Those were the ages of faith, and faith gathers her children instinctively around the throne of God's own sweet Mother.

Yet all this devotion did not blind the Scholastics, nor the faithful in general, to the limitations that must necessarily be placed upon the veneration to which Mary can justly lay claim. "Although the honor which is paid her," argues Alexander of Hales, "is in some way referred to Him who became incarnate in her womb, nevertheless from this it does not follow that she may be honored with divine worship. Still the honor that is her just due has a special excellence of its own. Although paid to a pure creature, yet it is not shared in by any other saint. It is in a manner a disposition to divine worship, but not divine worship itself. When I worship the Mother of God because of her sublime dignity, I do not worship her as the creative cause of my being, and therefore I do not pay her divine honor; but because I worship her as the Mother of God, I honor her as the Mother of the Creator, and this on account of the Creator Himself. Hence the foundation of her honor is the honor of the Creator; but the honor itself is that which is due to a creature." [52]

St. Bonaventure uses almost the same terms. "The most Blessed Virgin Mary," he says, "is a pure creature, and therefore she does not rise to the height of divine honor and worship. But because she has the most excellent name, so that nothing more excellent can be bestowed on any mere creature, hence it is that she is not merely entitled to the ordinary honor of *dulia,* but to the singular honor of *hyperdulia.* And that most excellent name is this, Virgin Mother of God, which in truth is of such exalted dignity, that not only the wayfarers on earth but also the blessed in heaven, not only men but the angels also, reverence her by paying her the tribute of special honor. For by the fact that she is the Mother of

[52] Sum. q. 30, m. 3, a. 2 ad 2[m].

God, she is raised above all other creatures, and hence it is becoming that she be honored and venerated more than all. And this honor it has become customary among teachers to call *hyperdulia.*" [53]

Thus also St. Thomas reasons. " Since *latria* is due to God alone," he says, " it is not due to a creature so far as we venerate a creature for its own sake. . . . Since, therefore, the Blessed Virgin is a mere rational creature, the worship of *latria* is not due to her, but only that of *dulia;* but in a higher degree than to other creatures, in as much as she is the Mother of God. For this reason we say that not any kind of *dulia* is due to her, but *hyperdulia.*" [54] And again: " The honor due to the king's mother is not equal to the honor which is due to the king: but is somewhat like it, by reason of a certain excellence on her part." [55]

[53] In Sent. III, d. 9, a. 1, q. 3.
[54] Sum. Theol. III, q. 25, a. 5.
[55] Ibid. a. 5 ad 1m.

CHAPTER XXIV

ESCHATOLOGY

In their treatment of eschatological subjects the Scholastics are very diffuse. They indulge in lengthy speculations on points for the establishing of which neither reason nor revelation furnishes sufficient data. In these speculations we need not follow them, as it would be little to the purpose in a work that is concerned only with doctrines whose development is likely to issue into definite results along the lines of faith. Hence the following brief remarks on the four principal eschatological topics, the resurrection of the dead, the general judgment, the eternal blessedness of the elect, and the everlasting sufferings of the reprobate, must here suffice.

1. *The Resurrection of the Dead.*— The fact of the resurrection is treated by all Scholastics as an article of Christian belief, which from the earliest times found a place in the Creed. However they adduce various arguments to prove that the teaching of faith is acceptable to reason. Thus they point to the resurrection of Christ as the exemplar and promise of our resurrection. He is our Head, we are His members; and as the Head rose from the dead, so is it also fitting that the members should rise again.[1] They also argue that the fitness of a full eternal recompense, either by way of reward or punishment, makes the resurrection of the dead appear most probable even from the standpoint of reason. It was the whole man who practiced virtue or indulged in vice; and therefore it should also be the whole man who reaps the everlasting recompense of his mortal deeds.[2]

[1] Cfr. Bonavent. In Sent. IV, d. 43, a. 1, q. 1; Thomas, Suppl. q. 75, a. 1, 2; Scotus, In Sent. IV, d. 43, q. 1, n. 11.

[2] Cfr. Thomas, op. cit. a. 1–3; Bonavent. loc. cit. q. 1.

However the act of resuscitating the dead is supernatural, and implies the exercise of divine power.[3] St. Thomas holds that Christ as God-Man is both the efficient and exemplary cause of the resurrection of the dead, and that His sacred humanity acts in reference to the effect as the instrument of the Godhead.[4] Furthermore, as they all explain, in the resurrection there are three things to be considered: First, the gathering together of the material that constituted man's body during life; secondly, the disposing of that material for its union with the soul; thirdly, the actual reunion of soul and body. Of these three, only the last is strictly supernatural and as such must be effected by divine power.[5] "In regard to the other two," says St. Thomas, "God will make use of the ministry of the angels. But as the soul was immediately created by God, so shall it also, without the intervention of the angels, be again united to its body by the immediate action of God. And the same must be held with regard to the glorification of the body: God will glorify the body immediately, without the ministry of the angels; the same way as He immediately glorifies the soul." [6]

The resurrection will take place in one instant of time, at the moment when the angels have gathered the dust and disposed the body for its second union with the soul.[7] The resurrection will be universal, not only in the sense that all the dead shall rise again, but also that all must die before the second advent of the Lord.[8] Those who are already risen from the dead and are now with body and soul in heaven, as our Blessed Savior and His Holy Mother, will of course neither die nor rise a second time; but Henoch, Elias, and the saints that rose from their tomb on the occasion of our Savior's death, must probably be counted among those who shall rise on the last day.[9]

All shall rise numerically the same human beings as they

[3] Ibid. q. 5; Albert Magn. ibid. a. 4. 5; Scotus, ibid. q. 5, n. 7.
[4] Op. cit. q. 76, a. 1, 2.
[5] Cfr. Bonavent. loc. cit.; Middleton, ibid. a. 3, q. 3.
[6] Loc. cit. a. 3.
[7] Ibid. q. 77, a. 4; Scotus, Report. IV, d. 63, q. 5, n. 4–9.
[8] Cfr. Bonavent. In Sent. IV, d. 63, a. 1, q. 2; Thomas, ibid. q. unica, a. 1; Scotus, ibid. q. 1, n. 11.
[9] Ibid.

were before death. The common teaching of the Scholastics on this point is formulated by St. Thomas as follows: "The necessity of admitting the resurrection arises from this, that man may attain his last end for which he was created. For this end he cannot attain during the present life, nor while his soul is separated from the body; and if he could in no way attain it, he would have been created in vain. And because numerically the same being that was made for a certain end must attain thereto, lest it appear to have been made in vain; hence it is that numerically the same man must rise again. And this is the case only when numerically the same soul is united to numerically the same body; for unless identically the same man were restored, it would not be a resurrection in the proper sense of the term. Hence to say that numerically the same man shall not rise again, is heretical, and derogates from the truth of Holy Scripture, which teaches the resurrection of the dead." [10]

In the philosophical system of St. Thomas this numerical identity is easily understood; for as according to it the immortal soul is the only substantial form, nothing further is required than that this soul should again be united to the same *materia prima* that was in the body during life. And this is all that St. Thomas postulates in his teaching on the subject.[11] But in the system of Scotus there appears a much greater difficulty as regards the numerical identity of the body. For according to him, man's body does not result from the union of the spiritual soul with prime matter; but it is constituted as a body by the *forma corporeitatis,* and this form is lost in the dissolution of the elements of man's body after death. Hence in the resurrection a new form must be educed, and consequently the body thus constituted is not numerically the same. He meets the difficulty by stating that the reproduction of numerically the same form is not impossible to God's omnipotence, and in this way there will be identity of body as well as of soul.[12]

There is also found in the writings of the Scholastics some

[10] Suppl. q. 79, a. 2.
[11] Ibid. a. 2 ad 3[m].
[12] Loc. cit. q. 3, n. 1–20.

difference of opinion in regard to the material elements that shall again be united to the soul in the resurrection. If the nourishment taken during life is converted into man's bodily substance, it is obviously impossible that the whole amount of substance, thus formed in the course of many years, should be made use of to constitute the risen body. Hence some hold, as Thomas points out,[13] that the human body consists, properly speaking, only of that portion of his bodily substance which each individual derived from his parents by way of generation, and consequently this alone will be taken up again by the soul on the last day. However, this view was commonly rejected as philosophically untenable, and most of the Scholastics hold that so much of each one's "true bodily substance" will be taken up again in the resurrection as suffices for a perfect body in the state of maturity.[14] In the case of infants God will supply additional matter, so that they too may rise in a state of perfect development.[15]

As the body is ultimately the handiwork of God, it will after the resurrection be possessed of all the perfections due to its nature;[16] and this, according to the more common opinion, will be the case even with the bodies of the reprobate.[17] The difference of the reprobate and the elect, as regards their respective bodies, arises solely from the different spiritual condition of their souls. Hence in the case of the former, the body remains grossly material, and although immortal, in the sense that it cannot die, it is susceptible of the same kinds of sufferings as it was during its earthly existence;[18] whereas in the case of the latter, the body after its own manner shares in the glory of the soul, and is thereby spiritualized and made independent of the laws of space and time by which it was bound down in the days of its sojourn on earth.[19] In regard to the glorified body, the Scholastics

[13] In Sent. II, d. 30, a. 1.

[14] Cfr. Bonavent. In Sent. IV, d, 64, a. 2, q. 1, 2; Thomas, ibid. q. 1, a. 2; Scotus, ibid. q. 1, n. 15.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Cfr. Thomas, Suppl. q. 81, a. 1, 2.

[17] Ibid. q. 86, a. 1; Bonavent. In Sent. IV, d. 44, p. 1, a. 3, q. 2.

[18] Ibid. a. 2, 3.

[19] Ibid. q. 82–85; Scotus, In Sent. IV, d. 49, q. 13–16.

restate and explain philosophically the teaching of St. Paul [20] and of St. Augustine,[21] without adding anything really new in the line of dogmatic development.

2. *The General Judgment.*— Immediately upon the resurrection of the dead follows the general judgment, which will mark the end of time for the race of man. In itself it is a public ratification of the sentence already passed at the moment of each one's death. Various reasons are adduced by the Scholastics for the fitness of such a general and public judgment. St. Thomas speaks of it as a detailed representation of the world's history, a mere glance at which will reveal to every one the justice, wisdom, and goodness of God in all His ways; and at the same time it is intended as a separation of the good and the bad, who shall then be known for what they really were during their life on earth.[22] It also serves the purpose of giving due honor to the Savior of mankind, whom so many despised or ignored when they should have given Him their undivided service.[23] Lastly, it will be a public justification of God's faithful servants so often misjudged by enemies and friends, and a public condemnation of that hypocritical holiness of life which sought only its own glorification.[24]

Hence there will be a general revelation of each one's deeds, both good and bad. On this point there is no difference of opinion, save only in regard to the sins of the elect that have been blotted out by sincere repentance. Thus Peter Lombard holds that these sins shall not be made known, as the evil done by them has been repaired; [25] but this view is commonly rejected as untenable. For, as St. Thomas argues, "from this it would follow that the penance done for these sins would not become known either, at least not perfectly; and that would detract much from the glory of the saints and from the praise due to God for having so mercifully freed them from their sins.[26] Furthermore, this revelation of their

[20] I Cor. 15.
[21] De Civit. Dei, 22, 9.
[22] In Sent. IV, d. 48, q. 1, a. 1.
[23] Cfr. Thomas, Suppl. q. 90, a. 2.
[24] Id. In Sent. loc. cit.
[25] Sent. IV, d. 45.
[26] Suppl. q. 87, a. 2.

sins will not be a cause of shame to the saints, as is quite obvious from the case of Mary Magdalene whose sins are publicly recited in the church.[27]

This revelation of each one's conscience, both to himself and to all others, is spoken of by the Scholastics as the reading of the book of life — *libri vitae*. It consists in an instantaneous cognition of all that was recorded by each one's conscience during life; and the efficient cause of this cognition is a special enlightenment of the intellect on the part of God.[28] There is some difference of opinion in regard to the reprobate, as to the manner in which they shall be enabled to read the book of life. Unlike the elect, they do not behold the essence of God, and therefore they do not seem to have an adequate means of instantaneous cognition; hence St. Thomas concludes: *Singula considerabunt, sed non in instanti, sed in tempore brevissimo.*[29]

As the reading of the book of life, so likewise the passing of the judicial sentence will most probably consist in an intellectual enlightenment, whereby each individual is made to understand his eternal condition as here and now irrevocably fixed. "In regard to this question," says St. Thomas, "nothing can be defined with certainty; nevertheless it is held to be more probable that the whole judgment, both as regards the examination, the accusation of the wicked, the commendation of the good, and the sentence passed upon each, is simply a mental process. For if the deeds of each one were to be recited by word of mouth, an immeasurable length of time would be required. . . . Hence it is probable that what is said in Matthew, c. 25, must be interpreted, not as a verbal, but as a mental process." [30]

The judgment will be general in the sense that all rational creatures of God will be present, and that each one shall receive a recompense according to his works. However most of the Scholastics take the term judgment in three different

[27] Ibid. a. 2 ad 3[m].
[28] Cfr. Bonavent. In Sent. IV, d. 43, a. 2; Thomas, Suppl. q. 87, a. 1–3.
[29] Ibid. a. 3.
[30] Ibid. q. 88, a. 2.

senses, and in accordance with this distinction they make the judgment either general or limit it to certain classes. In the first sense it is merely a public manifestation of each one's spiritual condition and of the recompense that is his due; and so considered the judgment will be general in the full sense of the term. In the second sense it implies an examination of those to be judged and the passing of a sentence on the part of the judge; and under this aspect the judgment will not be general. "For some are judged and perish, others are not judged and perish; some are judged and reign, others are not judged and reign." [31] In the third sense judgment means simply condemnation, and refers only to the wicked whose state is already fixed. These are of two classes: the evil spirits who were judged by God immediately after their fall, and infidels whose obstinate blindness here on earth was the beginning of their final judgment.[32] Later theologians, however, usually reject this distinction, and hold that the judgment applies in the same sense to all who had the use of reason during life.

According to the common teaching of the Scholastics, the judgment will be presided over by Christ, the Redeemer of the world. "To judge," argues St. Thomas, "implies dominion in him who pronounces judgment. Hence Christ will be the judge in as much as He has dominion over men, in respect of whom it is chiefly that the final judgment will take place. Now, He is our Lord not only by reason of creation, . . . but also by reason of the redemption, which He wrought in His human nature. . . . And because through the redemption He restored not only mankind, but all creation, in as much as by reason of man's restoration all creatures were placed in an ameliorated condition; . . . hence it is that Christ through His passion merited to have dominion, not only over men, but over all creatures, and consequently to act as their judge." [33] However, He will judge *ex virtute divinitatis*.[34]

[31] Cfr. Lombard, Sent. d. 47, c. 3.
[32] Cfr. Bonavent. In Sent. IV, d. 47, a. 1, q. 3; Thomas, op. cit. q. 89, a. 5–8.
[33] Suppl. q. 90, a. 1.
[34] Ibid. a. 1 ad 2m.

With Christ others will be associated in the judgment; not, however, as judges in the strict sense of the term. The common teaching of the Scholastics on this point is thus set forth by St. Bonaventure: "One is said to be a judge in a cause for one or other of two reasons: either because it pertains to him to pronounce judgment, or because he takes part in such pronouncement, in as much as some judges coöperate with and in some measure give counsel to the chief judge. He, therefore, who pronounces judgment is the chief judge; and such is Christ alone, as is clear from Matthew xxv, wherein is described the procedure of the judgment. Those, however, who coöperate, also partake of the title and dignity of judge; and such are those saintly men who have added to the works prescribed by the commandments the supererogatory perfection of the counsels. Now, such are chiefly the Apostles, as leaders, and their close followers. Their participation, however, will not be unto the giving of counsel, because the Lord hath no need of counsel; but it will be the honor of being near the judge, and, according to the word of the Lord, we can call this the honor of sitting in judgment with Him." [35] And the same honor will also be granted to the good angels.[36]

Christ will appear in His glorified humanity to the elect and the reprobate alike, but His divinity will be seen only by the elect. However, even the reprobate shall know with the utmost certainty that He is truly God, and they shall be forced to acknowledge this to their greater shame.[37] St. Thomas,[38] St. Bonaventure,[39] and nearly all Scholastic theologians hold that the facial vision of God on the part of the reprobate is impossible; whereas Scotus contends that it could be effected by God's absolute power.[40] Practically all Scholastics are of opinion that the judgment will take place in the early morning hours, at the time when Christ rose from the dead.[41] They also regard it as likely that Christ will ap-

[35] In Sent. IV, d. 47, a. 1, q. 1.
[36] Ibid. q. 2.
[37] Ibid. d. 48, a. 1, q. 2, 3; Thomas, loc. cit. a. 3; Halens. Sum. III, q. 25, m. 4.
[38] Loc. cit.
[39] Loc. cit. q. 2.
[40] In Sent. IV, d. 48, q. 1, n. 1–10.
[41] Cfr. Thomas, Suppl. q. 47, a. 3.

pear on Mount Olivet, and that those who are to be judged shall be gathered around Him in that neighborhood.[42]

Immediately after the last judgment there will be a universal conflagration in which all the works of man shall be destroyed. Animal and plant life shall then cease to exist, and the material elements shall all be renovated by a purifying flame, so that there results a new heaven and a new earth. Furthermore, according to St. Thomas, the terrestrial globe shall then be endowed with a peculiar brightness like that of the heavenly bodies, all movement shall come to an end, and thenceforth there shall be an everlasting calm.[43]

3. *The Punishment of Hell.*— St. Bonaventure mentions and refutes two antiquated heresies in regard to the eternity of hell, and then states the accepted teaching of the Church in these terms: "Therefore the third position is reasonable and in accordance with the teaching of faith, namely, that the punishment of the wicked is eternal; and this Holy Scripture manifestly declares, faith confirms, and right reason approves."[44] Then, as the teaching of Holy Scripture and of faith is quite obvious, he develops the argument from reason as follows. "First, by way of antithesis it is eminently fitting that as the virtuous receive an eternal reward, so the wicked should be condemned to everlasting punishment. Secondly, this is not only fitting, but also necessary; because justice requires that each one be recompensed according to his works. Now the wicked have sinned against an eternal and infinite good, and for that reason they deserve an eternal punishment. Furthermore, they are immovably fixed in their perversity, and therefore their guilt is everlasting; hence, as guilt and punishment must be in proportion, it follows that their punishment should be eternal."[45] The same argument had already been indicated by St. Augustine[46] and St. Bernard,[47] and was still further developed by St. Thomas.[48]

When speaking about the punishment of hell, the Scholas-

[42] Ibid. q. 48, a. 4
[43] Ibid. q. 91, a. 2.
[44] In Sent. IV, d. 44, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1.
[45] Ibid.
[46] De Civit. Dei, 21, 11.
[47] De Gratia et Lib. Arbitr. c. 9, n. 28.
[48] Suppl. q. 99, a. 1.

tics say practically nothing in regard to the pain of loss. They presuppose that this is most intense, as it is measured by the happiness that would have been theirs had they been faithful in the service of God.[49] But presupposing this, they treat at great length of the positive pain, or the pain of sense, inflicted on the reprobate. The following points may be briefly noted.

As the pain of loss corresponds to the sinner's turning away from God, so the pain of sense corresponds to his inordinate turning to creatures. He made them, to all intents and purposes, his last end; and now they are converted by divine justice into instruments of the most exquisite torture.[50] Hence the pain of sense, argues St. Bonaventure, is caused by the four elements that constitute the material world — air, earth, fire, and water.[51] Or as St. Thomas puts it: "According to St. Basil, in the last purification of the world there will be a separation of the elements, and whatever is pure and of a refined nature will remain in the higher regions for the glory of the blessed; but whatever is vile and filthy shall be cast into hell for the punishment of the damned: so that, as to the blessed every material creature shall be a source of joy, so in like manner to the damned all creatures shall be a cause of torment." [52]

It is the common teaching of the Scholastics that hell is a subterranean place, most probably situated at the center of the earth. "Its arrangement," says St. Thomas, "is such as corresponds to the extreme misery of those detained therein. Hence there is both light and darkness, but in such a way as to intensify the torments of the lost. In itself the seeing of things is a source of delight, . . . but under certain conditions it becomes a cause of suffering, namely, when we see things that are hurtful or repugnant to us. And therefore the disposition of light and darkness in hell must be such that nothing is seen distinctly, but that those things which can afflict the heart are perceived as wrapt in a certain shadowy gloom.

[49] Cfr. Thomas, op. cit. q. 98, a. 9.
[50] Ibid. q. 97, a. 1.
[51] In Sent. IV, d. 44, p. 2, a. 2, q. 2.
[52] Op. cit. q. 47, a. 1.

Hence, properly speaking, it is a place of darkness. Nevertheless, by divine disposition there is just sufficient light to make those things visible which can torture the soul: and this follows from the very position of the place; because in the center of the earth, where hell is said to be situated, there can be no fire except such as is dim and dull and smoky." [53]

The principal agent used by God in causing the pain of sense is material fire. This is the teaching of Peter Lombard [54] Alexander of Hales,[55] Albertus Magnus,[56] St. Thomas,[57] St. Bonaventure,[58] Duns Scotus,[59] and all representative Scholastics. "Whatever may be said about the fire that tortures souls while separated from their bodies," argues St. Thomas, "the fire by which the bodies of the reprobate are tormented after the resurrection must be corporeal; because the body cannot be afflicted except by corporeal agents of pain." [60] Furthermore, the fire of hell is specifically the same as the fire that we use here on earth, although in some mysterious way it burns without consuming or being consumed.[61] The material nature of this fire was defended by the Scholastics against Avicenna and other Arabian philosophers who denied the resurrection of the body, and consequently contended that the term fire, when used in connection with the punishment of hell, must be taken in a metaphorical sense.

Again, it is also the common teaching of the Scholastics that this same material fire afflicts the evil spirits and human souls while in the state of separation from their bodies. But when they try to explain how this is possible, they severally advance somewhat different views. Thus Albertus Magnus practically contents himself with stating the fact as contained in Holy Scripture, and then affirming that God in His wisdom and power must have ways and means of afflicting spirits through the agency of matter.[62] St. Bonaventure admits that material fire as such cannot affect spiritual substances directly,

[53] Suppl. q. 97, a. 4.
[54] Sent. IV, d. 44, c. 6.
[55] Sum. II, q. 116, m. 4.
[56] In Sent. IV, d. 44, a. 37.
[57] Ibid. a. 4.
[58] Breviloq. VII, c. 6.
[59] Report. d. 44, q. 3, n. 19.
[60] Suppl. q. 97, a. 4.
[61] Ibid. a. 6.
[62] Loc. cit.

but it may do so in an indirect way; for divine justice may use it for the purpose of producing in the intellect and will a condition of fearsome apprehension and loathing repugnance, which results in unbearable mental and physical torture. Both evil spirits and disembodied souls may be shut up within the fire as in a prison, and thus be made to experience all the horrors that one naturally associates with earthly dungeons. Moreover, human souls always retain their sensitive faculties, by reason of which they can in some way be brought under the influence of material agents.[63]

St. Thomas examines three different views on this subject, and then rejects them as inadmissible. The first of these holds that spirits are terrified at the mere sight of fire; the second maintains that fire is apprehended by them as hurtful, and from this apprehension results an agony of dread and sadness; the third contends that spirits are physically afflicted by God Himself, who acts in the fire. After setting aside these explanations as insufficient, he gives his own in these terms: "It is necessary, therefore, to gather all these different ways together into one, so that it may become intelligible how a spirit can suffer from material fire. Let us say, then, that it is in accordance with the nature of fire for spirits to be united to it by way of location, just as any other thing localized is in a place; but over and above, in so far as the fire in question is an instrument of divine justice, it has also the power of holding these spirits bound to itself; and in this the fire is truly hurtful to the spirit, in as much as the soul, seeing that the fire is thus the cause of its involuntary detention, is tormented by the fire." [64]

Substantially the same explanation is given by Duns Scotus. In the first place, he says, the lost spirits are detained in one place by the fire; then they apprehend this detention; from this arises a repugnance to being thus detained; next this repugnance is vividly realized; finally, from the realization of their imprisoned condition, thus always before their minds, there results an intense agony of suffering and despair.[65]

[63] In Sent. IV, d. 44, a. 3, q. 2.
[64] Suppl. q. 70, a. 3.
[65] Report. IV, d. 44, q. 2, n. 9; cfr. In Sent. ibid. n. 11.

Morally the reprobate are in a state of unalterable perversion: they cling to their past sins, although they at the same time shrink from them as the cause of their torture;[66] they hate God, not as He is in Himself, but in so far as they experience the rigor of His justice;[67] they likewise hate all created beings, but more especially the blessed in heaven, whose happiness fills them with a most intense envy.[68] Still, with all this, they do not sin; because their very condition of obduracy in evil is a punishment for their past misdeeds.[69]

4. *The Joys of Heaven.*— Heaven is a place where the elect see God face to face, as He is in Himself; and from this intuitive vision of the triune God results a state of ecstatic joy and unspeakable happiness. On this point, considered as a mere fact, there never was a difference of opinion among the Scholastics. Furthermore, nearly all of them are agreed that the elect are placed in full possession of their essential happiness as soon as they have satisfied the justice of God for their past sins. Early in the fourteenth century, Pope John XXII, while still a simple theologian, advanced it as his private opinion that the intuitive vision of God's essence might be delayed even in the case of souls already perfectly pure in the sight of God; but his view met with strong opposition, as being out of harmony with the teaching of the Church.[70] Almost half a century before that unguarded statement was made, St. Thomas had stigmatized the opinion it expressed as heretical.[71] And in 1336, Benedict XII thus defined the traditional teaching: *Homines pios plene purgatos vel justos ex hac vita decedentes statim consequi beatitudinem et visione Dei beatifica perfrui . . . definimus.*[72]

Most Scholastics divide beatitude into objective and formal. By the former they understand God Himself, who as the Supreme Good perfectly satisfies every rational tendency of the elect. By the latter they designate that operation of the soul

[66] Cfr. Thomas, op. cit. q. 98, a. 1, 2.
[67] Ibid. a. 5.
[68] Ibid. a. 7, 9.
[69] Ibid. a. 6.
[70] Cfr. Chartular Universit. Paris. t. II, n. 970–987.
[71] Suppl. q. 69, a. 2.
[72] Mansi, 25, 986 D.

or spirit by which God is possessed as the source of ecstatic fruition. In regard to objective beatitude there is no room for discussion, as apart from God there is no object the possession of which can be the source of perfect blessedness. Besides, on this point the teaching of Holy Scripture is so clear that it excludes all further development of doctrine. But matters look quite different when the question of formal beatitude comes up for consideration. For although it is a matter of faith that the blessed see God face to face, or as Benedict XII, defined it, *visione intuitiva et etiam faciali, nulla mediante creatura in ratione visi se habente,* nevertheless both the act of this vision itself and its relation to the essence of beatitude have always been a subject of discussion among theologians. Only a few passing remarks can here be made about the points in question.

As the intuitive vision of God is an act of the intellect, it must obviously be explained in terms of human knowledge. Now in human knowledge, according to the common teaching of the Scholastics, four things come up for consideration: the intellect, the object, the impressed species — *species impressa,* and the expressed species — *species expressa.* Of itself the intellect does not represent one object rather than another; and therefore, in order to represent a particular object, it must first be determined or modified by a likeness derived from that same object. This modification is called the *species impressa,* which is a virtual representation of the object in question. Thus modified, the intellect produces the *species expressa,* or the act of knowing, which is a vital and formal representation of the object as known.

Applying this exposition of the genesis of human knowledge to the beatific vision, the Scholastics studied the question in reference to the following three points: First, does the beatific vision postulate a *species impressa?* Secondly, does it postulate a *species expressa?* Thirdly, in whatever way the first two points be decided, must the intellect be supernaturally strengthened by the light of glory — *lumen gloriae* — in order to see God face to face?

Some of the older Scholastics, whom St. Bonaventure takes

occasion to refute,[73] identified the beatific vision with God's own eternal and uncreated knowledge, in a similar way as they identified sanctifying grace with the Holy Spirit. Somewhat like this is the opinion defended by Henry of Ghent, who distinguishes in the blessed a created and an uncreated beatitude. The former, he says, consists in acts of the intellect and will, which as such, even in this connection, do not imply proper knowledge of God; whereas the latter is an immediate communication of God, or of objective beatitude, to the soul by way of circuminsession — *per circuminsessionem vel illapsum.* It is in this that beatitude properly consists, and in so far it is not a perfection of the faculties, but of the soul's substance.[74]

St. Bonaventure defines formal beatitude as *influentia Dei in animam, quae est ipsa deiformitas et satietas.*[75] In his explanation of this definition he states that beatitude consists of two parts: the deification of the soul and its faculties which is a habit or quality, and the corresponding acts of the intellect and will. Hence it is neither a mere act, nor a mere habit, but a combination of the two; and thus it may be compared to a natural habit of knowledge which is always in act, or by which man always actually contemplates the object known.[76]

In none of these explanations is there a definite attempt made to analyze the act of knowledge in so far as it proceeds from the intellect. And hence the explanations themselves are vague and unsatisfactory. In this respect the exposition of St. Thomas is much more explicit. After setting aside the opinion of some Arabian philosophers as to the nature of human knowledge, he proceeds: "Since in all cognition there is need of some form by which the object is known or seen, the form by which the intellect is perfected, in order to have a cognitive vision of separated substances, is not the quiddity which the intellect abstracts from composite things, as is maintained by the first opinion; nor is it an impression of

[73] In Sent. III, d. 14, a. 1, q. 1.
[74] Quodl. 13, q. 12.
[75] In Sent. IV, d. 49, p. 1, a. unicus, q. 1.
[76] Ibid. q. 1 ad 5[m].

the separated substance remaining in our intellect, as is held by the second; but it is the separated substance itself which is united to our intellect as a form, so that this substance itself is both the object which is known and the form by which it is known.

"But whatever may be said in regard to other separated substances, this is undoubtedly the explanation to be accepted in regard to the intuitive vision of God; because by whatever other form our intellect be perfected, it necessarily remains incapable of seeing God's essence. However the explanation just given must not be understood in the sense that the divine essence is properly the form of our intellect, or that from its union with our intellect results a something that is strictly one, as is the case when matter and form are united in the natural order of things; but in this other sense, that the relation of the divine essence to our intellect is proportionately the same as that of form to matter. . . . And that this suffices to make our intellect capable of seeing the divine essence by means of that same essence, may be shown as follows. . . . In the matter of knowledge, it is necessary to consider the intellect itself as matter, and the intelligible species as its form; hence the intellect in the act of knowing is composed of the two. Consequently, given a self-subsistent being, which is pure intelligibility, that being can of itself act as the form by which the intellect knows. For since it is pure form, without any admixture of matter, there is nothing to prevent it from discharging the functions of form in regard to the intellect; and thus become in a manner part of the composite, which is the intellect in act. Because a thing is intelligible in so far as it is in act. . . . Hence it follows that the divine essence, since it is pure actuality, can be the form by which the intellect knows; and this is the beatific vision." [77]

In this exposition, as is quite obvious, both the *species impressa* and the *species expressa,* as taken in the strict meaning of the respective terms, are eliminated from the intuitive vision of God. Their place is taken by the divine essence,

[77] Suppl. q. 92, a. 1.

which unites itself immediately to the intellect, and through this immediate union is seen face to face. The explanation agrees perfectly with the definition of Benedict XII, issued some sixty years later. It reads as follows: *Definimus: quod secundum communem Dei ordinationem animae sanctorum omnium . . . vident divinam essentiam visione intuitiva et etiam faciali, nulla mediante creatura in ratione objecti visi se habente, sed divina essentia immediate se nude, clare et aperte eis ostendente, quodque sic videntes eadem divina essentia perfruuntur.*[78]

It is true, neither St. Thomas nor Pope Benedict suppose the intellect to be merely passive in the beatific vision; on the contrary, they imply that the vision itself is an intellectual act; but what they wish to exclude is the *species* as a created representation of the Godhead; for that representation would always be analogous, and as such it could not be nor lead to a proper knowledge of God. Substantially the same position is taken by Duns Scotus.[79] Hence, if the term *species expressa* be understood in a wider sense, as simply designating an act of knowledge, it may evidently be employed without prejudice to the faith.

For this intuitive vision of God, in so far as it is a cognitive act, the intellect must be disposed and strengthened by the light of glory, which in some way corresponds to the light of faith here on earth. The fact is generally admitted by the Scholastics, but most of them are rather vague when they attempt to explain the nature of this light. St. Thomas puts his exposition this way: "Everything that is elevated to what exceeds its nature, must be prepared by some disposition above its nature; as, for example, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by some disposition for such a form. Now when any created intellect sees the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary that some supernatural disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it may be elevated to such a great and sublime height. Since

[78] DB. 530.

[79] In Sent. IV, d. 49, q. 3, n. 6.

the natural power of the created intellect does not avail to enable it to see the essence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary that the power of understanding should be aided by divine grace. This increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of the intellect, as we also call the intelligible object itself by the name of light or illumination." [80]

Again: "This light is required to see the divine essence, not as a similitude in which God is seen, but as a perfection of the intellect, strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be said that this light is not to be described as a medium in which God is seen, but by which He is seen; and such a medium does not take away the immediate vision of God." [81] Furthermore, this light can in no wise be natural to any creature, but only to the divine nature; and therefore by it the rational creature is made deiform.[82]

At the time when St. Thomas wrote, no decision on this matter had yet been given by the Church; and hence a few later Scholastics, especially Durandus,[83] controverted his view, and argued that the mere fact of the divine essence being intimately present to the human intellect eliminates the necessity of the light of glory as a previous disposition. However, the Council of Vienne (1311–1312) decided against this teaching by rejecting a thesis in which it was stated, *quod anima non indiget lumine gloriae, ipsam elevante, ad Deum videndum et eo beate fruendum.*[84]

There was greater divergence of views among the Scholastics as regards the essence of beatitude. All were agreed that the blessedness of the elect must comprise at least three acts: an act of intuitive vision, an act of love, and an act of fruition or joy. The first of these is an act of the intellect, while the other two proceed from the will. In regard to them the question arose, and is still under discussion, what is their precise relation to the essence of beatitude? Are all three of them constitutive, so that if one be eliminated beatitude itself

[80] Sum. Theol. I, q. 12, a. 5.
[81] Ibid. a. 5 ad 1m.
[82] Ibid. a. 5 ad 3m.
[83] In Sent. IV, d. 49, q. 2, n. 24.
[84] DB. 475.

is destroyed? Or is only one of them essential, or at most two? And if so, which of them? Setting aside merely accidental and minor differences, the views of the Scholastics on this point may be reduced to the following three. First: Beatitude consists essentially in the intuitive vision of God, and from this flow the complementary acts of love and fruition. Second: The essence of beatitude comprises both the intuitive vision of God and an act of love, but in such a way that the intuitive vision is merely inchoative and receives its essential complement from the act of love. Third: Beatitude consists essentially in an act of love, to which the intuitive vision is presupposed as a necessary condition, and from which fruition flows as a connatural consequence.

The first of these three views is put forward by St. Thomas. Admitting that beatitude is the proper object of the will, since it is the possession of the Supreme Good, he holds that the act of the will does nevertheless not constitute the essence of beatitude. For, he argues, "that act is man's last end, taken subjectively, by reason of which he is placed in such a relation to God that the will rests perfectly satisfied in Him. But only the vision of God by the intellect is such an act; because by that only is there established a certain contact of God with the faculties — since everything that is known is in him who knows in so far as it is known; just as also bodily contact with something agreeable to the senses induces a quieting of the affections. And therefore man's last end consists in an act of the intellect; and thus beatitude, which is man's last end, is in the intellect as its proper subject. However, that which belongs to the will, namely, its resting in the end obtained, which may be termed delectation, is the formal complement of the essence of beatitude, as supervening upon the intuitive vision in which the substance of beatitude consists; so that thus there is attributed to the will both the first relation to the end, in as much as it desires its attainment, and also the last, in so far as it rests in the end already attained." [85]

The second opinion is defended by Richard of Middle-

[85] In Sent. IV, d. 49, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2.

ton,[86] and also by St. Bonaventure.[87] Both of them teach that by way of genesis beatitude is first in the intellect, in as much as it has its inception in the intuitive vision of God; but it receives its essential perfection in the will, which is united to God in the act of love and possesses Him as the object of blessed fruition.

The third view is that of Scotus. He admits that both the intellect and will possess God as their immediate object; and also that by way of genesis beatitude is first in the intellect, in as much as without the intuitive vision there could be no immediate union of the will with the divine essence. But the essence of beatitude consists in only one operation — that of the will.[88] The will is man's noblest faculty, just as charity is the highest of virtues.[89] It is right, therefore, and obvious too, that the full and complete and perfect possession of man's end is an act of unitive love; not of a love of concupiscence, but of benevolence, which finds its perfect expression in this utterance: "The infinite goodness of God is to me an object of complacency, and by accepting Him and delighting in Him, I simply desire Him to possess all the goodness He does possess."[90]

After setting forth their views on the essential blessedness of the elect, the Scholastics usually enter into rather lengthy discussions of a number of subordinate points, more or less intimately connected with the state of eternal beatitude. The chief of these are the *dotes*, or spiritual dowry of the blessed; the *aureolae*, or special crowns corresponding to certain states in life and the perfect practice of certain virtues; the accidental happiness that arises from various created sources: the perpetuity of that blissful state; the impeccability of the elect; their social relations, and kindred subjects. But these discussions need not be reviewed in the present connection; because, with the exception of a few points, the subjects discussed are likely to remain a matter of speculation until we shall have attained the blessed vision of God.

[86] Ibid. a. 1, q. 6.
[87] Ibid. I, d. 1, a. 2, q. unica; II, d. 38, a. 1, q. 2; Breviloq. VII, c. 7.
[88] In Sent. IV, d. 49, q. 3, n. 6, 5; q. 4, n. 6, 5.
[89] Ibid. q. 4, n. 13–18.
[90] Ibid. q. 5, n. 4.

CHAPTER XXV

MEDIÆVAL HERESIES: MEDIÆVAL COUNCILS[1]

It was stated in the introduction to this volume that the development of dogmas during the Middle Ages was little influenced by the aberration of heretics and consequent decisions of councils. That this statement is perfectly correct must be evident from what has been said in the preceding chapters. Such heresies as did arise were either slight modifications of errors condemned centuries before, or they were simply momentary disturbances caused by individual fanaticism or indiscreet zeal for the purity of ecclesiastical life. With one or two exceptions, they did not spring from intellectual difficulties regarding any particular doctrine, as had been the case with all the great heresies of the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries. Hence they led to little or no theological discussion, and consequently they did not affect the normal development of doctrine. It was owing to the ephemeral nature of these heresies that the numerous ecumenical councils held during the Middle Ages treated them only in passing. It was usually not for the purpose of giving dogmatic decisions that these councils were convoked, but rather for the sake of bringing about ecclesiastical reforms, or settling difficulties between the Church and the State. And this being the case, the following brief outline of mediæval heresies and councils will suffice for the proper understanding of the various questions that have thus far been treated in the present volume.

[1] Cfr. Hefele, Conciliengeschichte, V; Marion, Histoire de l'Eglise, II; Funk, Manual of Church History, I; Doellinger, Beitraege zur Sektengeschichte des Mittelalters.

A — Mediæval Heresies

In regard to the errors of Gottschalk, Berengarius, Roscelin, Abelard, and Gilbert de la Porrée, nothing need be said on the present occasion, as a summary of them has been given in the preceding chapters.[2] It need only be added that their false views did not find favor with men of wide influence, and as a result they soon disappeared from the theological world. Some of them were indeed revived by later heretics, but of that it will be more convenient to say something in its own proper place. Hence at present we may devote our attention to such heretical vagaries and tendencies as have thus far either not been taken note of at all or else only in a passing way.

1. *Peter de Bruys and the Petrobrusians.*— Concerning the person and life of Peter de Bruys little is known. Practically our only source of information is a letter of Peter the Venerable, abbot of Cluny,[3] and a brief statement of Abelard in his *Introductio ad Theologiam.*[4] According to these authorities, he was a priest who had disgraced himself and in consequence was chased from his church by his own parishioners.[5] After that he traveled for about twenty years through Southern France and the neighboring countries, causing great disturbance by his fierce invectives against the Church and some of her doctrines. He was burnt to death at St. Giles in 1137, the enraged people having cast him into the fire which he himself had made of broken crucifixes.[6] His work was continued by the Cluniac monk Henry of Lausanne, who was condemned by the Council of Rheims in 1148.

From the statements of Peter the Venerable and Abelard, the teaching of these sectaries may be reduced to the following points:

(a) The baptism of children is invalid, because they are

[2] Cfr. cc. 1–4, 17.
[3] Epistola sive Tractatus adversus Petrobrusianos Hereticos, ML, 189, 719–850.
[4] Op. cit. II. c. 4.
[5] Cfr. ML, 189, 790.
[6] ML, 189, 723 A.

unable to make an act of faith; hence all those who have received the sacrament in childhood, must be rebaptized.

(b) God may be adored and worshiped anywhere, and therefore it is unlawful to build churches; those that have been built already should be torn down and destroyed.

(c) No veneration must be paid to crucifixes, because they are instruments of punishment; hence wherever a crucifix is found, it should be broken to pieces and cast into the fire.

(d) Christ changed bread and wine into His body and blood only once, and He did not give the same power to His priests; hence He is not really and personally present in the Eucharist.

(e) Prayers, alms-deeds, and other pious works for the departed are useless. Church music, singing, and ecclesiastical ceremonies generally should be abolished. God simply laughs at them: He is pleased only with the worship of the heart.

For the time being, Peter and Henry had many followers and several synods were held to counteract their influence, but after their death the sect to which Peter had given his name slowly disappeared.

2. *Tanchelm and Eon de Stella.* — Tanchelm was an escaped monk, who gathered around him a large following with which he traveled from place to place in the Low Countries. He claimed to be the equal of Jesus Christ and to have received as his special mission the reformation of ecclesiastical and religious life. At the same time, however, his conduct was shockingly immoral, and so was that of his immediate followers. As he violently denounced the authority of the Church and all priestly ministrations, he caused widespread disturbance wherever he went. Finally, in 1115, he was slain by a cleric. Much of the harm wrought by him was repaired by the zeal and prudence of St. Norbert.

Some twenty years later, a similar disturbance was caused by Eon de Stella, a Breton nobleman. He gave himself out as the Son of God, the Judge of the living and dead. His extraordinary claim he tried to establish by an appeal to the liturgical text: "*Per eum* (*Eon*) *qui venturus est judicare vivos et mortuos et saeculum per ignem.* He fiercely inveighed against all worldly possessions on the part of the Church,

and also preached a kind of communism which secured him vast numbers of adherents. He was condemned by the Council of Rheims in 1148, and some years later died in prison.

About the same time, considerable agitation along these lines was carried on by Arnold of Brescia, who violently declaimed against the Church's possession of landed property, and also against the temporal power of the Pope. According to Otto of Freising, "he held that no cleric having property, no bishop holding fiefs, no monk who was not truly poor, could hope for salvation."[7] He was condemned by the Second Lateran Council, in 1139, but continued his propaganda for some time longer in France and Switzerland. In 1155 he was executed by Barbarossa, on account of his connection with the revolution which had broken out at Rome.

3. *Amalric of Bene and David of Dinant.*— Towards the end of the twelfth century, the Moorish commentaries on Aristotle gave rise to various false views among the professors of the University of Paris. Some held that what is true in philosophy may be false in theology, that authority alone cannot give full certainty, and that the Christian religion, like all others, contains both truth and falsehood. Others taught pantheistic doctrines, identifying the creature with the Creator. To this latter class belonged Amalric of Bene and David of Dinant. Amalric held that all Christians are members of Christ, in the sense that by way of identification they are all other Christs; while David maintained that God is primary matter, from which all other beings are derived by some kind of pantheistic evolution. The teaching of Amalric was condemned by the University of Paris in 1206, and also by Pope Innocent III, to whom he had appealed for an authoritative decision. Some years later, 1209 or 1210, a synod held at Paris renewed this condemnation and also ordered the writings of David to be committed to the flames.

However, the error of Amalric spread rapidly, both among the clergy and laity. In a few years after his death, which occurred in 1207, numerous adherents in France, Italy, Ger-

[7] Cfr. Hefele, op. cit. V, 861, 881.

many, and Switzerland proclaimed him as their prophet. They were known by various names, Amalricians, Brethren of the Free Spirit, or more generally, Beghards and Beguines. They held a threefold incarnation of God: of the Father in Abraham, of the Son in Christ, and of the Holy Ghost in each Christian. Because of this incarnation, each individual Christian is God in as true a sense as was Christ Himself. In their preaching they severely criticized the Church and the priesthood, and at the same time they claimed for themselves absolute freedom to indulge their sensual appetites. Their errors were repeatedly condemned by provincial synods, but it was only by the active intervention of the Inquisition that the sect was finally rooted out.

4. *The Cathari or Albigenses.*— These heretics are usually considered as the lineal descendants of the fourth-century Manichaeans, for whose conversion St. Augustine had labored with singular success. Since his time they had practically disappeared from the West, but in the seventh and eighth centuries they sprang up anew in the Eastern Empire, where they went by the name of Paulicians. Two centuries later they appeared under the name of Bogomiles among the Bulgarians, and thence made their way into Western Europe. In Italy they called themselves Patarini, while in the South of France they adopted the name of Cathari. In this latter country their stronghold was the city of Albi, and hence the French branch of the sectaries came to be known as the Albigenses.

Doctrinally these heretics belonged to two different schools. The Cathari of France were for the most part strict Manichaeans, who believed in the existence of two eternal principles, each of which was regarded as the creator of a different world. The Patarini of Italy, on the other hand, held the evil principle to be simply a fallen angel, whom they called Satan and identified with the God of the Old Testament. Aside from this fundamental difference in their belief, both parties were agreed on most other points of doctrine. They believed in the migration of souls, and as a consequence forbade the killing of animals. Their worship consisted chiefly in the recital of the Lord's prayer, and all ecclesiastical ceremonies,

the sacraments, veneration of the saints, and the like, were rejected by them. Churches they regarded as useless, and therefore destroyed them wherever they could. They were opposed to all civil government; held oaths, capital punishment, and wars to be unlawful; disapproved of marriage, abstained from flesh-meat, and observed long fasts. However, these austerities were practiced only by the Perfect, who had received the *consolamentum* or spiritual baptism. The rank and file were allowed to indulge their sensual appetite to the fullest extent. For them it was sufficient to promise that they would receive the *consolamentum* at the hour of death.

As these sectaries caused great civil disorder as well as religious, and were moreover protected by powerful nobles, Pope Innocent III found it necessary to organize a crusade against them, and so come to the assistance of the persecuted Catholics. The conflict lasted for twenty long years, and led to much bloodshed on both sides. In the beginning milder measures had been used, and the prayers and preaching of St. Dominic had met with considerable success; but the awful ravages committed by the heretics made the use of force against them inevitable. Their power was at last broken, but only when the fair countryside had been changed to a desert. Even then many persevered in their error, and it was only the constant vigilance and severe measures of the Inquisition that finally succeeded in extirpating the sect completely.[8]

5. *The Waldensians.*— This sect, like so many others in the Middle Ages, sprang from the misdirected zeal of a well intentioned man. Its founder was a certain Waldes, a wealthy broker of Lyons in France. After reading the story of St. Alexius, he made up his mind to follow that holy man's example. Hence, about 1177, he disposed of his wealth, and became a poor preacher of penance. His object was to restore the simplicity of life which had distinguished the early Christians. In a short time he gathered around him numerous companions, and these he sent out to preach the gospel of poverty wherever they could get a hearing. Although ex-

[8] Cfr. Funk, op. cit. I, 350; Hefele, op. cit. V, 827 sqq.

pelled from Lyons, they were at first left unmolested by ecclesiastical authority. However, in 1184, Pope Lucius III excommunicated them together with other heretics. In this excommunication they are referred to as the Humiliati or Poor Men of Lyons.

Unlike the early Christians, whom they professed to imitate, these sectaries not only relinquished their possessions, but also avoided all manual labor, and therefore depended for their livelihood upon alms. But as their number increased very rapidly, this mode of existence became too precarious, and so they divided into two classes — the Perfect and the Believers. While the former complied strictly with the demands of absolute poverty, the latter were allowed to own worldly possessions. The Perfect bound themselves by the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, and thus in a manner constituted a religious association. At the same time, they were doctrinally unsound. They not only denied the lawfulness of oaths, of military service, and of the death penalty for criminals; but also rejected the doctrine of purgatory, of intercession for the dead, and of indulgences. Moreover the Italian branch maintained that the value of the sacraments depended on the personal sanctity of the minister, a view that had been condemned by the Church centuries before.

Under Innocent III serious efforts were made to reclaim these deluded men, and large numbers returned to the Church, but others persevered in their error. They were no longer satisfied with claiming Waldes as their founder, but contended that they were a remnant of the primitive Christians who had remained faithful to Apostolic traditions when, through the misdirected liberality of Constantine, the Church had fallen a victim to the seduction of wealth and power. In the sixteenth century most of them threw in their lot with the Reformers, and through these Waldensians many Protestants later on tried to establish their claim to Apostolic succession.[9]

6. *John Wiclif.*— Like many a self-constituted reformer before him and since, Wiclif started out with the laudable in-

[9] Cfr. Hefele, op. cit. V, 726 sqq.

tention of counteracting certain tendencies that threatened the purity of ecclesiastical life. Many of the clergy in his day were more intent upon the accumulation of wealth than upon the saving of souls. Against these he preached the poverty of Christ and the Apostles. Then, to destroy the evil at its root as he conceived it, he began to attack the Church's right to possess property, and advocated a state-supported clergy. He was especially violent in his denunciation of religious orders, many of which possessed vast estates and great wealth. From these polemics against abuses, real or imaginary, he by degrees passed over to attacks on monasticism as an institution and finally on the Papacy itself. To such lengths, however, he did not go until after the outbreak of the Western Schism in 1378. From that time forward till his death in 1384, he fell into many doctrinal errors; and these he spread all through England by means of wandering preachers, historically known as Lollards, that is, sowers of tares.

The teaching of Wiclif was condemned by two synods held in London, the one in May and the other in November of 1382. At the first two lists of propositions drawn from the writings of Wiclif were examined and condemned. The most important of the condemned errors are the following: (a) The substance of bread and wine remain after the consecration. (b) The accidents of bread and wine do not exist without a subject. (c) In the Holy Eucharist Christ is not really and truly present in the same sense that He is in heaven. (d) A priest or a bishop who is in the state of mortal sin cannot consecrate, baptize, or administer any other sacrament. (e) If a person is truly sorry for his sins, he has no need of confession. (f) When the Pope leads a wicked life, he loses all his power except such as he received from the Emperor. (g) For clerics to own temporal possessions is against the teaching of Holy Scriptures. (h) It is a sin to found religious orders, whether they own property or not. (i) Whoever belongs to a religious order is by that very fact excluded from the communion of saints.[10]

[10] Cfr. Hefele, op. cit. VI, p. 954 sqq.

After the second of these synods, Wiclif retired to his vicarage at Lutterworth, where he spent his remaining days in writing his chief work, entitled *Trialogus*. In this he develops his erroneous views on predestination, the Church, and the Holy Eucharist. God predestines men to eternal life irrespective of their merit, the Church is made up only of the predestined, and the substance of bread and wine remain in the Holy Eucharist together with the body and blood of Christ. Forty-five propositions, taken partly from this book and partly from his other writings, were condemned by the Council of Constance and by Pope Martin V.[11]

7. *John Hus.*— Owing to the severe measures taken both by the ecclesiastical and secular authorities, Wiclifism practically disappeared from England soon after its author's death. But it found a home on the continent, and especially in Bohemia, where it was ardently defended by John Hus. He was at the time professor at the University of Prague, and an eloquent preacher. He took over the entire teaching of Wiclif, except his error on the Holy Eucharist. In opposition to that he firmly maintained the doctrine of transubstantiation as taught by the Church. In 1403, the University of Prague condemned a number of Wiclifite theses, but this had little effect upon Hus and his fellow admirers of the English heretic. Then, in 1411, he himself was excommunicated, and every community that presumed to harbor him was threatened with an interdict. He, however, continued to preach as before, and in his justification appealed from the Pope to a general council. He had a staunch supporter in his friend, Jerome of Prague.

On the 5th of November, 1414, the Council of Constance, convened for the purpose of terminating the schism, held its first session. Hus had secured a "safe conduct" from Emperor Sigismund, and came to the Council without any misgivings as to the favorable issue of the case against him. He seems to have been firmly convinced that he was perfectly orthodox in his teaching. However, after a preliminary examination, he was imprisoned in a Dominican monastery,

[11] Mansi, 27, 1207 sqq.

where he remained from the 6th of December till Palm Sunday. A formal charge of heresy was brought against him in a general congregation of cardinals and bishops on the 5th of June, and was thereafter discussed in four different sessions of the Council. These discussions led to the formulation of thirty propositions, which Hus was called upon to retract.[12] As he constantly refused to do so, on the plea that he had never taught heretical doctrines and that he could not retract the truth without offending God, he was degraded from his priestly rank and handed over to the secular arm. The Emperor ordered him to be burned at the stake, and this sentence was carried out on the 6th of July, 1415. Although his friend, Jerome of Prague, met the same fate eleven months later, it was not until after twenty years of civil war that the Husite troubles in Bohemia were finally settled.[13]

Protestant writers frequently state that Wiclif and Hus were Prereformers, who began the work that Luther was destined to perfect in the sixteenth century. But as Loofs [14] and other Protestant dogmatic historians point out, all these so-called Prereformers rejected every fundamental principle upon which Protestantism is based. They went astray on particular doctrines, but clung tenaciously to the Catholic concept of salvation through the ministerial intervention of the Church instituted by Christ. Neither the right of private judgment in the interpretation of Scripture, nor the doctrine of justification through faith alone, formed either an essential or an integral part of any heresy before the sixteenth century. Yet the two together make up the very essence of Protestantism.

B — Mediæval Councils

What was said in the preceding section in regard to mediæval heresies, may here be applied to mediæval councils — they contributed very little to the development of dogma. Exclu-

[12] Ibid. 1209 sqq.

[13] Cfr. Hefele, op. cit. VII, 66–240.

[14] Dogmengeschichte, 635–658.

sive of the Council of Trent, which forms in a manner the dividing line between mediæval and modern times, ten ecumenical councils were held during the Middle Ages, and of these only five dealt to any considerable extent with doctrinal matter. They are the following: The Fourth Lateran (1215); the Second of Lyons (1274); the Council of Vienne (1311–1312); the Council of Constance (1414–1418), and the Council of Florence (1438–1445). And even these five were not convened for the purpose of giving dogmatic decisions; their primary object was either the promotion of the crusades, the settling of difficulties between Church and State, the reformation of discipline, the union of the East and West, or the termination of schisms. Furthermore, as will be shown in the following paragraphs, such dogmatic decisions as were given amounted to little more than restatements of what was already a matter of faith.

1. *The Fourth Lateran Council.*— In his letter of convocation, addressed to the bishops of Christendom, Pope Innocent III stated the purpose of the Council in these terms: "Two things I have especially at heart: The recovery of the Holy Land and the reformation of the whole Church." The attainment of this twofold object, therefore, was to constitute the chief topic of discussion and legislation. In accordance with the Pope's wishes, on November 11, 1215, four hundred and twelve bishops, some eight hundred abbots and priors, besides numerous substitutes of absent prelates, gathered in the Lateran Basilica to begin the work outlined for them by the Sovereign Pontiff. Only three sessions were held, in which seventy *capitula* were drawn up, containing definitions against heretics, a decree in reference to the next crusade, and disciplinary canons.[15] It is only of the first that a brief summary need be given in the present connection.

The chief heretics in question were the Cathari and Waldensians, of whom a short account has been given in the preceding section. In opposition to them, the Council drew up a creed which contained the Church's teaching on the various

[15] Cfr. Hefele, op. cit. V, 872 sqq.; Mansi, 22, 982 sqq.

points of doctrine either denied or distorted by the sectaries. The first part sets forth what is to be held in regard to the Blessed Trinity, and then specially emphasizes the fact that this triune God is the one sole principle of all created beings. All things whatsoever, material and spiritual, angels, men, and demons, were created by God; and as created by Him, they were all good; but some of them became evil through a perverse use of their free will.

The second part states the doctrine of the Incarnation, the properties of Christ's human nature, the work of the redemption, the Savior's death, resurrection and ascension into heaven. Then brief reference is made to the resurrection of the dead, the last judgment, and the eternity of heaven and hell.

The third part deals with the Church and the sacraments, which points were especially attacked by the Cathari. Particular mention is made of the Holy Sacrifice, in which Christ is both the sacrificing priest and the immolated victim. The bread and wine are "transubstantiated" into His body and blood, and this transubstantiation cannot be effected except by a duly ordained priest. In regard to baptism it is stated that the Trinitarian formula must be used, and that it is valid no matter by whom conferred. If any one falls into sin after baptism, he can always obtain forgiveness by means of true penance. Finally, the attainment of eternal life is possible, not only for those who observe virginal chastity, but also for all others who live in the married state.

In the second *capitulum* the teaching of Abbot Joachim on the Blessed Trinity is condemned. As was pointed out in another chapter,[16] Joachim contended against the Lombard that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are not one essence, one nature, or a *quaedam summa res*. The Council further defines that the Father is the *principium quod* as regards the generation of the Son, and that the Father and Son together are *principium quod* in respect to the procession of the Holy Spirit. This is followed by a rejection of the pantheistic

[16] Cfr. c. 4.

views of Amalric of Bene, as noted in the preceding section of this chapter. It is from this Council that the Inquisition dates its origin.

2. *The Second Council of Lyons.*— When Michael Palaeologus, in 1261, wrested Constantinople from its Latin Emperor Baldwin II, ecclesiastical union between East and West was again dissolved. It was principally to restore this union that Gregory X determined to convene a general council at which both the Greek and Latin Church should be represented, although ecclesiastical reform and recovery of the Holy Land were also to be considered. The Greek Emperor favored the plans of the Sovereign Pontiff, perhaps not so much from a desire of promoting the union as through hope of thereby obtaining much needed help against the dethroned Baldwin. At a synod held in Constantinople he succeeded in prevailing on the Greek bishops to subscribe to the following three points, which he considered essential to the union: Acknowledgment of the papal primacy, the right of appeal to Rome, and mentioning of the Pope's name in the liturgy. As regarded the *Filioque* clause of the Symbol, the bishops admitted that its dogmatic content could not be called in question, but its addition to the Symbol was against the ruling of the Council of Ephesus, and therefore was not to be tolerated.

On his part, the Pope sent a symbol of faith to the Emperor, in which, besides a general outline of Catholic teaching, were contained the various points of doctrine till then objected to by the schismatics. It stated the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, the unlawfulness of rebaptizing those who had already been baptized, the existence of purgatory and the efficacy of suffrages for the dead, the immediate reception into heaven of the departed who have fully satisfied for their sins, the septenary number of the sacraments, the validity of consecration whether fermented or unfermented bread is used, the lawfulness of second, third, or fourth marriages, and the indissolubility of the marriage bond during the lifetime of the contracting parties. Then followed a clear statement of the privileges of the Roman Church, the Pope's

universal jurisdiction, and his competency to decide questions of faith.[17]

In his answer to the Pope, Emperor Michael declared himself ready to accept the symbol as a sincere expression of his own belief, and wished to submit to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff. However, he asked as a favor that the Greek Church might be permitted to retain its own Creed, without the addition of the *Filioque* clause; and also its ecclesiastical rites, such as they had been before the schism. Finally, he added, the legates had been instructed to repeat and explain his personal declaration at the Council.[18] A similar declaration was made by the archbishops of the Eastern Church, promising to accept the proposed union, and to yield the Pope that reverence and obedience which had been customary before the schism.[19]

The Council opened on May 7, 1274, in the Cathedral of St. John. There were present about five hundred bishops, and over a thousand inferior prelates. St. Thomas was to have taken part in the Council as a theologian, but died on his way thither, at the early age of forty-nine. St. Bonaventure, on the other hand, was present at the first four sessions, and rendered such valuable services that the success of the Council was largely due to his efforts. But before the sixth and last session of the Council, he also died. It was early Sunday morning, July 15, and on the same day he was buried in the church of his religious brethren, the Minorites of Lyons. It is sometimes stated that he presided at the Council, but this is obviously a mistake, since the Pope himself was present at all the public sessions.

The Greek representatives did not arrive at Lyons until June 24. They took part in the Council for the first time on July 6, when the fourth session was held. On that occasion they abjured the schism, and declared that they and those whom they represented returned freely to the obedience of the Roman Church, accepting in all its parts the symbol of faith

[17] Mansi, 24, 70 A sqq.
[18] Ibid. 67.
[19] Ibid. 74.

that had been submitted to their consideration before the Council.[20] Thus the schism was healed, but only for a time. After the death of Emperor Michael, in 1282, the enemies of the union, of whom there were not a few both among the bishops and priests, brought his successor, Andronikus, over to their side and thereby the schism was renewed.

The Council closed with the sixth session, which was held on July 16. The work of the Council was summed up in thirty-one canons, nearly all of which deal with matters of discipline and reform. At the close of the last session, the Pope declared that two objects for which the Council had been convened had been attained — the union of Christendom and the taking of effective measures for the recovery of the Holy Land; but the third, the reformation of morals, was still in a very unsatisfactory condition. Then, with a prayer and his blessing, he dissolved the Council.

3. *The Council of Vienne.*— The Council held its first session on October 16, 1311, in the Cathedral of Vienne in France. In his opening address, Pope Clement V assigned the following three objects for the attainment of which the Council had been convened. 1. the settlement of the question whether the Knights Templar should be suppressed; 2. the procuring of assistance for the Holy Land; 3. the reformation of morals and of the clergy. The number of bishops present is uncertain. From some sources it appears that there were as many as three hundred, while according to others there were only one hundred and fourteen. The Pope himself presided.[21]

The suppression of the Knights Templar had been demanded by Philip the Fair of France. His ostensible reason was that the order had fallen away from its original purpose, and was utterly corrupt both as regarded morals and faith. He brought forward many witnesses to prove his point, but his motives were justly suspected; and historically the true state of things is even now far from being clearly understood. At all events, Pope Clement, with the concurrence of the Council, suppressed the order and assigned its temporalities to the

[20] Cfr. Hefele, op. cit. VI, 141.

[21] Cfr. Hefele, op. cit. VI, 515 sqq.

Knights of St. John. He took every possible measure to be just to all concerned, but the story of the suppression does not make pleasant or edifying reading.

The doctrinal decisions of the Council were occasioned by certain accusations brought against Peter John Olivi, and by the errors of the Beghards and Beguines. John Olivi was a learned and pious Franciscan, who put forward somewhat extreme and partly untenable views on religious poverty. This brought upon him the enmity of some of his own brethren, who in consequence accused him also of other doctrinal errors. The matter was first examined into by a commission appointed by the Superior General of the Franciscans, with the result that thirty-four propositions taken from Olivi's writings were censured as rash and dangerous. Olivi defended himself, and denied the authority of the commission to decide in matters of doctrine. Then the discussion was taken up by the Council, but only three of the thirty-four propositions were selected for further investigation. They are the following: 1, that Christ was still living when the soldier pierced His side with a spear; 2, that the rational soul is not of itself — *per se* — the form of the body; 3, that children do not receive sanctifying grace and the infused virtues in baptism. The first two were condemned, but the third was declared to be less probable than the contrary view.[22]

Against the Beghards and Beguines two canons were drawn up, the first of which condemns their manner of life, while the second points out and censures their errors. These are in substance as follows: 1. It is possible to acquire so high a degree of perfection here on earth as to become impeccable, and altogether incapable of further increase in sanctity. 2. Those who have acquired this degree of perfection are no longer bound to fast or pray, and can freely indulge the inclinations of the body. 3. Such persons are not subject to any authority, not even to that of the Church. 4. They enjoy here on earth the same happiness as the blessed in heaven. 5. Rational nature is of itself capable of enjoying the beatific

[22] Mansi, 25, 410 E sq.

vision, and needs not the light of glory in order to see God. 6. To practice virtue is a matter that belongs exclusively to the imperfect. 7. To kiss a woman is a mortal sin, because nature does not incline thereto; but to satisfy the lusts of the flesh is not a sin, because that is according to nature. 8. It is an imperfection to reverence the body of Christ when it is elevated during Mass, because this interferes with the perfection of contemplation.[23]

4. *The Council of Constance.*— The primary purpose of this Council was to terminate the Western Schism. That schism had grown out of the contested election of Urban VI, who succeeded Gregory XI on April 8, 1378. As far as can now be determined, the election was valid. For although there was during the conclave a great popular outcry for an Italian Pope, still the freedom of the cardinals was not interfered with; and when the election was over, all of them spontaneously offered their homage to the new Pontiff. It was not until several weeks after the coronation, when Urban had already proved himself a stern master, that some of the disappointed cardinals began to feel that they had been unduly influenced in their choice by fear of the people. When it became evident that Urban was bent upon carrying out his strict views, the majority of the Sacred College repudiated his election as invalid, and on September 20 chose Robert of Geneva as the new Pope. He took the name of Clement VII.

Although the greater part of Christendom remained faithful to Urban, nevertheless France and a few other countries recognized Clement as the lawful successor of St. Peter, and thus the schism was started. When Urban died in 1389, he was succeeded by Boniface IX; and when Clement died in 1394, he received a successor in the person of Benedict XIII. Thus Rome and Avignon divided the Christian world into two obediences. Boniface was to all appearances the true Pope, and so was Gregory XII who succeeded him in 1406; but many learned and holy men yielded obedience to Benedict. Matters became even worse when the Council of Pisa, in 1409, at-

[23] Ibid. 410 A.

tempted to depose the two rivals and in their place elected Alexander V. As neither Gregory nor Benedict recognized the authority of the Council, the result was a third claimant of the Papal crown; and although Alexander died within a year after his election, his place was taken by John XXIII.

It was whilst ecclesiastical affairs were in this state of utter confusion that the Council of Constance was convened. The initiative was taken by the cardinals of all three obediences, whose plans for a reunion of Christendom were strongly supported by Emperor Sigismund. Of the three Popes, John alone had been induced to give a reluctant consent to the calling of a general council, while Gregory and Benedict steadfastly refused to countenance any movement in that direction. Hence if Gregory was the true Pope, as is practically certain that he was, the Council was simply an illegitimate gathering of prelates, who had no authority to legislate for the whole Church. It was only when after the resignation of Gregory, and the deposition of Benedict and John as doubtful Popes, Martin V was validly elected, that the Council became legitimate. By that time forty-two sessions had already been held, and several doctrinal decisions had been given, all of which were necessarily without force until approved by the new Pope.[24] The election of Pope Martin took place on November 8, 1417, just three years after the opening of the Council.

The doctrinal decisions above referred to bore chiefly on the errors of Wiclif and Hus, and they were embodied in the condemnation of these same errors by the Pope, as contained in the Bulls *Inter cunctas* and *In eminentis,* published February 22, 1418.[25] Hence there can be no doubt as regards their validity.

Considerable discussion was subsequently caused in regard to the proposition that a general council has its authority immediately from God, and that it is superior to the Pope. This view was adopted and promulgated in the fourth and fifth sessions, but at the time the Council was still illegitimate, and therefore incapable of defining matters of faith. Further-

[24] Cfr. Hefele, op. cit. VII, 66 sqq.; Salembier, The Great Schism of the West, 275 sqq.

[25] Mansi, 27, 1207 E sqq.

more, subsequent Roman Pontiffs always repudiated the doctrine as unorthodox; and Martin V, at the close of the Council, approved only in a general way what had been enacted by conciliar procedure in matters of faith — *in materia fidei conciliariter statuta.* It is, moreover, quite probable that the Council merely intended its declaration to meet a special difficulty, and therefore to have only temporary force.[26]

5. *The Council of Florence.*— One of the means chosen by the Council of Constance to bring about a reformation of morals, and also to counteract the ever increasing heretical tendencies of the times, was the frequent convening of general councils. It was determined that the next one should be called after five years, the one after that seven years later, and thereafter one should be held every ten years. This legislation had been agreed upon before the election of the new Pope, and it was obviously inspired by a distrust of the Papacy, which in its turn had been engendered by the sad experience of the forty years of schism before the Council. Although Pope Martin had bound himself by no personal pledge in this matter, he called a council at Pavia in 1423, which, owing to an epidemic, was shortly after transferred to Sienna. It accomplished practically nothing, and was dissolved in the spring of 1424.

The next council was convened at Basle, but before it met Martin V had passed away. He was succeeded by Eugenius IV. The Council held its first session in 1431, under the presidency of Cardinal Cesarini. But as nothing was accomplished, the Pope resolved to transfer it to an Italian city. This occasioned a restatement of the claim advanced at Constance, that general councils are superior to the Pope. Matters were allowed to drag on till 1437, when the Pope dissolved the Council. Its refractory members, however, continued to hold sessions, and in 1439 even elected an anti-Pope who took the name of Felix V. Meanwhile the Greeks had again applied for reunion, and to facilitate negotiations for this purpose, the Pope convened a council at Ferrara in 1438. After much useless discussion, which only showed the unwillingness of the

[26] Cfr. Funk, Kirchengeschichtliche Abhandlungen, I, 489 sqq.; Salembier, op. cit. 306.

Greeks to yield a whole-hearted submission to the Holy See, the Council was transferred to Florence.

There the same discussion was taken up again, with the result that finally an agreement was reached which apparently satisfied both parties. The Greeks admitted, as their forefathers had done at the Second Council of Lyons, that the Latin teaching on the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son was perfectly orthodox. An understanding was also reached on the four other points that had formed a matter of controversy — purgatory, the commencement of the beatific vision as soon as souls are purified from their sins, the use of unleavened bread in the Eucharist, and the primacy of the Roman Church. After this the union was once more established, and the Pope embodied the five points referred to in the Bull *Laetantur coeli,* which was published with the concurrence of the Council, July 6, 1439. However, the union was destined to be almost as shortlived as that which had been established at Lyons, nearly two hundred years before. It appears that the Greeks were animated by political motives rather than by the desire of being in communion with the Holy See. Hence, when the Turks, in 1453, took Constantinople, the schism was renewed.[27]

After the departure of the Greek representatives, the Council also received the submission of the Armenians and the Jacobites, on each of which occasions a doctrinal decree was issued, setting forth many points of teaching in regard to which conformity was required.[28] The Council was dissolved in 1445, after it had been transferred from Florence to the Lateran at Rome.

[27] Cfr. Hefele, op. cit. VII, 426 sqq.

[28] Cfr. DB. 695 sqq.; 703 sqq.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION: THE COUNCIL OF TRENT[1]

Centuries before Luther was born, the reformation of the Church in her head and members had been earnestly desired and repeatedly attempted by Popes and councils. Side by side with the strong faith and genuine piety of the Middle Ages, there was a widespread corruption of morals and a corresponding laxity of discipline. There was urgent need of a reformation, and this need was universally felt; but it was to be a reformation of practice, not of belief. The faith of the Church had ever been preserved in its pristine purity, and at the time of Luther's revolt her teaching was orthodox in every respect. Unfortunately, it was precisely her faith and her teaching that were finally made the chief objects of attack, and consequently what was at first heralded as a reformation of her morals ended in a revolt against her authority. The genesis of this revolt and the checks opposed to it by the Church form the subject matter of the present chapter.

A — The Protestant Reformation

That at the beginning of the sixteenth century there was a combination of circumstances which favored a religious upheaval, or a breaking away from ecclesiastical authority, is today conceded by all impartial students of church history. In the first place, respect for the authority of the Pope had been considerably weakened during the forty years of the Western

[1] Cfr. Grisar, Luther, especially vol. I; Denifle, Luther und Lutherthum; Moehler, Symbolism; *Gairdner Lollardy and the Reformation in England; *Schaff, Creeds of Christendom; Schwane, Histoire des Dogmes, VI; Hefele, Conciliengeschichte, VIII, IX; Swoboda, Das Concil von Trient.

Schism. The Papacy, which till then, in spite of the shortcomings of individual Popes, had been universally regarded with the greatest reverence, lost much of its ancient prestige through the divided obedience of the Christian world. The unseemly spectacle of rival claimants anathematizing one another and clinging desperately to the entirely human ambition of occupying the first place, did not a little towards shaking men's confidence in the divine shepherding of Christ's vicar on earth. Hence the growing tendency, first manifested at the Council of Constance, to subordinate the Pope's authority to that of a general council. The Pope was still regarded as the vicar of Christ; but, in the opinion of not a few, he was a vicar who needed watching and from whose decisions one might appeal to a higher court.

Another factor that prepared men's minds for the sixteenth-century revolt is found in the decay of Scholasticism, and in the consequent low ebb of theological learning. This condition was not universal, but it was widespread. The idle speculations and senseless quibblings of the Nominalists had replaced the comprehensive and deep studies of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure. Ockam, Gregory of Rimini, and Gabriel Biel were regarded by many as the highest authorities in the theological world; and they were at best unsafe guides. They discredited the ability of human reason to discern the truth even in its own legitimate sphere of mental activity, and in consequence they clung blindly to the teaching of the Church. As a result, when that authority was impugned, at least so far as it resided in the Pope, there was practically nothing left but recourse to the Scriptures read and interpreted by the individual under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. Thus the way was opened for the introduction of the fundamental principles of Protestantism, the right of private judgment in matters of faith.

As a third factor in bringing about a religious cataclysm, although of somewhat subordinate importance, we may assign the paganizing tendency of the Renaissance. The revival of classical learning brought with it a love of pagan ideals, and these ideals were all too often made the standard of moral

conduct. They corrupted both mind and heart, and sapped the very foundation of Christianity. And what made the effect all the more terrible and far-reaching, even if it did not directly touch the masses, was the fact that many of those who fell victims to the new paganism belonged to the ranks of the clergy. In the past not a few priests and bishops had given scandal by their loose morality; but even they, as a general rule, had preserved the faith; whereas now, where Humanism had done its work, even faith was lost, and with the loss of faith all respect for ecclesiastical authority was at an end. This explains the numerous defections of the clergy when the religious revolt was started. It was not only immorality that drove them into the camps of the innovators, although that too had much to do with it; but also the fact that they had already suffered shipwreck in the faith as taught by the Church.

With the ground thus prepared, there was nothing strange about the success that attended Luther's preaching of revolt against ecclesiastical authority. Whatever may have been his personal motives at the beginning of his career as a reformer, it was not a reformation of morals that constituted his life work, nor a purifying of the faith from human accrescences, as he tried to plead in his own justification; it was neither more nor less than an attempt to substitute a new religion for the Christianity that had been preached by the Apostles and handed down by the Church. And for such a substitution the ground had been prepared by the various agencies briefly indicated in the preceding paragraphs.

There is no need, in this place, of studying the psychological processes by which Luther was led to the adoption of his two fundamental principles; the right of private judgment in matters of faith and justification by faith alone. That belongs rather to his personal history, and has been admirably done by Hartmann Grisar in his monumental work referred to at the beginning of the present chapter. It suffices to state that these two principles formed the doctrinal basis of the whole movement, and were adopted by all other so-called reformers, no matter how much they might differ from Luther's views

in regard to other points of doctrine. It must be added, however, that the first principle — the right of private judgment — was admitted only to a limited extent. Each particular leader claimed its unlimited use for himself, but at the same time he denied it to all others. Hence the constant wrangling among the representatives of the reform movement, and the bitter invectives they hurled at each other in their doctrinal disputes. On the other hand, the second principle — justification by faith alone — was admitted by all.

The root of this principle is found in the superficial and inaccurate views on justification defended by the Nominalists. While they admitted the teaching of the Church that man is justified by the infusion of sanctifying grace, and that good works performed in the state of grace are meritorious of a supernatural reward, they held that all this was simply the result of a positive ordination on the part of God. In itself, according to their teaching, grace as understood by the Church is superfluous for salvation. For everything depends on God's will, and it is only by reason of His acceptation that any action is deserving of a supernatural reward.

It was in this school of theological thought that Luther himself had received his training, and he pushed its principles to their last conclusion. Only through the merits of Christ is justification possible, and that only in so far as God accepts them as our own. This He will do if we place our full confidence in Him, and thus appropriate by faith what belongs to Christ. No interior change is thereby wrought in us, save only as regards the attitude of our will towards God. Hence neither the sacraments nor good works have any direct connection with justification; it is faith alone, in the sense of trust and confidence, that justifies us in the sight of God.

This view on justification had been worked out by Luther, at least in all its essentials, as early as 1516; but it was not until 1520 that he openly stated the final conclusion of his system in the words: "A Christian who believes cannot, even if he should so wish, lose his soul by any sin however great; since no sin, except unbelief, can damn him." Meanwhile, in his ninety-five theses affixed to the door of the university

church of Wittenberg, he had taken his public stand against the Church's teaching on indulgences. Ostensibly he aimed his attack merely at abuses connected with the preaching of indulgences, but in reality it was the doctrine itself that he had in view. Hence the statement made by him in course of the controversy that ensued: "Let us hold to this, that an indulgence is not what the Pope declares it; and if an angel from heaven says otherwise, he is not to be believed." And by way of argument he urged the claim advanced by St. Paul: "I have from God all I teach;" but unlike St. Paul, he had no way of establishing his claim.

When Leo X, who then occupied the pontifical chair, was informed of the threatening situation in Germany, he offered Luther the alternative of retracting, or of presenting himself for trial at Rome. However, through the intervention of Luther's friend and protector, the elector of Saxony, Cardinal Cajetan was sent to Germany with full power to decide the case. Luther was dissatisfied with the decision given, and appealed "from Leo ill informed to Leo better informed;" and a few days later, realizing the hopelessness of his case, he appealed to a future general council. Leo fully understood the gravity of the situation, but was anxious to avoid extreme measures; hence, when he published the Bull on indulgences, wherein he set forth the Catholic doctrine, he made no mention of Luther's name.

The following year, 1519, a doctrinal discussion was arranged to be held at Leipzig, between Eck, a professor of Ingolstadt, and Carlstadt, Luther's former teacher. Luther himself was also present, and in the course of the dispute denied that the primacy was of divine institution and that general councils were infallible. This he followed up with the publication of three pamphlets. The first of these was an appeal "To the Christian Nobles of the German Nation," which was intended to stir up the princes against the Church. The second was entitled, "On the Babylonian Captivity," and in it he rejected the Sacrifice of the Mass and all the sacraments except baptism and the Eucharist. The third contained a summary of his own teaching under the title, "Of Christian

Liberty." This latter he sent to the Pope, together with a flattering personal letter.

Leo's answer was the Bull *Exsurge Domine,* which condemned Luther's teaching and demanded a retraction within sixty days, threatening excommunication in case he failed to retract. When Luther received this bull, he publicly committed it to the flames at Wittenberg, with the words: "As thou hast troubled the saints of the Lord, so may the everlasting fire trouble and consume thee." Then he published the pamphlet entitled, "Against the Bull of Antichrist," in which he calls the Pope "a damned obstinate heretic." Summoned to appear before the imperial diet held at Worms in 1521, he was given another opportunity to retract; but, backed up by the revolutionary freebooters under Franz von Sickingen and Ulrich von Hutten, he refused. Then the ban of the empire was placed upon him, but he found safety in the Wartburg.

Thus the die was cast, and the religious revolution which was destined to drag away vast numbers from the Church of Christ had become an accomplished fact. Of the further development of that revolution only this much need be said in the present connection, that Luther's claim to a divine mission was advanced by many others, with the result that reformer was pitted against reformer, and thus the non-Catholic religious world became a veritable chaos. What one affirmed, the other denied; and soon there were almost as many opinions in the revolutionary camps as there were heads. Out of this chaos, however, three great Protestant bodies emerged, the Lutheran, the Calvinist, and the Anglican, which, together with a number of smaller sects, in course of time claimed the greater part of Northern Europe as their own. The chief points of their heretical teaching may be briefly outlined as follows.

1. *Holy Scripture.*— The only source of divine revelation is the written word of God as contained in the Bible. The Bible, moreover, does not include the deutero-canonical books, that is, those books whose divine origin and inspiration were at first called in question by some, but which were finally recognized by the whole Church as sacred, canonical, and inspired. However, later Protestants usually include in their

canon the deutero-canonical books of the New Testament. Furthermore, the Bible is to be interpreted, not according to the authority of the Church, but according to the private judgment of each individual believer, assisted by the direct inward illumination of the Holy Spirit.

2. *Original Sin.*— Our first parents were constituted in the state of original justice, which consisted of certain high and noble gifts wherewith the souls of Adam and Eve were endowed; but these gifts were natural and essential to perfect human nature. Hence by the fall, in which original justice was lost, human nature was essentially corrupted and the soul was deprived of perfections that belonged to its natural integrity. In consequence, original sin is an essential corruption of our nature, and as irremovable as that nature itself. Some of the Reformers defined it as "the very substance of fallen man," but the majority agreed with Calvin that it is "the hereditary depravity and corruption of our nature, which first made us worthy of God's wrath, and also produces in us works which Scripture calls works of the flesh." [2]

3. *Free Will.*— Luther asserted that man never had a free will, whereas Calvin maintained that free will was lost by the fall. Moreover, according to both, the fall was due to an irresistible necessity and divine predestination. As man has no free will, there is no room for merit; and so-called good works have no relation to man's eternal salvation. Nay, in so far as they are the works of man, they are positively sinful — they are venial sins in the case of believers, and mortal sins in the case of unbelievers. Moreover, the observance of the divine precepts, even by the just, is an impossibility.

4. *Grace and justification.*— As man's nature is essentially corrupt, grace and justification do not consist in an interior supernatural quality, but are simply the pardon of sin and the imputation of the merits of Christ. Both are obtained by a firm confidence in the goodness and mercy of God, resulting in an absolute conviction and positive assurance that all sins have been forgiven. According to Luther, justification

[2] Instit. I, 2, c. 1, n. 8.

is so completely the work of God that man is entirely passive; whereas Calvin admitted the active coöperation of man, but only under an irresistible and invincible divine impulse.

5. *Predestination.*— As justification is entirely the work of God, without free coöperation on the part of man, it necessarily implies the doctrine of absolute and unqualified predestination. And this doctrine was at first commonly admitted by the Reformers; but it was afterwards abandoned by all except Calvin. The latter made it a fundamental doctrine of his theological system. He defines it as follows: "We call predestination the eternal decree of God, by which He determined what He willed to be done with every man. For all are not created in a like condition, but to some is preordained eternal life, to others eternal damnation. Hence according as each one is created for one or the other end, we say that he is predestined to life or to death." [3] Yet God is not unjust or cruel in regard to the reprobate; for "those whom He devotes to damnation are by a just and blameless but incomprehensible judgment shut off from all access to life." [4] Hence they can have no real faith, nor are they ever justified, nor did Christ die for their salvation.[5]

6. *The Sacraments.*— From their erroneous concept of justification, the Reformers were logically led to the rejection of the sacraments as means or causes of grace. Hence they considered them only as pledges of the divine promises for the remission of sins, and means of confirming man's faith in this remission. Moreover, of the seven sacraments admitted by the Church, they retained only two: Baptism and the Lord's Supper. Furthermore, according to Calvin, the efficacy of these two sacraments is restricted to the elect. In regard to the Eucharist all were agreed that the doctrine of transubstantiation must be rejected. The Real Presence was also denied by all except Luther, who favored the theory of impanation; but even according to him, Christ is not really present in the Eucharist except at the moment of communion. The laity as well as the officiating minister must receive com-

[3] Op. cit. I, 3, c. 2, n. 5.
[4] Ibid. n. 7.
[5] Ibid.

munion under both kinds. The Eucharist is not a sacrifice, and therefore the Mass as a sacrificial rite must be abolished.

7. *The Church.*— As the Reformers rejected all the sacraments except baptism and the Eucharist, there is no Christian priesthood as understood by Catholics. On the other hand, every Christian is both priest and teacher; and it is only for the sake of order and greater efficiency that ministers are appointed by the congregation. Hence the Church is not an hierarchical institution, but is simply an association of equals who acknowledge Christ as their head. Moreover, the real Church of Christ is invisible, or at least was so for centuries until the rise of Protestantism. The Pope, like any other minister, simply holds a place of honor; he has no jurisdiction over the faithful.

8. *The Communion of Saints.*— As justification is obtained by faith alone, there is no bond of prayer and helpfulness uniting all the children of God into one body. Hence neither must we pray for the dead nor invoke the saints. There is no other mediator besides Christ, and through Him each individual believer has direct access to God. Furthermore, as faith justifies man perfectly in the sight of God, there can be no purgatory, nor is there room for indulgences; all this must be swept away as so much popish invention.[6]

From this brief summary it will be seen that Protestantism differs from all preceding heresies. In the centuries that went before, heretics had denied one or other doctrine of the Church, but, with the sole exception of Arius, left the Christian religion as such untouched. The Reformers, on the other hand, brought about a fundamental change in that religion. Practically very little was retained of the Church's teaching aside from her doctrine on God, the Blessed Trinity, and the divinity of Christ. And in course of time, even in regard to these, errors sprang up that tended to sweep away the last vestige of Christianity. Nor was this merely an accidental outcome of the revolutionary movement initiated by Luther; it was the logical result of his rejection of ecclesiastical authority in matters of faith and morals.

[6] Cfr. Moehler, op. cit.

B — The Council of Trent

Throughout their contention with Rome, Luther and his followers appealed from the Pope to a general council; but when after many difficulties and delays the council finally met, they refused to attend. Their excuse was, though not expressed in these precise terms, that they would not be allowed to act as judges of the faith. It was with them no longer a question of arriving at the truth on the points under discussion, but solely of how they might most effectively impose their views on the rest of Christendom. Hence if their own cause was judged in their absence, it was entirely their own fault.

The Council was convened by Paul III, and opened at Trent on December 13, 1545. After the eighth session, 1547, it was transferred to Bologna, where it was prorogued in 1549. In 1551, Pope Julius III transferred it back to Trent, but it was suspended the following year. Again reassembled at Trent in 1561, it concluded its sessions there in 1563 and was dissolved. The final decrees were signed by 252 members, whereas at the first session only 40 bishops had been present.

Protestant writers usually contend that the Council met for the sole purpose of counteracting the movement set on foot by the Reformers; but this contention is not based on facts as known to history. Its purpose was not only to condemn error, but also to define the truth. Hence not only its canons, but its capitula also contain definitions of doctrine. There was at the time need of a definite exposition of Catholic teaching, and that exposition was given in clear and explicit terms. Besides, the Council was also called to effect a thorough reformation of discipline and morals, which object was altogether independent of the disturbance caused by Luther and his associates. Hence the work of defining the faith and reforming discipline proceeded side by side from the beginning of the Council to the end. On the other hand, most of the definitions of the Council were occasioned by the errors of the day; but the contents of these definitions are simply a clear statement of Catholic teaching irrespective of all errors. They are the witness of the Holy Spirit to the cause of truth.

The various dogmatic and disciplinary decrees were passed in the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 13th, 14th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, and 25th sessions. With regard to matters of faith, which alone need be considered in the present connection, the particular doctrine in question is usually first stated in a positive form and embodied in a *capitulum* or chapter, and then the contrary errors are condemned in the canons that follow. A brief summary of the Council's teaching is here subjoined.

1. *Holy Scripture and Tradition* (sess. 4).— The Council first lays down the principle that the Catholic faith is contained both "in written books and in the unwritten traditions which were received by the Apostles from the lips of Jesus Christ Himself, or were transmitted, after a manner of speaking, from hand to hand by the Apostles themselves from the dictation of the Holy Ghost, and have come down to us." Next the Canon of Scripture is promulgated. It contains all the deutero-canonical books rejected by the Reformers, and is identical with that of Pope Damasus published at the end of the fourth century. Then the Council declares that it "receives and venerates with like sentiments of piety and reverence all the books of the Old and New Testaments, for the one God is the author of both; and also the traditions relating to faith and morals, as having been dictated either orally by Christ, or by the Holy Ghost, and preserved by an unbroken succession in the Catholic Church. Furthermore, all are anathematized who refuse to receive, as sacred and canonical, these books in their entirety and with all their parts, as they have been wont to be read in the Catholic Church and are found in the old Latin Vulgate edition." Lastly, it is stated that it is the exclusive right and duty of the Church to pass judgment on the true sense and interpretation of the Sacred Writings.

2. *Original Sin* (sess. 5).— Leaving undecided the dispute between the Thomists and Scotists, as to whether Adam was created in the state of grace or elevated thereto subsequent to his creation, the Council puts its teaching on original sin in the form of anathematisms, which state the Catholic doctrine and at the same time condemn the contrary errors. However, no clear definition of original sin itself is given, although

all the elements of such a definition are stated. The following are the most important points contained in the decree.

(a) "If any one does not confess that the first man, Adam, when he had transgressed the commandment of God in paradise, immediately lost the holiness and justice wherein he had been constituted; and that he incurred, through the offense of that prevarication, the wrath and indignation of God, and consequently death, with which God had previously threatened him, and, together with death, captivity under his power who thenceforth *had the empire of death, that is to say, the devil,* and that the entire Adam, through that offense of prevarication, was changed, in body and soul, for the worse; let him be anathema."

(b) "If any one asserts, that the prevarication of Adam injured himself alone, and not his posterity; and that the holiness and justice, received from God, which he lost, he lost for himself alone, and not for us also; or that he, being defiled by the sin of disobedience, has only transferred death, and pains of the body, into the whole human race, but not sin also, which is the death of the soul; let him be anathema."

(c) "If any one asserts, that the sin of Adam — which in its origin is one, and being transfused into all by propagation, not by imitation, is in each one as his own — is taken away either by the power of human nature, or by any other remedy than the merit of *one mediator, our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath reconciled us to God in his own blood, made unto us justice, sanctification, and redemption;* or if he denies that the said merit of Jesus Christ is applied, both to adults and to infants, by the sacrament of baptism rightly administered in the form of the Church; let him be anathema."

(d) "If any one denies that infants, newly born from their mothers' wombs, even though they be sprung from baptized parents, are to be baptized; or says that they are baptized indeed for the remission of sins, but that they derive nothing of original sin from Adam, which has need of being expiated by the laver of regeneration for the obtaining of life everlasting — whence it follows as a consequence, that in them the

form of baptism, for the remission of sins, is understood to be not true, but false —; let him be anathema."

(e) "If any one denies, that, by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, which is conferred in baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted; or even asserts that the whole of that which has the true and proper nature of sin is not taken away; but says that it is only canceled, or not imputed; let him be anathema. For in those who are born again, there is nothing that God hates; . . . so that there is nothing whatever to retard their entrance into heaven. But this holy Synod confesses and holds that in those who are baptized there remains concupiscence, or an incentive to sin; which while it is left as an occasion of struggle, cannot injure those who consent not, but resist manfully by the grace of Jesus Christ; yea, he who shall have *striven lawfully shall be crowned.* This concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the holy Synod declares that the Catholic Church has never understood to be called sin, as being truly and properly sin in those born again, but because it is of sin, and inclines to sin. And if any one holds the contrary, let him be anathema."

(f) "The same holy Synod doth nevertheless declare, that it is not its intention to include in this decree, where original sin is treated of, the blessed and immaculate Virgin Mary, the Mother of God; but that the constitutions of Pope Sixtus IV, of happy memory, are to be observed, under the penalties contained in the said constitutions, which it renews."[7]

3. *Justification* (sess. 6).— As the Protestant error on justification was most fundamental, the Council discussed this point in all its details. Justification is described as "the transference of man from the state in which he is born as the son of the first Adam, to the state of grace and adoption of the sons of God through the second Adam, Jesus Christ, our Saviour." This transference is effected by means of the sacrament of baptism, received in deed or at least in desire.[8]

In the case of adults, the first motion towards justification is the work of God, who by His grace calls and moves the

[7] Cfr. DB. 787 sqq. [8] Ibid. 796.

sinner to repentance; but man must freely coöperate with the grace that is given. Then God continues the work, in as much as He offers His grace, which enables the sinner to elicit acts of faith, holy fear, and hope; and also to begin to love God as the fount of all justice, to be sorry for his sins, and to resolve to be baptized and to begin a new life, having the firm purpose to observe all the commandments of God.[9]

After this preparation, justification itself takes place. It does not consist in the imputation of the merits of Christ, nor merely in the remission of sins, but in an inward sanctification and renewal through the reception of the gifts of habitual grace and the virtues of faith, hope, and charity. These gifts are infused into the soul by God through the merits of Christ and the instrumentality of the sacrament of baptism. They are permanent gifts, in the sense that they inhere in the soul until destroyed by sin. Faith alone does not justify, but it is the indispensable beginning, basis, and root of justification. If not accompanied by hope and charity, it is profitless and dead. It is, moreover, not identical with confidence in God's goodness or the assurance that our sins have been forgiven through the merits of Christ. Furthermore, we cannot know with the certainty of faith that we are in the state of grace; for we never have the absolute assurance that we complied in every respect with the conditions upon which our justification was made to depend.[10]

Once justified, man is capable of performing meritorious works, which lead to an increase of sanctifying grace and give him a title to an eternal reward. With God's help he is able to observe the divine precepts, and to this he is strictly obliged under pain of sin. By an abuse of his free will, he can refuse to coöperate with the grace of God, and thus again fall away from the state of justification. Moreover, without a special privilege, such as was granted to the Blessed Virgin, he cannot throughout his life avoid all venial sins. But, on the other hand, it is heretical to say that every good work of the just is in itself sinful, though not imputed to him unto

[9] Ibid. 797, 798; cfr. 813, 814, 818, 819.

[10] Ibid. 799, 802, 819, 824.

damnation. And it is an error to hold that good works are vitiated by the hope of an eternal reward; or that the sorrow for sins which springs from the motive of fear is not good and praiseworthy.[11]

Even the just have no certain knowledge of their predestination to eternal life, or of their final perseverance, unless this has been specially revealed to them by God. No one can persevere without God's special help; but he must have confidence in the divine assistance, which he can always obtain by prayer. The grace of justification is given, not to the elect only, but to others also; nor has God predestined any one to damnation.[12]

Justification may be lost, not only by the sin of infidelity, but by any other grievous sin. It can be recovered in the sacrament of penance, which was instituted as a remedy against sins committed after baptism. The worthy reception of this sacrament requires sorrow for sins, a purpose of amendment, absolution, and the will to render satisfaction for the temporal punishment which often remains due to sins after the guilt and eternal punishment have been remitted. Sanctifying grace is lost by every mortal sin; but faith is lost only by the sin of heresy or infidelity. Those who have faith without charity are yet to be regarded as Christians.[13]

4. *The Sacraments in General: Baptism and Confirmation* (sess. 7).— As a means by which the grace of justification is first bestowed, then increased, and also restored after having been lost by sin, our Lord Jesus Christ instituted the seven sacraments of the New Law; and these sacraments differ from those of the Old Law, not only in their external rites and ceremonies, but also in their efficacy. This efficacy is derived from their institution, in as much as Christ meant them to be practical signs or instrumental causes of grace. Hence they do not merely excite the faith or devotion of the recipient, but in a true sense confer the grace which God himself produces in the soul. Moreover, their efficacy is independent of the faith and merit of the minister; grace is conferred *ex opere*

[11] Ibid. 803, 804, 818, 828–830.
[12] Ibid. 805, 806, 825–827, 832.
[13] Ibid. 807, 808, 837–840.

operato, through the merits of Christ. However, in the recipient certain dispositions are required in order to fit him for the reception of grace.[14]

Some sacraments are necessary means of grace for all; others only for certain classes of persons. However, even the former are not all of equal necessity; nor are all the sacraments of equal dignity. For their proper administration a duly appointed minister is required, on whose part nothing more is necessary, by way of validity, than the use of the essential rite instituted by Christ, with the intention of at least doing what the Church does.[15] Three sacraments, baptism, confirmation, and orders, imprint a character or indelible spiritual seal on the soul; hence they cannot be repeated.[16]

Baptism is necessary for salvation. The matter required for its validity is natural water. Christian baptism is essentially different from that of John the Baptist. It can be validly administered by heretics. Infants also must be baptized; nor may their baptism be repeated when they have reached the age of reason. They are truly enrolled among the faithful, and they are not at liberty later on to repudiate the obligations of their baptismal vows.[17]

Confirmation is not a mere empty ceremony that originated in the catechetical examinations to which Christian youths were of old subjected. It is a true sacrament in the strict sense of the term. A bishop only is its ordinary minister.[18]

5. *The Sacrament of the Holy Eucharist* (sess. 13).—"In the first place, the holy Synod teaches, and openly and simply professes, that in the august sacrament of the Holy Eucharist, after the consecration of the bread and wine, our Lord Jesus Christ, true God and man, is truly, really, and substantially contained under the species of these sensible things." The sacrament was instituted by the Savior when He was about to depart out of this world to the Father, that He might leave us a memorial of His passion, a sovereign remedy and pro-

[14] Ibid. 844–856.
[15] Ibid. 846, 853, 854.
[16] Ibid. 852.
[17] Ibid. 857–870.
[18] Ibid. 871–873.

tection against sin, and a most efficacious means of grace. It is the spiritual food and life of the soul, the symbol and bond of unity and charity, and a pledge of eternal glory.[19]

"The most Holy Eucharist has indeed this in common with the rest of the sacraments, that it is a symbol of a sacred thing, and is a visible form of an invisible grace; but there is found in the Eucharist this excellent and peculiar thing, that the other sacraments have then first the power of sanctifying when one uses them, whereas in the Eucharist, before being used, there is present the Author of sanctity Himself. . . . And this faith has ever been in the Church of God, that, immediately after the consecration, the veritable body of our Lord, and His veritable blood, together with His soul and divinity, are under the species of bread and wine; but the body indeed under the species of bread, and the blood under the species of wine, by the force of the words; but the body under the species of wine, and the blood under the species of bread, and the soul under both, by the force of that natural connection and concomitancy whereby the parts of Christ our Lord, *who hath now risen from the dead, to die no more,* are united together; and the divinity, furthermore, on account of the admirable hypostatical union thereof with His body and soul." [20]

"And because Christ, our Redeemer, declared that which He offered under the species of bread to be truly His own body, therefore has it ever been the firm belief in the Church of God, and this holy Synod doth now declare it anew, that by the consecration of the bread and of the wine, a conversion is made of the whole substance of the bread into the body of Christ our Lord, and of the whole substance of the wine into His blood; which conversion is by the holy Catholic Church suitably and properly called Transubstantiation." [21]

Hence divine worship is due to the Blessed Sacrament, and it should be reserved both for the adoration of the faithful and for the communion of the sick. The proper disposition for its reception presupposes the state of grace; and if one is in

[19] Ibid. 874, 875.
[20] Ibid. 876.
[21] Ibid. 877.

mortal sin, he must first have recourse to the sacrament of penance. Where the proper dispositions are found, it is the urgent desire of the Council that the Holy Eucharist be frequently received by the faithful.[22]

6. *The Sacraments of Penance and Extreme Unction* (sess. 14).— The sacrament of penance was instituted by Christ for the remission of sins committed after baptism, as appears from His own words: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them: and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained." Sacramental absolution is a judicial act, and can be imparted only by a minister who has the priestly character. The fact that the absolving priest is in the state of mortal sin does not invalidate his absolution; but the want of jurisdiction does. On the part of the penitent are required, (a) supernatural sorrow; (b) confession, as complete as reasonably possible, of unconfessed mortal sins; (c) satisfaction for the temporal punishment that usually still remains to be expiated.[23]

Extreme unction was instituted by Christ and promulgated by St. James. It removes from the soul the remaining effects of forgiven sins, and gives a special grace to those in danger of death by sickness. If necessary, it even forgives sins; and as a secondary effect, restores health of body when God judges it expedient. The matter of this sacrament is olive oil blessed by a bishop; its form consists in the prayers used in the application of the matter to the various senses by a priest.[24]

7. *The Sacrifice of the Mass* (sess. 22).— The Holy Eucharist was instituted by Christ not only as a sacrament, but also as a true sacrifice, which must be offered to God continually in His Church by the Apostles and their successors in the priesthood. As a sacrifice it is the image of the great sacrifice of the cross, with which it is identical both in victim and in priest, differing only in the manner of offering. Through it are applied the merits of Christ's passion and death, both to the living and to the souls departed. Hence

[22] Ibid. 878, 879, 880.
[23] Ibid. 894-906.
[24] Ibid. 907-910.

it does not detract from the efficacy or the universality of the sacrifice of the cross.[25]

8. *The Sacrament of Orders* (sess. 23).— A true sacrifice presupposes a true priesthood. The Christian priesthood was instituted by Christ at the Last Supper, and its principal power and office is to consecrate and offer in sacrifice the true body and blood of Christ. The hierarchy, consisting of bishops, priests, and ministers, is divinely instituted. Bishops are superior to priests, and have the power to confirm and ordain. Orders are divided into major and minor; those below the priesthood are, as it were, preparatory to that dignity. The sacrament of orders imprints an indelible character; hence once a priest, always a priest.[26]

9. *The Sacrament of Matrimony* (sess. 24).— Christian marriage is a true sacrament, and as such it is subject to the jurisdiction of the Church. When consummated, it is absolutely indissoluble except by death; and a second marriage during the life of the first partner is by divine law null and void. The Church has the power to constitute impediments rendering marriage invalid.[27]

10. *Purgatory: Veneration of Saints and Images: Indulgences* (sess. 25).— The decree on purgatory affirms the existence of a place of purgation and the utility of prayers and other suffrages for the dead. It rules that all the more difficult and subtle questions, which do not contribute to edification, should be avoided by preachers in their sermons to the faithful.[28] In the same session, the veneration of the saints, of their relics, and of images, was declared lawful and beneficial.[29] Lastly, it was defined that Christ gave His Church the power to grant indulgences, that their use is salutary for the faithful, and the custom of granting them is to be continued in the Church.[30]

To the foregoing summary of Catholic teaching, as contained in the chapters and canons of the Council of Trent, may be added the doctrine on the Blessed Trinity, on the Incarna-

[25] Ibid. 939, 940, 948–956.
[26] Ibid. 957–968.
[27] Ibid. 969–982.
[28] Ibid. 983.
[29] Ibid. 984–988.
[30] Ibid. 989.

tion, the divine motherhood of Mary, and her perpetual virginity, as reaffirmed against the Socinians in the Constitution of Paul IV, *Cum quorundam,* August 7, 1555.[31] Also the declaration of the primacy of the Roman Church and of the Sovereign Pontiff as successor of St. Peter, which was embodied in the Tridentine profession of faith.[32] The teaching of the Council was somewhat later adapted for the use of parish priests in their instructions to the people, in the Roman Catechism, which was then published by order of Pius V. Thus a strong barrier was opposed to the revolutionary movement of the sixteenth-century Reformers, and the faith preached by the Apostles was once more set forth with that clear definiteness which is always the prerogative of truth.

[31] Ibid. 993.

[32] Ibid. 999.

CHAPTER XXVII

NEO-SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGIANS

The Council of Trent not only opposed a strong barrier to the revolutionary movement of the sixteenth-century Reformers, but it also laid the foundation of activities which in a short while produced splendid results along every line of ecclesiastical life. A succession of able and deeply religious Popes, a large number of earnest and profoundly learned theologians, a vast multitude of holy religious and many great saints, an inexhaustible supply of zealous preachers and self-sacrificing missionaries — all these worked together in bringing about a thorough reform of morals both among the clergy and laity and also in carrying the glad tidings of the Gospel to the uttermost ends of the earth. It was a marvelous revival of Catholic life, and a most convincing proof of the indefectibility of the Church as a divine institution for the salvation of the world. The evil seed sown by the Reformers indeed still bore its evil fruit, and sometimes even in Catholic circles; but the vigorous spirit of revived Catholicism ever devised effective remedies, and thus within the Church herself comparatively little harm resulted.

Most of these varied activities, however, supplied matter for church history rather than for the history of dogmas. True, during the latter part of the sixteenth century, and during nearly the whole of the seventeenth, there was displayed in many countries an intense theological interest, and much useful work was accomplished; but it was mostly by way of commenting on mediæval teaching in the light of the decisions given at Trent. On the other hand, while there was no want

[1] Cfr. Schwane, V, 24 sqq.; K. Werner, Franz Suarez und die Scholastik der letzten Jahrhunderte; *Loofs, Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte; Hefele, The Life of Cardinal Ximenes.

of profound theological speculation, few of the topics dealt with were of a nature that promised definite and universally accepted results. They rather constituted so many school differences, and are apt to remain such for ages to come. Finally, though there was frequent occasion for authoritative pronouncements on the errors of the day, these pronouncements were for the most part little more than practical applications of dogmatic decisions given by previous councils. There are indeed exceptions to this, as will be pointed out below; but these exceptions are not as numerous as one might at first be led to believe when taking up the study of the documents in question. Hence, in a compendious work like the present, it seems advisable merely to summarize the more important points of post-Tridentine theology, without entering into any detail as regards the dogmatic developments which are still in course of formation. The following outline, therefore, must suffice for our present purpose.

In regard to the revival of theological studies after the Council of Trent, two points are especially deserving of notice. The first is the change of textbook employed in the schools; and the second is the shifting of the center of theological activities from France to Spain. This latter point is of interest chiefly because it marked the breaking away from the Nominalistic tendencies which since the middle of the fourteenth century had begun to dominate the University of Paris. The former, on the other hand, effected a general improvement in theological studies, both by providing a broader and more solid basis upon which to build, and by promoting clearness of thought and precision of reasoning. Up to the middle of the sixteenth century, the *Sententiarum Libri Quatuor* of the Lombard had been almost universally used as a text of Scholastic prelections; but thereafter this honor was accorded to the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas, except in the schools of the Scotists, where the time-honored custom of commenting on the *Sentences* was retained.

This new theology, which was already in process of formation when the Council of Trent began its work, is usually designated as Neo-Scholasticism. Its first distinguished rep-

resentative was Francis de Vittoria. He was born in 1488, and taught theology, first for some years at Valladolid, and then, from 1526 to 1544, at Salamanca. Being a member of the Dominican order, he took St. Thomas as his guide; and as not only his own younger brethren, but also many other religious and even seculars attended his lectures, he secured a large circle of admirers for the Angel of the Schools. Nor were his lectures merely a running commentary on the text of the *Summa,* but he adapted its principles and solutions to the needs of his own time. And even more than St. Thomas had done before him, he emphasized the positive aspect of theology, making an exensive use of Holy Scripture and the writings of the Fathers. Thus he replaced the idle speculations of decadent Scholasticism by a theological system that was at once thorough and comprehensive. In consequence he is justly regarded as the founder of Neo-Scholasticism, which is little else than the Scholasticism of the thirteenth century brought up to date and developed along positive lines.

Among the many distinguished disciples of Vittoria, Dominicus de Soto, Bartholomew Carranza, and Melchior Cano are deserving of special mention. All three were sent as theologians to the Council of Trent, and also ranked high as lecturers on theology, at Valladolid, Alcala, and Salamanca. Cano, however, considerably tarnished his fame by his unreasonable opposition to the Society of Jesus, whose growing success in the schools seems to have inspired him with envy. On the other hand, he gained immortal renown by his famous work *De Locis Theologicis,* which inaugurated a new era in the treatment of fundamental theology. Lucid in style and thorough in treatment, it is justly regarded as a model treatise on theological method. The author enumerates ten *loci,* or sources of theological arguments, each of which he treats in a separate book. These sources are, Holy Scripture, oral tradition, the Catholic Church, the councils, the Fathers, the Roman Church, the Scholastic theologians, natural reason as manifested in science, philosophy, and history. To these is added a final book that treats of the use and application of the *loci* in theological polemics.

The work thus begun by the Dominicans at Salamanca was ably continued by members of the same order during the second half of the sixteenth century. Thus Bartholomew de Medina, utilizing the writings of his predecessors in the theological chair, published two volumes of commentaries on the *Summa* of St. Thomas; and also a volume on moral theology, in which he defends the principles of probabilism. Towards the end of the century, Dominicus Bañez developed his doctrine of physical predetermination in reference to the action of efficacious grace, and thus became the founder of Neo-Thomism. His opposition to Molina's teaching on the *scientia media* was not only strong but violent, and largely on account of it he gave a decidedly forced interpretation of St. Thomas' doctrine on the foreknowledge of God. On both points he had numerous followers in his own order, as will be noted in the following chapter.

Besides the Dominicans, many other religious orders were established at Salamanca. Among them were the Augustinians, the Hieronymites, the Norbertines, and the Discalceated Carmelites. The last named published a large commentary on the *Summa* of St. Thomas, usually cited as *Salmanticenses*. The first edition, in nine folio volumes, appeared in 1631, under the title: *Collegii Salmanticensis fratrum discalceatorum B. M. de Monte Carmeto primitivae observantiae Cursus theologicus, Summam theologicam D. Thomae Doctoris Angelici complectens, juxta miram ejusdem Angelici Praeceptoris doctrinam et omnino consone ad eam, quam Complutense Collegium ejusdem ordinis in suo artium cursu tradit.* The last clause of this title refers to a work on the philosophy of Aristotle and St. Thomas, in five volumes folio, which had been published in 1624 at Alcala. The dogmatic standpoint of the *Salmanticenses* is strictly Thomistic, and to some extent also reveals the anti-Jesuit bias of Bañez and his followers.

The Scotist school of theology had also a number of distinguished representatives during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Among them may be mentioned Gregory Ruiz, John Ovando, John of the Incarnation, Hugh Cavelli, and John Poncius. The last two were Irish Franciscans, but

taught theology at the Ara Coeli in Rome. Their contemporary and brother in religion, Luke Wadding, published the works of Scotus in twenty-six folio volumes, together with a running commentary. The first volume appeared at Lyons in 1657. Unlike most other theologians of that time, the Scotists continued to use the *Sentences* of the Lombard as the text of their prelections, and to write commentaries on them as had been done by the Scholastics of the Middle Ages. Thus Mastrius, who died in 1673, wrote the *Disputationes Theologicae in 4 Libris Sententiarum,* which were published two years after his death. A few years later appeared the *Scotus Academicus* by Frassen, and the *Summa Theologiae Scotisticae* by Dupasquier. The latter work is regarded as the best presentation of the theology of Scotus. On the other hand, Bartholomew de Barberiis, Gaudentius of Brixen, and not a few others adhered closely to the teaching of St. Bonaventure.

By the side of the older religious orders, nearly all of which were intensely active in the fields of theology, the Society of Jesus took a distinguished position almost from its inception. Approved by Paul III in 1540, two of its first members, Salmeron and Laynez, were sent as the Pope's theologians to the Council of Trent, where both of them gave proof of their profound learning no less than of their religious fervor. However, it was with Toletus, later created cardinal, that Jesuit theology first made its way into the schools. He had received his theological training at Salamanca, and in 1559 was appointed to teach theology at the Roman College. He taught with great success, and wrote a valuable commentary on the *Summa* of St. Thomas. After his elevation to the cardinalate, he was succeeded in his chair of theology by Gregory de Valentia, who had previously taught at Dillingen. As this latter also had studied under the Dominicans at Salamanca, the theology of St. Thomas was naturally adopted by the Society as its own. This was entirely in accord with the wishes of St. Ignatius, who always had a great admiration for the Angel of the Schools.

While Toletus and de Valentia were establishing the theo-

logical reputation of the Society at Rome, Peter Fonseca and Louis Molina met with similar success at Evora in Portugal. The latter is best known as the author of a work on the *scientia media,* of which something will be said in the following chapter; but he proved his profound theological learning along other lines as well. Besides a commentary on the first part of the *Summa* and several historical treatises, he wrote a monumental work under the title, *De Justitia et Jure,* which secured for him an international reputation. From Evora, where he had taught dogmatic theology for twenty years, he was transferred to Madrid and appointed to the chair of moral theology. There he died in 1600, at the age of sixty-five.

About the same time two other Spanish Jesuits were making a name for themselves as distinguished lecturers and writers on theology. They were Gabriel Vasquez and Francis Suarez. Vasquez taught dogmatic theology for twenty-nine years, first at Alcala and then at the Jesuit college in Rome. He was both original and profound, and is sometimes called the Augustine of Spain. He wrote a large commentary of the *Summa* of St. Thomas, which has always been held in great esteem. Suarez, usually styled Doctor Eximius, lectured on philosophy at Avila and Segovia, and on theology at Valladolid, Rome, Alcala, Salamanca, and finally at the new university of Coimbra. In the latter place he taught from 1597 until his death in 1617. His fame as a professor of theology was so great that pupils flocked to Coimbra from far and near. He wrote voluminously both on philosophy and theology. His commentary on the *Summa* alone comprises twenty volumes.

In the first half of the seventeenth century, three other Jesuit theologians acquired great distinction, namely, Ruiz de Montoya, Martinez Ripalda, and John de Lugo, created cardinal by Urban VIII. De Montoya taught theology at Cordova and Seville, and published a work of remarkable depth of thought and closeness of reasoning on the omniscience and *scientia media* of God. He also wrote commentaries on parts of the *Summa.* Ripalda, professor of theology at Salamanca, is considered by many as one of the greatest

theologians after the Council of Trent. His most celebrated work is entitled *De Ente Supernaturali.* In an appendix to this work he gives a thorough refutation of the errors of Baius. His treatise on redemption and grace made such an impression that he was called the Cyril of modern times. De Lugo lectured on theology at the Roman College from 1621 to 1641, when he was raised to the cardinalate. He won great renown as a moral theologian; but his dogmatic treatises on the Incarnation, the Holy Eucharist, and the sacrament of penance are also highly esteemed.

Most of the theological activity referred to in the preceding paragraphs was caried on in Spain, and nearly all the men concerned in it were of Spanish origin and training. However, other countries were also active in the same field, although not to the same extent. Thus Italy maintained theological schools of considerable importance at Padua, Naples, Pavia, and Pisa; while the colleges of the different religious orders in Rome were usually kept up to a high standard of efficiency. Many of the ablest professors were indeed drawn from other countries, principally Spain; but Italy supplied also some eminent men of her own, as, for instance, the Jesuits Bellarmine, Viva, and Zaccaria; the Franciscian de Rubeis, and Cardinal Gotti.

France also contributed a considerable number of able theologians, although the University of Paris had lost much of its ancient fame. Special mention may be made of the Jesuit Petavius, the author of a famous work on positive theology; the Oratorian Thomassin, who wrote a similar work; the Franciscan Frassen; the Dominican René Billuart, and the Sarbonne professors Gonet, Dupasquier, Habert, and Tournely. In Germany and Belgium a high degree of excellence was reached by Becanus, Lessius, and the authors of the *Theologia Wirceburgensis.*

Thus from the Council of Trent till well into the eighteenth century, theological studies were nearly everywhere in a flourishing condition. Besides, much excellent work was also done in canon law, exegesis, and church history. Then for a cen-

tury or more there was a constant decline, until some fifty years ago the study of theology and kindred branches of learning was taken up again with renewed interest and considerable success.

CHAPTER XXVIII

SCHOOL DIFFERENCES[1]

As the Council of Trent had been convened for the purpose of extirpating heresy, and not with a view to decide controversies that happened to be carried on between Catholic theologians, it was but natural that the different theological schools should continue to defend their own particular views on points which had been in no way defined. Hence in regard to mere school differences, practically no change was brought about by the Council. In a few instances, indeed, particular opinions became untenable on account of their bearing upon defined doctrines; but that was by way of exception. Generally speaking, the Dominicans, the Franciscans, the Augustinians, the Scotists, and to some extent even the Nominalists, retained all that was peculiar to their own particular schools of theological thought. Besides, in the course of a few years after the Council, new differences arose; and these differences, in some instances, caused divisions between theologians of one and the same school. Again, differences were occasioned by the rise of new religious orders, as in the case of the Jesuits; even if they professed to follow the same guide as some older order. To discuss all these various and divergent opinions would be to no purpose in the present work, although a few of the more striking of them may be profitably noted. The following are perhaps the most important. They are so many later developments of mediæval teaching.

[1] Cfr. Schwane, VI, 57 sqq.; K. Werner, Franz Suarez und die Scholastik der letzten Jahrhunderte; De la Serviere, Theologie de Bellarmin; Kleutgen, Die Theologie der Vorzeit; Turmel, Histoire de la Theologie Positive; Regnon, Bañez et Molina, Histoire, Doctrine, Critique metaphysique; Schneemann, Controversiarum de divinae gratiae liberique arbitrii concordia initia et progressus; *Loofs, Leitfaden der Dogmengeschichte.

1. *God's Foreknowledge of the Conditionally Free Acts of the Future.*— The fact of God's foreknowledge, even in regard to the conditionally free acts of the future, was unanimously taught by the Scholastics of the Middle Ages. On the other hand, hardly any attempt was made by them to determine more closely the particulars of this knowledge. Like St. Thomas, most of the Scholastics contented themselves with saying that God knows all future events, necessary or free, absolute or conditional, by reason of their eternal presentiality; yet in such wise that His own essence is the ultimate medium of cognition. As regards necessary events, or those free actions whose futurity is absolute, there is no great difficulty; for they presuppose in God at least a decree of concurrence with the finite agent, by reason of which they may be said to be present in the divine essence, and therefore knowable in the same. But there appears to be an insuperable difficulty in regard to future events that are conditioned by the free determination of the finite agent. For God's decree of concurrence presupposes definite knowledge of the absolute futurity of the event in question; and whence does God derive that knowledge so long as the event is regarded as conditioned? This view of the matter was not professedly investigated by the older Scholastics.

After the Council of Trent the solution of the difficulty became urgent for two reasons. First, because Socinus and other innovators denied that the conditionally free acts of the future were definitely known by God. Secondly, because God's foreknowledge of these acts is intimately connected with the freedom of man's will under the action of grace, which freedom was denied by the Reformers and defined by the Council. Hence a way had to be found of reconciling two apparently irreconcilable doctrines. It was not a mere penchant for speculation that introduced the difficult subject of God's foreknowledge into the field of theological discussion, but rather the urgent need of finding a reasonable solution of difficulties that were brought against the faith.

It was with this object in view that Molina worked out his theory of the *scientia media,* which in the scheme of divine

knowledge holds a middle place between the *scientia simplicis intelligentiae* and the *scientia visionis,* till then commonly accepted as constituting a complete division of cognition on the part of God. The idea itself of the *scientia media* was not new; for aside from the many Patristic texts which imply it more or less clearly, it had already been formulated by Fonseca, Molina's professor, who called it *scientia mixta.* However, to Molina belongs the credit of having placed his professor's theory on a firm basis, and winning a place for it in the theological world.

As is quite obvious, all objects of divine cognition may be conceived to belong to one of these three classes: the purely possible, the actually existing, and possible events whose future occurrence is conditioned by the self-determination of a free agent. The first class comprises the objects of the *scientia simplicis intelligentiae,* the second those of the *scientia visionis,* and the third those of the *scientia media.* Hence the *scientia media* envisages its object as possible in itself and as actually existing on the supposition that certain conditions are fulfilled, and in so far it is intermediate between the other two kinds of divine knowledge. It is from this intermediate position that it takes its name — *scientia media.*

An example of this kind of divine knowledge is found in Christ's declaration that Tyre and Sidon would have done penance in sackcloth and ashes, if they had witnessed the signs and miracles that were wrought in Corozain and Bethsaida. The conversion of these two cities was in itself purely possible; it would have become an actual occurrence had the aforesaid signs and miracles been wrought in presence of the inhabitants; and although they were not so wrought, and consequently the conversion did not take place, yet Christ knew its conditioned occurrence with absolute certainty. Hence in regard to the mere fact of such a knowledge there can be no doubt. It is only when the medium of cognition is considered that difficulties occur, and that views of theologians begin to differ.

Molina, in common with all other theologians, held that the ultimate medium of cognition is the divine essence, in so far

as therein all objective truth is reflected. The fact that Tyre and Sidon, in the example given, would have been converted, was objectively true from all eternity, and as such it was like any other truth represented in the divine essence as a medium of cognition. This representation is independent of any decree of the divine will in regard to the occurrence in question; it is simply due to the perfection of God's essence as the mirror of all truth. Furthermore, God's knowledge, though determined by His own essence as the *medium in quo,* terminates at the object itself; and as His intellect is infinitely perfect, "He knows the most secret inclinations and penetrates the most hidden recesses of man's heart, and is thus enabled to foresee with mathematical certainty the free resolves latent in man's will." In this sense God may be said to know the conditionally free acts of the future even in their proximate causes. However, the certainty of this knowledge is in the last instance not derived from the object, which in itself is contingent; but from His own infinite perfection.

This represents the substance of Molina's theory as worked out by himself, and in the main also as it was adopted and defended by Suarez, Vasquez, Lessius, Becanus, and those who took part in the controversy with the Thomists. However, it was somewhat further developed by the introduction of two concepts which Molina had set aside as unnecessary. The first is derived from God's eternity. As St. Thomas teaches, God's eternal existence necessarily implies His co-existence with all His creatures, and this raises Him above and beyond all divisions of time. Hence the free self-determination of the will, even if it still lies in the future, is intimately present to His eternal essence. And therefore, looking at the matter from His point of view, He does not foresee but simply sees the future. Consequently, He knows future events as He knows those of the present; because to Him there is neither past nor future, but only the unchangeable *now* of eternal duration.

The second concept is taken from the obvious need and universally admitted fact of God's coöperation with the actions of His creatures. As no finite being can act except in so far

as God sustains its activity and concurs with the same, every future action presupposes on His part the will to concur, and this will constitutes the medium of cognition. In regard to absolutely future actions, the will to concur is absolute; while in regard to conditionally future actions it is hypothetical; and this hypothetical will of concurrence is the medium in which God knows all future occurrences that are conditioned by the self-determination of a free agent. However, it must be borne in mind that the divine concurrence does not induce but merely presupposes the hypothetical self-determination of the agent's will; and therefore God's infallible knowledge of this self-determination belongs properly to the *scientia media.*

This theory of divine foreknowledge, as first formulated by Fonseca and Molina and then perfected by successive generations of Jesuit theologians, was fiercely attacked by the Dominicans, who denounced it as an unwarranted innovation. They, too, recognized the necessity of giving a more detailed explanation of the matter than could be found in the works of St. Thomas, but in trying to work out that explanation they proceeded along lines directly opposed to those followed by the Jesuits. God's knowledge, according to them, is of two kinds only: the knowledge of simple intelligence, and the knowledge of vision. The former has the purely possible for its object, while the latter extends to all other events and occurrences, even the conditionally free acts of the future. The reason why the knowledge of vision is so comprehensive lies in the fact that God knows things in so far as He is their cause, either as regards their absolute or their conditional existence. Even the self-determination of man's free will, although free, is possible only under the physical premotion of God's concurrence; hence in the divine decree of that concurrence the self-determination of the will is contained as an object of eternal vision. Hence there is neither need nor room for the *scientia media* of Molina.

This system, though to some extent based upon thoughts that are found in the writings of St. Thomas, received its first real development from Michael Bañez, a Spanish Dominican and author of Neo-Thomism. It was later on completed

by Alvarez, Gonet, Gotti, Billuart, and others, who excogitated the theory of hypothetical decrees of the divine will. Hence Thomism no less than Molinism is the finished product of many minds, but in substance it has always remained what it was in the beginning — an explanation of divine foreknowledge by means of predetermining decrees.

A word of explanation may here be added in reference to the hypothetical decrees of the divine will. They are conceived as subjectively absolute and objectively conditioned. On the part of God there is a real decision concerning the occurrence of some future event, hence the decree is subjectively absolute; but the objective effectiveness of this decision is made dependent on the occurrence of something else, and therefore the decree is objectively conditioned. This something else is a condition the fulfillment of which is either entirely in the power of God, or partly also in the power of a created will. Hence there are two kinds of hypothetical decrees. Of the one kind the following is an example: "I decree that the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon will do penance, if I send them the Messias"; of the other this is an instance: "I will that all men be saved, if they will coöperate with my grace." Still, precisely as mediums of divine cognition, both kinds are really the same; because even where the fulfillment of the condition is partly in the power of a created will, the decree of God's will predetermines the self-determination of the created free agent. Hence God knows what choice the free agent will make, because He Himself is the cause of that choice, though without interfering with the agent's freedom.

That Thomism thus offers a much clearer explanation of God's foreknowledge than can ever be attempted by Molinism, or by any other theory of divine cognition, is quite obvious. For as God Himself is said to predetermine the self-determination of the free agent, He knows conditionally free actions of the future in the same way as He knows future necessary actions, and in regard to these latter no one has ever found any difficulty. But the system has two very serious drawbacks. First, it necessitates an infinite number of hypothetical

decrees, which seem more than unacceptable; secondly, to an unbiased person it appears impossible that these predetermining decrees should leave man's freedom untouched. It is especially on account of this latter difficulty that the system has found but little favor outside the Thomistic school.

2. *Controversies on Efficacious Grace.*— The relation of grace and man's free will is thus indicated by the Council of Trent, in its decree on justification: "The Synod furthermore declares, that, in adults, the beginning of justification is to be derived from the preventing grace of God, through Jesus Christ, that is to say, from His vocation, whereby, without any merits existing on their part, they are called; that so they, who by sins were alienated from God, may be disposed by His quickening and assisting grace to convert themselves to their own justification, by freely assenting to and coöperating with the aforesaid grace; in such a way that, while God touches the heart of man by the illumination of the Holy Ghost, man is not himself utterly without doing anything, while he receives that inspiration, forasmuch as he is also able to reject it; yet he is not able, by his own free will, without the grace of God, to move himself unto justice in His sight."

Hence in their discussions on grace and free will, all Catholic theologians regard two points as incontrovertible: First, that the influence of grace is necessary for every salutary act; secondly, that the human will remains free under the influence of grace. They, furthermore, also admit that there is a difference between merely sufficient grace and efficacious grace; but they are very much divided in their views when they come to assign the reason for this difference. In their efforts to demonstrate the mutual relations between grace and free will, which form the foundation of the difference between sufficient and efficacious grace, post-Tridentine theologians evolved two pairs of closely related systems, one of which takes grace for its starting point and the other the free will of man. To the former belong Thomism and Augustinianism; and to the latter, Molinism and Congruism. To these may be added a fifth system, known as Syncretism, which is eclectic and occupies a middle place between Thomism and Molinism. A few re-

marks in regard to each of the different systems will suffice for our present purpose.

(a) *Thomism.*— According to Bañez and his followers, every act of contingent causes is produced by an application of their potentiality to the act under the physical premotion of the First Cause. By an influence that precedes all acts of the creature, not in the order of time but in the order of causality, God moves every finite cause to its proper acts — the necessary to necessary acts, and the free to free acts. This is true both in the natural and the supernatural order of things. Hence the efficacy of grace is due to the intrinsic nature of the grace bestowed, and is in no way dependent on the attitude of man's free will in its regard. Consequently, efficacious grace is intrinsically and of its very nature different from sufficient grace. It has of itself an infallible connection with the free correspondence of man's will, so that it not only gives the power to act but causes the act itself. On the other hand, sufficient grace does not cause man to act, but merely gives him the power of acting. Nor is this power in itself sufficient for the intended act, but it must be supplemented by another grace which is intrinsically efficacious. The grace is called sufficient in the sense that it prepares the way for the supplementary grace, which would infallibly be given if the resistance of man's free will to the first grace did not place an obstacle in its way.

The objections to this system are obvious. For how does the will remain really free, if it cannot refuse to act under the premotion of efficacious grace? To say that it could refuse to act *in sensu diviso,* though not *in sensu composito,* appears to be little more than a quibble. Again, how can sufficient grace, as explained in this system, with any propriety be called sufficient? For as the will cannot act except under the influence of physical premotion, it can obviously not do anything else than resist whenever this physical premotion is wanting, as it is wanting in sufficient grace. Lastly, the system of physical premotion seems to make God the originator of sinful acts. For when God premoves man to the entity of the sinful act and at the same time withholds the opposite premotion of effi-

cacious grace, it is hard to see how man can possibly avoid sin.

(b) *Augustinianism.*— As the name indicates, this system is professedly founded on the teaching of St. Augustine. In its elements it dates back to the Middle Ages, but it was fully developed only after the Council of Trent. This development is largely the work of Berti, Bellelli, Bertieri, Habert, and other seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theologians. According to the advocates of this system, grace is intrinsically and of its very nature efficacious or merely sufficient, as the case may be; but efficacious grace does not physically predetermine the will. Its efficacy implies a merely moral predetermination, which results from the victorious delight — *delectatio coelestis victrix* — produced by its action upon the free agent. On the other hand, merely sufficient grace produces a delight which is too weak to overcome the contrary motions of concupiscence. Hence the two kinds of grace are intrinsically and essentially different; but this difference arises ultimately from their respective relations to the perversity of fallen nature.

At first sight, this system has much in common with Jansenism, in regard to which something will be said in the following chapter. However, it can point to one very essential difference, which secures it against all suspicion of heresy. While Jansenism makes efficacious grace irresistible, Augustinianism does not. According to it, the will invariably and infallibly follows the stronger influence of grace or of concupiscence; but it does so without coercion or intrinsic necessity.

(c) *Molinism.*— It was chiefly to safeguard the freedom of the human will under the influence of efficacious grace that Molina worked out his theory of the *scientia media.* Hence he entitled his work on the subject, *Concordia Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis, Divina Praescientia, Providentia, Praedestinatione et Reprobatione.* The views on the efficacy of grace defended in this book are directly opposed to the Thomism of Bañez, and they started a controversy between the Jesuits and the Dominicans that was terminated only by an order of Paul V, after the matter had been discussed for nine years before the *Congregatio de Auxiliis,* first convened by Clement

VIII in 1598. No decision was given for or against either of the two contending parties, but each was forbidden to censure the teaching of the other.

According to the teaching of Molina, there is no intrinsic and essential difference between efficacious and sufficient grace. Both have of their very nature the *efficacia virtutis,* in as much as they impart to man's free will the proximate power and aptitude to elicit a supernatural act. Hence the difference between them in reference to the act in question, or the *efficacia connexionis,* comes *ab extrinsico,* from the attitude freely assumed by the will. If the will gives its consent, the grace becomes efficacious; if the will withholds its consent, the same grace remains merely sufficient. However, in giving its consent, the will acts not merely as a natural power; for it is already prepared and placed in the supernatural order of activity by the presence in it of prevenient grace, and consequently the act that follows is the joint product of grace and free will. Yet in one sense this joint product is to be ascribed to grace rather than to free will; for it is not the will which by its free consent determines the power of grace, but it is grace which gives free will the power to act and coöperates with its action. Hence there is absolutely no similarity between Molinism and Semi-Pelagianism, as most Protestant writers assert.

While the freedom of the human will under the influence of efficacious grace is thus preserved intact, the sovereign dominion of God in the distribution of efficacious graces is placed in safety by the intervention of the *scientia media.* For by reason of it God foreknows infallibly what particular graces will in any given instance secure the free consent of the human will, and what particular graces will not; and in accordance with this foreknowledge He can decree to bestow whatever graces answer the purpose of His own wise dispositions in the economy of salvation. Thus infallibility of divine cognition is secured, to which, when there is question of efficacious graces, corresponds in the absolute order of things the infallibility of connection between grace and the subsequent act.

(d) *Congruism.*— When some of Molina's followers

pushed his principles to extremes by overemphasizing the power of free will, a reaction set in which led to the assertion of an intrinsic difference between efficacious and sufficient grace. This difference, however, was conceived to lie in the moral and not in the physical nature of grace. Efficacious grace, it was pointed out by Suarez, Vasquez, Lessius, Bellarmine, and others of the Society of Jesus, is a special gift of God and as such it has a higher moral value than merely sufficient grace. This higher moral value consists principally in the fact that the grace conferred is specially suited to the circumstances of the case, so that its congruity is a powerful factor in soliciting the consent of the will. Hence efficacious grace is called congruous grace — *gratia congrua* — whereas merely sufficient grace is termed incongruous grace — *gratia incongrua*. This view was strongly endorsed by Claudius Acquaviva, and by subsequent Generals of the Society. It must be noted, however, that the idea of congruous grace was already contained in the system as originated by Molina, only it was not emphasized by him to the same extent as it was by later theologians.

(e) *Syncretism.*— As the name indicates, this system resulted from the combination of elements taken from other systems then in vogue. However, the elements in question are really nothing else than Thomism on the one hand and Molinism on the other. The distinctive trait of Syncretism consists in the acceptance of two kinds of efficacious grace: one kind that is intrinsically and of its very nature efficacious, and another that derives its efficacy from the free consent of the will. The latter kind is given by God for the performance of less difficult good works, such as the resisting of slight temptations, devout prayer, and the like; then, if man accepts these graces and freely coöperates with them, God will give him an intrinsically predetermining grace for the performance of good works that are more difficult. Thus the freedom of the will is kept intact, the necessity of prayer is emphasized, and God's sovereign dominion in the matter of grace is vindicated.

The system was originated in the seventeenth century by Ysambertus, and later on developed by Duplessis, Habert,

Tournely, and others. It was endorsed by St. Alphonsus Liguori, and has not a few advocates among modern theologians. Yet there is little in it to make it acceptable. It has to solve all the difficulties that confront Thomism and Molinism, and offers no principle of so doing which is not contained in the one or the other of the two systems.

3. *Some Differences of Opinion Among Theologians.*— These differences are so numerous that it is practically impossible to give even the briefest outline of them in a compendious work like the present. Nor is there any need of it. Many of them are mere continuations of differences that arose among theologians in the Middle Ages, and as such have already been indicated in earlier chapters. Others have so little theological interest that an exposition of them would be out of place in a history of dogmas. Hence the following few points will suffice for our purpose.

(a) *The Hypostatic Union.*— The great theologians of the Middle Ages defended the fact of the hypostatic union, but did not evolve any very definite theory as to its ultimate explanation. This was attempted by their successors after the Council of Trent. All these theories are based upon different philosophical concepts of personality. Thus many Thomists hold that personality results ultimately from actual existence, between which and essence they place a real distinction. Hence, according to them, the hypostatic union consists in the fact that the personal existence of the Word supplies the actual existence of Christ's human nature. This view is taken, among others, by Cajetan, Gonet, Billuart, and more recently by Terrien and Cardinal Billot.

Not a few Jesuits, among them Suarez, Vasquez, De Lugo, and Ariaga, place personality in a physical mode, really distinct from existing human nature. And this mode, they contend, was impeded in the union, its place being taken by the personality of the Word. Some of them, like Suarez, furthermore postulate a *modus unionis,* in which the union formally consists. Others of the Society, as Molina, Petavius, Tiphanus, Cardinal Franzelin, Christian Pesch, and also many Scotists, place personality in a real mode which they hold to

be only negatively distinct from complete and actual existing human nature. Most of them, moreover, reject the Suarezian *modus unionis* and contend that the union formally consists in the extension of the hypostatic functions of the Word to the humanity in Christ.

The Scotists as a school adhere to the view taken by Duns Scotus, that personality consists in a real but negative perfection. This perfection is identical with the complete and independently existing nature, in so far as it excludes both actual and aptitudinal communication of the nature to another suppositum. Hence as this perfection is impeded by the accession of the Word to the human nature of Christ, the personality of the Word must take its place. In its last analysis, this view seems to be really the same as the preceding.— Many other theories have been excogitated, but these four suffice to indicate the general drift of theological thought on the subject under consideration.

(b) *The Redemption.*— Omitting minor variations in the soteriological teaching of post-Tridentine theologians, it is necessary only to mention in this connection that the view of Scotus on the primary motive of the Incarnation and on the adequacy of Christ's satisfaction has still its many defenders, even outside the Scotists' school of theology. And this is especially true in regard to the first point, although the weight of theological opinion is still in favor of considering the redemption of the world as the primary motive of the Incarnation. The necessity of the Incarnation, for the purpose of rendering God condign satisfaction for the sins of mankind, continued during all this time to be generally defended, but was insisted on with special emphasis by the Salmanticenses. This satisfaction is, according to all, in the order of justice, but many theologians deny that it is *ad rigorem justitiae.*

(c) *Sanctifying Grace.*— Although the Council of Trent defined that the created gift of sanctifying grace inhering in the soul must be considered as the sole formal cause of justification, yet it did not indicate all the various functions of that formal cause, and consequently there arose numerous discussions concerning them in the centuries that followed. Does

sanctifying grace expel mortal sin physically from the soul as is held by most theologians, or only morally as is maintained by the Scotists? Is the participation of the divine nature merely in the moral-juridical order as the Scotists contend, or is it physical, though only analogous, as the greater number of other theologians maintain? Again, is sanctifying grace as a physical entity really distinct from charity, according to the more common opinion, or is it essentially identical with that virtue, as was taught not only by the followers of Scotus, but also by Lessius, Bellarmine, and many others? These and many similar questions remain still unsolved in the theology of sanctifying grace.

(d) *Predestination and Reprobation.*— These two points were and still are discussed chiefly between the Molinists and Thomists, the question being whether God predestines *post* or *ante praevisa merita.* The Molinists contend for the former view, and the Thomists for the latter.

According to the Molinists, the order of divine decrees in regard to predestination is as follows: (a) Antecedently, even presupposing the existence of original sin, God truly and sincerely wills the salvation of all men, and in accordance with this will prepares for them means of salvation that are at least remotely sufficient. (b) By reason of a special predilection, for some He destines graces which He foreknows by the *scientia media* will prove efficacious. (c) By the knowledge of vision He foresees that these same persons will perform meritorious actions and die in the state of grace; and thus, after foreseeing their merits, He predestines them to eternal glory. In a similar way He foresees that others will die in the state of mortal sin; and these, in view of their demerits, He condemns to the punishment of hell.

In the Thomists' view the divine decrees are arranged in this order: (a) Antecedently, even presupposing original sin, God truly and sincerely intends eternal blessedness for all rational creatures, and with this intention He prepares for them sufficient graces. (b) When He foresees in His decrees of sufficient grace that no one makes a good use of the grace thus offered, He chooses some from amongst them whom He

decrees absolutely and efficaciously to save. (c) For these He prepares efficacious graces, through which they will infallibly work out their salvation. (d) Foreseeing in these same decrees that the elect will perform good works, He decrees furthermore in the order of execution to confer eternal life upon them as a reward. (e) As He foresees that all others, not belonging to the elect, will die in mortal sin, He condemns them to eternal punishment.— The Congruists arrange the divine decrees in a similar order, but they derive God's foreknowledge from the *scientia media.*

Comparing the two systems, one cannot help noticing that in regard to reprobation the Molinists have a decided advantage over the Thomists. For in their system of grace reprobation follows from the free choice of the reprobate themselves, whereas in the system of the Thomists it is ultimately due to the absence of a *praemotio physica* without which the free will of man cannot act. Hence the advocates of this system are forced to hold negative reprobation, in the sense that the reprobate had really no chance of saving their souls. The inference is, of course, denied; but it appears too obvious to admit of denial.

(e) *Sacramental Theology.*— The chief theological differences in regard to the sacraments bear upon sacramental causality, the composition of the sacramental sign, the immediate institution by Christ, and the nature of the sacramental character. The following few remarks will suffice to indicate the differences in question.

Sacramental causality is explained in many different ways, but all these ways may be classified in four systems. The first of these is usually called the system of dispositive causality, which holds that the sacraments are the instrumental causes, not directly of grace, but of a disposition thereto. In baptism, confirmation, and orders, this disposition is identified with the sacramental character, while in the remaining sacraments it is said to be a corresponding ornament of the soul — *ornatus animae.* This view was defended by St. Thomas in his commentary of the *Sentences,* and by the Thomists generally up to the time of Cajetan (+ 1510). Since his day

most Thomists are in favor of the second system, which is that of perfective physical causality. It differs from the foregoing in this, that the sacraments are said to be the direct instrumental causes of grace. According to its modern advocates, the system is in accord with the teaching of St. Thomas as contained in the *Summa Theologica*. However, Cardinal Billot and others still contend for dispositive causality, but under a different name. They call it intentional causality. The system of perfective physical causality is also defended by many Jesuit theologians, as Suarez, Bellarmine, Gregory de Valentia, and Sylvester Maurus.

The third system advocates what is usually termed occasional causality. The name is taken from the fact that the sacraments are regarded as occasional conditions on which the bestowal of grace has been made dependent by the divine will. The power of God is said to operate in the sacramental rite, but in such a way that the rite itself does not instrumentally contribute to the conferring of grace. Hence the sacraments are not really causes of the grace bestowed. This view of sacramental causality is usually attributed to St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and many of their early followers. Modern Scotists for the most part subscribe, though with some reservations, to the fourth system, which is known in the schools by the name of moral causality. In this system the sacraments are considered to be only mediate causes of grace. Their causality is conceived to consist in the fact that they are morally the actions of Christ, and as such have the inherent power of infallibly moving God to bestow grace upon the worthy recipient. The system is defended by the greater number of Jesuit theologians, and also by some of the older Thomists. The term, moral causality, as here used seems to have been introduced by Melchoir Cano.

In regard to the second point mentioned above, the composition of the sacramental sign, it need only be stated that there is a difference of opinion among theologians as to whether all the sacraments are intrinsically and essentially made up of things and words, or matter and form. Many agree with Scotus that penance does not include matter as an essential part,

and also that the Eucharist as a sacrament does not include words by way of form. In regard to the sacrament of orders there is quite a variety of opinions as to what parts of the rite of ordination constitute the sacramental sign. Not only is it a disputed question whether the *traditio instrumentorum* forms an essential part, but also what particular imposition of hands is to be regarded as essential. At least four different views are held by theologians of note.

The immediate institution of the sacraments by Christ seems to be implied in several statements made by the Council of Trent, and hence it is commonly admitted by theologians. But when there is question of the exact meaning of the term, opinions begin to differ. Some hold that Christ designated all the sacramental rites *in specie,* as He did that of baptism and the Eucharist; while others contend that in regard to five sacraments He indicated only in a general way what external signs should be used. This latter view is rapidly gaining ground, as it lends itself more readily to the solution of historical difficulties. If not pushed too far, it seems to be perfectly safe.

On the nature of the sacramental character there are two different views, each one of which is defended by a large number of theologians. Most Thomists consider the character to be a physical potency, which has regard to the due administration or reception of the sacraments. This view was also taken by St. Thomas. Outside the Thomistic school of theology the sacramental character is quite generally held to be a *habitus,* a spiritual quality which consecrates the soul and assimilates it to Jesus Christ. It must be noted, however, that the fundamental ideas contained in these two views are accepted by individual theologians with various modifications, so that there is quite a variety of opinions on the matter. Besides, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the view of Durandus, that the character is nothing but a relation, came again into vogue. This, however, is generally regarded as out of harmony with the teaching of the Council of Trent.

(f) *The Eucharistic Sacrifice.*— That the Mass is in the strict sense of the term a sacrificial rite, and that both victim and priest are the same as in the sacrifice of the cross, is a

matter of faith and taught as such by all theologians. But in what particular part of the Mass the sacrifice consists, and what is the formal reason of the Eucharistic sacrifice, are questions in regard to which theological opinions are very much at variance. Some answer the first question by saying that the essence of the sacrifice consists in the oblation that follows the consecration, others contend that it is found in the communion of the celebrating priest, others hold that both consecration and communion are essential parts, while very many maintain that the consecration alone constitutes the essence of the sacrifice. At the present time this last view is the more common, and is usually regarded as certain.

There is a similar variety of opinions as regards the formal reason of the sacrifice. What is it that makes the Eucharistic rite a true sacrifice? Suarez and others answer that it is the destruction of the bread and wine and the positing in place thereof of the body and blood of Christ as peculiarly pleasing to God. Others hold with Lessius that the Mass is a sacrifice because the words of consecration tend to bring about the actual separation of Christ's body and blood, and the realization of this tendency is impeded only by the present impassible state of the Savior. De Lugo, whose view is accepted by many modern theologians, sees the specific reason of the Eucharistic sacrifice in the fact that Christ is placed illocally under the species of bread and wine, and is thus deprived of the connatural functions of His humanity, becoming present in the condition of food and drink. Again, very many hold with Cardinal Billot, that by reason of the separate consecration of bread and wine Christ is mystically immolated *in specie sacramenti* as He was once really immolated in His natural body. Beside these views there are many others, but they contribute little towards clearing up the mystery.

Some of the remaining theological differences, which are almost innumerable, will be briefly touched upon in the following chapter. Enough has been said to make the reader keenly conscious of two facts: First, that since the Council of Trent there has been displayed an intense activity in the theological world; secondly, that without the guidance of an infallible Church, religious belief can find no security anywhere.

CHAPTER XXIX

HERETICAL TENDENCIES

Although the Council of Trent, besides defining many points of doctrine, also afforded much help to theological inquirers by embodying in the chapters of its various sessions timely expositions of truths still open for discussion, yet it only partially succeeded in suppressing such heretical tendencies as were not directly affected by its condemnation of Protestant errors. Men's minds were restless, and not a few of those who still remained faithful to the Church allowed the critical attitude of the sixteenth-century innovators to influence their views and judgments. Hence the repeated appearance of theological opinions that called for censure on the part of the Church; hence, too, the tenacity with which writers clung to their views after judgment had been given against them by the teaching authority which they themselves acknowledged as competent to decide matters of faith. The following few points will suffice to illustrate the tendencies in question.

1. *Baius and Baianism.*— Michael Baius and his friend John Hessels were both connected with the University of Louvain, and they first broached their untenable views during the absence of Chancellor Tapper, who had been sent as theologian to the Council of Trent. On his return, in 1552, he took immediate steps to counteract the evil influence of the two innovators. Through the intervention of Cardinal Granvelle, archbishop of Mechlin, Baius and Hessels were induced to discontinue the spreading of opinions that could apparently not be sustained. They remained quiet till Tapper's death, in 1559, but after that they began the discussion anew. Though ably opposed by the Jesuits and Franciscans, they carried on an active propaganda and gained many adherents. Then the

Franciscans brought the matter before the Sarbonne of Paris, with the result that eighteen propositions taken from the writings of Baius and Hessels were severely censured. As this did not end the dispute, Pope Pius IV imposed silence on both parties. A few years later, Baius and his friend were sent to the Council of Trent as theologians of the king of Spain.

It was in 1566, two years after the closing of the Council, and the very year of Hessel's death, that Baius gathered together the various tracts he and his friend had issued from time to time, and published them under the title *Opuscula Omnia.* Shortly after their appearance, complaint was lodged with the Pope that they contained many unsound doctrines. In consequence of this, Pius V, on October 1, 1567, issued the Bull *Ex omnibus afflictionibus,* which condemned seventy-nine propositions defended by Baius, but did not mention the author's name. The Bull closes with the sentence: *Quas quidem sententias . . . quamquam nonnullae aliquo pacto sustineri possent * in rigore et proprio verborum sensu ab assertoribus intento ** haereticas erroneas suspectas . . . damnamus.* As the document was without punctuation, a controversy immediately arose about the *comma Pianum,* that is, whether a comma should be placed at * or at **, the meaning of the sentence being obviously quite different according as the one or the other position were chosen. The discussion dragged on for a number of years, and it was not until Gregory XIII, in 1579, by the Bull *Provisionis nostrae,* confirmed the preceding condemnation that Baius finally submitted.

The errors of Baius have a bearing upon the threefold state of man: The state of innocence, of fallen nature, and of redeemed nature. The following is a brief outline of them as contained in his writings.

(a) The state of innocence, in which our first parents were placed, was not supernatural in the strict sense of the term. For the various gifts from which that state resulted were due to human nature, at least in the sense that without them man could not be saved. Destination to heaven, the inherent power of meriting, freedom from concupiscence, immunity from ignorance, preservation from suffering and death, are all nor-

mal requirements of human nature, and therefore they cannot strictly be called gratuitous gifts of grace.

(b) Fallen nature was not only deprived of sanctifying grace and the various gifts connected with the state of innocence, but was vitiated by a positive evil quality, which consists in concupiscence; and this concupiscence, as transmitted by the laws of heredity, constitutes original sin. Concupiscence is a sin irrespective of its relation to the will; hence, aside from the redemption, human nature is incapable of doing good; its actions are necessarily sinful. Furthermore, moral responsibility does not require that the agent enjoy freedom from internal determinism, but only from external coercion. Hence, in the state of fallen nature, man's will is not really free.

(c) In the state of redeemed nature, the gifts of primitive innocence are restored; and as they are no longer due to man because of the fall, they must now be regarded as gifts of grace. However, they are supernatural only in a relative sense, that is, as referred to man's present unworthiness. Grace does not elevate human nature to a strictly supernatural state; its office and purpose is to keep concupiscence under control, and thus enable man to fulfill the law and perform moral actions. Hence in justification there is no interior renovation, but only a canceling of liability to punishment.[1]

These views of Baius are evidently irreconcilable with the teaching of the Church as formulated by the Council of Trent. For in its decree on original sin, the Council quite clearly assumes that the gift of primitive justice was supernatural, and that original sin consists, not in a positive deterioration of human nature, but in the forfeiture of purely gratuitous privileges. Then, in the decree on justification, it describes the process by which man is transferred from the state of sin to that of justice as an interior renovation of the soul by means of inherent grace.[2] Consequently, the condemnation of Baianism by Pius V, though an *ex cathedra* pronouncement, does little more than apply the principles laid down at Trent.

[1] Cfr. Schwane, VI, 239 sqq.; DB. [2] Cfr. DB. 787 sqq.; 793 sqq. 1001 sqq.

2. *Jansenius and Jansenism.*— Cornelius Jansen was born in 1585, near Leerdam, Holland. He received his early education at Utrecht, and then studied philosophy and theology at Louvain. During his theological studies he came under the influence of Jacques Janson, who was deeply imbued with the errors of Baius. It was most likely owing to this influence that Jansenius later on revived Baianism in a somewhat modified form. Whilst studying at Louvain, he formed a close friendship with Jean du Verger de Hauranne, through whose recommendation he was afterwards appointed director of the episcopal college at Bayonne, in France. There the two friends devoted about twelve years to a close study of the Fathers, especially of St. Augustine. Then Jansenius returned to Louvain, where he was appointed president of the new college de Sainte-Pulchérie. He received the degree of Doctor of Theology in 1619, and then taught exegesis with great renown. In 1636 he was consecrated bishop of Ypres, where he died two years later in sentiments of great piety.

He is the author of many works, mostly on Holy Scripture, all of which were published after his death. With the exception of one, they are all perfectly orthodox in doctrine. This one exception is a work in three volumes, usually cited under the title *Augustinus.* It purports to be a faithful exposition of the teaching of St. Augustine against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians. Hence the full title is: *Cornelii Jansenii, Episcopi Yprensis, Augustinus, seu doctrina S. Augustini de humanae naturae sanitate, aegritudine, medicina, adversus Pelagianos et Massilienses.* In making provisions for its publication, the author is said to have declared: "If the Holy See wishes any change, I am an obedient son, and I submit to that Church in which I have lived to my dying hour. This is my last wish." Hence, although the work contains grave errors against the faith, it would not be fair to accuse Jansenius of formal heresy.

The errors of Jansenius are fundamentally the same as those of Baius. He, too, looks upon the primitive state of our first parents as devoid of strictly supernatural gifts, in as much as the beatific vision is the necessary end of human nature. Consequently, when man by his fall into sin forfeited the

spiritual endowments that fitted him for the attainment of his end, he was deprived of what belonged to his natural integrity. The result of this privation is the utter corruption of our nature, which shows itself chiefly in the powerlessness of our will. In fact, our will is purely passive, and is irresistibly moved to good or evil according as the attraction of grace or concupiscence is stronger. Thus the will always acts under the pressure of internal necessity; but this necessity is conceived to be compatible with freedom, and therefore we are morally responsible for our actions.

This, according to Jansenius, represents the genuine teaching of St. Augustine, whose writings against the Pelagians he claimed to have read thirty times. The book was received with great applause in the Netherlands, and also found many admirers in France, where the ground had been prepared by the author's friend, Verger de Hauranne. At the same time it was severely attacked by Jesuit theologians, with the result that Urban VIII forbade its circulation. It found an ardent defender in the person of the Sarbonnist Antoine Arnauld, whose hatred of the Jesuits injected a great deal of unnecessary bitterness into the discussion. In 1649, at the instance of the Syndic Cornet, the Sarbonne took up the matter, and the result was that eighty-eight bishops demanded the condemnation of five theses taken from the *Augustinus*. They wrote in this sense to the Sovereign Pontiff, Innocent X, but as eleven other bishops asked for further investigation, a commission of five cardinals and thirteen consultors was appointed for that purpose. The examination lasted two years, and although some members of the commission were in favor of Jansenius, the five propositions were solemnly condemned in the Bull *Cum occasione*, May 31, 1653.

The condemned propositions read as follows: —

(a) Some of God's commandments are impossible to just men who wish and strive to keep them, considering the powers they actually have; the grace by which these precepts may become possible is also wanting to them.

(b) In the state of fallen nature no one ever resists interior grace.

(c) In order to merit or demerit, in the state of fallen nature, we must be free from all external constraint, but not from interior necessity.

(d) The Semi-Pelagians admitted the necessity of interior preventing grace for all acts, even for the beginning of faith; but they fell into heresy in pretending that this grace is such that man may either follow or resist it.

(f) It is Semi-Pelagian to say that Christ died or shed His blood for all men.[3]

The first four of these propositions are absolutely condemned as heretical; while the fifth is condemned as heretical when taken in the sense that Christ died only for the predestined.

The condemnation was accepted by the Jansenists in so far as the doctrine contained in the five propositions came in question, but they denied that these propositions represented the genuine teaching of Jansenius. Innocent X, in 1656, rejected the distinction thus made between the question of right and fact, and so did Alexander VII a year later. In the Bull *Ad sanctam Beati Petri sedem,* of October 16, he confirmed the condemnation pronounced by his predecessor in these terms: "We declare and define that the five propositions have been drawn from the book of Jansenius entitled *Augustinus,* and that they have been condemned in the sense of the same Jansenius, and we once more condemn them as such." However, in spite of this clear condemnation, the conflict continued. Not only Arnauld, Pascal, and the religious of Port Royal, but several bishops also refused to subscribe the formula enjoined by the Constitution *Regiminis Apostolici,* of February 15, 1664. The more moderate of the French Jansenists then took the position that a respectful silence was all that could be required by the Holy See. This view was finally condemned by Clement XI, who on July 16, 1705, issued the Bull *Vineam Domini Sabaoth.* After that the opposition in France broke down, and Port Royal, the center of the rebellion, was destroyed.[4]

Meanwhile the followers of Jansenius in the Netherlands

[3] Cfr. DB. 1092 sqq.

[4] Cfr. Schwane, VI, 383 sqq.; Paquier, Jansenisme, etude doctrinal d'apres les sources, Paris, 1909.

prepared the way for a schism. In 1702, the Vicar Apostolic Peter Kodde had been suspended on suspicion of Jansenistic leanings, and when a successor was nominated, the States-General and a number of the clergy protested. The conflict lasted till 1723, when the Jansenist chapter of Utrecht elected Cornelius Steenoven archbishop of that see. Some years later two suffragan bishoprics were established, one at Haarlem and the other at Deventer. As Rome refused to recognize these appointments, the schism became permanent. However, even to-day, the Jansenist party in Holland counts only a few thousand adherents.[5]

3. *Paschase Quesnel.*— Quesnel was at first a member of the French Oratory, but was expelled from that congregation for his Jansenistic opinions in 1684. He published several editions of the New Testament, with comments and moral reflections. The last edition, in four large volumes, appeared in 1693, under the title: *The New Testament in French with Moral Reflections on Each Verse.* It had the approbation of Noailles, bishop of Chalons, and was very favorably received. However, as the "reflexions" reproduced the teaching of Jansenius and Baius on grace and the salvific will of God, several bishops forbade the reading of the book. Noailles, who had meanwhile been created cardinal and made archbishop of Paris, found himself under the necessity of withdrawing his approbation, but for a time hesitated to do so. Then appeal was made to Clement XI, who, after a careful examination of the book, issued the Bull *Unigenitus,* in which 101 propositions were condemned.[6]

As several of the condemned propositions, when taken apart from the context, seemed to have an orthodox sense, Noailles and eight other bishops applied to Rome for explanations before accepting the Bull. Thereupon a lengthy discussion ensued, in course of which a number of bishops, and hundreds of clerics and religious appealed from the Pope to a general council. However, the Pope remained firm, and in the Bull *Pastoralis officii,* of 1718, excommunicated the appellants.

[5] Cfr. Hergenrother, VI, 359 sqq. [6] Cfr. DB. 1351 sqq.

But they refused to submit, and it was not until Cardinal Noailles, in 1728, finally accepted the Bull *Unigenitus,* that the conflict gradually came to an end.

4. *Gallicanism.*—The essence of Gallicanism may be said to consist in a tendency to restrain and limit the Pope's authority in the Church in favor of the rights of bishops and of the temporal ruler. This tendency manifested itself in France for the first time at the beginning of the fourteenth century, during the conflict between Philip the Fair and Boniface VIII. In virtue of certain privileges, which he claimed had been granted to Charlemagne and his successors, the king maintained that he had the right to dispose of vacant ecclesiastical benefices. When Boniface refused to allow this claim, he, with the consent of the nobility and a large number of the clergy, appealed from the Pope to a future general council, implying thereby the superiority of the council to the Pope. Similar ideas were introduced into the schools by William Ockam, John of Jandun, and Marsilius of Padua, professors in the University of Paris. Although condemned by John XXII, and also by the University authorities, they persisted and found many defenders. At the time when the Council of Constance opened, Gallicanism had already struck deep root in the minds of the French people and clergy, and the action of the Council in a manner legitimatized the principles involved. It must be noted, however, that the proceedings of the Council in this matter were irregular and without proper authority.

Gallicanism is of two kinds: Parliamentary and Episcopal. The former involves the tendency to augment the right of the State to the prejudice of those of the Church. The latter involves a similar tendency to augment the ecclesiastical authority of the bishops to the prejudice of those of the Pope. Both claim to be a defense of the so-called Liberties of the Gallican Church.

The most important of the Liberties defended by Parliamentary Gallicanism are the following: The kings of France have the right to assemble councils in their dominions, and to make laws and regulations touching ecclesiastical matters.

The Pope's legates cannot be sent into France, or exercise their powers within that kingdom, except at the king's request or with his consent. Bishops, even when commanded by the Pope, cannot go out of the kingdom without the consent of the king. The royal officers cannot be excommunicated for any act performed in the discharge of their official duties. The Pope cannot authorize the alienation of any ecclesiastical landed estate, or the diminishing of any foundations. The Pope's Bulls and Letters may not be executed without the *Pareatis* of the king or his officers. He cannot issue dispensations to the prejudice of the laudable customs and statutes of cathedral churches. It is lawful to appeal from him to a future council, or to have recourse to the "appeal as from an abuse" against acts of the ecclesiastical power.— Altogether, as drawn up by the Jurisconsults Guy Coquille and Pierre Pithou, there were eighty-three of these "Liberties," and they practically did away with the Pope's authority in France.

Episcopal Gallicanism, which had found expression at Constance and Basle, grew constantly in force till the beginning of the sixteenth century, when through the exertions of the League against the Huguenots there was a brief reaction. It was revived after the assassination of Henry IV in 1610, and through the activity of Edmond Richer, syndic of the Sarbonne, again rapidly gained in strength. In 1663, the Sarbonne openly declared that it did not recognize the Pope's superiority to a general council, nor his infallibility apart from the consent of the Church. Matters came to a crisis some twenty years later, when Pope Innocent XI resisted the pretensions of Louis XIV in reference to the *regalia*. In the General Assembly of 1682, at which were present thirty-six prelates and thirty-four deputies of the second order, four articles were adopted in which Episcopal Gallicanism found its official expression. The first, however, deals only with temporal matters. They were drafted by Bossuet, bishop of Meaux. In substance they read as follows: —

(a) St. Peter and the Popes, his successors, and the Church itself have received dominion from God only over things spiritual and such as concern salvation, and not over things tem-

poral and civil. Hence kings and sovereigns are not by God's command subject to any ecclesiastical dominion in things temporal; they cannot be deposed, whether directly or indirectly, by the authority of the rulers of the Church; their subjects cannot be dispensed from that submission and obedience which they owe to their sovereign, nor can they be absolved from the oath of allegiance.

(b) The plenitude of authority in things spiritual, which belongs to the Holy See and the successors of St. Peter, in no wise affects the permanence and immovable strength of the decrees of the Council of Constance drawn up in the fourth and fifth sessions, approved by the Holy See, confirmed by the practice of the whole Church and the Roman Pontiff, and observed in all ages by the Gallican Church. That Church does not countenance the opinion of those who cast a slur on those decrees, or who lessen their force by saying that their authority is not well established, that they are not approved, or that they apply only to the period of the schism.

(c) The exercise of the Apostolic authority must also be regulated in accordance with the canons drawn up under the guidance of the Spirit of God, and consecrated by the respect of the whole world. The rules, customs, and constitutions received within the kingdom and the Gallican Church must have their force and their effect, and the usages of our fathers must remain inviolable, since the dignity of the Apostolic See itself demands that the laws and customs established with the consent of that august see and of the Churches be constantly maintained.

(d) Although the Pope has the chief authority in questions of faith, and his decrees apply to all the Churches, and to each Church in particular, yet his judgment is not irreformable, at least pending the consent of the Church.[7]

A few days later, Louis ordered the registration of the articles in all the schools and faculties of theology, and no one could be admitted to a degree without having defended the articles in one of his theses. Furthermore, it was strictly for-

[7] Cfr. DB. 1322 sqq.

bidden to attack them in writing. Pope Innocent XI took a firm stand against the action of the General Assembly, and so did his successor Alexander VIII. The latter, in the Constitution *Inter multiplices,* of August 4, 1690, issued a strong condemnation of the four articles, and refused to confirm any bishop elected in accordance with the provisions contained therein. Under his successor, Innocent XII, some kind of an understanding was reached, and thereafter Gallicanism began to decline. It was, however, not entirely eradicated until after the Vatican Council.[8]

5. *Febronianism.*— In concept and purpose, Febronianism is a politico-ecclesiastical system founded on a denial of the monarchical constitution of the Church. Its author was Johann Nikolaus von Hontheim, auxiliary bishop of Trier, who wrote under the pseudonym Justinus Febronius. He had studied at Louvain under the canonist van Espen, through whose influence he became deeply imbued with Gallican principles. However, in the development of these principles, he went far beyond the traditional Gallicanism which his master had introduced into the Low Countries. In working out his system, he seems to have been guided by the thought of facilitating the reconciliation of Protestant bodies with the Church. At least to this thought he gives expression in the title under which he published his work, which reads: *Justini Febronii Juris consulti de Statu Ecclesiae et legitima potestate Romani Pontificis singularis ad reuniendos dissidentes in religione christianos compositus.* The work appeared first in 1763, and in a short time ran through several editions. Its contents may be briefly summarized as follows: —

The power of the keys was entrusted by Christ to the Church as a body, but in such a way that it should be exercised through her prelates. Hence the power is possessed by the Church, and the prelates have only the use of it in so far as she communicates it to them for her own purposes. The first place among her prelates is held by the Pope, but even he is subordinated to the Church as a whole. The Roman Primacy does not

[8] Ibid. 1326.

rest on the authority of Christ, but on that of Peter and the Church, and therefore the Church has power to attach the primatial dignity to any other church, as may be expedient under given circumstances. As head of the Church, it is incumbent on the Pope to watch over her welfare, to promulgate laws in her name, and to enforce the observance of the canons; yet he has no real power of jurisdiction. He merely uses the jurisdiction that belongs to the Church as a whole.

Now, in course of time, especially through the influence of the False Decretals of Pseudo-Isidore, the See of Rome has acquired a far-reaching authority, to which it has no right; of this it must be deprived, so as to bring back the condition of things that obtained during the first eight centuries. Accordingly, such questions as were in olden times left to the decision of provincial synods and of metropolitans, but are now reserved to the Holy See, must no longer be submitted to the judgment of the Pope. Hence the election and confirmation of bishops, their transfer and removal, the establishment of new sees, the condemnation of heresies, and similar matters of local interest, lie outside the scope of the primatial power. So, too, does the granting of benefices, and the exemption of religious orders.

Furthermore, as the Pope is not infallible, he cannot, on his own authority, give any decisions on matters of faith that are of universal obligation. Nor can he in matters of discipline legislate for the whole Church, and laws once properly promulgated he cannot alter. He is subordinate to a general council, and hence the right of appeal from his authority to a future general council must be admitted. He has neither the exclusive right to summon a general council nor to preside at its sessions. Moreover, the decrees of general councils do not need the ratification of the Pope. On the other hand, such decrees are not binding until they have been accepted by the whole Church.

Lastly, although the Pope is to a certain extent entrusted with the care of the whole Church, yet in the exercise of his power in that regard he is not wholly independent of the State. Catholic sovereigns ought to take a reasonable interest

in the welfare of the Church in their dominions, and for this purpose, according to the need there may be of it, they should avail themselves of the *Regium Placet* as regards the publication of papal decrees. In like manner they should refuse obedience to the Pope, if the interests of the national Church require it. Subjects, moreover, must have the right to appeal to the secular authority by way of the *Apellatio ab abusu*.[9]

As is quite evident from this brief summary, the real object aimed at by Febronius was nothing less than the establishment of national Churches that were to be practically independent of the Pope, and more or less subject to the State. His system is a combination of Gallicanism and Cæsarism, and as such it is the very antithesis of the Church Catholic. It was reduced to practice by Joseph II of Austria, with the result that in his dominions the Church was almost ruined. The book was formally condemned by Clement XIII, in 1764, but it continued to be widely read and was translated into German, French, Spanish, and Portuguese. Pius VI, in 1778, induced the author to retract his views; but it is very doubtful whether the retractation was sincere, as he continued to write in defense of his position. At all events, the pernicious effects of his work were not checked, and many Catholic sovereigns eagerly accepted his ideas in order to promote their own interests at the expense of the Church.

6. *The Synod of Pistoia.*— The politico-ecclesiastical system of Febronius, tried on a grand scale in Austria by Emperor Joseph II, was also introduced into Italy by Joseph's brother, Grand Duke Leopold of Tuscany. The reform measures to be enacted were outlined in two instructions sent to the bishops in Leopold's dominion, and it was made incumbent upon the prelates to convene synods at which doctrinal, disciplinary, and liturgical matters were to be discussed and regulated. The bishops, however, proved intractable, the only one who entirely fell in with Leopold's designs being Scipio de' Ricci, bishop of Pistoia and Prato. He convoked a synod on July 31, 1786, having invited thereto many canonists and

[9] Cfr. Schwane, VI, 529 sqq.; DB. 1500 sqq.

theologians who were noted for their Gallican and Jansenistic tendencies. The synod was attended by 246 members, who for the most part were strongly in sympathy with de' Ricci's designs. Many of them had been irregularly intruded from other dioceses, while those of Ricci's priests who were known for their orthodoxy had not been invited.

As might have been expected under the circumstances, Leopold's ideas were fully carried out. The four Gallican articles were adopted, the Pope was declared to be merely the ministerial head of the Church, episcopal powers and rights were said to be derived immediately from Christ, and parish priests, when acting in conjunction with the bishop, were held to be judges of the faith. Regarding questions of strictly doctrinal import, such as the primitive condition of man, the nature and action of grace, the administration of the sacraments, the sacrifice of the Mass, indulgences, the veneration of images, and the practice of the Sacred Heart devotion, strongly Jansenistic views prevailed. The Synod closed on September 28, and in February of the following year its proceedings were published with the royal *imprimatur*. After a careful examination of the Pistoian enactments by a commission of cardinals and bishops, Pius VI condemned eighty-five propositions, in the Bull *Auctorem fidei* of August 28, 1794. Meanwhile, on the accession of Leopold to the imperial throne, de' Ricci had been compelled to resign his see. With his retirement and the papal condemnation of the Synod, Jansenistic influence in Italy came to an end.[10]

7. *Rationalism.*— From the middle of the eighteenth centurn forward there was a decided turning away of men's minds from the supernatural, with the result that many, especially among the upper classes of society, gave up all belief in revealed religion. Naturalism, deism, and rationalism were substituted for the teaching of Christianity, and intellectual Europe seemed to be drifting back into paganism. This condition of things obtained mostly among non-Catholics, but traces of it were found also in Catholic circles. And in not

[10] Cfr. DB. 1501 sqq.

a few instances, well intentioned men only aggravated the evil by their misdirected efforts to counteract it. The most distinguished of these men were Hermes, Guenther, Bonnety, and Bautain. Both philosophical and theological learning were at a low ebb, Scholasticism had again fallen into disrepute, and in their endeavor to strike out into new directions they went considerably astray.

Hermes, for ten years professor of dogmatic theology at Bonn, was strongly influenced by the teaching of Kant and Fichte, although he professedly opposed their systems of thought. At the same time he followed Descartes in making "methodical doubt" the starting point of all certitude. In fact, he goes even a step farther and asserts that one must *positively* doubt everything until reason finds something that admits of no doubt. And this holds true in theology as well as in philosophy. Hence faith no less than science rests upon the demonstrations of reason. In this, however, he distinguishes between practical and theoretical reason. The former accepts revelation because it is compelled to do so by man's moral needs; while the latter yields only to the evidence of a demonstrated truth.

The author developed his system in two works, entitled respectively, *Introduction to Philosophy,* and, *Introduction to Theology,* and then applied it in his *Dogmatik.* He had many followers, and, protected by the Prussian government and his own archbishop, he was left unmolested during his life time; but some years after his death a commission was appointed by the Pope to investigate the charge of unorthodoxy lodged against him at Rome. The commission found the charge only too true, and in consequence Gregory XVI, in a Brief of September 26, 1835, condemned the theological teaching of Hermes as "false, rash, captious, leading to skepticism and indifferentism, erroneous, scandalous, harmful to Catholic schools, subversive of divine faith, savoring of heresy and already condemned by the Church." The chief errors of Hermes designated by the papal Brief bear on the nature and rule of faith; on Holy Scripture and tradition, revelation, and the teaching office of the Church; the motives of credibility,

the proofs of the existence of God, and the doctrines concerning the nature of the holiness, justice, and freedom of God, and His ultimate purpose in His works *ad extra;* on the necessity of grace and its bestowal; on the reward and punishment of men; on the primitive state of our first parents; on original sin and on the powers of man in the fallen state.[11]

Similar lines of thought were followed by Anton Guenther, a private ecclesiastic residing at Vienna, who from 1818 until the condemnation of his works in 1857, displayed a ceaseless literary activity. His constant aim was to refute the pantheism of modern philosophy, and to demonstrate from the standpoint of natural reason the truth of positive Christianity. The better to accomplish this, he departed from the beaten path of Scholasticism and endeavored to construct an entirely new system of Christian philosophy. Unfortunately, he allowed himself to be unduly influenced by the methods of Hegel and Schelling, whose philosophy he tried to refute. His views, however, were widely adopted by Catholic scholars in Germany, although their unsoundness was clearly pointed out by men of recognized ability and learning.

In 1852, the Congregation of the Index began an official investigation of Guenther's writings, and five years later placed them on the list of forbidden books. This condemnation was approved by Pius IX, who, on June 15, 1857, addressed a Brief to Cardinal von Geissel, archbishop of Cologne, in which he pointed out some of the more serious of Guenther's errors. Aside from the fundamental rationalism which vitiates the author's philosophy, these errors bear especially on the Trinity, the person of Christ, the nature of man, creation, and particularly on the relation of faith to knowledge. Guenther himself submitted to the judgment passed on his works, and discontinued writing; but some of his followers kept up an active propaganda for his views until after the Vatican Council.[12]

An altogether opposite tendency, by way of reaction against rationalism, manifested itself in France, where Bautain and

[11] Cfr. DB. 1618 sqq.

[12] Cfr. DB. 1655 sqq.

Bonnety labored for the establishment of traditionalism. They built on the philosophical concepts of Bonald and F. de Lamennais, according to which human reason is of itself radically unable to know with certainty the fundamental truths of the metaphysical, moral, and religious order. Hence all knowledge must ultimately be traced back to revelation, and only by the transmission of revealed truths is the human mind put into the possession of such first principles as it needs for its proper operation. The system was condemned by Rome in so far as the authors were required to subscribe a number of theses in which the priority of reason to faith, the demonstrability of the existence of God, of the spirituality of the soul, of human liberty, and the harmony between faith and reason were asserted.[13]

Besides the tendencies thus briefly outlined, there were many others, in all the various fields of intellectual activity, that ran more or less counter to received views and approved teaching. Some of them, like the quietistic vagaries of Michael de Molinos,[14] were almost entirely confined to the order of Christian morality; others, like the ontological speculations of Gioberti and Rosmini,[15] bore primarily upon philosophical questions. Indirectly, indeed, they also touched Christian dogma, but they never exerted a far-reaching influence in that direction.

[13] Cfr. DB. 1622 sqq.; 1649 sqq.
[14] Cfr. DB. 1221 sqq.
[15] Cfr. DB. 1659 sqq.

CHAPTER XXX

SOME PAPAL DECISIONS: THE VATICAN COUNCIL: MODERNISM

Although the infallibility of the Pope had not yet been defined, in practice it was accepted by the whole Church. It is true, the Gallicans made it dependent on the assent of the episcopate, but they were only a small faction and had little influence outside of France. Hence papal decisions in matters of faith were generally regarded as final, provided it was sufficiently clear that the Pope intended to speak in his capacity of chief shepherd of the faithful. In the lapse of centuries, many such decisions issued from the Holy See, as is quite evident from what has been said in the preceding chapter. Most of them have been referred to in the course of the book, but a few deserve special notice in this place.

A — Some Papal Decisions [1]

1. *The Immaculate Conception.*— The most important of these decisions regard the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary. The question had been in dispute for centuries, although after the Council of Trent there were but few theologians who did not consider it rash to impugn the doctrine. The very fact that the Council took occasion to declare that it was in no wise its intention to include the Blessed Virgin among those who had incurred the guilt of original sin, and that it renewed "the constitutions of Pope Sixtus IV," [2] was generally considered as a clear indication that the Church regarded the question to be no longer open for discussion. The constitutions of Sixtus IV referred to by the Council are two in number. One was issued on February 28, 1476, and in it the Pope adopted the feast for the entire

[1] Cfr. Bachelet, Immac. Concept.; Reiner, Der Syllabus.

[2] Cfr. DB. 792.

Latin Church, at the same time granting an indulgence to all who would assist at the divine offices of the solemnity.[3] The other appeared on September 4, 1483, and was intended to end the dispute between the opponents of the doctrine and those who were in favor of it. Therein also excommunication was pronounced against either of the disputants who charged their adversaries with heresy.[4]

After the Council of Trent, the doctrine was denied, among others, by Baius, who explicitly asserted that "no one but Christ was without original sin, and that therefore the Blessed Virgin had died because of the sin contracted in Adam, and had endured afflictions in this life, like the rest of the just, as a punishment of actual and original sin."[5] This proposition was condemned by Pius V, as already noted in the preceding chapter. The same Pontiff, moreover, issued a Constitution in which he forbade all public discussion of the subject, and also inserted a new office of the Immaculate Conception in the liturgical books.[6] On December 8, 1661, Alexander VII promulgated the Constitution *Solicitudo omnium Ecclesiarum,* in which he defined the true sense of the term *conceptio,* and forbade all further discussion in any way opposed to the common and pious sentiment of the Church. He declared it to be the object of the feast that Mary was preserved immune from original sin in the first moment of the creation of her soul and its infusion into the body.[7]

From that time forward the definition of the doctrine was only a question of time. Hence when Pius IX, soon after his elevation to the pontifical chair, directed the bishops of the whole world to send in a report both as to their own views and the belief of the faithful, there was not a dissentient voice as regarded the truth of the doctrine. Furthermore, only four bishops considered the definition inopportune. In consequence, on December 8, 1854, the Pope issued the Bull *Ineffabilis,* in which the truth of Mary's Immaculate Conception was defined as having been revealed by God.[8]

[3] Cfr. Ibid. 734, 735.
[4] Ibid. 735.
[5] Ibid. 1073.
[6] Cfr. Bullar. Mar. 72 sqq.
[7] Cfr. DB. 1100.
[8] Cfr. DB. 1641.

2. *The Syllabus of Pius IX.*— On December 8, 1864, a document was sent to all Catholic bishops under the title: "A Syllabus containing the most important errors of our time, which have been condemned by our Holy Father Pius IX in Allocutions, at Consistories, in Encyclicals, and other Apostolic Letters." The document was accompanied by a letter of Cardinal Antonelli, Secretary of State, explaining the purpose of the Syllabus. As there was danger, the letter stated, that the various papal documents, in which modern errors had been condemned, might not reach each and every bishop of the Catholic world, a syllabus of these same errors had been drawn up for the proper instruction of all ordinaries, so that thereby they might be enabled to apply necessary remedies. At the same time, the Bull *Quanta cura,* which contains an exposition and explicit condemnation of the more fundamental modern errors, was also published.

The Syllabus had been in preparation for about twelve years, and three different commissions had successively labored at its composition. Its contents are divided into eighty theses, the wording of which is taken from the official declarations of the Pope. To each thesis a reference is attached, indicating the particular papal document from which it was taken. It is only by referring to the documents in question that the full meaning and theological value of the subjects treated can be determined. The eighty theses are grouped in ten paragraphs, the respective headings of which are: Pantheism, Naturalism, Absolute Rationalism (1–7); Moderate Rationalism (8–14); Indifferentism and false Religious Tolerance (15–18); Socialism, Communism, Secret Societies, Bible Societies, Liberal Clerical Associations, Errors regarding the Church and its Rights (19–38); Errors on the State and its Relation to the Church (39–55); Errors on Natural and Christian Ethics (56–64); Errors on Christian Marriage (65–74); Errors on the Temporal Power of the Pope (75, 76); Errors in Connection with Modern Liberalism (77–80).[9]

[9] Cfr. Ibid. 1700–1780.

The publication of the Syllabus caused a most violent outcry among non-Catholics, who regarded it as a formal rejection of modern culture and an open declaration of war against the rights of the State. On the other hand, Catholics viewed it with great satisfaction, as it clearly defined the position of the Church in regard to matters of the gravest practical importance. Its binding force was universally and gladly admitted, although lively discussions ensued in regard to its exact theological value. In fact the discussion is still going on, nor is it likely to be ever set completely at rest. While many theologians contend that the Syllabus is an ex-cathedra pronouncement, and therefore final and irreformable, others seriously question this, although they admit that it commands not only exterior submission but also interior assent. Furthermore, all are agreed that many propositions contained in the Syllabus have been condemned by final and irreformable decisions in the various documents from which they were taken. It is, therefore, to these documents that one must have recourse in order to determine the theological censure attached to any given proposition.

B — The Vatican Council [10]

On December 6, 1864, therefore two days before the publication of the Syllabus, Pope Pius IX, at a meeting of the Congregation of Rites, announced his intention of convening a general council. He then requested the cardinals to express their opinion in writing, both as to the opportuneness of carrying out his intention and the subjects that were to be discussed. As, with one exception, the reports of the cardinals favored the holding of a council, a commission was appointed to discuss preliminary questions and make all necessary preparations. At its suggestion, a number of bishops of both rites were also requested to send in their views under pledge of silence. Then many of the ablest theologians and canonists

[10] Cfr. Granderath und Kirch, Geschichte des vaticanischen Konzils; Granderath, Constitutiones dogmaticae; Vacant, Etudes theologiques sur les constitutions du concile Vatican; Gibbons, A Retrospect of Fifty Years, vol. I.

were summoned from the various countries to coöperate in the work of preparing the subjects to be debated in the Council.

The first public announcement of the contemplated Council was made at a Consistory held on June 26, 1867. As it was the centennial celebration of the Apostles SS. Peter and Paul, there were nearly five hundred bishops present in Rome, and in an address, dated July 1, they communicated their joyous agreement to the Sovereign Pontiff. The Bull of Convocation was issued on June 29, 1868, and it appointed December 8, 1869, as the date on which the Council was to open. A special Brief, *Arcano divinae providentiae,* was issued on September 8, 1868, to invite the non-Uniate Orientals; while another Brief, *Jam vos omnes,* of September 13, notified the various Protestant sects of the approaching Council, and exhorted them to reflect on the possibility of returning to the true faith.

By way of preparation, five special committees, each presided over by a cardinal, had been appointed to prepare the *schemata* that were to be laid before the Council. Their respective work bore on dogma, Church discipline, religious orders, Oriental Churches and missions, and ecclesiastico-political questions. When the Council opened, the following drafts were ready for discussion: (a) three drafts on dogmatic subjects, namely, on Catholic doctrine in opposition to the errors of rationalism, on the Church of Christ, and on Christian marriage. (b) twenty-eight drafts treating of Church discipline, in respect to bishops, episcopal sees, the different grades of the lower clergy, seminaries, the arrangement of philosophical and theological studies, marriage, Christian morals, etc. (c) eighteen drafts of decrees on religious orders. (d) two drafts in reference to Oriental Rites and missions. Besides the matter thus officially prepared, many petitions had been received from various bishops, asking for the discussion of certain subjects in which they were specially interested. Among these were nine petitions, signed by nearly two hundred bishops, that requested the definition of the bodily assumption of the Blessed Virgin.

On December 2, 1869, a preliminary session was held in the Sistine Chapel, at which the officials of the Council were announced and the conciliar procedure was outlined. The formal opening took place six days later, December 8, in the northern right transept of St. Peter's. Between that date and September 1, when the Council was prorogued, four public sessions and eighty-nine general congregations were held. The voting in the congregations was by *placet, placet juxta modum, non placet.* In the public sessions it was by *placet* or *non placet,* according as the vote cast was affirmative or negative. The decrees promulgated by the Pope were to bear the title: *Pius Episcopus, servus servorum Dei: sacro approbante Concilio ad perpetuam rei memoriam.* Altogether 774 prelates took part in the Council, out of a total of 1050 who were entitled to attend.

Owing to the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war, and the subsequent occupation of Rome by the Piedmontese, only a small part of the contemplated work was accomplished by the Council. Two Constitutions were promulgated, both rather brief, but of great importance. The first is the dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic faith, which defends the fundamental principles of Christianity against the errors of modern rationalism, materialism, and atheism. The second is the dogmatic Constitution on the Church of Christ, or, as it is more frequently styled, on the Roman Pontiff. This latter contains the definition of papal infallibility, for which petitions had been sent in by a large number of bishops. Both Constitutions are divided into preambles, chapters, and canons.

The contents of the first Constitution may be thus summarized: In the first chapter is set forth the doctrine of the existence of a personal God, who for the manifestation of His perfections freely created all things out of nothing, foresees all things, even the future free actions of rational creatures, and through His providence leads all things to their appointed end. In the second chapter the knowability of God is maintained, both in regard to natural reason and supernatural revelation. The necessity and existence of revelation is pointed out, and the two sources of revealed knowledge, Holy Scrip-

ture and tradition, are defended. The doctrine here set forth is a restatement of the teaching of Trent The third chapter treats of supernatural faith, its reasonableness, supernatural character, and necessity; the possibility and actuality of miracles as a confirmation of divine revelation, and the founding of the Catholic Church by Jesus Christ as the guardian and herald of revealed truth.

The fourth chapter is of special importance in these modern times, pointing out as it does the connection between faith and reason. The mysteries of faith are indeed above reason, but not contrary to it. On the other hand, any assertion that contradicts the teaching of faith is by that very fact to be regarded as false. Faith and true learning are never in opposition to one another, but each supports the other in many ways. However, faith is not like a philosophical system subject to intrinsic development; it is a sacred deposit entrusted to the Church for safeguarding and infallible interpretation. Hence the interpretation of dogmas given by the Church holds good for all times, and no deviation from it under pretense of more profound investigation can ever be lawful.— The Constitution closes with eighteen canons, in which heresies opposed to its teaching are condemned.

The second Constitution has the following contents: In the preamble it is pointed out how the Roman Primacy, so essential to the unity, strength, and stability of the Church, has always been an object of fierce attacks by the enemies of the Church of Christ. It is for this reason that the doctrine of its origin, permanency, and nature must be clearly set forth. Hence the first chapter establishes the fact that the primacy was given to Peter, not merely of honor but of jurisdiction. This is followed by a canon, in which anathema is pronounced upon those who teach the contrary doctrine. The second chapter, pointing out that Peter established his see at Rome, declares that his successors in that see hold the primacy in virtue of its institution by Christ. To this, again, a canon is attached in which the contrary doctrine is condemned.

The third and fourth chapters deal more directly with the nature of the primacy, and the powers involved therein.

After restating and confirming the definition of the Council of Florence, the third chapter explains that the primacy of the Roman Pontiff implies not merely precedence of honor, but a regularly constituted authority over all other Churches, and a true, direct, episcopal power of jurisdiction, which the clergy and faithful of every rite and rank are bound to obey. However, the jurisdiction of the Pope does not interfere with the jurisdiction of individual bishops in their own dioceses, but rather strengthens and defends the same. In virtue of his primatial power, the Pope has the right of direct and free relations with the clergy and laity of the entire Church, and his decrees are in no wise subject to the *placet* of the secular power. The Pope is the supreme judge of all the faithful, and may be appealed to in all matters that come up for adjudication. And from his decisions there is no appeal, even to a general council. Then follows the condemnation of all contrary teaching, appended in form of a canon.

In the fourth chapter is contained the definition of papal infallibility. First the historical proofs of the doctrine are briefly summarized, both as derived from the Sixth, Fourteenth, and Seventeenth General Councils, and as contained in the undisputed use of the prerogative by the Roman Pontiffs, and the constant appeal made to them in matters of faith. Thereupon the definition is given in the following terms: "Faithfully adhering, therefore, to the tradition inherited from the beginning of the Christian faith, we, with the approbation of the sacred Council, for the glory of God our Saviour, for the exaltation of the Catholic religion, and the salvation of Christian peoples, teach and define, as a divinely revealed dogma, that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedra,* that is, when he, in the exercise of his office as shepherd and teacher of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority, decides that a doctrine concerning faith and morals is to be held by the entire Church, possesses, in consequence of the divine aid promised him in St. Peter, that infallibility with which the Divine Saviour wished to have His Church endowed for the definition of doctrines concerning faith and morals; and that such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are of them-

selves, and not in consequence of the Church's consent, irreformable." In the canon that follows, anathema is pronounced upon such as presume to contradict the definition thus given.[11]

Although the Council accomplished only part of the work it had set out to do, nevertheless in these two Constitutions most important results were achieved. This is especially true of the second, which finally settled a question that had from time to time disturbed men's minds for nearly four hundred years. After the definition of the Pope's primacy of jurisdiction and infallible teaching authority, as contained in the Constitution on the Church of Christ, anything like Gallicanism and Febronianism is simply impossible. Furthermore, a most effective means has thereby been provided to meet the peculiar difficulties of modern times, which often necessitate the intervention of a teaching authority whose supremacy is universally acknowledged as contained in the sacred deposit of faith. Hence, although a small minority of the assembled bishops regarded the definition of papal infallibility as inopportune, subsequent events have made it quite clear that nothing more opportune could have been attempted.

Much of the work that had been prepared for the Council, and which had to be left undone on account of the political disturbances that arose, was subsequently more or less fully accomplished by the prudent zeal of the Sovereign Pontiffs. The great encyclicals of Leo XIII and the many reform measures of Pius X may be regarded as carrying out what the Vatican Council had been expected to do. Hence, even if there should never be an opportunity of reassembling the Council, its object may still be fully attained with the passing of years. On the other hand, the evil results which some apprehended and predicted, by way of schism and increased hostility of the sects, proved to be negligible quantities. A few secessions from the Church there were, which gave rise to the Old Catholic party in Germany and Switzerland, but they were mostly of men whose Catholicity amounted to little

[11] Cfr. DB. 1781–1840.

more than the name. Nor did the increased hostility of Protestants interfere seriously with the various activities of the Church. For some years Catholicity was fiercely assailed from the pulpit, on the platform, and in the press; but most of that hostility has disappeared with the passing of time.

C — Modernism [12]

Pius X, in his Encyclical *Pascendi,* of September 8, 1907, designates Modernism as a synthesis of all heresies. And this designation is perfectly just, in as much as the tendencies usually indicated by the term are subversive of the very foundation upon which Christianity is built. Hence Loisv, its high priest and apostle, states quite frankly: "All Catholic theology, even in its fundamental principles, the general philosophy of religion, divine law, and the laws that govern our knowledge of God, come up for judgment before this new court of assize." [13] As an intellectual tendency, Modernism is traceable to the agnostic philosophy of the eighteenth century, first manifesting itself in a false liberalism, then in crude rationalism, and finally in theological anarchism. This last phase became prominent at the beginning of the present century.

As a theological movement, Modernism made its first inroads into France and Italy. In the latter country it spread so rapidly that as early as 1905 it was recognized as an imminent danger to religion. Hence several bishops uttered grave warnings against it in their pastoral letters. About the same time it attracted attention in France, where Abbé Loisy, for many years professor at the Catholic Institute of Paris, had done much to inoculate the younger generations of the clergy with its virus. It had also distinguished representatives in other countries, but in none of them did it find so many and such devoted followers as in Italy and France.

The first thorough synthesis of Modernism was given in

[12] Cfr. Pesch, Theologische Zeitfragen, 4th series; Rickaby, The Modernist; Vermeersch, De Modernismo; Heiner, Der neue Syllabus Pius X.

[13] Simples réflexions, p. 24.

the Encyclical *Pascendi,* and although some Modernistic writers found in it matter for criticism, it was generally admitted that the statements contained in that papal document were substantially correct. The doctrinal decisions touching the tenets of Modernism had already appeared in the Decree *Lamentabili sane exitu,* which was issued by the Holy Office on July 3, 1907. This Decree was ratified by Pius X on the following day, and ordered to be published. On November 18, of the same year, the Pope published a *Motu Proprio,* in which he prohibited the defense of the condemned propositions under the penalty of excommunication, reserved to himself.

The Decree *Lamentabili* is usually called the Syllabus of Pius X, on account of its similarity to the Syllabus of Pius IX, issued in 1864. Its contents are mainly taken from the writings of Loisy, and the condemned propositions are substantially as follows.[14]

(a) The Church's interpretation of Holy Scripture, and also her dogmatic decisions, are subject to the judgment of scientific scrutiny and do not demand interior assent; nor has the law of the Index any binding force (1–8).

(b) " Excessive simplicity or ignorance is shown by those who believe that God is really the author of Holy Scripture " (9).

(c) Taking the term in the Catholic sense, God neither inspired the sacred writers nor guarded them from all error; the Gospels in particular are not books worthy of historic belief, as their authors have consciously, though piously, falsified facts (10–19).

(d) Revelation is nothing else than the consciousness acquired by man of his relation to God, and did not close with the Apostles (20, 21).

(e) " The dogmas, which the Church proposes as revealed, are not truths fallen from heaven, but an interpretation of religious facts, acquired by the human mind through the laborious process of thought " (22).

(f) One and the same fact can be historically false and

[14] Cfr. DB. 2001–2065.

dogmatically true; faith is based upon a number of probabilities; dogmatic definitions have only a passing practical value; they are not norms of belief but of conduct (23–26).

(g) The divinity of Christ is a dogma which Christian consciousness deduced from its idea of the Messiah; the real historical Christ is inferior to the Christ idealized by faith; Christ's knowledge was circumscribed, and He even fell into error; His resurrection is not an historical event; his vicarious death is a Pauline invention (27–38).

(h) The sacraments were not instituted by Christ, but they originated with the Apostles and their successors, who, influenced by the circumstances of their time, interpreted Christ's mind in that sense (39–51).

(i) The thought of founding a Church was never entertained by Christ; the Church is a purely human society, subject to all the changes of time; Peter was unaware of any primatial rights vested in himself; the Church is inimical to scientific progress (52–57).

(k) "Truth is as changeable as man himself, because it is evolved with him, in him, and by him" (58).

(l) There are no immutable Christian dogmas, because they have developed and must develop with the progress of the centuries (59–63).

(m) "Scientific progress demands a reform of the Christian dogmatic conception of God, creation, revelation, the person of the Word Incarnate, and the redemption" (64).

(n) "The Catholicism of to-day is irreconcilable with genuine scientific knowledge, unless it be transformed into a Christianity without dogmas, that is, into a broad and liberal Protestantism" (65).

The sixty-five propositions of the Syllabus, summing up the teaching of Modernism, are all condemned, but without a definite censure attached to each. That many of them are openly heretical is admitted by all theologians, while with regard to some others the matter is not clear. Nor have theologians thus far been able to pronounce definitely what precise dogmatic value should be attached to the Syllabus. Not a few contend that the Decree of the Holy Office is infallible and

irreformable on account of its confirmation by the Pope, as the sanction of excommunication seems to evidence; others, however, maintain that this inference is not valid, since, in spite of the papal confirmation and sanction, it remains simply the doctrinal decision of a Roman Congregation, and as such it need not be absolutely immune from error. But all are agreed that it binds in conscience, and that no Catholic is at liberty to defend any of the condemned propositions.

It may be added that this authoritative condemnation sounded the death-knell of Modernism within the ranks of Catholics. Those who had been deceived by the specious arguments advanced by the propagators of the system, without being aware of its real nature, turned away from it in horror; while others, who had suffered shipwreck in their faith, severed their connection with the Church. Furthermore, as all candidates for higher orders, newly appointed confessors, preachers, parish priests, canons, the beneficed clergy, the officials of the Roman congregations or tribunals, superiors and professors in religious institutions, are obliged to take an oath which binds them to reject and oppose Modernism, a remedy has been applied to the evil that appears to make its revival impossible.

CONCLUSION

By the end of the ninth century, as was stated at the close of the first volume of the present work, the Church's teaching on God, the Trinity, the Incarnation, original sin, grace, some of the sacraments, the veneration of saints, and eschatology, was more or less fully developed. Yet that there was still room for further development, and partly even with regard to these doctrines, is sufficiently clear from the contents of this second volume. The following points may be noted by way of general summary.

In reference to God, the Fourth Lateran Council found it expedient to bring out more definitely the Church's teaching on the divine attributes, and also on the mystery of the Blessed Trinity — the unity of the divine nature, the distinction of persons, and the principles of the immanent processions in the Godhead.

The same Council defined that the three divine persons act as one principle in their operations *ad extra,* and that there is only one Creator, from whom all finite beings, material, spiritual, and composite, have their origin. This had been the common belief of Christians from primitive times, but it had never been defined by the Church. The same doctrine was restated by the Vatican Council, which also defined that God created the world freely and for His own greater glory.

No particular aspect of either Christology or soteriology was made the object of a special definition; yet there was progress along both lines of theological inquiry, occasioned chiefly by the aberrations of Abelard and the sixteenth-century innovators. The condemnation of Christological Nihilism by Alexander III directed the attention of theologians to the real nature of the hypostatic union; while the Church's opposition

to Protestantism, Baianism, and Jansenism brought out more clearly the meaning and extent of the redemption.

Man's primitive state, his fall, the existence and transmission of original sin, and to some extent its nature also, were discussed and defined by the Council of Trent. In connection with these truths, the same Council defined the nature of justification, man's freedom under the action of grace, the necessity of grace for salutary works, and the uncertainty of final perseverance. These definitions were restated and in some measure amplified by the papal decisions against Baius and Jansenius.

The most striking development took place in the doctrine on the sacraments, which was almost entirely due to the work of the thirteenth-century Scholastics. Nearly all of their conclusions were sustained by the Council of Trent, which also defined the number of the sacraments, their institution by Christ, their objective connection with grace, certain conditions for their valid administration, and the existence of a sacramental character. The same Council also restated previous definitions regarding the Real Presence and the nature of the Holy Sacrifice.

In the teaching on the Church it was particularly the authoritative position of the Roman Pontiff that was brought out more clearly with the lapse of time. His universal jurisdiction was definitely stated by the Second Council of Lyons, reaffirmed by that of Florence, and, together with his official infallibility, formally defined by the Council of the Vatican. In this latter Council the visibility of the Church, her position in the economy of salvation, and the four notes by which she may be recognized as the Church of Christ, were also set forth and affirmed.

The teaching of the Church on indulgences came into prominence only since the beginning of the tenth century, and then developed steadily till it was defined by the Council of Trent. On the other hand, the Council's definition of the doctrine on purgatory was merely a restatement of what had been for centuries a matter of faith. The same is true of its teaching on the veneration of saints and of images. Mariology was con-

siderably developed during the Middle Ages, but, aside from the Immaculate Conception, no point of doctrine in regard to Mary's prerogatives has been defined since the Council of Ephesus.

Eschatology did not advance beyond the development it had received by the end of the Patristic age, although the Fourth Lateran found it necessary to define Catholic teaching on the resurrection and eternal retribution. The nature of the beatific vision was definitely stated by Benedict XII in the Constitution *Benedictus Dei,* in which he also defined the Church's teaching on the resurrection, the general judgment, and the immediate bestowal of reward or infliction of punishment according to each one's deserts.

The sources of faith, Holy Scripture and tradition, were made the object of a formal definition by the Council of Trent, and the same definition was restated by the Council of the Vatican. The same two Councils reaffirmed the traditional teaching on the canon of Holy Scripture, declared the Church to be the sole authorized interpreter of the Sacred Writings, and explained the meaning of inspiration in the sense that God Himself is to be accepted as the author of the Bible. Finally, as the truths of both reason and revelation have their source in the same God, the Vatican Council declared that there can be no real opposition between natural and supernatural truths.

Thus, as there had been considerable development of doctrine in the Patristic age, so was there in later centuries; and so will there be in the centuries to come. Very much is still to be accomplished — especially in the teaching on God's knowledge, on predestination, on the nature of grace, on the causality of the sacraments, and on many other subjects — before dogmatic development is complete. But in the very nature of things, complete dogmatic development is not to be looked for here on earth, where we see only "through a glass in a dark manner." That perfection of knowledge shall not be ours until we see "face to face," and "know even as we are known"; and then faith will have merged into vision.

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